ICJ advisory proceedings – Relevant jurisprudence

This is a compilation of excerpts from ICJ advisory opinions clarifying the Court's position on key aspects of its jurisdiction, especially as regards the nature of the legal questions put to it. For all useful purposes, all the questions submitted to the ICJ under its advisory jurisdiction to date are reproduced in the Annex.

• Jurisdiction and discretion

“When seised of a request for an advisory opinion, the Court must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any reason why the Court, in its discretion, should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction in the case before it.” (Kosovo, para 17)

“The Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested. But even if the question is a legal one, which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so.” (Certain expenses, p 155)

• Legal question arising within Organization's scope of competence

“It is also for the Court to satisfy itself that the question on which it is requested to give its opinion is a “legal question” [...] questions “framed in terms of law and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law.” (Kosovo, para 25)

“But a rule of international law, whether customary or conventional, does not operate in a vacuum; it operates in relation to facts and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules of which it forms only a part. Accordingly, if a question put in the hypothetical way in which it is posed in the request is to receive a pertinent and effectual reply, the Court must first ascertain the meaning and full implications of the question in the light of the actual framework of fact and law in which it falls for consideration. Otherwise, its reply to the question may be incomplete and, in consequence, ineffectual and even misleading. [...] Accordingly, it is apparent that [...] the true legal question under consideration in the World Health Assembly is: What are the legal principles and rules applicable to the question under what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Regional Office from Egypt may be effected? This, in the Court’s opinion, must also be considered to be the legal question submitted to it by the request. The Court points out that, if it is to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, it must ascertain what are the legal questions really in issue in questions formulated in a request.” (WHO-Egypt, paras 10, 35)

“But to determine the meaning of a treaty provision... is a problem of interpretation and consequently a legal question. [...] Article 96 [...] requires that the legal questions [...] shall arise "within the scope of their activities". [...] The Court finds that the legal questions submitted by the
Council in its request concern the activities of the Commission, since they relate to the mandate of its Special Rapporteur. [...] Mr. Cumaraswamy's activities as Rapporteur and the legal questions arising therefrom are pertinent to the functioning of the Commission; accordingly they come within the scope of activities of the Council, since the Commission is one of its subsidiary organs.” (Immunity from legal process, paras 26-27)

- **On unclear, vague or abstract questions**

“The Court would point out that lack of clarity in the drafting of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather, such uncertainty will require clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of interpretation have frequently been given by the Court. In the past, both the Permanent Court and the present Court have observed in some cases that the wording of a request for an advisory opinion did not accurately state the question on which the Court's opinion was being sought, or did not correspond to the “true legal question” under consideration. The Court noted in one case that "the question put to the Court is, on the face of it, at once infelicitously expressed and vague". Consequently, the Court has often been required to broaden, interpret and even reformulate the questions put. [...] The Court does not consider that what is contended to be the abstract nature of the question posed to it raises an issue of jurisdiction. Even when the matter was raised as an issue of propriety rather than one of jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court took the position that to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is "a mere affirmation devoid of any justification" and that "the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise". (Wall, paras 38-40)

The Court recalls that it may depart from the language of the question put to it where the question is not adequately formulated or does not reflect the “legal questions really in issue”. Similarly, where the question asked is ambiguous or vague, the Court may clarify it before giving its opinion. Although, in exceptional circumstances, the Court may reformulate the questions referred to it for an advisory opinion, it only does so to ensure that it gives a reply “based on law.” (Chagos, para 135)

- **On complex issues**

“It has been argued by some participants that the questions raise complex and disputed factual issues which are not suitable for determination in advisory proceedings. [...] The Court recalls that in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara when it was faced with the same argument, it concluded that what was decisive was whether it had “sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its judicial character”.

The Court observes that an abundance of material has been presented before it including a voluminous dossier from the United Nations. Moreover, many participants have submitted written statements and written comments and made oral statements which contain information relevant to answering the questions. [...] The Court is therefore satisfied that there is in the present proceedings sufficient information on the facts before it for the Court to give the
requested opinion. Accordingly, the Court cannot decline to answer the questions put to it.” (Chagos, paras 69-74)

- **On 'political' questions or motives**

“[T]he Court considers that the fact that a legal question also has political aspects,

"as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ‘legal question’ and to ‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’. Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them by international law.

In its Opinion concerning the *Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt*, the Court indeed emphasized that, “in situations in which political considerations are prominent it may be particularly necessary for an international organization to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legal principles applicable with respect to the matter under debate .... Moreover, the Court has affirmed in its Opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* that “the political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an opinion”. (Wall, para 41)

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“[T]he Court has repeatedly stated that the fact that a question has political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a legal question. Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to respond to the legal elements of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, in the present case, an assessment of an act by reference to international law. The Court has also made clear that, in determining the jurisdictional issue of whether it is confronted with a legal question, it is not concerned with the political nature of the motives which may have inspired the request or the political implications which its opinion might have.” (Kosovo, para 27)

- **Decline to give an advisory opinion for compelling reasons**

“[T]he Court has a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met. The Court however is mindful of the fact that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion “represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused”. Given its responsibilities as the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 92 of the Charter), the Court should in principle not decline to give an advisory opinion. In accordance with its consistent jurisprudence, only "compelling reasons" should lead the Court to refuse its opinion. [...] The present Court has never, in the exercise of this discretionary power, declined to respond to a request for an advisory opinion. Its decision not to give the advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* requested by the World Health Organization was based on the Court's lack of jurisdiction, and not on considerations of judicial propriety.” (Wall, para 44)
“The Court is, nevertheless, mindful of the fact that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion “represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused”. [...] Thus, the consistent jurisprudence of the Court is that only “compelling reasons” may lead the Court to refuse its opinion in response to a request falling within its jurisdiction.” (Chagos, para 65)

- **Usefulness of advisory opinion**

“As is clear from the Court's jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for them in their action. [...] It follows that the Court cannot decline to answer the question posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose. The Court cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion, namely the General Assembly.” (Wall, paras 60, 62)

- **Impact of advisory opinion**

“It has been argued by some participants that the advisory opinion requested would not assist the General Assembly in the proper exercise of its functions. [...] The Court considers that it is not for the Court itself to determine the usefulness of its response to the requesting organ. Rather, it should be left to the requesting organ, the General Assembly, to determine “whether it needs the opinion for the proper performance of its functions”. [...] In the Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court stated that it “cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion”. The Court recalls that “[i]n any event, to what extent or degree its opinion will have an impact on the action of the General Assembly is not for the Court to decide.” (Chagos, paras 75-77)
“When the Court states the law in the exercise of its advisory function, it lends its assistance to the General Assembly in the solution of a problem confronting it. In giving its advisory opinion, the Court is not interfering with the exercise of the General Assembly’s own functions.” (Chagos, para 137)
Questions referred to the ICJ for advisory opinions (1948-2023)

**Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), 1948**

"Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph I of the said Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State?"

**Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949**

"I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitled through him?"

II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United Nations to be reconciled with such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a national?"

**Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950**

"I. Do the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the one hand and certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the Treaties of Peace on the other, concerning the implementation of Article 2 of the Treaties with Bulgaria and Hungary and Article 3 of the Treaty with Romania, disclose disputes subject to the provisions for the settlement of disputes contained in Article 36 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, and Article 38 of the Treaty of Peace with Romania?"

In the event of an affirmative reply to question I:

"II. Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania obligated to carry out the provisions of the articles referred to in question I, including the provisions for the appointment of their representatives to the Treaty Commissions?"

In the event of an affirmative reply to question II and if within thirty days from the date when the Court delivers its opinion, the Governments concerned have not notified the Secretary-General that they have appointed their representatives to the Treaty Commissions, and the Secretary-General has so advised the International Court of Justice:

"III. If one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty Commission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a representative to the Treaty Commission, is the Secretary-General of the United..."
Nations authorized to appoint the third member of the Commission upon the request of the other party to a dispute according to the provisions of the respective Treaties?"

In the event of an affirmative reply to question III:

"IV. Would a Treaty Commission composed of a representative of one party and a third member appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations constitute a Commission, within the meaning of the relevant Treaty articles, competent to make a definitive and binding decision in settlement of a dispute?"

**International Status of South-West Africa, 1950**

"What is the international status of the Territory of South-West Africa and what are the international obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom, in particular:

(a) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under the Mandate for South-West Africa and, if so, what are those obligations?

(b) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applicable and, if so, in what manner, to the Territory of South-West Africa?

(c) Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South-West Africa, or, in the event of a negative reply, where does competence rest to determine and modify the international status of the Territory?"

**Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950**

"Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend?"

**Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951**

"In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention subject to a reservation made either on ratification or on accession, or on signature followed by ratification:

I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?

II. If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and:

(a) The parties which object to the reservation?

(b) Those which accept it?
III. What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to Question 1 if an objection to a reservation is made:

(a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified?

(b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?"

**Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954**

“(1) Having regard to the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and of any other relevant instruments and to the relevant records, has the General Assembly the right on any grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by that Tribunal in favour of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of service has been terminated without his assent?

(2) If the answer given by the Court to question (1) is in the affirmative, what are the principal grounds upon which the General Assembly could lawfully exercise such a right?”

**Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, 1955**

“(a) Is the following rule on the voting procedure to be followed by the General Assembly a correct interpretation of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950:

"Decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa shall be regarded as important questions within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations."

(b) If this interpretation of the Advisory Opinion of the Court is not correct, what voting procedure should be followed by the General Assembly in taking decisions on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa?"

**Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against UNESCO, 1956**

“Having regard to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation;

Having regard to the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and to any other relevant texts;

Having regard to the contracts of appointment of Messrs. Duberg and Leff and Mrs. Wilcox and Mrs. Bernstein:

I. Was the Administrative Tribunal competent, under Article II of its Statute, to hear the complaints introduced against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on 5 February 1955 by Messrs. Duberg and Leff and Mrs. Wilcox, and on 28 June 1955 by Mrs. Bernstein?

II. In the case of an affirmative answer to question I:
(a) Was the Administrative Tribunal competent to determine whether the power of the Director-General not to renew fixed-term appointments has been exercised for the good of the service and in the interest of the Organization?

(b) Was the Administrative Tribunal competent to pronounce on the attitude which the Director-General, under the terms of the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, ought to maintain in his relations with a Member State, particularly as regards the execution of the policy of the Government authorities of that Member State?

III. In any case, what is the validity of the decisions given by the Administrative Tribunal in its Judgments Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 21?

**Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956**

"Is it consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 for the Committee on South West Africa, established by General Assembly resolution 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the Territory of South West Africa?"

**Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960**

"Is the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted in accordance with the Convention for the Establishment of the Organization?"

**Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962**


**Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971**

"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970):"

“1. Has the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it as contended in the applicant's application to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements (A/AC.86/R.59)?

2. Has the Tribunal committed a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a failure of justice as contended in the applicant's application to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements (A/AC.86/R.59)?”

Western Sahara, 1975

"I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative,

II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?"

Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980

“1. Are the negotiation and notice provisions of Section 37 of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World Health Organization and Egypt applicable in the event that either party to the Agreement wishes to have the Regional Office transferred from the territory of Egypt?

2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both the World Health Organization and Egypt, with regard to the Regional Office in Alexandria, during the two-year period between notice and termination of the Agreement?”


“Is the judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General, warranted in determining that General Assembly resolution 34/165 of 17 December 1979 could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country other than the country of the staff member's last duty station?”


“(1) In its Judgement No. 333 of 8 June 1984 (AT/DEC/333), did the United Nations Administrative Tribunal fail to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by not responding to the question whether a legal impediment existed to the further employment in the United Nations of the Applicant after the expiry of his contract on 26 December 1983?

(2) Did the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, in the same Judgement No. 333, err on questions of law relating to provisions of the Charter of the United Nations?”

Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988

“In the light of facts reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General [A/42/915 and Add.1], is the United States of America, as a party to the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations [see
resolution 169 (II)], under an obligation to enter into arbitration in accordance with section 21 of the Agreement?"

**Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1989**

“The Economic and Social Council, […]

1. **Concludes** that a difference has arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Romania as to the applicability of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to Mr. Dumitru Mazilu as Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities;

2. **Requests**, on a priority basis, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 89 (I) of 11 December 1946, an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in the case of Mr. Dumitru Mazilu as Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission.”

**Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996**

“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

**Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996**

“In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?”

**Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999**

“The Economic and Social Council, […]

1. **Requests** on a priority basis, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 89 (I), an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in the case of Dato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General, and on the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case;”

**Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004**

“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”
**Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo**, 2010

“Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

**Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International Fund for Agricultural Development**, 2012

“Was the ILOAT competent, under Article II of its Statute, to hear the complaint introduced against the International Fund for Agricultural Development (hereby the Fund) on 8 July 2008 by Ms A.T.S.G., an individual who was a member of the staff of the Global Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (hereby the Convention) for which the Fund acts merely as housing organization?”

**Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965**, 2019

“(a) Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?

(b) What are the consequences under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?”

**Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change**, pending

“Having particular regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of prevention of significant harm to the environment and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,

(a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations?

(b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:

(i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or
specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?

(ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?”

**Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, pending**

“considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and the advisory opinion of the Court of 9 July 2004:

(a) What are the legal consequences arising from the ongoing violation by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, from its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and from its adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures?

(b) How do the policies and practices of Israel referred to in paragraph 18 (a) above affect the legal status of the occupation, and what are the legal consequences that arise for all States and the United Nations from this status?”

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