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Report of the Director-General

Third Supplementary Report: Report on the application of the resolution concerning the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization

▶ Introduction

1. At its 344th Session (March 2022), the Governing Body adopted a resolution on the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization (ILO).¹ The resolution requested the ILO to provide all possible assistance to tripartite constituents in Ukraine. It also requested the Office to work with constituents in developing programmes in support of those who fled Ukraine. Further, the resolution decided to temporarily suspend ILO technical cooperation assistance to the Russian Federation except for humanitarian assistance and to suspend invitations to the Russian Federation to discretionary meetings of experts, conferences and seminars, whose composition is set by the Governing Body. It also asked the Office to explore options to safeguard technical cooperation or assistance to all other countries in the region, including the possible relocation of the ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (DWT/CO-Moscow) to an area outside of the Russian Federation. It further requested the Director-General to follow the situation in Ukraine and

¹ GB.344/Resolution.

submit a report on its application for the consideration of the 345th Session (June 2022) of the Governing Body. This document responds to the terms of the Governing Body resolution, providing an overview of developments and their impact on the world of work in Ukraine, in neighbouring countries and globally. It highlights actions taken or options being considered by the Office to give effect to the resolution.

► General developments

2. After initially recognizing the independence of two eastern regions of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk) on 21 February 2022, the Russian Federation started an aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, including through Belarus in the north. Significant attacks were launched on various parts of the country, including against the capital, Kyiv. From the beginning, the Russian Federation has been accused by the Ukrainian Government and other governments of targeting and shelling civilian areas and destroying the country's physical infrastructure, including its industrial assets. The Russian armed forces have also been accused by the Ukrainian Government of atrocities against civilians in the cities of Bucha and Mariupol.²
3. On 2 March 2022, the United Nations General Assembly, in an emergency special session, adopted a resolution demanding that the Russian Federation "immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders". The resolution was sponsored by 96 countries, and passed with 141 voting in favour, 5 against and 35 others abstaining.³ On 24 March 2022, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression with 140 voting in favour, 5 against and 38 others abstaining. The resolution demands civilian protection and humanitarian access in Ukraine while recognizing the Russian Federation's responsibility.⁴ On 7 April 2022, following reports of violations committed by Russian armed forces in Ukraine, the General Assembly adopted a third resolution calling for the Russian Federation to be suspended from the United Nations Human Rights Council. The resolution was adopted by 93 countries voting in favour, 24 countries voting against and 58 others abstaining. After the adoption of the resolution, the Russian Federation announced that it had already decided to leave the Council before the end of its term.⁵
4. On 27 April 2022, the first extraordinary meeting of the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) General Assembly debated the suspension of the Russian Federation from the Organization as requested by the UNWTO Executive Council. The Russian delegation announced its withdrawal from the UNWTO before the debate took place. The UNWTO General Assembly voted in favour of suspension with the two-third majority required. On 10 May 2022, members of the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Committee for Europe adopted a

² Since 24 February, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has been documenting violations of international humanitarian law and violations of the human rights law which have been occurring in the country. Many of these allegations concern violations that may amount to war crimes. See the latest [statement delivered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Arria Formula Meeting](#), 27 April 2022 and the [High Commissioner's Statement to the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on Ukraine](#), 12 May 2022.

³ UN "General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federation Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops" press release, 2 March 2022 and [Resolution A/ES-11/L.1](#).

⁴ UN "General Assembly Adopts Text Recognizing Scale of Humanitarian Woes Arising from Russian Federation's Ukraine Offensive as Unseen in Many Decades" press release, 24 March 2022 and [Resolution A/ES-11/L.2](#).

⁵ UN "General Assembly Adopts Text to Suspend Russian Federation from Human Rights Council, Continuing Emergency Special Session on Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine" press release, 7 April 2022 and [Resolution A/ES-11/L.4](#).

resolution to explore options to safeguard the technical cooperation and assistance provided by the Moscow-based WHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, including the possible relocation of the aforementioned office to an area outside the Russian Federation. The resolution also called for consideration of the temporary suspension of all WHO regional meetings in the Russian Federation. ⁶ The Regional Committee asked that the resolution be brought to the attention of the World Health Assembly in May 2022.

5. Ukraine has applied for membership of the European Union (EU). Negotiations are expected to start later in 2022 through an accelerated accession procedure. On 4 March 2022, the European Council's Temporary Protection Directive ⁷ was activated for the first time ever. It grants temporary protection – for a minimum of one year – to Ukrainian nationals, and non-EU citizens who had been permanently residing in Ukraine and who fled the country after 24 February 2022. This Directive includes the right of immediate access to the EU's labour market, education systems, health services and social care.

▶ Global impact of the crisis

6. The UN Secretary-General has underlined on various occasions that, while most attention is focused on the effects of the hostilities on Ukrainians and on neighbouring countries, the crisis is also having a global impact, in a world that was already witnessing rising poverty, hunger and social tensions. ⁸ The crisis has created a new shock to the global economy through several transmission channels. Commodity prices have risen rapidly, especially food ⁹ and fuel, while supply chains are experiencing increasing disruptions. The impact on global food prices reflects the important role of the Russian Federation and Ukraine as producers and exporters of key agricultural commodities especially in the cereal sector. Some countries face not only higher prices, but also real shortages, particularly in grain, as they are heavily import-reliant on Russian and Ukrainian production. Disruption of energy supplies has led to high volatility in gas and oil markets and impacted consideration of alternative energy sources and energy transition.
7. The inflation spike, combined with the continuing disruptions in global supply chains is likely to diminish employment growth and real wages while creating additional pressures on social protection systems. This situation is expected to have a direct negative impact in most labour markets but would be particularly hard in low- and middle-income countries, many of which have been unable so far to fully recover from the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The economic and labour market impact within low- and middle-income countries will be uneven, depending on whether countries are commodity exporters or importers. At the same time, heightened uncertainty and monetary policy tightening in advanced economies can negatively impact financial flows to developing countries, which are already reeling from high levels of debt and

⁶ WHO, "Special Session of the WHO Regional Committee for Europe: Summary and Outcome", 10 May 2022.

⁷ EU, Council Directive 2001/55/EC.

⁸ UN Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance, "Global Impact of War in Ukraine on Food, Energy and Finance Systems" Brief No. 1, 13 April 2022.

⁹ The UN Security Council held a ministerial meeting on the impact of conflicts on global food security. See the [summary of the session](#), 19 May 2022.

limited fiscal space. A significant number of countries face heightened levels of debt distress with important implications for the sustainability of their financial situation.

► Impact on jobs, livelihoods, and enterprises in Ukraine

8. The Russian aggression against Ukraine has resulted in a devastating humanitarian crisis in the country, triggering the fastest forced population movement in Europe since World War II. Since 24 February 2022, there has been a cumulative estimated exodus of more than 6.444 million Ukrainian refugees¹⁰ primarily to neighbouring Poland, Romania, Republic of Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia.¹¹ As of 23 May, around 7.7 million people have been internally displaced.¹² Furthermore, some 208,000 non-EU nationals, including foreign migrant workers and students, have fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries.¹³
9. The Ukrainian economy has been severely impacted. There is massive damage to infrastructure and with the closure of a large number of businesses, economic activity has come to a standstill in many areas. Initial estimates suggest that up to 50 per cent of businesses have suspended their activities,¹⁴ while at least US\$100 billion worth of infrastructure, buildings, roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, and other physical assets have been damaged or destroyed in the first month.¹⁵ In addition, the closure of Black Sea shipping routes from Ukraine has cut off some 90 per cent of the country's grain exports and half of its total exports.
10. As a result, Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to suffer a very significant decline in 2022, with current estimates varying widely, from 35 per cent¹⁶ to 45 per cent,¹⁷ subject to different scenarios for the evolution of hostilities. This reflects major declines in imports and exports, a significant decrease in public and private investments and in household spending, the large-scale displacement of people, and loss of employment and livelihoods. In the event of a continuing, widening and protracted crisis, it is projected that 90 per cent of the population could be facing poverty or vulnerability to poverty, representing a loss of 18 years of socio-economic achievements in Ukraine and a return to poverty levels last observed in 2004.¹⁸
11. Estimating the precise magnitude of employment losses resulting from these developments is complicated by limited data availability and the highly uncertain and rapidly evolving circumstances affecting Ukraine. However, on the basis of existing data and previous

¹⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), [Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation](#) (accessed on 23 May 2022).

¹¹ UNHCR, The data of arrivals in Schengen countries (Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) bordering Ukraine therefore only represents border crossings into the first country of arrival, but UNHCR estimates that a large number of people have moved onwards to other countries.

¹² UNHCR, 23 May 2022.

¹³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), [“Humanitarian Impact Situation Report and Flash Appeal”](#), 6 April 2022.

¹⁴ OCHA, [“The Development Impact of the War in Ukraine: Initial Projections”](#), 16 March 2022.

¹⁵ Government of Ukraine estimate, quoted in: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [“The Development Impact of the War in Ukraine. Initial Projections”](#).

¹⁶ International Monetary Fund, [“War in Ukraine is Serious Setback to Europe's Economic Recovery”](#), 22 April 2022.

¹⁷ World Bank, [“War in the Region”](#), 2022.

¹⁸ UNDP's response. [“War In Ukraine”](#).

experience of the impact of military conflict on employment, the ILO estimates that around 30 per cent of employment has been lost compared to the pre-war situation.¹⁹ This is equivalent to 4.8 million jobs lost.²⁰ If hostilities ceased immediately, the recovery in employment could be rapid, with as many as 3.6 million jobs returning, reducing the overall employment losses to 7.7 per cent. In contrast, in a scenario of further military escalation, employment losses would increase further to reach 7 million, or 43.5 per cent.

12. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, it is clear that the crisis is generating labour market challenges which could have major long-term consequences. For example, in the current refugee flows, high-skilled women in particular are leaving the country. The refugee population comprises primarily women, children, and persons over the age of 60. The ILO estimates that 2.75 million refugees are of working age. Of these, 43.5 per cent, or 1.2 million were working prior to the onset of the hostilities and left or lost their jobs subsequently. More than 87 per cent of these previously employed refugees were working in full-time jobs. The great majority (88 per cent) were employees, and the remaining 12 per cent were self-employed. Two thirds have tertiary education. Nearly half (49 per cent) were employed in high-skilled occupations; only 15 per cent were in low-skilled occupations. In the case of a protracted conflict, that might imply a permanent loss of some of the most skilled workers in the economy but could increase the inflow of remittances. The destruction of infrastructure, enterprises and productive capital is also likely to increase informal employment, with possible implications for the protection of workers' rights and conditions at work.

► Impact on ILO constituents in Ukraine

A. Ukrainian Government

13. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Social Policy, which are the main ILO contacts in the Ukrainian Government, remain operational. Governmental efforts aimed at digitalizing public services during the past two years have helped ensure continuity of services. Public institutions initiated large scale income support programmes for all workers and entrepreneurs who lost their jobs or had to stop their activities because of the hostilities. Pensions and other social benefits are regularly disbursed and have been adjusted to meet the most pressing needs. However, the longer-term provision of social protection will depend on financial support from the international community as domestic public resources are increasingly depleted.
14. The State Employment Service (SES)²¹ is a key partner of the ILO and has engaged in various initiatives on inclusive labour markets. It has reported severe material damage and casualties. Several of their offices in the east of Ukraine have been destroyed, and two staff killed. The key challenge for the SES is to reach out to internally displaced persons (IDPs). The SES has

¹⁹ ILO, *The Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on the World of Work: Initial Assessments*, brief, 11 May 2022.

²⁰ The estimate refers to the number of workers that lost their main job, hence it includes both full-time and part-time workers. Part-time work typically accounts for a small share of total employment, and hence it is also expected to account for a small share of the losses due to conflict. Labour force survey data from 2019 shows that 10 per cent of workers were employed on a part-time basis in Ukraine.

²¹ The SES and the State Labour Service (SLS) are national institutions operating under the Ministry of Economy.

requested ILO's technical support and assistance in registering IDPs and in providing services for those who are looking for employment.

15. Another key government partner of the ILO in Ukraine is the State Labour Service (SLS). Under martial law, the mandate of the labour inspection authority is limited. Nevertheless, the SLS supports enterprises that are relocating from the east to safer regions in the country and is engaged in a joint campaign with the ILO to prevent human trafficking of refugees and other vulnerable populations. Ukrainian technical and vocational education and training (TVET) institutions, also a critical ILO partner before the hostilities, have urgently requested support in advancing and implementing e-learning solutions.

B. Ukrainian trade unions

16. The trade unions in Ukraine are severely affected by the crisis, but their core structures remain largely intact. The Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU) and The Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (KVPU) remain operational and in close contact with their membership. A key concern for trade unions is the loss of membership and the resulting impact on the financial sustainability of their organizations. The FPU estimates that it lost 700,000 members in the first month of the war, which is almost 10 per cent of its total membership and represents a major loss of income.

C. Ukrainian employers' organizations

17. The situation of employers' organizations in Ukraine is similar. The three main organizations in the country, namely the Federation of Employers of Ukraine (FEU), the Confederation of Employers of Ukraine (CEU) and the Association of Employers' Organizations of Ukraine (AEOU), have been severely affected by the crisis. Many member enterprises are unable to pay their financial contributions and the organizations are increasingly facing liquidity problems. The current income loss ranges from 60 per cent (AEOU) to close to 100 per cent (FEU and CEU). The national employers' organizations estimate that about 50 per cent of Ukrainian enterprises have suspended their operations or are operating at reduced capacity. Despite these challenges, the employers' organizations continue to operate remotely and support their member enterprises in their efforts to respond to the crisis and protect their workers. The main challenge faced by the employers' organizations is to ensure their financial and operational sustainability in the forthcoming months. They have indicated that their future will become increasingly uncertain if the hostilities continue.

▶ Action on the implementation of the Decent Country Work Programme and development cooperation activities in Ukraine

18. The [Decent Work Country Programme \(DWCP\) Ukraine 2020–2024](#) was the main planning framework for the ILO's work in the country before the beginning of the hostilities. It defined the priorities for ILO support to constituents. The main areas of cooperation were: (i) employment (local job creation, reform of the public employment service, entrepreneurship training, modernization of TVET institutions); (ii) social dialogue and labour law (labour law reform, reviving the tripartite National Economic and Social Council, technical assistance to trade unions and employers' organizations); (iii) conditions of work (reform of the Labour Inspectorate including the alignment of occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation with

EU directives and International Labour Standards); (iv) wage policies (wage arrears, minimum wage fixing system, gender pay gap); and (v) social protection (pension reform).

19. The ILO funded the DWCP with US\$1 million from its regular budget and US\$13 million from voluntary contributions. Most of this work had to be put on hold. Constituents recently requested the ILO to reprogramme the DWCP to better reflect the new and most urgent needs of the country. Consultations on this reprogramming exercise have already started. In parallel, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Ukraine is developing an 18-month interim transitional framework in place of the finalization of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) that was under development prior to the start of hostilities. The ILO is fully engaged in the preparation of this UN transitional framework.
20. During the first weeks of the conflict, ILO work in Ukraine focused on humanitarian assistance, wherever it could complement the efforts of other UN agencies. The development partners, that were supporting ILO work in Ukraine ²² prior to the aggression, have agreed to repurpose a part, between 5 and 10 per cent, of the approved budgets to humanitarian aid and staff safety without any amendments to the relevant agreements. As a result, emergency repurposing for a total of US\$1.3 million has been completed and will be disbursed by the end of May 2022. This will support shelter for refugees (in partnership with OCHA), provide food and drinking water for people in locations under attack, and retrain labour inspectors to provide psychological aid to workers. In addition, an awareness-raising campaign on the risks of human trafficking and labour exploitation was started at the request of the Government and in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and local women-led non-governmental organizations.
21. Regarding further support, the ILO recently held a meeting with all funding partners supporting ILO work in Ukraine and suggested six main interventions, following prior consultations with Ukrainian constituents. The ILO's planned response encompasses humanitarian, early recovery, and developmental approaches. It will target Ukraine itself, as well as the Republic of Moldova which is facing major challenges as a host country for Ukrainian refugees. The plan covers the following areas:

(a) Continuation of humanitarian aid in areas where the ILO can provide value added

The main focus will be on providing shelter for refugees in vacation centres and sanatoria of trade unions in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Aid will be delivered within the framework of the UN humanitarian and refugee response architecture. It will also include initiatives aimed at: (i) preventing labour exploitation and human trafficking through training of labour market actors; (ii) raising the awareness of refugees on risks and their rights at work; and (iii) strengthening the enforcement of the labour law.

(b) Inclusion of refugees and IDPs in labour markets and education

The focus will be on: (i) facilitating the recognition of the educational credentials of refugees in EU Member States; (ii) assisting with the digital recognition of diplomas that have been lost or left behind; and (iii) mapping of existing solutions by EU employment services for Ukrainian refugees and supporting the adaptation of these solutions to the needs of employment services in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

²² These development partners are Canada, Czechia, Denmark, European Union, Germany and Sweden.

(c) Income support

The focus of this component will be on technical assistance regarding the coverage, adequacy, and targeting of income support, including for groups of the population that are not covered by social protection schemes, in particular informal sector workers. As part of the early-recovery strategy, cash-for-work programmes for the removal of debris or the provision of social services can be implemented in coordination with governmental institutions and humanitarian actors, building on ILO's expertise on employment-intensive infrastructure programmes in post-conflict settings.

(d) Economic stabilization measures in relatively safe regions of Ukraine

In locations where it is feasible, the ILO will focus on: (i) promoting sectoral approaches to private sector development, including the increase of local production of aid items, (ii) developing local employment partnerships, (iii) extending support for the relocation of businesses from conflict-affected areas to safe havens; and (iv) offering entrepreneurship training for IDPs.

(e) Support for priority reforms of the Ukrainian Government

The ILO will continue to support the Government on priority reforms in selected areas including labour law reforms, e-learning solutions and lifelong learning.

(f) Support to trade unions and employers' organizations

This component will focus on the improvement of crucial services for example supporting business relocation schemes, matching businesses with aid and reconstruction actors, designing job referrals schemes through trade unions and providing legal advisory services for workers.

22. Part of these planned activities can be covered by reprogramming the current voluntary contributions. In addition, the ILO estimates a total funding need of US\$6 million until the end of 2022, to deliver the above assistance in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.
23. The hostilities in Ukraine have seriously impacted the safety and welfare of seafarers. At least, two seafarers have died on board ships as a result of missile attacks, and around 500 from more than 20 countries face an increasingly untenable situation, presenting grave risks to their health and well-being. According to information recently released by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), efforts to establish a safe blue maritime corridor²³ have been severely hampered by the continuing security risks, which prevent ships from departing safely ports in Ukraine. From the start and following an urgent communication from the Maritime Workers' Trade Union of Ukraine, the Office, together with the IMO, has convened weekly meetings with the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and representatives of crew managers, and welfare and charity organizations to address the challenges faced by seafarers. Further support is requested to ensure the full implementation of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, as amended (MLC, 2006), particularly in relation to payment of wages, access to free communication, repatriation of seafarers, extension of contracts, and access to healthcare services. The ILO Director-General and the IMO Secretary-General reached out to a number of humanitarian

²³ The IMO has called an Extraordinary Council Session which discussed the impacts on shipping and seafarers of the situation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov on 10 and 11 March. The IMO council adopted a [detailed decision](#), among which the establishment of a blue corridor which is a protected zone to allow the safe evacuation of seafarers and ships from high risk areas in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United National High Commissioner for Refugees, requesting urgent action, wherever possible, to assist with the delivery of the vital supplies needed by seafarers.²⁴

► Impact on other countries in the subregion

24. The ILO continues to safeguard technical cooperation or assistance to the nine Member States other than the Russian Federation covered by DWT/CO-Moscow.²⁵ Currently, there are active DWCPs in Armenia (2019–23),²⁶ Tajikistan (2020–24)²⁷ and Uzbekistan (2021–25),²⁸ the latter fully aligned with the recently adopted UNSDCF. Assistance provided to Belarus is limited to the measures taken to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry.²⁹ In that regard, the Director-General made a [statement on 21 April 2022](#) expressing deep concern over the arrest and detention of trade unionists in Belarus and calling for a halt to the intimidation of those peacefully exercising their freedom of association rights in the country.
25. Among the probable severe adverse effects of the crisis on labour markets in these countries are growing unemployment, informality and working poverty, and shrinking labour force participation of women and youth. Of particular concern is the situation of migrants from Central Asia working in the Russian Federation. The major economic and employment disruptions in the Russian Federation following its aggression against Ukraine are having significant ripple effects on Central Asia, especially in countries whose economies depend heavily on migrant workers' remittances. A weakening of economic activity in the Russian Federation is dampening the employment prospects and incomes of migrant workers from Central Asia and their ability to send remittances. Returning migrant workers would also put additional pressure on their home-country labour markets and social protection systems, which could result in severe economic consequences for Central Asia as a whole.
26. Technical assistance and advisory services to constituents in the above countries are focused primarily on employment and social protection issues. Special attention in programming and reprogramming activities across the subregion will also be given to the capacities and resilience of workers' and employers' organizations to engage actively in policy development, to support and protect their members, and to play their full role in defining national priorities and crisis mitigation measures.
27. The ILO has been implementing a public–private partnership development cooperation project funded by Lukoil and entitled "[Partnerships for Youth Employment in the Commonwealth of Independent States](#)" that requires refinancing and reprogramming in view of the suspension of technical assistance activities to the Russian Federation and because of its funding sources. The project covers activities in the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan and has some subregional work items, including training activities carried out by the International Training Centre of the ILO (Turin Centre). The project runs until the end of 2023

²⁴ ILO, "[ILO and IMO call for Urgent Action on Seafarers Stranded in Ukraine Following Russian Aggression](#)", 8 April 2022.

²⁵ These are: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

²⁶ ILO, "[ILO, Armenia Sign New Decent Work Country Programme](#)", 14 May 2019.

²⁷ ILO, "[ILO and Republic of Tajikistan Signed Decent Work Country Programme for 2020–2024](#)", 15 September 2020.

²⁸ UN, *The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2021–2025 Uzbekistan*, 24 September 2020.

²⁹ It should be noted that assistance provided to Belarus is limited to the measures taken to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. See relevant sections of the [Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association](#).

and supports the implementation of DWCPs both in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. At the time of writing, the Office has suspended the implementation of this project in the Russian Federation, terminated its funding modalities with the existing donor, and secured regular budget supplementary account (RBSA) resources to complete planned work in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. In addition, reprogramming work is ongoing concerning an HIV/AIDS workplace prevention project in the Russian Federation, which has been suspended.³⁰

▶ The situation of ILO staff in Ukraine

28. The ILO currently employs 14 staff in Ukraine (1 national coordinator, 3 international staff, and 10 national staff) who were based in Kyiv prior to hostilities. The safety of the staff and their dependants has been a priority for the Office and all of them have been either evacuated out of Ukraine or relocated within the country and are presently working from safe locations.

▶ Further ILO actions giving effect to the resolution

29. Following the adoption of the resolution by the Governing Body on 22 March 2022, the ILO temporarily suspended its technical cooperation and assistance activities to the Russian Federation. This partnership, which is framed under the Programme of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the International Labour Organization for 2021–2024, consists of advisory services in the areas of labour law reform, social protection, labour inspection, occupational safety and health, public employment services, lifelong learning and skills development, youth entrepreneurship, and capacity development initiatives for employers' and workers' organizations. The Office has also suspended invitations to the Russian Federation to all ILO meetings where participation is at the discretion of the Governing Body. These include technical meetings, meetings of experts, the International Conference of Labour Statisticians, the Tripartite Working Group on the full, equal, and democratic participation in the ILO's tripartite governance (symposiums, seminars, workshops and similar meetings). The provisions of the resolution have also been applied to the participation of Russian applicants in training activities implemented by the Turin Centre.
30. The ILO established a Country Office in Moscow in 1959. Following the adoption by the Governing Body in November 1996 of a proposal on the rationalization of field structures³¹ and the signing of a host country agreement between the ILO and the Russian Federation on 5 September 1997, the Country Office was transformed in 1998 into a Decent Work Technical Support Team and a Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia with representational and technical responsibility for ten countries.
31. At the time of writing, DWT/CO-Moscow has eight staff in the Professional category funded by regular budget resources, three staff in the national Professional category funded by regular budget resources and one national professional staff funded through voluntary contributions. There are seven staff in the General Service category funded by regular budget resources and

³⁰ See information available at: "[HIV/AIDS and the world of work](#)".

³¹ [GB.267/PFA/8/3](#).

three by voluntary contributions. In total, DWT/CO-Moscow has 22 staff holding fixed-term or without-limit-of-time contracts.

32. The question of the possible relocation of the DWT/CO-Moscow is referred to in the Governing Body resolution as an option in order to safeguard the technical cooperation or assistance to all other countries currently serviced by it. At the time of writing there have been no significant impediments, for example in respect of travel restrictions, visa problems, limitations on information and communication technologies or to financial transactions, arising from the current situation to the provision of these services from Moscow. For that reason, the Director-General does not see cause at this juncture for action under the terms of the Governing Body resolution on this matter. Nevertheless, should difficulties arise in maintaining the required operational capacities in Moscow, other options would need to be considered. It may be noted that for the time being other UN entities with an active presence in the Russian Federation³² are maintaining their footprint in the country.
33. In that eventuality, one option in the short term would be for the professional staff category to telework outside the Russian Federation and for the national Professional category and General Service category to continue working in Moscow. The budgetary impact would be limited to absorbing extra travel costs for the professional staff provided that this arrangement remained within a limited time frame of 6 to 12 months maximum. Should this arrangement be considered for a more extended period, the cost and staffing implications would have to be considered further.
34. A second option would be to the relocation of DWT/CO-Moscow outside the Russian Federation. This might involve moving the Team to ILO headquarters in Geneva or to Budapest, where the ILO Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe (DWT/CO-Budapest) is located. In both locations, office space can be rapidly arranged at no additional costs. This would also include the possibility of re-assigning on a voluntary and temporary basis some of the locally recruited staff to one of these locations.
35. The Geneva or Budapest options have the benefit of both maintaining the knowledge and skills of staff who are relocated, minimizing disruption to the activities in the subregion and avoiding significant recruitment and training costs. These options would be subject to an agreement by either host country to issue residence and work permits for any local staff and their dependants to be relocated. Locally recruited staff not willing to relocate or whose skills are not suited to temporary re-assignment would be requested to telework in the Russian Federation. This relocation process could be finalized by the last quarter of 2022.
36. In both scenarios, the financial implications include incremental costs for the relocation of professional and locally recruited staff from Moscow to either Geneva or Budapest, which are estimated at some US\$5.37 million and US\$2.78 million respectively for the first year, and at some US\$2.8 million and US\$510,000 for subsequent years. These amounts include purchasing office furniture and equipment in the new locations as well as the storage fees that the Office would incur for DWT/CO-Moscow assets, once the present lease at an annual cost of US\$300,000 expires in December 2023. In addition, under this option, the Office anticipates that mission costs would approximately double due to longer travel routes.
37. An additional option would involve identifying a location in the region covered by DWT/CO-Moscow, that is either a UN hub or a country, where the ILO has a substantial development cooperation portfolio. Such a scenario would probably involve significant delay as a host

³² See [list of UN entities present in the Russian Federation](#).

country agreement would need to be negotiated and agreed before a move could be organized. Costs could only be estimated once negotiations with the host country could be undertaken.

38. Should it become necessary for any of these options to be acted upon to safeguard technical cooperation assistance to other countries of the region, consultations would be undertaken with staff representatives on the implications for staff, in accordance with the existing mechanisms.

▶ Draft decision

39. **In the light of the developments in Ukraine outlined in document GB.345/INS/5/3 and the resolution on the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the mandate of the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted at its 344th Session (March 2022), the Governing Body:**
- (a) **noted the information provided in the document;**
 - (b) **reiterated profound concern at the continuing aggression by the Russian Federation, aided by the Belarusian Government, against Ukraine and at the impact this aggression is causing to tripartite constituents in Ukraine;**
 - (c) **urged the Russian Federation again to immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression;**
 - (d) **noted the temporary suspension of technical assistance to the Russian Federation, including the termination of the public-private partnership project, and invitations to attend all ILO discretionary meetings, including the training activities offered by the Turin Centre;**
 - (e) **requested the Director-General to continue responding to constituent needs in Ukraine and expand ILO's resource mobilization efforts;**
 - (f) **requested the Director-General to continue monitoring DWT/CO-Moscow operational capacity to safeguard the technical cooperation or assistance to all other countries in the subregion; and**
 - (g) **requested that the Director-General to continue monitoring the impact on the world of work of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and report to the 346th Session (November 2022) of the Governing Body on developments in light of the resolution.**