



# Evaluation Summary



International  
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## Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods, income generation and food self-sufficiency in Leyte province affected by Typhoon Haiyan – Final Evaluation

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** *Philippines*

**Final Evaluation:** *Feb/Mar 2015*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *Independent*

**Administrative Office:** *CO-Manila*

**Technical Office:** *DWT-Bangkok*

**Evaluation Manager:** *Pamornrat Pringsulaka,  
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**Project End:** *28 February 2015*

**Project Code:** *PHI/14/01/UKM*

**Donor & Project Budget:** *UK Government (US\$  
1,636,570)*

**Keywords:** *Natural disaster, livelihood recovery,  
emergency employment, sustainable agriculture,  
skills training, social protection*

### Background & Context

**Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure** One of the strongest tropical cyclones recorded, **Typhoon Haiyan** (local name: Yolanda) made its landfall on 08 November 2013 and wrought catastrophic damage throughout Samar and Leyte in the Visayas. The agriculture sector was severely affected as well as an estimated 5.6-million workers, of which 40 percent are women. Provision of immediate

opportunities for employment, were seen as a priority for these vulnerable groups.

ILO in collaboration with SCUK and FAO implemented the project in four municipalities of Leyete; Ormoc City, Kananga, Villaba and San Isidro. Its overall objective was “*Poor and vulnerable rice and corn farming households will have increased their income and spending power (which will have impact on their shelter, health and education expenditures) and increase their livelihood opportunities and employability (through increased skills) which contributes to re-establishing sustainable livelihoods in the four (4) selected municipalities*”. The ILO component of the project included: (a) Emergency employment (**EE**) creation through the clearing of debris and preparation of cleared land for agriculture production (rice and corn). (b) Employment created through preparing hill sites for contour farming and alternative crop production, Sloping Land Agriculture Technology (**SALT**), and (c) Skills training (**ST**) provided for non-agricultural economic activities for both men and women.

**Situation of the Project** Planned start for the project was early January 2014. Administration procedures delayed the MoU and mobilization by 3 mth until mid-March, affecting all activities. Due to typhoon Hagupit, (4-7 Dec 2014) the project completion date was extended from 31 Dec. 2014 to 28 Feb. 2015.

### Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

The evaluation aims to promote accountability and organizational learning among the stakeholders including the ILO. The evaluation covered all the project components across all sites. ILO’s institutional partners (i.e. FAO and SCUK) were involved as key informants in the assessment of the impact of their combined initiative. The scope of the evaluation only covers all ILO interventions funded by DFID.

The clients of the evaluation are the ILO Country Office and Project Team; Technical specialist of ILO DWT-Bangkok and Headquarters; tripartite constituents; and the donor (DFID).

### Methodology of evaluation

This included (a) desk study of relevant documents ; (b) Field visits for interview with stakeholders and direct observations (1-8 Feb, 2014); (c) Feed-back and consultation with stakeholders to confirm findings.

#### Limitations

The resources for the evaluation and tight time scale meant data collection was restricted to single-visit interviews. No stakeholder workshop to review findings was held although interpretations were checked with respondents at the end of interviews.

## Main Findings & Conclusions

Administration procedures which delayed the MoU and mobilization until mid-March, in particular affected the **Emergency Employment (EE)**. Special effort by the team completed 50% within one month of mobilization, i.e. end-May, the planned completion date. The remainder of EE was re-targeted and completed in Nov. Thus EE as delivered, could not be regarded as contributing to the emergency phase of recovery.

The **Sloping Land Agriculture Technology (SALT)**, established jointly by FAO (technical advice) and ILO (management of social preparation and Cash for Work, CfW), has potential to provide an upland agriculture system that will be resilient against the violent storms that cross the Visayas region. However this technical message was missed and the activity applied as 'paid labor' and 'income generation'.

The SALT sites all suffered from 'over-development' (elaborate pathways, various decorative aspects), which distract from the 'resilience' message. The sites had significant technical problems (ineffective contour bunds; bunds not following contours; sites on degraded land, etc.). Finally, contracting of 'farmer associations' while good to spread the message, is unlikely to see the group cultivation continue once project support ends, and will result in sites being abandoned.

Despite these issues progressive farmers in half the 24 sites applied SALT on their own land. This indicates that if SALT were delivered effectively it should contribute to establishing resilient upland agriculture.

The **Skills Training (ST)** due to the delays and lack of staff, this was almost not completed. The training options provided were carpentry; food processing and handicraft- bamboo and grass weaving. To date only a small number have used these skills for income. The handicraft option requires elaborate support of the whole value-chain not possible in such relief programs. Instead 'employment' options for ST should be those with a clear demand within trainees' own neighborhood. However, effects on character building (personal appearance and self-confidence) of the TESDA trainees was most notable, and will stand the trainees well in all their efforts to obtain employment.

The project was most effective in a range of **management strategies** the team applied. Significant 'social preparation' was made prior to each activity which prevented 'capture' of the activity by any group. CfW was applied for all interventions (\$0.5 M to 4700+ individuals) and was managed transparently, ensuring beneficiaries completed tasks, and prevented misuse of funds.

Disbursement of funds for CfW was made by DOLE under its national mandate. Payment were delayed up to 2 mth after task completion, undermining its purpose to inject income into affected HHs and to reinforce decent work standards.

Some lack of coordination amongst implementing occurred. For SALT, ILO initially budgeted as labour intensive 'terrace construction' rather than 'contour bunds' as planned by FAO. As part of the skills training, SCUUK provided the enterprise start-up funds (1200P) to trainees before training, with the result they were used for other activities.

## Conclusions

### Strategic fit

The strategic fit of the project with three key natural disaster response initiatives was good; PHAP (Dec 2013); Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response plan (10 Dec. 2013) directly addressing the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> objectives, and DFIDs response to Haiyan. It was aligned with local government units and through the application of social protection orientation and minimum wages for CfW; it complied with and broadcast relevant aspects of 'decent work'.

### Validity of Design

The project used the ILO 'natural disaster response' package. The three elements of this are appropriate to the real need of the beneficiaries, providing an initial emergency response (Emergency Employment), and

moving into transitional recovery (contour farming or SALT, and Skills Training). The emphasis on and planned early delivery of, EE was appropriate. For SALT its income generation aspect dominated, rather than as an introduction of a 'resilient' form of upland agriculture.

Administration procedures between the donor and international partners, from submission of proposal and indicated approval (Dec), delayed mobilisation from *planned start*, of Jan, to Mid-march, approx. 2.5 month. This delay resulted in the EE no longer having an emergency function, but rather a transitional recovery one.

Project resources were insufficient: the implementation time frame of 12 month is not sufficient to provide adequate follow-up for the two more complex activities (SALT and ST). The limited time results in these activities being 'delivered' and then left without support to ensure are well established. The need for value-chain development for these activities was also noted.

Due to application of their normal procedures, DOLE's CfW (Cash for Work) payments to beneficiaries were 1-2 month after work completion. Such delays in payment defeats the purpose of the initiative; undermines the 'decent work' rationale; and creates tensions between the LGUs and their population. Given the dominant role of CfW in 'natural disaster response' programs this issue should be given some attention

#### Project effectiveness.

The EE work was managed well, and the project showed flexibility and the capacity to negotiate with local agencies to retarget this effectively. The EE activity had good functional outcomes; land cleared was used for agriculture production, de-silting of irrigation canals did lift crop yields, etc. Overall this activity was impressive although delivery was delayed.

M+E is one of the 'unsung heroes' in effective delivery. This ensured transparency and enabled funds to be delivered as designed and to reinforce the 'decent work' message. That this 'delicate' task was done well, is a credit to the ILO staff.

The SALT activity had limited impact due to overdevelopment of sites and technical flaws. Joint cultivation by farmer associations is likely to see sites being abandoned. In spite of the above issues, innovative HHs in half the 24 SALT sites have begun to apply this on their own land, indicating an interest in resilient approaches to cultivation.

Skills Training, aimed as non-agricultural HHs, achieved its outputs although delayed. It is likely that a high

proportion of the carpentry and food preparation trainees will gain incomes from their new skills. The selection of handicraft items (bamboo and grass weaving) is problematic due to need to deal with extended and complex supply chains. The delivery of the training courses by TESDA conferred significant changes in trainees grooming and self-confidence, profound changes that will serve them well in accessing new employment, whatever that might be.

Monitoring procedures used for the EE ensured work was carried out effectively and that funds were not diverted. These management approaches should be documented as best practices, if not already.

Social protection and decent work characteristics that accompanied each intervention did make beneficiaries aware of these. While on-going application of these is unlikely, their application may lead beneficiaries to call for these in the future.

#### Efficiency

The delivery of interventions lagged firstly due to administrative procedures in start-up, and later for the ST activity due to lack of staff to focus on this.

The project operated a 'lean team'. This may have been a false efficiency and an additional staff to facilitate the complex interventions (SALT, ST) including value -chain development, is advisable to safe guard these activities.

#### Impact

The project had impact from CfW in terms of income gained and enabling agriculture production.

The establishment of a new model for resilient upland cultivation cannot be claimed for the reasons described. While uptake exists with innovative farmers, these examples are fragile and need to be reinforced and built upon.

New employment is expected from the ST, for the carpentry workers and some food processing trainees. All the trainees do appear to have improved their self-image and self-confidence, which will serve them well in seeking employment opportunities

#### Sustainability

The functional outcomes of EE debris clearing will be sustained subject to normal on-going management and maintenance by individual HHs. Similarly for the trainees of ST.

The SALT initiative is of some concern. The sites are unlikely to continue to be cultivated as a group activity. Abandoned the sites will create a negative message for

the approach. While there are progressive HHs who have applied this, they need on-going support otherwise such scattered initiatives will also disappear.

## Recommendations & Lessons Learned

### Main recommendations and follow-up

#### Project design

- 1) **Two of the activities SALT and ST common elements in 'natural disaster response' programs, are complex activities and require additional resources to be effective.** SALT activity will be applicable within 'natural disaster response' programs in upland areas subject to typhoon type disasters. Its role should be clarified by **donors, and implementers including FAO and ILO** at country level. It should also be clarified with **local GoP agencies** responsible for agriculture, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction in the Visayas Region to ensure future projects align and reinforce local priorities  
**(Targeting ILO, FAO, and local GoP agencies)**
- 2) **Project mobilisation and payment process should be seriously reviewed by the donor (DFID) and ILO to see what measures might be used to streamline this process.** Alternatives might include (a) assigning a task force to deal with processing and procedures; and (b) releasing a mobilising tranche to get teams on the ground for inception activities.  
**(Targeting DOL at both regional and national level and ILO)**
- 3) **A range of management procedures (social orientation, monitoring for transparency), should be noted and articulated (targeting ILO)**
- 4) **Methods for implementing SALT should be consistent with its prime function, introduction resilient agriculture practices for the uplands; so foster application by individual HHs; and align with objectives at district and provincial levels to establish sustainable agriculture systems. (Targeting ILO, FAO at country level and local GoP agencies)**

5) **On social protection inputs, these were considered to not have made a major impact on beneficiaries thinking, but at the same time set new benchmarks for what they should expect for minimum wage payments, and ways to protect their family incomes.** These will be part of the overall picture in the Philippines establishing their own capacity to deal with natural disasters. **(Targeting ILO and DOLE at regional and national level)**

6) **Immediate action should be taken to salvage the existing sites and prevent negative messages developing. (targeting ILO, FAO, DFID, SCUK)**

#### Lessons learned

- 1) Standard administrative procedures applied as 'business as usual' in times of disaster recovery, significantly delayed delivery of project interventions.
- 2) Delivery of complex activities (i.e. SALT and ST) requires additional project resources for follow-up activities, to what has typically been applied for natural disaster response program
- 3) The SALT activity offers an approach to upland agriculture resilient in the face of the violent storms that cross the Visayas. As such 'resilient upland agriculture' should be the dominate message to farmers, (rather than CfW and diversified incomes).
- 4) Effectiveness of delivery of the interventions was ensured through consistent use of good management practices, (often easily skipped over or not noted).

#### Emerging Good Practices

Supporting management activities to ensure well targeted and effective delivery of interventions should be noted. These include: (a) Social preparation to ensure that communities from which beneficiaries are to be drawn are aware of selection criteria; participants understand inputs they will receive; and the role they must play; (b) Monitoring of the emergency employment was consistent and transparent and ensure that beneficiaries performed their tasks and cash was not diverted.