



# Evaluation Summary



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## *Typhoon Bopha Philippines: Application of Local Resource-based Employment Generation Approach (PHI/12/08/AUS) and Joint Response Based Employment Generations and Livelihood Recovery Interventions (PHI/13/03/AUS)*

### *Final Evaluation*

#### Quick Facts

**Country:** Philippines

**Final Evaluation:** *September-October 2014*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *Independent*

**ILO Office Administratively backstopping the Project:** *ILO Country Office for the Philippines*

**Technical Backstopping Office:** EMP/INVEST

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**Project End:** 30 September 2014

**Project Code:** *(PHI/12/08/AUS) Agreement No. 65815 and (PHI/13/03/AUS) Agreement No. 66507*

**Donor & Project Budget:** Australia (AUD 300,000.00 +AUD 900,000.00)

**Keywords:** Natural disaster, livelihood recovery, employment generation, skills, cash for work, social protection, local infrastructure development

#### Background & Context

**Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure:** In March 2013, the ILO was granted a project namely “Application of Local Resource-based Employment Generation Approach” to be implemented in the municipality of Baganga with a funding support of AUD 300,000. The immediate

objective of this project was to regenerate incomes through medium term employment intensive reconstruction works.

In May 2013, a second project namely “Joint Response to Post Calamity Interventions, Local Resource-based Employment Generation and Livelihood Recovery” was granted with a funding support of AUD 900,000, for implementation in the municipalities of Cateel and Boston, Davao Oriental in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The immediate objective of this project was to increase access to income generating opportunities and improved livelihood for disaster affected households.

#### Project key elements

**Output 1:** Emergency phase- Short term - Rapid employment created through cash for work (CfW) activities.

**Output 2:** Early recovery component- Medium to Long term employment created through community contracting in affected communities particularly related to improvement of agri-infrastructure and livelihood.

**Output 3:** Recovery component – phase capacity building and mainstreaming – institutionalizing.

#### Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

The end users of this evaluation report are: 1) The Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as the donor; and 2) the ILO

project management team, technical specialists and technical unit at the headquarters.

This final evaluation is directed at appraising the extent to which the project partners and beneficiaries have benefited from the project and the extent to which the project strategy and implementation arrangements were successful.

### **Methodology of evaluation**

The evaluation had complied with evaluation norms and DAC standards and followed ethical safeguards, all as specified in the ILO's evaluation procedures. In order to enhance usefulness and impartiality of the evaluation, evidence-based approach to evaluation had been adopted.

A combination of tools and methods had been used to collect relevant evidences. Adequate time had been allocated to plan for critical reflection processes and to analyse data and information. The methodology for collection of evidences included the following: Interviews, Workshop (Mati City), Documents review and Site visits (Subprojects).

A number of potential limitations, assumptions and constraints were identified at inception stage. In most cases, these were addressed or mitigated ---

1. By triangulating information gathered from various sources in order to provide stronger evidence-based conclusions; and
2. By the fact that during the evaluation mission the 3 municipalities and 21 out of the 22 subprojects were visited.

## **Main Findings & Conclusions**

### **1. Relevance and strategic fit**

- The project has contributed to the PHAP and the APFR and to the newly emerged needs of the project beneficiaries like social protection.
- ILO ensured that decent work and sound labour practices were integrated to the process anent to implementing the EIIP through Community Contracting and Cash-for-Work (CFW) schemes by providing social protection coverage like SSS and Philhealth.
- The project was aligned with and supported other relevant areas of the ILO's

mandate like green jobs/works, social inclusion and social protection measures.

- The project was aligned with the strategic thrusts of the Local Government Units. The project complements the provincial government's pursuits of rehabilitating the livelihoods and reconstructing the agricultural infrastructures (with emphasis on mobilizing the community in CCA works) under the early recovery and building back better phases.
- The project was an appropriate contribution for DFAT to be made.

### **2. Validity of design**

- The project design was adequate to meet the project objectives. The delays affected the initial design of providing in the short term rapid employment during the emergency phase.
- The baseline condition established was not a conventional study, but other baseline references were useful in designing the subprojects.
- There were gender activities but not gender mainstreaming nor formal gender team capacity building. A gender analysis was not carried out. Indirectly, some gender information was taken into consideration.
- Explicitly local authorities benefited from the overall project.
- The capacity of various project's partners was taken into account in the project's strategy and means of action.
- Some risks and assumptions were identified and managed but some risks could have been better taken into consideration –for example for avoiding delays.
- Monitoring arrangements at the local level (project management office in Cateel down to the subproject sites) were adequate.
- Monitoring arrangements at the national –regional level were more focused in delivery rates and accountability towards the donor than in internal learning.

### **3 Project progress and effectiveness**

- The quantity of the outputs produced has been satisfactory and Project partners are using the outputs.
- The quality of the outputs produced could have been better monitored -documented.

Even if the processes are there, the time frame does not permit for the outputs to be fully transformed into outcomes -in the longer term.

- Alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the project's objectives like strategies related to reducing the delay in administrative matters.

#### **4 Efficiency of resource use**

- The project team performed well given the challenges and the delays. There were several strategies employed to maximize the resource allocation. The technical advice from the ILO EIIP specialist in Bangkok was an important support.
- The project had not been especially sensitive to different levels of investment required by local governments' existing programmes and newly introduced programmes in terms of their capacities to respond to similar future disasters.
- Project funds and activities have been delivered by ILO but not in a timely manner. Challenges in relation to ILO administrative system under humanitarian quick responses have been already pointed out in this and other two evaluations-WASHI and CERF evaluations. This evaluation reiterates the need to construct a more appropriate administrative procedure for projects that are of humanitarian context.

#### **5 Management arrangements including monitoring and evaluation**

- At ILO subprojects and local level management capacities and arrangements were adequate so as to facilitate good results and efficient delivery. At ILO national level there is room for improving the adequate facilitation of good results and efficient delivery.
- The project received adequate political, technical and administrative support from its national partners through their regional counterparts and local governments at the project areas.
- The Project made strategic use of coordination and collaboration with other ILO projects and with other donor's projects in the project areas.

#### **6 Impact and sustainability**

- ILO project has no detailed preference, approach or framework specific to the Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous organisations in the project areas have been empowered in the same way as any other kind of organisation.
- There was no explicit exit strategy of the project. No document called exit strategy but there was merely a description of an exit strategy. Nevertheless, exit activities were effective and realistic.
- The project has contributed to the enabling environment for developing technical capacities, local knowledge, and people's attitudes.

#### **7 Special concerns**

- Even if the model was not implemented as expected, the overall model had been effective as a post crisis-recovery transition strategy to restore livelihoods in the short term. The model could clarify how to be effective to restore livelihoods in the long term.
- The project applied the core concepts of human rights-based approach to ensure equality, non-discrimination, inclusiveness and participatory, accountability and rule of law.
- At subprojects level the project applied outputs-outcomes-based management principles/approaches to achieve the project objectives in different stages of the project cycle. At national level the project was more focused on inputs-based management.
- The number and level of staffing hired by the project was not adequate for effective and efficient delivery of the services to its stakeholders and the beneficiaries. This implied a big pressure to deliver on the part of the field team who had to work beyond normal working time. There should have been one project manager in Baganga and another one in Cateel and Boston. The project budgeted human resources working in Manila were not only working for the project administrative, financial and technical implementation.

### **Recommendations & Lessons Learned**

#### **Main recommendations and follow-up**

1. Consider the risks and implications of the delays in future projects' designs: Consider the late project implementation and time

mismanagement as risks. ILO should learn about the reasons of the delays in this project. Consider the ways of reducing delays in emergency contexts. Consider strategies related to reducing administrative delays and matching the technical implementation and the administrative processes in emergency contexts. To avoid the gaps between the field team and administrative unit at the ILO country office in Manila in future similar situations, leveling off on the specific procedures should be done. Construct a more appropriate administrative procedure for projects that are of humanitarian context.

2. Consider for future analysis and assessment: Consider the implementation of a meta-analysis of ILO model and approaches and focus in linking the emergency-recovery-development of livelihoods. Consider the need of an assessment of sustainability in 1 or 2 years to check again if the outputs-outcomes are there. Consider the documentation of the strategies used to increase efficiency at subprojects level, so as to integrate them in future planning. Need to explore/study the factors that make the community contracting successful (local contexts, attitudes, culture, etc.). Explore when and in what contexts community contracting is not the best approach. (Example for communities with strong local governments)

3. Consider the challenges of joint programming: DFAT could consider the need of time to make operational the effective coordination of stakeholders like UNFPA, ILO and FAO.

4. Need to reinforce the gender approach and formal gender capacity building: Consider the need to carry out gender analysis and establish a gender framework for integration in the project log frame.

5. Need a Monitoring specialist or advisor at country level: Need to focus more on changes and outputs than in inputs –delivery rates. The quality of the outputs produced needs to be better monitored-documented. Need of a stricter follow up of risk assessment to avoid delays in the implementation.

6. Considerations for improving the project management and results: Need to develop an implementation plan as attachment to the

project document. Revisit the project model if the project is not executed as expected (example: due to delays). Need to develop exit strategy at global and subproject level (example: exit strategy as a prerequisite for the last tranche). Need to consider the correct number of staff and to consider the implications of not devoting for the project only, all the budgeted resources in Manila -for technical, administrative or financial tasks. ILO Manila to develop advocacy strategies with the learning and knowledge products of this project specifically on integration of decent work and social protection activities in emergency and recovery phases.

### **Important lessons learned**

The ILO EIIP approach, even if innovative, can be effective with correct support from the local governments. Community contracting complemented with local government's active monitoring and participation is a correct approach.

Designing Joint interventions, adding value of different UN agencies is very relevant but certain considerations should be looked into like time, operational cost, overhead expenses and challenges of coordination. Capacity building strategies adopted in this kind of operation are keys to success. Some examples are gender capacity building for field staff, monitoring capacity building of implementing partners and exit strategy capacity-building

Technical implementation and administrative system need to be integrated and maximize efficiency. Working in emergency and early recovery interventions implies pressures on the field team and must be internalized by ILO.