



# Evaluation Summaries

## Elimination of child labour in the soccer industry in Sialkot, Pakistan (Phase II)

### Quick Facts

**Countries:** *Pakistan*

**Final Evaluation:** *September 2004*

**Mode of Evaluation:** *independent*

**Technical Area:** *Child Labour*

**Evaluation Management:** *IPEC*

**Project Code:** *PAK/00/50/USA*

**Donor:** *United States*

**Keywords:** *Child labour, sports industry*

### Executive summary of the full report

The second phase of the ILO-IPEC Elimination of Child Labour in the Soccer Industry in Sialkot Pakistan Project concluded in September 2004 and as part of its regular practice of examining the impact of the project and distilling lessons learnt, the Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section of ILO-IPEC fielded a one person independent evaluation team in May-June 2004 for a two week period. This report is the output of the desk reviews and field visits.

Phase II, started in 2000, was the successor to Phase I which ended in October, 1999. While generally the broader objectives remained the same i.e. removing children working as football stitchers and providing them and their families with social protection, Phase II was meant to put many of the achievements of Phase I on a more sustainable footing. This included the establishment of an independent monitoring agency to monitor activities ranging from the existence of child labour in football stitching

concerns to the status of children in NFEs and utilisation of credit by football-stitching families. Also in Phase II, community mobilisation was supposed to be strengthened for greater effectiveness of actions against child labour and for the handing over of NFEs to communities. The scope of the project was to be extended to cover the worst forms of child labour in Sialkot i.e. moving from a sectoral intervention to an area-based programme.

Overall, the removal of children from the football stitching industry was very successful and this was clearly spurred by the western purchasers of Sialkot-produced balls after they threatened to move to suppliers in countries not using children. This jolted the manufacturers into action. However, activities relating to rehabilitation varied from being very effective to unsatisfactory. The critical factors behind the degree of successfulness of a certain action programme depended upon, among other things, its own capacity and level of experience and the amount of time it got to complete its activities.

The project had a satisfactory number of actors involved and they were generally chosen keeping in mind their area of expertise. This included practitioners imparting non-formal education and vocational training such as BLCC and Sudhaar, large micro-credit institutions such as PRSP as well as small local players such as CSDO, CDC and Baidari. The latter three were more concerned with creating awareness amongst villagers and civil society and the provision of health services to children. The action programmes were not expected to work in isolation from one another. In a number of cases,

they were meant to work closely e.g. Baidari was supposed to provide health services to children of BLCC and Sudhaar schools, and IMAC was expected to monitor some aspects of the work of PRSP (i.e. credit utilisation) and status of the NFEs amongst other things. Thus, design-wise the project was well-designed.

Better synchronisation of activities during implementation could have resulted in greater effectiveness of the project. Child labour has all but gone from the industry but some of the rehabilitation work could have been better implemented. Where an activity was supposed to immediately follow another, sometimes it lagged way behind in terms of time. Some action programmes were finally initiated with just months to spare. This was due to a number of reasons primarily due to administrative bottlenecks on behalf of the partners but more so on behalf of the ILO.

Regarding the sustainability of the non-formal schools, this has been below expectations. While sustainability of these schools was clearly an objective of Phase II, only some were sustained and the quality of even the sustained schools could have been better. However, the local independent monitoring agency or IMAC is one of the more notable achievements of Phase II. Not only has its work been effective, the strong sense of ownership of the local industry of the body should ensure its continued functioning in the future.

On the whole monitoring and evaluation in this particular project has been below average both by ILO-IPEC and by the action programmes themselves. There is no data available with BLCC, for example, as to where the children who graduated from its schools or left them, ended up. The output of CSDO has not been satisfactory and the latrine programme of Baidari was implemented too late and in a weak manner to have any significant impact. ILO-IPEC, in the context of this project, should have had a much more rigorous M&E component especially at the district level.

While the involvement of the district government may have been there, it could have been greater. The fact that it was not meant that Phase II did not achieve two of its objectives namely the strengthening of district government capacity

to tackle child labour and the sustainability, in the longer-term, of most of the activities undertaken during the phase.