Taking a whole of government approach to skills development
UNESCO Education Sector

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UNESCO, as the United Nations’ specialized agency for education, is entrusted to lead and coordinate the Education 2030 Agenda, which is part of a global movement to eradicate poverty through 17 Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Education, essential to achieve all of these goals, has its own dedicated Goal 4, which aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.” The Education 2030 Framework for Action provides guidance for the implementation of this ambitious goal and commitments.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development
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Bangladesh: T.I. M. Nurunnabi Khan
Burkina Faso: Naceur Chraiti
Canada: CamProf Inc. (Guy Fortier)
France: Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques (GRET) (Sandra Barlet)
Jamaica: Paulette J. Dunn-Pieree
India: Madhusree Banerjee
Malawi: Jones W. Chafa
Philippines: WYNIM Education and Management Consultancy Services (Lemuel M Miravalles and Rodolfo Sabas)
Republic of Korea: Cho Jeong-Yoon and Kim Min-Kyu
The Russian Federation: Alexander Leybovich
Tunisia: Mongi Boughzala
Turkey: Bengisu Özenç
Table of contents

1. Introduction and background 12
   1.1 Purpose of study 12
   1.2 Recent trends in TVET and skills development 14
   1.3 Influence of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 18

2. Models and functions of inter-ministerial coordination 20
   Table 2 Relationship between functions of government, intervention areas, and impact and implications for inter-ministerial coordination 22

3. Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination 28
   3.1 Defining ‘success’ – TVET and skills development policy objectives and the three lenses approach 28
   Figure 1. Three analytical lenses for transforming TVET 29
   3.2 Identifying the key foundational requirements necessary for success 30
   Table 3 Ten essential building blocks of an effective TVET system 31
   3.3 The role of inter-ministerial coordination in ensuring that key foundational requirements are in place 33
   Table 4 Relationship between the ten building blocks of a successful TVET system, the four functions of government and the potential impact of improved inter-ministerial coordination 34
   Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains 36
   Standardized QA mechanisms and portability of qualifications 38
   Stable and sustained financing 39
   Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms 40
   Availability of accurate data and information including labour market information (LMI) 40
   The importance of high-performing training institutions 42

3.4 Key factors and trigger points that can facilitate or hamper inter-ministerial coordination efforts 43
   Trigger Point 1: Senior leaders across government portfolios have a genuine commitment to improving inter-ministerial coordination for TVET and skills development 43
   Trigger Point 2: Senior leaders are clear about their objectives for TVET and skills development and are willing to stake their reputation through public pronouncements on intended outcomes 44
Trigger Point 3: The civil service and relevant social partners have sufficient capacity and capability which is deployed effectively to implement the proposed reforms and achieve meaningful inter-ministerial coordination.

Trigger Point 4: A recent ‘crisis’ event or socio-economic shock has generated consensus on the need for change which can be harnessed to improve inter-ministerial coordination.

Trigger Point 5: The underpinning political-economic institutional structures in a particular country are conducive to coordination between government and social partners when coordination mechanisms are designed with these structures in mind.

Trigger Point 6: The need for accurate and timely information on labour markets, employment and skills development metrics acts as a catalyst for improved inter-ministerial coordination.

4. Results and analysis of country case studies

4.1 Background to the case studies
4.2 Results of the case studies
4.3 Critical features for successful inter-ministerial coordination
4.4 Assessing the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination arrangements
4.5 Triggers that have influenced the adoption of specific typologies
Table 5 The influence of trigger points on each of the governance typologies

5. Conclusions

6. Recommendations

Annex 1: Draft terms of reference for country case studies
Objective
Methodology
Specific research questions
b.) Assessment of current performance against ten foundational requirements including progress made since introduction of current coordination mechanisms

c.) Analysis of relationship between inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and strength of performance against foundational requirements
d.) Summary and conclusions regarding inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and recommendations for future actions

Deliverable
Annex 2: Summaries of country case studies
Annex 3: Country performance against building blocks of a successful TVET system
Annex 4: The four main functions that governments are expected to oversee for TVET and skills development
Annex 5: Overview of the three lenses approach
References
Figures and tables

Table 1  Ten essential building blocks and the impact of inter-ministerial coordination
Table 2  Relationship between functions of government, intervention areas, and impact and implications for inter-ministerial coordination
Table 3  Ten essential building blocks of an effective TVET system
Table 4  Relationship between the ten building blocks of a successful TVET system, the four functions of government and the potential impact of improved inter-ministerial coordination
Table 5  The influence of trigger points on each of the governance typologies
Figure 1 Three analytical lenses for transforming TVET
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

### Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNEFOP</td>
<td>National Council for Employment and Vocational Training and Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>GMR</td>
<td>Global Monitoring Report</td>
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<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<td>HRD</td>
<td>human resource development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMI(S)</td>
<td>labour market information (system)</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>management information system</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoEL</td>
<td>Ministry of Employment and Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoL</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoLSS</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoSE</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MVTE</td>
<td>Ministry of Vocational and Technical Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NQF</td>
<td>national qualifications framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDC</td>
<td>National Skills Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTVQF</td>
<td>National Technical and Vocational Qualifications Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Public Employment Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>quality assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPL</td>
<td>recognition of prior learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHRD</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Human Resource Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>science, technology, engineering and maths</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEVET</td>
<td>technical, entrepreneurial and vocational education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEVETA</td>
<td>Technical, Entrepreneurial, Vocational, Education and Training Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>trigger point</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>technical and vocational education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>VEC</td>
<td>Vocational Education Council</td>
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<td>WSDSP</td>
<td>workforce skills development strategy and plan</td>
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Executive summary

Coordination is a wide-ranging term which this publication interprets as covering interaction between different ministries and government agencies at a national level; interaction between national, subnational and local structures and agencies; and interaction with social partners such as employers, trade unions and civil society organizations. The publication focuses primarily on the interaction between government ministries and agencies at national and subnational levels, examining how governments can work to coordinate technical and vocational education and development (TVET) and skills development across relevant policy domains.

The overarching research question which is being asked is, Does the adoption of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms assist in the achievement of TVET and skills development policy objectives?

This publication attempts to answer that question through synthesizing evidence on inter-ministerial TVET coordination mechanisms from a range of countries, using a combination of desk research and country case studies. In doing so, it sets out six broad models. Two country case studies are developed for each. They examine instances where responsibility for TVET and skills development is:

Type 1: led by the ministry of education (MoE) or equivalent body, as in the Russian Federation and Turkey.

Type 2: led by the ministry of labour (MoL) or equivalent body, as in Malawi and Tunisia.

Type 3: led by a dedicated TVET ministry, as in India and Burkina Faso.

Type 4: led by a TVET focused government agency or non-departmental public body, as in Jamaica and the Philippines.

Type 5: overseen by a coordinating council or similar body placed higher than the relevant departments, as in France and Bangladesh.

Type 6: disaggregated across line ministries without a permanent centralized coordination mechanism, as in the Republic of Korea and Canada.

The purpose of the case studies was first, to identify the specific trigger points that lead to changes in the use or effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and second, to assess the extent to which these inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms have played a role in strengthening the foundational requirements of an effective TVET and skills development system in each country.

In order to determine the extent to which the different types of TVET governance achieve positive outcomes the research included developing a list of ten essential building blocks and assessing the impact of inter-ministerial coordination on each of them (Table 1).
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

**Table 1** Ten essential building blocks and the impact of inter-ministerial coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential building blocks of effective TVET system</th>
<th>Potential impact of improved inter-ministerial coordination (high/medium/low)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains</td>
<td>High, particularly in providing a unified vision and purpose across disparate policy domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision</td>
<td>High, particularly in providing a unified vision and purpose across disparate policy domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Well-functioning partnerships and networks promoting access and equity with partners adequately representing constituents’ interests</td>
<td>High: coordination across ministries and at subnational level can lead to improved relevance of policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. High-performing, quality training institutions</td>
<td>Medium: improved coordination can lead to more effective engagement of a wider range of social partners in policy development and delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Standardized quality assurance mechanisms and portability of qualifications</td>
<td>Low: improved coordination at national or subnational levels might not have much direct impact on institutional quality, at least in the short term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Stable and sustained financing</td>
<td>High, particularly regarding the development of unified progression pathways and enhancing the credibility of qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms</td>
<td>High: improved coordination can identify and eliminate perverse incentives across policy domains at national and subnational levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates</td>
<td>Medium: enhanced coordination can lead to campaigns, branding and social marketing aimed at addressing public perceptions of skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Availability of accurate data and information including LMI</td>
<td>High: coordination can be particularly effective in overcoming fragmentation in labour market information systems (LMIS) and management information systems (MIS) (particularly in relation to data categorization and data flows) so that a variety of relevant data sets can be considered when making policy decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Culture of policy learning and continuous improvement</td>
<td>Medium-coordination and information-sharing can lead to improved understanding and learning across different policy domains</td>
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</table>
However, analysis of the case studies leads to the conclusion that none of the six types can be said consistently to deliver superior results to the others across these ten building blocks. This is partly because of the small sample and subjectivity of the case studies, but also partly because of the inconsistency of results from countries using the same governance model. Rather, the analysis shows that the presence of a number of underlying features has more impact on the quality of governance and the likelihood of effective inter-ministerial coordination. These features include the need for the body responsible for TVET also to have authority to implement policy and to have control over TVET funding; for there to be clarity of role and purpose between stakeholders; for the mechanisms used for inter-ministerial consultation and coordination to be either sustained or abandoned and replaced; and for TVET to be part of a larger human resource development (HRD) strategy with clear pathways for learners to follow.

The case studies also highlighted that the success or otherwise of any of the types of governance may be judged by the extent to which additional coordination measures are required either day to day or in a crisis, how well they accommodate industry involvement and respond to labour market changes, and their impact at subnational and local levels.

The desk research identified ‘trigger points’ to facilitate effective inter-ministerial coordination, and the case studies explored the extent to which these enable an effective TVET and skills development system to develop. They conclude that the most likely triggers are those resulting from a shock to the economy or a political pronouncement, and that systems are rarely initiated through the availability of government capacity and resources or the need for improved labour market information (LMI).

Following the analysis, the publication draws conclusions on the combination of governance characteristics that needs to be present for any inter-ministerial coordination mechanism to work well, and on how the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms may be assessed. These are described in Section 5, and in summary, state that:

- Regardless of the governance system, some of the building blocks for successful TVET are harder to introduce and maintain than others.
- The type of governance structure adopted by a country for its TVET system is not the determining factor for whether the system will work well or badly. A combination of other features is more important.
- TVET governance structures can be evaluated according to how well they cope without compensatory measures both on a day-to-day basis and in response to sudden shocks in the system.
- The level of involvement of employers is an important measure but insufficient unless it shows evidence of improved employment results.
- The efficiency and effectiveness of training provision at local level should be traceable back to coordination with a well-functioning national system.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

- The stimulus to review governance systems is less likely to come from within the system and more likely to be in response to an external socio-economic shock or political pronouncement demanding better results in skills development.

Finally, acknowledging that other factors besides the governance model are critical, the publication makes recommendations on actions that governments could take to deliver better TVET and employment results, specifically by prioritizing resources for work on four high-impact building blocks which present the greatest challenge to governments. It also suggests nine criteria which governments can use to review the efficiency of their own TVET governance systems and the effectiveness of their coordination mechanisms.
1. Introduction and background
1. Introduction and background

Section 1 of this publication sets out the purpose of this study on inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms for technical and vocational education and development (TVET) and skills development. It identifies recent global trends in TVET and skills development, and highlights six intervention areas commonly accepted by governments across the world as being necessary to improve the status and relevance of TVET and which to varying degrees may be influenced by inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Section 1 concludes by considering the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and assessing the extent to which these might influence TVET and skills development policy and related coordination mechanisms.

1.1 Purpose of study

Governments across the world have, for decades, struggled to categorize and manage TVET and skills development. The ‘machinery of government’ created by politicians and civil servants tends to respond best to those issues and problems that are clearly defined, simple to classify and easy to measure. Issues that cut across traditional ministerial areas of responsibility, and which may rely on interaction and cooperation with a range of social partners, many of them acting on a voluntary basis, have historically proved much more difficult for governments to tackle⁷.

TVET and skills development, if implemented effectively, falls into this latter category. These areas act as a bridge between the world of education and training and the world of work and lifelong learning. TVET cuts across every sector of the economy, and relies on effective dialogue and interaction between education and training providers, labour market stakeholders including employers, worker representatives, and other stakeholders. In addition TVET is expected to contribute towards a wide range of (sometimes contradictory) socio-economic goals, including full employment, increased productivity and competitiveness, social cohesion, equity and sustainability.

¹ Just one example of such an issue comes from one author’s experience of working in the UK Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) in 2009. At this time England and Wales had one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates in Europe. When asked by Gordon Brown to conduct a priority review of this area the review team found senior civil servants in the Department of Health who felt that lead responsibility for tackleing teenage pregnancy was the responsibility of the Department for Education which, they felt, should provide better sex and relationships education (SRE). Meanwhile senior civil servants in the Department for Education felt that lead responsibility lay with the Department of Health which, they felt, should be providing more accessible and relevant access to contraception. Teenage pregnancy was therefore an example of a policy priority that fell across two ministries with unclear accountability for results.
While services such as basic education and primary health care are widely accepted to be ‘public good’ which governments are obliged to deliver directly due to the significant positive externalities associated with provision, the same does not apply to TVET and skills development. The case for government support for TVET, in particular in-service training, is much less clear-cut because of the potentially high economic returns to both employers and workers from investing in training. For resource-constrained ministries of education struggling to finance the growing recurrent costs of their basic education systems, it is relatively easy to deflect responsibility and state that TVET and skills development are primarily the concern of employers.

Given this context it is no surprise that governments have experienced difficulty in formulating, planning, managing, implementing and evaluating effective TVET and skills development policies, strategies and plans. In an effort to overcome these difficulties various governments across the world have given significant thought to the inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and ‘institutional architecture’ required to successfully plan, manage, monitor and evaluate TVET and skills development.

This paper synthesizes evidence on inter-ministerial TVET coordination mechanisms from across a range of country contexts. It summarizes recent global trends in the conception, design and delivery of TVET and skills development, and sets out a number of models for inter-ministerial coordination. It then identifies a set of critical success factors and ‘trigger points’ which can facilitate effective inter-ministerial coordination. The paper goes on to list a number of countries that have attempted to implement various models of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, and proposes a methodology for the development of detailed case studies for each of these countries, to investigate the extent to which the proposed success factors and trigger points enabled effective implementation. The resulting case studies are summarized in Annex 2. The case studies are analysed in Section 4 and Annex 3 to identify critical features for successful inter-ministerial coordination. The paper concludes with recommendations on targeting of resources for maximum impact on inter-ministerial coordination, and criteria for the evaluation of TVET governance systems.

It is important to define what is meant by ‘inter-ministerial coordination’ with regard to this study. Coordination is a wide-ranging term which can be interpreted as covering interaction between different ministries and government agencies at a national level; the interaction between national, subnational and local structures and agencies; and interaction with social partners such as employers, trade unions and civil society organizations. This publication focuses primarily on the interaction between government ministries and agencies at national and subnational levels, examining how governments can work to coordinate skills and TVET across relevant policy domains. Coordination and interaction with social partners is important, and is touched on in this publication, but it is not the primary focus of the study.
Introduction and background

1.2 Recent trends in TVET and skills development

Clearly identifiable trends have emerged in the conception and implementation of TVET and skills development worldwide. These trends should be viewed within the wider perspective of public sector reform and the application of new public management techniques and human capital theory to government policy and practice.

From the late 1980s onwards a number of governments began to place increasing emphasis on the role of education in preparing learners effectively for the world of work. This school of thought, termed ‘new vocationalism’, placed the skills needs of industry at the centre of discussions on the purpose of public education. TVET and skills development were thus viewed as an important component in promoting economic growth in general and addressing youth unemployment in particular. At the centre of the argument was the view that most general education systems had not been effective in developing the skills that many young people needed to secure employment in industry. The late 1980s and early 1990s thus saw the introduction and expansion of new vocational curricula and courses, often developed in collaboration with industry, and an increase in the variety of work-based learning routes on offer to young people.

While some of these reforms achieved successes, the core policy challenge of ensuring that TVET and skills development consistently supplied people with the skills required for economic growth in the right quantity at the right time, remained largely elusive. In a continued effort to overcome these challenges, roughly since 2007, policy interventions by governments across the world to improve the status and relevance of TVET have coalesced around a group of common intervention areas (McGrath, 2012; Marope et al., 2015):

- Reforms to TVET governance and ‘institutional architecture’ in order to increase participation and ‘ownership’ by employers and other social partners. These reforms have focused primarily on increasing stakeholder participation in the policy development process. The theory underpinning such reforms is that the greater involvement of employers in such processes will lead to the provision of more relevant and responsive training. In other words, it should produce a system that is better able to match the ‘supply’ of training delivered by the training market (incorporating both public and private providers) to the ‘demand’ created within the labour market. This has led to an emphasis on dialogue and partnerships as a means of managing TVET systems as an alternative to centralized government control (Leney, 2014).

- The development of a ‘national training’ system which harnesses previously disparate elements into a national policy agenda to support economic growth. These elements include curriculum development, the management of training centres and vocational colleges (both public and private), quality assurance (QA) mechanisms, assessment and testing regimes, and the introduction of recognition of prior learning (RPL) and progression pathways.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

- Development of national and regional qualifications frameworks and the blurring of traditional boundaries between academic and vocational learning streams in an effort to increase the portability of qualifications and develop progression pathways that enable learners to move seamlessly between institutions and means of instruction. This is intended to break down the traditional divide between academic and vocational learning routes, which segregated learners and closed off future progression opportunities, often while the learners were still in their early teens. In some countries this has been undertaken alongside extensive RPL efforts to assess and certify the competencies of existing skilled and semi-skilled workers, ostensibly to increase their earnings and progression potential. There has also been a trend towards the delivery of hybrid learning programmes in institutions that resist classification as either ‘academic’ or ‘vocational’ (Maclean and Pavlova, 2011).

- The introduction of new QA mechanisms which take a broader view of the TVET system which goes beyond institution-specific provision and may cover both public and private training. Such mechanisms cover the reform of qualifications, oversight of national skills development policies and the introduction of curricula related to new qualifications. QA in this context is a means by which the ‘centre’ is able to retain an element of control and oversight of delivery in a more diverse ‘training market’.

- Diversification of funding modalities including attempts to significantly increase contributions from employers as well as the adoption of payment regimes based on outputs and outcomes. Increasing employer contributions is both a means of tackling the historic chronic underfunding of many TVET systems and a way of promoting greater employer engagement. If employers are contributing to the funding of the skills development system through a payroll levy or similar mechanism, they are likely to have increased interest in engaging with the TVET system and ensuring that training provision meets their needs. Payment by results mechanisms see providers receiving funds based on the achievement of pre-agreed outputs or outcomes. Such funding mechanisms enable policy-makers to exert greater influence over institutions to achieve intended policy outcomes than is the case with traditional input-based recurrent block grant arrangements. Other mechanisms that serve a similar purpose include increased contestability of training funds by both public and private training institutions and increased use of vouchers and learning accounts as part of the marketization of education and training services.

- Managed autonomy for public training providers and an expansion of private training provision. There has been a general decentralization of functions away from central government and a consequent increase in the autonomy of public training providers. Many of these institutions now enjoy much greater freedom over staffing, resource use and revenue generation, and the qualifications and courses they offer. One of the principles underpinning this trend is that institutions are best suited to understanding and responding to the needs of their local labour markets and
making linkages with local employers. However this autonomy is not unconditional. Institutions must operate within the QA frameworks, target-setting regimes and funding modalities put in place by governments to achieve national objectives. Alongside this ‘managed autonomy’ for public providers, in many countries there has been a significant expansion in private training provision. Private providers are increasingly seen as having a critical role to play in enabling governments to reach a large number of employers and learners to achieve policy objectives. As private providers are able to access larger sums of public funds linked to payment by results mechanisms, and public providers have increased freedom to diversify their sources of income, in many countries there is a blurring of distinctions between public and private institutions. Increasingly institutions are becoming hybridized, sharing similar characteristics regardless of whether they are ‘public’ or ‘private’. Increasingly policy-makers’ focus is on the ‘what’ in terms of training and labour market outcomes rather than the ‘who’ in terms of delivery institutions.

These six intervention areas are viewed in an increasing number of countries as being essential steps in creating a demand-led TVET and skills development system. Such a system is viewed as desirable as, in principle, it enables the training market to supply the type and quantity of skills required by the labour market.

As countries attempt to enhance employer engagement in skills development systems, introduce qualifications frameworks and diversify TVET funding and delivery models, there is a prevailing view that the ‘traditional’ TVET system is not fit for purpose. These systems were nominally overseen by a ministry of education (MoE) or ministry of labour (MoL), with various line ministries playing a key role in managing and funding sector-specific provision. There were little or no formal coordination mechanisms and the systems were often dependent on incomplete and dated LMI. Such a system, it is believed, is far from optimal in nurturing the multi-stakeholder dialogues and partnerships required to deliver effective and responsive TVET provision in the context of today’s complex and rapidly changing labour markets.

Certainly there is increased realization by policy-makers that developing and implementing an effective economic development and growth strategy requires interaction and coordination across a number of policy domains. These domains each have a role to play in shaping national skills systems, as seen in the OECD’s country series of skills strategy publications undertaken between

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2 The training and labour markets can be defined as:

*The training market*, in which institutions sell their education, training and employment services to customers willing to purchase them to improve their skills and knowledge, or to organizations willing to purchase them on behalf of trainees unable or unwilling to pay the price;

*The labour market*, in which workers sell their skills and knowledge to employers, or to customers who are prepared to purchase and pay for them.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

They include education, employment, social welfare, industrial policy, science and technology, innovation, migration, taxation and public finance. In the modern market-based global economy the interaction between these various domains means that the relationship between the demand and supply of skills is complex, fast-moving and dynamic. Those governments that are able to establish coordination and coherence between policy domains so that they inform and complement each other should be inherently better placed to drive economic growth than countries where these domains conflict and operate in isolation.

Is the rejection of the ‘traditional’ TVET model based on empirical evidence that it is an ineffective organizational model for delivering desired policy outcomes? Or is the recent trend towards the development of more consensual and inclusive governance models and means of inter-ministerial coordination based on a belief that it is self-evidently the logical and ‘right’ thing to do?

A review of the available literature does not readily provide an answer to these questions. In part this is owing to a general lack of data on the effectiveness of TVET policies and programmes (UNESCO, 2015). TVET programmes are often expected to have multiple outcomes, and their multifaceted nature often complicates effective monitoring and evaluation. In any case many national governments often attach low priority to monitoring TVET interventions, partly because of their innate complexity and partly for reasons of political expediency.

In addition to the general lack of high-quality evidence on the impact of TVET policies and programmes, many of the studies that cover inter-ministerial coordination are largely descriptive in nature, focusing on the nature of the changes and implementation issues rather than the ultimate impact of coordination on policy outcomes. A notable exception is the excellent range of recent country-specific reports carried out by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) using its Skills Diagnostic Toolkit. These reports utilize a range of quantitative and qualitative data sources to identify specific challenges across four main areas: developing relevant skills, activating the supply of skills, using skills effectively, and the enabling conditions for an effective skills system.

This publication aims to mitigate the current lack of information on the impact of inter-ministerial coordination on policy outcomes by collecting and analysing relevant data in twelve country case studies.

1 http://www.oecd.org/skills/nationalskillsstrategies/
1.3 Influence of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

2015 saw the global adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a set of 17 goals and 169 targets to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an agenda for intergovernmental action. The SDGs emphasize that work should contribute to increased income, productivity and competitiveness as well as address social and environmental issues. This renewed focus on work opens up the possibility of greater international focus on training and preparation for employment, and an enhanced role for TVET linked to the Sustainable Development Agenda.

The specific education goal, SDG4, is to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.’ SDG4 has ten specific targets, among which skills and lifelong learning have a relatively prominent role. Looking across the 17 goals and 169 targets there are numerous areas where TVET and skills development has a role to play if the SDGs are to be achieved. These include poverty reduction, agricultural productivity, clean energy, sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth with full and productive employment and decent work for all, the promotion of inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and fostering innovation. The World Education Forum’s Framework for Action Education 2030 (the Incheon Declaration, WEF 2015) notes the importance of adopting a ‘whole-government’ approach to achieving the SDG education targets and the necessity of integrating education into wider socio-economic development frameworks. This, the Forum notes, will entail improved coordination and collaboration at both national and regional levels.

Overall, the all-encompassing nature of the SDG content and the aspirational nature of many of the goals and targets mean that it is uncertain whether they will have a significant practical influence over national budget allocation decisions or policy-making processes. Green and Yamada (2015) identify four major constituencies and impact areas that might be influenced by the SDGs:

- developing country budgets and policies
- wider social norms about the rights and duties of governments and others
- aid volumes and priorities (a re-run of the MDGs which were mainly effective as an aid lobbying tool)
- developed country budgets and policies.

The challenge now for TVET and skills development practitioners is to produce a convincing narrative that articulates the interrelatedness of the SDGs and the key role that skills development can play in their achievement. This needs to be linked to a series of metrics and monitoring mechanisms in order to produce the indicators required for a comparative league table of SDG performance related to skills development.
2. Models and functions of inter-ministerial coordination
2. Models and functions of inter-ministerial coordination

Section 2 of this publication examines the functions that inter-ministerial coordination on TVET and skills development are expected to perform, and grounds these in the context of the intervention areas identified in Section 1. It then identifies and describes six distinct models of inter-ministerial coordination that are used by governments worldwide.

2.1 Functions of inter-ministerial coordination on TVET and skills development

What is inter-ministerial coordination expected to achieve? What are the main functions of government regarding TVET and skills development? Leney (2014) identifies three key aspects of TVET governance: planning and management, finance and funding, and QA.

For the purposes of this study we have split Leney’s ‘planning and management’ function to identify policy development and design as a discrete governmental function which requires different skill sets and relationships from those required for the overall management, monitoring and evaluation of interventions. While in theory policy development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation should merge seamlessly in an iterative policy development cycle, this is rarely the case in real-world practice (Hallsworth et al., 2011)3.

It is also important to consider the interaction and relationships between national, subnational and local levels of government when looking at the functions and objectives of inter-ministerial coordination. Coordination among national government ministries, departments or agencies is only one dimension that needs to be considered. In the context of the growing trends toward decentralization, deconcentration and devolution, the interaction between national, subnational and local agencies is increasingly critical. Coordination between these levels ensures that resources are being used effectively and that agencies are reinforcing, rather than contradicting, each other’s interventions.

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3 The UK Cabinet Office explicitly rejected the use of policy cycles when looking to strengthen policy-making capacity across the civil service. The Cabinet Office did this because practitioners did not feel that cyclical models accurately reflected the realities of policy-making for four main reasons: policy making does not take place in distinct stages; policies need to be designed, not just conceived; policy-making is often determined by events; and the effects of policies are often indirect, diffuse and take time to appear (Hallsworth et al., 2011, pp. 5–6).
Governments often put greater emphasis on policy development than on implementation and evaluation. This has meant that many apparently well-designed policies fail to achieve intended results. In recent years this has been countered to some extent by a growing body of evidence that looks beyond the formulation of best practice policies and focuses on implementation and ‘getting things done’, or to use the World Bank’s terminology ‘the science and politics of delivery’ (Todd et al., 2014).

The focus on policy development over implementation and monitoring cuts across a range of service delivery and government policy areas, and is not exclusive to TVET and skills development, although recent trends have made it more noticeable. Section 1 explained how there has been a worldwide trend to implement reforms to TVET governance and institutional architecture in order to increase participation and ownership by employers and other social partners. But very often such reforms focus almost exclusively on dialogue and input at the initial policy development and design stage. As Leney (2014: 5) notes, ‘ministries still tend to be reluctant to extend the role of social partners beyond early stage policy dialogue’.

The other slight change that we have made to Leney’s list of TVET governance functions is to expand the title of the ‘quality assurance’ function to explicitly include curriculum development and assessment, as Leney originally did.

The four main functions that governments are expected to oversee for TVET and skills development are described in detail in Annex 4. The relationship between them and the six intervention areas, and the impact this has had on the need for inter-ministerial coordination, is set out in Table 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions of government</th>
<th>Key intervention area(s) with impact on function</th>
<th>Description of impact on function of government</th>
<th>Implications of impact on the need for inter-ministerial coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy development and design</td>
<td>Reforms to TVET governance and ‘institutional architecture’; Development of a national training system</td>
<td>Policy development to become more inclusive and include a wider range of social partners. Increasing expectation on TVET and skills development to have an impact beyond the economic sphere and address social cohesion and equity issues. Requirement to make linkages with other policy domains such as migration, trade, science and technology, innovation, as well as considering subnational and local linkages and coordination.</td>
<td>Ministries need to become adept at consulting with a wide variety of stakeholders (employers, representative bodies, trade unions, civil society organizations) to build consensus and ownership among a coalition of often diverse interests. This requires empathy, diplomacy and negotiating skills. There is a need to either involve wider representation of government ministries and agencies in policy formulation given intended impacts across education, economic growth, welfare, gender etc., or have common policy goals adopted across different policy domains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning, management and delivery, monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Reforms to TVET governance and ‘institutional architecture’; development of a national training system; development of national and regional qualifications</td>
<td>Oversight, management and monitoring of TVET policy interventions becomes more complex for central government with increased decentralization of responsibility to subnational levels, greater autonomy for public training providers and the enhanced profile of private training providers. Such decentralization requires governments to relinquish functions, and the influence and</td>
<td>Ministries need to demonstrate a diverse range of skills from negotiation and problem-solving to contract management. There is a need to process and assimilate increasing amounts of performance information and utilize this effectively across a range of policy domains. As agencies are established to oversee functions such as QA, employer engagement or funding, this can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and funding</td>
<td>Diversification of funding modalities; managed autonomy for public training providers and an expansion of private training provision</td>
<td>Ministries need to make efforts to increase funding contributions from a diverse range of stakeholders including employers. This involves holding a dialogue with employers (many of whom are naturally sceptical of government) to convince them of the bottom-line benefits of investing in training. Diversification efforts may also involve designing and implementing payroll levy, vouchers or similar TVET funding mechanisms. Managed autonomy for training providers and the adoption of payment by results funding mechanisms present further challenges to governments which need to either implement or delegate to a third party the creation of effective performance-based contracts with accompanying verification mechanisms and sanctions for noncompliance.</td>
<td>Ministries need to be able to talk to employers in terms which they understand and are receptive to if they are to convince them to invest in training or adopt a levy arrangement. Often the ministry of education is not best placed to lead these discussions which would be better led by a ministry of business or trade or by discussions between relevant line ministries and sector-specific employers. Introducing payment by results funding mechanisms for training institutions requires a shift in ministerial attitudes as well as an understanding of procurement and commercial contracting. If training institutions fall under the remit of individual line ministries (e.g. hospitality institutes under the ministry of tourism, agriculture colleges under the ministry of agriculture), introducing consistent performance-based funding regimes for public institutions will require significant levels of cooperation, collaboration and information-sharing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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4 The author has first-hand experience of such a situation with the UK Government’s £1 billion work-based training scheme, ‘Train to Gain’. Following a machinery of government change in 2007 there were ‘mirror’ policy officials in two government departments (the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills and the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) and one non-departmental public body (the Learning and Skills Council, LSC). Each set of officials believed that they had primary responsibility for overseeing the scheme, which caused tension, confusion and inertia. The situation was resolved by merging the two departments to form the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and replacing the LSC with the Skills Funding Agency, an executive agency with much closer links to its host department, BIS.
| Quality assurance, standard-setting, curriculum development and assessment | Development of national and regional qualifications frameworks and the blurring of traditional boundaries between academic and vocational learning streams; the introduction of new quality assurance mechanisms; managed autonomy for public training providers and an expansion of private training provision | Ministries need to recognize that some of the traditional policy ‘levers’ to influence behaviour and implement policy are no longer available to them. Instead of a ‘command and control’ style system they are now operating in a more complex environment of incentives, behaviour change, negotiation and delegation. This opens up a range of ‘soft’ (as opposed to ‘hard’) levers to influence implementation. It is important therefore that ministries attempt to fully understand the delivery system in which they are operating and the motivations, strengths and weaknesses of the actors in the system. They then need to establish systems that incentivize actors throughout the delivery system to work towards the achievement of national targets and desired outcomes. | Ministries need to collaborate with a wide range of agencies and bodies. These can include standard-setting bodies, sector representative bodies, funding agencies, qualifications and curriculum development agencies and examinations and testing authorities. While some of these agencies may have a clear reporting line to a single line ministry (such as the ministry of education) others (such as sector representative bodies) may have linkages with a number of ministries. Coordination between ministries is thus required to ensure that information is shared between the different organizations responsible for quality assurance, curriculum development and assessment so that they are working consistently towards a common set of objectives. Failure to achieve this coordination may lead to different actors in the QA system working towards contradictory aims. |
Table 2 demonstrates how, in theory, improved inter-ministerial coordination in TVET and skills development has an important role to play in enabling the effective adoption and implementation of TVET policies. The later sections of this publication examine the extent to which evidence exists to demonstrate that this is actually the case.

### 2.2 Models of inter-ministerial coordination

There are six broad types of mechanism used by government to oversee and manage the functions described in Section 2.1:

a. TVET and skills development is led by the MoE or equivalent body (Type 1). This is a common mechanism which is used in many countries to oversee TVET and skills development. In theory it should facilitate TVET coordination with general education policy. In some countries there is a demarcation between responsibility for policy and strategy, and for regulation, QA and implementation.

b. TVET and skills development is led by the MoL or equivalent body (Type 2). This is another common mechanism which is used in a number of countries. In theory it should facilitate TVET coordination with employment and labour market policy.

c. TVET and skills development is led by a dedicated TVET ministry (Type 3). This oversight mechanism is quite rare but has been deployed in countries concerned with fragmentation across ministries.

d. TVET and skills development is led by a TVET-focused government agency or non-departmental public body (Type 4). This type of oversight mechanism seeks to establish a stand-alone TVET and skills development body which, it is hoped, will act as a focus for coordination efforts across government. The perceived benefits of such a body are that, in principle, it provides a clear and dedicated focal point for skills development while also having some autonomy from its sponsoring ministry or department.

e. TVET and skills development is overseen by a coordinating council or similar body placed higher than the relevant departments (Type 5). In this model governments seek to facilitate coordination through the establishment of a council with representation from various ministries and agencies as well as social partners. The precise arrangements used can vary considerably.

f. Responsibility for TVET and skills development is disaggregated across line ministries without a permanent centralized coordination mechanism (Type 6). In these systems there is either no specific, formal government mechanism for coordinating TVET and skills development, or coordination takes place primarily through inter-ministerial skills’ meetings or committees that meet to discuss specific issues.
This classification of types of coordination and oversight mechanism is in some ways a simplification as countries have also developed multiple QA and financing agencies and administrative bodies. The typology above is nationally focused and does not in itself capture the range of mechanisms used to coordinate with subnational and local structures. Such mechanisms vary significantly depending upon the regional and local government systems in place across country contexts.

When classifying country case studies according to these six types of mechanism, the dividing lines between them are often far from clear-cut. As an example TVET and skills development might be led by a non-departmental public body or executive agency that is ultimately accountable to an MoE. In such a situation it is a judgement call whether to classify the system as Type 1 or Type 4. When making these decisions we were guided by an assessment of the strength and autonomy of the agency, its degree of decision-making independence from the host ministry, and the perception of stakeholders (particularly employers and other line ministries) of its degree of independence.

It is also the case that TVET and skills development governance systems are dynamic not static, and that a number of countries selected for case studies are in the process of transitioning from one type to another. With the increased emphasis on inter-ministerial coordination brought about by the global shifts in conceptual thinking and practice in TVET and skills development, we came across a number of countries where systems were transitioning from ‘traditional’ Type 1 or 6 arrangements to variants of Types 3–5. It is therefore important to take the level of maturity of a particular TVET system into account when assessing the relative effectiveness and impact of each type.
3. Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination
3. Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination

Section 3 considers how to define ‘success’ when considering the issue of inter-ministerial coordination. Without attempting an objective definition of success it is not possible to move beyond a descriptive and anecdotal assessment of the effectiveness and impact of inter-ministerial coordination. ‘Success’ is defined in terms of the objectives and goals of a country’s TVET policy viewed through the three interlocking ‘lenses’ of economic growth, social equity and sustainability (Marope et al., 2015). The publication then identifies the key foundational requirements which need to be in place in order for a TVET and skills development system to have a chance of achieving its economic growth, social equity and sustainability goals. Next it considers the potential role of inter-ministerial coordination (viewed through the perspective of the four key government functions set out in Section 2.1) in helping to ensure that these foundational requirements are in place. Section 3 then concludes by considering the key factors and trigger points that can facilitate or hamper effective inter-ministerial coordination efforts.

3.1 Defining ‘success’ – TVET and skills development policy objectives and the three lenses approach

Our overarching research question when examining country case studies is:

*Does the adoption of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms assist in the achievement of TVET and skills development policy objectives?*

While a fragmented approach to policy-making and a lack of coordination across ministries has been identified as a contributory factor to the ‘failure’ of TVET and skills development to achieve its potential, Marope and colleagues (2015, p. 147) identify a more fundamental problem, the ‘absence of a suitable, shared and inter-sectoral approach which could help to connect the analysis of TVET systems with intended development outcomes’. In an attempt to address this problem they propose a ‘new, integrated, analytical approach that combines economic growth, social equity and sustainability concerns in a balanced and strategic manner’ (2015, p. 147). Each of these three demand areas is conceived as an ‘analytical lens’ through which to view a country’s TVET system. This approach is set out in Figure 1.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

**Figure 1.** Three analytical lenses for transforming TVET

The intention of the ‘three lenses’ approach is to provide a conceptual framework for in-depth analytical work ahead of TVET system reform and policy development. This is intended to overcome the problems of reactive, poorly considered system reform and to strengthen the evidence of linkages between policy actions and positive developmental outcomes. The approach is intended to be flexible and adaptive, with governments able to review the three demands and give them different weighting depending on the local context and political priority (for instance, increasing focus on ‘economic growth’ if unemployment is the main issue, or increasing focusing on ‘social equity’ if addressing income inequality is the major policy priority). A brief overview of the three lenses is provided in *Annex 5*. 

A recent research think-piece commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) on the skills that will be required in the global workforce of 2030 reinforces the conceptual analysis which underpins the three lenses approach. This study (Dunbar, 2015) highlights the importance of considering economic growth, social equity and sustainability when looking at the requirements of the workforce in 2030.

*Source: Marope et al. (2015, p. 148).*
In conclusion, we can state that ‘success’ of TVET policy and systems reform can be assessed by the extent to which such reform achieves positive outcomes related to the three lenses of economic growth, social equity and sustainability. We must also consider the extent to which policy and systems reform is resilient to shocks and risks such as environmental degradation, conflict and instability, the increased flow of migrants and labour market unrest. Achieving positive outcomes across the three lenses will help to ensure that countries are developing the skills required by the global economy of tomorrow. Inter-ministerial coordination should facilitate the achievement of these outcomes if it is to have an instrumental purpose rather than simply an intrinsic value.

### 3.2 Identifying the key foundational requirements necessary for success

What are the key foundational requirements (or building blocks) that a TVET system needs in order to achieve successful outcomes in the context of the three lenses of economic growth, social equity and sustainability? We must answer this question in order to get a sense of the relative importance of inter-ministerial coordination in the context of systemic reform and policy development for improved outcomes. Is inter-ministerial coordination of central or peripheral importance to achieving TVET policy objectives? Does inter-ministerial coordination have an essential role to play in laying the foundations of a successful skills development and TVET system?

After reviewing the literature on critical foundational requirements of TVET systems (including Aring, 2011; ETF, 2012, Marope et al., 2015; Usman, 2013) we have created a list, set out in **Table 3**, of ten essential building blocks of an effective TVET system.
### Table 3 Ten essential building blocks of an effective TVET system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential building blocks of effective TVET systems</th>
<th>Description and justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains</td>
<td>The government’s aims and objectives for TVET and skills development are clear and widely understood in government and among key stakeholders. All stakeholders have a clear understanding of what they need to do to contribute to these aims. The cross-policy domain relevance of skills to national and subnational policy objectives is clearly stated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision</td>
<td>TVET provision is responsive to the needs of the labour market. The local labour market is sufficiently developed to view skills as an essential component in improving productivity and competitiveness. Employers are willing to pay for training and are satisfied that the training and qualifications on offer are producing workers with skills that will enhance their business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Well-functioning partnerships and networks promoting access and equity</td>
<td>TVET provision and learning opportunities are available to all who want to access them regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, social status or disability. Social partners (including civil society organizations) are actively engaged in TVET delivery, and work to ensure equality of access across the system. The existence of well-managed college/industry partnerships and recognition of non-formal learning and RPL further enhance access and opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High-performing, quality training institutions</td>
<td>Training institutions (public and private) have the capacity, staffing, equipment and facilities to deliver high-quality training which meets the expectations of employers and learners. Institutions provide high-quality student support services, have strong connections to their local labour market, and use these linkages to offer work-based learning opportunities and to improve the quality and relevance of their training. Institutions are gender-aware and are led by teams with strong leadership skills and an entrepreneurial approach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 See for example the World Economic Forum’s categorization of economies as ‘factor-driven’, ‘efficiency-driven’, or ‘innovation-driven’. The demand for skilled labour from employers will vary significantly depending on the stage of development of a particular labour market, by both country and by sector.
5. **Standardized QA mechanisms and portability of qualifications**  
Qualifications are widely recognized as being an accurate and trustworthy proxy for the actual skills and competencies of the bearer. Qualifications allow the bearer to choose from a number of high-quality recognized learning routes and progression pathways. Opportunities for continuing learning and progression exist for those who have been in employment for many years as well as new entrants to the labour market. QA systems ensure high-quality training or remedial measures where necessary.

6. **Stable and sustained financing**  
The TVET system is adequately financed to enable it to achieve anticipated outcomes. This financing is stable so that stakeholders can have the confidence to forward plan. Funding is directed towards priority areas, and performance-based incentives are in place to achieve positive outcomes. Funding comes from diverse sources, which reduces over-reliance on a single source and enhances stakeholder engagement and ownership.

7. **Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms**  
Institutions across the TVET system work effectively to transmit national policy priorities into deliverable activities. Incentives and related accountability and transparency measures are in place for training providers (both public and private). In addition to institutions, incentives also need to be in place for individuals so that people (including the poor) feel able to invest time and scarce resources in acquiring skills.

8. **Public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates**  
The TVET system is recognized by stakeholders and the general public as producing successful outcomes which lead to the attainment of valuable qualifications and sustainable employment with higher wage returns than unskilled workers. This success attracts more (and better qualified) learners to consider TVET options and encourages more employers to work with the TVET system. Training is provided for workers in the informal sector and for the self-employed as well as formal sector employees.

9. **Availability of accurate data and information including LMI**  
Monitoring, reporting and evaluation systems are in place so that policy-makers, stakeholders and members of the public are able to access accurate and timely information regarding progress against TVET and skills development activities, outputs and outcomes. This information should include performance information on training providers (both public and private) which is readily available for the public, employers and prospective learners. Data and information are collected, analysed and used to influence decision-making. They are sufficiently disaggregated to be meaningful for sectoral and subnational planning and decision-making. Without accurate and comprehensive LMI it will be very difficult to develop a training supply system which has labour market relevance and is demand-driven.
Government and TVET stakeholders display a willingness to challenge existing assumptions and continuously learn and improve on existing interventions. This involves both attitudes and the establishment of mechanisms to support the gathering and dissemination of information and research from a range of sources that might not traditionally have played a central role in the policy-making process. A culture should include mechanisms for evaluating the impact of TVET policy and programmes and examining the prospects for scaling up pilot and innovation projects as well as academic research. It should encourage interaction, collaboration and reflection so that TVET is implemented in a dynamic rather than static environment.

It can be argued that some of these ten requirements are more important than others (the absence of adequately staffed and resourced training institutions for example is likely to have a more immediate and deleterious impact on TVET performance than the absence of a culture of policy learning and continuous improvement). However we believe that all ten requirements are necessary if a country is to ensure that its TVET system and policies are able successfully to achieve significant progress on the ‘three lenses’ of economic growth, social equity and sustainability.

### 3.3 The role of inter-ministerial coordination in ensuring that key foundational requirements are in place

Now that we have identified the ten key foundational requirements of an effective TVET and skills development system, the next stage in our analysis is to assess the extent to which improved inter-ministerial coordination can assist in creating these ten building blocks.

The matrix in Table 4 provides an overview of the relationship between the ten key foundational requirements of an effective TVET system and the four functions of government discussed in Section 2.1. This analysis shows that all ten foundational requirements are related in some way to the key functions of government (the breadth of relationships are shown by the shaded sections of the table, with the depth of each relationship determined by the type of shading), demonstrating that government has a role to play in ensuring the achievement of all these foundational requirements. Table 4 also includes a column providing an initial assessment of the extent to which improved inter-ministerial coordination can impact on the successful achievement of each foundational requirement. The rating for this column is classified as either ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’, with ‘high’ meaning that improving inter-ministerial coordination may have a significant impact on achievement and ‘low’ that it is unlikely to have any real impact.
### Table 4
Relationship between the ten building blocks of a successful TVET system, the four functions of government and the potential impact of improved inter-ministerial coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10 Building blocks of an effective TVET and skills development system</th>
<th>Policy development and design</th>
<th>Planning, management and delivery, monitoring and evaluation</th>
<th>Finance and funding</th>
<th>QA, standard setting, curriculum development and assessment</th>
<th>Potential impact of improved inter-ministerial coordination (high/medium/low)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High - particularly in providing a unified vision and purpose across disparate policy domains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High - coordination across ministries and at subnational level can lead to improved relevance of policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Well-functioning partnerships and networks promoting access and equity with partners adequately representing their constituents’ interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium - improved coordination can lead to more effective engagement of a wider range of social partners in policy development and delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High-performing, quality training institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low – improved coordination at national or subnational levels may not have much direct impact on institutional quality, at least in the short term.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Standardized quality assurance mechanisms and portability of qualifications</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>High - particularly regarding the development of unified progression pathways and enhancing the credibility of qualifications.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stable and sustained financing</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td><strong>High</strong> - the budgeting system is a powerful tool for more integrated policy-making. Integrating it can contribute to improve transparency, synergy across sectors and facilitate accountability and performance monitoring.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms</th>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>High</strong> - improved coordination can identify and eliminate perverse incentives across policy domains at national and sub-national levels.</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates</th>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong> - enhanced coordination can lead to campaigns, branding and social marketing aimed at addressing public perceptions of skills.</td>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Availability of accurate data and information including LMI</th>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>High</strong> - coordination can be particularly effective in overcoming fragmentation in LMI/MIS systems (particularly in relation to data categorisation and data flows) so that a variety of relevant data sets can be considered when making policy decisions.</td>
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<th></th>
<th>Culture of policy learning and continuous improvement</th>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong> - coordination and information sharing can lead to improved understanding and learning across different policy domains.</td>
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</table>

**key**

- Significant impact
- Medium impact
- Some impact
Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination

This initial assessment identifies those areas where improved inter-ministerial coordination has ‘high’ potential to make an impact: leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains; standardized QA mechanisms and portability of qualifications; stable and sustained financing; well-functioning incentives and accountability mechanisms; and availability of accurate data and information including LMI. This means that, in TVET systems where these areas are problematic, improving inter-ministerial coordination might (if well designed) prove highly effective in improving performance.

Our assessment also identifies one area where improved inter-ministerial coordination has ‘low’ potential to make an impact – high-performing, quality training institutions – and three areas where it has ‘medium’ potential: well-functioning partnerships and networks promoting access and equity; public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates; and a culture of policy learning and continuous improvement. This means that, in TVET systems where these areas are problematic, enhancing inter-ministerial coordination might have some impact on improving performance but it will need to be combined with other activities to be truly effective.

This analysis creates a framework for countries to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their TVET and skills development system and then decide on the most appropriate and relevant policy activities to address identified shortcomings. Just as the ‘three lenses’ approach is flexible and adaptive, enabling countries to focus on their own priority areas, so too this analytical framework enables countries to identify the priority policy areas that are most likely to improve performance given their own specific situation.

Below are a series of practical examples across a variety of countries that illustrate some of the ways in which inter-ministerial coordination can impact on the building blocks set out in our analytical framework.

Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains

Developing a national skills strategy can be an effective means of improving coordination and providing a framework for cross-government consensus-building. Ireland introduced its latest ten-year Skills Strategy in January 2016, covering the period to 2025. This National Skills Strategy forms an integral part of the Irish Government’s long-term economic plan to restore full employment and build a sustainable economy. It is closely aligned with broader government policy including Enterprise 2025, Pathways to Work 2016–2020 and the Action Plan for Jobs.

Evidence suggests that, while a national skills strategy can be of great benefit in providing clarity of purpose across policy domains and a framework for coordinated action, implementation of such a strategy might be hindered if there is not a coordination and arbitration mechanism to resolve cross-government issues. The existence of a coordinating council however does not guarantee clarity of leadership and direction on skills development, as is apparent from the weaknesses in Nepal and Bangladesh.
As policy challenges become more complicated and require fast-moving cooperation between different agencies, many countries find that efforts can be hampered by complex governance structures which vary by policy area and involve the interaction of national, subnational and local-level agencies and actors. This means that, even if coordination structures and a clear national skills strategy are in place, national leadership and clarity of purpose might not be sufficient to ensure effective implementation if subnational structures are not effectively coordinated. Effective coordination needs to be both vertical (cooperation between higher and lower levels of government) and horizontal (across ministries and at a lower level, across local agencies) (OECD, 2014b).

In Norway, efforts to implement a whole-government approach to skills have been constrained by vertical coordination issues. Split responsibilities across various ministries are not unusual, but vertical integration is rendered particularly complex in Norway because the overlapping geographic boundaries of different agencies for education, labour and migrant integration services do not correspond with county limits (OECD, 2014b).

**Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision**

In order to ensure that training provision is responsive to the needs of the labour market, governments must either establish a delivery system whereby training institutions are incentivized and empowered to interact with employers and gather local LMI for which they then develop training provision, or develop systems to gather and disseminate LMI to all stakeholders. In practice the most effective systems combine both approaches.

Can inter-ministerial coordination play a role in enhancing the relevance of training provision? Certainly coordination mechanisms can assist in creating a bridge between the spheres of education and employment. Labour market assessments will generate employment information identifying skills needs in specific sectors of the economy, but this will then require a response from the education system if provision is to be mobilized to address these needs. In the United Kingdom for example, skills assessments such as the sector-specific studies carried out by sector skills surveys and the biannual National Skills Survey (carried out by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills) are used to update and develop new qualifications within the National Qualifications Framework (NQF).

There are also important benefits in utilizing skills and labour market assessments to coordinate employment and industrial policy. In Belgium skills assessment and anticipation exercises are used to generate economic incentives for companies to upskill or reskill workers in skills identified as being in short supply in the labour market.

In the Netherlands, labour market assessment exercises predicting a significant shortage of science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM)-related skills led to the formation of the Techniekpact (Technology Pact) in 2013. This is an example of issue-specific inter-ministerial coordination rather than a generalized coordination mechanism. It involves a partnership of ministries, social partners and regional authorities united around the achievement
of twenty-two specific activities to increase the number of students enrolled in STEM subjects while strengthening linkages between education and employers. The Netherlands Government recognizes that the key to success of the Techniekpact is effective regional-level implementation, hence this is the focus of coordination and implementation structures.

Place and locality are very important in determining the relevance of training provision, particularly in countries where there are significant variations in the composition of labour markets in different parts of the country. A number of countries have recognized the need to create forums where local stakeholders can discuss the findings of skills assessments and coordinate policy responses. In Portugal both regional and subregional actors are involved in discussing the findings of skills assessments. In Ireland, in response to a lack of effective local-level responses to skills needs, the government has created a body chaired by local authorities to assist in coordinating local responses and increasing the relevance of local provision.

**Standardized QA mechanisms and portability of qualifications**

Developing a standardized quality framework is seen as one means of enabling governments to strike the balance between the development of nationwide standards and allowing sufficient flexibility at local and institutional levels to respond to emerging needs. Are there examples where inter-ministerial coordination has helped to enhance the effectiveness of such efforts?

Austria is a good example of a country that has a complex skills governance system with differences in responsibility and approach between national, subnational and local structures (OECD, 2014a). This has led to stability and inclusion in policy-making with the involvement of many stakeholders, but it has also led to difficulties in responding rapidly to changing needs because of the absence of strategic steering mechanisms.

In Austria one of the consequences of a lack of vertical and horizontal inter-ministerial coordination is a skills system that lacks career progression pathways and portability of qualifications for prospective learners. This is a situation that can be found in many countries. In Nepal fragmentation and a lack of uniform standards has led to a similarly confused situation. Ten ministries or line government agencies in Nepal oversee institutions that provide skills training, including the Ministries of Industry, Labour, Health and Agriculture. The lack of a common policy framework and a uniform set of national qualification standards means that there is no consistency in competencies, as each ministry oversees a different assessment system.

Encouragingly there are examples of situations where inter-ministerial coordination has led to improvements in QA and the portability of qualifications. In Uganda the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development has worked in collaboration with other ministries to develop a workforce skills development strategy and plan (WSDSP) for the oil and gas subsector. The WSDSP sets out the actions Uganda will take to maximize the employment of Ugandans.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

in the oil and gas sector. This includes the promotion of a set of internationally recognized qualifications which have been agreed by all ministries in collaboration with international oil companies operating in Uganda. These qualifications, delivered by a mixture of public and private training providers, are promoted under a consistent set of branding so that prospective learners know that their training is industry-recognized. Ongoing coordination of the WSDSP is the responsibility of the National Content Steering Committee, which has a diverse membership.

In Sri Lanka, in an effort to address the fragmented QA arrangements and qualifications on offer, disparate public training providers of TVET have all been brought under one administrative roof – the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Skills Development – with the aim of improving consistency and QA.

**Stable and sustained financing**

The budgeting system is a powerful tool for more integrated policy-making, as the availability of adequate resources often guides the implementation of government priorities. Can inter-ministerial coordination therefore play a role in enhancing the availability of stable and sustained financing for TVET and skills development?

The coordinated financing of national skills development strategies and plans is made easier in situations where the political drive for skills development emanates from a ministry of finance or equivalent body. This was the situation in England and Wales in 2006 when the World Class Skills policy document was produced. As an absolute policy priority adequate funds were made available to all relevant government departments to achieve ambitious quantitative targets.

in Austria, there is a complex fiscal equalization system which distributes public funding across government levels, and hinders the capacity of policy-makers to ‘steer’ the skills system. For example, adult education is largely financed and provided by the Public Employment Service (PES) which only reaches the unemployed, yet only 5 per cent of Austria’s low-skilled population are classified as unemployed while 62 per cent are in employment, and 33 per cent are classed as inactive. As a result this majority cannot be reached by the PES (OECD, 2014a).

In Norway, horizontal inter-ministerial coordination on skills is carried out through a series of inter-ministerial working groups, committees and action plans. These are often time-bound and task-specific rather than being permanent structures. Norway has a highly consensual national government system which uses a Council of Ministers to ensure that all ministries are broadly incentivized to achieve agreements with each other. However, even with clearly assigned ministerial responsibility for addressing skills challenges, a lack of formalized pre-agreement in the national budgetary process can block incentives to cooperate, particularly when costs and incentives fall across different ministerial remits. This can lead to policy development being conducted as ‘silos’ within ministries even when the challenges being
addressed spill over across policy domains (OECD, 2014b).

With complex delivery systems and each agency and ministry holding its own dedicated budget and setting its own specific priorities, the OECD (2014b, p. 138) points out that ‘Institutional complexity can create a logic driven by the delivery system rather than one centred on the needs of the user.’

**Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms**

One of the areas where the benefits of improved inter-ministerial coordination seem self-evident is in aligning incentives and accountability mechanisms to drive purposive action across the delivery system. Evidence demonstrates that it is a case not simply of establishing structures but also of understanding the political economy of these coordination structures so that they can assist in aligning incentives.

As an example, Nepal’s TVET council (CTVET) is hampered by a conflict of interest as its remit spans a wide range of functions including policy development, QA and delivery. This means that it is too burdened with implementation tasks and oversight of public training institutions to deliver effectively on other aspects of its remit (ADB and Australian Aid, 2014). Clearly when a coordinating council is established as part of efforts to improve inter-ministerial coordination, care needs to be taken to ensure a separation of responsibilities in the agreed structure. Failure to separate responsibility for regulation from delivery of training is unlikely to lead to well-aligned incentives or impartial accountability mechanisms.

Bhutan has a well-planned coordination structure with an apex agency (NTTA) embedded in the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, but its effectiveness is hampered by a shortage of personnel in the ministry and changes in ministry leadership during the transition to democracy (ADB and Australian Aid, 2014). The case of Bhutan highlights the necessity for well-functioning, capacitated institutions. Improved coordination involves not just getting the structure right but also resourcing it adequately with qualified people.

Incentives are linked closely to financing. Funding flows and the promise of funds are an important means of nudging the delivery system to deliver on national priorities. Going back to the case of Austria, the OECD (2014a, p. 143) notes that the complex system of local governance leads to ‘distorted incentives as funding support is stronger for some parts of the system than others’. These poorly aligned incentives are one consequence of the lack of a formal coordination body.

**Availability of accurate data and information including labour market information (LMI)**

Accurate, timely and relevant LMI is an essential component of a demand-driven skills system in which government is able to coordinate activities to close the evolving gap between skills supply and skills demand in the shortest time possible.
Can inter-ministerial coordination have a positive impact on the collection and usage of LMI and related data? Portugal provides a good example of a skills system where the establishment of a respected and independent institution, ANQEP, providing high-quality data on skills and LMI, has helped to build consensus and improve information flows. ANQEP has played a positive role because its work is respected and it is viewed by the three ministries involved as not having a particular agenda to push. As a result ministries accept the accuracy of its findings and are willing to use this data to inform decision-making. As all three ministries are involved in the institutional architecture of ANQEP, they are also able to play a role in ensuring that the data collected through assessment processes is relevant, useful and can be applied practically in policy-making processes (OECD, 2015).

Norway is another example of a country that has a strong skills assessment and anticipation system (OECD, 2014b). Employment and education authorities are jointly involved in the design and development of forecasts carried out by Statistics Norway. This helps to ensure ownership, and means that outputs are useful and intelligible for policy-making. (This can be an issue in systems where information collection is carried out by agencies with limited connection to ministries, and data can be presented in a format that is not compatible with policy-makers’ needs.) Interestingly, in Norway, formal discussions on the findings of Statistics Norway and the implications for policy, happen only at the regional level. One reason is that Norway’s labour market is highly segregated along geographic lines.

Austria also recognizes the importance of gathering disaggregated data in order to provide information that can be useful to a skills system that involves a significant number of subnational actors. That is why Austria has introduced the Qualifications Barometer, a data-gathering system in which information on current and short-term qualifications needs is disaggregated by occupational category and by region.

In Australia and the United Kingdom there is close cooperation between education and employment policy, as data from sector skills assessments are used to update occupational standards and on-the-job training courses. In both countries this process is led by dedicated sector bodies.

The example of Uganda shows that consensus and coordination across government ministries and with social partners is facilitated by the availability of high-quality skills assessments, but that such assessments are hard to conduct across many sectors. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development conducted a high-quality needs assessment in 2014 which quantified the number of jobs likely to be generated by the oil and gas industry, disaggregated by occupational type and qualifications level. This assessment provided a very firm foundation for the development of the WSDSP mentioned earlier. However, a series of factors unique to the oil and gas sector facilitated the high-quality nature of this assessment. In 2015, when the World Bank supported the Ugandan Ministry of Works and Transport to carry out a similar exercise in the logistics sector, the assessment results were far from robust.
The importance of high-performing training institutions

From the mid-1990s onwards the first democratically elected government in South Africa prioritized skills development, seeking to overhaul the system that existed during the apartheid years. South Africa’s priorities were set out in the country’s National Skills Development Strategy produced by the Department of Labour. The next decade saw the introduction of a number of measures which represent international best practice for the common intervention areas identified in Section 1.2. These included the establishment of sectoral education and training authorities (Setas) as a means of increasing employer and trade union engagement in skills development. Financing was diversified through the introduction of a levy-grant system through which employers pay 1 per cent of payroll costs, of which 80 per cent goes to fund Setas and 20 per cent goes into a National Skills Fund intended to fund training for disadvantaged groups and the unemployed (Allais, 2012).

In addition to these structural changes, South Africa developed a National Qualifications Framework (NQF) intended to replace all existing qualifications with new outcomes-based qualifications designed in partnership with stakeholder bodies (Allais, 2012). Reforms were intended to reach across the whole education system, with the Department of Labour announcing that apprenticeships would be replaced by broader ‘learnerships’ and the Department of Education developing a new curriculum and new general qualifications. These were designed to be broader and more substantial than the previous offer.

What impact did these interventions have? Allais (2012, p. 634) provides the following concise summary:

“in terms of the system’s own (arguably questionable) targets, the system has not been a total failure. There is no doubt, however, that levels of training for artisans and other mid-level skills remains extremely low (Mukora, 2009). Numbers enrolled in vocational and occupational education programmes are low. The quality of provision is very erratic. Throughput rates of the colleges are very low (Taylor, 2011). In short, the Skills Development Strategy led to little ‘skills development’. “

There is a rich and varied literature setting out the potential causes and symptoms of this relative policy failure. Allais (2012, p. 637) provides a summary of what she believes is at the heart of the issue:

“What the South African case shows is how a policy which on the one hand is strongly centralizing – in terms of control and accountability mechanisms, and standards specification – but on the other, strongly decentralizing – in terms of the management and delivery of education and the development of curriculum – has been very damaging to a sector which is extremely diverse and mainly institutionally weak. This model made it unlikely that the National Skills Development Strategy could contribute to the development of a training system, because of its focus on regulatory systems instead of building and developing education institutions.”

If we relate this case study to our analytical framework, insufficient attention was paid to building block number 4 (high-performing, quality training institutions) and this ultimately
led to the failure to achieve the intended policy outcomes. This demonstrates the critical importance of this building block. Although all ten building blocks identified through our analysis are important, we can hypothesize that there is a logical order and hierarchy to ensuring that these blocks are all in place. The case of South Africa demonstrates that building block 4 may well be a key foundational block which needs to be put in place before serious attention should be paid to achieving some of the others.

3.4 Key factors and trigger points that can facilitate or hamper inter-ministerial coordination efforts

Now that we have identified the areas where improved inter-ministerial coordination can potentially have a significant positive impact, the next stage in our analysis is to identify the key factors and trigger points that can facilitate or hamper inter-ministerial coordination efforts. The detailed country case studies provide an opportunity to explore these factors in more detail, to gain a deeper understanding of their cause and impact.

Here are seven possible trigger points that can affect inter-ministerial coordination efforts.

1. **Political and governmental willingness**: Do the key political actors in government and the key officials in the concerned ministries really want to improve inter-ministerial coordination? If there is genuine willingness from the most senior leaders in government to improve coordination, this will increase its chances of success. Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in performance because they are merely ‘capability traps’, which Andrews and colleagues (2012, p. 2) define as ‘a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt “reforms” to ensure ongoing flows of external financing and legitimacy yet never actually improve’.

**Trigger Point 1: Senior leaders across government portfolios have a genuine commitment to improving inter-ministerial coordination for TVET and skills development.**

2. **Strategic vision**: If the government has clarity over what it wants to achieve on TVET and skills development, this creates a focus and objective for inter-ministerial coordination. This in turn creates a stimulus for improved coordination. Marope and colleagues (2015) note that countries that have adopted an HRD approach have often been the most successful in delivering on their economic development goals since the mid-twentieth century. In Malaysia for example, there is a clear link between TVET systems and national development goals, which in turn provides a clear purpose for inter-ministerial coordination. Similarly, when politicians make public statements setting out the scale of their ambition for TVET this can have the effect of
Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination

galvanizing policy-makers and putting pressure on civil servants. Regardless of how achievable these goals are, they create focus, direction and urgency which can be harnessed to improve inter-ministerial coordination.

Trigger Point 2: Senior leaders are clear about their objectives for TVET and skills development and are willing to stake their reputation through public pronouncements on intended outcomes.

3. Adequate civil service capacity and institutional arrangements: Willingness and good intentions may be necessary factors in effective inter-ministerial coordination but they will not, by themselves, lead to improved coordination if there is inadequate capacity and capability within the civil service. If the civil service lacks the capacity and capability to develop these skill sets, inter-ministerial coordination might well be unsuccessful. Bhutan is an example of a country with well-designed coordination structures which are hampered by a lack of skilled officials. Given the increasing range of social partners with a more central role in TVET systems it is also important to consider their capacity and capability. If they are weak then inter-ministerial coordination might be suboptimal. Capacity does not just have to be in place, it also needs to be deployed effectively if meaningful coordination is to be achieved. If appropriate institutional arrangements are not in place, the capacity and skills of talented individuals in the civil service will not have an impact on improving coordination.

Trigger Point 3: The civil service and relevant social partners have sufficient capacity and capability which is deployed effectively to implement the proposed reforms and achieve meaningful inter-ministerial coordination.

4. Crisis events and structural socio-economic changes: Crisis events and ‘shocks’ are recognized in public policy theory as having the potential to catalyse significant changes in practices which would not be considered in a period of equilibrium. If there is widespread acceptance and acknowledgement of a significant problem, this creates opportunities to challenge the status quo. Tanzania’s dismal public examinations pass rates in 2013 and the subsequent introduction of the Big Results Now! (BRN) education programme is a good example of such an event. The window of opportunity presented by such crises or shocks is generally relatively short, but during it stakeholders need to utilize the disruption generated to build the foundation of an alternative, more effective system.

Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

Trigger Point 4: A recent ‘crisis’ event or socio-economic shock has generated consensus on the need for change which can be harnessed to improve inter-ministerial coordination.

5. Labour market structure and political-economic relationships between employers, government and social partners: While more relevant to the interaction between social partners and government than to coordination between ministries, the structure of the labour market can have a profound impact on the effectiveness of government policy efforts to bridge the gap between skills supply and demand. Various research studies have demonstrated the impact of labour market structures on skills, training and human capital formation (see for example Iverson and Stephens, 2008; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Their analysis emphasizes that skills formation and vocational training are reflective of the underpinning political-economic institutional structure. From reviewing the literature it is clear that there is a need for this type of labour market analysis to be extended from developed capitalist contexts and applied in developing country contexts.

However, the implications of such an analysis for the interaction between government and social partners are clear: the ease of forming partnerships will depend on the nature of the underpinning political-economic institutional structures in the economy. Facilitating partnerships between government, employers and social partners will be most challenging in countries with a history of individualistic action and voluntarist engagement. It is therefore important that policy-makers have a strong understanding of the particular political-economic institutional structures prevalent in their own country, and design inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms with these in mind.

Trigger Point 5: The underpinning political-economic institutional structures in a particular country are conducive to coordination between government and social partners when coordination mechanisms are designed with these structures in mind.

6. Availability of accurate and timely information on labour markets, employment and skills development metrics: If government, employers and social partners are producing information that demonstrates failings in the current TVET and skills development system, this can act as a catalyst to drive improved inter-ministerial coordination. The existence of such information, perhaps gathered by sector-specific bodies, can demonstrate that there are significant skills shortages or gaps in certain parts of the economy. This in turn can focus ministerial attention on addressing these shortages and gaps, hence leading to enhanced inter-ministerial coordination as a means of trying to ensure a closer match between skills supply and demand.
Critical success factors in inter-ministerial coordination

Trigger Point 6: The need for accurate and timely information on labour markets, employment and skills development metrics acts as a catalyst for improved inter-ministerial coordination.

7. **Connection between resource availability, allocation and coordination objectives**: Government policy objectives cannot be achieved without the allocation of sufficient finances and resources (both human and material). In order to be effective, inter-ministerial coordination efforts must be backed with sufficient resources to implement the proposed activities as planned. This requires the active engagement of the government department, ministry or agency with responsibility for resource allocation. In many cases this will be the ministry of finance. Many government coordination structures across a variety of sectors have historically failed because of the lack of engagement of the ministry of finance. Without the body responsible for resource allocation involved in such discussions, plans can focus on what stakeholders would like to do rather than what they are actually capable of doing.

Trigger Point 7: Adequate resources are available to support improved inter-ministerial coordination, and the government agency responsible for allocating funding (often the ministry of finance) displays sufficient interest in engaging with coordination efforts and/or making resources available to fund these efforts.

These seven trigger points are not mutually exclusive, and a number of them may overlap at any one time in a particular country context. Through a series of twelve country case studies we shall explore their occurrence and identify the extent to which each of them acts as a catalyst for improved inter-ministerial coordination. The terms of reference and summary country case studies are contained in Annex 1 and Annex 2.
4. Results and analysis of country case studies
4. Results and analysis of country case studies

4.1 Background to the case studies

Methods of assessment

Building on the results of the literature review, Section 4 of this publication provides information on, and analyses, the twelve country case studies, the aims of which were to:

(i) determine the relative strength of each of the ten building blocks of an effective TVET and skills development system, identified through the literature review

(ii) analyse and describe the particular type of coordination model in use (Types 1–6)

(iii) establish whether any of the seven trigger points apply to the particular country context.

The countries for which case studies were constructed are:
Type 1, MoE or equivalent body in the lead: the Russian Federation and Turkey
Type 2, MoL or equivalent body in the lead: Malawi and Tunisia
Type 3, dedicated TVET ministry in the lead: India and Burkina Faso
Type 4, TVET-focused government agency in the lead: Jamaica and the Philippines
Type 5, coordinating council placed higher than relevant bodies: France and Bangladesh
Type 6, TVET disaggregated across line ministries: Republic of Korea and Canada.

Summaries of each country case study are provided in Annex 2 and a grid plotting the relative strength of the ten building blocks in each country, according to the information in the case studies, is included as Annex 3.

The sample of case studies, two of each type, is too small to draw conclusive results. The case studies have been prepared by different people and therefore do not necessarily use common standards with which to judge the impact of a building block on a country’s TVET and skills development system. Therefore the following cumulative results of the case studies should be used with caution and cannot be extrapolated from.

4.2 Results of the case studies

For some of the building blocks there is no discernible pattern to their performance according to type of governance arrangement. Below we use the analysis in Annex 3 to draw attention to some issues worth noting.
As reported in Section 3.3, building block 4, high-performing quality training institutions, could be regarded as a foundational block which needs to be in place before addressing the other building blocks, even although it has a low impact on improved ministerial coordination. It is therefore interesting to note that, according to the case studies, the countries were evenly split between those with above-average and strong training institutions and those with average or below-average ones. Countries in which either the MoE or MoL were in the lead all fell into the latter category, while countries in which TVET is led by a dedicated government agency or is disaggregated across line ministries are reporting above-average or strong training institutions. This might be the result of the type of governance arrangement or it might be the result of funding decisions, as the four countries reporting high-performing, quality training institutions also reported stable and sustained financing. Three of them were also strong or above average for the availability of accurate data and information, including LMI, and reported strong graduation and employment rates. From this it could be deduced that countries in which the TVET and skills development system results in high-performing, quality training institutions which deliver good exam and employment results, have done so at least in part through providing these institutions with stable and sustained financing, and they have been able to base their strategies and actions on accurate data and information.

In almost all of the countries studied, leadership and clarity of purpose were reported as being strong and none were reported as below average, sometimes despite other weaknesses in their systems. The case studies report an above-average level of stakeholders’ understanding of the TVET and skills development system and the objectives it aims to achieve. In some cases, such as India, the purpose has been widely and strongly articulated by the prime minister himself. None of the other building blocks performed so well, suggesting that although this is a critical building block it is relatively easy to achieve. The challenges come later, in turning political statements and goals into action.

Another of the building blocks that shows a strong performance in TVET and skills development systems is standardized QA mechanisms and portable qualifications. This is reported as being above average in eight of the country case studies, although the remaining four are still reporting as below average. Performance varied across all of the different types of TVET governance, but those in which the MoL or a dedicated government agency is in the lead, performed most strongly. Of the four countries reported as below average, three are in the process of introducing national qualification frameworks (Turkey, India and Bangladesh), which could be expected to have a positive impact on both QA and portability. However, so far this does not appear to be the case. The results of the case studies show no correlation between strong QA and portability of qualifications, and the introduction of a coordinating mechanism such as a framework.

No country was reported as having particularly strongly functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms, with as many as seven reporting their impact as being only average or weak. Again the results showed no discernible pattern, although those systems in which the MoL was the lead agency were reported as particularly weak in this building block.
Although, as stated above, it would be rash to read too much into the analysis of a small number of country case studies, those countries in which a TVET-focused government agency or non-departmental body is in the lead appear to be having the most positive impact on the quality of the TVET and skills development system. At the other end of the spectrum, countries in which the MoE is in the lead appear to perform below average across a majority of building blocks. As is reported in the case study on Malawi, where responsibility for TVET was transferred out of the MoE, this might be because the sector is competing for funds against high-priority primary education, and suffers from a consequent lack of political and policy attention.

While this might be interpreted as meaning that having a TVET-focused government agency in the lead is to be welcomed, while leaving TVET to the MoE should be avoided, this data cannot be considered sufficiently robust to justify generalization. Similarly, the fact that both of the countries in which the MoL is in the lead report below average institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms, and availability of accurate data and (LMI) information, does not mean that all countries in which the MoL is in the lead would have the same experience.

Such a cautious approach is further justified by noting that there are often significant variations between countries using the same governance typology. These include:

- The Russian Federation and Turkey are countries in which the MoE has responsibility for TVET. Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision (building block 2) perform strongly in the Russian Federation yet have been rated below average in Turkey.

- France and Bangladesh have both adopted Type 5 in which TVET and skills development are overseen by a coordinating council. Yet for three building blocks (finance, LMI and policy learning, and continuous improvement) France has experienced a strong impact on its inter-ministerial coordination while in Bangladesh it is rated below average.

- The Republic of Korea and Canada are both countries in which governance of TVET is disaggregated across line ministries without a permanent, centralized coordination mechanism (Type 6). In the Republic of Korea there has been an above-average impact on inter-ministerial coordination from the building blocks of labour market relevance and quality assurance and portability of qualifications, while in Canada the impact has been rated as weak in those respects.

There appears to be greater consistency within any single country’s performance (if it is strong in one building block it is likely to be strong in others; if it is below average in one building block it is likely to be below average in others) than a strong correlation between types of governance and specific building blocks.

This suggests that other factors are at play, and that the governance model adopted is not the only, or not the most critical, factor in determining a successful governance regime for TVET. The analysis in Annex 3 also suggests that some building blocks are inherently
more difficult to put in place, regardless of the governance model. For example, while a majority of countries are assessed as ‘strong’ or ‘above average’ for leadership and clarity of purpose, the majority are assessed as only ‘average’ or ‘below average’ for having well-functioning partnerships and networks or achieving public esteem and good graduation and employment rates.

4.3 Critical features for successful inter-ministerial coordination

What emerges from the case studies is not whether one style of inter-ministerial coordination delivers superior results to the others, but rather the importance of certain features that must be present for any typology to be successful. The presence or lack of these features in the case studies impacts strongly on the success or otherwise of a country’s inter-ministerial coordination. The six most critical features are identified below.

1. Responsibility underpinned by authority

Whichever typology is in place, its effectiveness in coordinating the work of different ministries and government agencies will depend heavily on the authority bestowed on it.

**Turkey: Type 1**

MoNE chairs the VEC, composed of representatives of ministries, public agencies, employers and workers. But decisions made in the VEC are not binding and therefore do not always lead to progress being made.

In Turkey, we can see that although the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) has been allocated the chairmanship of the Vocational Education Council (VEC), decisions made in VEC meetings are not binding, and as a result MoNE is deprived of the authority to implement them immediately. This slows down the policy implementation process and weakens coordination.

Similarly, in Tunisia, where the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) has been given responsibility for coordination, neither the ministry nor its agencies have the authority to issue directives that other ministries must execute or the power to impose any behavioural rules. This situation seriously diminishes MVTE’s ability to bring coherence to the TVET and skills development system.

As these difficulties are not reported for Types 3 and 4 (although the authority of the Ministry for Skills Development in India is still to be fully tested), it could be assumed that responsibility without authority is more likely to occur when one line ministry has to impose its policy on another. Indeed, as an example of Type 6, the Republic of Korea has experienced difficulty in having one line ministry take the lead in developing and managing cooperative agendas related to other ministries and so resorts to a higher authority.

However, in the Russian Federation, where a government decree mandates the Ministry of Science and Education (MoSE) to coordinate the educational activities of federal, public organizations and the executive, MoSE decisions are compulsory and must be followed by
other ministries and private organizations. The differences therefore between the two examples of Type 1 are that the MoE in one (the Russian Federation) has been vested with authority as well as responsibility, while the MoE in the other (Turkey) has relatively less authority.

**The Russian Federation: Type 1**
MoSE is mandated by government decree to coordinate educational activities of federal, public organizations and executive authorities of the Russian Federation by making decisions that it is compulsory for other ministries and organizations to implement.

In France, the authority of the National Council for Employment and Vocational Training and Guidance (CNEFOP), the quadripartite coordinating body, is vested in its proximity to the prime minister, who appoints all members, and its reporting line to the General Secretariat of Social Ministries. Although a similar structure with similar links exists in Bangladesh, its operation is suboptimal owing to lack of capacity and infrequency of meetings.

2. Clarity of role and purpose
Inter-ministerial coordination is more easily achieved when the role of each player is clearly defined. However, the allocation of roles needs to be revisited as the policy environment changes. For example in the Republic of Korea, the introduction of an NQF and competence-based education and training is leading to a blurring of the previous distinction between vocational education and vocational training. This in turn challenges the definition of the role and purpose of the two ministries responsible, and new lines of authority need to be drawn.

**Tunisia: Type 2**
The Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) has the mandate to set strategy, provide incentives and resources to achieve TVET objectives and is responsible for collaboration between all partners. It fulfils its responsibilities through three agencies. Neither MVTE nor these agencies have the authority to issue directives that other ministries must execute, or the power to impose any behavioural rules. Communication and coordination between ministries and agencies is regarded as imperfect.

In Burkina Faso, the growing importance of TVET to the nation’s economic development has been reflected in its change of status from department to ministry with an expanded role and remit to implement the National Policy. Changes are also under way in Bangladesh, with plans for the establishment of a National Skills Development Authority. While this might be a natural redrawing of the lines of authority, it will be important that the weaknesses inherent in Bangladesh’s current system are not replicated in the new one.

The redrawing of lines of authority is also evident in India, where a new ministry has been established bringing agencies that were previously autonomous or attached to other ministries within its authority. This allows roles and purpose to be clarified, as all report to a
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

Malawi: Type 2
The Government of Malawi responded to the crisis in the very small numbers of young people who were receiving skills training and the large numbers of unskilled people trapped in subsistence farming, by establishing an inter-ministerial National Steering Committee to ensure wider participation and involvement of all stakeholders from national down to community level.

In other instances, and Canada is a strong example of this, the role and purpose of different bodies can be very clearly defined but other characteristics undermine the achievement of inter-ministerial coordination. Even in Jamaica, where each stakeholder has a clearly defined role, there is a call for greater clarity of purpose across different policy domains.

The role and purpose of stakeholders therefore need to be regularly considered, and adjusted if necessary, to take account of a changing environment, because not only do the roles need to be well defined, they need also to be fit for purpose. Clarity of role and purpose does not appear to be the preserve of one or two of the typologies, but is a benefit to all of them.

3. Nature and momentum of consultation and coordination mechanisms
In every case study, mechanisms, sometimes quite elaborate ones, have been established to facilitate the widely recognized need for coordination and consultation. In addition to the question of their authority (as addressed in (1) above) there are also questions around their commitment.

India: Type 3
There were up to seventeen government departments with some responsibility for TVET in India. This led to a rationalization of the governance system in 2014 under the newly formed Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship. Although it is too early to say whether this will lead to improved inter-ministerial coordination, some of the six critical features reported on here are beginning to emerge.

In Tunisia, an example of Typology 2, it was decreed that the main coordination mechanism was to be the Supreme Council of Human Resource Development. Despite, or perhaps because of, having the prime minister as chair, it is regarded as ineffective and has not met for over six years. Possibly as a result, the Permanent Commission for TVET Co-ordination, which reported to it, has lost most of its functions.

However, as these bodies continue to exist, even if only on paper, they might be preventing a more effective coordination mechanism from being introduced. The same weakness occurs in Malawi, where the National Steering Committee displays the high priority given to TVET through the seniority of its members, but fails to meet regularly because of the competing calls on their time. The same weakness is evident in Bangladesh, and together these three examples...
highlight the danger inherent in nominating very senior officials who, while demonstrating the government’s commitment to the task, cannot give the time required to fulfil the consultation and coordination role expected of them, resulting in a lack of momentum.

In the Republic of Korea, where responsibility for TVET and skills development is disaggregated across line ministries, some mechanisms are proving more successful than others, although the power to make decisions and impose authority often reverts to, or is dependent on, the support of, the president. While a lack of policy momentum has led to suboptimal results for the Social and Cultural Affairs ministerial meetings, at the same time use of the National Policy Co-ordination Council is increasing and has shown good results in recent TVET initiatives.

**Burkina Faso: Type 3**

Over the past two decades Burkina Faso has continuously reformed its TVET governance, most recently establishing a Ministry of Youth, Training and Professional Integration (MJFIP) in 2011. Despite its efforts to improve the quantity and quality of TVET, the proportion of TVET students in post-primary and secondary education remains low at less than 4 per cent.

In Canada, with its highly disaggregated TVET system, increased awareness of common priorities among stakeholders has led to greater demand for collaboration and concern about the political and economic costs of fragmentation. France, although it does not have a disaggregated system, does have a heavily devolved one, and in those regions where political backing is unclear the system is weakened.

The case studies suggest that consultation and coordination mechanisms are only effective when they have authority, clearly defined functions, meet regularly and serve common interests. These features need not be exclusive to one or two types of governance but are relevant across all six.

**4. Culture of governance**

**Jamaica: Type 4**

The mandate for TVET lies with the Human Employment and Resource Training (HEART) Trust, and is influenced by Jamaica’s first long-term strategic development plan, Vision 2030, for which there is an inter-ministerial mechanism coordinated by the Planning Institute of Jamaica. There is a culture of strong commitment and leadership across the coordinating mechanisms for TVET.

Since a governance culture cannot be changed overnight, it does need to be taken into account in the establishment of coordination mechanisms. Tunisia’s five years of political instability and the slow transition to democracy have left their mark on how the government operates. In the Republic of Korea, government departmental defence of their identity and territory has created a governance culture which depends on direct intervention by the president to ensure policy implementation.

Outside influence can also be brought to bear, as in Jamaica where the TVET system has been heavily
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

Influenced by the Caribbean Heads of Government strategy for workforce development and economic competitiveness. And in Canada, the highly devolved arrangements, hindering coordination in so many ways, do also allow space for inter-provincial accords to address local priorities.

France’s culture, which depends to an extent on informal relationships and flexibility, is well suited to the Typology 5 arrangement where an overarching body provides a forum for coordination while allowing the ministries themselves to make their own operational arrangements. Although Bangladesh provides a similar forum, there is a marked contrast in its effectiveness owing to Bangladesh’s culture of announcing ambitious plans but without the resources and capacity to implement them.

Inter-ministerial coordination arrangements, to be effective and regardless of typology, need to take these cultural influences into account so that they accommodate them rather than conflict with them.

5. Competition/influence over funding

A key factor in the success of inter-ministerial coordination is control over funding. It enables the lead ministry to influence the actions of other ministries. This is the case in the Russian Federation where, each year, MoSE decides on the number of students who will be funded by the state budget in all TVET organizations under the management of federal ministries. In this way, MoSE influences the scale and scope of training carried out by other ministries.

In contrast in Turkey, the other Type 1 country, MoNE, which is the lead ministry, receives funding from the central budget only for its own activities. The Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS) also receives its funding directly from the central budget. There is therefore no opportunity for the MoNE to use funding as a way of influencing the work of MoLSS and fostering coordination. Each ministry prepares and submits its budget proposal without any coordination mechanism embedded in the central budget allocation. This might be a contributory factor in the general perception of weak coherence of education policies and labour market outcomes in Turkey.

Philippines: Type 4
Inter-ministerial coordination in the Philippines is managed through the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority. Results are mixed – agreement and a shared commitment by stakeholders on key issues is counterbalanced by slow progress on the introduction of a levy-grant system and on the devolution of training centres to local government units.
A similar situation exists in Tunisia, a country in which MVTE is in charge of TVET and skills development. MVTE is often unable to provide sufficient financial incentive to encourage effective coordination, and the three ministries in charge of education prepare their budgets separately. The other Type 2 country, Malawi, while benefiting from strong leadership, still struggles to provide adequate funding to public institutions, reflecting the doubts people have about the current fiscal environment, characterized by high inflation rates and depreciation against other currencies.

Like Malawi, Bangladesh is heavily dependent on donor funding, which influences its spending decisions and the future sustainability of its provision. As funds follow the line ministries and the NSDC is relatively weak, part of Bangladesh’s difficulties lies in a lack of coherence between different budget streams.

The positive influence that undisputed control of funding can have is clear in Jamaica, where HEART/NTA has sole jurisdiction and responsibility for the collection and disbursement of a 3 per cent employer tax levy. This allows it to influence the activities of all stakeholders and to ensure coherence with national policy.

Increased funding influence is becoming apparent in the Republic of Korea, with the establishment of an Employment Insurance Fund under the control of the Ministry of Employment and Labour (MoEL). Its ‘rival’ for the TVET and skills development portfolio, the MoE, has far fewer financial resources at its disposal, and as the distinction between vocational education and vocational training blurs, is becoming dependent on MoEL to provide funds for training provision which is under the policy direction of MoE. Were it so inclined, MoEL could use this situation to influence the policy direction of MoE and foster stronger coordination.

Even in Canada’s disaggregated system, the federal government is largely responsible for funding TVET and skills development through funding agreements, and is therefore in a position to influence policy and delivery through attaching conditions to spending.
In India, an example of Typology 3, failure to attract public–private partnerships and the additional financing they might bring through corporate social responsibility (CSR) or other funds, is a major concern, as the government struggles to provide most of the financing of skills training. This militates against stability and sustainability.

Yet again regardless of typology, ownership of the purse strings is critical to effective inter-ministerial coordination. Control over funding needs to rest with the entity that has the responsibility and authority for TVET and skills development, so that even when other entities may have responsibility for delivery, their cooperation with the lead entity and conformance with national policy can be assured.

6. Integrated HRD system with joined-up pathways

The positive impact that an integrated HRD system can have on inter-ministerial coordination is evident in Jamaica. The country benefits from having developed Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan, which is an inter-ministerial initiative. The policies and strategies of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Information are influenced by Vision 2030 and in turn guide the operations of HEART/NTA, the body responsible for TVET and skills development. As an inter-ministerial initiative, Vision 2030 also has a highly structured, inter-ministerial coordination mechanism with high-level representation and a super-ministry providing oversight. Having TVET and skills development as a constituent part of a wider HRD system provides a level of support to inter-ministerial coordination not seen in the other case studies.

In contrast, Canada’s patchwork of policies and initiatives, while possibly effective at a local level for provincial labour markets, lacks national coherence and is not best placed to serve a mobile working population wishing to access national and international career opportunities.

France, despite its largely successful attempts at coordination, still lacks a national skills strategy, far less an integrated HRD system, and students are disadvantaged by the lack of articulation between the various public qualifications. Lack of articulation is also a problem in Bangladesh, where the NTVQF has been designed but the resources to make it operational are still inadequate.

As an aid to economic and social development, having a comprehensive HRD policy with TVET as one of its strands is critical across all types. A lack of HRD policy direction undermines all types, and the case studies provide evidence of the benefit of such direction.
4.4 Assessing the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination arrangements

The success or otherwise of any type of arrangements may be judged by:

- The degree and number of additional coordination measures required to make a particular style work effectively day to day. Such measures are perhaps most evident in Canada, where a heavily devolved system has caused a lack of coherence between provinces, making inter-province mobility and recognition of qualifications a problem. As a result, a new federal ministry had to be established to improve coordination between employment, training and social affairs, leading to more effective use of resources. Additional coordination measures are also evident in the Republic of Korea, where the president often steps in to impose decisions on line ministries that are struggling to cooperate on issues of common interest. The need for such additional measures implies weaknesses in the existing system.

- The extent to which alternative measures are needed in a crisis. In the Russian Federation in 2014 the existing arrangements, which generally worked satisfactorily, were insufficient to respond to the need for greater numbers of trained workers when sanctions by western countries required an increase in the market for domestic products. At that time special measures for improvement of the TVET system had to be introduced. In Turkey, in response to the 2008 financial crisis, the TVET system was insufficient for the training of growing numbers of unemployed young people. As a result, two ministries combined resources to provide training through specialized training centres. In both these cases, although the existing system was unable to cope with the sudden increase in demand for training, solutions were found and implemented, suggesting some degree of robustness.

- How well it accommodates industry involvement and responds to labour market changes. Malawi’s TVET governance system has been introduced specifically to move the economy away from a reliance on estate agriculture and to address the problem of large numbers of unskilled young people trapped in subsistence farming. The Ministry of Trade was given the task of including employers in reviewing the availability of skilled labour in the private sector, and all employers are subject to a payroll levy to fund training. However, Malawi still struggles to provide adequate TVET for its young people, suggesting that the governance regime needs further improvement. In the Philippines, despite the inclusion of industry in the governance structure, employment of TVET graduates remains stubbornly at around 60 per cent, suggesting that employers’ input is not of a type that results in improved employment rates.

- Its impact on the subnational and local governance structures. Several of the case studies demonstrated highly devolved systems. In France, in what is generally regarded as a well-functioning TVET governance system, political backing is not
uniform across all regions. This weakens the system at subnational level. Canada’s high levels of autonomy at subnational level have led to concerns about lack of compatibility between the TVET systems in provinces and its impact on worker mobility. The Philippines struggles to devolve responsibility for training institutions to local level owing to uncertainty about sustainability and staffing. In general, impact at subnational level can be positive or negative. Provision at local level is a direct result of the effectiveness of the national governance system.

4.5 Triggers that have influenced the adoption of specific typologies

Table 5 shows which trigger points were considered most influential in countries that have adopted each of the six typologies. From this, it is clear that Trigger Point 4 (TP4) has had the greatest impact across all countries regardless of their TVET and skills development governance typology. In other words, a recent ‘crisis’ event or socio-economic shock has generated consensus on the need for change which has then been harnessed to improve inter-ministerial coordination. This is indicative of the increasing recognition of skills development as a tool in economic and social development and as a valid response to socio-economic shocks. TPs 1 and 2 have also been influential, suggesting that TVET governance reforms often follow election promises or publicly stated objectives of senior leaders, leading to reconsideration of existing governance structures and a move to make them better able to deliver these objectives.

Table 5 The influence of trigger points on each of the governance typologies

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<th>TP1</th>
<th>TP2</th>
<th>TP3</th>
<th>TP4</th>
<th>TP5</th>
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<td>Typology 1</td>
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<td>Typology 2</td>
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<td>Typology 4</td>
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<td>Typology 5</td>
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<td>Typology 6</td>
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N.B. some case studies identified more than one trigger point.

On the other hand, the availability of resources (TP7), capacity within the civil service (TP3) or suitability of existing structures (TP5) does not trigger greater efforts towards inter-ministerial coordination without some external pronouncement or shock. Similarly, the need for accurate and timely LMI is not on its own sufficient to stimulate change. It appears that for improvements to inter-ministerial coordination to be addressed in anything other than small, incremental steps, a major political or economic stimulus is required.
5. Conclusions
5. Conclusions

This publication has identified a number of country-specific examples which tend to support the hypothesis that adopting inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms can assist in the achievement of TVET and skills development objectives across a number of policy domains. There are examples of where the introduction of formal inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms has helped to provide leadership and clarity of purpose, to promote demand-driven training provision, to improve the portability of qualifications and the development of career pathways, to integrate budgeting and provide stable and sustained financing, to align incentives and accountability mechanisms, and to improve the practical application of LMI across policy domains.

However, both the literature review and the case studies also demonstrate that the adoption of formal inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms is by no means a guarantee of improved outcomes. This is particularly true in circumstances where there are conflicting policy priorities and objectives at a national level; in countries that have complex subnational governance systems; in circumstances where agencies’ remits are unclear and may encompass conflicts of interest; in countries which have not historically used market information and data to underpin decision-making at a national, subnational or local level; and in countries where financing systems are either unwilling or unable to commit sufficient resources to implement activities as planned.

It is also apparent that, while the introduction of formal inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms can have numerous benefits, there are a number of countries which – while not perfect – are able to operate well-functioning skills systems without having formal permanent coordination mechanisms.

Taking account of the information generated by the case studies and the literature review, we reached six conclusions. When considering them it is essential to bear in mind that each of the case studies was conducted by different consultants, although all were working to the same terms of reference. A degree of subjectivity is inevitable, including different interpretations of what constitutes strong, above average, average and below average, and the depth of the critique. The twelve countries vary in their level of development, and their systems have emerged from different histories and cultures. Each governance type is exemplified by only two case studies, which is a small sample from which to draw conclusions. With these caveats in mind, this research into, and analysis of, types of TVET and skills development governance systems and their efficacy in promoting inter-ministerial coordination has delivered the following results:

(i) Regardless of the governance system, some of the building blocks for successful
TVET are harder to develop and maintain than others. Those that appear to represent the greatest challenge (ref. Annex 3), and that also have a high impact on inter-ministerial coordination (ref. Table 5) are: a) ensuring labour market relevance and demand-driven provision; b) establishing stable and sustained financing; c) operating well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms; and d) ensuring the availability of accurate data and information, including LMI.

- The type of governance structure adopted by a country for its TVET system is not the determining factor for whether the system will work well or badly. A combination of other features is more important. Six of these are described in detail in Section 4.3. They represent good practice for both governance and management and are largely generic.

- TVET governance structures can be evaluated according to how often they require additional measures to ensure effective coordination occurs, both on a day-to-day basis and in response to sudden shocks in the system.

- The level of involvement of employers is an important measure but insufficient unless it shows evidence of improvement to the quality and relevance of programmes and employment results.

- The efficiency and effectiveness of training provision at local level should be traceable back to coordination with a well-functioning national system.

- The stimulus to review governance systems, including inter-ministerial coordination, is less likely to come from within the system and more likely to be in response to an external socio-economic shock or political pronouncement that demands better quantitative and qualitative results in skills development.
6. Recommendations
6. Recommendations

This publication makes no recommendations on the adoption of one or more preferred governance types. While the typologies themselves are perfectly valid and adequately describe the types of national governance structures to be found around the world, there is insufficient evidence to judge them as more or less successful. Therefore, rather than propose that governments should adopt one or another type, we offer the following recommendations, drawn from the above conclusions. They suggest actions that any country could take to improve its inter-ministerial coordination to deliver better TVET and employment results:

(i) Countries should prioritize resources for work on those of the ten building blocks that have both the greatest impact on inter-ministerial coordination (see Table 5) but that, according to the analysis in Annex 3, are also proving the most difficult to achieve across all typologies. There are four:

a. **Ensuring labour market relevance and demand-driven provision.** This will require greater efforts on education/industry links, access to up-to-date LMI and clear articulation of employers' skill needs.

b. **Establishing stable and sustained financing.** Reliance on government or donor funding will not give the long-term stability and capacity required. Inter-ministerial coordination efforts must work towards new forms of funding which include contributions by learners and by employers.

c. **Operating well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms.** Regardless of which governance typology is in operation, all institutions, whether public or private, specialist or broad-based, should have a set of quality standards with which they must comply and to which they should be held accountable. Funding and resources should reflect the challenges that each institution faces with regard to its geography and student profile.

d. **Ensuring the availability of accurate data and information, including LMI.** This links to (a) and will require governments to overcome the problems associated with national, cumbersome LMI data-gathering and analysis, which has often failed to deliver the necessary intelligence, and to opt instead for less resource-intensive, faster and more immediate methods which regularly deliver the up-to-date analyses required in fast-changing economies. It will also require better data-gathering from TVET institutions showing in particular graduation and employment results from each training programme, and sufficient autonomy for heads of institutions to be able to take action in response to that data.
(ii) Every country should regularly review its TVET governance system against the following nine criteria to ensure that:

a. **Responsibility is underpinned by authority**, so that the lead body can require action to be taken rather than rely on the goodwill of other stakeholders. While consultation with stakeholders is always desirable, only one body can be responsible for decision-making and implementation. A measure of whether or not that body also has authority is the extent to which other stakeholders can block implementation or adopt an approach of non-cooperation. Where appeal to a higher authority, such as the prime minister’s office, is necessary to make implementation happen, it indicates that the authority of the lead body is weak and requires to be strengthened. This criterion can therefore be measured by establishing the extent to which the lead body is able to impose change and reform on stakeholders, the extent of instances of non-cooperation and the frequency with which a higher authority has had to intervene. Legislation might be required to ensure that sufficient authority is delegated to the lead body.

b. **There is a clarity of role and purpose**, with all stakeholders sharing a common vision and an understanding of each other’s contribution to achieving it. This should be demonstrated both in official documentation and in practice on the ground. This criterion can be measured through checking the compatibility of official documentation from the range of stakeholders, ensuring compatibility of objectives and actions and lack of overlapping or conflicting responsibilities. It would also be possible to track different implementation scenarios to check for a smooth operation without ambiguities.

c. **The nature and momentum of the coordination mechanisms that are effective** being understood by all stakeholders. If their momentum cannot be maintained, for any reason, they should be disbanded and replaced so that they do not block reform and operational efforts. As is evident from the case studies, coordination mechanisms that do not function as planned create decision-making bottlenecks in the system. This appears to occur most often when senior officials with competing calls on their time are required to attend meetings. This criterion can therefore be evaluated by recording frequency of meetings, attendance of decision-makers at meetings, examining related documentation (such as minutes of meetings showing decisions reached), and following through scenarios when decisions are required to establish the time taken for their conclusion and the robustness of the decision-making process.

d. **Cultural influences are taken into account** so that governance systems accommodate rather than conflict with them. Incompatibilities between governance systems and the society they are designed to serve are most likely to reveal themselves in strained relationships between government
bodies and representatives of civil society. In the case of TVET, that will mean relationships with employers are stressful and TVET learners experience difficulty in progressing through training and into employment. Recording the frequency and nature of strained inter-ministerial and inter-stakeholder relationships should allow the most prevalent of these to be identified and addressed.

e. **Responsibility is underpinned by influence over funding**, allowing the lead ministry or agency to influence the actions of other ministries. TVET funding should be used to support policy priorities, so that it is directed at areas of greatest need, whether these are geographic, sectoral or for the redressing of social inequities. It can be used to encourage the private sector to fill gaps in state provision and to reward progress towards the achievement of quality standards. The extent to which the lead body for TVET governance has influence over funding can be ascertained by a government’s budget allocations and the authority vested in the lead body to make decisions on how that money can be spent. Alternatively, all ministries and agencies should agree on how their budgets will be allocated collectively across priority areas. Influence over funding is also evident when other stakeholders are dependent on the lead body for TVET funding, rather than having separate budget lines from central government to be spent at their own discretion.

f. **TVET is part of an integrated HRD system with joined-up pathways**, which supports the achievement of economic and social development goals. In the past in many countries, TVET has sat apart from other ministries and has been a low priority for government funding. With the increased realization of its role in economic development and the importance of skilled labour for economic growth and global competitiveness, the status of TVET has improved. Whether it is part of an integrated HRD system can be measured first of all by ascertaining whether there is legislation and a governance framework for a comprehensive HRD policy, and if so, whether TVET is taken into account. In practice, the strength of the links with general education and with higher education can be measured through, for example, the extent of collaboration on programme design, recognition of qualifications for progression into further training or education, and the existence of pathways through a qualifications framework or other mechanism.

g. **Operational efficiency does not rely on ad hoc additional coordination measures**, meaning that coordination in the TVET system is sufficiently robust to withstand sudden crises and increased, or different, demands upon it. While it is difficult to legislate for unforeseen crises, the existence of ad hoc additional measures to compensate regularly for operational inefficiencies across ministries, rather than undertaking a significant reform of the system, suggests inherent weaknesses. This criterion could be evaluated by identifying the types of
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

scenario that have required additional coordination measures to be introduced, the frequency and cost of these and their impact. Different conclusions will be reached in different countries but in some instances ad hoc measures may be sufficiently rare and place such small demands on resources that they can be tolerated.

h. **The role of employers has a positive impact** in coordination and governance, leading to improved quality and relevance of programmes, employment results and the job-readiness of graduates, and to a reduction in hard-to-fill vacancies and skills shortages. Although this is not strictly an inter-ministerial coordination issue, employers are often present on the boards of government agencies with responsibility for TVET and they are lauded as an important partner. However, if their presence is to be more than token, the impact of their participation in TVET governance should be evident. It can be measured by the influence they bring to a range of TVET activities such as curriculum development and student assessment, but most importantly, their actions related to graduate employment. Any country that claims significant employer involvement in TVET, but also displays high levels of TVET graduate unemployment or under-employment, shows evidence of a dysfunction in the role of employers, and an under-utilization of them as a resource.

i. **There is evidence of well-functioning training providers at local level** with strong communication and coordination lines to national government and employers. The test of the effectiveness of the system is that ultimately, TVET students are receiving a quality training that equips them for available jobs in the labour market. Signs of weakness at the local level should be traced back to their origins in national governance, some of which might be found to result from poor inter-ministerial coordination. For example, issues that relate to management reporting lines, funding priorities, availability of sound LMI and articulation between training programmes, while manifesting themselves at local level in training institutions, could be a direct result of weak inter-ministerial coordination and only able to be resolved at national level.

These nine criteria, if met, will contribute in large part to the strengthening of the four particularly challenging and relevant building blocks, and thus lead to improved inter-ministerial coordination as a result.
Objective

To assess the extent to which the adoption of inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms in Country X has facilitated the achievement of TVET and skills development policy objectives.

Specifically the country case studies will:

- Identify the broad type of inter-ministerial coordination mechanism used by government to oversee and manage policy functions using the Type 1–6 model developed in this publication.
- Describe how this Type 1–6 coordination mechanism interacts and coordinates with subnational and local governance structures.
- Identify which combination of the seven key trigger points (if any) led to the adoption of the current inter-ministerial coordination mechanism.
- Assess the current state of the country’s TVET and skills development system against each of the ten ‘essential building blocks’ outlined in this publication. Assess the progress made against each of these building blocks since the introduction of the country’s current model of inter-ministerial coordination.
- Analyse the strength of the quantitative and qualitative evidence base regarding the instrumental effect that adopting the current inter-ministerial coordination model has had on progress against each of the ten building blocks.
- Draw conclusions as to the impact, effectiveness and appropriateness of the current model of inter-ministerial coordination, and provide recommendations to strengthen impact going forward.

Methodology

The country case study will be informed by the collection of quantitative and qualitative evidence from a range of sources as set out below:

- An initial desk-based literature review including policy papers, external analysis conducted by OECD, ILO, ETF etc. of the country’s skills system, academic research papers, documents produced by government agencies and departments including labour market assessments.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

- Key informant interviews with stakeholders in the skills delivery system including representatives from government departments; representatives from coordination mechanisms e.g. committees and councils; employer representatives; training provider representatives; and other concerned stakeholders including development partners, subnational and local agencies where relevant.

- Focus group discussions with groups of key stakeholders e.g. representatives from different government departments, employer representative bodies, learner representative bodies, development partners etc. if deemed necessary to strengthen the evidence base in order to answer key research questions.

- Carry out a small-scale qualitative questionnaire survey of specific stakeholders e.g. government officials, employers, subnational agencies etc. if this is required in order to fill any existing data gaps.

**Specific research questions**

**a. Types of coordination mechanism in place (including sector-specific and subnational arrangements)**

i. What type of inter-ministerial coordination mechanism is in place (Type 1–6)? How does it interact with any sector-specific or subnational agencies?

ii. When was the inter-ministerial coordination mechanism established?

iii. Where did the initiative to establish this particular inter-ministerial coordination mechanism originate (reference against the seven trigger points set out in the accompanying publication)?

iv. How does the coordination mechanism operate in practice? Does it operate in the way in which it was originally attended?

v. In the eyes of different stakeholders what are the main strengths and weaknesses of the current coordination mechanism?

**b. Assessment of current performance against ten foundational requirements including progress made since introduction of current coordination mechanisms**

i. Provide a high-level assessment (and accompanying explanatory narrative) of the relative strength of each foundational requirement from the ten building blocks using a four-point scale (Strong/Above Average/Below Average/Weak) using a combination of relevant quantitative and qualitative data.

ii. Provide an assessment of any changes (either positive or negative) that have taken
Recommendations

place against the ten building blocks since the introduction of the current inter-ministerial coordination mechanism.

c. Analysis of relationship between inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and strength of performance against foundational requirements

i. Draw on quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess the extent to which these changes in ‘building block’ performance are related (either directly or indirectly) to the adoption of the current coordination mechanism.

d. Summary and conclusions regarding inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and recommendations for future actions

i. Analyse the strength of the evidence regarding the relationship between changes in building block performance and the adoption of the current inter-ministerial coordination mechanism in order to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of current arrangements.

ii. Develop a series of recommendations as to how to improve coordination and system performance based on evidence of i.) deficiencies in the effectiveness of the current coordination mechanism and ii.) foundational requirements where performance is below expectations.

Deliverable

A concise report (no longer than 15 pages) setting out answers to the statements specified in the ‘objectives’ section of these Terms of Reference. Supporting evidence (summary of interview transcripts etc.) to be provided in the form of accompanying Annexes.
Annex 2: Summaries of country case studies

Type 1: The Russian Federation and Turkey – Ministry of Education or equivalent body in the lead

The Russian Federation

At the federal level, the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Education (MoSE) plays the key role, although the National Council (established in 2014) under the president, and chaired by an industrialist, is also highly influential. It is possible that this latter body will become the main coordination body in the future. For now, Government Decree N466 (3 June 2013) mandates the ministry to coordinate educational activities of federal, public organizations and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation by making decisions that are compulsory for other ministries and private organizations.

MoSE carries out its mandate through consultation with other government authorities, employers’ associations, research and educational institutions. These include the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Advisory councils have been established to advise the Russian president, MoSE and regional education authorities.

Examples of inter-ministerial coordination include: each year MoSE determines the number of students to be funded by the state budget in TVET organizations under the management of federal ministries; the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MoLSP) approves national occupation classifiers and occupational standards, and provides a national reference book of professions and occupations in demand by the labour market.

In special cases alternative arrangements have been made. For example, in 2014 after the introduction of sanctions against the Russian Federation by western countries, the government decided that specific measures needed to be taken to satisfy the needs of the domestic market for industrial products made in the Russian Federation. The training of workers was one mechanism to support implementation of investment projects to address import substitution. Responsibility for carrying out a special set of measures for improvement of the TVET system was divided between several ministries, including Education, Labour, Economic Development, and Industry and Commerce, and some independent organizations, including those representing employers.
**Turkey**

The Ministry of National Education (MoNE) is the leading institution for TVET policies, and is responsible for developing and implementing the Vocational and Technical Education Strategy Document and Action Plan (2014–2018). Within MoNE, TVET is coordinated by the Directorate General of Vocational and Technical Education (DGVTE). The tasks of DGVTE are to develop and implement policies related to the management of schools and institutions; arrange for the development of education and training programmes, textbooks, tools and equipment and submit them to the Board of Education for approval; and develop, implement and coordinate the implementation of policies and strategies to enhance TVET and strengthen the education–employment link.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS) is responsible for coordinating the labour market aspect. Poor communication and coordination between it and MoNE is perceived as a weakness in the coherence of education policies and labour market outcomes. Both ministries receive the majority of their funding from the central budget. Each ministry prepares and submits a budget proposal, and there is no coordination mechanism embedded in the central budget allocation. Nor is there coordination between these two ministries in the collection and analysis of data. MoNE collects all data on education, while MoLSS is responsible for labour market data collection. As yet, there is no mechanism for following a student, in vocational or general education, from education into the labour market.

MoNE carries out its mandate for TVET through a variety of consultation and procedural mechanisms. Principal among these is its chairmanship of the Vocational Education Council (VEC), which has been in existence since 1986 and comprises representatives of a comprehensive range of ministries, public institutions and agencies, employers and workers. However, decisions made in VEC meetings are not binding, and as a result changes in TVET might not move at the pace industry requires. MoNE is also represented, as are several other ministries, on the board of the Vocational Qualifications Authority (VQA), which is chaired by MoLSS.

Although coordination between MoNE and MoLSS can be problematic, one particular instance in which it worked well was the response to the 2008 financial crisis in Turkey, when unemployment reached 14 per cent and youth unemployment 25 per cent. MoNE, MoLSS and the private sector joined forces to provide training through specialized vocational training centres.

**Type 2: Malawi and Tunisia – Ministry of Labour or equivalent body in the lead**

**Malawi**

Following changes in Malawi’s economic and political environment, moving away from a reliance on estate agriculture and the adoption of multi-party politics, the governance of
TVET has been reformed to address the erosion of training standards, lack of teaching and learning materials, poor and outdated technology, lack of qualified teachers, low participation of the private sector and inadequate funding of the TVET system.

Although the Government of Malawi delivers TVET through several ministries, departments and agencies, it is the Ministry of Labour (MoL) that provides the oversight to policy development, planning and implementation, and coordinates infrastructure development. It does this through the Department for Technical and Vocational Training (DTVT). It was transferred from the Ministry of Education (MoE) where, as a result of having to compete for funds with high-priority primary education, it had suffered from a lack of political and policy attention as well as limited resource allocation. MoL coordinates development partners’ support for the TVET sector and manages public TVET provision.

At an operational level, the Technical, Entrepreneurial, Vocational, Education and Training Authority (TEVETA) was established in 1999 as an autonomous and independent facilitator, promoter and regulator of technical, entrepreneurial and vocational education and training (TEVET), with a mandate to develop an integrated, demand-driven system providing skills in both the formal and informal sectors. TEVETA regulates and facilitates the implementation of TEVET programmes and is responsible for their quality assurance, assessment and certification. Representatives of the Ministries of Labour, Education and Trade sit on the TEVETA Board as ex-officio members. The role of the Ministry of Trade is to host a Public-Private Sector Dialogue Forum (PPDF) which conducts joint sector reviews on the availability of skilled labour in the private sector. Since November 2015 TEVETA’s training programmes have been funded through the collection of a new TEVET levy payable by both public and private employers. The levy is 1 per cent of the basic payroll.

To support this coordination role, in 2014 the GoM set up an Inter-Ministerial Committee on TEVET and Skills Development which introduced:

(i) A National Steering Committee, chaired by the MoL, responsible for policy direction. Its objectives include securing political commitment, coherence and coordination, and mobilizing and promoting funding and other resources for implementation of programmes in the community colleges. While the seniority of members is considered an advantage, it is also seen as a potential weak point as meetings of the committee are seldom convened because of the busy schedules of members.

(ii) A Technical Working Group responsible for overseeing the functioning of the community colleges, developing infrastructure, curricula and training materials, and building the capacity of teachers, with members drawn from public and private TVET training institutions and from industry.

(iii) District management committees, responsible for activities such as identifying sites for establishing community colleges, identifying trainers and their training needs, and identifying additional operational funds.
(iv) College management committees.

TPs 3 and 4 have been most influential in forming the present governance structure in Malawi. That is, the crisis in the very small number of young people who were receiving skills training and the large numbers of unskilled people trapped in subsistence farming led to the establishment of an inter-ministerial National Steering Committee, ensuring wider participation and involvement of all stakeholders from national down to community level.

As a result of these reforms, two of the ten building blocks for effective inter-ministerial coordination are considered to be particularly strong: leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains, and standardized QA mechanisms and portability of qualifications. However four of the building blocks remain particularly weak: stable and sustained financing; well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms; public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates; and availability of accurate data and information, including LMI.

**Tunisia**

TVET and skills development has been led by the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MVTE) since 1990. For eight of these years (2002–10) it was merged with MoE. MVTE has the mandate to set the strategy and provide the incentives and resources to achieve TVET objectives, and is responsible for collaboration between all partners. It is expected to operate in synergy with the other involved ministries, primarily the MoE, Ministry of Higher Education, and those in charge of economic development, agriculture, tourism, health, industry and finance. To this end, coordination councils and committees have been created.

MVTE fulfils its responsibilities through three agencies: ATFP which manages initial vocational training, CENAFFIF which is responsible for the training of trainers and for the design of training programmes, and CNFCPP which is responsible for continuous in-service training. There is also a fourth minor agency, ANETI, which is responsible for employment services. MVTE and these agencies play a coordination role but have neither the authority to issue directives that other ministries must execute nor the power to impose any behavioural rules. MVTE is in a weak position and often unable to provide sufficient incentives for the success of the coordination process, for example through the distribution of funds.

There are two other important agencies. The first is the Supreme Council of Human Resource Development (SCHRD), which was restructured by decree in 2010. According to this decree, it is expected to serve as a coordination mechanism between the various components of the complex education and training systems. It is chaired by the prime minister and its board is composed of representatives of various ministries (including MVTE and MoE) and the main social organizations. However, it has not met since January 2011 and was regarded as ineffective when it did meet.
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

The second is the Permanent Commission for TVET Coordination, created in 2003, which is supposed to report to SCHRD. It does meet regularly as it has to be consulted on all matters concerning diplomas, accreditation and disciplinary measures. Despite starting well it has now lost most of its functions and has become a minor forum. While some discussion does take place within the Commission and in ad hoc committees when development plans are prepared, well-defined coordination mechanisms and procedures are not applied.

In general, the TVET and skills development system is perceived as not being well integrated because of the imperfect communication and coordination channels between the various components and ministries. This is despite the government confirming in its Eleventh Development Plan the need for more effective and better coordination between sectors and ministries. Five years of political instability and the slow transition to democracy have created challenges. A national development plan which includes the objective of a better and well-integrated education and skills development system was drafted for 2016–20 but is still waiting for approval. Likewise, the three ministries in charge of education and skills development agreed that coordination was necessary, formed a commission to prepare a common vision, but have prepared their plans and budgets separately.

The new Tunisian constitution introduced in 2014 ruled that the Tunisian government system will be decentralized to allow for more participation of regional and local political and economic forces. Although the necessary legislation and procedures have yet to be introduced, stronger links between skills development and regional economic development are to be expected, which will raise new challenges for effective coordination.

MANFORME, which is the only major comprehensive TVET reform programme undertaken in Tunisia, launched in 1995. Along with small programmes which followed it, it aimed to create a unified, strategic vision for all TVET providers with the coordination and participation of all stakeholders.

**Type 3: India and Burkina Faso – dedicated TVET ministry in the lead**

**India**

In the Government of India (GoI) there are as many as seventeen departments in various ministries with some responsibility for the delivery of vocational training and skill development. Earlier, unsuccessful attempts to overcome the lack of communication and coordination between them finally led to the establishment in 2014 of the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE). This new ministry brought under its authority the Directorate General (DG) of Training, the National Council for Vocational Training, the National Skills Development Agency (NSDA) and the National Skills Development Council (NSDC). GoI’s National Skills Development Mission (NSDM), organized through the ministry, is expected to provide the overall institutional framework to rapidly implement and scale up
Recommendations

development efforts across India to meet the target of training approximately 400 million people by 2022.

The governance structure is still in a state of some flux. However the main supporting organisations catering for the NSDM include:

- the NSDA which is a regulatory and quality assurance institution with responsibility for coordinating all central ministries, state governments and private players to harmonize the approach to skills development through the national skills qualification framework (NSQF)
- the NSDC, a public–private partnership which supports establishment of sector skills councils and the involvement of employers in TVET
- state skill development missions to oversee state-level coordination.

Despite several years of attempted coordination efforts, a 2016 report (India, 2016) identified a large number of continuing weaknesses in the system, including governance ones such as the absence of a sound national TVET system, inadequate financing and the need for comprehensive legislation. One of the first activities undertaken by MSDE was to formulate the National Skills Policy 2015, which anticipated and addressed many of the issues contained in the 2016 report.

The adoption of a National Skills Qualification Framework (NSQF) in 2013, overseen by the National Skills Qualification Committee (NSQC), provided an opportunity to coordinate between different public and private sector stakeholders. However, the coordinating role of NSQC has so far been quite limited. Furthermore, the National Quality Assurance Framework (NQAF), which is essential for recognition of the qualifications in the NQF, is yet to be ratified by the NSQC. Another opportunity for coordination which is under-utilized is the tendency for ministries and states that maintain their own labour market information databases to not feed data into the national LMIS.

It is too early to say whether the creation of a dedicated ministry will lead to improved coordination between central and state agencies, as well as between government departments, industry, training providers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. However, some of the six desirable features outlined in Annex 3 are beginning to emerge in the new governance arrangements.

**Burkina Faso**

Over the past two decades Burkina Faso's TVET has experienced a period of transition in its governance framework, moving from a department within a ministry through several iterations until it was finally granted a dedicated ministry in 2011. The Ministry of Youth, Training and Professional Integration (MJFIP), as it now is, has responsibility for vocational and technical training provided in public and private centres and institutions under MJFIP.
or other ministries, such as Agriculture and Tourism. It is also responsible for employability and employment. Technical and vocational education comes under the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (MENA) in its role covering secondary education, so there are implications in terms of coordination, harmonization and articulation.

MJFIP has two directorates, the DG for Vocational Training (DGFP) which coordinates the National Policy for TVET (NP-TVET) and its technical tools, develops the strategies for involving economic and professional circles in the training and qualification process, and organizes dialogue and partnerships with national and international stakeholders; and the DG for Employment Promotion (DGPE) which coordinates the implementation of the National Employment Policy and its action plan.

MJFIP is represented at regional level by thirteen regional departments and forty-five provincial departments.

In support of economic and social development goals, and reflecting a wish for TVET to become demand-led, the Government of Burkina Faso developed the NP-TVET, which was adopted in 2008 with seven main areas of intervention: management of the overall system, planning training courses, increasing access to training, improving the quality of training, certification of vocational training, employability of trainees, and funding. The aim was to overcome a situation where TVET was being marginalized in the education system while at the same time being required to take on increasing numbers of students.

Despite considerable efforts to improve TVET both quantitatively and qualitatively, the proportion of TVET students in post-primary and secondary education remains low at about 3.4 per cent in 2013–14.

**Type 4: Jamaica and Philippines – TVET-focused government agency in the lead**

*Jamaica*

The mandate for TVET and skills development lies with the Human Employment and Resource Training (HEART) Trust/National Training Agency (NTA) of Jamaica, a statutory body that reports to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Information (MEYI). The HEART Trust was formed by an Act of Parliament in 1982 and reformed in 1991 when it incorporated the NTA. HEART/NTA is responsible for TVET in schools and in all the TVET colleges and vocational training institutions across Jamaica. It is also responsible for implementing the National TVET policy developed in 2012 by MEYI, reporting regularly to the MEYI through the board of directors. That board includes permanent secretaries from both MEYI and the Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation as well as representatives from various economic sectors and the National Council for TVET (the body responsible for assuring quality in the TVET system).
Since its inception, HEART/NTA has been funded through a 3 per cent employer tax levy. The HEART Trust Fund has sole jurisdiction and responsibility for both the collection and management of the funds. The operations of HEART/NTA are guided by the policies of MEYI, which in turn are influenced by Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan, the country’s first long-term strategic development plan, developed during 2008–09 by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) with the involvement of several government ministries, including MEYI. The inter-ministerial mechanism for Vision 2030 is coordinated by PIOJ, which formed a number of thematic working groups, including the Education and Training Thematic Working Group (ET-TWG) and its related subcommittee, the Labour Market Reform Commission (LMRC). ET-TWG was instrumental in the development of a National TVET Policy by MEYI.

ET-TWG is considered the umbrella group for inter-ministerial coordination for TVET and skills development, and reports to the PIOJ Technical Monitoring Committee (TMC). ET-TWG meets quarterly, and meetings are co-chaired by the permanent secretary of MEYI and the executive director of HEART/NTA. The TMC provides oversight of all thematic working groups and is central to the operation of Vision 2030. PIOJ, in turn, reports to the new ‘super-Ministry’, the Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation, headed by the prime minister.

Strong advocacy for a revised TVET strategy was reinforced by the Caribbean Heads of Government’s Regional TVET Strategy for Workforce Development and Economic Competitiveness, which has heavily influenced Jamaica’s TVET goals and objectives.

The commitment and leadership across the coordinating mechanisms for TVET and skill development in Jamaica is unquestioned but greater clarity of purpose across policy domains is required.

**Philippines**

Inter-ministerial coordination in the Philippines is facilitated through the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), which was established in 1994 and is composed of a board, chaired by the secretary of labour, and a secretariat. The board has tripartite membership: government departments, the private sector and the trade unions. TESDA is responsible for providing the overall policies and directions, developing systems and setting standards, supporting TVET provision and building the capacity and capability of TESDA and its partners to deliver relevant TVET programmes, projects and activities. It allocates resources, based on the recommendations of its secretariat, for the programmes and projects it undertakes.

The effectiveness of this governance structure has been mixed. On the one hand TESDA’s successes in recent years have been due in part to agreement by stakeholders on the key issues in the Philippine education and training sector and the actions needed to address them. Members of Congress and senior government officials have had a shared commitment to improving inter-ministerial coordination for TVET and skills development, which created
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

81

a clear strategic vision. The involvement of employers has been strengthened, which has contributed to improved LMI, and TESDA has been successful in attracting funding from external agencies to support its reform efforts.

On the other hand, several challenges remain for TESDA which suggest that its coordination mechanism is not fully effective. The first of these centres around the fact that, in addition to managing technical and vocational schools and non-formal training centres, TESDA is the policy and QA agency for all post-basic TVET subsectors. This creates a conflict of interest as the agency that accredits and supervises training institutions also runs them. The TESDA Law of 1994 mandates that training centres be devolved to local government units (LGUs), NGOs or the private sector. Attempts to do so have met with little success owing to resistance both from within TESDA and by the LGUs. Devolution has therefore stalled. The same law gives TESDA the mandate to introduce a levy-grant system and the TESDA Development Fund. These have also not yet been established and implemented.

Similarly the coordination mechanisms for the Philippines Qualification Framework, the subject of a 2012 Executive Order, although not led by TESDA, have not made as much progress as expected during the intervening five years.

While enrolment and graduation rates of TVET students have been improving over the last decade, employment rates remain at only just over 60 per cent, similar to the rate reported at the beginning of the millennium. There are also questions over accessibility by the rural population (the majority) to TVET training, which is predominantly in urban areas.

The obstacles being encountered by the current coordination mechanism point to the need for TESDA to involve wider representation of government agencies in policy formulation and programme implementation given intended impacts that cut across basic education, higher education, economic growth, social welfare, overseas employment, and mutual recognition arrangements of qualifications with foreign governments. Such an expanded inter-ministerial coordination task may require the establishment of a national coordinating body for the entire education sector.

Type 5: France and Bangladesh – coordinating council placed higher than other relevant bodies

France

France has a total of twelve ministries with some involvement in the field of TVET. The two most active ministries, MoL and MoE, collaborate to a degree by, for example, participating in each other’s advisory boards and committees and co-signing decrees. However these arrangements have not been formalized and rely on the cooperation and willingness of individuals, albeit they are deemed effective at national, regional and local levels. On the whole, this more informal approach is preferred as it does not require all twelve ministries to
be involved and so retains flexibility and a light governance machinery. The government’s
direct work with the decentralized levels and with civil society is perceived as a real strength,
with the government playing an influential role in the various structures in which it is
represented, despite generally having no decision-making power.

Areas where improvement could be made in ministerial coordination include developing
a national skills strategy and policy guidelines, and coherence and articulation between
certificate-issuing ministries.

In order to ensure that coordination between stakeholders in policy development does take
place, France has adopted a system of quadripartite bodies to foster dialogue at national,
regional and sectoral levels. For TVET the body with the broadest influence is the National
Council for Employment and Vocational Training and Guidance (CNEFOP), established in
2014. CNEFOP brings together the state, represented by the twelve ministries, the regions,
and representatives of employers and workers. It is the advisory body for all laws and
regulations in the field of employment and TVET, and it is also responsible for consultation,
monitoring, coordination and evaluation of policies relating to employment, initial and
continuing vocational training, and lifelong career guidance, including monitoring the
quality of training providers. CNEFOP defines three-year guidelines, setting out priorities
and a concerted strategy to promote the implementation of those guidelines in the field of
employment, career guidance and vocational training.

CNEFOP is attached to the prime minister and reports to the General Secretariat of Social
Ministries. Its budget is renewable and non-negotiated and is managed in a non-political
manner. Its funding is therefore secure. It carries out its work through six permanent
committees and plenary discussions.

CNEFOP oversees the work of its counterparts at regional level, the regional councils for
employment, vocational training and career guidance (CREFOPs).

The quadripartite approach is perceived as a strength of the system, ensuring representation
from all stakeholders, operational flexibility and a clear and protective legal and regulatory
framework. CNEFOP gives minority stakeholders a voice, and the dynamic it creates gives
relevance and legitimacy to the collective.

The quadripartite system works less well at the regional level, where a lack of political backing
and limited operational resources for the permanent secretaries of the CREFOPs mean that
they are weakened as a result.

**Bangladesh**

The requirement for inter-ministerial coordination on TVET is particularly significant in
Bangladesh, where twenty-three government ministries and thirty-three departments under
those ministries are providing skills training, both formal and non-formal. The body to which
Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

that coordination task has been allocated is NSDC, which is an apex body chaired by the prime minister. Its role is to provide policy directives and guidance, vision and mission for skills development, coordination and decision-making. Due to its status, it has the authority to address key issues related to the structure, policy, procedures, delivery, finance and coordination of skills development programmes. NSDC has thirty-seven members drawn from all the key ministries, employers’ and workers’ representatives, and private sector bodies. However, it meets only once per year.

To function at a more operational level, an Executive Committee of the NSDC (known as ECNSDC) has been formed to provide advice to the NSDC, and is authorized to take certain decisions. It meets quarterly. NSDC and its Executive Committee are supported by a secretariat.

Despite this governance infrastructure, coordination between the various stakeholders leaves much room for improvement. This is in part because of the structure of government budgeting, for both revenue and development budgets, which are along sectoral lines led by each individual ministry. The suboptimal training system which results may account for the fact that almost half of TVET graduates make no practical use of the training they have received and a similar proportion remain unemployed.

The improvements that have taken place, such as greater involvement of employers, some labour market data collection and increased access to training by members of disadvantaged groups, have been driven largely by donor projects and cannot clearly be attributed to the impact of sound governance.

Although senior leaders in government have expressed their commitment to skill development and have pledged significant increases in the enrolment of TVET students, such ambitious targets often remain unmet owing to implementation bottlenecks. The capacity limitations of key institutions such as the NSDC Secretariat and the Bangladesh Technical Education Board (BTEB) are a major constraint from implementing reform. The NSDC secretariat is not equipped to play the coordination role foreseen for it in the National Skills Development Policy (Bangladesh, 2011).

In December 2016 the prime minister announced that the NSDC will be replaced by a National Skills Development Authority (NSDA) under the Prime Minister’s Office. The NSDA is expected to be a more powerful body and will regulate the National Human Resources Development Fund. To date, donors have supported the establishment of the Fund but progress towards its operationalization has been slow, the number of high-performing institutions remains modest, and there is a lack of good trainers, managers, assessors and instructors.

Sitting alongside the NSDC and jointly responsible with it for implementing the National Skills Development Policy is BTEB, a statutory body responsible for registration and inspection
Recommendations

of all types of institutions (public, private, NGO-led), preparation of skill standards and curricula, examinations, certification and QA. One of its key responsibilities is implementation of the National Technical and Vocational Qualifications Framework (NTVQF).

Type 6: Republic of Korea and Canada – TVET disaggregated across line ministries

Republic of Korea

In the Republic of Korea, responsibility for vocational education and vocational training is separated, as it is for the level of education and qualification. The Ministry of Education (MoE) is in charge of secondary education while the Ministry of Employment and Labour (MoEL) is mostly in charge of adult vocational training. MoE and MoEL cannot act independently or in isolation. There is now increasingly close cooperation with other ministries to promote TVET policies, including the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning. In addition, as new initiatives are introduced, such as the Korean Qualifications System and competence-based education and training, the differences and divisions between vocational education and vocational training are quickly disappearing. This is challenging in a country where independence between ministers and the emphasis on forming a separate identity are strong.

Decision-making on government policy is carried out under a two-tier process. A coordination system has been established which comprises, first, the National Policy Coordination Council, chaired by the prime minister, set up to mediate on differences between ministries and coordinate policies concerning important national issues, and meeting weekly; and second, two lesser councils, one of which, the Education, Social and Culture Policy Minister Council, is chaired by the deputy social prime minister, who is the minister of education.

Other coordination-facilitating mechanisms, apart from regular contact between civil servants from different ministries, include the Human Resources Development Conference chaired by the minister of education, and the appointment of the minister of education as one of two deputy prime ministers. This minister convenes social and cultural affairs ministerial meetings for cooperation and coordination of major policies and mid- and long-term plans. However, these meetings are not achieving the expected results, owing to a lack of policy momentum. In addition, the senior secretary to the president for state affairs planning aids the collaboration effort between ministries, and the annual evaluation of each ministry’s work reports on those efforts.

In reality, many of the conflicts and issues between ministries are resolved by the president, which is indicative of the fact that it is difficult for ministers to take the lead in developing and managing cooperative agendas related to other ministries. Indeed, the political will of
the president is an important factor to ensure policy implementation. Use of the National Policy Co-ordination Council and related ministers’ meeting, chaired by a senior minister, is increasing and has proved successful in recent TVET initiatives.

Major policies, although led by central government, are mainly carried out by public agencies such as the Human Resources Development Service of Korea, Korea Employment Information Service, and KRIVET (Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training). KRIVET researchers have been known to arbitrate key policies between MoE and MoEL.

Critical to current and future coordination between the two principal ministries, MoE and MoEL, is the funding of TVET. At present, MoEL runs the Employment Insurance Fund (EIF) which provides most of the funding for skills development. In contrast, most of MoE’s budget is controlled by the Ministry of Planning and Finance, and it has less financial resource to invest in skills development. As the distinction between vocational education and vocational training continues to blur and industry–school collaboration gains in importance, EIF funds are being used for training provision that is under the policy direction of MoE. A further example of blurring lines is the Korean Qualifications Framework, whose management will be centralized and which will oversee HRD nationally and take responsibility for quality management of TVET.

**Canada**

There is no single pan-Canadian approach to TVET and skills development. Every Canadian jurisdiction (province or territory) has its own specific strategies, policies and legislation. These powers are enshrined in Canada’s constitution and extend into the creation of separate labour markets through the provincial regulation of certain occupations. The federal government is, however, responsible for funding TVET and skills development, through funding agreements, supplemented by some provincial self-funding.

Inter-ministerial coordination takes place at the provincial level between provincial government departments, and not at the federal level. At provincial level responsibility for TVET is shared across line ministries and various stakeholder groups. TVET and skills development is therefore disaggregated both vertically and horizontally. Almost all TVET and skills development targets are provincial or regional in nature, resulting in a patchwork of diverse programmes, regulations and objectives. Each province has developed its own mechanisms in an attempt to coordinate provision of employment support, economic development, post-secondary education (including TVET) and its share of immigration quotas, to address its needs as identified by industry, communities and LMI data.

The above situation is a source of concern for many Canadian policy-makers, and since the constitution cannot be readily changed, compensatory actions have been introduced instead. For example, Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), a federal ministry, was established to move Canada towards a more modern approach to human resource development, including coordination between employment, training and social
Recommendations

affairs in an attempt to achieve maximum resource effectiveness. It has responsibility for
financial aid for post-secondary studies, and social development programmes targeting
equity for specific population groups, among other things. It also shares some of the
responsibility for LMI creation and dissemination with Statistics Canada.

In addition to ESDC, there is the Forum of Labour Market Ministers (FLMM), which consists
of the federal and provincial ministers tasked with responsibilities related to Canada’s labour
markets. In collaboration with the minister of employment, workforce development and
labour (one of three ministers responsible for ESDC) and the ministers from the provinces
and territories, FLMM serves as a discussion and feedback mechanism for concerns such as
LMI, labour mobility, foreign qualifications recognition, programming flexibility, productivity
issues and strengthening apprenticeships. FLMM is increasingly effective as a coordination
mechanism as there are a growing number of provinces and territories where the same
ministry is responsible for both labour market and post-secondary issues, leading to a critical
mass of people participating in both FLMM and the Council of Ministers of Education,
Canada (CMEC), thus facilitating discussions that touch both portfolios.

CMEC, unlike FLMM, is comprised entirely of representatives from the ministries of education
of the thirteen provinces and territories (there is no federal ministry), covering primary
education through to lifelong learning. It serves as a feedback and consultation mechanism,
providing a coordinated approach to discussions with the federal government and
international entities related to education.

These three bodies, and other stakeholder entities, are developing an increased set of
common priorities which has created demand for collaboration and highlighted the political
and economic costs of not responding to it. Common priorities are evident in the inter-
provincial accord established by the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta in 2006, the
Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA). This Agreement recognized
and reconciled the rules that hindered the free movement of goods, services and people,
including providing a mechanism by which officials described a process and principles for
the equivalency of TVET qualifications.
### Annex 3: Country performance against building blocks of a successful TVET system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building blocks of an effective TVET and skills development system</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Above average</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Below average</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leadership and clarity of purpose across policy domains</td>
<td>Turkey (T1)</td>
<td>The Russian Federation (T1)</td>
<td>Tunisia (T2)</td>
<td>Bangladesh (T5)</td>
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<td>2. Labour market relevance and demand-driven provision</td>
<td>Jamaica (T4)</td>
<td>Turkey (T1)</td>
<td>Tunisia (T2)</td>
<td>Canada (T6)</td>
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<td>3. Well-functioning partnerships and networks promoting access and equity with partners adequately representing their constituents’ interests</td>
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<td>Rep. of Korea (T6)</td>
<td>Tunisia (T2)</td>
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<td>4. High-performing, quality training institutions</td>
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<td>Rep. of Korea (T6)</td>
<td>Tunisia (T2)</td>
<td>Bangladesh (T5)</td>
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<td>5. Standardized quality assurance mechanisms and portability of qualifications</td>
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### Recommendations

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<tr>
<th>Building Blocks</th>
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<th>Tunisia (T2)</th>
<th>Turkey (T1)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stable and sustained financing</td>
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<td>India (T3)</td>
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<td>Well-functioning institutions, incentives and accountability mechanisms</td>
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<td>Jamaica (T4)</td>
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<td>Public esteem, strong graduation and employment rates</td>
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<td>Tunisias (T2)</td>
<td>Turkey (T1)</td>
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<td>Availability of accurate data and information including LMI</td>
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<td>Culture of policy learning and continuous improvement</td>
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The colour-coding of the building blocks indicates the strength of their relationship to inter-ministerial coordination and is explained in the key below.

- **High impact**
- **Medium impact**
- **Low impact**

N.B. The above chart does not include results for Burkina Faso as an evaluation was not available from the case study.
Annex 4: The four main functions that governments are expected to oversee for TVET and skills development

1. **Policy development and design.** Identify key issues then formulate, design and refine policies to address these issues. Facilitate stakeholder consultation to develop policy measures, and draft strategy and implementation documents to operationalize policies, with accompanying indicators and means of verification. Ensure that TVET and skills development policies and accompanying activities are consistent with wider government objectives and reinforce (rather than contradict) other policy measures. Policy domains where coordination and reinforcement are particularly important include employment, migration, welfare, trade and industry. This wide-ranging remit is captured in the ‘three lenses’ approach (introduced in Section 3) which highlights the importance of viewing TVET and skills development from an economic growth, social equity and sustainability perspective. Government should also oversee, either directly or through an independent agency, the collection and analysis of information and market intelligence across a range of relevant metrics to inform policy design. Ideally this data should be disaggregated by sector and subregion to enable effective decision-making. Communicate policy measures to concerned stakeholders and the general public.

2. **Planning, management and delivery, monitoring and evaluation.** Ensure that policies are actually implemented as planned. At its heart the key to effective skills policy implementation is whether the market for skills (which can be international, nationwide or for a particular sector, locality or a target group of people, for instance women, young people, vulnerable groups) is working effectively. In other words, the supply of skills must be well matched with the demand for those skills. This requires the development of oversight and governance structures to manage implementation, rapidly identify bottlenecks and achieve speedy resolution of issues. This can involve the drafting and passing of legislation to facilitate implementation of agreed policy measures as well as the creation of feedback loops and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that decision-makers have access to reliable and timely data on key performance metrics. Ensure that evaluation and impact assessment is built into programmes from the very start so that accurate information on policy effectiveness can be gathered to inform future policy development. Increasingly, in the context of decentralization of roles and responsibilities, planning, implementation and oversight will take place at the subnational level. Where this is the case it is important to ensure that information-sharing mechanisms are in place so that local activities feed into the national whole, along with learning about what works and what does not in various contexts.
3. **Finance and funding.** Ensure that sufficient resources are available to implement policies as planned. Given the significant competing priorities for government resources and the historic levels of under-funding of TVET in many countries this will very often involve efforts to diversify sources of funding. Implementing measures to increase the contributions of both employers and learners will both ease pressure on government funds and serve to reinforce the demand-led nature of training supply. As well as seeking to diversify sources of funding it is also important for governments to assess the effectiveness and value for money of their policy interventions so they can prioritize spending on those interventions that deliver the strongest outcomes. Introducing and then overseeing payment by results mechanisms for training institutions is a key component of such a strategy, as is the introduction of contestable funding open to both public and private training organizations. In addition to diversifying funding sources and introducing new and more innovative output and outcome-based financing mechanisms, government also has a role to play in enhancing transparency. It can do this by publishing expenditure data and making it available for public scrutiny so that citizens are able to see how their taxes are being spent. Such measures have the potential to increase upwards accountability on institutions through pressure from citizens and members of the local community, which can complement the more traditional methods of downwards accountability enforced through government-run QA mechanisms.

**Quality assurance, standard setting, curriculum development and assessment,** at both institutional and systemic levels. At institutional level ensure that training providers are adhering to the parameters set out in the relevant regulatory framework. Parameters in such a framework may include an assessment of whether a particular institution is delivering appropriate training and assessment services, managing resources effectively, providing adequate support to learners, and cultivating productive linkages with employers in the local labour market. At a systemic level governments must ensure that they have a qualifications system and related curricula that are fit for purpose. The criteria for making such an assessment include the relevance of the qualifications and the extent to which they reflect the needs of employers and the demands of the current (and future) labour market; transferability of qualifications (including internationally) and the extent to which they enable learners to progress and enhance their skills in the context of lifelong learning; the extent to which qualifications and related curricula are understood and valued by institutions which, in turn, have adequate capacity to deliver them effectively; and the extent to which assessment processes are robust, appropriate and trusted by stakeholders, employers and the general public so that qualifications act as an effective proxy for the actual skills and competencies of the bearer. In the context of decentralization and increased autonomy for providers, QA mechanisms also act as an important means by which governments can influence the skills
delivery system to ensure that provision contributes towards national targets and priorities set out in policy documents.

The global shifts in thinking and practice on TVET and skills development, coalesced in the six intervention areas outlined in Section 1 of this publication, have had an impact on the tasks government are expected to perform, oversee and mandate across the four main functions of government in TVET and skills development outlined above. This has in turn had an impact on the extent to which inter-ministerial coordination is required to ensure that the four functions are performed effectively.

Annex 5: Overview of the three lenses approach

**Economic growth lens:** how can TVET contribute towards improved productivity, sustained growth and competitiveness by equipping young people with the skills required to enter the labour market, by enabling those in employment to upskill and be as productive as possible in the changing world of work, and by contributing towards sustained employment creation? Four aspects that need to be considered in the context of this lens are 1. **Productivity and growth**, 2. **Employability**, 3. **Employment creation** and 4. **New modes of work**.

**Social equity lens:** how can TVET benefit individuals and society by ensuring inclusive and equitable lifelong learning for all? To what extent are TVET systems truly equitable and to what extent do they serve to reinforce existing social inequalities? Two aspects that need to be considered within the context of this lens are 1. **Redistribution of both material and intangible wealth** and 2. **Inclusion**.

**Sustainability lens:** how can TVET contribute to the sustainability of societies and enhance human-centred development which considers the rights of future generations as well as the needs of the present? Three aspects that need to be considered within the context of this lens are 1. **Greening economies**, 2. **Intergenerational rights** and 3. **Global citizenship**.

The three lenses approach provides a strong analytical framework for considering the purpose of TVET and skills development policies and system reform efforts. Such efforts need to consider the extent to which they address the relative issues and objectives of the three lenses.
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Taking a whole of government approach to skills development


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Taking a whole of government approach to skills development

Today, technical and vocational skills development is considered to be a crucial vehicle for sustainable development. Many ministries of government, the private sector and other stakeholders, have an interest in technical and vocational skills development systems responding effectively to the broad and intersecting demands of labour market, communities and individuals.

This publication underscores the multi-sectoral character of technical and vocational skills development by recognising its historical fragmentation and the need for systems to simultaneously respond to the external demands of economic growth, social equity and sustainability.

The publication identifies six types of governance models, ranging from systems led by one ministry (for example the Ministry of Education or Ministry of Labour) to ones disaggregated across several ministries. However, whilst the publication concludes that none of the six types of models seems to consistently deliver superior results, effective coordination measures do have a greater impact on some parts of a TVET and skills system compared to others. However, it suggests that a number of underlying features must also be present for good governance and effective inter-ministerial coordination to occur.

This publication is the result of sustained collaboration between UNESCO and ILO. It will be of interest to policy-makers to analyze contextual trends and transform governance of technical and vocational skills development systems to more effectively meet the demands.