



# INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOR MIGRATION IN ASIA



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# CONTENTS

Tables, Figures, and Box	v
Foreword	vii
Acknowledgments	ix
Abbreviations	x
<b>1 Trends in Labor Migration in Asia</b> Jonathan Chaloff and Philippe Hervé	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 How Asia Fits into Global Migration—Medium-term Trends	1
1.3 Labor Migration Flows from Asia to Non-OECD Countries	3
1.4 Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries	7
1.5 Characteristics of Asian Migrants in OECD Countries	11
1.6 Labor Market Situation of Asian Migrants in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe	16
1.7 International Student Mobility to and from Asia	17
1.8 Remittance Flows to Asian Economies	19
1.9 Conclusion	22
<b>2 Demographic Trends and Labor Migration Policies in Asia</b> Pitchaya Sirivunnabood and Yong Jun Baek	25
2.1 Introduction	25
2.2 Demographic and Migration Trends	25
2.3 Labor Migration Policies in Asia	34
2.4 Challenges and Policy Implications	42
<b>3 Policies and Legislation on Recruitment Fees and Costs in the Asia and Pacific Region</b> Geoffrey Ducanes and Nilim Baruah	
3.1 Introduction: Defining Recruitment Fees and Costs	45
3.2 Institutions and Agents Involved in the Recruitment Process and in Determining Fees and Costs	46
3.3 Recruitment Cost Items Covered by Legislation and Policies	47
3.4 Summary for the 20 Economies	58
3.5 Comparing Recruitment Fee Policy on Foreign Workers against National Workers	61
3.6 Monitoring and Compliance	62
3.7 Policy implications	63

<b>4</b>	<b>Skills Mobility Partnerships: A Mechanism to Raise the Skill Level of Labor Migration in Asia</b>	70
	Jonathan Chaloff and Yusuke Namiki	
<b>4.1</b>	Introduction	70
<b>4.2</b>	Training as Part of Labor Migration	70
<b>4.3</b>	Toward a New Cost-sharing Model	70
<b>4.4</b>	Conclusion	78
<b>Annexes</b>		
<b>1</b>	Economy-specific Notes	83
<b>2</b>	Comparative Tables	107

# TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOX

## TABLES

<b>1.1</b>	Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2008–2018 (thousands)	4
<b>1.2</b>	Flows of Workers to GCC Countries, 2018 (thousands)	5
<b>1.3</b>	Flows of Workers to ASEAN Countries, by Origin and Destination, 2018	6
<b>1.4</b>	Migration to OECD Countries by Asian Economy of Origin, 2016–2017	9
<b>1.5</b>	Top 15 OECD Countries for Asian Migration, 2017	10
<b>1.6</b>	Numbers of Migrants (15+) Born in the Top 10 Asian Origin Economies and Living in OECD Countries, 2000/2001 and 2015/2016 (thousands)	13
<b>1.7</b>	Labor Market Indicators for Native-born and Foreign-born Migrants in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European OECD Countries (%)	16
<b>1.8</b>	Remittances by Receiving Economy, 2000 to 2018 (\$ billion)	20
<b>1.9</b>	Share of Remittances in Gross Domestic Product by Economy, 2000–2018 (% of GDP)	21
<b>2.1</b>	International Migrant Stock in Japan by Origin from Selected Asian Economies	36
<b>3.1</b>	Recruitment Fee/Cost Items Mentioned in at Least One Law or Policy in the 20 Economies	58
<b>3.2</b>	Cap on Placement Fee to Be Paid to Recruitment Agencies	61
<b>A3.1</b>	South Asia: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs	65
<b>A3.2</b>	Southeast Asia (mainly labor-sending countries) and Mongolia: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs	66
<b>A3.3</b>	Southeast Asia and East Asia (mainly labor-receiving economies): Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs	68
<b>A3.4</b>	Pacific Countries: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs	69
<b>4.1</b>	Result of the First Tests for Specified Skilled Workers, as of July 2019	78

## FIGURES

<b>1.1</b>	International Migrant Stock by Region of Destination, 1990–2019 (annual rate of change, %)	2
<b>1.2</b>	International Migrant Stock by Region of Origin and Gender, 1990–2019 (share of women in migrant stock, %)	3
<b>1.3</b>	Total Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2007–2018 (millions)	4
<b>1.4</b>	Share of Women among Labor Migrants, by Origin Country, 2016–2018, Selected Asian Countries (%)	7
<b>1.5</b>	Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries, 2000–2017 (millions)	8
<b>1.6</b>	H-1B Visas Delivered, by Region of Origin, 2005–2018 (thousands)	11
<b>1.7</b>	Share of Origin Regions in Total Migrant Population in OECD Countries, 2000/2001 to 2015/2016 (%)	12
<b>1.8</b>	Share of Migrants (15+) with High Education Living in OECD Countries, by Place of Birth in Asia, 2010/2011 to 2015/2016 (%)	13
<b>1.9</b>	Emigration Rates to OECD Countries, Total and Highly Educated, 2015/2016 (%)	14
<b>1.10</b>	Share of Women among Asian Migrants Living in OECD Countries, 2015/2016 (%)	15
<b>1.11</b>	Foreign Students by Region of Origin, Worldwide, 2000–2017	17
<b>1.12</b>	Top 10 Asian Destination Countries for Internationally Mobile Students, 2015–2018 (thousands)	18
<b>1.13</b>	Share of Asian Students among International Students in OECD Countries by Level of Education, 2013–2017 (%)	18
<b>1.14</b>	Remittances to Asia, 2000–2018 (\$ billion)	19
<b>2.1</b>	Population Growth Rate (%), World and Regions	26
<b>2.2</b>	Total Fertility Rate, World and Regions	26
<b>2.3</b>	Old-age Dependency Ratio, World and Regions	27
<b>2.4</b>	Population Growth Rate (%), Selected Asian Countries	28
<b>2.5</b>	Life Expectancy, Selected Asian Countries	29
<b>2.6</b>	Total Fertility Rate (live births per woman), Selected Asian Countries	29
<b>2.7</b>	Old-age Dependency Ratio, Selected Asian Countries	30

<b>2.8</b>	World Population by Age Group (thousands)	31
<b>2.9</b>	World Population by Broad Age Group and Income Group (thousands)	32
<b>2.10</b>	International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Region	33
<b>2.11</b>	International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Age Group in Selected Economies, 2019	33
<b>2.12</b>	International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Origin	34
<b>2.13</b>	Number of International Migrants in Japan by Origin	36
<b>2.14</b>	Number of International Migrants in Thailand by Origin	37
<b>3.1</b>	Economies (out of 20) in Which Cost Item Was Mentioned in Legislation or Policy	59
<b>4.1</b>	Plans of APTC Graduates to Migrate to Other Pacific Countries in the Region, Australia, or New Zealand, 2014 (% of respondents)	75
<b>4.2</b>	Nationality of Specified Skill Exam Takers (2019) and All Foreign Employed (2018) in Food Services and Accommodation Industries	78
 <b>BOX</b>		
<b>1.1</b>	Asian H-1B Visa Recipients in the United States	10

Global migration has been steadily growing since the 1990s. Although much policy attention has focused on large-scale movements of people in search of protection or fleeing conflict or social disruption, global migration trends include many other forms of migration, including pursuing employment or education opportunities, as well as family reunions or building a new family. In Asia, the biggest driver of migration flows is the search for better job opportunities or a better income. Labor migration flows can also be driven by structural changes in demography and the demand for, and supply of, skills. The aging population has become a global issue. According to estimates by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, about 727 million people, or 9% of the world's population, will be over the age of 65 by 2020. For some Asian economies, this requires preparation for expected labor shortages. In spite of this, not all countries in the region are sufficiently well equipped with policies and infrastructure to effectively govern international migration.

At an international level, efforts to improve the governance and management of labor migration have been increasing. The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda has mainstreamed the role of decent work and well-managed migration in its Sustainable Development Goals. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, a state-led and voluntary process, has identified a comprehensive set of priorities for action at the national level. A number of Asian economies played a major role in the Global Compact drafting process through intergovernmental negotiations. In 2017, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the Manila Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, renewing a commitment made in its 2007 Cebu Declaration. In 2019, at the Osaka Summit, the Group of 20 leaders acknowledged the importance of labor mobility and emphasized the need to improve labor market governance, legal frameworks, and institutions.

Since 2011, the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have been collaborating to organize the Annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia, which celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2020.

ADBI, the OECD, and the ILO have also prepared this joint publication. This 2020 edition, “Innovative Approaches for the Management of Labor Migration in Asia,” has four chapters and two statistical annexes providing the most complete comparative data on international labor mobility in Asia. It contains major outcomes and key lessons from the Ninth Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia: Innovative Approaches for the Effective Management of Labor Migration in Asia, held in Tokyo on 24–25 January 2019.

Chapter 1 reviews the current global migration trends affecting Asia and the related statistics on migrants and remittances. It covers intra-Asian labor migration, looking at the importance of different destinations and the recent changes in migration corridors. It includes the first analysis of recent data on Asian migrants settled in OECD countries, in addition to examining migrant flows to OECD countries for different reasons, including for higher education.

Chapter 2 highlights the demographic trends and labor migration policies in selected economies in Asia. It investigates how the larger working-age population in low-income economies could help address the demand for labor in middle- and high-income economies with the appropriate and effective management of international labor movement.

Chapter 3 draws on an ILO survey and desk review to examine the policies and legislation on recruitment fees and costs in the Asia and Pacific region. The recruitment cost items and fees prescribed in national



legislation, and whether the employer or worker is to pay, vary greatly in the region. The definition of recruitment fees and related costs prepared by an ILO tripartite technical meeting in November 2018 provides a good reference point and international standard.

Chapter 4 examines the ways to improve the current framework for developing skills through the labor migration process in the Asian context, with a specific focus on skills mobility partnerships. The skills mobility partnership approach could be used to equitably and sustainably meet the increasing demand for skills in labor migration by implementing a cost-sharing model to ensure migrants acquire the skill sets sought by employers in destination countries.

The current economic and social transitions in the global economy affect labor migration in Asia and put pressure on policy makers and regulators to develop timely policy responses and innovative approaches to guarantee the effective management of labor migration. We hope that this publication will provide useful policy guidance and statistical reference to practitioners, authorities, and policy makers. Further, we extend our sincere gratitude to the organizing team for their efforts and contribution in preparing this joint publication and the Annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia.

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Finally, David Hendrickson and Adam Majoe, ADBI, coordinated the publication of the report. Expert editing and typesetting were provided by Ainslie Smith and Aileen Magparangalan, respectively.

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# ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADBI	Asian Development Bank Institute
APTC	Australia-Pacific Technical College
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLA	bilateral labor agreement
BOESL	Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited
DIOC	Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries
EPS	Employment Permit System
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
ILO	International Labour Organization
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
MOEAF	Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Federation
MoHR	Ministry of Human Resources
MoLVT	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MRA	mutual recognition arrangement
ODA	overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFW	Overseas Filipino Worker
PRC	People's Republic of China
RBA	Responsible Business Alliance
RSE	Recognised Seasonal Employer
SLBFE	Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment
SMP	skills mobility partnership
SWP	Seasonal Worker Programme
TITP	Technical Intern Training Program
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population
US	United States
VET	vocational education and training

## Trends in Labor Migration in Asia

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### 1.1 Introduction

Attention to global migration trends in the past few years has often focused on large-scale movements of people in search of protection or fleeing conflict or social disruption, such as the departures from Syria, Myanmar, and Venezuela. Yet, global migration is a much larger phenomenon, comprising many different kinds of migration. People migrate to pursue opportunities for employment or education, to form families, or reunite with family members. Within Asia, the single largest driver of migration flows is to take up work abroad. Temporary labor migration flows from Asian countries, principally directed toward the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and to certain developed East Asia and Southeast Asian economies, are substantial. Migration extends outside the region. Indeed, migrants leaving the region, heading primarily to countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), constitute a large part of total flows to these countries.

There are many factors explaining not only why people migrate, but also how, from where, and to where. Labor migration reflects above all the economic cycle. However, some underlying structural changes also affect labor migration flows, especially within Asia. Demographic changes in origin and destination countries are one such factor. Changes in the supply and demand of skills are another. Finally, certain exceptional events decided at the policy level can also affect labor migration flows: major infrastructure projects related to events or following natural disasters, for example. Similarly, political decisions in both origin and destination countries can affect labor migration flows, causing a reshuffling of corridors.


This chapter reviews a number of important migration trends affecting Asia: migration to, from, and within the region. Section 1.2 gives a brief description of the role of Asia in global migration, then Section 1.3 focuses on labor migration from Asian countries to the main destinations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia. Sections 1.4 to 1.7 draw on data from OECD countries to describe inflows to the OECD, the distribution of Asian immigrants in OECD countries, and their labor market integration relative to migrants from other origin regions. Section 1.8 then provides an overview of remittance flows in the region and Section 1.9 concludes.

### 1.2 How Asia Fits into Global Migration— Medium-term Trends

Globally, the number of international migrants has been steadily increasing since the 1990s. From 1990 to 2019, migrant stocks grew from 153 million to 272 million, an average annual growth of 2%. Growth was particularly strong in the late 2000s before the financial crisis curtailed labor migration to many destination countries, as weaker economies offered fewer employment opportunities (Figure 1.1). The stock of migrants grew by 3% worldwide between 2005 and 2010. This increase in the migrant

stock was particularly steep—7%—in West Asia<sup>1</sup> during the late 2000s. This regarded mainly the GCC countries, which have continued to see an increase in the migrant stock, although the rate of increase steeply declined. Still, migrant stocks continue to increase more quickly in that region than elsewhere in the world. Outside West Asia, Asian migrant stocks have grown more slowly than elsewhere in the world, and indeed have barely budged in the past few years.

**Figure 1.1: International Migrant Stock by Region of Destination, 1990–2019**  
(annual rate of change, %)



Note: West Asia refers to Western Asia according to the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) definitions. See <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> (accessed 20 October 2019)


Source: UN DESA. International Migrant Stock 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp>.

In terms of gender distribution, globally, about half of all migrants are women and half are men. This is true for most regions of origin, but not for Africa and for several regions of Asia (Figure 1.2). Asian regions are also those where there have been the most visible changes in the gender balance. The share of women among migrants from South Asia is just 37%, and has been steadily declining. The share of women among migrants from West Asia is 44%, down from 48% 2 decades earlier. One factor explaining this shift is the increase in labor migration to GCC countries, which, although it includes many women, remains predominated by men. The share of women among migrants from East Asia,<sup>2</sup> however, rose from 49% to 53% over the past 2 decades. This is largely explained by the fact that the People's Republic of China (PRC), the main origin country, has a migrant stock in many destination countries and without a strong gender imbalance.

<sup>1</sup> West Asia refers to Western Asia according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) definitions.

<sup>2</sup> East Asia refers to Eastern Asia according to UN DESA definitions. See <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> (accessed 20 October 2019)

**Figure 1.2: International Migrant Stock by Region of Origin and Gender, 1990–2019**  
(share of women in migrant stock, %)



Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs. International Migrant Stock 2019. <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp>.


### 1.3 Labor Migration Flows from Asia to Non-OECD Countries

As noted above, a large component of migration in Asia is temporary labor migration. Most main origin countries track outgoing temporary workers, especially those deployed through regular recruitment channels. The statistics presented in this section are based on these figures for outflows.

A remarkable decline in deployment of workers from Asian countries is apparent in 2018. Already there was a visible decline between 2016 and 2017, which was largely driven by a collapse in deployment of workers from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia (Hervé and Kinoshita 2019). For 2018, the decline was broader and affected many of the main countries in the region deploying workers. Total deployment for the main 12 origin countries fell by 10%, to 4.8 million workers (Figure 1.3). This is still more than in the depths of the economic crisis in 2009–2010, but indicates a weakness in the market for migrant workers in the main destination countries.

The Philippines is the main origin country of deployed workers. Although statistics on deployment are not available for 2018, the stock of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) is estimated by the Philippines Statistics Authority at 2.3 million in 2018, down 1.7% from the previous year. This decline conceals a possibly much larger decline in new deployment, since most OFWs are deployed for several years.

**Figure 1.3: Total Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2007–2018**  
(millions)



Note: Total of the 12 countries presented in Table 1.1.

Source: National authorities.

Indeed, large declines were visible for Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nepal (Table 1.1). A recruitment ban from Nepal to Malaysia was imposed by the Nepalese government in early 2018 and had an important impact on the total number of deployments from Nepal (Malay Mail 2018).

**Table 1.1: Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2008–2018**  
(thousands)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2017–2018 % change
Philippines	870	991	1,124	1,319	1,435	1,469	1,431	1,438	1,670	1,615	1,587	–2%
Bangladesh	875	475	391	568	608	409	426	556	758	1,009	734	–27%
PRC	427	395	411	452	512	527	562	530	494	522	492	–6%
Pakistan	425	396	358	453	635	620	752	947	839	496	382	–23%
India	849	610	641	627	747	817	805	781	521	391	340	–13%
Nepal	249	220	294	355	385	451	520	499	404	383	354	–8%
Indonesia	636	630	567	594	460	469	430	276	235	262	284	8%
Sri Lanka	250	247	268	263	282	293	301	263	243	212	211	0%
Viet Nam	87	73	86	88	80	88	107	116	126	135	143	6%
Cambodia	9	15	30	26	35	23	25	41	85	96	105	9%
Lao PDR	2	4	19	34	7	23	8	51	58	49		
Myanmar	12	6	5	18	68	67	65	95	146	162	238	47%

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Outflows from the Philippines are an estimation.

Source: National authorities.

Several Asian countries saw an increase in deployment, however, including Cambodia and Myanmar. These increases may be partly attributed to a shift from irregular migration to Thailand to declared and regular labor migration. The number of contract workers sent by the PRC for projects abroad also fell slightly in 2018, although the stock working abroad at the end of the year remained about 1 million.

Looking more in detail at the corridors for deployment in order to explain this overall decline, several trends become visible. Excluding the Philippines, deployment from the main Asian origin countries to GCC countries fell by 25% between 2017 and 2018 (Table 1.2). Bangladesh, which had sent record numbers of workers to Saudi Arabia in 2017, saw that deployment corridor decline by more than 50%, to about 257,000. Overall, deployment from Bangladesh to GCC countries fell 82%. The decline was about 32% for Pakistan and 16% for India.

Behind these declines are a series of factors, economic and political. Persistently low oil prices have hampered economic growth in a number of GCC countries. More broadly, the slowing economy in Saudi Arabia and the continuing implementation of a policy to favor hiring Saudi nationals over foreign workers has affected migration flows from Asia. Indeed, a number of GCC countries have been implementing policies concentrating on the service sector to favor nationals and increase the cost and difficulty of hiring workers from abroad (Hervé and Kinoshita 2019). Political turmoil affecting Qatar's trade relations with its neighbors also continues to dampen demand for migrant labor, even as major infrastructure projects continue.

A further factor is the diversification of recruitment in the GCC countries, away from traditional Asian sending countries. The number of migrant workers from East Africa in the GCC countries has been increasing steadily in the past few years. African workers often arrive through irregular channels and are not covered by bilateral agreements, making them more vulnerable to exploitation than regularly deployed Asia workers and less costly for employers (Atong, Maya, and Akhator 2018).

Figures on deployment from the Philippines are not available, although the stock of OFWs is estimated to have fallen by about 4% in West Asia. Among the GCC countries, the United Arab Emirates is the only country where OFW numbers increased in 2018. A 3-month recruitment ban imposed by the

**Table 1.2: Flows of Workers to GCC Countries, 2018**  
(thousands)

	Philippines	India	Pakistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
	2018	2018	2018	2017/18	2018	2018	2018	2018
Saudi Arabia	410	72	101	41	36	257	6	923
United Arab Emirates	251	112	209	60	33	3	1	669
Qatar	116	34	21	103	51	77	1	402
Oman	24	36	27	3	8	73	1	172
Kuwait	102	58	0	18	47	28	1	253
Bahrain	20	9	6	5	3	1	0	44
<b>Total GCC 2018</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2,463</b>
<i>Total GCC 2017</i>	<i>976</i>	<i>374</i>	<i>481</i>	<i>272</i>	<i>180</i>	<i>795</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>3,090</i>

GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council.

Source: International Labour Organization and national authorities of origin countries.



Philippines on Kuwait may be responsible for a noticeable decline in the number of OFWs estimated to be in the latter country, which fell 15% in 2018.

After the GCC countries, the next main destination of workers deployed from Asian countries is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, primarily Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore (Table 1.3). Excluding the Philippines, for which recent data are not available, the main origin countries of deployed workers to ASEAN are Myanmar, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, and Cambodia. Overall, the inflow of workers to ASEAN countries from Asia rose 27% between 2017 and 2018. For Malaysia, the increase was 32%, explained by a continuing increase of deployment from Bangladesh. From 40,000 Bangladeshis entering Malaysia for employment in 2016, the numbers rose to 100,000 in 2017, and 176,000 in 2018. The overall increase for Thailand between 2017 and 2018 was 29%. The main origin countries, Myanmar and Cambodia, have seen sharp increases since 2016, as more workers enter through regular channels under the bilateral agreements in place.

**Table 1.3: Flows of Workers to ASEAN Countries, by Origin and Destination, 2018**

Origin	Philippines	Indonesia	Nepal	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Thailand	Sri Lanka	Myanmar	Cambodia	Viet Nam
Destination	2018	2018	2017/18	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018	2018
Singapore		18,324	127	41,393	0	65	4,553	1,917	556	287	0
Malaysia		90,671	104,209	175,927	16,370	9,881	8,182	2,455	14,589	53	1,102
Thailand		11	31	0	6	0	0	0	208,312	96,699	0
Brunei Darussalam		5,707	144	4,480	0	225	0	8	0	0	0
<b>Total 2018</b>	<b>205,295</b>	<b>114,713</b>	<b>104,511</b>	<b>221,800</b>	<b>16,370</b>	<b>10,171</b>	<b>12,735</b>	<b>4,380</b>	<b>223,457</b>	<b>97,039</b>	<b>1,102</b>
<i>Total 2017</i>	<i>220,747</i>	<i>108,992</i>	<i>95,244</i>	<i>148,775</i>	<i>14,002</i>	<i>7,440</i>	<i>13,839</i>	<i>3,809</i>	<i>152,622</i>	<i>88,074</i>	<i>1,551</i>

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Source: International Labour Organization and national authorities of origin countries.


Partial figures for overseas employment for the first three semesters of 2019 indicate a rebound of GCC countries as destination for Asian workers. In particular, a switch between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as a destination of workers from Bangladesh and a strong rebound of deployment of Pakistani workers to Saudi Arabia are visible.

Labor migration is strongly gendered, for a number of factors. Labor demand may be strongly gendered by sector and occupation. Education, training, and labor supply may also differ. Women and men may see different costs and benefits from migrating for employment. In some cases, regulations on deployment may treat women and men differently (Napier-Moore 2017).

The share of women among the outflows of labor migrants from Asia ranges widely. In Pakistan and India, it is close to zero among deployed workers, although India excludes nurses—a sizable contingent—from its overseas employment statistics.<sup>3</sup> At the other end of the scale, women comprise around 70% of deployments from Indonesia (Figure 1.4). Women also make up the majority of workers from the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) (53%) and the Philippines (56%) and represent about 40% of those from Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam. To some

<sup>3</sup> Migration by nurses from India is significant. There were more than 20,000 from Kerala alone in 2016, more than half in GCC countries—and most are women (WHO 2017).

**Figure 1.4:** Share of Women among Labor Migrants, by Origin Country, 2016–2018, Selected Asian Countries (%)



Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Source: Official data from national authorities (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand); ILO (2018) and BEOE (2019) for Pakistan; ILO International ASEAN Labour Migration Statistics database (for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam); Philippines Statistics Authority for the Philippines.


extent, this depends on the specialization of the country in terms of sectors and corridors; countries from which a high share of migrants depart for employment in domestic work maintain a high share of women. In 2018, the share of women in worker outflows increased for Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bangladesh, and Nepal and decreased in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The evolution of this share is subject to several factors, such as the demand in destination countries for workforces in gendered sectors and occupations, such as in mining and construction, where workers tend to be men, or in the healthcare and domestic sectors, where they tend to be women. For example, in Sri Lanka, the share of female domestic workers among all workers was 31% in 2018, up 26% the previous year. The gender distribution can also be affected by bans and restrictions, or by changes in bilateral agreements.

The most recent available figures indicate sharp rises in 2019 for Nepal (from 6% in fiscal year 2017/18 to 9% in 2018/19) and for Bangladesh (14% to 17%, over January–September 2019), a slight decrease for Viet Nam over January–August 2019 (35% to 34%), and stability for Indonesia (at 69% over January–September 2019).

## 1.4 Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries

Asians are more and more inclined to emigrate to OECD countries. Migration flows of Asian citizens to OECD countries have been increasing since 2012, so that since 2016, they number more than 2 million annually (Figure 1.5). In 2017, 2.2 million migrants from Asia entered OECD countries, 6% more than in 2016 and 33% more than in 2012.

**Figure 1.5: Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries, 2000–2017**  
(millions)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration database.

The main country of origin of Asian migrants to OECD countries in 2017 was the PRC, from which 565,000 migrants arrived, 2% more than in 2016 (Table 1.4). Migrants from the PRC comprised almost 8% of all migration to OECD countries. India was the second-most important origin country, with 312,000 new migrants, up 12% from the previous year. Viet Nam, which has seen steadily increasing migration flows to OECD countries, was in third place, at 214,000, up 15% in 1 year. While inflows from the Philippines were stable at 175,000, Thailand increased sharply, by 64%, to 111,000.

Migration from the Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan) rose sharply from 2016 to 2017. These flows are largely directed toward Turkey, where international student enrolments from these countries rose substantially.

Relative to the population of the country of origin, the highest rates of migration to OECD countries were from Mongolia and Bhutan, where more than five inhabitants per 1,000 residents migrated to OECD countries in 2017. Central Asian countries mostly had high rates of expatriation. Other countries with high expatriation rates to OECD countries include Thailand (3.1 per 1,000), and Viet Nam and Singapore (2.2 per 1,000).

The main OECD destination countries for Asian migration are in the region: the Republic of Korea and Japan (Table 1.5). Together they account for 35% of Asian migration to the OECD. The increase in migration to these countries—14% more in 2017 than in 2016—accounts for much of the overall increase in Asian migration to the OECD seen in 2017. An increase in migrants from Viet Nam to Japan and Thai migrants to the Republic of Korea explains much of this change. Other countries saw increases in migration from Asia. In the United Kingdom, increased student flows from the PRC and India contributed to an overall increase. In Turkey, an increase in protection of Afghanis and an increase in students from Central Asia were seen. In Sweden, a rise in temporary information technology contractors from India and seasonal agricultural workers from Thailand boosted the total numbers.

**Table 1.4: Migration to OECD Countries by Asian Economy of Origin, 2016–2017**

Origin Economy	Flows 2017 (thousands)	Average Flows 2007–2016 (thousands)	% of Total OECD Inflows 2017	% Change 2016–2017	Expatriation Rate 2017 (per million inhabitants)
People's Republic of China	565	525	7.7	+2	401
India	312	243	4.2	+12	233
Viet Nam	214	110	2.9	+15	2,243
Philippines	175	164	2.4	+1	1,671
Thailand	111	58	1.5	+64	3,121
Afghanistan	105	50	1.4	-32	533
Pakistan	93	86	1.3	-4	1,819
Republic of Korea	74	73	1.0	+1	1,072
Bangladesh	52	46	0.7	+1	314
Nepal	49	32	0.7	+1	1,681
Uzbekistan	45	19	0.6	+36	1,416
Indonesia	39	31	0.5	+1	149
Myanmar	30	22	0.4	+2	564
Japan	30	34	0.4	-15	232
Taipei, China	28	22	0.4	+7	1,004
Sri Lanka	27	32	0.4	-10	1,300
Kazakhstan	25	9	0.3	+32	1,389
Turkmenistan	21	2	0.3	+127	3,672
Cambodia	20	14	0.3	+2	1,263
Mongolia	20	12	0.3	+35	6,520
Malaysia	19	20	0.3	+22	615
Hong Kong, China	17	8	0.2	+26	2,362
Kyrgyz Republic	14	4	0.2	+30	2,258
Singapore	13	8	0.2	+68	2,198
Tajikistan	5	1	0.1	+29	543
Bhutan	5	7	0.1	-10	5,889
Lao People's Democratic Republic	3	3	0.0	+1	386
<b>Total Asia</b>	<b>2,162</b>		<b>29.5</b>	<b>+6</b>	

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration database.

Declines were seen notably in Germany, driven entirely by a fall in the number of Afghani asylum seekers receiving protection between 2016 and 2017. In the United States, “Green Cards” (permanent residence) are subject to a per country limit of 7% of the total annually, which imposes a long waiting list for the main Asian origin countries (notably India, the PRC, and the Philippines). New Green Cards issued to Asian nationals fell slightly in 2017, due mainly to administrative factors.

Some of these flows are driven by the movement of skilled labor migrants. Outside European OECD countries, a large share of total skilled labor migration comprises Asian workers. The United States’

**Table 1.5: Top 15 OECD Countries for Asian Migration, 2017**

OECD Country	Number of Migrants in 2017 (thousands)	Difference from 2016 (absolute %)		% of Inflows from Asia to OECD	Main Asian Countries of Origin			
Republic of Korea	388	49	14	18	PRC	Viet Nam	Thailand	Uzbekistan
Japan	375	46	14	17	PRC	Viet Nam	Philippines	Rep. of Korea
United States	358	-27	-7	16	PRC	India	Philippines	Viet Nam
United Kingdom	174	57	49	8	India	PRC	Pakistan	Malaysia
Canada	153	12	9	7	Philippines	India	PRC	Pakistan
Australia	129	0	0	6	India	PRC	Philippines	Pakistan
Germany	128	-63	-33	6	Afghanistan	India	PRC	Pakistan
Turkey	128	40	46	6	Afghanistan	Azerbaijan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan
Italy	60	-1	-1	3	Pakistan	PRC	Bangladesh	India
New Zealand	54	11	26	2	PRC	India	Philippines	Rep. of Korea
Spain	32	3	12	1	PRC	Pakistan	India	Philippines
Sweden	28	11	64	1	India	Afghanistan	PRC	Thailand
France	27	5	21	1	PRC	India	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh
Netherlands	26	1	5	1	India	PRC	Afghanistan	Indonesia
Poland	19	3	16	1	PRC	Viet Nam	India	Uzbekistan

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.


Source: OECD International Migration database.

(US) H-1B visa, a temporary migration program for highly skilled workers, is an example—although, as a temporary program, it is not included in the US figures in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 (Box 1.1). In Canada, India is the leading nationality of new permanent residents; most use the selective economic migration channels for skilled workers. The number of Indians receiving permanent residence in 2017 rose by 30% over the previous year.

### Box 1.1: Asian H-1B Visa Recipients in the United States

The US issues the H-1B visa for temporary employment of foreigners in a specialty occupation, mainly (about three in four) in computer-related and engineering occupations. About 180,000 workers were granted an initial H-1B visa in US fiscal year 2018 (October 2017 to September 2018), close to the figures for the preceding 2 fiscal years (Figure 1.6). Asian workers are the main beneficiaries, representing over 90% of the recipients. The distribution between Indian and PRC workers changed somewhat, as the number of H-1B visas granted to Indians dropped for the first time since 2009 to 126,000 (-3%), while those delivered to the PRC's workers increased by 20% to 27,000. Most migrants from India and the PRC in the US waiting for a "Green Card" for employment are holding H-1B visas.

*continued on next page*

**Box 1.1** *continued***Figure 1.6: H-1B Visas Delivered, by Region of Origin, 2005–2018**  
(thousands)

Note: Data are for US fiscal years (October–September).

Source: US Department of State.


## 1.5 Characteristics of Asian Migrants in OECD Countries

The most recent update of the OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) provides a picture of the distribution of migrants in OECD countries by country of birth, up to 2015/2016 (OECD and AFD 2019). In 2015/2016, there were 120 million foreign-born living in OECD countries, of which 27 million were from Asia. Asia is the second main region of origin of immigrants residing in OECD countries, following Europe (Figure 1.7). In 2015/2016, Asia's share represented 22% of the total, 4 percentage points more than in 2000/2001. The increase of Africa's share was much smaller, less than 1 percentage point, while the share of Europe fell by about 5 points.

While the top country of origin globally of migrants residing in OECD countries in 2015/2016 was Mexico, the same as 15 years earlier, India and the PRC were ranked second and third, with 4.8 million and 4.6 million migrants, respectively (Table 1.6). Over one-quarter of the migrants from India and the PRC arrived in the OECD during the previous 5 years, which reflects the strong recent surge in immigration. The Philippines ranked sixth overall and third among Asian countries, with 3.5 million migrants, 83% more than in 2000/2001.

The number of persons born in Asia and living in OECD countries increased by 90% over the 15 years to 2015/2016, from 13.6 million to 26 million. Growth was particularly sharp for persons born in Nepal: the number living in the OECD countries increased more than eleven-fold. Other countries with a growth rate above the average include India (145%), Thailand (125%), the PRC (123%), Bangladesh (140%), Sri Lanka (115%), and Pakistan (113%).

**Figure 1.7:** Share of Origin Regions in Total Migrant Population in OECD Countries, 2000/2001 to 2015/2016 (%)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

One in five Asian immigrants arrived recently (in the past 5 years) in 2015/16. This is 2.5 percentage points more than in 2010/2011. Almost three-quarters of immigrants from Turkmenistan in OECD countries arrived between 2010/2011 and 2015/2016—most of them in Turkey. More than half of those born in Bhutan (58%) and in Mongolia (55%) are also recent immigrants. Emigration from Japan has slowed, and only 5% of Japanese-born in OECD countries in 2015/2016 were recent arrivals. Similarly, only 11% of the Viet Nam-born residents of OECD countries in 2015/2016 were recent migrants.

The increase in Asia's share of migrant stock in OECD countries is remarkable, as over the same period, the share of Asia in the total world population fell slightly.

Of the 27 million migrants from Asia living in OECD countries, 48.3% had some tertiary-level education in 2015/2016, up from 45.3% in 2010/2011. Asian migrants are more likely to be more highly educated than other migrants, and indeed Asian-born, highly educated migrants comprised 32.9% of all high-educated migrants in the OECD in 2015/2016. The share of those who had only primary education or less fell from 23.6% to 22.2% over the same period. The educational composition of migrants from Asia vary according to the place of birth (Figure 1.8). Indian-born residents in the OECD countries have a high education level, with at least three in five having completed some tertiary education. The figures are only slightly lower for Malaysia and Japan. Notable increases were seen between 2010/2011 and 2015/2016 in the share of migrants from the Republic of Korea and the PRC with tertiary education: from 48% to 57% in the case of the Republic of Korea and from 44% to 49% for the PRC. The only Asian countries for which the highly educated share fell over the 5-year period were Myanmar and Afghanistan.

**Table 1.6: Numbers of Migrants (15+) Born in the Top 10 Asian Origin Economies and Living in OECD Countries, 2000/2001 and 2015/2016 (thousands)**


2000/2001		2015/2016		Growth 2000/2001–2015/2016 (%)	Recent (<5yrs) (%)
PRC	2,072	India	4,826	145%	27%
India	1,971	PRC	4,620	123%	28%
Philippines	1,939	Philippines	3,549	83%	16%
Viet Nam	1,518	Viet Nam	2,196	45%	11%
Rep. of Korea	1,447	Rep. of Korea	1,787	24%	14%
Pakistan	670	Pakistan	1,427	113%	20%
Japan	566	Kazakhstan	1,044	141%	5%
Kazakhstan	433	Japan	704	24%	21%
Hong Kong, China	388	Bangladesh	686	140%	21%
Indonesia	340	Sri Lanka	682	115%	15%
Other Asia	2,307	Other Asia	4,517		

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Growth between 2000/2001–2015/2016 calculated for the 10 leading origin economies in 2015/2016. Recent migrants refer to those who have been in the destination country for 5 years or less.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

**Figure 1.8: Share of Migrants (15+) with High Education Living in OECD Countries, by Place of Birth in Asia, 2010/2011 to 2015/2016 (%)**




OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).



**Figure 1.9: Emigration Rates to OECD Countries, Total and Highly Educated, 2015/2016 (%)**



Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: The emigration rate to OECD countries is defined as the ratio of the number of migrants/highly educated migrants living in OECD countries to the population/highly educated population of the place of origin. This means that the denominator does not include migrants living in non-OECD countries.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

From 2000/2001 to 2015/2016, the emigration rate to the OECD countries—the share of total population born in a country that is living in OECD countries—for all of Asia rose from 2% to 2.7%. For the highly educated—those with tertiary-level education—the rate rose from 6.6% to 7.1%.

Emigration rates to OECD countries were highest in Bhutan (10.4%), Hong Kong, China (8.7%), and Kazakhstan (7.7%), and the lowest in India (0.5%), the PRC (0.4%), and Indonesia (0.2%) (Figure 1.9). The low figures for India and the PRC, despite the large emigrant population, are due to the enormous size of their total populations. For Indonesia, migrant workers tend to emigrate within the region, or to go to GCC countries, rather than to OECD countries, and are not included in the DIOC.

Those with higher education are more likely to have emigrated than those without. The average emigration rate of the highly educated from Asia (7.1%) is 2.6 times higher than the overall emigration rate (2.7%). In almost all Asian countries, the emigration rates of the highly educated to OECD countries are higher than the overall emigration rate. This is due to a number of factors, including the relatively greater access to emigration for highly educated individuals and the effect of international students from these countries remaining abroad rather than returning home.

Five Asian economies have emigration rates of the tertiary educated above 15%: the Lao PDR (19.9%), Cambodia (18.5%), Hong Kong, China (18%), Brunei Darussalam (17.8%), and Bhutan (15.9%). The rate remains below 2% in the PRC (1.8%), Myanmar (1.1%), Indonesia (1.1%), and Japan (1%). Asia is not the region most affected by the emigration of their tertiary-educated population to OECD countries. Indeed, 40 countries in the world have emigration rates of the tertiary-educated above 20%, including 15 African countries and no Asian countries.


Excluding West Asia, among the 27 million Asian immigrants living in OECD countries in 2015/2016, almost 54% were women (Figure 1.10). This share was particularly high among immigrants born in Thailand (72%), Turkmenistan (65%), and Maldives (65%). The lowest share of women were observed among immigrants from Afghanistan (40%), Bangladesh (43%), and Pakistan (43%); there were notably fewer women than men for three other South Asian countries (Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka).

The overall share of women among Asian immigrants was unchanged compared to the 2010/2011 figures, but for two-thirds of the Asian origin countries, the share of women increased. In particular, it increased sharply among immigrants born in Maldives (+27 percentage points), Brunei Darussalam (+6 percentage points), and Bhutan (+5 percentage points). It decreased mostly among immigrants from Afghanistan (-3.6 percentage points), the Kyrgyz Republic (-2.8 percentage points), and Mongolia (-1.9 percentage points).

Among PRC-born immigrants, the largest origin group, the share of women stood at 55% in 2015/2016 (+0.9 percentage points compared to 2010/2011). For the three other main origin countries, the share of women was largely unchanged for India (47%) and the Philippines (62%), and slightly increased (up 1.3 percentage points to 54%) for Viet Nam.

The average age of Asian immigrants in OECD countries rose between 2010/2011 and 2015/2016. Indeed, of the Asian-born aged 15 and over, 13% were over 65 years old (+2.3 percentage points), and only 11% were under 25 (-1.4 percentage points). For some countries of origin, the migrant population in OECD countries has a large share of older people. Among Indonesian migrants, 28% are over 65. For migrants born in the Republic of Korea and Cambodia, the share over 65 is 17%. In contrast, younger immigrants, aged 15–24, represented 26% of immigrants born in Afghanistan, 25% of those born in Nepal, and 22% of those born in Mongolia.

**Figure 1.10: Share of Women among Asian Migrants Living in OECD Countries, 2015/2016 (%)**



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC).

## 1.6 Labor Market Situation of Asian Migrants in the US, Canada, Australia, and Europe

Asian migrants, as a whole, fare better than the native-born and other migrants in the labor market in the US, but worse than the native-born and other migrants in Canada and Australia. The situation is mixed in the European Union. Looking at labor force survey data between 2008 and 2018—reflecting pre-crisis, recovery, and post-recovery in most cases—the picture appears consistent over time, but different across destinations (Table 1.7).

In the US, Asians have consistently had a higher employment rate, a lower unemployment rate, and higher participation rate than native-born. Other immigrants had a higher employment rate and participation rate than Asian immigrants in 2018, however. In Canada, the outcomes for Asian immigrants have

**Table 1.7: Labor Market Indicators for Native-born and Foreign-born Migrants in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European OECD Countries (%)**

Residence	Place of birth	Employment Rate				Unemployment Rate				Participation Rate			
		2008	2013	2018	Change 2013/2018 (% pts)	2008	2013	2018	Change 2013/2018 (% pts)	2008	2013	2018	Change 2013/2018 (% pts)
United States	Asia	72.2	69.2	70.4	1.1	3.9	5.0	2.6	-2.4	75.1	72.9	72.3	-0.6
	Foreign-born	70.8	68.4	71.6	3.3	5.9	7.0	3.5	-3.5	75.2	73.5	74.2	0.7
	Native-born	69.4	65.7	69.2	3.5	6.0	7.7	4.1	-3.6	73.8	71.2	72.2	1.0
Canada	Asia	69.9	69.4	72.6	3.2	7.1	8.1	5.7	-2.4	75.3	75.6	77.0	1.5
	Foreign-born	70.7	69.9	73.8	3.9	7.2	8.2	5.9	-2.3	76.1	76.1	78.4	2.3
	Native-born	74.3	73.2	74.4	1.1	6.0	6.9	5.7	-1.1	79.0	78.6	78.9	0.2
Australia	Asia	67.6	66.7	69.4	2.7	5.8	6.4	5.7	-0.8	71.8	71.2	73.5	2.3
	Foreign-born	69.8	69.7	72.0	2.2	4.7	5.9	5.2	-0.7	73.2	74.1	76.2	2.0
	Native-born	75.0	73.3	74.9	1.7	4.2	5.8	5.4	-0.3	78.2	77.8	79.2	1.5
EU 28 countries	Asia	63.2	64.3	66.1	1.7	7.5	10.4	6.9	-3.4	68.3	71.8	71.0	-0.8
	Foreign-born	66.8	60.9	65.0	4.0	9.3	17.1	12.0	-5.1	73.6	73.5	73.8	0.3
	Native-born	65.8	64.3	67.4	3.0	6.3	10.3	7.2	-3.2	70.3	71.8	72.6	0.8

EU = European Union, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Notes: The population refers to working age (15–64) for the employment and participation rates and to the active population aged 15–64 for the unemployment rate. EU 28 does not include Germany because 2012 data by region of birth are not available. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the secretariat are coded. The data for European countries refer to the first three-quarters only.

Source: European countries: Labor Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labor Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.


improved over the decade, with the employment rate increasing, and the unemployment rate falling to the level of native-born Canadians. In Australia, improvements in recent years have not been enough to catch up to the native-born and other migrants in terms of employment. In Europe, the broad gains made in the 5 years since 2013 in terms of lower employment were particularly striking for immigrants, including Asian immigrants.

## 1.7 International Student Mobility to and from Asia

The number of foreign students enrolled in higher education programs has been steadily growing. From a little over 2 million foreign students in 2000, the total number rose to more than 5 million in 2017 (Figure 1.11 Panel A). Enrolment of students from Asian countries has increased even more quickly. They comprised 38% of all students in 2000 but more than half in 2017 (Figure 1.11 Panel B).

Asia's global weight in international student mobility has remained stable since 2015, both as region of destination and as region of origin. Indeed, in 2017, 51% of all international students in the world were Asian, and Asian countries hosted 14% of all international students, as of 2015.


**Figure 1.11: Foreign Students by Region of Origin, Worldwide, 2000–2017**



Source: OECD Education database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics Education database.

As international student movements have increased, their enrolments in Asian destination economies have also grown (Figure 1.12). The PRC in particular has seen three consecutive sharp increases in the number of international students, for a total 38% rise between 2015 and 2018 at 230,000 students. Japan, whose international student enrolments stalled in the early 2010s, has also seen double-digit increases since 2015. In 2017, 164,000 international students were enrolled in Japanese higher education institutions. After a sharp drop in 2017, international student enrolments in Malaysia rebounded by 22% in 2018, to return to its 2016 level (122,000 students). The number of internationally mobile students enrolled in the Republic of Korea rose by 14% in 2017, and stood at 71,000, while Singapore and India saw no or little change in recent years.


**Figure 1.12: Top 10 Asian Destination Countries for Internationally Mobile Students, 2015–2018**  
(thousands)



PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD education database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics education database.

**Figure 1.13: Share of Asian Students among International Students in OECD Countries by Level of Education, 2013–2017**  
(%)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD. 2019. Education at a Glance Database. <http://stats.oecd.org> (accessed 20 October 2019).


In 2017, more than one in two internationally mobile students enrolled in tertiary education in OECD countries came from Asia (Figure 1.13). Since 2013, this share has increased from 48% to 50.5%. The share of Asian students is particularly high in short-cycle tertiary education, where they represented more than two-thirds of mobile students in 2017. These programs have attracted growing numbers of students from Asia, especially in Canada and Australia. Asians also account for about one in two mobile students at the bachelor's (48%), and master's level (52%), and one in three at the doctorate level (36%). While the rise between 2013 and 2017 has been very sharp at the short-cycle level, and moderate at the master's level, the share of Asian students among mobile students in OECD countries has been fairly stable at the bachelor's and doctorate levels over the period.

## 1.8 Remittance Flows to Asian Economies

Remittances—financial transfers from individuals abroad—are largely driven by emigrants sending their earnings to the home country to support their families, or to realize other projects. Remittances globally exceed international development assistance and have become a major contributor to the economies of many origin countries.

After the rebound observed in 2017, remittance flows to Asian economies rose again sharply in 2018 (+9.4%) to hit a new record at almost \$300 billion (Figure 1.14). According to the most recent forecasts published in October 2019, remittances are expected to grow a further 4.4% in 2019 and exceed \$310 billion. While remittances are increasing worldwide (+7.6% in 2018 and +3.5% in 2019), these increases are slightly stronger. Nonetheless, they reflect the increases observed for all low- and middle-income countries globally (+8.6% and +4.7%).

**Figure 1.14:** Remittances to Asia, 2000–2018  
(\$ billion)



Note: Figures for 2018 are estimates.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data.

At the subregional and country levels, the sharpest increases in remittance inflows were observed in South Asia (+12.7% in 2018, the steepest rise of any region in the world) and in particular in India (+14%). In absolute terms, remittance flows to India rose by almost \$10 billion to \$79 billion in 2018 and contributed more than one-third to the overall increase in Asia (Table 1.8). They also represent 26% of all remittances to Asian economies. The second main receiving economy is the PRC, which received \$67 billion (+6%), accounting for 14% of the regional increase and 23% of the total. The Philippines

**Table 1.8: Remittances by Receiving Economy, 2000–2018**  
(\$ billion)

Remittance-receiving Economy	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Share 2018
India	12.8	22.1	53.5	62.5	68.8	70.0	70.4	68.9	62.7	69.0	78.6	26%
PRC	0.8	23.6	52.5	61.6	58.0	59.5	62.3	63.9	61.0	63.9	67.4	23%
Philippines	7.0	13.7	21.6	23.1	24.6	26.7	28.7	29.8	31.1	32.8	33.8	11%
Pakistan	1.1	4.3	9.7	12.3	14.0	14.6	17.2	19.3	19.8	19.7	21.0	7%
Viet Nam	1.3	3.2	8.3	8.6	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	15.9	5%
Bangladesh	2.0	4.6	10.9	12.1	14.1	13.9	15.0	15.3	13.6	13.5	15.5	5%
Indonesia	1.2	5.4	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.6	8.6	9.7	8.9	9.0	11.2	4%
Nepal	0.1	1.2	3.5	4.2	4.8	5.6	5.9	6.7	6.6	6.9	8.1	3%
Sri Lanka	1.2	2.0	4.1	5.2	6.0	6.4	7.0	7.0	7.3	7.2	7.5	2%
Thailand	1.7	1.2	4.4	5.3	5.7	6.6	6.5	5.9	6.3	6.7	7.5	2%
Korea, Rep. of	4.9	5.2	5.8	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.4	6.5	6.2	6.7	2%
Japan	1.4	0.9	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.4	3.7	3.3	3.8	4.4	5.6	2%
Uzbekistan	..	..	2.9	4.3	5.7	6.7	5.7	3.1	2.7	3.9	3.9	1%
Myanmar	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.8	1%
Kyrgyz Republic	0.0	0.3	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.5	2.7	1%
Tajikistan	..	0.5	2.0	2.7	3.2	3.7	3.4	2.3	1.9	2.2	2.3	1%
Georgia	0.2	0.4	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.8	2.0	1%
Malaysia	0.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1%
Cambodia	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	0%
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.6	1.4	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.3	0.6	1.1	1.3	0%
Hong Kong, China	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0%
Mongolia	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0%
Kazakhstan	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0%
Afghanistan	..	..	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0%
Lao PDR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0%
Bhutan	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
Macau, China	..	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
Maldives	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
Turkmenistan	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>194.6</b>	<b>225.6</b>	<b>240.8</b>	<b>252.5</b>	<b>265.0</b>	<b>265.3</b>	<b>257.1</b>	<b>273.2</b>	<b>298.9</b>	<b>100%</b>

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Figures for 2018 are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

follows with \$34 billion (+3%). This is the 20th consecutive year of growth, although the smallest. In looking for explanations, one factor may be that the more highly educated migrants remit more. The top three origin economies of tertiary-educated immigrants in OECD countries in the DIOC in 2015/2016 were India (3 million), the PRC (2 million), and the Philippines (1.8 million), which may explain the high remittance flows to these economies.

Pakistan follows with \$21 billion (+6%), then Viet Nam with \$16 billion (+7%). Among the other main receiving Asian economies, remittance flows increased particularly sharply in Indonesia (+25% to \$11 billion), Nepal (+16% to \$8 billion), and Bangladesh (+15% to \$15 billion). Almost all Asian economies received more remittance flows in 2018 than in 2017.

**Table 1.9: Share of Remittances by Economy, 2000–2018**  
(% of GDP)

	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Afghanistan	..	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.9
Azerbaijan	1.1	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.3	2.5	2.4	1.7	2.8	2.8
Bangladesh	3.7	9.4	9.4	10.6	9.2	8.7	7.8	6.1	5.4	5.4
Bhutan	..	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.6	1.7	1.8
Cambodia	2.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	2.3	2.2	1.9	5.2	5.8
Georgia	6.7	10.2	10.7	11.2	12.1	12.0	10.4	10.6	11.8	12.2
Hong Kong, China	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
India	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.9
Indonesia	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.1
Japan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Kazakhstan	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Korea, Rep.	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4
Kyrgyz Republic	0.2	26.4	27.6	30.8	31.1	30.0	25.3	29.3	32.9	33.6
Lao PDR	0.0	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.5
Macau, China	..	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Malaysia	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Maldives	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mongolia	0.1	3.7	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	3.5
Myanmar	1.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	2.7	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.8
Nepal	2.0	21.6	22.3	25.4	29.0	29.4	31.4	31.3	28.3	28.0
Pakistan	1.5	5.5	5.7	6.2	6.3	7.1	7.1	7.1	6.5	6.8
Philippines	8.5	10.8	10.3	9.8	9.8	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.5	10.2
PRC	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.5
Sri Lanka	7.1	7.3	7.9	8.8	8.6	8.9	8.7	8.9	8.2	8.1
Tajikistan	..	35.8	41.7	42.2	43.5	36.6	28.8	26.9	31.6	31.0
Thailand	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Turkmenistan	..	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uzbekistan	..	7.3	9.3	11.0	11.6	9.2	4.6	3.7	..	9.0
Viet Nam	4.3	7.1	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.8	5.8	6.2	6.6

PRC = People's Republic of China, GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Note: Figures are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.



Overall, for Asia as a region, the ratio of remittances to gross domestic product (GDP) stands just over 1%, similar to the world figure. However, this conceals a wide variation in dependency on remittances. In several low- and middle-income Asian economies, remittance inflows make up a significant share of the GDP. The most heavily dependent country is the Kyrgyz Republic, where remittances account for more than one-third of the GDP, a record-high ratio (Table 1.9). Tajikistan is also highly reliant on remittances (31% of the GDP, -0.6 percentage points compared to 2017). In Nepal, remittances comprised 28% of the GDP in 2018, although this was -0.3 percentage points less than the previous year and the third straight year of decline. Among other countries with fairly high remittance to GDP ratios are the Philippines (10.2%, -0.3 percentage points), Sri Lanka (8.1%, -0.1 percentage points), Pakistan (6.8%, +0.3 percentage points), Viet Nam (6.6%, +0.4 percentage points), Cambodia (5.8%, +0.6 percentage points), and Bhutan (5.4%, stable). Economies where remittances play only a marginal role in the GDP (under 0.5%) include the PRC; Malaysia; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Macau, China; Maldives; and Turkmenistan.

## 1.9 Conclusion

Asia continues to play a major role in global migration, and for many of the origin economies of Asian migrants, migration is important for the economy, both through alleviating labor market pressure and through the remittances sent by workers abroad. The overseas deployment market for less-skilled workers from Asian origin economies has been affected by softening economic growth in the GCC countries, to which migration from Asia has been falling since 2015, although it is estimated to have remained above 2.3 million. Migration to the ASEAN countries rose by 27%, excluding the Philippines, to 800,000, while migration to the OECD countries rose by 6%, to 2.2 million. The significant increase in the flow of Asian migrants to ASEAN and OECD destinations leads to a more balanced picture of Asian emigration, but is not sufficient to compensate for the decline in absolute numbers of migrants leaving for the GCC countries. Nonetheless, early indications are that migration to the GCC countries is picking up again in 2019. Within the region, Malaysia and Thailand became the main destination countries for workers, in particular those from Indonesia, Nepal, and Bangladesh (for Malaysia), and from Myanmar and Cambodia (for Thailand).

Migration flows to OECD countries have been long been on an upward trend, and the number of Asian-born immigrants living in OECD countries has increased sharply since 2000. The share of women (53.7%) and that of the highly educated (48.3%) in the Asian-born population of OECD countries are higher than for other groups. Their situation on the labor markets of OECD countries, in terms of employment rates, is often more favorable than that of other groups of migrants. Asia is still a major source of international students in the OECD, accounting for more than half of student mobility. Asian destinations—OECD and non-OECD—are of growing importance for international study.

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## Demographic Trends and Labor Migration Policies in Asia

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### 2.1 Introduction

The world is in the midst of demographic change, with varying degrees, toward population aging. Statistics show a downward trend in the world's population growth as the world's fertility rate continues to drop. These two factors, with a complement of advanced medical technology and innovation, lead to lower mortality rates and a rise in an aging population, particularly in developed economies; thus, implying a shrinking working population in the world's labor market. Every month, more than 1 million people turn 60 years old. According to the United Nations Fund for Population (UNFPA 2012), there will be more people aged over 60 than those under 15 in 2050. In the more developed regions, the population aged over 60 is expected to double by the same year, while the population under aged 60 will likely decline. This, consequently, will push up old-age dependency, which in turn affects economic productivity and causes fiscal implications.


Even so, another part of the world may not experience the same trend of an aging population. An increasing trend is indicated in the population growth in Africa and some parts of Asia. This trend in the economies with younger populations can balance out the impacts of a rising aging population in developed economies. To maintain economic growth and induce productivity in the global economy, labor movement can play an important role. Appropriate frameworks for socioeconomic policy and international partnerships for well-governed migration that supports economic growth and equality are required.

This chapter is structured in four sections to assess the relationship of global and Asian demographic trends and the migration trends and the associated policies. Section 2.2 demonstrates the global demographic trend as well as Asia's trend. The impacts of population aging are also examined. Section 2.3 presents the policy stocktaking of labor migration in Asia, both in recipient and sending countries. Section 2.4 discusses challenges arising from the management of labor movement in Asia. Some conclusions and policy implications are drawn in Section 2.4.

### 2.2 Demographic and Migration Trends


#### Global Demographic Trends

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA 2019) forecasts a possibly increasing trend of population growth after 2050, following a continuous decline since 1990. Figure 2.1 shows the growth rate of the world population, exhibited in different regions. A continuous decreasing trend is shown in the past 5 decades since 1970 as the growth rate in most regions declined. However, it is forecast that the growth rate may go up after 2045, due mainly to growth in the African region.

**Figure 2.1: Population Growth Rate (%), World and Regions**


Note: Projections based on constant fertility rates.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.

**Figure 2.2: Total Fertility Rate, World and Regions**


Note: Projections based on medium variant.


Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.

Figure 2.2 shows a continuous declining trend of the total fertility rate around the world, even in the African region. Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean shared the same trend of sharp decreases in their fertility rates during the period of 1970–2010, while Europe and Oceania experienced a constantly gradual decline in their rates. The fertility rate in North America, on the other hand, fluctuated in the 1980s and stayed steady after 1995. The United Nations’ projection (UN DESA 2019) demonstrates the constant trend of total fertility rates until 2100.

Consequently, following the declines in population growth and the fertility rate, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio is evident (Figure 2.3). The rates in the three regions, i.e., Europe, North America, and Oceania, have always been relatively higher than the rest of the world. This could possibly be the result of better medical technology and healthcare systems. It should be highlighted that the old-age dependency ratio started to increase significantly from 2015 in most regions. Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean are undoubtedly forecast to have a sharp increase in the ratio from 2015. Africa, on the other hand, does not seem to observe this trend as its ratio of old-age dependency continues to stay at a low level consistently.

According to the United Nations (2017), globally, the population aged 60 or above is growing faster than all the younger age groups. There are an estimated 962 million people aged 60 or over in the world, accounting for 13% of the global population. The number of older people in the world is projected to be 1.4 billion in 2030 and 2.1 billion in 2050 and could rise to 3.1 billion in 2100. Considering the ratio of the working population to the aging population, it is obvious that the dependency ratio will increase in the near future, while it is possible that the overall productivity will depend mostly on the shrinking working population, particularly in the economies with aged and rapidly aging populations.

**Figure 2.3: Old-age Dependency Ratio, World and Regions**



Note: Projections based on constant fertility rates.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.


## Asian Demographic Trends

Asia is the most populous region in the world economy, accounting for 60% of the world population. While South Asia accounts for the biggest share of the population in Asia, or 25% of the world total population in 2019, East Asia and Southeast Asia together account for approximately 30.3% of the world total population. Although many countries in the region still have young populations and show an increasing population growth, many are experiencing unprecedented population aging.

Figure 2.4 shows the population rate in selected Asian countries from East Asia and Southeast Asia. A significant decline is shown in Japan, as a negative growth rate has occurred since 2010. Japan has the highest proportion of people aged over 65 in the world and the country's population size is shrinking, as indicated by the negative growth rate. The Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are catching up to the fall, while the trends are forecast to be negative by 2030. Singapore observed a high rise from 2005–2010; the population growth has been in a downturn since then. It is forecast that Singapore will face a negative rate in 2040. Viet Nam's population growth rate is also downward, but gradually. The forecast suggests a negative growth for Viet Nam by 2055. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, on the other hand, still maintain their positive growth rate, but a gradually decreasing one.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 confirm a similar trend through life expectancy indicators and total fertility rates of the selected Asian countries. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore show comparatively higher life expectancy over time, while their total fertility rate has stayed constant since

**Figure 2.4:** Population Growth Rate (%), Selected Asian Countries




Note: Projections based on constant fertility rates.

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.

**Figure 2.5: Life Expectancy, Selected Asian Countries**




Note: Projections based on medium variant.

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.

**Figure 2.6: Total Fertility Rate (live births per woman), Selected Asian Countries**



Note: Projections based on medium variant.

PRC = People's Republic of China.


Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.



2000–2005. The second tier, i.e., the PRC, Thailand, and Viet Nam, demonstrates a gradual decline in the total fertility rate as life expectancy continues to go up. The last group, i.e., younger population economies, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, reveals comparatively higher total fertility rates but lower life expectancy compared to other selected Asian countries.

The old-age dependency ratio (Figure 2.7) follows the other implications of a rising aging population. The projection suggests a more severe degree of dependency in the Republic of Korea than in Japan in the later years. Most countries will experience a rise in dependency by 2020.

**Figure 2.7: Old-age Dependency Ratio, Selected Asian Countries**



Note: Projections based on constant fertility variant.


PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). World Population Prospects. 2019 Revision.

## Impacts of population aging on the labor force and productivity

Overall, the world's working population continues to increase at a constant or decreasing rate. Figure 2.8 reflects two important facts of the world population. First, the young population aged less than 14 will potentially stay steady until 2100 due to low fertility rates. Second, the proportion of the population aged over 65 has increased in size since 2000. This number of the aged population accelerated in 2015 and is projected to rise more by 2050. It is possible that, by 2050, the population aged over 65 will be larger than the young population. Putting these two facts together implies potentially a shrinking working population in the world economy; in other words, potential labor shortages.

**Figure 2.8: World Population by Age Group**  
(thousands)



Note: "P" indicates projected values.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2018). Population Division.

Generally, population aging has wide-ranging implications to economic growth and productivity. Some economists suggest that population aging can put downward pressure on gross outputs and returns to capital. Theoretically, at an early phase of the demographic transition, an increase in a proportion of workers enhances aggregate consumption, cumulative investment, and total labor inputs; thus, outputs increase. This is called demographic dividend. As the transition progresses, a significant drop in the labor supply, due to a lower total fertility rate and a decrease in the mortality rate, reduces aggregate outputs as well as domestic savings. Although it does not necessarily imply lower productivity from a rising aging population, we can observe changes in a pattern of economic behavior that could bring lower consumption and lower investment. These factors can hamper overall economic growth.

Figure 2.9 shows the projection of the world population by broad age group and income group, indicating a decreasing growth rate of the population in the high-income and middle-income countries. The population of aged 65 and above is forecast to grow constantly in both groups of economies. On the contrary, the population structure of low-income countries shows an increasing growth rate with a bigger working population aged 15–64 years old.

In response to rising population aging, it is arguable that capital flows, labor movement, and migration may alleviate its impacts on productivity and economic growth. A larger working population in low-income economies can help compensate the demand for labor in high-income and middle-income economies with appropriate and effective management of international labor movement. However, net migration levels remain low, particularly in Asia, mostly due to homogeneity and national identity (ESCAP 2016). A policy framework that accommodates fair and smooth management of labor migration is required. Existing labor migration policies in selected Asian countries will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Figure 2.9: World Population by Broad Age Group and Income Group (thousands)**




Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2018). Population Division.

## International Migration Trends

According to UN DESA (2019), the number of international migrants will reach 272 million in 2019, an increase of 51 million since 2010. Regionally, Asia hosts the biggest number of international migrants (83.6 million), followed by Europe (82.3 million), and North America (59 million). Saudi Arabia hosts the largest share of international migrants in Asia as most international migrants move between countries located within the same region. Figure 2.10 shows the numbers of international migrant stock in 2019 by region.


From the recipient economy's side, in Asia in 2019, West Asia hosts the biggest share of international migrant stock, as mentioned, led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. The percentage of the working population of migrants in West Asia is also the highest, followed by Southeast Asia. Figure 2.11 shows the numbers and percentages of international migrant stock by different age groups in 2019. The working-age group (15–64 years old) dominates other groups in all subregions in Asia and in all selected recipient economies. To match this labor migration trend with the economies with aged and/or rapidly aging populations, the significant flow of working-age migrants to such economies can help alleviate a high degree of labor shortage.

**Figure 2.10: International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Region**



Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.


**Figure 2.11: International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Age Group in Selected Economies, 2019**



UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.

From the labor-sending economy’s perspective, South Asia and Southeast Asia dominate the share of international labor migration in Asia. Figure 2.12 presents the number of international migrants to the world by origin in 2019. India and the PRC are leading the international migrant flows to destination countries. Other countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines have also sent labor to other parts of the world at an increasing rate. Although this number represents the total international migrants, most are labor migrants, accounting for 64% according to International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates in 2017.

**Figure 2.12: International Migrant Stock at Mid-year by Origin**


PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.

## 2.3 Labor Migration Policies in Asia

The movement of labor contributes to the efficient and productive use of human capital and catalyzes knowledge transfer across the region. Therefore, there is a growing desire among countries to take a more proactive role to facilitate and foster labor mobility as skilled workers are required to create knowledge-based economies and to promote innovation. More importantly, an aging population and changing demographics necessitate a more efficient use of human resources through regional cooperation.

### Southeast Asia/ASEAN

According to the Asian Development Bank (2019), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a region with active labor migration where the numbers have been substantially increasing over the years. The number of people moving across ASEAN has tripled from 2.1 million in 1995 to 6.9 million in 2015. The movement of the labor force is generally from Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, the Philippines, and Viet Nam to countries like Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The intra-ASEAN labor mobility is mainly concentrated along the borders: (i) in the Greater Mekong Subregion, where labor migrants move from Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar to Thailand, and (ii) the Strait of Malacca area, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The primary factor driving large cross-border and intra-ASEAN labor migration is the persistent, uneven level of economic development across the region as well as the labor shortage, including in the domestic work sector in a host country. The average monthly wage of Thai workers is about three times higher than their counterparts in neighboring countries, such as Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar. It is also the fact for Malaysia and Indonesia.

Interestingly, large unidirectional traffics of people within ASEAN are primarily managed by the host and origin governments. For example, Thailand has separate memoranda of understanding (MOU) with Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar, specifying procedures to formalize labor migration. Malaysia also has MOUs with several major migrant source countries—such as Indonesia—to strengthen labor migration governance. In Asia, the MOU is the most common arrangement for managing international labor migration, followed by bilateral agreements (Song 2018). Also, other special arrangements exist for the Pacific island countries, such as New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme and Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme (ILO 2019).

## Japan


Japan’s population is shrinking and aging rapidly. The total population is projected to decline by almost 25% between 2015 and 2050, falling to below 100 million. The elderly dependency ratio (the elderly population as a share of the working-age population), which was 44% in 2015, is projected to spike to 73% by 2050 (OECD 2018). Therefore, the Japanese government faces a grave challenge of managing this unprecedented demographic transition to maintain the current economic prosperity and well-being.

Japan shifted from a sending to a receiving state decades ago. Recognized as a migration destination economy, Japan has implemented a number of laws in response to its increased demand for foreign labor. In 2016, the number of newborns in Japan was fewer than 1 million, and Japan’s old-age dependency ratio increased by 32 points between 1980 and 2015. If this trend continues, Japan’s working-age population will reduce to around 55 million by 2050 (OECD 2018). In order to address the situation, Japan will need to make the best use of all available talents and resources by promoting the inclusion of women, the elderly, youth, technological innovation, and foreign workers in the labor market.

Japan’s aging society, a long period of slow economic growth, and strict employment protection of regular workers have created a dual labor market, and the gap between regular and non-regular workers continues to widen. About two-thirds of the relatively low-paid non-regular employees are women, while men account for almost 70% of regular employees. Men enjoy seniority-based remuneration and considerable employment security, but in return often work very long hours. Young women are less likely to enter regular employment upon graduation and less likely to enter fast-track career streams where workers are groomed for higher management (Kinoshita and Guo 2015). Achieving greater gender equality, and making more efficient use of everyone’s skills more broadly, would help Japan address labor shortages and sustain economic growth.

Figure 2.13 shows an increasing trend of international migrant stock in Japan since 1990. In 2019, the share of international migrants in Japan’s total population reached 2% (UN DESA 2019). A majority of the migrants to Japan are from developing countries, particularly working in the low or intermediate skill sectors. It is also recorded that the share of female migrants is comparatively higher with 51.7% of the total number of international migrants in Japan. As such, the employment opportunities for foreign workers have been expanding over the years. It is estimated that the number of foreign workers in employment rose to almost 20% between 2015 and 2019, indicating employers’ willingness to incorporate foreign workers into their labor force.

Table 2.1 also presents the numbers of international migrant stock in Japan from selected Asia economies. Since 1990, the majority of international migrants were from the PRC, followed by the Republic of Korea, but the number of migrants from Southeast Asia has steadily increased over the years, and surpassed the Republic of Korea in 2019. This could imply that Southeast Asian migrants are becoming a new source of labor for Japan’s market.

**Figure 2.13: Number of International Migrants in Japan by Origin**


Note: North refers to developed countries, South refers to developing countries.

LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.

**Table 2.1: International Migrant Stock in Japan by Origin from Selected Asian Economies**

	People's Republic of China	Republic of Korea	Philippines	Viet Nam	Thailand	Indonesia	India
1990	150,383	687,832	49,106	6,235	6,726	3,624	3,108
1995	222,311	660,554	75,318	9,224	16,255	7,052	5,584
2000	335,600	635,194	144,882	16,909	29,291	19,347	10,065
2005	648,120	532,475	198,241	39,408	38,934	23,481	21,219
2010	687,156	565,989	210,181	41,781	41,279	24,895	22,497
2015	714,570	457,772	229,595	146,956	45,379	35,910	26,244
2019	784,763	475,166	255,530	209,731	49,967	44,937	30,063

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.

The hiring of foreign workers in professional and technical fields has been actively promoted for almost 2 decades, and increasingly favorable conditions for the highly qualified have been offered since 2012. Nonetheless, Japan needs to further promote migration and increase the number of foreign skilled professionals (Kimura 2016).

Japan has a long history of policy development for the management of labor migration since 1952 when the Immigration Control Ordinance was enforced. In response to the labor shortages, one of the most progressive measures implemented by Japan to answer the need of mid-skilled and/or skilled

labor was the establishment of National Strategic Special Zones in 2015 to meet locally specific labor demands. Under the National Strategic Special Zones system, the local government can bring migrant workers into specific sectors as approved by the national government. New sets of professionals, e.g., medical doctors, Japanese cuisine chefs, agricultural workers, investors, and entrepreneurs, were approved for the employment of international migrants in indicated areas. A major amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, effective in April 2019, is to accept middle-skilled foreign workers. In addition, Japan identified industrial fields that need “specified skilled workers” to address the serious labor shortages. Taking into account the impact of population aging in the country, aged-care workers are identified in the specified skilled workers’ system. The government also extends the period of stay to 5 years for occupations identified in this system.


## Thailand

The age structure of Thailand’s population has been through a drastic change in the past decades. In 1970, about half of the population was under age 15, but in 2017 only 18% of the population was under age 15. On the other hand, the elderly population (age 60 years or older) increased from only 5% in 1970 to 17% in 2017. It is projected that Thailand will become a complete-aged society by 2021, which is when the proportion of the elderly population reaches 20% of the total population (TGRI 2019). Both the number and proportion of Thailand’s elderly population are increasing. Given that Thailand is still categorized as a middle-income economy, a concern is that Thailand may become old before becoming rich. Thus, it is imperative for the government to design policies to support the elderly citizens as well as prepare for the labor shortage problems.

In the past decades, Thailand has become a growing destination for migrant workers from neighboring countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion, mainly due to imbalanced economic development in the region, and the broader Asia and Pacific region. Figure 2.14 shows evidence of the increasing number of international migrants in Thailand, dominated by Myanmar, the Lao PDR, and Cambodia.

However, the actual number of migrant workers in Thailand is difficult to determine. Many migrants have moved across Thailand’s borders irregularly and have joined the informal sectors of employment.

**Figure 2.14:** Number of International Migrants in Thailand by Origin



Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC= People’s Republic of China.

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (2019). International Migrant Stock. 2019 Revision.



This has resulted in a continued lack of reliable official data and records proving their existence both as residents of the country and as wage earners in the local labor market. It is estimated that the majority of workers from Cambodia (73%), the Lao PDR (96%), Myanmar (91%) and Viet Nam (91%) used irregular channels to enter Thailand (Harkins, Lindgren, and Suravoranon 2017). The period of large-scale labor migration to Thailand from Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar began in earnest during the 1990s. This coincided with a decade-long economic boom from 1987 to 1996, which greatly expanded wage differentials between Thailand and its neighboring countries.

Prior to recent legislative developments in 2017, the Thai government had struggled to formulate a long-term migration policy, instead relying heavily on periodic regularization of irregular migrants and a nationality verification process. In 1992, Myanmar migrant workers were registered to fill the labor shortages in sectors which had become undesirable to Thai workers. However, as the labor shortage continued, this ad hoc approach to migration policy remained the foundation of Thailand's labor migration policy framework. Most migrants from Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar continue to make use of semi-annual registration windows to obtain legal status or simply work irregularly. The last such registration window concluded in 2018.

The Thai government tried to formalize the migration policy on a bilateral basis; for example, by agreeing on MOUs on employment cooperation with the Lao PDR government in 2002, and with Cambodia and Myanmar in 2003, which established channels for regular labor migration into Thailand. However, only a small proportion of migrants have up to recently entered Thailand through the MOU process. In 2015 and 2016, Thailand revised the MOUs to broaden cooperation on labor issues, including skills development and social protection, and signed a new agreement with Viet Nam. The MOUs define the term of employment for migrants as 2 years with a possible extension of another 2 years. The focus of the Thai legislation is to legalize irregular economic migrants from Cambodia and to integrate them into the local legal framework. Thailand entered into an MOU with Cambodia to protect the migrant workers' rights in 2013, and another MOU with the Lao PDR to eliminate trafficking of women and children in 2015 (Song 2018).

In 2017, further measures to limit irregular migration were enacted as part of a comprehensive law on labor migration, entitled the Royal Ordinance on the Management of Foreign Workers Employment B.E. 2560. Consolidating Thailand's laws on recruitment and employment of migrant workers, it was hoped that a unified law would bring greater clarity and coherence to Thailand's largely ad hoc legal framework on labor migration. However, this law enforced severe penalties on irregular migrants and their employers. Tens of thousands of migrants fled the country in fear, causing a significant labor shortage across the country.

After experiencing the detrimental effect of the new law, the government decided to suspend and revise the penalty provisions in 2018. The government consulted employers, civil society, and migrant workers for suggestions, and the ILO supported the revision of the law by aligning it to the international standards of labor migration governance (Harkins 2019).

In response to the aging society and to boost skills and talents in the labor market, Thailand adopted two main approaches. First, the skill development scheme via tax incentives was adopted by the enforcement of the Skill Development Promotion Act B.E. 2545, with an amendment in B.E. 2557. The act encourages enterprises with at least 100 employees to provide skill development programs for at least half of their employees, both Thai and migrant workers. The expenses from the program can be applied for tax deduction. Second, Thailand is implementing the Mutual Recognition of Skill Program carried out by the ILO with its neighboring countries, including Viet Nam and the Philippines. The progress has been made through the Mutual Recognition of Skill Roadmap and Guidelines.

## Philippines

The total population of the Philippines reached 106.6 million in 2018, out of which the working-age population was 71.3 million (around 67%), as the country is maintaining a young demographic. Also, educational attainment in the Philippines is high compared to other low- and medium-income developing countries. However, there were not enough quality jobs for the well-educated population as the overall unemployment rate was 5.3% and the underemployment rate was 18% in 2018. The situation is worse for women as there are fewer job opportunities. In 2017, the labor force participation of the working-age population for men and women was 76.4% and 46.8%, respectively (Masuda and Sakai 2018). More than half the female working population was not able to participate in the domestic labor market; thus, they tend to go abroad in search of jobs.

The Commission on Filipinos Overseas estimates that there were a total of 8.8 million Filipinos residing abroad in 2017. The Filipino international migrant workers are commonly called Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). Interestingly, OFWs did not go to nearby ASEAN countries but rather to the Arab Gulf states, East Asia, Europe, or North America. Even as early as 1990, intra-ASEAN migration accounted for only 7% of total labor migration and the share has been decreasing ever since (Masuda and Sakai 2018). International labor migration is encouraged by the Philippine government as a considerable amount of remittances flow into the Philippines. In 2017, nearly \$31.3 billion in remittances was sent to the Philippines. Among the major destination countries, Japan and Singapore were registered as economies from where the remittances were sent. The remittance flows to the Philippines constitutes 10% of its gross domestic product. OFWs are mainly employed as household service workers, manufacturing laborers, nursing professionals, and cleaners and helpers in offices, hotels, and other establishments.

Recognizing the important contribution of OFWs to the economy, the government provides comprehensive welfare protection to OFWs. Initially, the international migration of Filipino workers was considered as a temporary measure to deal with domestic unemployment. However, as the volume of labor migration increased, there was a paradigm shift in the government. A presidential announcement in 2008 gave the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration the responsibility of exploring and securing job opportunities for overseas workers. In 2015, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Act (2015) was enacted to expand the social security protection of OFWs. The act states that the government is responsible for the protection of OFWs and is obliged to promote employment opportunities for all overseas workers. Then, in 2016, the 8-Point Labor and Employment Agenda was announced to strengthen the protection and security of OFWs (Olivier 2018).

In addition, OFWs are also covered by a large number of provisions under the Labor Code of Philippines, which aims to protect both domestic and overseas workers. Also, the Social Security Act (1997) has allowed OFWs to be protected under the Social Security System but only on a voluntary basis. OFWs could register with the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, which has been granted a key institutional role in the provision of benefits and services, including social security services to OFWs. In 2009, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (1995) was amended through Republic Act No. 10022 of 2009 to expand the social security benefits for OFWs (Olivier 2018). Other social protections for OFWs are provided through bilateral agreements with the receiving countries. In fact, these bilateral agreements are the foundation for ensuring that the social protection and benefits provided by the Filipino government are safely arranged and received by the overseas workers.

In order to ensure competitiveness of the OFWs in the global labor markets, the Philippines Qualifications Framework was enforced in 2018 to promote the recognition of skills and qualifications of Filipino workers. The government has placed efforts to refer the Qualifications Framework with the

ASEAN Qualification Reference Framework, the region's common reference framework that provides a means for the comparison of educational qualifications across ASEAN. According to the Philippines' Institute for Labor Studies (2019), the country has successfully entered into 43 valid bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) with 27 countries of destination. The government has put its effort to insert the provisions related to the mutual recognition of skills and qualifications, human resources development, skill enhancement and development, and exchange of professionals in the BLAs.

## Indonesia

In the 1980s, Indonesia experienced high population growth with an average growth rate of 2% per annum. The total population increased from 119 million in 1971 to 257 million in 2016 and it is projected to increase to about 345 million by 2030. In addition, the total fertility rate steadily increased from 2.2 in 2013 to 2.47 in 2016, maintaining Indonesia's young population. In 2016, the percentage of the population aged 14 or younger was 27.1%, the percentage of the working-age population was 67.4%, and the percentage of the elderly population was only 5.5%. Despite the large labor force, Indonesia faces a critical challenge of unemployment, with more than 7 million unemployed every year during 2013–2016 (Hasibuan 2017). With a growing youth population and insufficient domestic job creation, out-migration of Indonesian workers helps to stabilize the employment rate and induce economic prosperity.

More than 6 million Indonesian migrant workers are spread out in 150 countries around the world. Indonesian migrant workers make a major contribution to the economy, sending \$8.9 billion of remittances back to Indonesia in 2016. The remittances have been growing over the years, now being equivalent to about 1% of Indonesia's total GDP (World Bank 2017). Given this significant economic contribution, the government has introduced policies in recent years with the effort to maximize the benefits of international labor migration. These include signing MOUs with some of the destination countries, the establishment of a smoother migration process, and efforts to ensure that migrant workers receive adequate protection, with labor attachés now being placed in Indonesian consulates in the countries of destination with large numbers of Indonesia migrant workers.

A vast array of regulatory instruments informs the social security coverage of these migrant workers and the supporting legal, institutional, and operational framework (Olivier 2018, p. 49). The 2004 Act concerning the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers provides the key legislative framework, supported by inclusive supporting and implementing regulatory instruments. This act appears to only deal with the position of regular migrant workers, not irregular, undocumented, or illegal workers.

By Presidential Decree, the government has also established an integrated team for the protection of Indonesian workers overseas. This team is responsible for evaluating the problems faced by overseas Indonesian workers and making recommendations to resolve them (Song 2018). In addition, Indonesia ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in 2012, strengthening its commitment to international standards and the protection of workers' rights.

Indonesia's Law on Immigration (Law No. 6/2011) regulates the entrance and departure of individuals within Indonesian territory, immigration control, and immigration detention. The Regulation of the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration No. 6 of 2013 facilitates the placement of Indonesian workers overseas by requiring a representative to act on behalf of a licensed placement operator in the receiving country. The regulation also outlines the reporting obligations of the relevant parties, and the processes for dispute settlement. Government Regulation No. 4 of 2013 sets out the procedures for the

employment of Indonesian migrant workers. Then, Law No. 18 of 2017 further enhanced the protection of Indonesian migrant workers (Song 2018).

From a policy and strategic perspective, the National Medium-term Development Plan 2015–2019 is worth noting. The plan emphasizes the importance of international cooperation related to migration in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements (Olivier 2018). In addition, skilled migration is being prioritized, with the goal to increase the number of Indonesian migrant workers who have skills and expertise in line with market needs. A new initiative is introduced to minimize risk and promote professional, skilled, and formal labor as well as a comprehensive database in all sectors suitable for overseas job markets that can be matched to Indonesian migrant workers.

## Bangladesh

The population growth in Bangladesh was on average about 1.5% per annum from 2000 to 2013. It is notable that the share of the working-age population has also increased, reaching about 69% of the total population in 2013. According to ADB and ILO research (2016), if this growth rate is maintained over the years, the total labor force is projected to be about 74.45 million by 2020. This gives an additional labor force of 13.75 million during 2013–2020, or about 1.95 million per year. However, despite the growing labor force, unemployment remains high. Since the 1990s, the unemployment rate has remained between 4% and 5%. In addition, the quality of jobs is low so that a high proportion of the employed labor force remains in vulnerable employment, which signifies low productivity employment. Apart from low incomes, workers often face the risk of losing their livelihoods when hit by crises from personal factors (such as illness, etc.) to economic fluctuations. Therefore, with the continuous high unemployment rate domestically, the global labor market has become an important alternative source of employment for Bangladesh via international migration. A key challenge for Bangladesh's government is to manage the surplus labor force, as well as to develop semi-skilled and/or skilled labor to match the demand in the international labor market.

In 2017, Bangladesh transformed into a lower-middle income country. International migration and the remittances sent by overseas Bangladeshi workers have played a critical role in economic contribution during the breakthrough. The impact of overseas employment and the concomitant remittance flow contributed significantly to the success of alleviating poverty in the country as well. The Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training data suggest that a total of 734,181 Bangladeshi workers migrated to different countries across the world, including the Gulf and other Arab states, as well as Southeast Asian countries in 2018. From 1976 to 2018, about 12.2 million individuals migrated overseas for employment (Siddiqui et al. 2019). Almost 64.5% of the total number of workers who migrated from Bangladesh in 2018 went to the Gulf and other Arab states. The majority of the remaining, or 35.5%, went to countries in Southeast Asia. In 2018, the highest number of overseas Bangladeshi migrant workers was evident in Saudi Arabia. Although the number of migrant workers from Bangladesh in Japan is comparatively lower than those from other developing Asian countries, i.e., the PRC, Philippines, Thailand, or India, a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed with Japan in 2018. The provisions in this signed memorandum offer opportunities for Bangladeshi migrant workers to work as technical interns in four specified sectors: construction, caregiving, hospitality, and manufacturing (Siddiqui et al. 2019).

Realizing the important role of migrant workers to the economy, the government passed a major law that provides the framework of governance of emigration, titled the Overseas Employment and Migration Act of 2013. This act aims to govern emigration with a specific focus on migrant rights and welfare (Neelim and Siddiqui 2015). In 2018, the Wage Earners' Welfare Board was established as a statutory body through the Wage Earners Welfare Board Act, 2018. This act covered the needs of

female migrants by extending the social and economic protection to the migrants' families through services such as assisting in the transportation and burial of deceased migrants, providing scholarships to migrant workers' children, and supporting physically challenged dependents of migrants (Siddiqui et al. 2019). To further support the rights and welfare of overseas Bangladeshi workers, the government implemented policy reforms with a major focus on promoting safe migration, protection of migrant workers and their family members, benefits and welfare services for migrant workers, female migrant workers, and governance of labor migration. The most important effort taken by the government is to link migration with the national development agenda to ensure its significance in the context of economic and social development.

The Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism are the five key ministries dealing with international labor migration. The technical training centers under the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training, the district level manpower offices, and the Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited are the organizations involved in regulating and processing migration. Private recruitment agencies, associations, medical centers and their associations, grassroots nongovernment organizations, and civil society bodies also play an important role (Neelim and Siddiqui 2015).

## 2.4 Challenges and Policy Implications

Recognizing the impacts of population aging in some economies in Asia, governments have implemented new initiatives, measures, and policy responses. Challenges emerge in both receiving and sending countries, which lead to policy implications for respective governments to take into consideration.

For *labor-receiving countries*, labor shortages are evident, potentially due to the shrinking working population. Many receiving countries, e.g., Japan and Thailand, have started to implement new frameworks to encourage more semi-skilled and/or skilled migrant workers to their markets. Efforts have been made to decentralize skilled workers to other areas outside metropolitan districts, as well as limiting the concentration of professionals in certain sectors. Japan, for example, has introduced the Specified Skilled Workers' Scheme to alleviate labor shortages in specific industrial fields, while protecting public security, and enhancing migrant workers' skills. A challenge may arise in the area of skills management for skill and qualification recognition that can match suitable industrial fields to skills possessed by migrant workers.

ASEAN endorsed the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) for seven professional services, i.e., accountancy, architecture, dentistry, engineering, medical doctors, nursing, tourism, and surveying. However, full implementation is still challenging across the region due to the difficulty in aligning the domestic regulatory regimes with what was agreed in the MRAs. Institutional challenges include inadequate funding, coordination among related government agencies, and poor databases.

Effective labor management requires comprehensive databases and efficient registration for migrant workers. Undocumented migrant workers are still a concern in some countries. In response to this problem, Thailand, in collaboration with its neighboring countries, i.e., Myanmar, the Lao PDR, and Cambodia, enforces the required registration process for all migrant workers who come to Thailand's labor market, particular in the domestic work, fishery, and construction sectors. In order to improve migrant workers' skills, hence productivity, Thailand has started to focus more on the use of technology as well as offering skill-promotion programs to migrant workers.

Another challenge that the receiving countries face is how to retain skilled labor in their economies. Labor theoretically follows competitive benefit packages and higher incomes. Realizing this fact, governments in the host countries have started to include elements of social security and welfare for migrant workers,

e.g., favorable work conditions for foreign workers, employment counseling services, and job security (longer-term employment) in foreign employment and immigration frameworks. This approach aims to provide better opportunities for migrant workers in order to retain skilled labor in the country, while protecting the domestic labor market from the possibility of being undercut by the foreign workers.

For *labor-sending countries*, the focus is on (i) the protection of migrant workers, i.e., migrant workers' rights, safety, and job security, and (ii) empowering them, i.e., ensuring their competitiveness in the global labor market via skill development. The Philippines is an example of a country that has made progress in implementing and enforcing laws to facilitate mutual recognition of professional qualifications and skills. This is to make sure that the OFWs can develop desired skills from recipient countries, and hence, improve their competitiveness in the global labor market. The provision in the MRAs covers the conduct of research, identification of areas of alignment, and onsite visits and outreach to foreign counterparts. In order to promote labor protection for migrant workers, countries have applied measures and initiatives for safe migration and fair employment to help their overseas workers. For example, the Lao PDR has established a migration resource center and an employment service center to facilitate employment for overseas Lao PDR workers, as well as providing advice on eligible rights, labor protection, and welfare.

A common challenge shared by both labor-receiving and labor-sending countries is insufficient interdependence and cooperation between the two groups. Although many BLAs and MOUs have been signed, it is important to strengthen collaboration and coordination between bilateral partners, as well as to involve social partners in the development and implementation monitoring of these agreements. Together, it is necessary to ensure that essential provisions, e.g., skill development and labor protection, must be included as well as being enforced and implemented. Moreover, international standards must be inserted and followed. This is to maximize benefits of the BLAs and MOUs for both sides, while promoting interdependence of countries through fair and efficient management of cross-border human resources, and thus increased labor mobility.

In addition, to improve the management of cross-border labor mobility in the region, monitoring mechanisms are required. To address the challenges and find respective policy responses, inclusive databases and analysis must be developed at the national level. The comprehensive monitoring mechanisms play a significant role in policy design that directly and promptly responds to addressed challenges. Databases can be developed by including basic indicators such as the number of international migrants by age, gender, and origin, which are available in the international labor migration statistics datasets, from, for example, the UN and ILO. These indicators provide information about migration trends and the behavior of international migrants. Surveys can be conducted in more sophisticated and detailed databases on information of the labor market; for example, details about migrants' families and educational background, work experience or skills, recruitment background, and expectation of social welfare. The recipient countries can use these kinds of databases to evaluate their labor demand while they also implement the monitoring mechanisms to manage immigration records, improve border security, and minimize public security.

On the other hand, the labor-sending countries can conduct stock-taking studies on migration regulations and laws in major destination countries and surveys on the demand for specific skills in such countries as well as skill availability in their domestic labor market. To develop such databases and monitoring mechanisms, the labor-sending countries can track their overseas migrant workers and ensure their rights and welfare. It is evident that there is some inconsistency in the laws, regulations, and policies between countries of origin and destination, which can worsen migrant workers' rights and security. At the same time, appropriate data analysis can be conducted to develop desired skills to match with the ones required by the recipient countries. Training programs, which include predeparture training programs and on-arrival information workshops, can be developed and organized according to available databases and analysis.

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## Policies and Legislation on Recruitment Fees and Costs in the Asia and Pacific Region<sup>1</sup>

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### 3.1 Introduction: Defining Recruitment Fees and Costs

Migrant recruitment issues have come on the international agenda in a major way over the past few years with the growing realization that malpractices in recruitment processes largely erode the benefits of labor migration for migrant workers and their families (Wickramasekara and Baruah 2017). The International Labour Organization (ILO) developed and disseminated Fair Recruitment General Principles and Operational Guidelines in September 2016 (ILO 2016b). As part of the fair recruitment framework and for further elaboration, in November 2018 an ILO technical meeting comprising governments and employers and workers' representatives developed guidelines on the definition of recruitment fees and costs (ILO 2019).

The ILO Fair Recruitment General Principles state that no recruitment fees or related costs should be charged to, or otherwise borne by, workers or jobseekers; and define recruitment fees as including:

- payments for recruitment services in matching offers of and applications for employment
- payments for recruitment in case of third party employment or direct recruitment
- payments made to recover recruitment fees from workers

Related costs are defined as “expenses integral to recruitment and placement within or across national borders”. The guidelines note that the competent authority has the flexibility to determine exceptions to their applicability, after due consultation, and subject to certain conditions.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter was prepared as a result of a survey and desk review that fed into an ILO global comparative study on defining recruitment fees and related costs (ILO 2018b). The global comparative study, which included a proposed definition subject to negotiation, provided a backdrop to the ILO technical meeting in 2018 referred to above. The chapter examines 20 economies in the Asia and Pacific region on their policies and legislation concerning recruitment fees and recruitment costs as they apply to overseas workers.<sup>3</sup> With a few exceptions, most economies do not have a formal (or official) definition of recruitment fees and costs, or what constitutes recruitment fees and costs. In this report, the approach we take is to consider cost items that are mentioned in the legislation or policies of a country as part of what the governments of those countries consider as going into recruitment fees and costs.

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Geoffrey Ducanes, based on a desk review and technical inputs from and surveys conducted by staff from various ILO migration projects in the Asia and Pacific region. Contributions and edits to the draft have been made by Nilim Baruah.

<sup>2</sup> All of the above refer to contractual fees and costs. Extra-contractual or illicit costs are never legitimate.

<sup>3</sup> For a sample of countries, we compare policies on recruitment fees for foreign workers with those for national workers. See section 3.4.



Of the 20 economies that are part of this regional review, five are mainly countries of origin in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), seven are mainly labor-sending countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic [Lao PDR], Myanmar, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam), five are mainly labor-receiving economies from Southeast Asia and East Asia (Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Thailand), and three countries (two are mainly receiving and one is mainly sending) are from the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, and Vanuatu). To facilitate presentation and discussion in the report, the countries are divided into these subgroups in relevant sections and the tables in the appendix.

All of the 20 economies have at least some policies or legislation on recruitment fees and costs but they sometimes differ widely in terms of the cost items that are covered by their policies and legislation, and also on who is expected to pay the cost items. The cost items covered by legislation and policies range from only one (recruitment fee) in Vanuatu to at least 16 in the Philippines. In the assignment of responsibility for payment, there is also much heterogeneity, with, on one end, Mongolia, which has ratified the ILO Convention on Private Employment Agencies (No. 181),<sup>4</sup> which stipulates that workers shall not directly or indirectly be charged any fees related to their recruitment and placement, and, on the other end, countries such as Indonesia and Viet Nam, where the workers are assigned by law or policy to shoulder most of the costs.

There is no single definition of what constitutes recruitment fees or recruitment costs that is widely applied in the region.<sup>5</sup> A recruitment fee is sometimes used interchangeably with placement fee, service fee, or registration fee. In some countries, recruitment fee refers specifically to what is paid to the recruitment agency (by the worker or employer) for its services in facilitating the recruitment of the worker by the foreign employer. In other countries, recruitment fee includes not only service charges but also other cost items (such as visa fee, medical fee, training fee, etc.) For instance, Cambodia's Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training (MoLVT) defines the recruitment fee as payment to recruitment agencies for professional services to a worker and is inclusive of a registration fee, predeparture training, and the placement of the worker in the destination country.<sup>6</sup> The MoLVT defines recruitment costs, meanwhile, as expenses for what it considers the worker's personal documents, such as an overseas worker card, passport, visa, work permit, stay permit, medical check-up, and transportation. In contrast, Malaysia's Ministry of Human Resources (MoHR) defines recruitment fees and costs differently, defining recruitment fees as migration-related expenses regulated by law and recruitment costs as migration-related expenses not regulated by law.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.2 Institutions and Agents Involved in the Recruitment Process and in Determining Fees and Costs

Recruitment is a major function of the labor market where employers seek workers and workers seek jobs. Employers have three strategies to recruit workers (and workers to find jobs): (i) directly through job announcements and screening; (ii) through public employment services; and (iii) through private intermediaries that include licensed recruitment agencies and social networks (Wickramasekara and Baruah 2017). The overseas recruitment process in Asia is mainly private and through private

<sup>4</sup> In the Asia and Pacific region, Fiji and Japan are the two other countries that have ratified ILO Convention 181.

<sup>5</sup> Based on results of a survey conducted by ILO migration projects in the Asia and Pacific region of government agencies in charge of labor migration specifically for this report and a desk review of legislation and policies in the economies considered in this report. It should be noted, however, that legislation and policies are almost always expressed in the national language, while this report relied on their English translations. This places some limitations on the comparisons made across economies.

<sup>6</sup> Survey response of MoLVT, Cambodia to survey questionnaire specific for this report.

<sup>7</sup> Survey response of MoHR, Malaysia to survey questionnaire specific for this report.

recruitment agencies. In some corridors (such as in the Mekong and Indonesia to Malaysia), however, there is still a large volume of labor migration through irregular channels. Some independent migration, in the sense of being done through personal networks, also occurs, in particular among returning or repeat migrants. In the case of labor migration into the Republic of Korea (but also previously from Bangladesh to Malaysia), the recruitment process is through a government-to-government channel.

The main regulations on recruitment fees and costs, in some cases, are embedded in a general law regulating private recruitment agencies. This is the case, for example, in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China.<sup>8</sup> In others, they are mainly through a law governing overseas workers in particular and/or decrees or circular orders issued by the ministry or department in charge of overseas labor migration (e.g., Indonesia, Viet Nam, and India). There are also many instances of recruitment cost items being regulated at the corridor level through bilateral agreements between governments.

The government entity charged with overseeing labor migration is also typically the one in charge of setting prescribed amounts for recruitment cost items. In the Lao PDR, for example, this falls under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare; in Pakistan under the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment; in Singapore, under the Ministry of Manpower; and in Viet Nam, under the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. The prescribed fees are typically updated every few years.

### 3.3 Recruitment Cost Items Covered by Legislation and Policies

#### 3.3.1 South Asia

##### Recruitment cost items mentioned in legislation or policies

In the five South Asian countries that are part of the focus of this study, there is some legislation or policy that aims to regulate or at least provide guidance on the charging of recruitment costs including recruitment fees but they vary across countries in terms of scope (the cost items included in the policy or legislation) and objectives (caps applied on certain components and who is expected to pay them). The list of policies and legislation on recruitment fees and other costs in the five South Asian countries is in Table A3.1.

In each of the five countries, there is a policy or legislation regulating the recruitment (placement or service) fee, which is the payment made to an agency (which can be a private recruitment agency or a government entity such as Sri Lanka's Bureau of Foreign Employment [SLBFE], or the Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited [BOESL]) for the service of finding employment for a worker or alternatively for finding a worker for an employer. In each of the five countries, there is also a policy or legislation regulating medical exam fees. In Sri Lanka, the term used is registration fee, which includes a placement fee but is also contributory to the overall funds that support Sri Lankan migrant workers in Sri Lanka and countries of destination.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 and its Amendment in 2017 in Malaysia; the revised Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Filipino Workers of 2016 in the Philippines; the Employment Agency Act of 2011 in Singapore; and the Employment Agency Regulations under the Employment Ordinance in Hong Kong, China.

<sup>9</sup> The SLBFE relies on its funding from this registration fee and the annual registration fees paid by licensed recruitment agents.

Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan have policies or legislation that at least mention airfare (to destination country). Nepal, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have policies or legislation that touch on visa fees—at least for certain destination countries. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have policies or legislation that mention predeparture orientation training costs and contribution to a welfare fund.

In Bangladesh, some other recruitment cost items touched on by legislation or policies are the emigration tax, value-added tax, BOESL registration fee (for Bangladeshi workers going through the BOESL, who are a small portion of total Bangladeshi overseas workers), and collateral fee (also for workers going through the BOESL). In Nepal, insurance is also included as one of the financial costs of migration. In Pakistan, other costs mentioned in legislation or policies not yet listed above are work permits, levies, and documentation fees. In Sri Lanka, an administrative fee for the use of the facilities of the SLBFE and other operational costs is also explicitly mentioned.

## Prescribed fees or costs and who is expected to pay

### Recruitment fees

Taking into account the possible differences in the definition of what constitutes a recruitment fee noted in the first section, in all the five countries, a cap is set on the recruitment fee which is expected to be paid by the worker. In the case of India, the cap on the recruitment fee is set at the equivalent of 45 days of wages of the worker as stated in the employment contract but no more than ₹30,000 (approximately \$435).<sup>10</sup> Apart from the payment for the professional services of the recruitment agency, this is also expected to pay for the visa fee, the airfare to the destination, the medical exam, and initial hotel stay at the host country, and any other costs associated with overseas employment. Any amount exceeding ₹30,000 is to be shouldered by the foreign employer. In the case of Bangladeshi workers finding employment through the BOESL, the cap varies by skill category of the worker (and whether or not the employer paid for his or her air ticket) with more skilled workers typically paying a higher recruitment fee.<sup>11</sup> For unskilled and semi-skilled workers where the air ticket is paid by the employer, the service charge is Tk27,410 (approximately \$322), while for skilled workers it is Tk38,450 (approximately \$452). In the case of Nepal, the Foreign Employment Act 2007 explicitly gives the government authority to put a cap on the recruitment fee, which maybe country and company-specific. Following the implementation of the *Free Visa, Free Ticket* policy, the cap on the recruitment fee was set at \$100. The worker is expected to pay the recruitment fee if not already paid by the employer. In Pakistan, the Emigration Rules (updated 2012) caps the recruitment fee on the basis of the worker's salary and the length of the contract, with those earning more and with longer contracts facing a higher cap. For a worker earning at most \$1,200 per month, the service charge is set at about \$48, whereas for those earning more, the service charge is set at about \$80. Sri Lanka is similar to Nepal in that the law (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act) allows the government, specifically the SLBFE, to cap the recruitment fee, which may vary by type of employment and other circumstances, and also in that the worker is expected to pay for recruitment fee. For migrant workers leaving for the first time, the cap is currently set at about \$111.

<sup>10</sup> Previously, the Emigration Act of 1983 made the cap on the recruitment fee dependent on the skill level of the worker (similar to Bangladesh), with skilled workers charged ₹5,000, semi-skilled workers ₹3,000, unskilled workers ₹2,000, and ₹10,000 for workers classified differently.

<sup>11</sup> The exceptions are Bangladeshi workers in the Republic of Korea hired through the Employment Permit System (EPS) who are not expected to pay any recruitment fee and female garment workers who pay a low recruitment fee (about half that of semi- and/or unskilled workers).

### Medical exams

In the five countries, the workers are to pay for a medical exam. In India, this is part of the recruitment fee that is charged to the worker.

### Air tickets

In Bangladesh, for workers going through the BOESL, the policy is that the airfare is to be paid by the employer. In Nepal, the *Free Visa, Free Ticket* policy and the bilateral agreement with Jordan also mandate that, for workers going through recruitment agencies to work in Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan, the cost of the air ticket is to be borne by the employer.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, in the case of Pakistan, the recruitment agency is allowed to charge the worker the actual expenses for the air ticket (going to the destination country), although the employer is expected to shoulder the cost of the return ticket upon contract completion. As stated above, in India, the outgoing cost of air travel for workers that go through a recruitment agent is part of the recruitment fee paid by the worker, unless the total expense incurred by the worker exceeds ₹30,000, in which case the excess is borne by the employer.

### Visa fees

Visa fees paid by workers vary widely, from free, such as for Nepalese workers going to select destinations, to more than \$2,000, on average, for Pakistani workers headed to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, the recruitment agencies are allowed to charge workers actual expenses for the visa. In Nepal, for the seven countries covered in the *Free Visa, Free Ticket* policy, and for Jordan, the employer shoulders the cost of the visa, but otherwise, it can be charged to the worker but with a cap set by the government. In Bangladesh, the visa fee is also charged against the worker. In India, it is the same arrangement as with the air ticket.

### Predeparture orientation training

In Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, workers pay for the cost of predeparture orientation training. But in Nepal, in the case of women migrant workers, this cost is reimbursed by the Foreign Employment Promotion Board. Further, the cost of 30 days, predeparture training and orientation for women domestic workers is shouldered by the recruitment agencies.

### Contributions to migrant welfare funds

In Bangladesh and Nepal, as well, workers contribute to a migrant welfare fund before departure. Again, in Sri Lanka, this is part of the recruitment fee that is charged to the worker.

### Insurance

In Nepal and Sri Lanka (as part of the recruitment fee), the workers pay for accident and life insurance.

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<sup>12</sup> It should be noted, however, that the implementation of this policy has been problematic and there is still a lack of awareness among prospective migrant workers as to how the policy works. A lack of coordination between Nepal and the destination countries has also made it difficult to ensure that employers who initially paid for the ticket and visa do not end up deducting them from workers' wages. For more discussion of this issue, see *Stand Firm with Nepal: Zero fees as a first step towards migrant worker empowerment* by the Open Working Group on Labour Migration and Recruitment.

## Others

In Bangladesh, the worker is also expected to shoulder the emigration tax, the value-added tax, the BOESL registration fee (for workers going through the BOESL), and a collateral fee (also for workers going through the BOESL), although the latter is to be refunded by the BOESL to the worker after 4 months. In Pakistan, the worker is expected to pay for the work permit, levy, and documentation fees. In Sri Lanka, workers are charged an administrative fee as part of the recruitment fee. In India, the employer is expected to pay all costs exceeding ₹30,000.

### 3.3.2 Southeast Asia (mainly countries of origin) and Mongolia

#### Recruitment cost items mentioned in legislation or policies

Mongolia is both a labor-receiving and labor-sending country and has ratified ILO Convention 181 in 2015. Under Article 2.2 of the Law of Mongolia on Employment Promotion, and also under Article 2.2 of the Law of Mongolia on Sending Labor Force Abroad and Receiving Labor Force and Specialists from Abroad, if an international treaty to which Mongolia is party stipulates other than the laws, then the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail. So as per the law, workers are not supposed to shoulder any recruitment costs in Mongolia.<sup>13</sup> The list of policies and laws on recruitment fees and other costs in the other six countries in the subgroup (and Mongolia) is in Table A3.2.

Each of the six countries has laws or policies that mention (and regulate) recruitment or placement fees; although similar to South Asia, they differ in the scope of what is covered by the recruitment fee or placement fee. In the case of the Lao PDR, although not formally defined, the recruitment fee appears to be a catch-all payment to the recruitment agency to cover the service of finding employment for the worker (service charge), plus other recruitment expenses (e.g., visa fee, airfare to the destination, medical fee, and predeparture orientation training) that recruitment agencies are supposed to pay for based on the legislation. In Viet Nam, the service charge (the fee charged by recruitment agency for its own services in assisting the worker) is treated as separate from the brokerage fee, the latter defined as the payment to a broker or foreign partner to perform the labor supply contract or to secure contracts to send the laborer to work overseas.<sup>14,15</sup> In the other countries, there is no differentiation in the policy or legislation between a recruitment fee and a brokerage fee and a recruitment fee is treated separately from the other recruitment cost items.

<sup>13</sup> However, Mongolia sends workers to the Republic of Korea via the EPS, where they are expected to shoulder specific cost items. In the two other Asia and Pacific countries that have ratified the Convention, there have been gaps in implementation. In Fiji, for example, which ratified the Convention in 2013, a Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations formed by the ILO noted that the country's Employment Relations (Employment Agencies) Regulations of 2008 contain a general authorization for private employment agencies to charge fees to workers. The Committee has requested that the Government of Fiji provide information for the reasons for authorizing such exceptions and on consultations with the most representative organizations of employers and workers as required by the Convention. News reports also document cases of applicants for overseas jobs being charged by illegal recruitment agencies for applications (e.g., "Queries Over Job Agency" in Fiji Sun online on 30 November 2016). In Japan, which ratified the Convention in 1999, a similar committee has been established to examine a representation alleging non-observation by Japan of the Convention, in particular on Article 11 on measures to ensure adequate protection for workers employed by private employment agencies, and Articles 10 and 14 on the investigation of complaints and adequate remedies. The Japan legislation in question is the 2012 Revised Worker Dispatch Law.

<sup>14</sup> The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs Joint Circular on Guiding Brokerage Fees for Labor Export (No. 59/2006/TTLT-BTS-BLDTBXH).

<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that Viet Nam's law (Law on Guest Workers) prohibits the collection by a recruitment agency of a recruitment fee from overseas workers, but then allows for a collection of a service charge and a brokerage fee from the same workers. Since the latter expenses would normally be considered synonymous with, if not forming an important part of a recruitment fee, it is not clear what the law meant by "recruitment fee".

Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Viet Nam (for those going to Taipei, China and Japan), and the Philippines have legislation or policies that explicitly mention visa fee, airfare, medical fee, predeparture orientation, and documentation expenses such as for passport and police clearance.<sup>16</sup> Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have legislation or policies that mention local transport (from the airport in the destination country to the jobsite), and insurance premiums. Indonesia and the Philippines are the only ones to have legislation or policies that mention a skill certificate for the job applied for. Cambodia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam have legislation or policies that mention insurance premiums. Cambodia and the Philippines also have legislation or policies that mention the processing fee of home government agencies overseeing migration. Only Cambodia and Indonesia have legislation or policies that mention a levy, although in the case of Cambodia it is only for Cambodian workers going to Malaysia. Only Cambodia and Viet Nam have legislation or policies that mention a deposit. The Philippines, Viet Nam, and the Lao PDR have policies that mention a contribution to the migrant welfare fund.<sup>17</sup> Only the Philippines has a policy that mentions a membership payment to the home country social security system, residence permit, and additional trade assessment required by the employer. Only Viet Nam has legislation or a policy that mentions the brokerage fee already discussed above.

## Prescribed fees or costs and who is expected to pay

### *Recruitment fees*

Except for Mongolia and Indonesia, in the countries under consideration the workers are generally expected to pay the recruitment fee. In the Philippines, based on the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Filipino Workers of 2016, there is a cap equivalent to 1-month's basic salary as stated in the approved contract, but domestic workers, workers going to countries where the collection of a recruitment fee is prohibited, and seafarers are exempt. In the case of Cambodia, the employer is expected to advance the payment first and then deduct it from the worker's salary later. In 2017, Indonesia adopted a new law that forbids the charging of a placement fee to the worker, effectively assigning it to the employer. Previously, it capped the placement fee depending on the destination country. But the government is still working on the implementing rules and regulations of the new law, and so what cost components are included under the placement fee apart from the fee for the services of the recruitment agency is still to be sorted out. In the Lao PDR, in the Guidelines on the Implementation of Decree on Export of Lao Workers Working Abroad, the recruitment fee is capped at 15% of the salary of the worker per month. In Myanmar, according to the Rules and Regulations for the Law Relating to Overseas Employment, the recruitment fee (service fee) is capped at 4 months' expected base salary. Similarly, in Viet Nam there is a cap on the recruitment fee that typically differs by destination country and by the occupation or skill level of the worker.

### *Visa fees*

Similar to South Asia, visa fees paid by workers vary widely, from free, such as for those from the Philippines and potentially Indonesia, to about \$70, on average, for migrant workers from the region employed in Thailand, to potentially a much higher fee for workers employed elsewhere in the region

<sup>16</sup> In the case of Indonesia, the 2017 Law on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers only explicitly mentions the placement fee (although implicitly the placement fee is understood to have different components – see Article 72a). Previous legislation or policies in Indonesia mentioned the other recruitment cost components cited here or below.

<sup>17</sup> In the case of Viet Nam, overseas workers contribute to the overseas employment support fund (that supports overseas workers in case of injury, death, or other risks and is also used to support the expansion of the labor market). In the Lao PDR, under the MOU with Thailand on Employment Cooperation, workers contribute to a deportation fund, which can be used to cover the cost of deporting workers, but otherwise can be claimed by the workers in full with interest after their employment ends.

and other parts of the world. In the Philippines, the employer is expected to pay the visa fee. In the Lao PDR, the policy is to have the recruitment agency pay the visa fee, although in effect this is probably already costed in the recruitment fee paid by the worker. In Indonesia, under the old system, the outgoing worker was expected to pay the visa fee. Under the 2017 Law, the implementing rules and regulations of which are still being sorted out, this is likely to be assigned to the employer. In Cambodia, in an MOU with Malaysia for workers going to Malaysia on a government-to-government basis, a worker is expected to pay the visa fee.<sup>18</sup> In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, workers are expected to pay unless employers agreed to pay for it under the labor supply contract.

### *Airfares to destinations*

In the Philippines, legislation or policies mandate that the employer pays for the airfare going to the country of employment. In Cambodia, an MOU with Malaysia for general workers going to Malaysia states that this is to be borne by the worker. However, for Cambodian domestic workers going to Malaysia under a separate MOU, this is to be borne by the employer. In Indonesia, under the old policy, payment for this was assigned to the worker, but it could be different under the 2017 law when the implementing rules and regulations come out. In the Lao PDR, this should be paid by the recruitment agency.<sup>19</sup> In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, who pays depends on the negotiation between the recruitment agencies and their foreign partners.

### *Medical exams*

In the Philippines, the fee for the medical exam is paid by the worker according to legislation or policy. The same was true for Indonesia, but again this might change under the 2017 law that prohibits the charging of a placement fee on workers once the implementing rules and regulations come out. In Cambodia, the worker is to pay for this fee. In the Lao PDR, this is to be paid by the recruitment agency.<sup>20</sup> In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, workers are expected to pay unless employers agreed to pay for it under the labor supply contract.

### *Predeparture orientation training*

In Cambodia and the Lao PDR, predeparture orientation training, including transportation to the training site, accommodation and food, is assigned to the recruitment agency, but is likely passed onto the workers. In Indonesia, under the old policy, this was assigned to the worker, but this might change under the 2017 law. In the Philippines, this comes with the contribution to the migrant welfare fund, which is paid for by the employer. In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, workers are expected to pay unless employers agreed to pay for it under the labor supply contract.

### *Local transport from airports to jobsites*

In the Philippines, based on legislation or policy, local transport from the airport to the jobsite is paid by the employer. In Cambodia, for domestic workers going to Malaysia, this is to be shouldered by the employer under the MOU between the two countries. In Indonesia, under the old system, payment for

<sup>18</sup> The MOU has yet to be implemented, however.

<sup>19</sup> It should be noted, however, that, in practice, the cost of the airfare to the destination country is believed to be passed on to the workers.

<sup>20</sup> In practice, this, as well as the documentation costs discussed below, are likely shouldered by the workers.

this was also assigned to the worker, but again this could possibly change when the implementing rules and regulations of the 2017 law are set. In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, workers are expected to pay unless employers agreed to pay for it under the labor supply contract.

#### *Documentation costs*

In Cambodia and the Philippines, based on legislation or policy, the worker is expected to pay for the costs of a passport, police clearance, and other documentation costs. Under the old system in Indonesia, this was also assigned to the worker. Under the 2017 law, this might change once the implementing rules and regulations are worked out. In the Lao PDR, payment for this is assigned to the recruiter. In Viet Nam, there is no legislation or policy but, in practice, workers are expected to pay unless employers agreed to pay for it under the labor supply contract.

#### *Insurance premiums*

In Indonesia, under the old system, the payment of an insurance premium was assigned to the worker. Again, it is possible that this could change once the implementing rules and regulations of the 2017 law come out. In the Philippines, this is assigned to the recruitment agency. In Cambodia, the employer is expected to pay for the insurance premium.

#### *Work permits*

In Cambodia and the Philippines, legislation or policy assigns the payment for a work permit to the employer.

#### *Levies*

In Cambodia and Indonesia, legislation or policy tasks the worker with paying the levy, which in the case of Indonesia is the TKI protection levy.

#### *Skill certificates*

In Indonesia and the Philippines, based on legislation or policy, payment for a skill certificate specific to the job applied for is assigned to the worker.

#### *Others*

In the Philippines, additional recruitment cost items, which employers are assigned to pay based on legislation or policy, are additional tests and/or trade assessments required by the employer, processing fees of the home government agency overseeing migration, contributions to the migrant welfare fund, and residence permits. Meanwhile, in the Philippines also, the worker is assigned to pay the membership fee in the home social security system.

In Cambodia, legislation or policy assigns the employer to pay a deposit. In Viet Nam, it is the worker who is assigned to pay a deposit, which is to be used to cover the losses of the recruitment agency in case the employment contract is broken through the fault of the worker.

In Viet Nam, the worker is assigned to pay for a brokerage fee which is capped based on the destination country and skill level of the worker.



### 3.3.3 Southeast Asia and East Asia (mainly destination economies)

#### Recruitment cost items mentioned in legislation or policies

The list of policies and legislation on recruitment fees and other costs in the five economies in the subgroup is in Table A3.3. In the five East Asian and Southeast Asian mainly receiving economies that are part of the focus of this study, there is again some legislation or policy that aims to regulate or at least provide guidance on the charging of recruitment cost items, including recruitment fees, but with the exception of the Republic of Korea, where recruitment is done on a government-to-government basis (Employment Permit System [EPS]), they are on only a few cost items.<sup>21</sup> Malaysia; Thailand; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore have laws or policies regulating the recruitment or placement fee. Medical exam fees are mentioned in legislation or policies in Thailand; Hong Kong, China; and the Republic of Korea; visa fees only in Hong Kong, China and the Republic of Korea; predeparture orientation training only in Thailand and the Republic of Korea; the foreign worker levy only in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea; skill-testing fees only in Thailand; registration fees only in Malaysia; insurance in Hong Kong, China. Additionally, only in the case of the Republic of Korea are the following cost items mentioned: one-way airfares, contribution to the migrant welfare fund, membership payment in the home country social security system, language exams, employment permits, certificate of confirmation of visa issuance, and administrative fees for the use of facilities of government offices in charge of migration.

#### Prescribed fees or costs and who is expected to pay

##### Recruitment fees

54

In Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China,<sup>22</sup> the foreign worker is expected to pay for the recruitment or placement fee. In Thailand, it is instead the employer who is expected to pay for this fee. In Malaysia, according to the Private Employment Agencies Act 2017, the placement fee a recruitment agency may charge a non-Malaysian for employment within Malaysia is capped at 1-month's basic wage.<sup>23</sup> In Hong Kong, China, under the Employment Ordinance, the cap on the placement fee is set at only 10% of the worker's first month's wage. In Singapore, based on Article 12 of the Employment Agencies Act of 2011, the recruitment fee is capped at 1-month's salary for each year of the period of the contract of employment or validity of the foreign worker's work pass, whichever is shorter, pro-rated according to the length of contract, but no more than 2-months' salary. In Thailand, the rate of the recruitment fee that an agency can charge the employer is based on the number of migrant workers recruited for the employer, but is not to exceed 25% of the first month's income of the worker.

##### Medical exam fees

In the Republic of Korea, under the EPS, the worker is expected to pay for the medical exam, according to policy. In Hong Kong, China, for foreign domestic workers, employers are expected to pay for the medical exam.<sup>24</sup> In Thailand, for Thai workers going abroad, it is instead the worker who is expected to pay for this.

<sup>21</sup> In the case of Thailand, subordinate legislation to the Royal Ordinance (2018) is not yet developed.

<sup>22</sup> Not including domestic workers.

<sup>23</sup> For Malaysian workers, the cap is 25% of the first month's basic wage.

<sup>24</sup> *Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers – What foreign domestic helpers and their employers should know.* Labor Department; Hong Kong, China.

### Visa fees

In the Republic of Korea, under the EPS, the visa fee, which differs by country of origin but is typically less than \$100, is to be paid by the worker. In Hong Kong, China, for domestic workers, the visa fee is to be paid by employers. In Singapore and Malaysia, where the laws and policies are silent on the visa fee, presumably the workers are the ones who pay.

### Predeparture orientation training

In the Republic of Korea and in Thailand for Thai workers going abroad, the fee for predeparture orientation training is shouldered by the worker.

### Foreign worker levies

In both Malaysia and Singapore, a foreign worker levy is to be paid by the employer.<sup>25</sup>

### Others

In the Republic of Korea under the EPS, the workers are additionally expected to pay for the airfare to the destination, a language exam, an administrative fee, a contribution to migrant welfare fund, and membership to the home country social security system, while employers are expected to pay for the work permit and a certificate of confirmation of visa issuance. In Malaysia, the foreign worker is to pay for the registration fee. In Thailand, for a Thai worker going abroad, the worker is to pay for a skill-testing fee. In Hong Kong, China, the employer is to reimburse a foreign domestic worker for insurance, the cost of daily food, and travel allowance in her/his journey to Hong Kong, China, as well as provide free passage for return, including air ticket, daily food, and travel allowance in the amount of HK\$100 per day.

## 3.3.4 Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island Countries

### Recruitment cost items mentioned in legislation or policies

A recruitment or placement fee is mentioned in legislation or policy in New Zealand and Vanuatu. A visa fee is mentioned in both Australia and New Zealand. The airfare to the country of employment, inoculation expenses, training fees, payments to the home country social security system, skill-testing fees, and administrative fees are mentioned in legislation or policy in New Zealand. Meanwhile, return airfares, local transport, health insurance, and other insurance are also mentioned in legislation or policy in Australia.

### Prescribed fees or costs and who is expected to pay

#### Recruitment fees

In New Zealand, the collection of a recruitment fee from workers (whether national or foreign) is prohibited.<sup>26</sup> In the case of recruitment from the Philippines to New Zealand involving a Philippine

<sup>25</sup> The Republic of Korea is considering putting a foreign worker levy system in place. See, for instance, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/07/113\\_200721.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/07/113_200721.html).

<sup>26</sup> Section 12A of the Wages Protection Act 1983 states “No employer or person engaged on behalf of the employer shall seek or receive any premium in respect of the employment of any person, whether the premium is sought or received from the person employed or proposed to be employed or from any other person.”

recruitment agency, the employer is mandated to pay the recruitment fee. In Vanuatu, the law does not assign who pays the recruitment fee, but states that the recruitment agency may receive payment for its services from the employer or the worker. In Australia, as well, under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 and the Private Employment Agents (Code of Conduct) Regulation 2015, workers (whether national or foreign) are not to be charged a placement fee by the recruitment agency.<sup>27</sup>

### *Visa fees*

In Australia, under the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP), employers pay initially the workers' visa fee, later recovered from workers through wage deductions. Australia's SWP is an arrangement with eight Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste that allows workers from the latter countries to work in Australia for a period of 14 weeks to 6 months in the horticulture sector and other sectors with labor shortages. In New Zealand, under the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme, workers pay for their visa. The RSE is an arrangement similar to Australia's SWP where workers from the Pacific Islands are allowed to come to New Zealand to work in the horticulture and viticulture industries for up to 7 months. But in the specific case of recruitment from the Philippines to New Zealand, the employer is expected to pay for the visa fee.

### *Airfares to destinations*

In New Zealand, under the RSE and also in the recruitment from the Philippines, the employer is to pay for the airfare to New Zealand. Otherwise, the worker is expected to pay for the airfare.

### *Local transport and airfares (return)*

In Australia, under the SWP, the employer pays the full cost of each seasonal worker's return international airfare and domestic transfer arrangements upfront, but recoups from the seasonal worker any amount over A\$500.

### *Health insurance*

Also in Australia under the SWP, health insurance is a requirement for the visa and is initially to be paid by the employer but can be recovered from the worker by the employer via wage deductions.

### *Inoculations and skill-testing fees*

In New Zealand, in the specific case of recruitment from the Philippines, inoculations and skill-testing fees are to be shouldered by the worker.

### *Other training (including work and site-safe briefings), membership payments in home country social security system, and administrative fees*

In New Zealand, again in the specific case of recruitment from the Philippines, other training costs, membership payments to the home country social security system, and administrative fees to the home country government agency in charge of migration are all to be borne by the employer.

<sup>27</sup> Section 408D of the Industrial Relations Act states "A private employment agent must not directly or indirectly demand or receive from a person, other than a model or performer, looking for work (a work seeker) a fee for finding or attempting to find, the person work".

### 3.3.5 Private Sector

Private sector groups, in particular the recruitment agencies, have additional items that they would include among recruitment costs. For instance, the Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Federation (MOEAF) thinks that recruitment costs should include the costs of advertising jobs for new workers, the cost of organizing job fairs for overseas jobs, and the agency's staffing costs.<sup>28</sup>

Increasingly, recruitment agencies in the region have been adopting codes of conduct pertaining to the setting and collection of recruitment fees. The Viet Nam Association of Manpower Supply, for example, urges its members to collect fees in accordance with law and policy, to provide complete information to workers on all fees, and to provide receipts. The MOEAF has similar provisions in its own Code of Conduct. The SLBFE has prepared a Code of Ethical Conduct for Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies/Licensees that all licensed agencies are obligated to comply with.

The Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), a private organization of employers that has a presence in Malaysia, has come up with a document delineating what it claims foreign migrant workers should not pay and what they may pay (RBA 2019). Things that the RBA states workers should not pay can be divided into five categories: (i) predeparture fees and costs including skills tests, additional certifications, medical exams/screening if required by the employer or law; predeparture training or orientation; and any other requirement to access the job opportunity; (ii) documentation/permits and associated costs of obtaining such documents, such as new passports needed for obtaining new employment including any renewal required for retaining employment, visas, temporary work or residence permits, police clearance fees, birth certificate fees, and certificate of good behavior fees; (iii) transportation and lodging costs (including taxes and fees), such as transportation and lodging costs after the employment offer has been made and accepted, from their home in the sending country to the port of departure, transportation from sending country to receiving country port of entry, transportation from receiving country port of entry to the suppliers' facility or provided accommodation, border-crossing fees, relocation costs if asked to move once employment has begun, return transportation to the employee's home country at the end of employment; (iv) arrival/on-boarding including, but not limited to, new-hire training or orientation and medical exams; and (v) other legal requirements including deposits and bonds whether legislated or not.

Items that the RBA views foreign workers can pay if noted in their contract and receipts are provided are also further divided into four categories: (i) basic expense items to prepare for the interview such as CV copies, copies of existing documents and certificates, incidentals; (ii) costs to meet minimum qualifications for the job such as degree or certification; (iii) passport replacement cost due to employee loss or fault and visa/work permit replacement costs; and (iv) dormitory and meals (must be fair market value and meet international health and safety standards).<sup>29</sup> The policy also states that all other initial and ongoing employment expenses and fees for work-related equipment, tools, and apparel shall be borne by the employer, and that if other costs are added by any agent, subagent, or intermediary which are not required by law or by the employment site, the worker shall not be required to pay.

<sup>28</sup> Survey response of MOEAF to survey questionnaire specific for this report.

<sup>29</sup> RBA Trafficked and Forced Labor - "Definition of Fees" January 2020 (Revised by the RBA Board of Directors on 23 Oct 2019).

### 3.4 Summary for the 20 Economies

If all the distinct cost items mentioned in the legislation or policies of the 20 economies are counted, they total 30 (see Table 3.1).<sup>30</sup> They can be grouped into expenses incurred in the home country prior to departure (e.g., placement fee, visa fee, medical exam, emigration tax), transportation costs (e.g., airfare to destination country, local transport), and expenses incurred in the destination country, which can further be broken down into those intended for the host country (e.g., work permit, initial hotel stay at host country) and those to be remitted to home country (e.g., contribution to migrant welfare fund, membership payment to home security system).

**Table 3.1: Recruitment Fee/Cost Items Mentioned in at Least One Law or Policy in the 20 Economies**

Recruitment fee/cost item		Recruitment fee/cost item	
1	Recruitment fee	16	Value-added tax
2	Brokerage fee	17	Administrative fee
3	Visa fee	18	Collateral fee
4	Documentation costs (passport, police clearance, birth certificate, school records)	19	Deposit
5	Certificate of confirmation of visa issuance (EPS)	20	Insurance premium
6	Medical exam	21	Work permit
7	Inoculation	22	Foreign worker levy
8	Health insurance	23	Registration fee
9	Skill-testing fee	24	Residence permit
10	Additional test/trade assessment required by employer	25	Airfare (to country of employment)
11	Language exam	26	Initial hotel stay at host country
12	Predeparture orientation training	27	Local transport from airport to workplace in destination country
13	Contribution to migrant welfare fund	28	Other training including work and site-safe briefings
14	Membership payment in home country social security system	29	Airfare (back to home country)
15	Emigration tax	30	Catch-all for any other cost associated with overseas employment

EPS = employee permit system.


Source: Prepared by authors.

If mention of a specific fee or cost item in legislation or policy is to be interpreted as a recognition of that cost item as part of what constitutes recruitment fees and costs, then there is relatively broad agreement that the following are part of recruitment fees and costs: recruitment or placement or service fee (mentioned in almost all 20 economies), visa fee (13 of 20), medical exam (13 of 20), airfare to destination (11 of 20), and predeparture orientation training (10 of 20). On other items, there is less agreement, although an insurance premium, contribution to a migrant welfare fund in the home country,

<sup>30</sup> This is simply indicative, as it is of course possible that the survey of legislation and policies might have been incomplete.

foreign worker levy, administrative fee, skill testing fee, documentation costs, and local transport all received more than a few mentions. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows in how many economies, out of the 20 covered by this study, the respective cost items are mentioned at least once in legislation or policy.

**Figure 3.1: Economies (out of 20) in Which Cost Item Was Mentioned in Legislation or Policy**



EPS = employee permit system.

Source: Prepared by authors.

It may be possible roughly to classify the policies on recruitment fees and costs of the 20 economies considered here into four broad types. The first type is where workers can be charged to pay all (or almost all) recruitment fees or costs recognized in legislation or policy. This is the case, evidently, in Sri Lanka (except with regards to domestic workers), Pakistan, and Viet Nam, although most of the other economies surveyed also fall closer to this type. The second type is where—by law—workers are either not supposed to pay anything, or are not to be charged a recruitment fee. In the sample, this is represented by Mongolia, which has ratified ILO Convention 181. Indonesia, which under the new Law on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, prohibits the collection of a placement fee from workers, appears to be moving as well in this direction, coming from a system where workers paid almost all expenses. Thailand forbids the charging of recruitment fees to workers, as do Australia and

New Zealand. The third type is where there is a distribution between workers and employers in the assignment of who pays for the cost item, which is most clearly exemplified by the Philippines and to some extent Cambodia. In the case of the Philippines, the assignment of who should pay for a given cost item appears to be related to the stage of the recruitment process at which the expense is incurred and whether the expense will have to be incurred by the worker anyway, even if the worker were not recruited for overseas employment. Thus, the worker pays the recruitment fee, the medical exam fee, and the skill-testing fee, and is also responsible for the payment to the home country social security system, but the employer pays for the visa, airfare, local transport, residence permit, and others. It can be argued that India is a separate fourth type as it mandates that workers pay a given fixed amount (₹30,000) to recruitment agencies, but it also mandates that anything in excess has to be shouldered either by the employer or the recruiter. This requires a judgment (and some computations) on the part of regulators as to what can be considered reasonable cost items that should be charged to the workers (in this case, recruitment fee, visa fee, airfare to destination, medical exam, and initial hotel stay in the host country), and the cost associated with these items. At the same time, at least in theory, it incentivizes the recruitment agencies into finding the least cost for these items as they are able to retain the residual.

The prescribed fee for the same recruitment cost item (for the same origin country) may differ across different destinations and occupations. For instance, a worker from Viet Nam going to Taipei, China as a manufacturing or construction worker has to pay a maximum of \$1,500 in brokerage fees, whereas one going as a healthcare worker needs to pay only a maximum of \$800. A similar construction worker from Viet Nam going to Brunei Darussalam has to pay a maximum of only \$350 in brokerage fees. Caps are typically based on the salary the worker gets under his or her contract, which varies mainly by occupation (or worker skill) and destination.

## Social considerations in fee setting and subsidies for overseas employment

Unusually, the cap on brokerage fees for Viet Nam's workers going to Malaysia is based on the gender of the worker, with the cap on males at \$300 and those for females at \$250.<sup>31</sup>

There are other manifestations of a gender dimension in recruitment fees and costs. Domestic workers, who are typically women, are sometimes covered by a different policy, and are sometimes charged less or even exempted from some fees and costs. Domestic workers from the Philippines are exempted from paying recruitment fees. In Nepal, domestic workers going abroad are not charged at all. In Hong Kong, China, employers have to pay for the visa fee, medical exam, and insurance for domestic workers but not necessarily for other types of workers. In some countries, restrictions have been placed on countries of origin for women migrating for domestic work (Sri Lanka and Myanmar), and this can drive up migration costs as well as push women to go through irregular channels, where they have even less access to protection (Napier-Moore 2017).

Viet Nam applies a social dimension to recruitment fees. Based on Decision 71/2009/Ttq on approving the project on supporting poor districts by promoting the sending of workers abroad for sustainable poverty reduction in the period 2009–2020, the residents of designated poor districts can get a subsidy to facilitate their overseas employment. The government will fully cover the cost of their training, predeparture orientation, medical check-up, visa and documentation fees, and even provide them with loans at a low interest rate. It should be noted, however, that this policy is currently under review because of questions as to whether it does indeed contribute to development or only encourages migration by those least capable of dealing with the many challenges of migrating for work.

<sup>31</sup> The caps on the brokerage fee for Viet Nam's workers going to Malaysia excludes domestic workers. Source: Decision No. 61/2008/QĐ-LĐTBXH dated 12 August 2008 of Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs.

### 3.5 Comparing Recruitment Fee Policy on Foreign Workers against National Workers

In this section, we briefly compare and contrast legislation and policies on recruitment fees for national workers versus foreign workers of five mainly sending economies among our surveyed economies. These five are Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea.

The policies differ across the five countries regarding whether a national worker or a foreign worker is expected to pay more in terms of the recruitment fee and also the cap placed on the recruitment fee (see Table 3.2). In Singapore and Australia, national workers and foreign workers are essentially treated similarly. In the case of Singapore, for both national workers and foreign workers, the cap is 1-month's salary for each year of the period of employment, subject to a maximum of 2-months' salary.<sup>32</sup>

**Table 3.2: Cap on Placement Fee to Be Paid to Recruitment Agencies**

Country	National workers	Foreign/non-citizen workers for employment in the country	Source
Australia	No fee, deposit, or bond from a work seeker in Australia attempting to find work outside Australia	No fee, deposit, or bond from a worker residing, or intending to reside, temporarily in Australia as a condition of finding or attempting to find work for the work seeker in Australia	Private Employment Agents (Code of Conduct) Regulation 2015
Malaysia	25% of basic wages for the first month's wages whether employed within Malaysia or outside Malaysia	1-month basic wages for the first month's wages	Private Employment Agencies Act 2017
Republic of Korea	Recruitment agency not allowed to receive any fees other than what is allowed by the Ministry of Employment and Labor, apart from the fee collected from employer previously agreed on	Under the Employment Permit System, no placement fee charged to the worker, but worker covers cost of preliminary training, Korean language test, medical exam, visa, administrative fees, and airfare	Employment Security Act; Employment Permit System
Singapore	1-month's salary for each year of the period of the contract of employment, subject to a maximum of 2-months' salary of the employer	1-month's salary for each year of the period of the contract of employment or the period of validity of the foreign employee's work pass, whichever is shorter, subject to a maximum of 2-months' salary of the employer	Employment Agencies Rules 2011
Thailand	Recruitment agency for domestic employment allowed only to receive service charge or expense and no other money from worker; recruitment agency for overseas employment allowed to receive service charge or expense from worker	Worker does not pay recruitment fee; employer pays recruitment fee, which is not to exceed 25% of the worker's income for the first month	Employment and Job-seeker Protection Act, B.E. 2528 (1985); Royal Ordinance Concerning Rules on Bringing Migrant Workers to Work with Employers in the Kingdom (2016)

Source: Prepared by authors.

<sup>32</sup> Employment Agencies Rules 2011



In Australia, neither national workers (whether for employment in Australia or outside Australia) nor foreign workers are expected to pay a fee.

In Malaysia, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, national workers and foreign workers are treated differently in terms of the cap on the recruitment fee. In Malaysia, the cap on the recruitment fee is lower for national workers (whether for domestic or foreign employment) at only 25% of the basic wages for the first month, whereas it is at a full month of basic wages for foreign workers.<sup>33</sup> In Thailand, it is somewhat the reverse as foreign workers are not expected to pay a recruitment fee,<sup>34</sup> whereas the law allows recruitment agencies to collect a service charge from national workers whether for domestic or foreign employment.<sup>35</sup> The Republic of Korea is somewhat similar to Thailand in that there is a provision in the law that would allow recruitment agencies to collect a fee from national workers if permitted by the Ministry of Employment and Labor,<sup>36</sup> whereas foreign workers do not pay any placement fee under the EPS, although they cover other costs.

### 3.6 Monitoring and Compliance

Under the various legislation and policies, there are penalties for charging excessive and disallowed fees. For instance, under the Foreign Employment Act (2007) of Nepal, recruitment agencies found to collect recruitment fees or visa fees in excess of the caps can be fined NRs100,000 apart from having to return the excess fees. In Pakistan, charging of fees in excess of the prescribed amount is punishable by imprisonment of up to 14 years, or a fine, or both. In Bangladesh, the same violation is punishable by imprisonment of up to 5 years, or a fine, or both. In the Philippines, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration accepts complaints related to overcharging or collection of placement fees where they are not allowed. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration can cancel the license of an erring recruitment agency apart from making it refund the excessive or unwarranted fee with interest. Similarly, in Myanmar, the government may cancel the license of the recruitment agency found to be charging service fees in excess of the prescribed amount. In the case of Viet Nam, where problems and issues arise, workers are first to lodge a complaint with the recruitment agencies, and if this is not settled, workers and recruitment agencies are asked to report problems to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs for settlement. A fine of D20,000 to D100,000 is imposed on recruitment agencies violating the prescribed fees, apart from having to return the excess fees or illegal fees. In Myanmar, the Ministry of Labour, Immigration, and Population (MOLIP) may take disciplinary actions against recruitment agencies violating the rules or laws or regulations. MOLIP could suspend recruitment agencies found guilty of overcharging after an investigation and blacklist those that are persistent violators. In Indonesia, BNP2TKI monitors the implementation of the caps on placement costs. If the recruitment agencies are found to violate prescribed placement costs, BNP2TKI will first warn the erring recruitment agencies, and then give the recommendation to the Ministry of Manpower to possibly revoke the permit of the recruitment agencies in violation.

According to Thailand's Ministry of Labour, in the past 1.5 years, it has punished three Thai recruitment agencies that were licensed for domestic recruitment for overcharging recruitment fees. Their licenses were suspended from between 1 to 8 months. Malaysia's MoHR reports of one case in 2015 where their inspection identified one private recruitment agency who overcharged an employer. The recruitment agency was given a warning. Singapore imposes a fine for the overcharging of fees.

<sup>33</sup> Private Employment Agencies Act 2017.

<sup>34</sup> Royal Ordinance Concerning Rules on Bringing Migrant Workers to Work with Employers in the Kingdom (2016).

<sup>35</sup> Employment and Job-seeker Protection Act, B.E. 2528 (1985).

<sup>36</sup> Employment Security Act 1994.

Looking at the actions taken in terms of suspension or cancellation of a recruitment agency's license, enforcement varies from country to country and clearly appears lax in some.<sup>37</sup> Migration cost surveys have indicated high costs in certain corridors (e.g., ILO 2014, 2016a, 2018a), pointing to significant gaps in official oversight and monitoring of the conformity by recruitment agencies (and employers) on the assignment of who is to pay for certain recruitment cost items and the prescribed caps, especially on recruitment fees.

### 3.7 Policy Implications

In sum, we find that recruitment cost items, both in legislation and as collected in practice, vary enormously in the region. This lack of a common definition hampers the drive to ensure these costs are not charged to workers, consistent with the ILO's *General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment*. This also means that the impact of exempting workers from paying specific items, or from paying them completely, will also vary widely. Shifting the payment of some if not all recruitment costs to employers has the potential to reduce overall recruitment costs, as it incentivizes employers to offer longer employment contracts, which spreads the fixed costs of recruitment over a longer period, making them less burdensome to those who pay them. However, currently employers in some Asian countries complain of high recruitment costs as well (the workers) and there is a need to research recruitment costs for employers and how these can be reduced for all parties (Kouba and Baruah 2019).

Building on global comparative research of national laws and policies and other codes on recruitment fees and related costs, an ILO tripartite experts' meeting adopted a definition of the same and the components that comprise them in November 2018. The next step (already undertaken since 2019) is to make known and disseminate the definition, and advocate its use, especially at the level of national laws and policies. Promoting the review and development of laws in line with the ILO definition, including the development of implementing rules and regulations, is the next step in most countries in the region. Meanwhile, compliance with current laws—that workers pay only what they are legally obligated to pay and that caps are strictly adhered to—and learning from successful practices in countries in the region and in other regions is similarly important in the immediate term.

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<sup>37</sup> The Philippines and India are countries where action taken has been more notable among countries of origin. Baruah (2016).

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## Appendix

**Table A3.1: South Asia: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs**

Country	Legislation or policy	Year policy or legislation was made	Office or agency originating policy or legislation or administering the policy
Bangladesh	Overseas Employment and Migrants Act 2013	2013	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training
	Government-to-government initiative between Bangladesh and Malaysia	2013	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training
	Notice in BOESL Website <sup>a</sup>	2018	Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services, Limited
	Notice in BOESL Website <sup>b</sup>	2013	Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services, Limited
India	The Emigration Act	1983	Ministry of Overseas of Indian Affairs
	Administrative Circular No. Z-11025/208/2013-ES	2015	Ministry of Overseas of Indian Affairs
	Guidelines for Registering as Recruitment Agencies	2007	Ministry of External Affairs
Nepal	Foreign Employment Act, 2064 (2007)	2007	Nepal Legislature-Parliament
	Foreign Employment Rules, 2064 (2008)	2008	Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers
	Foreign Employment Policy, 2068 (2012)	2012	Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Ministers
	Free Visa, Free Ticket Policy for workers going to Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman	2015	Ministry of Labor and Employment
	Bilateral Agreement with Jordan	2017	Ministry of Labor and Employment
	Guidelines Regarding Sending Domestic Workers on Foreign Employment	2015	Ministry of Labor and Employment
	Directives for Sending Nepalese Technical Interns to Japan 2066 (2010)	2010	Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security
Pakistan	Emigration rules, 1979 updated to 2012	2012	Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act	1985	Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment

<sup>a</sup> <http://www.boesl.org.bd/ServiceCharge.aspx>

<sup>b</sup> <http://www.boesl.org.bd/UploadedDocument/NoticeboardAttachments/207.pdf>

Source: Prepared by authors.

**Table A3.2: Southeast Asia (mainly labor-sending countries) and Mongolia: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs**

Country	Legislation or policy	Year policy or legislation was made	Office or agency originating policy or legislation or administering the policy
Cambodia	Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia	2014	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
	Cambodian Subdecree No. 190 on Management of Sending of Cambodian Migrant Workers Abroad through Private Recruitment Agencies	2011	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
	Prakas No. 046 on Recruitment and Predeparture Training	2013	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
	MOU between Cambodia and Malaysia on the Recruitment and Employment of Cambodian Domestic Workers	2015	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
	MOU between Cambodia and Malaysia on the Recruitment and Employment of Cambodian Domestic Workers	2015	Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
Indonesia	Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 18/2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers	2017	Badan Nasional Penempatan & Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI)
	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 17/2009 on the Organization of Pre-Departure Training for the Indonesian Labor Force Working Overseas	2009	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration
	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 186/2008 (on Indonesian workers going to Hong Kong, China)	2008	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration
	Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers and the Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services On the Deployment and Acceptance of Indonesian Candidates for Kangoshi, Indonesian Candidates for Kaigofukushishi, Indonesian Kangoshi and Indonesian Kaigofukushishi	2013	Badan Nasional Penempatan & Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI)
	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 22/2014 (on the implementation of placement and protection of overseas Indonesian migrant workers)	2014	Badan Nasional Penempatan & Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI)
	Kemnaker Decree No. 588/2012 on Components and Amount of Fees Paid by Candidates for the Placement of Indonesian Workers for the Domestic Sector of Countries of Interest – Singapore	2012	Badan Nasional Penempatan & Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI)

*continued on next page*

**Table A3.2** *continued*

Country	Legislation or policy	Year policy or legislation was made	Office or agency originating policy or legislation or administering the policy
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Operations Manual on the Protection and the Management of Migrant Workers for three Ministries of Lao PDR	2014	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security
	Labor Law	2013	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
	Prime Minister Decree No. 68/2002	2002	Office of the Prime Minister
	Guideline on Implementation of Decree on Export of Lao Workers Working Abroad (No. 2417/MoLSW)	2002	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
Mongolia	Law of Mongolia on Sending Labour Force Abroad and Receiving Labour Force and Specialists from Abroad	2001, amended 2015	Government of Mongolia
	ILO Convention 181	Ratified in 2015	Government of Mongolia
Myanmar	Rules and Regulations for the Law Relating to Overseas Employment	2014; 1999	Ministry of Labour, Immigration, and Population (administering the policy)
Philippines	Revised POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Filipino Workers of 2016	2016	Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Viet Nam	Joint Circular No. 16/2007/TTLT-BLDTBXH-BTC Specific Regulation on Brokerage and Service Fee in the Operation of Sending Viet Nam's Labourers to Work Abroad under Contracts	2007	Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
	Official correspondence 5251/LDTBXH-QLLDNN	2013	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
	Official correspondence 1123/LDTBXH-QLLDNN	2016	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
	Official correspondence 1538/LDTBXH-QLLDNN	2016	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
	Circular 21/2013/TT-BLDDTBXH	2013	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs
	Circular 15/2017/TT-BTC	2017	Ministry of Finance
	Law on Guest Workers (No. 72/2006/QH11)	2006	Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs

Source: Prepared by authors.

**Table A3.3: Southeast Asia and East Asia (mainly labor-receiving economies): Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs**

Economy	Legislation or policy	Year policy or legislation was made	Office or agency originating policy or legislation or administering the policy
Hong Kong, China	Employment Agency Regulations under Employment Ordinance	1968	Hong Kong, China Labour Department
	Practical Guide for Employment of Foreign Domestic Helpers - What foreign domestic helpers and their employers should know	2017	Hong Kong, China Labour Department
Malaysia	Private Employment Agencies Act 1981	1981	Labour Department, Ministry of Human Resources
	Private Employment Agencies (Amendment) Act 2017	2017	Labour Department, Ministry of Human Resources
	Guidelines on foreign workers posted in Immigration Department Website <sup>a</sup>	n.d.	Immigration Department
Republic of Korea	Employment Permit System	2013	Ministry of Employment and Labour
Singapore	Employment Agency Act (Chapter 92)	2011	Ministry of Manpower
Thailand	Royal Ordinance on Management of Employment of Migrant Workers	2017	Department of Employment
	Royal Ordinance Concerning Rules on Bringing Migrant Workers to Work with Employers in the Kingdom	2016	Department of Employment
	Employment and Job-seeker Protection Act	1985	Department of Employment

<sup>a</sup> <http://www.imi.gov.my/index.php/en/foreign-worker.html>

n.d. = no date.

Source: Prepared by authors.

**Table A3.4: Pacific Countries: Policies and Legislation Concerning Recruitment Costs**

Country	Legislation or policy	Year policy or legislation was made	Office or agency originating policy or legislation or administering the policy
Australia	Seasonal Worker Programme	2012	Department of Employment
New Zealand	Wages Protection Act of 1983	1983	Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment
	Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme	2006	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
	Are you recruiting migrant workers from the Philippines? What you need to know: A Guide for Employers <sup>a</sup>	2018	New Zealand Immigration
Vanuatu	Laws of the Republic of Vanuatu (Consolidated Edition 2006) Chapter 160 Employment	2006	Government of Vanuatu

<sup>a</sup> <https://www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/employer-resources/are-you-recruiting-migrant-workers-from-the-philippines-a-guide-for-employers.pdf>

Source: Prepared by authors.



## Skills Mobility Partnerships: A Mechanism to Raise the Skill Level of Labor Migration in Asia

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### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at how the current framework for developing skills through the labor migration process can be improved, with specific reference to the Asian context. Examining the cost-sharing arrangements in place, it explores how the skills mobility partnership approach could equitably and sustainably meet the increasing demand for skills in labor migration. It looks at difficulties in applying the approach, particularly in terms of arranging the right partnerships and ensuring that different parties have the right incentives. It concludes with examples of the relevance of new forms of skills mobility partnerships to Asian economies.

### 4.2 Training as Part of Labor Migration

Many aspirant migrants have long invested in learning specific skills for use in employment in other countries. This is the norm for skilled migration from many developing countries, where part of the incentive to invest in education may be the greater chance to work abroad. Labor migration for employment in less-skilled jobs requires lower levels of training but usually requires some. Aspirant migrants may still invest in language training or acquisition of specific technical skills to boost their chances of selection, facilitate their workplace integration, and increase their bargaining power. Training in the origin country for potential labor migration has almost always occurred without direct involvement of potential destination countries. The costs of acquiring training fall on the individual or the country of origin.

It is possible to find training components in government-to-government agreements to manage labor migration, notably low-skilled labor migration. Such training often amounts to little more than short and superficial predeparture training covering basic language skills, workplace safety, and cultural orientation. This might be followed up by a day or two of pre-employment orientation following arrival in the destination country.

### 4.3 Toward a New Cost-sharing Model

How can training be designed in concert with the destination country so that the right skills are acquired, without placing the entire burden on the country of origin? Can the potential for some to migrate be used to increase the overall skills pool within the country of origin, and be of relevance to the country of origin's needs?

The idea of destination-country actors sharing the costs of skills development is not new. For example, in 2009 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) called for “support

[...] education and training institutions with the objective of increasing the total supply from [...] origin countries and giving graduates privileged treatment in the legal migration queue” (OECD 2009). The goal of supporting development of the origin country and improving management of migration has been picked up. This idea has notably crystallized in the United Nations Global Compact for Migration (UN 2018). Under Objective 18, “Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences”, Point e) reads:

Build global skills partnerships amongst countries that strengthen training capacities of national authorities and relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and trade unions, and foster skills development of workers in countries of origin and migrants in countries of destination with a view to preparing trainees for employability in the labour markets of all participating countries.

A further commitment to skills supply and skills matching appears in the Global Compact in Objective 5, “Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration”. Among other points, Point b) reads:

Facilitate regional and cross-regional labour mobility through international and bilateral cooperation agreements, such as [...] labour mobility frameworks, in accordance with national priorities, local market needs and skills supply.

During the negotiations on the Global Compact, the OECD published a brief, discussing concrete examples of skills mobility partnerships (SMPs) (OECD 2018). The following discussion draws partly on this brief.

### 4.3.1 A Typology of Skills Mobility Partnership Programs

Programs combining the elements of SMPs are not new. Although they account for only a tiny part of total labor migration, small-scale training programs run by private or public bodies in the destination country have subsidized training in the origin country; putting skills development at the center of their objectives, these programs have enabled workers to gain new competencies.

In fields such as health care or child care, often mentioned in the context of SMPs, bridging courses to help candidates meet licensing requirements in the destination country are offered. In lower-skilled occupations, however, notably in agriculture, hospitality, construction, or manufacturing, labor migration programs may not have an explicit skills development component necessary to be considered SMP-type programs. These are nonetheless larger than any self-declared SMP currently operating, and some successfully achieve a “triple win”: low-skilled workers gain an earning opportunity in the destination country, with working conditions protected to some degree and an acceptable level of earnings, even as they acquire some skills; the origin country relieves unemployment and receives remittances; and the destination country safeguards its resident labor market and reduces the risk of unauthorized overstay. Acknowledging and reinforcing the skills development component of these programs is key to scaling-up SMPs beyond the few medium-skilled occupations which currently represent the main examples of SMPs.

There are quite a few examples of how SMPs are currently structured and could be designed in the future (OECD 2018). SMP-type initiatives have been implemented based on different models of cost-sharing and migration. They differ in terms of their overall objectives, the financing of training, and its place. Such programs include for example:

**Seafarer training for the merchant marine industry.** In 2017, there were about 1.65 million seafarers working on international merchant ships worldwide. One in three was trained in the Philippines; other leading countries where training occurs are the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. All major shipping companies are directly involved in the training of seafarers in these origin countries and contribute to the cost of training.

**Scholarships for international students in higher education.** International study is a form of SMP in that skills development is associated with mobility in a specific cost-sharing model. There are more than 3.5 million international students in the OECD, although most do not receive scholarships. Retention rates in destination countries are typically in the range of 30% to 35%, which means that many students move on to other countries or return to their country of birth.

**Vocational training in the destination country.** Employers in countries and sectors where the vocational education and training (VET) system is well developed and recognized may have a strong preference for training in the destination country using apprenticeships and on-the-job trainees. Such VET allows for work experience with employers of the destination country and provides employers with reassurance regarding the quality and relevance of education, as well as the opportunity to develop language skills in a working environment. Participating employers are strongly inclined to retain successful trainees, however, so they are less likely to encourage return migration to the home country. Access to VET for migrant workers is not always guaranteed, however (OSCE, IOM, and ILO 2006).

**International trainees, whether intra-company transfers or under subsidized programs for technology transfer and capacity building.** Here, training occurs in the destination country, but options to remain may be constrained by legislation, and employers know from the outset that retention is not the objective of the program.

**Sectoral recruitment programs in nursing, where destination country bodies work with origin-country partner institutions or recruiters to train to specific requirements.** This has been done in Finland, Germany, Italy, and Norway, for example (OECD 2004). These small programs work because of clear and long-term demand, large employer bodies, public-sector approval, and well-defined training programs.

**Vocational training in the origin country following destination-country standards, where overseas development assistance (ODA) invests in the skills pool in the origin country.** The possibility to migrate is not guaranteed, nor, in some cases, is certification in the destination country, which may be done separately—but graduates potentially qualify for migration opportunities which would otherwise be foreclosed. One of the largest examples of support for training to destination country standards is the Australia-Pacific Technical College (APTC) program, discussed in the next section in greater detail.

In all cases, when the training takes place at origin, the primary benefit for the country of origin accrues when some of those who successfully undertake training remain rather than migrate and those who stay have higher employability and productivity, or if enough return from abroad and use their acquired skills. If the training component consists mostly of retraining or upskilling professionals who were already employed so that they can work permanently abroad, the overall benefit for the origin country will be nil. Similarly, if the selection process for migration after graduation identifies those with the highest abilities and recruits them to jobs abroad, the net effect on the total stock of human capital remaining in the origin country may be marginal. Finally, if those who remain have no opportunities to use their newly acquired skills, any potential benefit is lost. When the training takes place in the destination country, the potential gain for countries of origin depends on return migration. In addition,

returnees should have the possibility to get their skills recognized, and enjoy a return to their skills in the labor market of their origin country.

### 4.3.2 The Role of Employers in Making Skills Mobility Partnerships Work

SMPs are almost all small-scale pilot projects, or are little more than niche initiatives involving small numbers of participants. Even among the successful examples, no single model has emerged as universal or most effective. Most skilled migration occurs outside SMP-type initiatives.

There are a number of reasons for this, but one of the main factors is the exclusion of employers. When the stakeholders involved are limited to the origin and destination states and the migrant, other key participants are ignored, especially employers in both origin and destination countries. When employers don't see how participation can benefit them, the SMP faces less chance of success. Bringing the employer on board, however, requires notably that origin country training must meet employer expectations. For employers, saving money on training is secondary if the quality cannot be guaranteed and the worker does not arrive with sufficient language and workplace skills. Second, employers must be involved in planning the partnerships to ensure that the training content and design matches their needs. A further consideration is that employers in destination countries want to retain some workers—especially those who are most suitable. Destination countries making major investments in training—especially if these investments are made in the higher-cost destination country—generally do so on the assumption that employers will be able to retain any workers who have acquired the skills and productivity to remain. If programs are only temporary, employers may have less incentive to participate, knowing that they will lose all their recruits. While temporary programs may make sense, provisions for some of the most successful, trained, and higher-remunerated employees to remain—e.g., extensions and change of status for long-term residence—should be included even in temporary programs. One example is the Republic of Korea's points-based system for temporary nonprofessional workers to acquire a renewable work permit, based on their skills, wage, and employment record (OECD 2019).

### 4.3.3 The Use of Overseas Development Assistance for Skills Mobility Partnerships

An SMP, to be truly a partnership, requires that actors in the destination country transfer resources (human or financial) to the country of origin. These resources can come fully or partly from employers, either through recruitment fees or through subsidies for the training process. However, additional public support from the destination country for capacity building may be needed. To justify ODA expenditures, it is essential to also show the development impact of the program through an increase in the skill base in the origin country.

ODA is not meant to benefit a donor country. As migration flows from developing countries increased in the 1990s and 2000s, ODA-driven initiatives to build skills in origin countries have faced the dilemma of what to do when even newly trained participants immediately took their skills and qualifications and left the country to seek work abroad.

Indeed, the objective of ODA—to support the economic development of less-developed countries—was potentially undermined when participants in training packed their bags and took their new skills to donor-country labor markets rather than staying home. When residents asked for courses explicitly training for emigration (such as language or other destination-country specific skills), they had to be refused since ODA could not be spent to benefit donor countries, especially when it was clear that no skills surplus would remain in the country.

However, building skills with an explicit focus on emigration could, under certain conditions, actually increase the total supply of skills in origin countries (“Brain Gain”), through increasing the total pool of skills at origin (see Mountford [1997], and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport [2008], among others). This can occur by increasing the surplus of trained people who do not emigrate, as well as drawing on return migration (Clemens 2015). The thinking behind “circular migration” schemes, popular in the early 2000s, reflects concern over potential brain drain and the need to enhance expected benefits for countries of origin. SMPs need to be judged against whether they end up increasing the skills base in the origin country.

#### 4.3.4 Rethinking Skills Mobility Partnerships in the Evolving Asian Context for Labor Migration

In light of the above discussion of SMPs, one region holding great potential for their expansion is Asia. A profound shift in the role of migration in developed Asian economies has occurred in recent years, especially in the Asian OECD countries of Japan and Republic of Korea. In part, this evolution is driven by demographic change, with shrinking youth cohorts and an ever more educated young population.

Many origin countries of labor migrants in Asia have a stated strategy to raise the skill level of the workers going abroad. For example, this is the stated goal of countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia (Chaloff 2015). In these countries, however, most workers deployed abroad are still low-skilled. In Pakistan, for example, 41% of migrants going abroad in 2018 were unskilled, and 18% were semi-skilled. In Sri Lanka, in 2018, 31% of workers deployed were unskilled female domestic workers and 25% other categories of unskilled workers. In Bangladesh, in 2017, 40% of migrant workers were unskilled and 15% were semi-skilled.


Understanding the importance of skills development in labor migration management and building on employers’ interest and support, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan provide interesting examples of emerging models to build skills for migration.

##### *The Australia-Pacific Technical College program*

The APTC is one example of an SMP, as cited above. The APTC was created with support from the Australian international cooperation agency in 2006. Comprising training centers in five different Pacific nations, the APTC was designed to provide training excellence and to help Pacific nationals gain Australian-standard skills and qualifications for a wide range of vocational careers throughout the Pacific. It was also meant to build the capacity of the Pacific training institutions, and to provide qualifications which would allow some graduates to qualify for labor migration programs in Australia and migrate for employment. The occupations targeted were those where skilled employees are in high demand in both the Pacific and in Australia. The initial stage of the program was intended to build skills in island nations where an absence of sufficient skilled workers meant that workers from developed countries came to fill these jobs, at high cost. A revision in the program in 2018 recalibrated the cost-sharing model.

In fact, while the first two 5-year stages of the APTC program produced positive results, very few went abroad to take up higher-paid work: during the first 8 years, the migration rate for graduates was below 2%. Yet more than 10,000 graduates have gone through the APTC program and met the desired skill level, with their employers satisfied with their skill levels. Low mobility was due to the fact that many of the students were already employed and remained with their employer and because many were older (average age: 32), making them less prone to migrate. Yet migration intentions appeared high (Figure 4.1). The low actual emigration rate seems due to other factors.

**Figure 4.1: Plans of APTC Graduates to Migrate to Other Pacific Countries in the Region, Australia, or New Zealand, 2014 (% of respondents)**



APTC = Australia-Pacific Technical College.

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2014).

An external evaluation of the program identified a number of these obstacles (Education Resource Facility 2014). The initial program was not connected to a regular labor migration channel, scheme, or even an international matching mechanism, so graduates had to conduct their own international job search. Further, while the qualifications were at the Australian standard, Australia’s skilled migration program required an expensive recognition procedure. Further, trainers were sent from Australia, so the program ended up being quite expensive (about A\$35,000 per graduate), similar to what it would have cost to train them in Australia itself.

Major changes were introduced in the third stage of the APTC program, starting in 2018. The APTC program now includes coalitions with relevant stakeholders to promote technical and vocational education and training reform. Cost-sharing models are expanded to involve some of the actors who stand to benefit from training: individuals, individual enterprises, industries, national governments, and the Australian aid program. The new stage includes connecting graduates to legal labor migration pathways.

*The expansion of temporary nonprofessional work programs in the Republic of Korea*

Since 2005, the Republic of Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS) for temporary nonprofessional employment by the possibility for temporary workers to come to the Republic of Korea from one of about 15 partner countries and work for periods of up to almost 10 years. The EPS allows workers to undertake training during their stay in the Republic of Korea, to improve their skills for the job they are performing in the Republic of Korea, and to improve their chances for a productive integration in the home country at the end of their stay, capitalizing on the skills acquired during their employment in the Republic of Korea.

The EPS includes a number of training elements. First, while still in the origin country, applicants are responsible for preparing for a Korean language test. Human Resource Development (HRD) Korea, the Republic of Korea's agency managing the program, offers a curriculum for self-preparation for this language test. Following selection, additional specific training necessary for the workplace is provided by HRD Korea on arrival and prior to beginning employment. However, training is also offered by HRD Korea during the temporary stay of foreign workers to improve their vocational skills and to prepare for their reintegration in the country of origin upon return (OECD 2019; Chaloff 2019). About 3% of all EPS workers participate; from 2010 to 2017, there were more than 26,000 training participants from among the EPS workers. In general, training focuses on the sector of employment in the Republic of Korea, primarily on improving productivity. Most of the workers, it turned out, did not plan to work in the same tasks once they returned home. As a result, more recently, training has shifted toward employment possibilities on return to the home country in other roles. Training, however, builds on the relationship with the Republic of Korea's employers to help former workers become suppliers or qualified sales staff in the home country (Lee 2014).

With more than 40,000 new workers arriving in the Republic of Korea annually, almost all of whom are expected to return home definitively after 5 or 10 years, the EPS represents a large-scale opportunity for skills development. Indeed, while the program began as a nonprofessional program with no skills requirement, it has increasingly rewarded specific skills. Starting in 2017, the selection process includes the consideration of vocational skills acquired in the origin country. Similarly, the opportunity for a longer stay is largely contingent on the improvement of skills during the first period of employment in the Republic of Korea (OECD 2019). As the skills expectations increase, so does the scope for the Republic of Korea's employers and HRD Korea to become more involved in supporting the development of specific skills in the origin country.

### *Japan's residence status for "specified skilled workers"*

For decades, Japan has accepted foreign workers without a high technical skill level as trainees, through its Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). The TITP was originally intended to promote international cooperation, rather than meet the labor demand in Japan. Indeed, firms employing TITP participants had to commit to a skills development plan. The number of participants in the TITP has grown over the decades; according to the Ministry of Justice, there were almost 330,000 at the end of 2018, up from fewer than 110,000 a decade earlier. As the employment of interns and trainees expanded, so has concern about protecting them from exploitation, and a number of reforms were introduced to reduce the risk of fee-taking and to protect workers while extending their stay in Japan (Abella and Kouba 2016). The TITP has been a growing source of labor for participating Japanese firms and has represented an earning opportunity for participating trainees. The objective of supporting technical skills transfer to origin countries has however been contested as a main outcome (e.g., Hayakawa and Barnes 2017). In this sense, the TITP cannot be described as an SMP as defined above. A new status of residence, "Specified Skilled Worker", has higher skills requirements. The potential involvement of employers in supporting skills development makes this status a potential field for experimentation of the SMP model. This section presents the new system, highlights the actions undertaken by some employers to support skills acquisition, and points to possible future developments.

The new status of residence, Specified Skilled Worker, was enacted in December 2018 and came into effect in April 2019. Under this system, candidates must pass both Japanese language and skills tests for specific industrial sectors of employment. No specific prior training or experience is required. The new residential status holders can work in any of 14 fields considered to face serious labor shortages. These include the food service industry, accommodation industry, and care work. Government expectations are that about 345,000 foreign workers will use the system between 2019 and 2024. The system is a

major shift in foreign employment policy in Japan and requires the creation of a new infrastructure and new partnerships for skills development.

In this new system, the Japanese government aims to cut out rent-taking and exploitative intermediary organizations by cooperating with each government of origin countries of participating workers. As of 11 October 2019, it had established bilateral memoranda of cooperation with nine origin countries. The main contents of the memoranda are sharing information between governments and creating a basic framework for consultation to eliminate malicious intermediaries. The new status of residence builds on the experience with previous temporary labor channels, and contains a training and skills transfer component. It is open to TITP participants who have achieved a certain skill level.

Employers have been active in implementing the new system. Japanese firms have launched various new systems to support foreigners who want to obtain the new residential status. Employers have targeted two different categories of candidate to support: foreigners living in Japan under a different status of residence, primarily students and trainees; and potential migrants living outside Japan.

The main target of the support provided by firms in Japan is the population of foreign students currently employed part-time. Employers such as restaurants, which already employ many foreign students as part-time workers, distribute study materials to employees, and perform on-the-job training. Such support is free and places no financial burden on international students. For employers, the potential benefit of acquisition of the new status is that specified skilled workers can work as much as regular Japanese employees, while international students are limited to a maximum of 28 hours work per week. Some employers also pay the examination fee and transportation expenses for international students, to encourage them to commit to work for the firm in the future (Chunichi Shimbun 2019).

By contrast, the main targets of the support provided in origin countries are broader: not only former international students and former technical intern trainees, who have returned from Japan to their home country, but also local high school graduates and university students who have never been in Japan. In particular, food service companies that have already opened restaurants in the origin countries as part of market expansion are able to hire young people interested in the new residential status and help them study for tests through on-the-job training in their own country.

Moreover, some Japanese firms have already moved to establish training centers and Japanese language schools in origin countries to help local people acquire the new residential status. Some such centers have introduced a new scheme in which they intermediate between trainees and Japanese companies and charge the hiring companies a referral fee, rather than charge the trainees.

By mid-2019, language skills exams had been conducted for skills in three sectors: food services, accommodation, and care. More than 70% of candidates in each field passed the exams (Table 4.1). This high pass rate is due to many candidates in the food services industry and accommodation industry being well-prepared for tests, because they are foreign students already in Japan and already employed in those industries as part-time workers, and because some employers supported them. Among successful applicants, there were more men than women, and the main nationality was from Viet Nam.


The nationalities of test takers do not match the relative weight by nationality of foreigners currently employed in Japan. PRC nationals are heavily represented (31.4%) among foreigners employed in the industries identified in Table 4.1 (Figure 4.2). Workers from Viet Nam accounted for 27.3% of all foreigners employed in Japan. Yet, those from Viet Nam comprised 53.3% of all test takers in the first few months of the new system, while workers from the PRC comprised only 10%. This may reflect the greater interest of Viet Nam's international students in Japan to acquire the new status of residence,



**Table 4.1: Result of the First Tests for Specified Skilled Workers, as of July 2019**

Industry	Test Country	Successors / Examinees (Pass Rate)	Male / Female	Nationality
Food service	Japan	347 / 460 (75.4%)	231 / 116	Viet Nam, People's Republic of China, Nepal, Others
Accommodation	Japan	280 / 391 (71.6%)	143 / 137	Viet Nam, Nepal, People's Republic of China, Others
Care worker	Philippines	84 / 113 (74.3%)	—	Philippines
Total	711 / 964 (73.8%)			

Sources: Declaration of the Organization for Technical Skill Assessment of Foreign Workers in Food Industry cited in Jiji Press (2019); General Incorporated Association Center for Accommodation Industry Proficiency Test cited in kankokeizai.com; and Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare of Japan.

**Figure 4.2: Nationality of Specified Skill Exam Takers (2019) and All Foreign Employed (2018) in Food Services and Accommodation Industries**


PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan (2018). Status of Reporting on the Employment of Foreign Workers by Employers. October 2018.

while the PRC's international students may be more interested in other statuses of residence for higher-skilled employment after graduation, or oriented toward returning to the home country.

By early November 2019, about half of the almost 900 applicants who received "Specified Skilled Worker" status had passed the tests, and half had changed their status from the TITP (Osumi 2019). About half of the 3,300 applicants for the status were outside Japan. As the new status of residence is implemented further, the opportunities to incorporate training in the origin country with support from prospective employers in Japan will expand. The potential to develop skills mobility partnerships with firms and training institutions will become clearer.

## 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has briefly reviewed the challenge of integrating skills development into labor migration channels, and in particular the search for a cost-sharing model that can increase the skills base in

origin countries, ensure that migrants have the right level of skills, and that employers in destination countries have a stake in the process.

In recent documents, including the Global Compact on Migration (UN 2018), the name given to this approach is skills mobility partnerships (SMPs). SMPs comprise three important elements:

- **Skills development and recognition**, in which the migrant acquires new professional skills or improves existing ones building on prior experience and training.
- **Partnership**, in which mobility is organized, generally within existing legal migration channels, and the costs of training and matching are at least partially borne by the country of destination and/or employers.
- **Mutual benefit**, in which benefits are provided for all involved: countries of origin (by increasing the potential pool of skills), the destination country (by facilitating access to skills in demand), and migrants (by enabling them to acquire and market new skills).

The chapter also looked at the examples of Australia's APTC program, the EPS system in the Republic of Korea, and the Specified Skilled Worker scheme in Japan as concrete examples of the potential to bring together skills development and labor migration management in the Asian context. In all cases, employers crucial to the success of an SMP are motivated to participate in training and already dispose of a number of elements on which an SMP can be built. Some question remains on how best to adapt these models to ensure that countries of origin can also see a benefit beyond remittances sent back by participating workers.

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ANNEX 1

ECONOMY-SPECIFIC NOTES

BANGLADESH								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	144.3	720	6.0	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				56.2
2018	161.4	1,203	7.9	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				4.3
Immigrant Population in Bangladesh								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	988	0.75	49	17.14	79.7	n.a.	n.a.	
2015	1,423	0.88	50	24.1	73.4			
2017	1,501	0.91	50	20.5	76.2			
Stock of foreign workers by sector								
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)								
% of total employment								
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2009	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	1.6							
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from Bangladesh to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Bangladesh living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	161.9	123.6	285.5	390.4	295.9	686.3		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	33.0	24.4	57.4	18.4	24.5	21.0		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	17.2	23.1	19.7	9.6	11.0	10.2		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	78.2	73.3	76.1	85.5	84.0	84.9		
Total emigration rates (%)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.6		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	2.7	2.0	2.4	4.0	6.5	4.8		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>43.4</b>	<b>48.8</b>	<b>50.8</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>51.7</b>
United States	14.8	16.7	14.7	12.1	14.6	13.6	18.7	14.7
Italy	9.7	10.3	10.1	10.5	12.7	12.4	10.7	14.6
Canada	4.7	2.7	2.6	3.8	2.2	3.3	3.2	3.2
Japan	1.1	0.8	1.2	1.2	2.0	2.4	2.8	2.8
Rep. of Korea	2.9	2.3	1.9	2.5	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.7
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>20.6</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>23.1</b>
United States					3.8	4.8	5.4	6.5
Australia					3.6	3.9	4.4	4.7
United Kingdom					4.2	4.9	3.6	3.1
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,046.2</b>							
Saudi Arabia	1,315.6							
United Arab Emirates	1,176.5							
Malaysia	453.8							
Kuwait	214.9							
Oman	226.7							
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>568.1</b>	<b>607.8</b>	<b>409.3</b>	<b>425.7</b>	<b>555.9</b>	<b>757.7</b>	<b>1,008.5</b>	<b>734.2</b>
Saudi Arabia	15.0	21.2	12.7	10.7	58.3	143.9	551.3	257.3
Malaysia	742.0	804.0	3.9	5.1	30.5	40.1	99.8	175.9
Qatar	13.1	28.8	57.6	87.6	124.0	120.4	82.0	76.6
Oman	135.3	170.3	134.0	105.7	129.9	188.2	89.1	72.5
Singapore	48.7	58.7	60.1	54.8	55.5	54.7	40.4	41.4
Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-0.45	-1.49	-1.19	-2.24	-4.54	-3.04	-2.30	-2.07
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,988	15,296	13,574	13,498	15,496

CAMBODIA								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	13.9	76.4		Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				80.3
2018	16.2	1,205		Unemployment (% of total labor force)				1.0
Immigrant Population in Cambodia								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	146	1.20	51	38.8	56.5			
2015	74	0.47	46	18.3	76.2			
2017	76	0.48	46	15.6	78.3			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2015								
	Total	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	Accommodation and food service	Administrative and support service activities	Other
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	49.2	18.7	2.6	5.5	12.5	2.4	1.2	6.2
% of total employment		0.1						
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2006	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	0.1							
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from Cambodia to OECD countries								
Stock of persons born in Cambodia living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)			239.1	130.1	162.2	292.3		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)			15.2	5.9	8.8	7.5		
15–24 (% of population 15+)			11.8	5.8	5.0	5.3		
25–64 (% of population 15+)			81.1	76.7	78.2	77.5		
Total emigration rates (%)			3.2	2.5	2.9	2.7		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)			52.7	16.7	29.0	21.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>20.2</b>
Rep. of Korea	3.7	6.4	9.5	10.5	9.5	9.6	10.2	9.5
Japan	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	2.3	3.7	4.2	4.8
United States	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5	1.9	3.2	4.1
Australia	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
France	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>					<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>36.7</b>
Australia					0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9
United States					0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6
France					0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>133.3</b>							<b>1,165.2</b>
Thailand								1,134.2
Malaysia								30.1
Singapore								0.9
Hong Kong, China								0.1
Saudi Arabia								0.0
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>22.6</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>40.8</b>	<b>85.5</b>	<b>96.3</b>	<b>105.0</b>
Thailand	16.8	26.4	13.5	15.8	31.0	76.4	87.9	96.7
Rep. of Korea	5.0	8.1	8.5	7.4	7.5	7.4	6.0	4.9
Japan	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	1.4	1.6	2.3	3.0
Singapore	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Malaysia	4.4	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.1
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-1.87	8.34	6.11	-0.55	-4.29	-2.01	-1.86	-1.74
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	611	855	1,003	1,103	1,185	1,200	1,295	1,411



## HONG KONG, CHINA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	7.0	31,554	2.1	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)	58.6
2018	7.5	38,785	3.0	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	2.8

## Immigrant Population in Hong Kong, China

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	2,669	40.05	54	7.7	67.7		
2015	2,839	39.18	61	10.4	65.2		
2017	2,883	39.15	61	9.9	66.5		

## Stock of foreign workers by sector

	Total							
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)								
% of total employment								
<b>Stock of international students (‘000s)</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
	10.3	18.0	21.1	26.7	30.0	32.0	32.0	34.3
<b>Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>

## Emigration from Hong Kong, China to OECD countries

	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Stock of persons born in Hong Kong, China living in OECD countries						
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	188.5	199.9	388.4	291.8	332.7	624.5
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	6.3	7.7	14.0	7.2	7.1	7.2
15–24 (% of population 15+)	24.8	20.7	22.7	11.5	8.3	9.8
25–64 (% of population 15+)	69.7	73.7	71.8	74.4	77.9	76.2
Total emigration rates (%)	6.5	6.6	6.6	8.8	8.7	8.7
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)				16.7	17.0	16.9

## Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>17.4</b>
United Kingdom	3.0	2.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	8.0
United States	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.4
Japan	1.1	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.6	2.3
Australia	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.8
Canada	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.3
<b>Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Total</b>					<b>32.8</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>36.7</b>
United Kingdom					12.9	14.7	16.2	16.7
Australia					9.2	9.1	8.8	9.3
United States					8.6	8.5	8.5	8.0

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								

## Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								

## Net migration rate (per thousand)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	8.04	5.30	11.84	1.94	2.61	2.12	3.99	3.15

## Remittance inflows (current \$ million)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	352	367	360	372	387	399	437	469

INDIA								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	1,200.7	1,193	3.1	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				50.6
2018	1,352.6	2,104	7.0	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				2.6
Immigrant Population in India								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	6,411	0.61	48	7.3	59.8	73.1	3.0	
2015	5,241	0.40	49	9.5	70.0			
2017	5,189	0.39	49	9.6	70.4			
Stock of foreign workers by sector								
Total								
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)								
% of total employment								
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
		27.5	28.3	34.4	39.0	42.0	44.8	46.7
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from India to OECD countries								
Stock of persons born in India living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	1,027.6	943.0	1,970.6	2,545.0	2,280.6	4,825.6		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	264.2	226.6	490.8	27.0	26.9	26.9		
15-24 (% of population 15+)	10.2	11.0	10.6	9.3	7.6	8.5		
25-64 (% of population 15+)	80.0	77.7	78.9	79.1	78.8	79.0		
Total emigration rates (%)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	2.9	3.8	3.2	2.7	3.7	3.1		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>260.6</b>	<b>245.6</b>	<b>229.0</b>	<b>240.7</b>	<b>284.6</b>	<b>272.1</b>	<b>277.8</b>	<b>311.7</b>
United States	69.2	69.0	66.4	68.5	77.9	64.1	64.7	60.4
Canada	34.2	27.5	30.9	33.1	38.3	39.5	39.8	51.7
United Kingdom	68.0	61.0	36.0	30.0	46.0	36.0	35.0	50.0
Australia	23.5	21.9	27.8	38.1	39.6	34.7	38.6	40.0
Germany	13.2	15.4	18.1	19.5	22.4	26.1	27.7	29.5
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>181.1</b>	<b>186.3</b>	<b>181.6</b>	<b>168.3</b>	<b>149.6</b>	<b>172.6</b>	<b>223.0</b>	<b>262.3</b>
United States					74.8	82.2	112.7	135.7
Australia					16.2	25.6	36.9	46.3
Canada					13.6	15.7	16.3	19.9
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>						<b>10,401.2</b>		<b>10,453.2</b>
Saudi Arabia						3,050.0	3,253.9	2,812.4
United Arab Emirates						2,800.0	2,800.0	3,100.0
Kuwait						921.7	918.0	928.4
Oman						795.1	783.0	688.2
Qatar						600.0	697.0	691.5
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>626.6</b>	<b>747.0</b>	<b>817.0</b>	<b>805.0</b>	<b>781.0</b>	<b>520.9</b>	<b>391.0</b>	<b>340.2</b>
United Arab Emirates	138.9	141.1	202.0	224.0	225.5	163.7	150.0	112.1
Saudi Arabia	289.3	357.5	354.2	329.9	306.0	165.4	78.6	72.4
Kuwait	45.1	55.9	70.1	80.4	66.5	72.4	56.4	57.6
Oman	73.8	84.4	63.4	51.3	85.0	63.2	53.3	36.0
Qatar	41.7	63.1	78.4	76.0	59.0	30.6	24.8	34.5
Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	0.01	-0.12	-0.14	-0.34	-0.45	-0.37	-0.40	-0.33
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910	62,744	68,967	78,609

INDONESIA								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	235.5	2,885	6.0	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				64.2
2018	267.7	4,285	5.2	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				4.3
Immigrant Population in Indonesia								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	292	0.14	48	30.5	68.1	33.0	46.0	
2015	338	0.13	42	25.1	68.4			
2017	346	0.13	42	22.8	70.3			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018								
	Total	Agriculture, forestry and fishing		Industry	Services			
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	106.4	34.9		25.0	46.5			
% of total employment	0.1							
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	6.4		7.2					5.9
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	55.5	60.7	70.1	73.6	77.1	80.4	86.0	95.3
Emigration from Indonesia to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Indonesia living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	162.3	177.3	339.6	159.8	205.2	365.0		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	22.0	26.4	48.4	15.0	14.8	14.9		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	13.7	11.3	12.4	14.7	8.9	11.4		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	65.4	61.8	63.5	57.4	62.2	60.1		
Total emigration rates (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	3.2	4.2	3.6	0.9	1.1	1.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>30.5</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>35.2</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>39.2</b>
Japan	8.3	8.4	9.3	9.6	11.8	14.3	16.8	19.6
Rep. of Korea	5.3	8.1	8.3	11.8	10.5	8.5	9.0	6.9
Germany	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.6
United States	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.9
Australia	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.1	1.9
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>24.5</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>24.5</b>	<b>25.4</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>34.4</b>
Australia					9.5	9.5	10.2	10.7
United States					8.2	8.6	8.9	9.3
United Kingdom					1.7	2.2	2.8	3.2
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,256.0</b>			<b>3,256.0</b>	<b>4,300.0</b>			
Saudi Arabia	1,500.0			1,500.0				
Malaysia	917.9			917.9	17.8	20.0		
Taipei, China	146.2			146.2				
Hong Kong, China	140.6			140.6				
Singapore	106.0			106.0				
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>586.8</b>	<b>494.6</b>	<b>512.2</b>	<b>429.9</b>	<b>275.7</b>	<b>234.5</b>	<b>262.9</b>	<b>283.6</b>
Malaysia	134.1	134.0	150.2	127.9	97.7	87.6	89.0	90.7
Hong Kong, China	50.3	45.5	41.8	35.1	15.3	14.4	69.2	73.9
Taipei, China	78.9	81.1	83.5	82.7	75.3	77.1	62.8	72.4
Singapore	47.8	41.6	34.7	31.7	20.9	17.7	13.4	18.3
Rep. of Korea	11.4	13.6	15.4	11.8	5.5	5.9	3.7	6.9
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.30	-0.04	-0.07	-1.05	-1.14	-0.36	-0.37	-0.38
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,659	8,907	9,011	11,237

## JAPAN

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	128.1	45,166	-1.1	Employment / population ratio (15+, Total)	59.2
2018	126.5	48,920	0.8	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	2.4

## Immigrant Population in Japan

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	1,687	1.32	53	17.8	75.4		
2015	2,232	1.74	55	19.8	71.4		
2017	2,321	1.82	55	19.8	71.4		

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018	Total	Construction	Manufacturing	Information and communications	Wholesale and Retail trade	Accommodations, eating and drinking services	Education, learning support	Medical, health care and welfare	Others
	620.9	55.3	240.5	44.8	62.8	26.1	30.0	7.4	154.0
	1.0	1.4	2.4	2.2	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.1	0.8

Stock of international students (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	141.6	151.5	150.6	135.8	132.7	132.0	143.5	

Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	130.9	144.1	142.0	160.3	190.0	208.8	237.5	278.6

## Emigration from Japan to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Japan living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	215.6	348.7	564.3	266.5	437.5	704.0
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	68.4	93.5	161.9	25.9	18.0	21.1
15–24 (% of population 15+)	15.0	12.7	13.6	13.3	8.3	10.2
25–64 (% of population 15+)	81.0	73.3	76.2	74.8	73.1	73.8
Total emigration rates (%)	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.6
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.0

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>34.5</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>37.0</b>	<b>33.9</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>29.6</b>
Germany	5.6	6.8	6.6	6.8	6.7	6.9	7.0	6.9
United States	6.3	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.5	5.4	5.2	4.6
Rep. of Korea	4.7	5.5	5.8	5.9	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.5
France	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6
New Zealand	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.5

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>					<b>29.2</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>29.2</b>
United States					16.0	15.5	15.1	15.4
United Kingdom					3.1	3.1	3.1	2.9
Germany					1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-0.48	0.07	-0.16	0.26	0.43	0.56	0.56	0.52

Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	2,132	2,540	2,364	3,734	3,325	3,830	4,440	5,634

## LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	6.0	1,010	7.8	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)	77.7
2018	7.1	1,789	6.5	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	0.6

## Immigrant Population in Lao People's Democratic Republic

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	22	0.41	47	24.7	70.2	49.5	8.2
2015	45	0.67	46	14.4	80.8		
2017	45	0.66	46	14.4	80.1		

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2016	Total	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	Industry	Services
Number of foreign workers ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	38.3	14.9	11.3	12.1
% of total employment				

Stock of international students ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5

Inflows of foreign workers ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

## Emigration from Lao People's Democratic Republic to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Lao People's Democratic Republic living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	132.8	131.4	264.1	122.3	131.7	253.9
Recent emigrants 15+ ( <sup>'000s</sup> )	4.4	5.8	10.2	2.4	6.0	4.2
15-24 (% of population 15+)	13.8	13.7	13.8	2.4	3.2	2.8
25-64 (% of population 15+)	81.2	79.0	80.1	84.6	82.2	83.4
Total emigration rates (%)	8.3	8.1	8.2	5.1	5.4	5.2
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	23.8	29.2	25.9	9.5	13.4	11.1

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, <sup>'000s</sup> )	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Japan	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.2	1.3
United States	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.7
Rep. of Korea	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3
France	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
New Zealand	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1

Stock of international students (3 main destinations, <sup>'000s</sup> )	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.73</b>	<b>0.73</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.85</b>
Australia					0.19	0.22	0.21	0.23
Japan					0.22	0.20	0.19	0.19
Rep. of Korea					0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, <sup>'000s</sup> )	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>							<b>110.0</b>	

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, <sup>'000s</sup> )	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.6</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>49.4</b>	
Thailand	8.4		13.6					

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	0.01	-2.66	-5.30	-5.35	-3.68	-3.46	-2.10	-1.95

Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	110	203	170	188	189	189	253	271

MALAYSIA								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	27.2	8,850	4.8	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				62.4
2018	31.5	12,109	4.7	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				3.4
Immigrant Population in Malaysia								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	1,277	5.45	44	26.8	70.6	91.3	5.9	
2015	2,651	8.63	40	20.2	77.8			
2017	2,704	8.55	40	16.1	81.1			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018								
	Total	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing		Mining and quarrying	Manufacturing	Construction	Services	
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	2,183.4	492.4		4.9	543.5	280.3	861.3	
% of total employment	14.8	22.6		0.2	24.9	12.8	39.3	
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	64.7	63.6	56.2		99.6	111.4	124.1	100.8
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	62.7	79.3	69.8	79.8	77.8	70.7	45.6	
Emigration from Malaysia to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Malaysia living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	98.6	115.7	214.3	152.6	179.2	331.8		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	16.9	18.8	35.7	23.1	20.6	21.8		
15-24 (% of population 15+)	23.9	19.0	21.2	17.9	14.7	16.2		
25-64 (% of population 15+)	71.2	75.3	73.5	69.3	70.4	69.9		
Total emigration rates (%)	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.5		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	5.7	6.7	6.2	4.5	5.6	5.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>17.7</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>23.3</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>19.5</b>
Australia	4.9	4.9	5.4	5.6	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.2
United States	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.4	4.1
Rep. of Korea	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	3.8
Japan	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7
New Zealand	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.6	1.8	1.8
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>45.7</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>48.0</b>
United Kingdom					13.3	15.6	17.0	17.4
Australia					15.5	15.4	15.0	15.3
United States					7.4	7.3	7.9	8.4
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	5.06	3.04	4.73	5.49	5.65	1.71	1.60	1.50
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,580	1,644	1,604	1,648	1,663

MONGOLIA								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	2.6	2,601	8.9	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				56.1
2018	3.2	4,198	6.9	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				6.3
Immigrant Population in Mongolia								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	8	0.34	44	15.7	80.8			
2015	18	0.59	40	12.2	84.2			
2017	18	0.59	40	11.8	83.6			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018								
	Total	Mining and quarring	Education	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	Manufacturing	Administrative and support service activities	Construction	Other
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	4.5	1.7	0.9	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.1	550.0
% of total employment		36.7	20.4	17.4	6.6	4.0	2.7	12.2
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.5
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from Mongolia to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Mongolia living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	1.8	2.6	4.4	15.6	24.0	39.7		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)				55.1	55.6	55.4		
15–24 (% of population 15+)			27.2	27.6	18.4	22.1		
25–64 (% of population 15+)			70.3	71.5	80.9	77.2		
Total emigration rates (%)		0.3	0.3	1.5	2.1	1.8		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)		1.5	1.3	2.8	3.0	2.9		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>20.1</b>
Rep. of Korea	5.4	4.3	5.7	4.3	4.0	8.3	8.2	11.8
Japan	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5	3.2
Czech Republic	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.2
Germany	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	0.8	0.8
United States	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>				<b>6.6</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.9</b>
Rep. of Korea					2.5	2.2	2.1	2.3
United States					1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4
Japan					1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.00	-7.89	-4.47	-1.22	-0.84	-0.30	-0.27	-0.25
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	250	324	257	255	261	260	273	441

NEPAL									
KEY INDICATORS									
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)					
2008	26.7	548	6.1	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)					81.9
2018	28.1	812	6.3	Unemployment (% of total labor force)					1.3
Immigrant Population in Nepal									
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over					
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated		
2000	718	3.02	66	22.9	70.8				
2015	510	1.78	69	10.7	78.8				
2017	503	1.72	69	10.3	78.5				
Stock of foreign workers by sector									
Total									
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)									
% of total employment									
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	0.1								
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Emigration from Nepal to OECD countries									
	2000			2015/16					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Stock of persons born in Nepal living in OECD countries									
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)			23.9	171.6	136.0	307.6			
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)			8.7	36.8	41.2	38.8			
15–24 (% of population 15+)			24.0	25.5	24.0	24.8			
25–64 (% of population 15+)			75.0	72.5	73.6	73.0			
Total emigration rates (%)			0.2	1.6	1.2	1.4			
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)			2.2	12.3	20.8	15.0			
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
<b>Total</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>46.8</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>49.3</b>	
Japan	2.9	3.5	4.8	8.3	11.5	13.4	14.1	14.5	
United States	7.1	10.2	11.3	13.0	12.4	12.9	12.9	11.6	
Rep. of Korea	2.7	4.3	6.9	6.0	6.8	6.5	8.7	8.6	
Australia	1.3	2.1	2.5	4.0	4.4	4.2	5.1	4.4	
Portugal	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.7	
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
<b>Total</b>					<b>24.1</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>38.9</b>	
Australia					7.2	9.2	11.8	14.7	
United States					8.7	7.6	7.9	9.9	
Japan					2.4	3.1	5.1	8.4	
Emigration to non-OECD destinations									
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
<b>Total</b>									
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010–2011	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	
<b>Total</b>	<b>354.7</b>	<b>384.7</b>	<b>450.9</b>	<b>519.6</b>	<b>499.1</b>	<b>403.7</b>	<b>382.9</b>	<b>354.1</b>	
Malaysia	106.0	96.3	158.7	210.0	196.2	59.0	95.2	104.2	
Qatar	35.9	44.9	103.9	128.6	124.0	127.9	121.1	103.2	
Saudi Arabia	62.5	68.1	96.9	86.6	96.8	134.8	72.9	41.0	
United Arab Emirates	24.0	34.5	58.6	55.4	53.1	52.1	57.9	60.2	
Kuwait	8.0	9.2	17.4	20.2	9.6	9.9	13.1	17.6	
Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	–2.42	0.75	–4.08	–6.22	–7.37	–15.11	1.49	5.07	
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e	
	4,217	4,793	5,589	5,889	6,730	6,612	6,928	8,064	



PAKISTAN								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	171.6	989	1.7	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				51.7
2018	212.2	1197	5.4	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				3.0
Immigrant Population in Pakistan								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	4,182	3.02	46	10.2	79.2			
2015	3,629	1.92	49	9.6	80.2			
2017	3,398	1.72	49	8.0	82.8			
Stock of foreign workers by sector								
Total								
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)								
% of total employment								
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2003	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	0.4							
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from Pakistan to OECD countries								
Stock of persons born in Pakistan living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	375.0	293.7	668.7	806.7	620.5	1,427.2		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	79.8	60.4	140.2	20.4	19.6	20.0		
15-24 (% of population 15+)	13.9	15.4	14.5	12.4	11.8	12.1		
25-64 (% of population 15+)	80.3	78.2	79.3	79.9	79.9	79.9		
Total emigration rates (%)	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.1		
Emigration rates of the highly educated (%)	3.1	3.6	3.3	7.3	9.2	8.0		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
Total	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	95.6	101.6	83.5	72.3	79.4	99.4	96.2	92.7
United States	18.3	15.5	14.7	13.3	18.6	18.1	19.3	17.4
United Kingdom	30.0	43.0	19.0	10.0	11.0	8.0	11.0	15.0
Italy	10.8	7.5	8.8	7.8	9.6	11.4	14.7	15.0
Germany	3.3	5.4	6.5	8.0	9.5	24.5	12.2	9.0
Canada	6.8	7.5	11.2	12.6	9.1	11.3	11.3	7.7
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
Total	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	23.2	25.8	27.3	28.1	26.1	28.7	31.4	35.0
Australia					4.8	6.3	8.2	10.0
United States					4.6	4.8	5.2	6.1
United Kingdom					7.2	6.6	6.1	5.5
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
Total	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total	5,811.2	6,449.8	7,072.5	7,825.0	8,771.6	9,610.9	10,107.2	10,489.6
Saudi Arabia	2,965.2	3,323.8	3,594.3	3,906.8	4,429.5	4,892.1	5,035.5	5,136.4
United Arab Emirates	1,751.9	1,934.6	2,207.8	2,558.3	2,885.3	3,180.9	3,456.4	3,665.0
Oman	448.0	517.4	565.2	605.0	652.7	697.8	740.2	767.4
Kuwait	180.9	180.9	181.2	181.3	181.5	182.2	183.0	183.5
Qatar	87.2	94.5	102.6	112.6	125.4	135.1	146.7	167.7
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
Total	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total	456.9	638.6	622.7	752.5	946.6	839.4	496.3	382.4
United Arab Emirates	156.4	182.6	273.2	350.5	327.0	295.6	275.4	208.6
Saudi Arabia	222.3	358.6	270.5	312.5	522.8	462.6	143.4	100.9
Oman	53.5	69.4	47.8	39.8	47.8	45.1	42.4	27.2
Qatar	5.1	7.3	8.1	10.0	12.7	9.7	11.6	21.0
Malaysia	2.1	1.3	2.0	20.6	20.2	10.6	7.2	9.9
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	0.28	-1.77	0.71	-0.86	-0.40	-1.14	-1.11	-0.87
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,244	19,306	19,808	19,689	21,014

## PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	1,324.7	3,797	9.7	Employment / population ratio (15+, Total)	65.7
2018	1,392.7	7,755	6.6	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	4.4

## Immigrant Population in People's Republic of China

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	508	0.04	50	16.2	74.0	n.a.	n.a.
2015	978	0.07	39	15.3	72.4		
2017	1,000	0.07	39	14.4	72.5		

## Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2012

	Total
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	246.4
% of total employment	

Stock of international students (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	71.7	79.6	89.0	96.4	108.2	123.1	137.5	157.1

Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

## Emigration from People's Republic of China to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in People's Republic of China living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	976.3	1,089.8	2,066.1	2,057.5	2,562.6	4,620.1
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	217.0	250.7	467.7	28.0	27.5	27.8
15–24 (% of population 15+)	12.3	11.4	11.8	17.4	16.2	16.8
25–64 (% of population 15+)	73.1	73.4	73.3	68.6	70.9	69.9
Total emigration rates (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.4
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	1.5	2.3	1.8	1.2	1.8	1.5

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>502.2</b>	<b>524.6</b>	<b>502.6</b>	<b>546.4</b>	<b>552.2</b>	<b>545.4</b>	<b>553.1</b>	<b>565.0</b>
Rep. of Korea	155.3	149.2	127.3	178.6	192.9	177.0	165.5	156.8
Japan	107.9	100.4	107.0	93.0	98.6	100.6	103.3	109.8
United States	70.9	87.0	81.8	71.8	76.1	74.6	81.8	71.6
United Kingdom	28.0	45.0	41.0	46.0	39.0	43.0	35.0	58.0
Canada	30.4	28.5	33.0	34.1	24.6	19.5	26.9	30.3
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>451.9</b>	<b>500.5</b>	<b>580.5</b>	<b>624.8</b>	<b>657.0</b>	<b>703.9</b>	<b>746.1</b>	<b>788.9</b>
United States					231.9	266.1	291.1	309.8
Australia					88.0	90.2	97.4	112.3
United Kingdom					81.8	86.2	91.5	89.3

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>812.0</b>	<b>850.0</b>	<b>853.0</b>	<b>1,006.0</b>	<b>1,027.0</b>	<b>969.0</b>	<b>979.0</b>	<b>997.0</b>

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>452.0</b>	<b>512.0</b>	<b>527.0</b>	<b>562.0</b>	<b>530.0</b>	<b>494.0</b>	<b>522.0</b>	<b>492.0</b>

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–0.08	–0.13	–0.06	–0.30	–0.32	–0.22	–0.25	–0.26

Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938	61,000	63,860	67,414

PHILIPPINES								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	90.9	2,017	4.2	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				58.3
2018	106.7	3,022	6.2	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				2.5
Immigrant Population in Philippines								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	318	0.41	49	20.3	68.5	54.8	11.9	
2015	212	0.21	48	16.4	69.1			
2017	219	0.21	48	16.6	69.1			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2014								
	Total							
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	91.4							
% of total employment	0.1							
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	4.3	3.3						
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	14.3	17.1	21.0	22.7	24.3	28.4	42.0	54.2
Emigration from Philippines to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Philippines living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	745.8	1,192.1	1,938.0	1,349.3	2,200.0	3,549.3		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	107.5	168.8	276.4	16.4	16.3	16.3		
15-24 (% of population 15+)	13.9	9.6	11.3	12.3	7.5	9.3		
25-64 (% of population 15+)	75.7	80.5	78.6	73.6	76.7	75.5		
Total emigration rates (%)	3.1	4.8	3.9	3.9	6.1	5.0		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	5.3	8.1	6.8	11.8	16.2	14.3		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>167.3</b>	<b>161.3</b>	<b>159.5</b>	<b>151.8</b>	<b>160.3</b>	<b>183.1</b>	<b>173.3</b>	<b>175.3</b>
United States	58.2	57.0	57.3	54.4	50.0	56.5	53.3	49.1
Canada	38.6	36.8	34.3	29.5	40.0	50.8	41.8	40.9
Japan	13.3	13.6	15.4	16.4	19.9	24.0	26.2	29.6
Australia	10.2	10.7	12.8	11.0	10.3	11.9	12.0	12.1
New Zealand	2.0	2.4	2.9	3.2	4.7	8.4	8.2	9.1
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>13.8</b>
Australia					2.8	4.2	4.4	5.1
United States					3.3	3.2	3.0	3.0
New Zealand					0.4	0.6	1.1	1.5
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,158.0</b>	<b>2,220.0</b>	<b>2,285.0</b>	<b>2,320.0</b>	<b>2,447.0</b>	<b>2,240.4</b>	<b>2,338.6</b>	<b>2,299.1</b>
Saudi Arabia	487.7	457.3	505.0	575.4	604.4	533.2	594.0	558.4
United Arab Emirates	315.1	330.8	351.9	361.9	379.3	356.2	357.8	361.1
Hong Kong, China	114.4	122.1	118.8	116.0	144.4	125.5	152.0	143.8
Kuwait	92.8	93.2	105.1	123.0	141.9	143.4	156.7	131.7
Taipei, China	82.0	86.6	100.5	111.4	110.1	116.5	88.9	125.4
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,318.7</b>	<b>1,435.2</b>	<b>1,469.2</b>	<b>1,430.9</b>	<b>1,437.9</b>	<b>1,669.5</b>	<b>1,614.7</b>	
Saudi Arabia	316.7	330.0	382.6	402.8	594.0	460.1	433.6	
United Arab Emirates	235.8	259.6	261.1	246.2	227.1	276.3	265.5	
Singapore	146.6	172.7	173.7	140.2	141.5	171.0	162.2	
Hong Kong, China	129.6	131.7	130.7	105.7	85.7	116.5	144.5	
Qatar	100.5	104.6	94.2	114.5	133.2	141.3	122.6	
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	-1.08	-2.12	-2.57	-3.03	-3.44	-1.70	-0.63	-0.59
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	23,054	24,610	26,717	28,691	29,799	31,142	32,810	33,827

## REPUBLIC OF KOREA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)
2008	49.1	20,804	2.8	Employment / population ratio (15+, total) 60.6
2018	51.6	26,762	2.7	Unemployment (% of total labor force) 3.8

## Immigrant Population in Republic of Korea

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	244	0.52	41	27.9	69.2		
2015	1,143	2.26	44	19.2	79.1		
2017	1,152	2.26	44	13.5	83.7		

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018	Total	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	Mining and quarrying	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesales and Retails, Food, Lodging	Electricity, Transportation, Telecommunication, Finance	Enterprise, Individual, Public and Others
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	884.3	49.5	1.6	403.3	110.7	163.2	14.2	141.8
% of total employment	3.3	3.7	8.4	8.9	5.4	2.7	0.1	4.5
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	59.2	62.7	59.5	55.5	52.5	54.5	61.9	
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

## Emigration from Republic of Korea to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Republic of Korea living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	628.9	817.2	1,446.1	766.3	1,020.4	1,786.7
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	88.0	105.3	193.3	14.8	13.3	14.0
15–24 (% of population 15+)	16.8	15.4	16.0	12.4	9.3	10.6
25–64 (% of population 15+)	74.6	74.9	74.8	71.5	72.7	72.2
Total emigration rates (%)	2.2	2.9	2.6	3.6	4.6	4.1
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	2.9	4.8	3.7	3.8	5.9	4.8

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>71.1</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>75.1</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>74.0</b>
Japan	27.9	23.4	25.7	24.2	21.1	22.6	25.6	28.0
United States	22.2	22.8	20.8	23.2	20.4	17.1	21.8	19.2
Germany	4.1	4.8	4.9	5.5	6.3	7.2	7.7	8.2
Canada	5.5	4.6	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.1	4.0	4.0
Australia	4.3	4.3	5.0	5.4	3.8	3.6	3.3	3.2
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>					<b>111.0</b>	<b>108.1</b>	<b>102.8</b>	<b>99.7</b>
United States					70.5	67.6	64.0	60.5
Japan					16.5	15.0	13.5	13.0
Australia					6.8	6.6	6.2	6.1

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
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## Total

Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
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## Total

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.82	0.32	0.69	0.34	-0.64	1.60	0.23	0.39
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	6582	6571	6455	6551	6444	6504	6224	6703

SINGAPORE									
KEY INDICATORS									
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)					
2008	4.8	43,216	1.9	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				65.7	
2018	5.6	58,248	3.1	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				3.8	
Immigrant Population in Singapore									
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over					
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated		
2000	1,352	34.54	55	15.8	72.8				
2015	2,544	45.95	56	12.5	78.1				
2017	2,623	45.95	56	13.0	77.2				
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018		Total	Manufacturing	Construction	Services				
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)		1,386.0	242.6	327.6	810.5				
% of total employment		37.3							
Stock of international students (‘000s)		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
		48.6	47.9	53.0	48.9			53.1	
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Emigration from Singapore to OECD countries									
	2000			2015/16					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Stock of persons born in Singapore living in OECD countries									
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	48.5	58.1	106.6	66.4	90.0	156.4			
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	9.1	10.8	19.9	19.6	18.1	18.7			
15–24 (% of population 15+)	19.3	17.0	18.0	21.2	15.3	17.8			
25–64 (% of population 15+)	76.2	78.0	77.2	70.7	71.1	71.0			
Total emigration rates (%)	3.0	3.6	3.3	2.7	3.7	3.2			
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	8.6	11.3	9.9	2.9	4.2	3.5			
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>		<b>5.9</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>
United Kingdom		0.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	6.0
Australia		1.9	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.6
United States		0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Rep. of Korea		0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7
Japan		0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>		<b>17.7</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>19.2</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>23.5</b>
Australia						9.1	8.8	8.8	8.9
United Kingdom						5.9	6.8	7.3	7.5
United States						4.5	4.6	4.7	4.5
Emigration to non-OECD destinations									
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>		<b>192.2</b>	<b>200.0</b>	<b>207.0</b>	<b>212.2</b>	<b>212.5</b>	<b>213.4</b>		
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>									
Net migration rate (per thousand)									
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	8.38	18.22	17.03	4.47	30.71	11.83	4.72	4.53	
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e

## SRI LANKA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	20.0	2,538	6.0	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)	50.2
2018	21.7	3,936	3.2	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	4.4

## Immigrant Population in Sri Lanka

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	40	0.21	45	3.8	68.0	41.8	13.4
2015	39	0.19	48	28.4	54.5		
2017	40	0.19	48	28.4	57.1		

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2016	Total	Professional	Middle level	Clerical	Skilled Labor	Unskilled labor	Housemaids	
Number of foreign workers ('000s)	242.9	6.6	8.3	10.9	80.4	71.7	65.1	
% of total employment								
Stock of international students ('000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
		0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.3
Inflows of foreign workers ('000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

## Emigration from Sri Lanka to OECD countries

	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Stock of persons born in Sri Lanka living in OECD countries						
Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	169.2	147.7	317.0	353.5	329.0	682.5
Recent emigrants 15+ ('000s)	26.7	30.5	57.2	13.9	16.4	15.1
15-24 (% of population 15+)	14.6	15.2	14.9	8.6	6.6	7.6
25-64 (% of population 15+)	79.8	76.8	78.4	81.9	82.3	82.1
Total emigration rates (%)	2.4	2.1	2.3	4.3	3.8	4.0
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	27.2	28.7	27.7	8.2	6.0	7.0

Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000s)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>30.3</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>27.1</b>
Japan	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	2.2	3.1	4.7	5.6
Rep. of Korea	4.2	5.9	4.7	5.3	4.8	5.5	7.1	3.9
Italy	7.1	6.8	7.1	6.3	5.3	4.8	4.0	3.7
Australia	5.2	4.5	5.7	5.3	4.5	3.9	3.8	3.2
France	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.3
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, '000s)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>14.1</b>
Australia					4.0	4.4	4.9	6.1
United States					3.0	2.9	2.8	3.0
United Kingdom					2.9	2.5	1.8	1.4

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, '000s)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2016	2017	2018	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,642.5</b>	<b>1,792.4</b>	<b>1,831.4</b>	<b>1,932.2</b>				
Saudi Arabia	517.7		600.0					
Kuwait	308.5		200.0					
United Arab Emirates	238.6		150.0					
Qatar	133.4							
Lebanon	117.0							
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, '000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>263.0</b>	<b>282.4</b>	<b>293.2</b>	<b>300.4</b>	<b>263.4</b>	<b>242.8</b>	<b>212.2</b>	<b>211.5</b>
Qatar	52.7	57.5	80.7	84.6	65.1	59.5	56.6	50.8
Kuwait	50.6	44.2	42.7	43.6	38.5	32.4	37.4	47.0
Saudi Arabia	68.6	98.0	80.9	80.5	74.9	63.3	37.9	35.9
United Arab Emirates	39.3	38.3	48.5	50.3	43.7	40.1	36.7	32.8
Oman	5.4	4.9	5.3	5.8	7.1	9.7	8.9	8.3

Net migration rate (per thousand)	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	-1.64	-2.88	-4.99	-4.69	-5.23	-4.71	-4.63	-4.03

Remittance inflows (current \$ million)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	5,153	6,000	6,422	7,036	7,000	7,262	7,190	7,464

## TAIPEI, CHINA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)	
2008	23.0	18,131	0.7	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)	65.7
2018	23.6	25,026	2.6	Unemployment (% of total labor force)	3.8

## Immigrant Population in Taipei, China

	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over			
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15-24	% 25-64	% low- educated	% high- educated
2000	400	1.8	52				
2010	474	2.0	62				

Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018	Total	Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and animal husbandry		Manufacturing	Construction	Social Welfare (nurses and home-maids)		
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	706.9	12.6		432.0	4.1		258.1	
% of total employment	6.2	2.3		14.1	0.5			
Stock of international students (‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	10.1	11.6	12.6	14.1	15.8	17.8	21.2	28.4
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018

## Emigration from Taipei, China to OECD countries

Stock of persons born in Taipei, China living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	191.6	238.3	429.9	226.9	318.9	545.9
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	42.5	54.0	96.4	15.3	15.7	15.5
15-24 (% of population 15+)	22.4	17.4	19.6	11.1	9.3	10.0
25-64 (% of population 15+)	73.7	78.5	76.4	74.1	77.9	76.3
Total emigration rates (%)	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	3.0	2.6
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	5.3	7.0	6.0	4.6	6.4	5.4

## Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.6</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>27.8</b>
Japan	6.6	5.6	6.6	6.6	7.7	10.8	12.2	13.7
United States	6.7	6.2	5.3	5.4	4.7	4.9	5.1	4.9
Rep. of Korea	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.5
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.9
Australia	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>31.0</b>							
United States								
United Kingdom								
Australia								

## Emigration to non-OECD destinations

Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>687.0</b>	<b>681.0</b>	<b>698.0</b>	<b>717.0</b>	<b>726.0</b>	<b>724.0</b>	<b>728.0</b>	<b>736.0</b>

## Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>								

## Net migration rate (per thousand)

1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025

## Remittance inflows (current \$ million)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018e

THAILAND									
KEY INDICATORS									
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)					
2008	66.5	4,802	1.7	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)					67.1
2018	69.4	6,362	4.1	Unemployment (% of total labor force)					0.7
Immigrant Population in Thailand									
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over					
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated		
2000	1,258	2.00	49	36.7	56.0	84.7	9.9		
2015	3,487	5.08	50	18.6	75.9				
2017	3,589	5.20	50	15.6	78.7				
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2018									
	Total, 2018	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Construction	Mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas and water supply	Trade, Transportation, Accommodation and Food, and Business and Administrative Services	Public administration, Community, Social and Other Services and Activities		
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	1,130.6	133.7	516.8	73.5	3.7	330.2	72.6		
% of total employment		1.1	8.2	3.6	1.5	2.7	1.5		
Stock of international students (‘000s)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	19.1	20.2	20.3				31.6		
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	79.8	91.2	107.7	117.9	120.6	125.1	129.0		
Emigration from Thailand to OECD countries									
Stock of persons born in Thailand living in OECD countries	2000			2015/16					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	90.8	180.0	270.8	171.1	438.7	609.8			
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	15.8	33.9	49.7	17.6	21.2	20.2			
15–24 (% of population 15+)	38.7	21.8	27.5	23.3	9.9	13.7			
25–64 (% of population 15+)	59.6	76.3	70.7	69.4	82.8	79.0			
Total emigration rates (%)	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.5	1.0			
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	2.4	3.1	2.8	1.4	2.9	2.2			
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
<b>Total</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>53.6</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>86.7</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>67.7</b>	<b>110.9</b>	
Rep. of Korea	6.9	10.3	13.8	18.3	48.3	20.1	28.5	71.5	
Japan	10.9	13.6	15.4	15.4	14.3	14.5	15.4	16.4	
United States	9.4	10.0	9.5	7.6	6.2	7.5	7.0	6.3	
Germany	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.4	
Australia	2.6	2.5	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.8	2.7	
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
<b>Total</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>21.2</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>24.5</b>	
United States					7.0	7.1	7.1	6.9	
United Kingdom					6.0	6.2	6.1	6.0	
Australia					3.2	2.9	4.8	5.7	
Emigration to non-OECD destinations									
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)									
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
<b>Total</b>	<b>997.3</b>	<b>1039.0</b>				<b>153.3</b>	<b>168.4</b>	<b>154.9</b>	
Taipei, China						74.2	77.0	71.8	
Singapore							4.3	3.5	
Malaysia								3.1	
United Arab Emirates								2.7	
Hong Kong, China									
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)									
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
<b>Total</b>	<b>147.6</b>	<b>134.1</b>	<b>130.5</b>	<b>119.5</b>	<b>117.3</b>	<b>114.4</b>	<b>115.2</b>	<b>115.7</b>	
Taipei, China	47.8	39.1	34.6	37.1	34.7	35.0	35.2	33.5	
Malaysia	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.2	3.3	3.3	7.1	8.2	
Singapore	11.5	11.9	10.7	8.2	7.3	5.8	5.4	4.6	
United Arab Emirates	9.6	7.2	5.5	5.0	4.6	4.0	3.3	2.3	
Hong Kong, China	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.0	
Net migration rate (per thousand)									
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	1.86	–2.09	2.34	1.17	0.18	0.49	0.28	0.28	
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)									
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e	
	5,256	5,657	6,585	6,524	5,895	6,270	6,720	7,459	



VIET NAM								
KEY INDICATORS								
	Population (million)	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP growth rate (annual, %)	Labor market indicators (2018, %)				
2008	86.2	1,198	5.7	Employment / population ratio (15+, total)				76.0
2018	95.5	1,964	7.1	Unemployment (% of total labor force)				1.9
Immigrant Population in Viet Nam								
	Stock of foreign-born population (0+)			Foreign-born population, 15 years old and over				
	Total (‘000s)	% of population	% women	% 15–24	% 25–64	% low- educated	% high- educated	
2000	57	0.07	42	27.6	66.4			
2015	73	0.08	42	16.0	77.6			
2017	76	0.08	42	14.7	78.0			
Stock of foreign workers by sector, 2011								
	Total							
Number of foreign workers (‘000s)	78.4							
% of total employment								
Stock of international students (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	3.3	3.7	4.0	3.6	2.5	2.9	5.6	4.2
Inflows of foreign workers (‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	55.4	56.9	74.0	78.4	76.3	83.6		
Emigration from Viet Nam to OECD countries								
	2000			2015/16				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stock of persons born in Viet Nam living in OECD countries								
Emigrant population 15+ (‘000s)	747.4	768.6	1,515.9	1,016.5	1,179.2	2,195.7		
Recent emigrants 15+ (‘000s)	63.0	86.1	149.1	8.7	12.3	10.6		
15–24 (% of population 15+)	12.5	12.1	12.3	9.4	8.2	8.8		
25–64 (% of population 15+)	81.1	79.9	80.5	76.5	76.6	76.5		
Total emigration rates (%)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.0		
Emigration rates of the high-educated (%)	17.1	19.8	18.2	9.9	10.8	10.4		
Legal migration flows to OECD (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>94.6</b>	<b>93.7</b>	<b>102.3</b>	<b>126.0</b>	<b>152.2</b>	<b>186.0</b>	<b>214.3</b>
Japan	11.9	13.9	19.5	31.7	43.0	65.9	77.5	98.6
Rep. of Korea	22.9	27.9	24.7	22.2	28.0	30.2	40.1	48.0
United States	30.6	34.2	28.3	27.1	30.3	30.8	41.5	38.2
Germany	4.3	4.2	3.9	4.1	5.1	6.1	7.0	7.0
Australia	3.8	4.8	4.8	5.7	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.5
Stock of international students (3 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>37.3</b>	<b>41.3</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>63.7</b>	<b>78.2</b>
United States					17.7	17.9	19.3	22.2
Japan					4.2	6.1	10.6	19.2
Australia					12.4	12.9	13.1	14.5
Emigration to non-OECD destinations								
Stocks of workers overseas (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2017
<b>Total</b>	<b>500.0</b>							
Taipei, China	90.0						200.0	206.2
Malaysia	75.0		74.8			70.0		
Russian Federation	72.0							
Lao PDR	14.5				30.0			
Saudi Arabia	11.5							
Flows of workers deployed (5 main destinations, ‘000s)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Total</b>	<b>88.3</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>88.2</b>	<b>106.8</b>	<b>116.0</b>	<b>126.3</b>	<b>134.7</b>	<b>142.9</b>
Taipei, China	38.8	30.5	46.4	62.1	67.1	68.2	67.0	60.4
Malaysia	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.1	7.4	2.1	1.6	1.1
Algeria	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.5	2.0	1.2	0.8	
Macau, China	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.5	0.5	0.3		
United Arab Emirates	1.2	1.7	2.1	0.8	0.3	0.1		
Net migration rate (per thousand)								
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-1.03	-1.10	-0.56	-1.59	-1.86	-0.89	-0.84	-0.94
Remittance inflows (current \$ million)								
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,000	14,000	15,000	15,934

## GENERAL NOTES

1. All tables with top three/five destinations are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available
2. Data on remittances for 2018 are estimates
3. "n.a." data not available
4. Educational attainment levels are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997).  
"Low-educated" persons have completed at best lower secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2).  
"Medium-educated" have completed at best post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 3/4).  
"Highly-educated" persons hold at least a first stage tertiary degree (ISCED 5/6).
5. The definition of non-citizen students was only used for the economies for which no data on non-resident students were available.
6. Data on international students in the Asian economies are only for degree programs (undergraduate and upwards) and do not include short-term language courses
7. Stock of foreign workers in [economy] by sector reports figures for the four largest employers of foreign workers

## DATA SOURCES

Data	Source
<b>Key indicators</b>	World Bank, World Development Indicators
<b>Immigrant population in [economy]</b>	
Total immigrant population 0+ (thousands)	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017). International migrant stock: The 2017 revision.
% of total population 0+	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017). International migrant stock: The 2017 revision.
Age structure (2000, %) (population 15+):	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017). International migrant stock: The 2017 revision.
Education (2000, %) (population 15+):	DIOC-E 2000.
<b>Stock of international students</b>	UIS Education database unless otherwise specified. Break in series in 2013.
<b>Inflows of foreign workers</b>	ILO-ILMS
<b>Emigrant population: persons born in economy living in OECD countries</b>	DIOC-E 2000, DIOC 2000, DIOC 2010, DIOC 2015, Barro and Lee (2010) and Lutz et al. (2010).
<b>Legal migrant flows</b>	OECD International Migration Database (IMD).
<b>International students from economy in OECD countries</b>	OECD Education and Skills database.
<b>Net migration rate</b>	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision, custom data acquired via website.
<b>Remittance inflows</b>	World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data

METADATA		
Emigration to non-OECD destinations	Comments	Source
<b>Bangladesh</b>		
Stocks of workers overseas in non-OECD countries		Population and Housing Census 2011
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries and the category "others"	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET).
<b>Cambodia</b>		
Stocks of workers overseas in non-OECD countries		"Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia", ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 (original source: Community Welfare Attache of the respective Middle-east country), country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	ILO ILMS
<b>Hong Kong, China</b>		
Emigrant population living in OECD countries	Some destination countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are not included.	
Stock of foreign workers		
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		
<b>India</b>		
Stocks of workers overseas in non-OECD countries	Change to "Non-resident Indians" from "overseas Indians" last year.	Ministry of External Affairs (Annual Reports).
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		Ministry of External Affairs, Department of Overseas Employment database, <a href="http://emigrate.gov.in">emigrate.gov.in</a> ; Country wise Emigration Clearances (ECs) obtained by RAs and Direct Recruitment by Fes, 2015-2016 E-migrate ( <a href="https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/home.action">https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/home.action</a> )
<b>Indonesia</b>		
Stock of foreign workers	Trade includes wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		(i)ILO news 17 December 2010, based on BNP2TKI available at <a href="http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm">http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm</a> , (ii)Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, cited in IOM Report (2010) "Labour Migration from Indonesia", (iii)World Bank presentation "Malaysia-Indonesia Remittance Corridor"; news reports.
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries and the category "others"	BNP2TKI (Placement and Protection Agency)
<b>Japan</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		Status of reporting on the employment of foreign workers, and Labor Force Survey, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Inflow of foreign workers		Statistics on Legal Migrants, Immigration Bureau of Japan

<b>Lao PDR</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		IOM “Lao PDR Labour Force Survey 2017”, Lao PDR Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Planning and Investment, June 2018
Inflows of foreign workers	Number of work permits issued in 2011	Department of Skills Development and Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		ILO-ILMS.
<b>Malaysia</b>		
Stock of foreign workers	Figure for agriculture includes plantation	Department of Statistics Malaysia
<b>Mongolia</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		National Statistics Office of Mongolia
<b>Nepal</b>		
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	Department of Foreign Employment, for Nepalese Fiscal Years
<b>Pakistan</b>		
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries	Figures are for stocks of Pakistanis overseas (including workers, students and other categories). We assume that for the Gulf countries, most of this figure represents migrant workers. All totals include OECD Countries	Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment.
<b>People’s Republic of China</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		Country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security).
Emigrant population living in OECD countries	Some destination economies, such as Germany and the United States, include Taipei, China and Hong Kong, China data.	
International students in OECD countries	Figures include those for Taipei, China	
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		Ministry of Commerce.
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		Ministry of Commerce.
<b>Philippines</b>		
Inflows of foreign workers	New permits delivered to foreign workers	ILO-ILMS, Department of Labor and Employment
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		The Philippine Statistics Authority
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	ILO-ILMS, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

<b>Republic of Korea</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		Korean Statistical Information Service
<b>Singapore</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		Ministry of Manpower
<b>Sri Lanka</b>		
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		Institute of Policy Studies (2008): "International Migration Outlook, Sri Lanka" (original source: Bureau of Foreign Employment); "Sri Lanka country Study" by Judith Shaw (original source: SLBFE 2005); "Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia", ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 .
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	Bureau of Foreign Employment, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable
<b>Taipei, China</b>		
Key indicators		National Statistics
Stock of foreign workers		Ministry of Labor
Stock of international students		Ministry of Education
Emigrant population living in OECD countries	Some destination countries, such as Australia, Germany and the United States, are not included.	
International students in OECD countries	Number of students obtaining visas from foreign nations	Ministry of Education
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	
<b>Thailand</b>		
Stock of foreign workers	Only total is the number for 2018	ILO-ILMS
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries	Includes illegal workers	ILO-ILMS, Overseas Employment Administration Division
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries	All totals include OECD Countries	Overseas Employment Administration Division
<b>Viet Nam</b>		
Stock of foreign workers		MOLISA
Stock of workers in non-OECD countries		MOLISA, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable
Flows of workers deployed to non-OECD countries		ILO-ILMS, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable

## ANNEX 2

# COMPARATIVE TABLES

**Annex Table 2.1: Inflows from Asia to the OECD by Economy of Origin ('000s)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Afghanistan	17	20	15	13	13	16	15	11	13	18	24	29	35	34	45	139	153	105
Azerbaijan	1	2	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	6	4	4	4	5	6	23	28
Bangladesh	23	24	19	22	30	37	42	34	40	50	50	50	42	43	47	51	51	52
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	9	14	13	11	9	7	5	5
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	4	5	5	5	6	7	11	9	10	9	10	12	15	16	16	17	20	20
People's Republic of China	282	334	335	322	367	438	503	518	530	460	508	531	504	547	555	541	553	565
Georgia	1	2	7	7	8	11	10	9	8	8	8	9	10	11	12	14	19	22
Hong Kong, China	10	12	13	12	10	8	10	8	8	6	9	7	6	9	7	7	14	17
India	113	151	161	145	192	213	206	213	215	227	253	243	229	241	263	268	278	312
Indonesia	29	32	33	31	27	35	30	27	31	22	25	29	31	36	35	35	39	39
Japan	34	38	39	35	36	42	34	32	29	34	32	34	37	37	34	37	35	30
Kazakhstan	5	4	17	15	12	9	8	7	7	7	8	9	7	9	11	12	19	25
Republic of Korea	59	69	62	54	57	66	68	72	79	78	76	71	71	75	70	65	73	74
Kyrgyz Republic	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	11	14
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3
Malaysia	11	14	12	13	16	11	12	20	24	20	22	17	21	23	19	22	16	19
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	6	6	4	7	8	11	15	15	15	9	10	9	10	9	8	15	15	20
Myanmar	2	3	3	3	3	5	11	10	10	23	19	24	27	23	23	27	29	30
Nepal	4	3	5	6	8	9	14	17	19	23	25	30	33	39	42	47	49	49
Pakistan	54	59	49	47	73	74	83	74	76	77	100	106	84	73	78	99	96	93
Philippines	165	188	195	192	211	192	173	169	158	164	168	161	160	152	158	181	173	175
Singapore	6	6	6	5	6	7	7	7	7	5	7	9	9	8	9	7	7	13
Sri Lanka	23	21	22	24	23	28	28	21	33	33	41	36	35	30	29	31	30	27
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	5
Taipei, China	16	21	21	15	20	17	32	33	22	24	20	18	17	22	18	22	26	28
Thailand	32	35	34	35	36	47	51	48	47	47	50	53	59	61	87	64	68	111
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	9	21
Uzbekistan	8	6	8	11	8	9	11	12	20	13	16	16	19	19	21	21	33	45
Viet Nam	52	60	64	55	66	78	82	88	98	76	87	95	94	102	125	152	186	214
<b>Total Asia</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>1,117</b>	<b>1,139</b>	<b>1,083</b>	<b>1,245</b>	<b>1,379</b>	<b>1,470</b>	<b>1,465</b>	<b>1,511</b>	<b>1,449</b>	<b>1,593</b>	<b>1,621</b>	<b>1,578</b>	<b>1,645</b>	<b>1,734</b>	<b>1,896</b>	<b>2,038</b>	<b>2,162</b>

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

**Annex Table 2.2: General Characteristics of Emigrants from Asia in the OECD, 2015–2016**

Economy of origin	Emigrant population 15+ ('000s)	Women (%)	Low-educated (%)	Highly educated (%)	15–24 (%)	65+ (%)	Recent (<5yrs) (%)
Afghanistan	608	39.7	51.6	19.9	26.2	5.9	36.6
Azerbaijan	116	55.1	26.3	47.0	8.1	17.1	32.4
Bangladesh	686	43.1	34.4	38.1	10.2	5.0	21.0
Bhutan	67	50.9	58.0	10.5	4.3	11.6	57.6
Brunei Darussalam	14	56.2	12.0	62.2	16.0	8.9	19.7
Cambodia	292	55.5	44.0	21.0	5.3	17.1	7.5
People's Republic of China	4,620	55.5	23.7	48.6	16.8	13.3	27.8
Georgia	222	62.7	26.2	37.8	8.7	15.6	21.8
Hong Kong, China	625	53.3	14.1	58.3	9.8	14.0	7.2
India	4,826	47.3	16.3	64.7	8.5	12.5	26.9
Indonesia	365	56.2	17.8	46.4	11.4	28.4	14.9
Japan	704	62.1	7.3	59.4	10.2	16.1	21.1
Kazakhstan	1,044	53.1	29.1	19.4	8.6	13.3	4.8
Republic of Korea	1787	57.1	9.9	57.0	10.6	17.2	14.0
Kyrgyz Republic	40	62.9	12.1	62.7	14.6	8.3	45.3
Lao People's Democratic Republic	254	51.8	37.5	23.8	2.8	13.8	4.2
Malaysia	332	54.0	12.4	60.5	16.2	13.9	21.8
Maldives	2	65.3	45.2	34.2	21.0	1.3	35.3
Mongolia	40	60.6	17.3	50.6	22.1	0.8	55.4
Myanmar	220	51.5	48.2	26.9	14.5	11.3	30.7
Nepal	308	44.2	19.8	46.4	24.8	2.1	38.8
Pakistan	1,427	43.5	32.8	40.9	12.1	7.9	20.0
Philippines	3,549	62.0	13.1	53.3	9.3	15.1	16.3
Singapore	156	57.5	14.4	56.2	17.8	11.2	18.7
Sri Lanka	682	48.2	34.6	33.7	7.6	10.3	15.1
Tajikistan	25	55.3	11.4	52.5	5.9	14.6	18.5
Taipei, China	546	58.4	6.2	73.1	10.0	13.6	15.5
Thailand	610	71.9	34.4	34.1	13.7	7.3	20.2
Turkmenistan	34	65.3	39.5	31.5	11.7	12.7	73.4
Uzbekistan	186	57.1	19.8	46.4	9.5	12.7	20.2
Viet Nam	2,196	53.7	33.0	30.5	8.8	14.7	10.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>26,582</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>48.3</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>20.5</b>
<b>Total 2010–2011</b>	<b>21,720</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>18.0</b>

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010/11 and 2015/16.



**Annex Table 2.3: Emigration Rates to the OECD by Level of Education, 2000–2001, 2010–2011 and 2015–2016**

	Total (%)			Highly educated (%)		
	2000–01	2010–11	2015–16	2000–01	2010–11	2015–16
Afghanistan	1.1	2.0	3.0	3.2	5.7	6.6
Azerbaijan	n.a.	n.a.	1.5	n.a.	n.a.	4.6
Bangladesh	0.4	0.5	0.6	2.6	3.5	2.6
Bhutan	n.a.	n.a.	10.4	n.a.	n.a.	15.9
Brunei Darussalam	3.7	4.1	4.2	15.4	16.8	17.8
Cambodia	3.1	2.7	2.7	52.7	14.8	18.5
People's Republic of China	0.3	0.4	0.4	2.1	1.9	1.8
Georgia	n.a.	n.a.	5.9	n.a.	n.a.	4.3
Hong Kong, China	6.6	4.4	8.7	16.5	12.9	18.0
India	0.3	0.4	0.5	3.0	3.5	3.5
Indonesia	0.2	0.2	0.2	3.6	2.6	1.1
Japan	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.0
Kazakhstan	3.8	8.0	7.7	4.8	7.0	5.9
Republic of Korea	3.8	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.5	5.1
Kyrgyz Republic	1.2	0.4	1.0	2.2	1.7	4.9
Lao People's Democratic Republic	8.0	6.1	5.2	25.3	14.9	19.9
Malaysia	1.4	1.5	1.5	6.3	5.2	4.3
Maldives	0.3	0.6	0.6	6.9	10.2	3.6
Mongolia	0.3	1.1	1.8	1.3	2.9	6.3
Myanmar	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.5	1.5	1.1
Nepal	0.2	0.8	1.4	2.2	8.9	11.0
Pakistan	0.8	1.0	1.1	3.3	6.5	8.3
Philippines	3.9	4.8	5.0	6.8	8.1	8.1
Singapore	3.3	3.4	3.2	9.9	9.6	3.3
Sri Lanka	2.1	3.4	4.0	4.1	6.7	14.1
Tajikistan	0.5	0.3	0.5	2.3	1.8	2.6
Taipei, China	2.4	2.4	n.a.	6.0	4.4	n.a.
Thailand	0.6	1.0	1.0	2.8	2.7	2.4
Turkmenistan	n.a.	0.3	0.9	n.a.	1.0	2.4
Uzbekistan	n.a.	0.7	0.9	n.a.	2.1	4.5
Viet Nam	2.8	2.8	3.0	18.3	10.6	10.5
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2000–01, 2010–11, and 2015–16.

**Annex Table 2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Economies, by Destination**

	Bangladesh							India						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>														
United Arab Emirates	215,452	14,241	24,232	25,271	8,131	4,135	3,235	141,138	202,016	224,033	225,718	163,731	149,962	112,059
Saudi Arabia	21,232	12,654	10,657	58,270	143,913	551,308	257,317	357,503	354,169	329,937	308,380	165,356	78,611	72,399
Oman	170,326	134,028	105,748	129,859	188,247	89,704	72,504	84,384	63,398	51,318	85,054	63,224	53,332	36,037
Kuwait	2	6	3,094	17,472	38,188	49,604	27,637	55,868	70,072	80,419	66,579	72,402	56,380	57,613
Bahrain	21,777	25,155	23,378	20,720	72,167	19,318	811	20,150	17,269	14,220	15,623	11,964	11,516	9,142
Qatar	28,801	57,584	87,575	123,965	120,382	82,012	76,560	63,096	78,367	75,935	59,384	30,619	24,759	34,471
<b>Other Middle East</b>														
Jordan	11,726	21,383	20,338	22,093	23,017	20,449	9,724	1,819	1,462	2,133	2,047	2,742	2,341	1,941
Lebanon	14,864	15,098	16,640	19,113	15,095	8,327	5,991	288	281	313	341	316	110	109
Israel														
<b>Asia, OECD</b>														
Japan	420	41	55	99	165	145	163							
Rep. of Korea	1,447	2,121	1,748	2,359	1,980	1,829	2,287							
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>														
Singapore	58,657	60,057	54,750	55,523	54,730	40,401	41,393							
Malaysia	804	3,853	5,134	30,483	40,126	99,787	175,927	21,241	22,388	22,926	20,908	10,604	14,002	16,370
Taipei, China														
Thailand								9	15	53	10	1	0	6
Hong Kong, China														
Brunei Darussalam	5,038	5,971	6,633	6,354	5,836	8,587	4,480							
Indonesia								11	38	29	6	1	10	10
India														
People's Republic of China														

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**Annex Table 2.4** *continued*

	Indonesia							Nepal							
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>															
United Arab Emirates	35,571	44,505	17,962	7,619	2,575	1,667	726	34,503	58,586	55,426	53,094	52,793	57,887	60,244	62,776
Saudi Arabia	40,655	45,394	44,325	23,000	13,538	6,471	5,894	68,103	96,903	86,613	96,887	138,529	72,892	40,962	46,080
Oman	8,836	10,719	19,141	6,766	1,014	1,085	749	1,884	3,931	3,952	3,470	3,059	3,066	3,059	2,722
Kuwait	2,518	2,534	1,714	310	987	1,162	1,172	9,165	17,376	20,196	9,634	10,049	13,134	17,555	15,995
Bahrain	6,328	5,384	5,472	2,570	123	125	86	3,100	4,255	4,418	4,168	3,146	3,911	4,862	4,633
Qatar	20,380	16,237	7,862	2,460	1,355	1,037	587	44,883	103,932	128,550	124,050	129,038	121,128	103,179	75,024
<b>Other Middle East</b>															
Jordan	106	0	0	103	65							1,232	2,745	1,944	1,458
Lebanon												167	146	22	11
Israel												189	132	118	58
<b>Asia, OECD</b>															
Japan	3,293	3,042	2,428	468	279	538	458					3,844	2,238	761	959
Rep. of Korea	13,593	15,374	11,848	5,501	5,912	3,728	6,905					80	90	27	22
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>															
Singapore	41,556	34,655	31,680	20,895	17,700	13,379	18,324					89	148	127	206
Malaysia	134,023	150,236	127,827	97,635	87,616	88,991	90,671	96,272	158,663	210,009	196,497	60,979	95,244	104,209	9,999
Taipei, China	81,071	83,544	82,665	75,303	77,087	62,823	72,373					0			
Thailand	1,035	1,041	717	90	6	6	11					21	26	31	30
Hong Kong, China	45,478	41,769	35,050	15,322	14,434	68,103	73,917					360	175	175	88
Brunei Darussalam	13,146	11,269	11,616	9,993	8,152	6,623	5,707					150	158	144	143
Indonesia												6	1	5	1
India	535	409	203	68	97										
People's Republic of China	1,967	2,055	915	108	65	84	22					181	186	269	448

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**Annex Table 2.4** *continued*

	Pakistan							Philippines						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>														
United Arab Emirates	182,630	273,234	350,522	326,986	295,647	275,436	208,635	259,546	261,119	246,231	227,076	276,278	265,498	
Saudi Arabia	358,560	270,502	312,489	522,750	462,598	143,363	100,910	330,040	382,553	402,837	406,089	460,121	433,567	
Oman	69,407	47,794	39,793	47,788	45,085	42,362	27,202	16,048	16,577	15,880	22,274	27,579	25,399	
Kuwait	5	229	132	164	770	773	493	75,286	67,856	70,098	86,019	109,615	107,604	
Bahrain	10,530	9,600	9,226	9,029	8,226	7,919	5,745	22,271	20,546	18,958	21,428	21,429	21,388	
Qatar	7,320	8,119	10,042	12,741	9,706	11,592	20,993	104,622	94,195	114,511	133,169	141,304	122,619	
<b>Other Middle East</b>														
Jordan	279	345	328	321	282	285	170	3,025	2,223	3,393	7,253	9,970	7,063	
Lebanon	23	15	57	33	42	24	27	1,227	2,874	3,010	3,694	3,959	4,179	
Israel								4,582	4,385	4,590	2,288	6,392	6,879	
<b>Asia, OECD</b>														
Japan	62	44	69	82	102	153	258	9,947	10,936	12,815	14,161	21,363	21,924	
Rep. of Korea	7	12	46	13	17	9	13	8,979	11,664	11,958	11,418	13,592	13,479	
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>														
Singapore	47	42	76	68	33	544	65	172,690	173,666	140,205	141,453	171,014	162,223	
Malaysia	1,309	2,031	20,577	20,216	10,625	7,174	9,881	38,407	34,088	31,451	26,199	33,178	33,194	
Taipei, China								41,492	41,145	58,681	62,598	65,364	69,235	
Thailand								9,204	8,659	6,653	7,204	9,321	10,405	
Hong Kong, China	17	20	38	29	38	54	57	131,680	130,686	105,737	85,704	116,467	144,535	
Brunei Darussalam	74	67	48	85	85	212	225	14,907	17,000	11,478	14,088	10,099	14,925	
Indonesia								5,166	5,489	5,007	3,880	5,302	4,984	
India										466	581		386	
People's Republic of China	220	155	254	355	482	457	854	9,969	9,829	6,229	6,564	9166	9,369	

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**Annex Table 2.4** *continued*

	Sri Lanka							Thailand						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>														
United Arab Emirates	38,234	48,502	50,347	43,666	40,124	36,667	32,836	7,245	5,495	5,038	4,623	4,014	3,270	2,326
Saudi Arabia	97,993	80,887	80,480	74,894	63,389	37,745	35,866	517	509	446	36	358	297	220
Oman	4,889	5,317	5,759	7,082	9,748	8,865	8,345	298	280	260	245	370	288	295
Kuwait	44,229	42,740	43,552	38,473	32,415	37,410	46,951	1,792	1,729	1,626	2,448	1,265	1,703	1,917
Bahrain	4,533	4,547	3,979	3,722	3,222	3,002	2,922	1,106	969	888	853	904	807	641
Qatar	57,478	80,724	84,622	65,139	59,527	56,637	50,774	2,623	2,392	2,449	2,273	1,562	904	554
<b>Other Middle East</b>														
Jordan	10,387	7,060	6,197	4,809	3,870	3,925	4,163						13	17
Lebanon	3,945	3,537	3,058	2,604	2,640	2,408	2,229						42	35
Israel	1,768	1,944	2,010	1,986	2,274	2,498		5,126	8,393	7,618	7,144	8,629	7,494	8,260
<b>Asia, OECD</b>														
Japan	112	118	88	106	144	402		8,596	6,904	7,614	7,705	8,610	9,196	9,180
Rep. of Korea	5,629	5,402	6,686	6,967	8,609	5,807	5,409	10,393	11,758	9,835	189	12,609	12,609	12,476
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>														
Singapore	980	1,265	1,470	1,461	1,840	1,795	1,917	11,864	10,728	8,191	7,265	5,843	5,399	4,553
Malaysia	2,691	3,297	3,312	3,239	2,916	1,996	2,455	4,441	3,852	3,237	3,318	3,263	7,141	8,182
Taipei, China								39,128	34,631	37,105	34,738	35,027	35,199	33,546
Thailand	2				11	16								
Hong Kong, China	449	513	468	493	573	636	584	2,533	2,225	2,209	2,185	2,160	2,296	2,028
Brunei Darussalam	11	15	12	9	14	9	8	2,697	2,489	1,944	1,846	1,461	1,299	1,109
Indonesia					20	21		2,480	3,210	3,103	2,538	1,967	1,724	1,636
India	97	11	136	121	187	157		2,480	3,210	3,103	1,860	1,646	1,468	1,432
People's Republic of China	6	3	5	11		10		923	1,169	725	405	261	398	287

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**Annex Table 2.4** *continued*

	Viet Nam							Myanmar						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>														
United Arab Emirates	1,731	2,075	831	286	136			39	0	14	77	271	127	214
Saudi Arabia	2,360	1,703	4,191	3,975	16									
Oman	154	25	57	86										
Kuwait	440	31	30	54	40	9		1	0	0	0		0	0
Bahrain	11	16	9											
Qatar	105	206	850	455				10	77	15	0	73	135	87
<b>Other Middle East</b>														
Jordan	20	0	0										0	296
Lebanon														
Israel	210	141	484	268	250									
<b>Asia, OECD</b>														
Japan	8,775	9,686	19,766	27,010	39,938	54,504		0	36	518	1,678	2,384	3,331	3,877
Rep. of Korea	9,228	5,446	7,242	6,019	8,482	5,178		3,669	4,003	4,482	4,475	5,731	5,676	7,473
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>														
Singapore	107	149	92	31	29			452	791	501	431	707	355	556
Malaysia	9,298	7,564	5,139	7,354	2,079	1,551	1,102	26,921	25,905	25,892	35,022	33,920	3,386	14,589
Taipei, China	30,533	46,368	62,124	67,121	68,244	66,926	60,369							
Thailand	0	0	0	0		0		37,347	36,029	33,188	53,578	102,722	144,302	208,312
Hong Kong, China	0	0	0		11	0								
Brunei Darussalam	74	18	0	0		0								
Indonesia	0	0	0	0		0								
India														
People's Republic of China	0	4	0		7	0								

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**Annex Table 2.4** *continued*

	Cambodia						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>							
United Arab Emirates							
Saudi Arabia							
Oman							
Kuwait							
Bahrain							
Qatar							
<b>Other Middle East</b>							
Jordan							
Lebanon							
Israel							
<b>Asia, OECD</b>							
Japan	102	111	518	1,399	1,562	2,280	3,002
Rep. of Korea	8,132	8,820	7,671	7,073	7,371	5,967	4,870
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>							
Singapore	0	111	190	99	87	138	287
Malaysia	180	90	470	807	123	27	53
Taipei, China							
Thailand	26,390	13,468	15,839	16,163	76,433	87,909	96,699
Hong Kong, China							
Brunei Darussalam							
Indonesia							
India							
People's Republic of China					0	15	

Source: ILO ILMS. National sources.

**Annex Table 2.5: Migrant Remittance Inflows in Asian Economies, 2000–2018**  
(\$ million)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018e
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	106	152	362	179	204	329	250	341	368	378	384
Azerbaijan	57	104	181	171	227	623	790	1,268	1,518	1,255	1,410	1,893	1,990	1,733	1,846	1,270	643	1,050	1,272
Bangladesh	1,969	2,100	2,860	3,192	3,582	4,642	5,428	6,562	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,988	15,296	13,544	13,469	15,496
Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	3	4	5	8	10	18	12	14	20	34	40	48
Brunei Darussalam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cambodia	121	133	140	138	177	164	184	186	188	142	153	160	172	176	377	400	371	386	1,411
People's Republic of China	758	1,209	2,354	4,620	6,640	23,626	27,565	38,395	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938	61,000	63,860	67,414
Georgia	210	222	231	236	303	446	627	883	1,065	1,112	1,184	1,547	1,770	1,945	1,986	1,459	1,521	1,794	2,034
Hong Kong, China	136	153	121	120	240	297	294	317	355	348	340	352	367	360	372	387	399	430	469
India	12,845	14,229	15,707	21,015	18,753	22,125	28,334	37,217	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910	62,744	68,968	78,609
Indonesia	1,190	1,050	1,260	1,490	1,866	5,420	5,722	6,174	6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,659	8,891	8,997	11,237
Japan	1,374	1,987	1,821	1,079	930	905	1,177	1,384	1,732	1,595	1,684	2,132	2,540	2,364	3,734	3,325	3,819	4,578	5,634
Kazakhstan	122	171	205	147	166	62	84	143	126	198	226	180	178	207	229	194	275	355	419
Korea, Rep. of	4,862	4,836	5,530	6,301	6,574	5,178	4,826	5,130	6,952	5,982	5,836	6,582	6,571	6,455	6,551	6,444	6,504	6,332	6,703
Kyrgyz Republic	9	11	37	78	189	313	473	704	1,223	982	1,266	1,709	2,031	2,278	2,243	1,688	1,995	2,486	2,690
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	6	18	38	42	110	59	60	40	93	116	124	271
Macau, China			47	48	53	53	55	54	52	48	47	48	47	49	37	40	28	29	27
Malaysia	342	367	435	571	802	1,117	1,365	1,556	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,580	1,644	1,585	1,634	1,663
Maldives	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	8	6	5	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4
Mongolia	12	25	56	129	202	180	181	178	225	200	266	250	324	257	255	261	260	269	441
Myanmar	102	116	105	84	117	129	115	81	55	54	115	127	275	1,644	279	387	682	723	2,754
Nepal	112	147	678	771	823	1,212	1,453	1,734	2,727	2,983	3,464	4,217	4,793	5,589	5,889	6,730	6,612	6,947	8,064
Pakistan	1,080	1,460	3,550	3,961	3,942	4,280	5,121	5,998	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,244	19,306	19,761	19,665	21,014
Philippines	6,957	8,769	9,740	10,244	11,473	13,733	14,988	15,853	18,064	19,078	21,557	23,054	24,610	26,717	28,691	29,799	31,145	32,808	33,827
Singapore	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0
Sri Lanka	1,163	1,190	1,312	1,434	1,586	1,976	2,167	2,507	2,925	3,337	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,422	7,036	7,000	7,257	7,190	7,464
Tajikistan	..	..	79	146	252	467	1,019	1,691	2,544	1,748	2,021	2,722	3,222	3,698	3,384	2,259	1,867	2,220	2,275
Taipei, China	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0
Thailand	1,700	1,250	1,380	1,610	1,620	1,187	1,333	1,635	1,898	2,776	4,433	5,256	5,657	6,585	6,524	5,895	6,270	6,729	7,459
Turkmenistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	14	30	50	34	35	35	37	40	30	16	9	10	2
Uzbekistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	898	1,693	3,007	2,071	2,858	4,276	5,693	6,689	5,828	3,062	2,479	2,839	3,899
Viet Nam	1,340	1,100	1,770	2,100	2,310	3,150	3,800	6,180	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,200	11,880	13,781	15,934
<b>Total</b>	<b>36,464</b>	<b>40,632</b>	<b>49,602</b>	<b>59,688</b>	<b>62,831</b>	<b>91,288</b>	<b>108,022</b>	<b>137,570</b>	<b>173,362</b>	<b>167,977</b>	<b>193,829</b>	<b>224,960</b>	<b>239,796</b>	<b>251,278</b>	<b>262,432</b>	<b>262,682</b>	<b>251,695</b>	<b>267,718</b>	<b>298,533</b>

Note: All numbers are in current US dollars.

Source: World Bank.



**Annex Table 2.6: Net Migration Rate**  
(per 1,000 population)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
Afghanistan	-25.1	40.3	-8.9	6.4	-7.6	3.3	-1.7	-1.5
Azerbaijan	-4.6	-3.1	-2.8	0.9	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
Bangladesh	-0.5	-1.5	-1.2	-2.2	-4.5	-3.0	-2.3	-2.1
Bhutan	0.6	-22.0	0.1	2.0	-3.3	0.1	0.4	0.4
Brunei Darussalam	3.1	3.4	2.7	0.2	-1.2	-0.4	0.0	0.0
Cambodia	-1.9	8.3	6.1	-0.6	-4.3	-2.0	-1.9	-1.7
People's Republic of China	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3
Georgia	-1.6	-22.8	-28.0	-6.9	-5.8	-4.7	-2.5	-2.5
Hong Kong, China	8.0	5.3	11.8	1.9	2.6	2.1	4.0	3.1
India	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3
Indonesia	0.3	-0.0	-0.1	-1.1	-1.1	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4
Japan	-0.5	0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5
Kazakhstan	-8.4	-17.9	-16.4	0.6	-0.4	1.9	-1.0	0.0
Republic of Korea	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.3	-0.6	1.6	0.2	0.4
Kyrgyz Republic	-6.1	-12.4	-1.2	-6.9	-2.9	-3.3	-0.6	-1.5
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.0	-2.7	-5.3	-5.3	-3.7	-3.5	-2.1	-2.0
Macau, China	21.3	12.0	13.7	20.3	16.6	14.9	8.0	7.4
Malaysia	5.1	3.0	4.7	5.5	5.7	1.7	1.6	1.5
Maldives	-2.5	-2.6	-0.8	11.6	10.5	28.4	22.8	-16.3
Mongolia	0.0	-7.9	-4.5	-1.2	-0.8	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
Myanmar	-1.0	-3.3	-2.4	-5.1	-5.4	-2.0	-3.1	-0.7
Nepal	-2.4	0.8	-4.1	-6.2	-7.4	-15.1	1.5	5.1
Pakistan	0.3	-1.8	0.7	-0.9	-0.4	-1.1	-1.1	-0.9
Philippines	-1.1	-2.1	-2.6	-3.0	-3.4	-1.7	-0.6	-0.6
Singapore	8.4	18.2	17.0	4.5	30.7	11.8	4.7	4.5
Sri Lanka	-1.6	-2.9	-5.0	-4.7	-5.2	-4.7	-4.6	-4.0
Tajikistan	-1.3	-8.4	-7.9	-4.5	-4.1	-3.4	-2.2	-2.0
Taipei, China	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Thailand	1.9	-2.1	2.3	1.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3
Timor-Leste	0.0	0.0	-18.9	-5.9	-7.3	-4.9	-4.3	-3.6
Turkmenistan	-2.3	2.2	-3.0	-5.4	-2.5	-1.9	-0.9	-0.6
Uzbekistan	-3.7	-3.0	-2.0	-1.9	-1.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3
Viet Nam	-1.0	-1.1	-0.6	-1.6	-1.9	-0.9	-0.8	-0.9

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision (UNDESA) <https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/> (accessed 18 November 2019).

**Annex Table 2.7: International Students in OECD Countries by Economy of Origin**

	Numer of international tertiary students enrolled			Of which at master's and doctoral level	As a percentage of total tertiary	Number of graduates at master's and doctoral level
	2016	2017	% change	2017	2017	2017
Afghanistan	6,438	7,515	17	3,067	41	483
Azerbaijan	16,330	18,865	16	5,438	29	960
Bangladesh	23,144	24,551	6	14,791	60	3,133
Bhutan	1,011	1,416	40	617	44	229
Brunei Darussalam	2,346	2,047	-13	265	13	169
Cambodia	3,098	3,542	14	1,529	43	626
People's Republic of China	788,822	844,332	7	356,944	42	97,818
Georgia	5,392	5,617	4	2,294	41	465
Hong Kong, China	36,743	35,943	-2	5,308	15	2,276
India	262,233	290,611	11	194,476	67	25,526
Indonesia	34,420	36,178	5	14,093	39	4,887
Japan	29,198	29,049	-1	9,163	32	2,199
Kazakhstan	11,677	11,628	-0	4,012	35	1,115
Korea, Rep. of	99,726	99,361	-0	29,472	30	3,391
Kyrgyz Republic	3,581	3,553	-1	1,416	40	224
Lao People's Democratic Republic	847	935	10	456	49	172
Malaysia	50,884	50,110	-2	9,241	18	4,016
Maldives	518	467	-10	153	33	95
Mongolia	7,922	8,758	11	3,665	42	822
Myanmar	4,877	5,490	13	1,548	28	541
Nepal	38,918	52,071	34	15,980	31	2,816
Pakistan	34,974	36,801	5	20,050	54	5,320
Philippines	13,767	14,537	6	4,529	31	1,241
Singapore	23,450	22,297	-5	5,182	23	2,366
Sri Lanka	14,113	15,774	12	6,030	38	1,386
Tajikistan	1,499	1,467	-2	471	32	71
Taipei, China						
Thailand	24,502	26,431	8	11,172	42	4,522
Turkmenistan	10,418	10,954	5	838	8	71
Uzbekistan	5,579	6,489	16	2,049	32	447
Viet Nam	78,169	90,157	15	21,242	24	6,314
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,634,598</b>	<b>1,756,946</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>745,489</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>173,701</b>
Rest of the world	1,702,602	1,813,597	7	812,022	45	230,057
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,337,200</b>	<b>3,570,542</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1,557,512</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>403,758</b>
Share of Asia (%)	49	49		48		43

Note: Data for graduates in Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States are not available.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. [www.oecd.org/education/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/education/database.htm) (accessed December 2019).



# INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOR MIGRATION IN ASIA

This report analyzes labor migration trends in Asia and puts them in the context of demographic and policy trends. It provides an overview of the population trends in different Asian countries and looks at policy settings in several sending and destination countries of labor migrants. It examines different approaches to effective labor migration management, including the imposition and regulation of fees and costs, and reviews the relevant policies in Asia and the Pacific. The report also looks forward to new approaches, examining the concept of skills mobility partnerships and how existing migration channels in Asia could be innovated using this concept.

The chapters reflect the discussions that took place at the “Ninth Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia: Innovative Approaches for the Effective Management of Labor Migration in Asia,” held in Tokyo in February 2019. The event, co-organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labour Organization, brought together regional experts and policy makers.

The report provides the most up-to-date comparative statistics on labor migration flows in and from Asia. The introductory chapter reviews the recent regional trends and newly available data on the changes in the stock of Asian migrants, while two statistical annexes offer detailed country fact sheets and coverage of intra-Asia and cross-regional migration flows.

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## **International Labour Organization**

The ILO is devoted to promoting social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. The ILO helps advance the creation of decent work for all women and men. Its main aims are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection, and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues. Its tripartite structure provides a unique platform for promoting decent work. Making fair migration a reality is high on the ILO agenda, at the global level and in the Asia-Pacific region.

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