LABOUR MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990s

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I am pleased to present the latest contribution to the SAMAT Policy Paper Series, "Labour Migration to South Africa in the 1990s". This paper addresses the question of contemporary labour migration in the SADC region — a key issue of debate and policy-making in the 1990s which has direct implications for future political, economic and employment development at national and regional level. The study calls for more and better information on current factors and dynamics affecting labour migrancy in the region, particularly information which adopts a regional scope, and places the changing South African experience within the context of the regional economic and labour market integration. The report investigates the question of migrancy's net socio-economic benefits for both South Africa and its labour-sending neighbours, and explores the issue of individual migrants' experience of discrimination within South Africa. It considers the scope and dimension of migration to South Africa, the underlying factors which have affected migration patterns (including notably, trade and investment flows), and the prospects for multi-lateral collaboration among SADC states. The report concludes with a number of observations and recommendations for further policy-oriented research and action around regional migration issues.

SAMAT Policy Papers focus on policies and strategies that are pursued and developed in Southern Africa which affect labour standards, employment and other labour issues. As such, the series is intended to provide an ILO perspective on such issues, with a view to suggesting ideas and alternatives which can be taken account by policy makers in the fields of labour and development. In this way, the Policy Papers aim to provide a basis for technical co-operation between the ILO and its constituents in Southern Africa.

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The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) kindly provided migration data from its Migration Data Base.

I thank all contributors for making this an interesting and useful contribution to a key area of debate and policy action. ILO SAMAT very much looks forward to hearing the responses to this study's analysis and recommendations.
I would also like to thank the many individuals - from the trade unions, employers’ organisations, government, NGOs and the academic community - who were interviewed for this study and who provided us with very useful ideas and information. A list of these contacts can be found at the end of this report.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

1.1 Introduction

The 1990s have seen a marked rise in the flow of labour migrants to South Africa from the Southern African region, in the wake of political liberalisation within South Africa and continued deterioration in the economies of many neighbouring states. In response, governments, research institutions, labour organisations and business groupings are attempting to weigh the costs and benefits of labour migration, and to formulate appropriate policy responses. The process is taking place within a politically-charged atmosphere characterised by growing hostility towards foreigners within South Africa, and heightened expectations of returns from the post-apartheid peace dividend in the rest of the SADC region.

Migration to South Africa is currently the subject of intense political debate within the country and region. Much of the discussion rests on a poor understanding of the causes and consequences of migrancy. Statistical guesstimates of trends and unsubstantiated assessments of social and economic impacts prevail. As a direct result, public debates have been driven by questionable media and official sources, and flawed research inspired by narrower political agendas. The policy options developed and adopted have thus tended to be weak and unsubtle.

An effective regional labour migration policy needs to be based on reliable and comprehensive information. It also needs to be integrated with research and policy making on key related issues such as regional trade and capital movement. Moreover, the social partners directly affected by policy — including business, labour and other civil society organisations — need to have a greater voice if new migration policies are to be effectively formulated and implemented.

Despite migration’s profound implications for the whole SADC region, few efforts have been made to date to coordinate research, information and policy making at a regional and international level. It is in this context that the ILO/SAMAT commissioned the current study. The study aims to stimulate informed debate within the SADC region on labour migration to South Africa; and to inform and strengthen regional labour policy formulation among the ILO’s tripartite partners.

1.2 Key Policy Issues

Within the SADC and South Africa itself, sharp differences of opinion have emerged on the complex issue of migration to South Africa. These differences reflect divergent political and economic priorities, variable assessments of the history and impact of labour migration, and differing visions of future regional development. Inside South Africa there is a slowly growing awareness of the inextricable economic and political ties which bind the country to the region; and of the need to work cooperatively towards mutual stability. This sensitivity is often compromised by what other SADC countries perceive to be a domineering "big brother" approach to intra-regional relations.
Several recurrent policy concerns can be identified in the debates on migration.

*The scope and dimensions of foreign migration to South Africa.*
Migrants from most SAC countries have been moving to and from South Africa for many decades. All are agreed, however, that both legal and undocumented migration to South Africa from the SADC region, and elsewhere, has increased dramatically since 1990. Official border crossing statistics show a significant growth in cross-border movement in both directions. New and expanding communities of foreign citizens have grown up in many South African cities. Non-South Africans are increasingly visible on the streets and in many areas of public life. Does this mean that the country is being “swamped” or “flooded” as is sometimes proclaimed by the South African media? Estimates of the numbers of “illegal” foreign citizens in South Africa vary from a few hundred thousand to many million. The definition of “illegality” is itself a point of contestation and confusion. Policy prescriptions vary widely, often closely following the definition of migrancy accepted and the estimated scale of the problem.

*The net socio-economic benefits of migration to the labour sending countries and to South Africa.*
South Africa has realised substantial net benefits from inward labour migration over many decades, but there is less agreement when it comes to the case of the labour sending countries. Measurement of the costs and benefits of migration is a complex exercise, if taken beyond a purely economistic analysis focused on fiscal and individual benefits. When regional social and political relations, trade patterns and macro-economic trends are included in the calculation of costs and benefits, the repercussions of labour migration become more ambiguous. For example, increased rural income and investment in certain source areas suggests there may be net gains to migrants and their communities. Yet at the same time, migration has hurt local and national economies by diminishing the supply of locally available labour, and inducing heavy dependence on wage remittances from South Africa.

*The linkage between migration and broader structural aspects of the regional economy, notably trade and investment patterns.*
While there is insufficient evidence to draw definitive conclusions, it is sometimes argued that there is a close correlation between migration to South Africa and the trade and investment benefits accruing to the country. Increased migration to South Africa appears to have coincided with a widening trade imbalance in favour of South Africa. A number of observers have pointed out that South Africa has benefited disproportionately from regional trade and foreign direct investment. But at the same time it is recognised that the country has also been the source of substantial direct and indirect capital investment into the region. One question therefore concerns the possibility of developing policy instruments to redress structural imbalances in SADC. These instruments would involve a variety of positive measures in the areas of regional migration, trade and investment, and efforts to curb the growing trend towards protectionism in most countries.
The prospects for multi-lateral collaboration on migration issues.
The Department of Home Affairs has had bilateral discussions with many
neighbouring governments to elicit their support for its migration policies.
Simultaneously, the SADC Secretariat has developed and promoted a very
different vision of multi-lateral, regional policy making on the issue through the
Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in Southern Africa. The South
African government has led opposition to the Protocol within SADC and has
tabled an alternative policy document. Organisations and governments
committed to the development of a multi-lateral, regional approach need to work
collaboratively to promote a viable set of policy positions to which all could
subscribe.

The treatment of foreign migrants within South Africa.
A key policy issue is the degree to which foreign migrants within South Africa
are discriminated against in terms of wages and working conditions, and access
to social services and basic human rights. The evidence on this issue is primarily
anecdotal, but is sufficient to cause some concern. The research findings of
several individuals and organisations involved in this area will eventually provide
much greater insight. Policy research needs to focus not only on the actual
working conditions and treatment of non-South Africans but on the impact of
foreigners on the South African labour market. There is a widespread
misconception in South Africa that foreign migrants take but do not create
employment. This contention is not based on any substantial research. In policy
terms, there is a debate on whether employer sanctions or employment standards
legislation are the optimal means of countering exploitation of non-South African
migrants.

1.3 Outline of Report

This study focuses on (a) the patterns and fundamental causes of migration to South
Africa, (b) the impact of such migration, and (c) emerging policy responses. The survey
highlights what is known about each of these issues as well as the knowledge gaps that
currently exist. The study is based primarily on a review of the research literature,
official reports, organisational records, study papers commissioned by the ILO-SAMAT
and media reports. The research also involved numerous interviews and consultations
with a variety of persons in relevant government organisations, trade unions, NGOs,
research institutes and employers and recruitment organisations (see list in Annex).
Although most interviews were conducted with individuals, discussion groups were also
utilised to garner broader responses. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP)
provided statistical data for the report from its Migration Data Base. Chapter Two
reviews the current state of knowledge on the various categories of migration to South
Africa. The chapter highlights the variability of the quality of data and argues for the
construction of a comprehensive profile of migrants which includes their national or sub-
national origins, temporal cycles of migration, demographic features (in terms of age,
sex and household data), specific skills and experience, and sectoral and geographic
origins and destinations. The need for data capture systems for both authorised and
unauthorised migrants is stressed.
The next section, Chapter Three, examines the obstacles to a better understanding of the causes and impacts of regional migration. These include a pessimistic medium-term reading of the outlook for economic and employment growth in several labour sending countries. The chapter suggests that migration policies are often underpinned by myths and false perceptions concerning the nature, direction and prospects of economic growth and development in affected countries. Both the economic and employment potential of South Africa and the prevailing picture of economic and social decimation in other SADC states have been over-stated. Analysis of the relationship between economic trends and migration have been driven by simplistic "push-pull" theories of migration.

A corrective analysis is then presented. Detailed analysis of the relationship between regional trade, investment and employment is hampered by the absence of detailed research required on these issues. The chapter nonetheless examines the actual economic and employment capacities of South Africa and its neighbours, and broadly assesses their implications for migration. The impact of regional cooperation within SADC, especially with regard to changing flows of trade and capital and their impact on regional employment, are also considered. Of particular relevance are current concerns over structural adjustment, trade liberalisation and the growing threat of de-industrialisation and labour market contraction. The chapter argues that comparative labour productivity and industrial competitiveness, as well as the growth of informal sector-related migration, should assume central importance in policy-making around regional migration.

Chapter Four assesses the impacts of migration on South Africa and the labour sending countries. The analysis is complicated by the lack of systematised, quantitative information, and also by the multiplicity, diffuseness and largely qualitative nature of available information on the costs and benefits of migration. In a more comprehensive study, these costs and benefits would be evaluated at the macro-economic, micro-economic and household levels within labour sending and receiving countries. Existing quantitative and qualitative data can still be used in a preliminary assessment of the impacts of migration. The conclusions reached do not always match the negative and populist pictures painted in the media.

The chapter recommends greater effort to gather evidence of the costs and benefits of migrancy in the region. The key variables should include migrants' incomes, wages and social security, their economic use-value and productivity, and the extent to which they displace (or indeed complement) local workers in the South African labour market. Other issues include the costs and benefits experienced by migrants and their home countries, and the social and political repercussions of migrancy for the South African and regional labour movements.

Chapter Five assesses current political responses to the new regional migration regime. The primary aim is to assess South African policy on immigration and migration, as well as related labour and social security policies. The influence of South African unions on policy development is also briefly reviewed. The policies of the labour sending countries are also examined, including efforts to promote a regional labour market policy by means of the SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons.
The discussion highlights the lack of a comprehensive, collaborative, coordinated, multilateral policy dialogue among tripartite partners on regional strategies to effectively tackle the migration issue. As with other SADC regional activities, bilateral agreements between South Africa and its labour sending neighbours have unfortunately assumed pre-eminence over regional arrangements.
II. PATTERNS OF MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

South Africa has experienced strong growth in labour migration from the region in the 1990s. Migration patterns are also changing and becoming more complex. These shifts must be carefully contextualised historically, since cross-border migration is nothing new in the region.

Estimates of the number of labour migrants in South Africa vary widely and have been influenced by the politically-charged nature of the issue. However, reliable information on historical and contemporary migration trends, the impact of migration on the South African labour market, and the available policy options is sadly deficient. More and better information is required for effective policy-making. In particular, researchers should place more emphasis on defining and differentiating various types of migrants, and assessing their motives, needs, treatment and impact.

Current migration data is inherently problematic. First, information on the current wave of migrants is difficult to capture because a large number of undocumented workers aim to avoid identification. Often, therefore, evidence of undocumented migration is qualitative and anecdotal, rather than quantitative. Second, there is a singular lack of clarity in the use of the term "foreign migrant". Many employ the term inconsistently. As a result, it is unclear whether cited figures refer to recent migrants, undocumented migrants or all foreign-born migrants, including those holding South African citizenship and those who have lived in the country since childhood. Third, there is a tendency to conflate data on refugees with that on labour migrants, although the two categories of migrants are usually distinct in their membership and differ sharply in their relationship with the South African labour market. Finally, there are currently no mechanisms for the coordinated collection and collation of data across the various countries of the region.

The looseness of definitions of migration within South Africa has led to exaggerated and alarmist assessments of the situation, and simplification of the problem as involving “floods” of illegal "border jumpers". Informed policy making requires a better grasp of who labour migrants are, which sectors they work in and what discrete problems they face. Unfortunately, the higher range of estimates of migrancy have been most influential in framing debates, shaping public opinion and informing policy decisions in South Africa. This is not to say that the higher figures are more accurate, but rather that the issue of labour migration is a thoroughly politicised one in which sectional and political interests, rather than reliable data, have played a key defining role.

2.2 Historical Trends in Labour Migration

Southern Africa has a long history of organised and informal labour migration between its territories. From the late nineteenth century, South Africa (and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe) was a key recipient of labour migrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. In some leading sectors, notably mining and commercial agriculture, labour migrants played a crucial role in the development of large scale and highly profitable production: indeed, without cheap
migrant labourers over a sustained period, South Africa's key gold mining industry and white farms would probably not have been developed at all (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991; Jeeves and Crush, 1997).

Foreign migrant labour has been central to the South African economy for most of this century owing to the relatively concentrated development of mining, agricultural and agro-industrial production on the one hand; and shortages of domestic labour on the other. Labour shortfalls in periods of rapid growth necessitated the development of a highly regimented system of labour recruitment. As a solution to this dilemma the contract labour system was developed jointly by employers and the state, and for many decades served as a key component in South Africa's industrial success.

The highly organised and well-documented contract system of the mining industry was unique to that sector. Other employers were too disorganised and divided or lacked the economic power to assert their interests centrally. As a result, many employers wanting non-South African workers utilised small recruiting companies or relied on informal migrant networks to secure their labour. Much of this movement was unregulated and even clandestine, but involved both men and women from many neighbouring countries who worked in agriculture, industry, domestic service and various other sectors. The apartheid government cracked down on the use of such labour in the 1960s and began to pressure the mines to use more local labour. The mines consistently resisted this pressure, and by the early 1970s, 80% of the mine workforce came from outside the country. Other employers were less resistant and the numbers of foreign migrants in many other sectors did begin to decline.

The withdrawal of Malawian and Mozambican labour from the mines in the 1970s and significant compensating wage hikes attracted South African workers back on to the mines. The situation stabilised in the late 1970s with a local to foreign ratio of 60:40. This situation has persisted, and has even tilted back in favour of foreign miners since 1990. Some 50% of miners are now non-South African.

Until the 1960s, mine workers were drawn from most of the current SADC states including Tanzania and Angola. The numbers of migrants involved are well-documented in the case of the mining industry (Table 2.1). In other sectors, the numbers are much less well-known but not insubstantial. Many families and households in the SADC region have an inter-generational history of migration to South Africa for work. Migrants from the region have been living amongst and struggling alongside their South African counterparts for many years. This makes the upsurge in anti-foreigner sentiment since 1994 the more surprising and troubling.

The primary historical legacy of decades of migration to South Africa is a deeply entrenched dependence on migration amongst many communities and households outside South Africa, particularly in countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique. The other legacy is the legal and institutional framework erected to ensure that all migrants remained migrants and never settled in South Africa. Under South African immigration legislation, only whites could qualify as immigrants (a stipulation modified in the 1980s to meet the homelands policy). Blacks were consigned to the ranks of contract migrants, forced to return home at regular intervals, and once and for all when they were no longer useful as workers. In this way, the South African state externalised the social and
economic costs normally associated with the support of a productive workforce. Legal entry to the mines was by way of bilateral labour agreements. Migrants in other sectors simply came and worked outside any formal regulatory mechanism.

2.3 Components of Contemporary Labour Migration

Part of the difficulty in determining the dimensions of foreign labour migration to South Africa stems from the fact that migrants fall into several distinct legal and administrative categories:

2.3.1 Documented Migrants

temporary residents in possession of visitors, business, study, or medical permits. There is considerable evidence that migrants holding legal visitors and business permits, work or engage in economic activity once in South Africa.

skilled migrants (historically white), who enter legally as temporary residents with work permits under the provisions of the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995.

skilled immigrants (historically white), who enter legally as permanent residents. Citizenship rights may follow in due course.

contract workers, primarily in the mining industry, who are hired on fixed-duration contracts (of one year to 18 months) under the terms of bilateral labour agreements between the South African and source-country governments.

migrants in possession of Section 41 exemptions. Selected South African employers, primarily white farmers in Northern and Mpumalanga provinces, are permitted to register illegally employed labour with local Home Affairs offices. The employees are issued with Section 41 exemptions under the Aliens Act, which allow them to stay and work.

migrants in possession of Section 28 exemptions. Migrant miners and SADC country citizens who applied for the recent SADC amnesty are issued with Section 28 exemptions, which exempt them from the requirement to have residence and work permits. This is the first stage in the issue of permanent residence permits.

border permit holders. Recent bilateral agreements between South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe allow for the issue of short-term permits to border area residents for cross-border access to a designated zone. The numbers involved are not known.

2.3.2 Undocumented Migrants

“visa overstayers.” These are migrants who entered South Africa legally but have purposefully or inadvertently allowed their permits to expire and have therefore become prohibited persons in terms of the Aliens Control Act.
Of these ten categories, only four (the first three plus the overstayers) are explicitly regulated by immigration law in the form of South Africa’s omnibus Aliens Control Amendment Act. Two others (visa overstayers and unauthorised migrants) are categorised as “prohibited persons” under the Aliens Control Act, and treated accordingly. Three more (including refugees) are dealt with under ministerial exemptions to the Act. These exemptions give officials wide-ranging and non-accountable discretionary powers. One category (border permits) is regulated by the Department outside any formal regulatory system.

Not only are these different categories regulated by different legal instruments, but the data collection systems also vary. Consequently, there is no single data base which enables the immediate determination of the number of migrants, or even the number of legally-present foreign citizens. The quality of data and information available for each category of migrant therefore varies considerably.

2.4 Dimensions of Legal Migration to South Africa

2.4.1 SADC Visitors to South Africa

Since 1990 there has been a dramatic increase in legal cross-border movements within the Southern African region, from less than 500 000 in 1990 to 3.3 million in 1995 (Table 2.2). The bulk of this registered and legal cross-border traffic consists of people moving temporarily to South Africa for a range of non-work related reasons — mainly tourism, visiting relatives, shopping, medical attention and education. Only a very small portion of these entrants are in possession of work permits. However, some who enter do work illegally or engage in informal sector and other trading activity once inside South Africa. Amongst these would be many of the recorded overstayers (see below). Estimates of the numbers of non-South African operatives in the South African informal sector reach as high as 500 000 (or 40% of the total). Such figures are highly unreliable and probably exaggerated.

2.4.2 Legal Temporary Residence in South Africa

Legal access by SADC-country workseekers under the Aliens Control act is extremely limited. This is consistent with a more general restrictive approach to skilled and unskilled non-South African workers since 1994. The total number of workers from all sources on temporary permits has increased slightly in the 1990s, from 38 571 in 1993 to 52 704 in 1996 (Table 2.3). However, 72% of these permits are renewals. In 1995, the South African government amended its legislation to prohibit anyone changing their purpose of visit once in the country. The amendment was designed to stop people entering as visitors and then acquiring work once in the country.
2.4.3 Legal Immigration to South Africa

Only a tiny proportion of labour migrants — those "legal immigrants" entering the country with permanent residence and work permits — enjoy any semblance of labour rights and security. These migrants overwhelmingly comprise professional, semi-professional, managerial, clerical and sales workers, most of whom are white because of the legacy of apartheid and its racial recruitment policies.

In the 1990s the South African government has taken an increasingly restrictive approach to immigration. The total number of permanent residence permits issued between 1990 and 1996 was only 62,257. The annual total declined every year from 14,499 in 1990, to only 5,407 in 1996 (Table 2.4). There are two reasons for this. First, the old racial imperatives for recruiting white immigrants from overseas fell away. Second, the collapse of the homeland system meant black professionals from Africa were no longer recruited as they had been in the 1980s. Third, the perception that immigrants take jobs from South Africans has become widespread.

In the late 1980s, a “brain drain” of skilled and professional migrants to South Africa and Botswana from the region gathered pace. These two countries were the only ones in the region to attract professionals in numbers during this period, because they alone experienced increases in real wages for higher skilled occupations. Neighbouring countries accounted for an estimated 30-40% of all skilled and professional legal immigration to South Africa between 1982 and 1988, with Zimbabwe contributing 90% of South Africa’s immigration from Africa during the early 1980s (a result of post-independence white emigration.) Despite South Africa’s recent tightening of immigration criteria for professional immigrants, in the early 1990s Zimbabwe continued to account for 30% of legal immigration into South Africa, followed by Zaire (16%), Lesotho (10%), Zambia (6%) and Swaziland (5.5%). More than half of these immigrants are professionals and semi-professionals, with another 19% in clerical and sales occupations.

2.4.4 Contract Migration

A larger category of legal labour migrants is the "contract worker." These are migrants who enter South Africa outside the Aliens Control Act under long-standing bilateral labour agreements between the South African and some neighbouring governments. Until recently, labour migration to South Africa was dominated by this form of employment and its characteristic pattern of "circular" or "oscillating" migrancy. Both the numbers involved and the source areas involved have fluctuated over time. The primary suppliers today, as they always have been, are Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Botswana (Table 2.5). Despite the dire predictions of some experts, the mines have continued to employ foreign miners in large numbers and there are few signs that mining houses would like this situation to change.

Contract migrant labourers are recruited under contract and remain effectively bound to specified mines and job grades. Contract migrant workers have traditionally been denied permanent rights to work or residence in South Africa, regardless of the overall length of their employment under succeeding contracts, or their established familial connections and social ties. This arrangement links foreign workers' residence and labour rights directly to individual labour contracts, and specifically bars families and dependents
from accompanying migrant workers. Migrants are compelled to return to their countries of origin upon completion of their contracts, if only to negotiate new contracts for the same employment. Gold mine recruiting is still organised centrally by The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). Other smaller recruiters recruit under contract in Mozambique and Lesotho for smaller, non-Chamber of Mines operations and for some commercial farms.

In 1994, there were an average 147 000 non-South African mine workers on contract, down from 183 000 in 1984. The fall in numbers reflects downsizing and retrenchments. Yet South African miners were disproportionately affected by these cuts: more than twice as many South African miners were laid off over a similar period, as the number of employees fell from 437 000 to 303 000 on Chamber gold mines and 58 000 to 18 500 on Chamber coal mines (Table 2.5). On the other hand, Mozambican and Swaziland miners were only marginally affected by retrenchments. But further layoffs can be anticipated if the gold price continues to plummet.

In the last twenty years, patterns of migration to the mines have “stabilised.” In essence, this means that migrants are now career miners continuously employed on the mines, returning home for fixed annual leave. In effect, non-South African migrants miners are now continuous residents of South Africa. On the other hand, migrants now return home for short visits far more often than they used to. A recent report for SAMP by Sechaba Consultants (1997) shows that 60% of miners go home at least once a month. This pattern of continuity and stability — very different from that which prevailed before the 1970s — points to an aging mine workforce and only limited opportunities for new workseekers. “Novice” employment rates are at an all-time low, and new workers are primarily sons and relatives of current miners.

An additional complicating factor is the rapid growth of sub-contracting within production operations over the last decade. By 1994, 10% of the workforce was employed by sub-contractors (compared with 2% in 1987). This form of contract labour is generally non-unionised and not tied to negotiated collective agreements. The growth of sub-contracting is vigorously opposed by the National Union of Mineworkers because since it is seen to undermine union gains. Sub-contractors often hire ex-miners, and Lesotho and Mozambique are favoured as sources. Some hire through TEBA while others are known to use illegal labour. The net effect is that working conditions and wage levels for all miners, including non-South Africans, have been and continue to be undercut.

2.4.5 Section 41 Farmers Exemptions

White South African farmers in Mpumalanga and Northern Provinces have a special “deal” with the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa. They are permitted to register their illegally resident farm workers in order to escape prosecution. The employees are issued with Section 41 exemptions which allow them to stay and work in the country as long as they remain with their employer. Many farmers do not bother to utilise this system, preferring to avoid the fee charged. The chances of prosecution are very slight and most farms have a high labour turnover. In these circumstances, registration is not an attractive option. The use of this system is still on the increase with 2 146 permits in 1994, 1 825 in 1995 and 6 466 in 1996; and if government delivers on
its threats to impose widespread employer sanctions, such permits could become even more common, in light of the pervasive use of “illegal” labour in the farming sector.

2.4.6 Section 28 Amnesty Exemptions

During 1995 and 1996 the South African government announced two “amnesties”, by which persons in affected categories could apply for Section 28 exemptions leading to the acquisition of permanent residence permits.

The first, the so-called “miners amnesty”, was offered to anyone who had voted in the 1994 elections and who had been normally resident in South Africa for more than 10 years. Because the amnesty was organised in a deal between the NUM, Department of Home Affairs and President Mandela, there was a widespread perception that it applied to miners only. Mining records were used to determine eligibility and in practice, anyone who had been on the mines since 1986 or before could apply and automatically receive the exemption. Of an estimated 104 000 eligible miners, only 47 000 applied, primarily from Lesotho (31 481) (Table 2.6). Research by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) shows that miners were not well-informed about their rights or the implications of the offer (Sechaba Consultants, 1997, de Vletter, 1997). Even those who applied were uninterested in permanent residence in South Africa, which calls into question the whole basis of the amnesty.

After much internal debate, the South African government offered a second amnesty to SADC country citizens. This amnesty had several conditions attached: candidates had to be resident in South Africa before 1991, have a South African partner/spouse or children born in South Africa, have engaged in gainful economic activity for five years, and have a clean criminal record. The amnesty faced some administrative problems, and after at least one extension the Department of Home Affairs attracted only 199 596 applications (compared Department predictions of 600 000 to one million) (Table 2.7). Of these applicants, the vast majority were Mozambican refugees who had fled to South Africa in the 1980s and stayed. As experts had predicted, the applications from other SADC states were relatively small. This confirmed that illegal immigration to South Africa was not a significant “problem” before the 1990s.

Up to 1 April 1997, 100 218 applications for this amnesty were approved. The long-term migration intentions of these new permanent residents have yet to be determined. However, the rejected applicants are now in an extremely vulnerable position as they have identified themselves to the authorities. A third amnesty, limited only to ex-Mozambican refugees, is currently in the pipeline. The government estimates the eligible population at 100 000.

2.4.7 Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Though several thousand refugees have arrived in South Africa in the 1990s from Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other countries further afield in Africa, the vast majority of South Africa’s refugee population is Mozambican, a result of that country's civil conflict in the 1980s. Ironically, South African Government hostility to these refugees during the era of apartheid rule set the stage for an enduring migrant labour problem. South Africa's refusal to accord war-weary Mozambicans formal
refugee status deprived them of international assistance, and forced thousands to become economically active — in most cases illegally — on commercial farms and in urban areas. With the cessation of hostilities in Mozambique in 1992, it was anticipated that at least 250 000 refugees would be repatriated under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In fact, the number returned home was less than 70 000. The rest have remained in South Africa, where they have or will become eligible for Section 28 exemptions.

Mozambican refugee workers constitute a heavy presence in the labour markets of the northeastern commercial farming areas and the lower end of the job market in the urban centres of Gauteng. Researchers speculate that refugees also feature in significant numbers as labourers within smallholder agriculture and informal sector production located close to refugee communities and concentrations. In addition, it is estimated that large but undefined numbers of former refugees have drifted to urban areas, to work mainly in low-skilled jobs.

Current South African law makes no special provisions for refugees. In popular discourse, they tend to be lumped together with other in-migrants, including economic migrants. Since South Africa acceded to international refugee conventions, asylum seekers have been issued with Section 28 exemptions pending judgment on the refugee claim by the Department of Home Affairs. As of 1 January 1997, the Department had received 23 452 applications of which 10 263 had been adjudicated (leaving 13 279 outstanding). Only 3 298 positive determinations were made, of which only six were for permanent residence. The remainder received asylum for periods of less than 2 years. The vast majority of refugee claimants are young males with relatively high levels of education. This has given rise to the widespread and unfortunate perception in South Africa that most “refugees” are economic migrants in disguise.

The primary sources of refugees are Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Table 2.8 illustrates that refugees from internationally-recognised “refugee” zones and countries tend to be accepted. Refugee claimants from other countries, such as West Africa or the Indian sub-continent, have a much more limited chance of acceptance. South African refugee legislation is currently undergoing a major overhaul, and a new and more effective system is likely to be put in place. Burden-sharing with other SADC states may become one of the principle tenets of a new South African refugee policy.

2.5 Dimensions of Unauthorised Migration to South Africa

The rise of undocumented or “illegal” migrants to South Africa since 1990 is often considered as a new and significant “problem.” Media reports have appeared with aquatic metaphors suggesting that South Africa is being “flooded” by an unstoppable “tide” of “illegal aliens.” The depth, strength, origins and impact of this new migration movement have become the subject of heated contestation involving Government, politicians, research agencies and individual experts. Estimates range as high as twelve million, although officials regularly cite figures of 2.5 to 5 million. Yet as the Labour Market Commission and the Green Paper on International Migration argue, the basic evidence underpinning estimates is thin, and claims about an explosive immigration
problem should be treated with caution (LMC, 1996: 170; see also Brunk, 1996; Crush 1997a).

2.5.1 Visa Overstayers

The computerised National Movement System of the Department of Home Affairs records every person who crosses legally into South Africa and their date of exit. The implication is on any given day, the system has a record of how many people are legally in the country and where they are from. The system also knows how many people have overstayed their allotted time in the country by allowing their permits or visas to expire. The resulting data points to sharply rising numbers of overstayers since 1990. As of March 1997, some 830,000 people were recorded as being in South Africa with expired papers. Of these, only 33,000 had entered the country before 1990; 250,000 between 1991 and 1994; and 363,000 in 1995 and 1996. Since the figures for 1995 and 1996 will likely decline as people leave, it is not unreasonable to conclude that South Africa’s true illegal immigrant population (of long-term stayers) is being augmented in this manner by approximately 80,000 each year. Some 225,000 (27%) of the overstayers are from Lesotho, and 544,000 (66%) from SADC. This dispersion tends to suggest that not everyone recorded is necessarily still in South Africa, and that therefore the real figure of overstayers may be even lower.

2.5.2 Deportation Data

Data on deportations from South Africa is available. The figures show a sharp increase in the 1990s (Table 2.9). Some have argued that the total number of illegal immigrants can be calculated from this data using a multiplier. Others have pointed out that the growth in deportations indicates that the numbers arriving are increasing dramatically year by year. Neither conclusion is sustainable. These statistics do not in fact reflect the degree of illegal migration, as much as changing patterns of police enforcement. Resources devoted to arrest and deportation have increased substantially since 1994.

Other factors also go unaccounted in estimates based on deportations. For example, "revolving door" migrancy — the process by which undocumented migrants are deported to their home countries, only to return to South Africa to face repeated deportation — is not taken into consideration in such statistics. In addition, "headcounting" data does little to uncover the sharp distinctions between short-term migrants and long-term immigrants, their different reasons for migrating south, the likelihood of their staying on and the possible solutions to the problems they pose.

2.6 Counting the Uncountable

Several attempts have been made to calculate the number of “illegal immigrants” in South Africa. These have been bedevilled by faulty methodology, an absence of definitional clarity and a lack of appreciation for the basic fact that unauthorised people have no interest in being counted. Within South Africa, the most influential survey is that carried out by the Human Sciences Research Council at the behest of the Department of Home Affairs. But the methodology used in this research was in some critics' views questionable, and its results and conclusions unreliable (Crush 1997a).
has not prevented its estimation of 2.4 to five million migrants being regularly cited when calls have been made for “get tough” measures.

To date, the low-end estimate of about two million illegal migrants still appears to be the best among many ill-informed guesses. But constructive debate based upon reliable, comprehensive information continues to be absent. Some researchers now argue that despite fresh information anticipated from the October 1996 census, the actual extent of unauthorised migration to South Africa can only be revealed once the status of all migrants is regularised and the threat of repatriation following identification is removed.

In the interim, better policy responses demand that new and better use be made of available data, including official South African statistics on migration, as well as observations and trends concerning the labour market and social economy of all the affected countries of the region. For it is not only South Africa which has "pulled" migrants south, but also circumstances in neighbouring states which have pushed migrants from their home areas. This broader analytical approach is necessary if the key factors and tendencies now influencing labour migration are to be uncovered.
III. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

A number of inter-related factors have clearly pushed workers southwards in the 1990s to South Africa from other SADC countries. Many of these factors appear self-evident: poverty, war and political instability in much of Africa; economic decline associated with the destabilisation of neighbouring countries by the former apartheid government; the political settlement in South Africa and relaxation of visa restrictions for certain countries; and particularly, the perception of South Africa’s relative economic strength.

Of major importance as a pre-condition for intensified migration has been the legacy of past political and civil strife. A large section of South Africa’s foreign migrant community came to the country as refugees. During the early 1980s, political conflict in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland led to migration to South Africa on a small scale. Armed conflict on a much larger scale produced massive forced population movements from Mozambique and Angola into various neighbouring countries, including South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of refugees remained in their host countries for extended periods. But such involuntary migration in the region has been on the decline since 1994.

In addition to increased intra-regional flows, the 1990s have witnessed new forms of immigration from beyond the region. Political fragility, military violence and civil strife at the regional, national and sub-national level in various parts of Africa have broadened South Africa’s migration watershed. After more than a decade of political instability in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and Nigeria, for example, a growing number of migrants from West, East and Central Africa have drifted towards South Africa. Large population movements in Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda and Liberia have also been felt in the form of a small but growing refugee community.

Not all migration from outside the region has been politically induced. Economic activity in the informal sector (notably trading), and the under-supply of professional and other higher-skilled workers in the South African labour market, are important magnets for migrants from outside the region. The growing number of Senegalese traders and Ghanaian and Ugandan professionals exemplifies the new migration trend of the 1990s. New inflows of skilled and unskilled labour from Western and Eastern Europe and the Far East aimed at filling perceived niches in the local labour market, are also evident. In this regard South Africa’s historical legacy of skewed labour skills distribution is a key underlying factor.

Any analysis of migration needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the dynamics of regional labour markets, which puts into context the region’s emerging human capital and labour demand structures, and allows for planning making around new potential labour flows. In this regard, the differentiated nature of regional labour markets, along with the various enabling and inhibitory factors influencing different sections of the migrant labour population, require investigation. To what extent, it needs to be asked, are migrants’ expectations of post-apartheid South Africa realistic, economically viable and politically sustainable?
3.2 Migration and the State of the SADC Economies

Patterns of economic growth and social investment in labour-sending countries are critical in explaining southward migration trends in Southern Africa. Overall, the SADC region has been characterised by uneven development, declining growth and rising unemployment since the 1980s. Mauritius and Botswana are notable exceptions. South Africa’s economy is plagued with similar problems, but its relatively large economy and comparatively high real standards of living set it apart from its neighbours. South Africa is therefore attractive to formal sector job-seekers and informal sector operators.

In general, regional patterns of labour flow are correlated to key national and regional imbalances which have intensified since 1980. Rate of unemployment, per capita incomes and real standards of living are the key variables. Unemployment rates across the SADC region are relatively high, and per capita incomes and real living standards for most sectors have shown decline. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Zambia all face average unemployment rates of about 40% (Table 3.1). Low levels of labour participation across SADC tend to mask equally high levels of underemployment, irregular work and low income labour which characterise much of the informal sector in both rural and urban areas.

In the 1990s, southward migration trends were accentuated by structural adjustment programmes in several SADC countries. In many cases, these reform programmes helped accelerate rates of economic decline. Economic reform planners insisted that high growth rates of up to 8% were required to relieve the rising tide of formal sector unemployment. Furthermore, they argued, these rates were only achievable through deregulation and the market-led restructuring of local economies. In practice, such measures did not achieve the goals set for them in most of the countries in which they were adopted, at least in the short run.

The lowering of tariff barriers and de-regulation of national capital and labour markets led in several cases to stiff international competition, unsteady growth and signs of de-industrialisation. Some sections of South African industry appear to have benefited directly from this shake-out process in neighbouring states. While local investment tailed off and South Africa selectively imposed higher tariff barriers, key labour-intensive industries in some SADC countries sought protection by moving south. Textile and clothing factories, for example, relocated from Lesotho (Matlosa 1996); and from Zimbabwe, where more than 15 000 textile workers lost their jobs over the period 1992-96 (Zimtrade 1996). While this was not an immutable trend — since South Africa too has moved to lower many of its tariff barriers — the short-term shocks felt in many SADC countries were considerable. Liberalisation and aggressive foreign competition undermined the viability of certain SADC industries and likely encouraged the southward migration of newly retrenched workers.
At the same time, liberalisation and the decontrol of local markets reduced government investment in social services and depressed real wages for most formal sector workers. The resulting decline in standards of living in the majority of SADC countries has further encouraged migration flows; particularly (but not exclusively) among higher-skilled, higher-waged workers. The same overall pressures have led to increased informalisation of most SADC economies, and the growth of trans-border petty trade and other means of informal sector income generation. In the 1990s, cross border movements for informal trade have become a significant form of transitory migration among SADC member states. Fluctuations in prices of basic commodities and erratic supplies among countries have encouraged this trend.

Changing local environmental conditions and agricultural activity have long been closely related to migration flows in the region, particularly amongst the rural poor. In the 1990s they have also contributed directly to new migrancy to South Africa. Unequal land distribution and acute land shortages in many SADC countries have confined the rural majority to marginal drylands. As a result, intra-country and external migrant wage incomes have often been crucial to the survival and growth of rural economies. In Mozambique, the shattered state of large swathes of the countryside greatly compromised the sustainability of local food production systems and provided a strong push factor for migrants. More broadly, climate in the form of recurring drought has played an important role in regional migration. The incidence of drought has tended to increase the propensity to migrate in many rural communities. The big drought of 1992 and the poor rainy seasons of 1994 and 1995 decimated many peasant production systems and accelerated regional migration in various directions. Communities in some drought-prone areas have been sustained by migrant incomes repatriated from South Africa, along with remittances from domestic urban centres.

Generally, the net incomes realised by migrant households have perpetuated southward migrations in search of employment, even though such migration can have negative effects on home communities; for example, by creating seasonal labour shortages in labour sending agricultural regions. Demographic growth and increased land pressure over time have combined to reinforce households’ need for migrant labour income. In some cases, dependence on earnings, remittances, trade and other forms of cross-border economic interaction with South Africa, is a crucial component in the national economy. In the extreme case of Lesotho, more than 60% of GNP (in 1995) is attributable to wage remittances from South Africa.

3.3 Southern African Trade and Migration

Policy makers and researchers have recently begun to consider the ways in which South African economic and trade relations with the rest of Southern Africa interact with labour migration patterns. South Africa’s growing domination of trade in the SADC region requires better understanding and more appropriate policy action. Awareness of the mutual interaction between trade, investment and labour migration is critical in future policy making on regional labour markets.
In the 1990s, trade between South Africa and the rest of SADC increased rapidly. Between 1990 and 1995, South African exports to SADC increased nearly six-fold, to US$2.3 billion, while the value of imports, though lower in absolute terms, rose almost seven-fold to US$502 million (Table 3.2). The latter dynamic in particular underlines the continuing vital importance of South African markets to SADC producers and their economies. With one exception, Namibia, South Africa constituted the single largest regional export market for all SADC countries, typically outdistancing by a wide margin other SADC trading partners (IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook). A similar pattern existed with regard to imports, with South Africa dominating trade in consumer and capital goods among the countries of the region.

One result is a large and growing trade imbalance ratio of as high as 5.4:1 in South Africa's favour. This imbalance grew with the relaxation of tariffs and other barriers by several liberalising economies in the region, and the expiry of preferential trade agreements between South Africa and its non-SACU neighbours (Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.) South African goods, supported by South African export incentive policies, gained easier access to neighbouring national markets. The expiry of long-standing trade pacts led to higher tariffs for trading partners in the region, with devastating consequences. Zimbabwe’s well-developed textile and clothing sector was pushed to the brink of collapse as several leading producers failed, with the loss of thousands of jobs.

Within South Africa, a strong lobby argued for the preservation of the defensive tariff and non-tariff barriers which limited SADC countries' access to South Africa's domestic markets. The protectionists argued, without substantial evidence, that the barriers prevented cheap goods produced overseas from flooding into South Africa via the neighbouring SADC states. They construed this as harmful both to South African domestic producers, and to the long-term industrial development of neighbouring SADC states.

Some observers have pointed out that the situation benefited South Africa significantly and disproportionately, and substantially undermined the trade, production and employment-generating capacity of many of its SADC neighbours. There is growing recognition — but all too little hard information — of the links between trade policies and out-migration pressures (de Vletter, 1995; Keet, 1996; Tolo and Bethlehem, 1994). As the spectre of an unstoppable wave of labour migrants from other SADC countries looms large within South African policy debates, issues of regional economic and trade policy have been brought increasingly to the forefront.

3.4 The Attractions of South Africa

In the absence of comprehensive and reliable information, current estimates of unemployment in South Africa range widely, between 25% (ILO 1996 and LMC 1996) and 50% (World Bank 1992). One observer estimated in 1995 that of an economically active population of about 13 million, roughly five million or 40% were without formal employment (de Vletter, 1995: 23). Declining rates of growth in medium and high wage job sectors and high rates of participation in marginal and insecure employment have
contributed to job insecurity. Between 1980 and 1992, formal sector employment grew by just 300,000, reflecting an annual increase of 3.2% and sharply declining rates of labour absorption in the economy (de Vletter, 1995; see Table 3.3). Employment levels in labour intensive sub-sectors like manufacturing, mining and agriculture actually contracted during this period, with mining alone shedding nearly 14% of its workforce.

Stagnation in the early 1990s led to a loss of at least 250,000 formal sector jobs in the first years of the decade, of which about half were in the mining sector (National Manpower Commission Annual Report, 1992).

The great paradox of regional migration is that South Africa, with unemployment rates similar to many of its neighbours, still attracts labour migrants. Several reasons have been advanced to explain the paradox. First, there is the argument that South Africa’s employment rate is actually much lower than is commonly supposed. In practical terms, this would mean that it is not as difficult as the statistics would suggest for migrants to obtain formal or casual work.

Second, it has been suggested that South Africa’s relative size, varied opportunities and income levels are of pivotal importance (Table 3.4). Tellingly, South Africa’s GNP is ten times that of all other SADC countries combined. Therefore, while the South African economy suffered some of the lowest growth rates in SADC in the early 1990s (lower even than Lesotho and Mozambique) actual per capita incomes in South Africa outstripped those in all neighbouring states, and in most cases by a wide margin. This trend will probably sharpen, judging from recent macroeconomic indicators for 1995 which show continuing improvement in South African GDP growth rates.

Third, average incomes in most SADC economies are well below the US$500 mark, the level of the average black South African household. None have average income levels which match those of better off-black South Africans. Such essential potential income differentials between segments of the South African labour market and those found in SADC countries act as a powerful incentive for southward migration, especially for more highly qualified workers. Indeed a similar, less-pronounced pattern of income differential-inspired labour migration is now affecting Mauritius, which has recently begun to recruit labour from Malawi and other countries in the region (MEBA, 1996).

Fourth, there is certainly a long-standing perception in Southern Africa that the South African economy has the capacity to absorb not only its own active population, but also a growing number of labour migrants from the region. Apart from the aggressive and sustained regional labour recruitment policies of the past, current features of the South African economy, including its developed infrastructure, variegated institutions and large productive capacity, help explain the country's continued appeal to migrant workers. In practice, real questions remain about the ability of the South African labour market to continue absorbing migrants. Part of the reason is the changing, more capital-intensive structure of South African production. This, combined with an ever-expanding domestic labour supply, means that increased employment opportunities for foreign migrants do not necessarily accompany South African economic growth.
A fifth aspect of South Africa's attractiveness to migrants lies in the supposed wage differentials between the countries. In South Africa, strong unionisation and affirmative action have forced up general wage levels despite downward pressure on the real wage rate. Real wage gaps between South Africa and the SADC region have tended to remain high; and disproportionately so in higher skill categories. In this regard, differences in real wage gains and access to social services among lower and higher skilled South African workers in the 1990s, and their implications for labour migration to the country, merit close attention. Data on household incomes among economically active South Africans — particularly the unskilled and semi-skilled — shows that in a large range of jobs there are actually no significant wage differentials between South Africa and its neighbours. A recent study shows that 35.6% of economically active black South African households earn up to R419 (about US$100) per month, a low wage in most countries of the region (Shabalala, 1996; see Table 3.5). Nearly three-quarters of black households earn less than R1400 each month (about US$350). One implication is that the wage-pull effect of better pay in South Africa is perhaps not a primary consideration for large numbers of low-skilled, lower paid migrants.

Sixth, even in a saturated labour market with high unemployment, non-South African migrants can still find work because there are employers who wish to hire them. The mining industry is a classic and overt example of a broader tendency. The industry has a long history of employing workers from neighbouring states and those who set labour policy make no apologies for their preference for non-South African miners. The standard argument is that they have skills and experience unavailable in the local labour market. A more cynical view is that these workers are more vulnerable, more likely to accept poorer working conditions and less likely to be militant.

Many niches in local labour markets are filled by non-South Africans. The examples are legion: Zimbabwean gardeners, Malawian waiters, Mozambican mechanics and builders, Yao seamsters and so on. Many Mozambicans are employed by ex-Mozambican whites who fled that country in the 1970s. The “competitive advantage” of “illegal” non-South Africans in the labour market must also be reckoned with. It does seem that there are some jobs which South Africans will not do and others will. Whether non-South African labour would continue to be quite so attractive if it was legal and employers were held to basic standards of employment, is another matter.

Finally, there are significant divisions in the shape, size and dynamic of the South African labour market, particularly in terms of skills content. In some sub-sectors, namely those involving professionals and other more highly-skilled workers, shortages in the local labour supply (and policies designed to alleviate these shortages) have played a role in inducing migration from the region. Since 1988, South Africa has experienced a deficit of professional and skilled labour for several reasons. Large outflows of professional and skilled whites, coupled with the current indigenisation of the civil service (including provincial governments) and affirmative action outlook of the private sector, have generated an increased demand for high level professional and skilled workers.
The historical pattern of South African under-investment in non-white education underlies much of the current skills shortage. Only 8% of South Africans had education above secondary school level in 1994, while 13% had no education at all. Less than 3% had university degrees. In 1993 it was estimated that 32% of South Africa's regularly employed workforce was illiterate, with persistently low levels of literacy among those with some literacy skills (National Training Board, cited in Nicol 1995). The resulting poor "knowledge base" in the local labour market has been a key factor motivating the brain drain to South Africa from the SADC region and beyond in Africa, although in absolute numbers this movement of higher-skilled workers accounts for only a small fraction of total labour migration.

The emigration of mainly white, higher-skilled South African nationals has fluctuated over the past decade, with current trends showing a rising pattern of emigration led by professional and managerial workers. Increasingly, they are heading in the direction of other African countries, mostly within the SADC region. Official emigration figures remain comparatively low. In 1995, for example, a total of 4 526 economically active South Africans emigrated, more than double the 1992 figure of 2 000 emigrants — but considerably less than the 5 500 persons who left the country for work in 1986. But it is now widely accepted that the official figures grossly underestimate the volume of flight. Many departing professionals do not declare their intention to emigrate and are hence missed by the official gatekeepers (Cohen 1997).

3.5 Migration and Regional Integration

The sluggish rate of South African job creation in the face of large increases in trade with the region has drawn greater attention to the evolving structure and capital-intensity of production (ILO 1996, LMC 1996). Given these circumstances, South Africa can hardly blame its SADC neighbours for dampening its economic growth; indeed as shown above, given the importance of regional markets for South African producers, the opposite may well be true.

The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region also shows deepening South African involvement in the regional economy. The loosening of restrictions on capital flows in SADC in the 1990s has played a significant role in boosting overall growth of FDI in the region, and South Africa’s key role in particular (Table 3.6). Inside South Africa, FDI's potential contribution to regional economic stabilisation and development has recently been stressed by labour market researchers and policy makers. Some have argued that South African FDI has a major role to play in regional employment creation and the reduction of out-migration pressures (Davies, 1997). Others suggest that the scale of investment required is so massive that no short-term impact can be expected (Cooper, 1987). A more extreme position still, is that increased FDI will actually precipitate rather than inhibit further migration to South Africa.
In this context the Labour Market Commission has proposed a "humane approach" to regional labour regulation. The Commission suggests labour market integration policies which complement, rather than constrain, the recent improved flows of trade and capital in the SADC region. More broadly, a Regional Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) has been proposed, which would work within a SADC framework to coordinate industrial policy, establish compensatory preferential trade measures, develop programmes for the relief and rehabilitation of different productive sectors and undertake other similar functions aimed at integrating and developing the regional economy. The RRDP would also provide for control and regulation of regional labour markets, taking into account the uneven economic development among SADC states and hence, the potential disruptive impact of entirely free movements of labour in the region. Fundamentally, the RRDP would recognise the importance in policy development of linking issues of regional trade, investment and migration on the one hand, with infrastructure, environmental and social policy elements on the other.

These debates notwithstanding, there is growing concern within SADC about the extent to which trade has promoted employment growth and investment at national and regional levels. The SADC countries have yet to develop a well-balanced cost-benefit analysis of current and projected trade patterns in the region, even though a draft Trade Protocol has been tabled for negotiation. Major bilateral trade agreements between South Africa and key partners like Zimbabwe and Zambia are still under negotiation, supposedly within the context of promoting a wider regional trade and industrial strategy. Yet these trade-related negotiations tend to be separate from discussions on the labour migration protocol. There is little optimism among experts that any of the protocols will be agreed to by 1998 unless substantive policy analysis support is provided to SADC and individual governments.

At the same time, there are signs that the migration question is increasingly being treated by most government, in principle and practice, as a fundamental aspect of the "liberalisation" of factor markets which include labour, capital and trade (Mistry 1996). The draft SADC Protocol on migration, for example, proposes the "freeing" of labour markets, an approach which does little to address the concerns, fears and needs of labour sending and receiving countries, or the problems and pressures faced by migrants themselves (SADC, 1995). In the absence of workable multilateral regional planning, policy-making will likely continue primarily at the bilateral level, with inadequate consultation and coordination.
IV. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LABOUR SENDING COUNTRIES

4.1 Introduction: Complicated Equations

Assessing the net impact of labour migration on labour sending and receiving countries is a complicated exercise. While many studies have focused on either the gains to South Africa, or the losses to sending countries, very few have attempted to tally the gains and losses to both. Moreover, analyses of migration's contemporary effects do not adequately integrate economic factors with a wide range of social, cultural, psychological and political impacts. The variable impact of migration at different geographical scales — local, sub-national, national and regional — has also been given inadequate attention to date and demands further investigation and analysis.

A holistic analysis of migration's complex and spatially variable impacts demands the kind of sophisticated data base that is not available at present. The present study did not have the resources to engage in this kind of broad-based and long term collection of data. Given the current reality that most SADC countries have no coordinated migration policy units, data used in cost-benefit analysis must be obtained from a variety of inconsistent and contradictory sources. The current discussion aims to bring together some of this available data with new (albeit limited) primary research. It also attempts, as a contribution to identifying the information needs and gaps, to conceptualise the range of economic, social and political costs and benefits of labour migration to South Africa and its regional neighbours.

Despite the dominant wisdom within South Africa that labour migration has primarily benefited neighbouring countries, contemporary and historical evidence suggests both gains and losses to labour sending states, and considerable net benefits to South Africa. Indeed, labour migrants have often been useful tools for labour sending and labour receiving countries alike. In the supplier areas, migrants have contributed to their home country economies via substantial remittances. At the same time, their absence has reduced unemployment pressures on over-supplied local labour markets. In South Africa, foreign workers have typically been employed in the worst jobs for little pay, minimal social protection and no political representation; effectively constituting a relatively docile source of cheap labour for South African employers.

This chapter argues that migration has also entailed a number of long-term costs for the region's labour sending countries. In many cases migration has led to the depletion of human resources in migrants' home countries, creating severely negative pressures on rural household economies and social structures. While remittances and other earnings have often bolstered migrant households — in many cases surpassing the economic surplus traditionally derived locally by these households — the longer term repercussions of cross-border migration include a marked decline in agricultural and other production, and increased dependency on migrants' wages.
The region's migrant labour force is sharply differentiated in terms of skill levels. The costs and benefits of labour migrancy thus differ sharply according to the skills capacity of the migrants concerned. The "brain drain"/"brain gain" phenomenon, for example, has a very different distribution of costs and benefits from migration involving lesser skilled, unskilled and undocumented workers. Though the "brain drain" involves only a small proportion of the total migrant labour force in South Africa it has far-reaching implications for the economic stability and development of the whole region. The differentiation of migration means it is impossible to describe, assess or politically address migration's impact according to any one generalisable formula. For these and other reasons, the costs and benefits of migration are less clear and one-sided than media reports and politicians on both sides of the South African border have typically acknowledged.

The post-1990 shift in perspective and recent devaluation of the economic importance of migrants within South Africa is a function of changes in that country’s industrial structure and is related to developments in the country's labour market. The past ten years in particular have seen increased capital intensity and diminished demand in the formal sector for lesser-skilled labour. The same period has also witnessed changes in the composition of labour migrancy, with greater numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled migrants coming to work in South Africa without permits, typically on a short-term basis.

Increasingly, the tendency has been for high and low skilled, legal and undocumented migrants, to be grouped together and identified as a growing problem for the South African economy. This means that the nuances of the segmented migrant labour force, and the different advantages its component parts offer the country's productive sector, have not been rigorously assessed or challenged by many of the more popular assessments of the "migrant problem". It has also left more room for the politicisation of the issue, rather than debate and understanding.

4.2 Labour Migrants as Components of Production

Migrant workers in South Africa have played a crucial role in the country's industrial development, serving for many years as the backbone of key export-oriented sectors and more recently, as a source of low-cost labour power for a variety of labour-intensive businesses. For many decades, they were known and understood to be essential elements in the creation of wealth and industrial expansion in South Africa and in securing the viability and competitiveness of key industries. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the leading sectors of mining and agriculture, which between them make up 15 per cent of South Africa’s GDP (1994) and more than half of its foreign exchange earnings. In both sectors, migrant labourers have been a critical feature in the production process for many years, both in terms of the number of foreign workers employed, and the low rates of remuneration (and social spending) received.
Most legal migrant workers are employed in the mining and agricultural industries under contract. Most unauthorised migrants work in economically marginal employment categories, like casual work, sub-contracting and informal trading. These are sectors where conditions of work are often poor and wages are low, and where there is little security of employment (Crush 1997b). Because of the relatively low production expenditure they represent to employers, migrants constitute something of a structured cost advantage within South African industry.

In the mining industry, employment levels have declined steadily in recent years, particularly in the gold sector (which shed 178 000 of its 520 000 workers between 1987 and 1995). But mining still represents a significant factor in formal sector employment and national income generation. Some 50% of the gold mine labour force is supplied by neighbouring countries. In 1995 the Nation Union of Mineworkers, NUM, estimated the average wage of all mineworkers at approximately R1 400 a month, with the average wage of migrant mineworkers significantly lower. A survey by the Central Bank of Lesotho in 1992-93 found that the highest number of Basotho migrant mineworkers (many of them highly experienced and therefore comparatively well-remunerated) earned a net monthly income between R700 and R800. Less than twenty percent earned more than R1 000 a month. More recent research by SAMP shows a gross average monthly income of R1 361 and a net income of R836 in 1996 (Sechaba Consultants 1997). There is no evidence that foreign migrants earn less than their South African equivalents. Nevertheless, they are still part of a low-wage system which derives considerable benefit from their presence.

Wages in the agricultural sector, in which migrants form an important component of contracted and seasonal labour (both legal and undocumented), are among the lowest in the country. On average, farmworkers in 1996 earn an estimated monthly cash wage of R400, with additional wages-in-kind (food rations and accommodation) amounting to less than R100 per month. The South African Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers Union (SAAPAWU) is currently campaigning for a minimum wage of R750 a month, together with the maintenance of payments in kind, to bring farmworkers to a minimum living wage (estimated by SAAPAWU at R850 in 1995). Wages and working conditions are much worse for casual and seasonal workers, a key employment category for migrants. Most foreign casual agricultural workers are estimated to receive three-quarters of the wages of permanent workers. In some cases they are reported to earn only R80 per month, typically employed under an arduous system of task work in which unrealistically large quotas are the norm (Crush 1997b).

Reports from Kwazulu-Natal indicate that labourers sometimes work up to fourteen hours continuously before completing a day's task — or qualifying for the day's wage (Sipho Khumalo, South African Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers Union). Smaller contracted growers, union research indicates, pay as little as R120 per month and rely heavily on migrants. In late 1994 press reports claimed thousands of Zimbabweans were crossing into South Africa to work on Northern Transvaal farms for monthly wages of between R90 and R150 (City Press, September 1994). Other media have reported migrants from Lesotho working on farms under extremely arduous conditions, earning R10 a day or less (Africa Analysis, September 1996). Indeed, some reports have indicated that without the benefit of migrant workers paid at rates far below
subsistence level, many employers — notably including farmers in the northern border regions — would go out of business (Financial Mail, September 1995). Qualitative research on the participation of refugees in the commercial agricultural sector indicates that in many instances refugees work for food and accommodation only, thus further depressing agricultural wages, particularly for seasonal and other temporary work (Dave Husy, Farmworkers Research and Resource Project).

Because much of the work undertaken by migrant workers is undocumented, there is little reliable information on wage disparities with South African nationals. Anecdotal evidence from sectors where migrants are concentrated — like construction and hotel and catering — suggests that the wages and working conditions experienced by migrant workers are poorer than those for South Africans. In sectors which are low-paying to begin with, migrants are likely to be particularly exploited by employers, because of their vulnerability to detection and deportation.

Lower-paid migrant workers have also become a feature of some higher skilled formal sectors of the South African labour market in the 1990s. While the benefits for South Africa of receiving this relatively well-experienced workforce at low cost seem clear, the reaction of South Africans has been generally hostile. Although it could be argued that the influx of highly skilled migrants might reduce the market costs of goods and services needed by ordinary South Africans, and even create jobs through micro-enterprise investment and increased demand for upstream production linkages, demands for labour market protectionism by local professional associations have strongly influenced popular and official outlooks on the question.

4.3 Job Displacement of South Africans

Several surveys by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) reveal that South Africans have an abiding concern with the impact of immigration on employment. In 1994, 55% of those surveyed felt that “illegal aliens” were taking jobs from South African nationals. This view underpins much of the thinking of the South African Department of Home Affairs. The assumption seems to be that because a majority of South Africans think that immigrants take jobs from South Africans, it must be true.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which migrants contribute directly to South Africa’s high levels of unemployment, because most are concentrated in marginal economic and poorly documented sectors. The limited data on the job displacement of South Africans by foreign workers suggests that migration is not the primary factor in the current crisis of joblessness in South Africa. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the relative size of the migrant labour force in South Africa generally declined in the last twenty years (Table 4.1). This is not to say that the inflow of labour migrants does not have discernible impacts on the South African labour market. However, the market effect of migrant labour differs according to skills and wage categories, location of work and other such variables.

In the well-documented mining sector, for example, there is some evidence of direct displacement after the 1987 strike, when more Mozambicans and Swazi workers were hired to replace militant South Africans dismissed during the strike. Since then,
Retrenchments and the downsizing of the mining industry have affected South African workers disproportionately. Between 1987 and 1994, the percentage of South Africans employed by Chamber of Mines affiliates fell by 44%, as opposed to only 26% for non-South African mineworkers. A total of 156,000 South African-held jobs were lost, compared to only 58,000 occupied by workers from the region. There is some evidence therefore that the mining companies have employed a “foreign labour preference” policy at a time of contraction and downsizing.

In the face of formal sector job losses by South African workers, trade unions have attempted to play a stabilising role by negotiating as far as possible the retrenchment of industrial labour, and maintaining wage levels in an environment of labour over-supply. This has clearly exposed foreign migrants to greater risk of loss of legal employment in the formal sector. Most unions in the country have a minimal foreign worker membership and are therefore generally less sensitive to questions of labour market protectionism, with the important exception of the National Union of Mineworkers, the largest South African union with 357,000 members (30% of them from Lesotho alone). In the agricultural sector, on the other hand, the existence of a large group of non-unionised farmworkers in the labour market has been a recent source of tension. COSATU, for example, has complained to the government over the perceived negative effect of undocumented migrants on the federation’s efforts to establish a farmworkers union (Minnaar et al, 1995).

A 1994 NALEDI research paper identified four major concerns for unionism arising from undocumented migration. First, the unions fear these migrants are used by employers to undermine labour standards. Second, they are concerned that the majority of migrants face extreme exploitation at work, at home and from the government. Third, they say that the large number of migrants compromises the efforts of government to deliver housing and other social services. Finally, they express concern about the rise in anti-immigrant xenophobia and racism, which diverts attention from the need for longer-term strategies aimed at integrated regional development (Toofo and Bethlehem, 1994).

The impact of migrants in the informal and micro-enterprise sectors is more difficult to unravel. South African hawkers organisations have lobbied government for legislation to bar foreign operators. However, aside from the growing resentment of local businesses there is little concrete evidence of an employment displacement effect in these sectors. Recent studies by SAMP (Peberdy, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) show that migrant informal sector workers bring new skills, capital and competitive services needed by ordinary South Africans, and even provide net benefits to local labour markets. The survey of foreign-operated micro-enterprises in Gauteng shows that these businesses actually create an average of 4.6 jobs.

Nonetheless, in workplaces and local communities, tensions between South Africans and foreign workers have occasionally erupted into violent incidents. Migrants’ homes have been looted and in some cases burnt, and individuals have been assaulted. In many other communities, migrants and South Africans appear to live relatively harmoniously, although there may be simmering tensions. However, migrants who have been in South Africa since before 1994 tend to suggest that attitudes towards them have changed.
recently. It is simplistic to dismiss the concerns of South Africans as purely xenophobic. There are real concerns about job security and wage levels. The problem, from a research point of view, is that detailed research on local labour markets and employer practices has not been undertaken, so that it is impossible to determine if such fears are baseless or legitimate.

4.4 Policies on Social Protection

Social protection is an important element in the rising debate about regional migration for several reasons. A recent ILO study of the modalities and legal ramifications of social protection for labour migrants in South Africa (Fultz and Pieris, 1996) has observed that the quality of migrant workers' lives, and those of their families and dependents, is directly affected by such protection. Eligibility of migrants for benefits, for example, can determine whether the family of a retrenched worker can retain their home; whether an injured worker receives treatment and rehabilitation; or whether a deceased worker's children can continue their education.

The social protection of migrants also has important economic effects. By promoting migrants’ well-being, health, and sense of security, it can enhance their productivity. It can also make migration more attractive to foreign workers contemplating relocation, thereby influencing the mobility of labour. Further, if financed by a levy on employers, social protection can influence labour costs, making migrants more or less attractive to employing firms. Finally, the social protection of migrants has fiscal effects, as their coverage may increase the level of a government's social spending significantly. The method by which a government finances protection can also raise issues of equity, since the use of general revenues (as opposed to payroll deductions) can produce a significant subsidy of migrants by domestic taxpayers.

Social protection may be differently defined. Defined broadly, it is in essence a mechanism by which workers pool resources to insure themselves against certain risks, based on the principle of social solidarity. Defined narrowly, social protection usually insures against risks that result in lost wages, such as retrenchment, disability, and old age. When defined broadly, it can include the full range of preventive and ameliorative benefits that a society provides its members, including education, housing and police protection. This current discussion takes as its focus the narrower definition.

Social protection in South Africa differs from that in many countries of comparable economic development (Smith Commission, 1995). Its distinctive features are the absence of a national social insurance scheme to provide retirement and disability benefits to the national workforce, a strong reliance on the private sector to provide benefits on an optional basis, and a consequent unevenness in the coverage of the workforce. Furthermore, the social protection which does exist is called on to meet a highly diverse set of needs. But in most cases, labour migrants are not included in or covered by these schemes.

A profile of the social protection of migrants as it currently exists in South Africa must take account of the present flux in government policy. Given the pace of change and its
fragmented character, it is useful to consider the social protection of migrants in two parts: first, as it existed prior to March 1996, when a significant legislative change offering greater rights to certain categories of migrant workers was made; and second, after subsequent changes which followed the March liberalisation.

Until recently, social protection for migrants has been a function of the way in which they enter South Africa. Two major gates are available: the Aliens Control Act and government-to-government agreements providing for temporary contract labour. Migrants who enter by the first gate generally are accepted for their required skills. With entry permits issues by the Department of Home Affairs, skilled “migrants” are authorised to work, stay in the country so long as the permit is extended, and be granted permanent resident status either immediately or after a period of work. Permanent resident status in turn triggers eligibility for social protection on the same basis as South African citizens. Thus, workers who become permanent residents may receive a range of benefits and protection: workers compensation in the event of workplace accident or disease; unemployment insurance if they are retrenched, become ill, have or adopt a child, or die (in which case their survivors may receive payments); and state pensions if they retire from work due to disability or old age. The proportion of migrants in this general category is small and falling still further (Chapter 2).

The second entry gate applies to temporary contract labour in the mining industry and, to a lesser extent, in agriculture. Here a South African firm enters an employment contract with a migrant pursuant to the bilateral agreement between the migrant's home country and the South African government. Most of these agreements date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Contract workers can neither change jobs, renew their contract while in the country, nor obtain permanent resident status. Without the latter, social protection is generally not available. The single exception is workers compensation, which is paid under a special administrative arrangement between South Africa and the worker's home government or, in the alternative, through TEBA, the mines’ major recruitment agency. However, inefficiency and corruption in the former arrangements have resulted in significant losses of benefits by injured and ill migrants and their survivors.

In the absence of social protection, some contract workers receive private benefits from their employers. These are most extensive in the mining industry, where migrants recruited by TEBA are provided with housing, medical care, life insurance, and matching contributions for a provident fund (if the mine has established one) as contractual benefits.

While generous in relation to other industries, these benefits have several shortcomings. First, neither their scope nor quality is specified in the TEBA employment contract, leaving the employer with broad latitude to decide what to provide. Second, employers make no provision for retirement pensions for rank and file workers, providing only lump-sum payments from provident funds. Third, private benefits are optional on the part of the employer and generally do not extend beyond the worker’s period of employment. As a result, they may become unavailable just when the worker is most in need of protection.
While some have argued that differences in social protection afforded under the two-gate system are justified given the short duration of many work contracts, in practice this system is inequitable. In reality, many "short-term" workers renew their contracts for many years (in some cases, decades) in succession, residing for extended periods of time in South Africa as temporary residents. Until 1991, the Aliens Control Act prohibited the granting of permanent resident status to migrants who were not "readily assimilable by the white inhabitants" or who threatened "the language, culture or religion of any white ethnic group." This provision effectively barred black workers from securing the social protection which resident status provides. Thus, until the 1991 repeal of this restriction, migrants seeking to live in South Africa had only two real options: temporary work under multiple, successive short-term contracts or illegal status. Neither provided significant social protection nor any route to improved benefits over time.

Recent changes, including the amnesties for SADC citizens, will have an impact on the social protection of rights of those affected. However, parallel actions by the Department of Welfare has partially negated migrants' access to benefits. Just as the Department of Home Affairs began processing applications for amnesty, the Welfare Department issued new regulations implementing a little known provision of the 1992 Social Assistance Act. This provision restricts eligibility for state old age and disability pensions to South African citizens. Thus, as of 1 March 1996, migrants who seek and obtain permanent residence will no longer secure social protection equal to that of South Africans. While they will receive Unemployment Insurance Fund benefits, they will continue to be ineligible for old age and disability coverage. The net effect of the two agencies’ action, therefore, has been to extend social protection with one hand and withdraw part of the extension with the other.

Given that the low labour cost of migrants to employers (including contributions of employers to labour benefit schemes) is a key element in the recruitment of migrant labour by South African employers, and in downward pressures on local labour market wages, it seems clear that a narrowing of the gap in social protection between South Africa workers and migrants would have strong policy advantages. The extension of benefits to migrants would also, of course, directly address some of the crucial problems faced by migrants themselves, in terms of job security, social services access and occupational health and safety. But the elaboration of such benefits schemes and the development of coordinated sets of government policies alongside them will require further debate and research; and importantly, cooperation and coordination within a regional framework. Only within a regional framework can the broader issues and practices of migrants' social protection — including questions of global reciprocity, cross-coverage and linkage to avoid gaps and duplication, financing of social insurance funds and regional employment creation — be fully addressed and implemented.

4.5 The Social Costs of Migration for Labour Supply Countries

The costs of migration to most labour sending countries are well known and widely experienced. First, migration of higher-skilled workers has produced a brain drain to South Africa from the rest of the region, and beyond. De Vletter (1995: 28) argues that "[t]he exodus of university lecturers, doctors and other scarce professionals has had a
devastating effect on their countries of origin”. Since 1985, for example, three-quarters of Zimbabwe’s veterinarians have emigrated; at the University of Zambia, two hundred lecturers have been lost in the course of the last ten years. Similar instances of large-scale evacuation of the professional ranks have occurred in other SADC countries.

Throughout the region, this southward drain has severely undermined the continued provision of quality social services like health care and higher education. The loss of much-needed professional skills has left many countries in the region with little option but to recruit expatriates, usually at great financial cost. Meanwhile, South Africa and to a lesser extent, Botswana, continue to absorb professionals from the region, although the rate of out-migration has slowed markedly since 1994.

Historical research on social transformation in several SADC countries has belaboured the essentially negative impact of the out-migration of young men to South Africa on rural development. Such patterns have entailed considerable social costs to local households and communities, as families have been fragmented and the burden of traditional work left to women and children. In recent years, internal migration in most SADC countries has overtaken migration to South Africa in absolute terms (with the notable exception of Lesotho). Established patterns of migration out of the rural areas have deepened, as have the pronounced labour shortages in these generally poor, agriculture-based local economies. Increasingly, other means of income generation are sought out, such as cross border trading or casual work on nearby farms.

Other social costs have affected workers themselves more directly. The occupational health consequences and costs of migration, and in particular the long term illness and progression of disabling injury, have been a major cost to labour sending countries (Loewenson 1996). The mining industry is particularly concerned. Migrants are vulnerable to occupational health illnesses because they engage in arduous and dangerous work, with little protection from risk in the workplace. The South African mining sector has stubbornly high rates of disablement and death. Serious attention needs to be given to the inability of the current system to prevent, gauge and adequately compensate for occupational injury and illness. The legacy of under-recognition and under-detection of occupational disease on the mines has persisted into the 1990s (Packard 1989; Crush and James 1995).

The problem is compounded by the fact that ill health may only emerge some time after employment contracts have ceased and migrants have returned home. What has not been recognised by employers and host governments alike, is that there can be a time-lag of up to twenty years between exposure to risk factors on the mines, and detectable occupational lung disease in mine workers. As a result of this delay, the burden of disease is displaced to the home area rather than where it belongs, in South Africa itself.

In the event of sickness, injury and disability, migrants are forced to fall back on the rural households and the public health systems in the countries from which they come (Cohen 1987). Rural migrant households not only serve as a source of new labour but also as a mechanism for the “renewal, repair and recuperation of exhausted labourers” (Cohen 1987). These households, and the public health systems in supplier states, have become less capable of meeting the health, social and economic needs of migrant
families with a disabled breadwinner (Arkles 1993).

Arkles' detailed study of the social consequences of disabling work injury for migrant workers and their families, highlights the limitation of benefits systems. She shows that disability is strongly associated with "repatriations, retrenchments and resignations" and a consequent slide into impoverishment by rural households. The same appears to be true for other migrant workers, such as farmworkers, where the risk of occupational illness and accident is also high.

4.6 Benefits of Labour Migration to Supplier Countries and South Africa

The literature on the costs and benefits of migration for the supply states appears to focus almost exclusively on the negative impacts, thus overlooking a variety of positive economic, social and political benefits. Any positive impacts for suppliers are seen to pale by comparison with the benefits realised by receiving states. What is needed, then, is a much closer, disaggregated analysis of labour migration's effects on labour-sending countries.

The primary benefits to labour-sending countries from cross-border flows are economic in character. They include large and enduring employment opportunities, and substantial income remittances by migrants to home countries and households. The entrenched system of regional migration has also relieved employment pressures on local labour markets, and served as a critical source of foreign earnings and household capital.

Studies suggest that migrant income is a key source of investment in agriculture and other small enterprises in neighbouring countries. Even skilled and professional workers often see migration as a means to satisfy short or long term investment needs. For the large majority of less skilled or unskilled migrants, South African incomes constitute an important component of the regular household economy. This is particularly true in Lesotho, with its substantial dependence on migrant male labour. While the degree of dependence is less marked in other SADC states, similar historical patterns of income dependence by rural households on migrant earnings apply.

There is some debate over the extent to which repatriated incomes have contributed to the development of migrants' home areas. Studies show that single males often invest remittances in cattle, while those with dependents also invest them into education, economic activities and housing. In Malawi, migrants are known to invest earnings in a vast array of small and informal sector business activities. A recent survey in Mozambique found that migrants bought seeds from South Africa, Swaziland or Maputo and shared them with their communities, which had been ravaged by years of drought and civil war (Brito and Fernandes, eds, op.cit.).

Generally, however, rural communities with high concentrations of migrant workers do not display clear signs of greater social investment and economic development than those without. Many argue that the millions of man-years invested by mostly rural migrant mineworkers over several decades have benefited South Africa (and particularly South African urban centres) in a heavily lopsided manner (De Vletter 1995). It has only
been in the last twenty years, moreover, that improvements in the real wages of mineworkers have led some to the view that miners now constitute a wealthier “rural elite” (Sechaba Consultants 1997).

In contrast to most households, some governments have gained considerable financial benefits from labour migration. A system of compulsory deferred pay in the mining industry has meant that a proportion of the income of foreign mineworkers has been deducted at source and repatriated through the home government. For some countries “labour export” has become an important, if involuntarily surrendered, source of foreign exchange earnings. Over and above these requirements, significant additional sums are repatriated voluntarily through both formal and informal channels (Table 4.2).

In the case of Lesotho, despite dramatic declines in remittances share of GNP, migrants' repatriated incomes continued to comprise 35% of the national wealth in 1995. Sechaba Consultants (1997) show that miners remit an average amount of R538 per month (or 64% of their net income). Because compulsory deferred pay accounts for only 30%, miners, on average, remit more voluntarily than they do through deferred pay. In Mozambique, labour contracting agencies estimate that R220 million flowed into the country in 1996 from remittances, making up approximately 35% of foreign exchange earnings. They estimate that an additional R97 million was repatriated voluntarily. When the value of goods repatriated is also included, it appears that Mozambique receives an annual investment from legal migrants of roughly R500 million (Kevin Cotterell, Wenela). To this should be added an unknown sum repatriated by unauthorised migrants.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to piece together diverse and fragmentary evidence on the effects of migration in labour sending and receiving countries, in order to demonstrate the scope and direction, rather than the precise scale and intensity, of migration's net impacts.

The migration of workers to South Africa has complex long term costs and benefits for migrants, employers and their respective countries. These costs and benefits are both planned and unplanned, officially sanctioned and unauthorised. In the case of both South Africa and neighbouring countries, it seems clear that migration has entailed an array of positive and deleterious features. Observers have tended to compare labour sending with labour receiving countries when weighing up the net impact of migration on countries in the region. A more reasonable and useful approach would be to consider the net impact of migration on a nation's own unique development needs and experiences.

Costs and benefits of migration should not be seen strictly in terms of win-loss equations; whether at the level of individual migrants, their households, surrounding communities, or indeed, national economies. Using this perspective, researchers and policy makers can begin to respond more effectively and sensitively to the nuanced experiences and interests of migrants and their home countries.
At the same time, much better information about local labour markets, particularly in South Africa, is required if the impact of migration on domestic employment levels is to be properly understood and assessed. Currently there is scattered and inconclusive data on the degree to which migrants depress local wage scales and employment opportunities, and act as a drain on the national treasury through increased state spending on social services and security.

Such questions need to be addressed not only at the national level, but also on a sectoral and local geographical basis. When such calculations are made, they cannot and should not be portrayed and explained in terms of cash values. Migration, with its shifting internal dynamics and wide-ranging effects, is as much about relations and power among different social interests, as about individual income-generating aspirations and net capital transfers.
V. THE PAST AND PRESENT POLITICS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION

5.1 Introduction: Past Policies

Migration policy in Southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was determined by the changing political, economic and demographic configuration of the region. Colonial administrations in labour sending territories used taxation, land alienation, job reservation, market discrimination, deferred pay systems, as well as support for migrant labour recruitment, to encourage the export and return of labour. This was particularly the case where national economic growth could not absorb the unemployed. Under colonial rule, migration flows reflected uneven patterns of development within and among the colonies. Differential rates of development, population growth, rates of white settlement and resource exploitation led to differential rates of labour demand and supply, and variable wage levels.

After 1920, labour mobilisation gave way increasingly to labour control. Mechanisms of labour mobilisation had created and sustained a regular flow of migrants to employment centres. Governments turned to channeling labour to where it was most needed and to removing labour from where it was not wanted or no longer required. The control and regulation of this labour supply became a major function of colonial administrations in the region, even after the forced recruitment of local labour was increasingly replaced by "voluntary" and privatised recruitment in countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Colonial borders rapidly became much more than figments of the cartographer’s imagination. Fences and border posts defined the territories and boundaries in which colonial states believed they could contain and regulate whole populations. By the 1940s, labour migration policies in most colonies had shifted from servicing South African industry to meeting the labour needs of "internal" settlers. Migration policy was redesigned to contain labour within territories experiencing increased investment. The pull of South Africa for migrants was still so overwhelming that most states signed accords to try and put limits on the volume of migration and to confine it to particular sectors. Various bilateral and multilateral labour supply agreements underwrote the policy tenet of mutually beneficial cooperation in the colonial regulation of labour movements across territorial boundaries.

Within South Africa, the post-1910 (and post-1948) experiments in “white” nation-building were also integrally related to the demarcation and “protection” of a national space. Immigration legislation, beginning with the Immigration Act of 1913, gave the state sweeping powers of inclusion and exclusion. Race and national origin became the defining elements in immigrant selection. Legislation defined who was and who was not “admissible” to and “assimilable” by the white population. The roots of South Africa’s current Aliens Control Act of 1991 lie in legislation passed in the 1930s to control the entry of Jews fleeing Nazi persecution in Europe. Legislation and language stigmatised the unwanted and gave the state draconian powers to exclude.
After 1948, the apartheid government continued to use the instruments and discourses of control handed to it by earlier governments. A central tenet of all policy and legislation was that only whites could immigrate to South Africa. Blacks could only migrate — their presence inside South Africa considered only temporary and transient. Whites were regulated by immigration legislation; blacks by bilateral labour agreements. The agreements codified the compromises between labour supplier and user, setting quotas and minimum conditions. Both were agreed that migrants should regularly and eventually go home.

The newly-independent states of Southern Africa inherited entrenched patterns of cross-border population movement in which labour migrants only heeded national boundaries when it was convenient to do so. They also inherited modern bureaucracies that defined themselves in terms of the demarcation and protection of territorial integrity. Post-colonial states adapted quickly to the modern notion that there are insiders and outsiders, defined in terms of access to and exclusion from national space. Most passed and enforced tight restrictions on entry and settlement through new immigration legislation. Many continue to debate the merits of territorial rootedness as a condition of full participation in civil society and national political life. Democratic South Africa, in this respect, is simply treading the same path as its neighbours, several decades later. A new nation-building project, such as that now in progress in that country, is by definition redefining the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion.

This overview of migration and immigration policy in the region highlights the inherited political and psychological barriers to the emergence of a truly regional consciousness and policy regime on migration in the SADC region. Immigrants and migrants are outsiders and as such they are seen by definition to “threaten” national interests and disadvantage insiders or citizens. Inherited policy instruments, in terms both of regulations and the immigration apparatuses to enforce them, are premised fundamentally on protecting and controlling access to national space. Since states do this in what most citizens would agree is their own best interests, few are led to question the methods and policy instruments used. Without a new and much better developed supra-national, regional identity, new initiatives for population movement which cut across national ideas, interests and bureaucracies will struggle to be heard and hold sway.

Against this backdrop, this chapter focuses primarily on the fluid policy environment within South Africa at the present time. Unlike the other countries of the SADC region, whose immigration legislation and policies are well-established and deeply embedded, South Africa is currently engaged in a serious and broad national debate on a range of migration and immigration issues. The main contours of this national discussion are therefore of particular interest at this time. The way in which this debate is eventually resolved will have important consequences for the future of efforts to get SADC states to think supra-nationally about migration and immigration. If the status quo prevails, the outlook will be bleak; but if a new regionalism can be injected into a transformed South African migration management ethos and system, then the prospects should be brighter.
The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) appointed an independent team of experts to write the recently-published Draft Green Paper on International Migration. The Department of Labour has also provided political space for the articulation (if not the implementation) of alternative viewpoints by including the migration issue within the brief of its Labour Market Commission (LMC). The LMC chapter on migration has proved to be one of the most controversial sections of the entire report. However, the Green Paper on International Migration, based on a more substantial body of research, echoes and elaborates many of the LMC conclusions on the issue of SADC migration. These two documents are thus worth closer scrutiny.

5.2 New Prescriptions

The Green Paper on International Migration and the Labour Market Commission Report share the following basic policy positions:

a call for a new regionalism in South African policy-making. Neither is in favour of an open borders approach, and both counsel caution about the SADC Draft Protocol. However, both acknowledge the long-standing migration ties of South Africa and its neighbours and suggest that migration policy should adopt a tiered approach which distinguishes first between SADC and non-SADC migrants; and second, within SADC, between migrants from Lesotho and Mozambique, and those from elsewhere.

the need to integrate policy positions on migration with those on regional trade and integration are stressed. In this respect, both documents are in agreement with the line of analysis presented here (see Chapter 3).

the mechanisms for continued access of SADC country citizens to the South African labour market are spelt out in greater detail in the Green Paper, though both agree that policy should be labour-market driven. The Green Paper outlines several suggestions for a humane and acceptable temporary work system but also suggests that limits, in the form of negotiated quotas, should be placed on the issue of work permits.

the abolition of inherited “special privileges” for the mining and farming industries are recommended. Both suggest that the bilateral labour agreements and compulsory deferred pay systems should be abolished. The Green Paper argues that the costs to source countries would not be as severe as is sometimes claimed. Both indicate the need for mechanisms for all employers to be able to employ non-South Africans, if they have a demonstrable need to do so.

the relaxation of controls over the temporary and permanent importation of skills is advocated. Both documents highlight South Africa’s severe skills shortages and the difficulty of replacement from domestic sources. On the other hand, both caution against more open policies that would denude the SADC region of its skilled workers and professionals.
the Green Paper advocates far reaching transformation of the institutions, ethos and legislative immigration framework inherited from the past. The DHA would be renamed the Department of Citizenship and Immigration services and devote its attention to service rather than control. The SAPS would no longer be involved in policing immigration. A new Immigration Act would be enacted. Due process and administrative justice would prevail. Enforcement would focus on true illegal immigrants (long term illegal residents) rather than short-term unauthorised migrants who would, in any event, enjoy greater opportunities for legal access to South Africa.

The Labour Market Commission proposals, underwritten as they were by the Department of Labour, had less directly bearing upon the DHA which has migration policy in its mandate. But the same cannot be said of the Green Paper, which was produced by a task team appointed by the Minister. The publication of the Green Paper, which includes several proposals that cut across the thrust of current DHA policy, is an important development. Certainly the adoption of the paper’s proposals by the government in their current form would have a critical impact on South Africa’s migration regime, as well as on the regional migration situation. The extent to which the proposals will be revised by political opposition and fiscal constraint, however, remains to be seen. What is clear is that the Green Paper has issued a challenge to policy-makers within the South African government to devise policy that has a tangible, rather than rhetorical, commitment to the SADC region.

In the ranks of organised labour, a view does seem to have emerged that the legalisation of de facto immigrants would help to remove the conditions under which migrants are exploited, criminalised or forced to compete unfairly with South Africans for jobs. Those who adopt this view also argue that an uncontrolled and unregulated regional labour market is undesirable, given the differing stages of economic development of countries in the region. The unions were firmly behind the recent amnesties, discussed in Chapter 2, and were the prime mover in one of them.

The NUM (which has a large foreign component in its own membership) has rejected the large-scale deportation of migrant workers as a “cheap political approach to creating jobs”, and advocated greater toleration of foreigners. NUM argues that the current situation calls for a negotiated, consensual and broad approach involving the participation of different relevant social partners inside and outside of South Africa (Kate Philip, 1996). The NUM is now pressing for the reopening of the “miners’ amnesty” and a five year eligibility period. The Green Paper suggests that quotas for foreign miners should be the subject of negotiations between the industry and labour. The logic behind this proposal is clear although responses to it are uncertain. The Green Paper implies it might also be extended to other sectors.

COSATU has offered a number of specific proposals aimed at establishing a framework for dealing with migration issues. COSATU researchers have proposed that all migrants, once employed in the country (legally or illegally), should enjoy the same workplace rights, working conditions and rates of pay as their South African counterparts (TooIoo and Bethlehem, 1994). This leveling, it is argued, would make illegal workers less attractive to cost-cutting employers. While COSATU believes that South Africans be
accorded first preference in the filling of jobs, it has suggested that something akin to a "most favoured nation" policy be developed to give preferential treatment to labour migrants from various Southern African countries. In a reversal of apartheid-era recruitment of expatriate whites, the union suggests that higher-skilled migrants be given entry on contractual terms, without tying their migration to long-term residence and eventual citizenship.

Underpinning the current policy proposals is the widely-held view among labour researchers and some trade unions that strengthened regional economies and labour organisations are crucial to the future stability of South Africa's labour markets and economic growth. This view is reflected in moves by several unions, among which NUM has been notable (owing in part to its high migrant membership), to develop closer cooperative links among regional labour organisations; and in some cases, to actively support job-creation projects in economically hard-hit areas of neighbouring labour exporters. A recent twist to the rapidly changing situation has been the suggestion by some mining unions that retrenched foreign miners based in South Africa should be transferred to new sister operations outside South Africa, if possible in the unemployed workers' home countries.

5.3 SADC Policy Developments

The contemporary evolution of SADC level policy on migration illustrates some of the key contradictions in the spirit and politics of regional cooperation. While SADC aims to build balanced regional cooperation for mutual development, trends in regional migration, and trade and capital flows, are towards increasing asymmetry between South Africa and its neighbours (LMC 1996). Unsteady economic performance, emerging conflicts over trade relations, loosening of controls over capital and investment flows, and occasional volatile domestic political situations have all pushed the other SADC countries into closer economic integration with South Africa. The post-apartheid regional reality has led to renewed calls for regional-level integration and planning on a wide range of economic issues, including labour and capital flows.

Earlier attempts at regional cooperation on migration, including the Southern African Labour Supply Commission (SALC), were largely unsuccessful. SALC emerged under circumstances of political and ideological confrontation between apartheid South Africa and the SADC member states. In the late 1970s, the supplier states mistakenly thought that South Africa was about to expel all foreign miners and decided that a united front was necessary. They also believed that SALC could mitigate the exploitative working conditions on the mines (Crush 1993). Various proposals for the regional regulation of migration were made within SALC. The organisation called for the harmonisation and standardisation of labour migrants' contracts, and of labour sending states' migration policies; at other times, it advocated the gradual coordinated withdrawal of migrant labour from South Africa, or the ultimate abolition of labour migration system in Southern Africa (see Patton 1995: 324).

These plans often conflicted with the different strategies and aims of member states. Their bilateral links with their southern neighbour undermined their states' capacity to
engage in mutual, coordinated action against South Africa. South Africa worked actively to undermine SALC initiatives for regional cooperation through its bilateral agreements with SADC countries. The divergence of SALC objectives from those of the SADC during the 1980s also proved problematic. While SALC ultimately wanted to see the phased withdrawal of migrant labour from South Africa, SADC preferred an approach which aimed to maximise the benefits to labour sending from migration. Finally, SALC was handicapped by the absence of substantial secretariat resources and stable political and administrative leadership throughout its tenure.

In the early 1990s, SADC resuscitated the idea of regional coordination of migration with the introduction of its Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region. The Draft Protocol of 1995 goes beyond the problem of labour migration per se, to encompass wider issues of citizenship and the protection of basic rights. These rights include the right to cross-border movement within the region. The document calls for agreements to guarantee the right of SADC citizens to translocate and work in other SADC states, and to enter these states freely without the requirement of visas for visits of short duration (LMC, 1996).

However, the Draft Protocol is more ambiguous when it comes to the institutional framework necessary for researching, negotiating, establishing and monitoring these policies. In addition, its provisions have been opposed by labour receiving countries like South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. These states argue that the free movement of persons in the region would be unsustainable economically and politically due to the unevenness of national economic development within SADC (Mhone 1996). However, there is a view that the free movement of labour should be the longer term goal of SADC.

Within SADC structures there has been a general absence of labour policy discussion in the past. It was only as recently as 1996 that a formal institutional sub-structure for labour and employment issues was established under the SADC umbrella. The support systems of research and policy formulation and negotiation at national and regional level remain weak, and require strengthening and consolidation. For example, those countries most affected by the growing trade and labour conflict with South Africa have yet to develop the research and analytical capacities needed to engage with South African policy negotiators on an equal footing. Outside of South Africa, there is a serious lack of digested knowledge about current changes in labour and migration regulations, even though the impact of these changes will be crucial to neighbouring SADC states.

Another source of regional policy development within the ambit of SADC involves the trade union sector. Under the umbrella of the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), national labour centres in the region have increasingly made collective inputs into SADC level policy formulation on labour issues and related, broader concerns of economic planning and development. Within South Africa, leading trade unions — particularly in the mining, metal and clothing and textiles industries — have actively attempted to coordinate regional policy debates on labour migration within SADC. Some unions have regionalised their strategies out of concern for the impact that trade liberalisation and the movement of South African industries into the region will have upon their members.
The mineworkers' union, NUM, continues to be at the forefront of collaborative efforts in the region. In 1985 NUM assisted in the establishment of the Southern African Mineworkers Federation, an organisation representing 450,000 members which aims to facilitate coordination and solidarity among mineworkers in eight SADC countries. As a regional union, the Federation seeks to monitor the transfer of workers and ensure that employment agreements spell out workers' basic conditions of employment and benefits. A key goal of the Federation is to pre-empt the manipulation by transnational companies of mineworkers and their organisations in individual countries of the region, by developing a regional approach to labour relations in the sector.

South African unions in the clothing and textiles, metals and construction sectors, as well, are moving with similar intent towards regional engagement with unions in their respective sectors. By strengthening unions in surrounding countries, the South African unions aim to increase the bargaining power of workers in the entire region, as South African companies prepare to move into the region.

5.4 Conclusion

South African policies on labour migration are currently in a state of flux as the government re-evaluates its policy options. The contradictory demands and constraints imposed by inherited structures and actors have complicated the formulation of new policies; so too have the changing political and economic circumstances of countries in the region. But when labour migration in Southern Africa is considered historically and across the region, popular assumptions — for example, that migration mainly benefits the sending countries and has negative effects on South Africa — are called into question.

Recent South African debates on migration evidence a growing awareness of the regional context within which migration occurs. Various factors are prompting South African policy-makers to look seriously at whether regional options are consistent with national self-interest. These include the high costs and impossibility of unilateral policing of unauthorised migration, criticism by South African unions of the exploitative and undermining role of cheap illegal labour, pressures for rewarding regional anti-apartheid political solidarity and a sense that only economic growth in the SADC region as a whole can stem cross-border flows. The views of the Green Paper on International Migration and the South African Labour Market Commission may therefore enjoy wider currency and support in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the 1990s, SADC economies have been dramatically affected by economic reform programmes, political and economic change in South Africa, accelerating globalisation of trade and investment, and the growth of economic regionalism. Political liberalisation has opened new space for, and placed new demands on, policy-making processes in a region long deprived of peace, security and democracy. For labour markets, the prime effect of these transformations has been a marked change in national and regional levels of demand for labour, particularly in the skills level and quality of employment.

Both South Africa and other SADC countries are increasingly acknowledging the significance of regional linkages for their respective national economies. Political liberalisation, but also structural adjustment policies, have opened space for greater interaction among SADC countries. Recent years have witnessed the widening of the trade gap between South Africa and most of its neighbours in the region. On the other hand, the post apartheid era has also seen increasing flows of direct investment from South Africa into the region, and some of the country's SADC neighbours have benefited from this capital influx. While South Africa has certainly been the primary beneficiary, several countries in the region have also experienced employment and income benefits from regional economic integration.

In this context, a key finding of this report is that despite the decline of official demand for expatriate labour in South Africa in the 1990s, substantial increases in migrant flows from the region towards South Africa have been experienced. The scale of this trend, however, now shows signs of stabilising. The report also suggests that the patterns and forms of South African labour migration have changed radically. A large share of such migration is now towards various non-mining sectors, with the informal traders and small industries absorbing the bulk of migrants, and agriculture increasing its rates of migrant employment as well. Alongside this shift, there has been a notable decline in the proportion of migrants covered by national labour export agreements, and a corresponding rise in the number of undocumented "illegal" migrants. The extent of this phenomenon has been exaggerated in South Africa but such misinformation has had a strong influence on recent policy making.

There have also been rapid changes in the sectoral and skills composition of migrants. Significant numbers of professionals and other highly skilled workers from the region have relocated to South Africa in the 1990s, with the collapse of apartheid and the coming of democratic rule. Meanwhile, more short term, cyclical migration has also been observed. The traditionally dominant migrant sending states remain Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland, with Zimbabwe increasing its share of migrants, many of them relatively highly-skilled.
The report suggests that South Africa's relatively attractive employment conditions — notably the promise of higher real wages and wider employment prospects for many categories of work — provided important incentives for increased migration from other SADC countries in the 1990s. Although unemployment in South Africa is rising sharply and amid diminishing formal sector demands for labour, in absolute terms South Africa presents the best opportunities for wage labour in the region.

Inside the country, important sections of the business community have advocated labour market "flexibility" and continued use of low-cost migrant workers. Leading trade unions have sympathised with the plight of documented migrant workers, particularly in the mining sector where foreign migrants still comprise an important part of the workforce. Within the wider trade union movement, however, debates continue regarding the possible policy options which might enable both the protection of all workers in the South African labour market, and the safeguarding of jobs for South African nationals. Meanwhile, growing popular aspirations for socio-economic advancement and redress of apartheid injustices, have created the political conditions for anti-foreigner sentiment and heightened policy demands for the exclusion or severe restriction of foreign migrants.

Main Conclusions

In the context of the above observations, this report draws several broad conclusions:

1. South Africa has been a major beneficiary of labour migration for the past several decades, and its growth rates would have been significantly lower in key sectors without the benefits stemming from years of large scale migrancy. However, there has been little official and public recognition of this fact.

2. Most labour sending countries have realised net benefits at macro-economic, local and individual levels, despite the negative effects from the loss of labour in many local communities. But coordination and reworking of labour migration policies in South Africa and labour sending countries is needed for the optimisation of benefits to migrant labourers and their communities.

3. There is some indirect evidence of labour discrimination, for example in wage levels and conditions of work, against foreign migrants in various employment sectors in South Africa. More research is needed to quantify and explain this problem. However, most foreign workers in South Africa do suffer from low and inadequate levels of social protection compared to South African nationals, and this may be considered a form of discrimination in a broader sense. Recent liberalisation measures affecting South African migrant labour policy have done little to improve social protection coverage for most migrants.
4. Public perceptions of migrant workers in South Africa are sometimes misinformed by debates and policy positions emphasizing the negative features of migration for the country. Foreign migrants have, at times, become a political scapegoat for the economic problems now confronting South Africa. At the same time, nationalist responses in labour sending countries to South Africa's repatriation of migrants have occasionally exaggerated the degree of discrimination against foreign migrants, and contributed to a hardening of popular opinion against South African policies.

Policy Implications

South African policies dealing with labour migration are not yet well coordinated or broadly coherent. To date, new policy visions have been limited to a new tolerance of long standing Southern African migrants tempered by a desire to restrict further large-scale migration. Debate continues on the most effective means by which barriers and other disincentives to entry into the South African labour market can be achieved.

On their part, labour sending countries have had little incentive to stem the growing private and clandestine migration to South Africa. In the past labour exporting states readily controlled outward migration through bilateral agreements in order to guarantee revenue and foreign currency earnings. But more recently, the decline in formal demand for labour through these structures and the increase in privately arranged migration have reduced the benefits of state-controlled labour export. In light of the dramatic deterioration of their own labour markets in the 1990s, labour sending states have relaxed migration controls to try and relieve pressure on local job markets.

Current South African migrant labour policy is mostly comprised of ad hoc political instruments confined to the physical regulation of people's cross-border movements. This report argues that a humane approach to labour migration to South Africa should be adopted, within the framework of current regional cooperation, and given the history and context of regional labour migration. In this respect, the report supports the more humane and realistic approach to regional migration advocated by the South African Green Paper on migration and the Labour Market Commission.

Controls on the influx of foreign workers should take cognisance of (and normalise) the current residence status of migrants working in South Africa, give precedence to migrants from the region and relax restrictions on migrancy in line with national skill requirements. In addition, labour migrants to South Africa should enjoy the same workplace rights (and notably wages) as South African nationals, including a range of measures designed to expand and enhance social protection and security of employment. In the latter regard in particular, the South African labour market has long been notable for its inequitable treatment of foreign workers.
In all of these policy modifications, various ILO conventions relating to labour standards in the realm of migrancy and workplace rights could provide some guiding principles (Tajgman 1996). Both the Green Paper and the LMC Report make explicit recommendations to this effect. Two ILO Conventions in particular, the Migration for Employment Convention (No.97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplemental) Convention (No. 143), aim to regularise as much as possible the process of migration while leaving a large degree of flexibility in their interpretation and implementation. At the same time, however, they do not provide substantial practical advice or direction on the issue of undocumented or clandestine migration, or the sort of "own-account" employment which typifies migrant work in much of the informal sector in South Africa. Other instruments, notably Conventions Nos. 19, 118 and 157, also provide sets of adaptable standards on matters relating to social security issues and the social status of documented migrants in their country of work which have clear application in the current context of southern Africa, where even very basic principles and mechanisms of cross-border reciprocity, for example, are absent.

However, of the key migrancy conventions only No. 97 has been ratified in the region, and then just by two countries, Malawi and Zambia. Among the social security-related conventions, only the Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention (No. 19) has been ratified by most southern African countries (Mozambique and Namibia being the exceptions). No state in the region has ratified either of the social security related instruments, the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention (No. 118) or the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention (No. 157). These conventions and accompanying recommendations, nonetheless, may provide an important source of principles and initiatives for future policy making aimed at developing improved and humane labour migrancy standards in the region.

More broadly, beyond the narrower realm of labour migrancy policy, a realistic approach to labour migration should involve the elaboration and implementation of an integrated package of trade, investment and migration measures; in effect a kind of Regional Reconstruction and Development Programme. This programme would work within SADC to coordinate industrial policy, enhance trade and develop other measures for the improvement and balanced integration of different productive sectors — and labour markets — across the region. The formulation of such a programme requires sustained consultation and investment in regional analytic capacities. The policy analytic capacities of most of the affected countries and the SADC institution are currently too weak and under-resourced to address these problems. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of adequate information on migration trends, and their impact on levels of employment and the regional economy.

To date, there has been inadequate research of fundamental factors such as the effects of global and regional trade on investment, industrialisation, technological capacities and consequently, employment and migration. The current policy debate on migration neglects longer term shifts in the technological capacities, productivity patterns, and changing locales and quality of employment in labour sending and receiving countries. The effects of unequal regional patterns and rules of trade on industrial employment and investment flows are little understood, and more information is needed on the labour market impact of increasing informal cross-border trade.
The labour migration policy making capacities of all SADC states and SADC organs need to be strengthened, and encouraged towards a more comprehensive approach to regional policy making, if labour migration policy is to assume its proper place as a pivotal instrument for forging regional cooperation. Much, though not all, of the current research on migration has been based in South Africa and attends to only some aspects of the policy demands of South Africa as a labour receiver. The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and the Labour Law Unit at the University of Cape Town, for example, are both pursuing research agendas with a strong regional component and participation. Within affected labour sending countries, there has been little research and policy coordination among government departments and social partners concerned with migration issues. There has been even less regional policy coordination on migration, as demonstrated by the submergence of the SALC, the current disputes within SADC over a Free Movement Protocol, and the low levels of effective regional cooperation among national trade unions.

Although there is increased policy interest and awareness of the need for comprehensive and collaborative policies on regional migration, limited donor support has been given to resolving this issue, compared to support given for research and policy development on trade, investment, infrastructure, environment and gender themes. This report argues, however, that there can be little success in promoting economic reforms — especially trade and capital liberalisation — if the employment and labour migration effects of these reforms are not addressed and incorporated into the design of macro-economic and sectoral policies, at the national and regional level.

**Recommendations**

This study recommends that the following actions be addressed by the ILO-SAMAT in view of its regional capacity and experience:

1. **National Migration Policy Coordination and Administration Capacity**

The ILO should assist its tripartite partners, and a variety of interested social partners, towards improved policy formulation, policy coordination and administration of labour migration. There is need to build the policy capacities and systems of countries in the region, as well as to support activities to monitor the social security, labour and human rights of migrants.

This process should involve streamlining the roles, policies and procedures, legal instruments, activities and systems of various government agencies, in order to develop consistent governmental attitudes, policies and practices towards migration. Agencies involved in this process should include departments of labour, social welfare, home affairs/immigration, police/security, justice/human rights, as well as the sections of the productive sector which employ most migrants.
Similarly, the ILO should assist coordination with and among trade unions, NGOs, policy research centres, migrants associations and employers, to develop and articulate viable migration policies, and to engage in structured and comprehensive policy dialogue with their governments. This will require inputs such as technical expertise for policy analysis, facilitation of policy articulation, documentation, dialogue and public dissemination. These functions could perhaps be mobilised by the ILO/SAMAT from within the region, and by the ILO at large.

The ILO should provide advice, encouragement and otherwise facilitate moves towards the ratification by all countries in the region of instruments related directly to migrancy (Nos. 97 and 143) and social security (Nos. 19, 118 and 157), and assist in the adaptation of the principles contained in these Conventions and related Recommendations to the policy context of the region.

2. National and Regional Migration Information System

The collection of quality data on migration and its impacts should be promoted. This process should include the standardisation, analysis and publication of collected data, and the exchange of information among countries. Support should be given for the use of such information for policy analysis by all partners concerned with migration.


ILO/SAMAT should collaborate with and support regional centres and networks of policy research, as well as national centres, in order to broaden the analytical capacities of existing institutions for policy dialogue on migration. Well structured policy dialogue activities bringing together analysts, tripartite partners and other concerned interests should be supported. Specific research activities should focus on the following themes:

a) Trade, employment and migration;
b) Sectoral patterns of migration, productivity and technical change;
c) Cross-border informal sector activities, migration and employment trends;
d) Deferred payment systems and their impact;
e) Rehabilitation of returning migrants;
f) Harmonisation of labour standards and policies;
g) The social security and human rights of migrants;
h) Migration trends among skilled workers and professionals (brain drain).

4. Social Security Initiatives

Changes are needed in South African social protection policy for migrants in order to bring existing measures into closer conformity with both the spirit and the letter of South Africa's new democracy, whose Constitution specifically guarantees all residents of the country the right to social security. Changes are also needed at regional level, in coordinated efforts, if the current unbalanced patterns of labour migrancy are to be
regulated effectively for the benefit of all countries in the region.

Activities to improve understanding, analysis and policy making relating to the social protection of workers should be promoted. This should include research on the impact of social protection regulations on migrants, and more widely, on the changing patterns of migrancy in the region. Policy debate and cooperation around issues of social protection should be encouraged and supported at national and regional level. Specific attention should be accorded the following issues:

a) extension of minimum wage protection to all workers in South Africa, and the elimination of current differences in the application of such standards to the formal and informal sector, and documented and undocumented workers;

b) enhancement and extension of social protection to all labour migrants in South Africa, regardless of their temporary or permanent status, and with a view to both narrowing the gaps in social protection between South African and SADC nationals, and improving the scope, funding, management and equitable implementation of existing schemes;

c) research and policy support involving the use of social protection benefit schemes as a means of investment, job creation and resettlement of retrenched or retired migrant workers in workers' home countries;

d) support for and coordination of improved social policy and programmes at regional level, including instruments supporting a variety of forms of reciprocity on a number of social protection measures and if desired, closer integration of social protection schemes at regional level;

e) new research on the nature and degree of discrimination against labour migrants in the South African labour market, including not only issues of wages and conditions of work, but also access to workplace and wider social protection, and related forms of discrimination stemming from immigration restrictions.

5. Regional Policy Capacity Support

Activities to improve the regional exchange of information on migration, policy and analysis and policy coordination, as well as collaboration in the administration of various aspects of migration, should be promoted. This implies investing in technical inputs which support:

a) Revision and development of the SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People;
b) Revision and development of a more comprehensive SADC Trade Protocol, which takes into account the impact of regional interdependence, bilateral agreements and current economic imbalances, and global and regional trade, on employment and migration within SADC member states;

c) Strengthening of national and regional labour organisations' capacity to collect, analyze and make coordinated policy interventions around labour market issues at national and regional level; including efforts aimed at harmonising and standardising labour laws, social protection schemes and regulations on cross-border movements.

6. Regional Reconstruction and Development Plan

The ILO/SAMAT should facilitate activities towards the design of a SADC Regional Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) in conjunction with key socio-economic actors in SADC governments, the SADC secretariat, business, labour, NGOs and policy analysis institutes. The objectives of such an RRDP could include:

a) Development of an appropriate integrated regional policy framework for an RRDP, which combines aspects on labour and migration, trade and investment, infrastructure and various social policies, within a coherent regional macro-economic policy framework.

b) Design of a series of regional sectoral development programmes which focus on sectors not adequately covered by existing SADC structures and programmes; and improvement and strengthening of cooperation around the latter. In recognition of the emerging reality of greater regional integration, the regional sectoral development plans would aim to promote coordinated, balanced and cooperative regional positions and policies relating to different sectoral activities.

c) Identification and mobilisation of a variety of new and additional financial resources from a range of external sources in the public and private sphere, towards the implementation of the RRDP.

d) Rehabilitation and reintegration of the growing number of retrenched workers, through special regional labour intensive public projects, and through the enhancement of small and informal sector enterprise development.

e) Promotion of more effective formal and informal cross-border trade policies, regulations and facilities, especially concerning women and smaller entrepreneurs.

f) Promotion of further research and coordinated studies into the RRDP and other regional labour migrancy issues; and efforts aimed at heightening public awareness of the RRDP and other issues, such as migrant labour protection.
g) Strengthening and consolidation of the capacity of existing non-governmental policy analysis institutions, including independent research organisations, trade union research units and business promotion and research agencies, in order to broaden their awareness of and contributions to, SADC policies and the new RRDP.

The ILO/SAMAT should jointly develop proposals for the implementation of the above objectives with a variety of regional policy analysis organisations, and facilitate the raising of funding for such activities, in order to broaden the creativity and ownership of the RRDP concept.

It is recommended that the ILO/SAMAT organise workshops, involving key government actors, trade unions, policy research centres and employers at regional level; and later, at national level (especially in South Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Botswana). These workshops would aim to discuss the migration problem and the nature of actions required; and discuss the above recommendations in more detail. It is critical for the ILO/SAMAT to identify key collaborating partners, including policy research centres, the SADC secretariat, regional trade union federations and others, to facilitate the actions identified.
### Table 2.1: Sources of Mine Labour, Average Number of Black Workers Employed, 1920-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RSA</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Bots.</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Swazi</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>74,452</td>
<td>77,921</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>10,439</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>5,484</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>174,402</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>92,772</td>
<td>77,828</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>3,151</td>
<td>22,306</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>200,634</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>178,708</td>
<td>74,883</td>
<td>8,037</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>14,427</td>
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<td>347,054</td>
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<td>2,073</td>
<td>5,496</td>
<td>9,767</td>
<td>12,390</td>
<td>34,467</td>
<td>6,619</td>
<td>370,614</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>141,806</td>
<td>101,733</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>14,025</td>
<td>21,404</td>
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<td>6,623</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>13,565</td>
<td>8,770</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>421,885</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. Yudelman, Southern African Labour Empire (Bovidlic, 1991)

### Table 2.2 SADC VISITORS TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1980-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
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**Source:** SAMP Migration Data Base
Table 2.3 Issue of Temporary Residence Permits in South Africa, 1990-1996

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*Source: SAMP Migration Data Base*

Table 2.4 Immigration to South Africa, 1990-1999 Permanent Residence

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*Source: SAMP Migration Data Base*
## Table 2.5 Contract Migration to Chamber of Mines Member Mines, 1984-1994

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**Source:** SAMP Migration Data Base

## Table 2.6 Mineworkers Amnesty

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<tr>
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**Total** 50 692
### Table 2.7  Applications for the SAD

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*Source: SAMP Migration Database*
Table 2.8 Refugees in South Africa, January 1996

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*Source: SAMP Migration Data base*
Table 2.9 Deportations of SADC Citizens from South Africa

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*Source: SAMP Migration Data Base*

Table 3.1 SADC Labour Market Data

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Table 3.2 South Africa’s Trade with SADC: 1990-1995

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<tr>
<td>Total Exports to SADC</td>
<td>402</td>
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<td>984</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>2,314</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>401</td>
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<td>470</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>852</td>
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<td>Total Imports from SADC</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
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<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>132</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>354</td>
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Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, IMF.

Table 3.3 Changes in Employment in the Formal Economy: 1980/1992

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1 459 900</td>
<td>1 447 200</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>976 400</td>
<td>1 360 100</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail/Wholesale</td>
<td>943 700</td>
<td>981 600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1 009 900</td>
<td>872 900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>868 200</td>
<td>787 300</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>768 600</td>
<td>662 600</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>291 800</td>
<td>474 900</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>398 700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>502 200</td>
<td>401 900</td>
<td>-20.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Government</td>
<td>261 900</td>
<td>313 800</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>79 100</td>
<td>81 600</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL GROWTH</td>
<td>7 560 400</td>
<td>7 801 600</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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### Table 3.4 Basic Economic Indicators: SADC (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GNP, USDbn</th>
<th>GNP PER CAPITA USD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>800.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1900.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>750.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3 250.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>80.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1 950.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1 300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>3 130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>370.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>540.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>168.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Avg) 1 200.0</strong></td>
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### Table 3.5 Monthly Household Income in SA by Population Group among the Economically Active Population (N = 142 297 000)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>POPULATION GROUP (%)</th>
<th>R419-R420</th>
<th>R420-R726</th>
<th>R727-R1386</th>
<th>R1387-R2752</th>
<th>R2753+</th>
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<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
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<td>Indian</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
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*Source: S. Shabalala (1996)*

### Table 3.6 Foreign Direct Investment Into SADC : 1981-1998

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<td>119</td>
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<td>665</td>
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<tr>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>-8</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>15</td>
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*Sources: African Development Indicators 1994-95, World Bank Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, 1995*
Chapter 4

Table 4.1 Proportion Of Migrants To Active Labour Force 1900-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>WORKER YEARS IN MILLIONS by 1990</th>
<th>MIGRANTS AS % POP. 1990</th>
<th>MIGRANTS AS % POP. 1955</th>
<th>MIGRANTS AS % POP. 1900</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>&gt;1%</td>
<td>&gt;1%</td>
<td>&gt;1%</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>SADC Average</td>
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<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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Table 4.2 Mine Remittance to Sending Countries, 1994

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<th>Other</th>
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<td>Amount</td>
<td>% Total</td>
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<td>1,776,450</td>
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<td>17,806,669</td>
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Source: SAMP Migration Data Base
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## ANNEX

### PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
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