

Jobs and livelihoods for a peaceful and resilient Burundi



International
Labour
Organization

*Jobs and livelihoods for a peaceful and resilient Burundi*¹
July 2017

The Country

Burundi is a small, landlocked country in east-central Africa's Great Lakes region, covering a land area of 25,678 km² (plus 2,150 km² covered by water). The UNFPA estimates Burundi to have a population of 11.2 million people (2016). The population growth rate is 3.3 percent per year, more than double the average global rate. Burundi remains an overwhelmingly rural society, with just 12% of the population living in urban areas in 2015. One fifth of the population (19.2%) are in the age bracket 15 to 24 years. The population density of around 436 people per square kilometre is the second highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Roughly 85% of the population are of Hutu ethnic origin, 15% are Tutsi, and less than 1% belong to the indigenous Twa ethnic group (Pygmies).

With a GDP per current of 286 US-\$ current (2014) Burundi is one of the poorest country in the world; it's human development index ranks 184th among 187 nations (2015). Two thirds of the population (68%) live below the national poverty line. The degree of inequality (42.4), as measured by the Gini coefficient, is relatively moderate compared to other countries in the region. The labour market in Burundi is characterized by the predominance of informal sector, low labour productivity, and low wages. The labour participation rate is very high (83%) for both women



¹ This think Piece is authored by Jürgen Schwettmann, ILO Consultant with guidance and commentary by Mary Kwar, ILO Director for Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda

and men, meaning that almost everyone works because unemployment is not a real option. It is estimated that 95% of Burundians work in the informal economy, including small-scale agriculture.

Burundi legislative system consists of a bicameral Parliament which comprises a Senate (49 seats in the July 2015 election²³) and the National Assembly (121 seats in the June 2015 election⁴). The members of both chambers serve 5-year terms. The President serves as both head of state and head of government and is supported by two vice-presidents.

A brief History⁵

Burundi is one of the few African nations which emerged from the colonial period as a direct territorial continuation of a pre-colonial African state. The Kingdom of Burundi existed according to the traditional account from the 16th century until 1966, but it is now thought that the first king began to reign in 1680. Like the monarchy in neighbouring Rwanda it was led by Tutsi kings. In 1899 Burundi was colonized by Germany; in 1916 Belgian troops conquered the area during the First World War. In 1923, the League of Nations mandated to Belgium the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, encompassing modern-day Rwanda and Burundi. The Belgians administered the territory through indirect rule, building on the Tutsi-dominated aristocratic hierarchy.

Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi became a United Nations Trust Territory under Belgian administrative authority. On 20 January 1959, Burundi's ruler Mwami Mwambutsa IV requested Burundi's independence from Belgium and dissolution of the Ruanda-Urundi union. In the following months, Burundian political parties began to advocate for the end of Belgian colonial rule and the separation of Rwanda and Burundi.

Full independence was achieved on July 1, 1962. In the context of weak democratic institutions at independence, Tutsi King Mwambutsa IV established a constitutional monarchy comprising equal numbers of Hutus and Tutsis. The 15 January 1965 assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe set in motion a series of destabilizing Hutu revolts and subsequent governmental repression. In October 1965, a group of Hutu carried out a failed coup attempt against the monarchy, which in turn prompted the killing of scores of Hutu politicians and intellectuals. On 8 July 1966, King Mwambutsa IV was deposed by his son, Prince Ntare V, who himself was deposed by his Prime Minister Capt. Michel Micombero on 28 November 1966. Micombero abolished the monarchy and declared a republic. A de facto military regime emerged and civil unrest continued throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. Similar to 1965, rumours of an impending Hutu coup in 1969 prompted the arrest and execution of scores of prominent political and military figures.

On April 29, 1972, there was an outbreak of violence in the south of the country, where bands of roving Hutu committed innumerable atrocities against Tutsi civilians. All civilian and military authorities in the city of Bururi were killed and the insurgents then attempted to kill every Tutsi they could, as well as some Hutu who refused to participate in the rebellion. A week later government troops moved in. Meanwhile, President Micombero declared martial law on May 30 and asked Zairean President Mobutu for assistance. What followed was not so much a repression as a hideous slaughter of Hutu civilians. The carnage went on unabated through the month of August. By then virtually every educated Hutu element, down to secondary school students, was either dead or in flight. From late

³ Of whom 34 members are indirectly elected by an electoral college of provincial councils; 4 seats reserved for former heads of state, 3 seats reserved for Twas, and 8 seats for women.

⁴ Of whom 100 members are directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 21 co-opted members – 3 Twas and 18 women.

⁵ This section relies largely on various Wikipedia entries.

April to September 1972, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 Hutu were killed. About 300,000 people became refugees, with most fleeing to Tanzania.

In 1976, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took power in a bloodless coup. Although Bagaza led a Tutsi-dominated military regime, he encouraged land reform, electoral reform, and national reconciliation. In 1981, a new constitution was promulgated. In 1984, Bagaza was elected head of state, as the sole candidate. In 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya overthrew Bagaza in a military coup d'état. He dissolved opposition parties, suspended the 1981 constitution, and instituted his ruling Military Committee for National Salvation (CSMN). During 1988, increasing tensions between the ruling Tutsis and the majority Hutus resulted in violent confrontations between the army, the Hutu opposition, and Tutsi hardliners. During this period, an estimated 150,000 people were killed, with tens of thousands of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Buyoya formed a commission to investigate the causes of the 1988 unrest and to develop a charter for democratic reform. In 1991, Buyoya approved a constitution that provided for a president, non-ethnic government, and a parliament. Burundi's first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, of the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) Party, was elected in 1993.

Ndadaye was assassinated three months later, in October 1993, by Tutsi army extremists. The country's situation rapidly declined as Hutu peasants began to rise up and massacre Tutsi. In acts of brutal retribution, the Tutsi army proceeded to round up thousands of Hutu and kill them. The Rwandan Genocide in 1994, sparked by the killing of Ndadaye's successor Cyprien Ntaryamira, further aggravated the conflict in Burundi by sparking additional massacres of Tutsis.

A decade of civil war followed, as the Hutu formed militias in the refugee camps of northern Tanzania. An estimated 300,000 people were killed in clashes and reprisals against the local population, with 550,000 citizens being displaced. After the assassination of Ntaryamira, the Hutu presidency and Tutsi military operated under a power-sharing political system until July 1996, when Tutsi Pierre Buyoya seized power in a military coup. Under international pressure, the warring factions negotiated a peace agreement in Arusha in 2000, which called for ethnically balanced military and government and democratic elections. Sporadic violence continued until 2006, when the powerful Hutu rebel group FNL finally signed a peace agreement with government.

In February 2007, the UN shut down its peacekeeping operations in Burundi and turned its attention to rebuilding the nation's economy, which had suffered severely during 12 years of civil war. The UN had deployed 5,600 peacekeepers since 2004, and several hundred troops remained to work with the African Union in monitoring the ceasefire.

The Arusha Peace Agreement mandated that local and national elections be held before the ending of the transitional period on 31 October 2004, but transitional institutions were extended. On 28 February 2005, Burundians approved a post-transitional constitution by national referendum, with elections set to take place throughout the summer of 2005. After local, parliamentary, and other elections in June and July, on 19 August 2005, the good governance minister, Pierre Nkurunziza, became the first post-transitional president. He was re-elected in 2010 with more than 91% of the votes amidst an opposition boycott. In April, 2015, Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term in office. The opposition said that Nkurunziza's bid to extend his term was in defiance of the constitution, as it bars the president from running for a third term. However, Nkurunziza's allies said his first term did not count as he was appointed by parliament and not directly by the people. On April 26, 2015 police clashed with demonstrators protesting Nkurunziza's announcement that he would seek a third term in office. At least six people were killed in the first two days of ongoing protests. The government shut down multiple radio stations and arrested a prominent civil society leader, Pierre-

Claver Mbonimpa. More than 24,000 people fled Burundi in April, as tensions mounted ahead of presidential elections in June. On May 13, 2015, Burundi army General Godefroid Niyombareh, former head of Burundian intelligence, declared a coup via radio while Nkurunziza was abroad attending a summit in Tanzania. Despite reports that gunshots had been heard and people were celebrating in the streets of the capital, government officials dismissed the threat and claimed to remain in control.

The presidential election was held on 21 July, 2015, without the participation of the opposition. Main opposition leader Agathon Rwasa proposed the formation of a national unity government, under the condition that Nkurunziza's third term would need to be greatly truncated to no more than one year. The government welcomed the idea of forming a national unity government, but rejected the notion of truncating Nkurunziza's new term. The presidential election results were announced on 24 July 2015. Nkurunziza won the election with 69.41% of the vote. Agathon Rwasa was placed second and credited with 18.99%.

The Economy

Burundi is a resource-poor country with an insignificant manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population⁶. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for 90% of foreign exchange earnings. Thus, Burundi's export earnings - and its ability to pay for imports - rest primarily on weather conditions and international coffee and tea prices, although exports are a relatively small share of GDP. Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors. Foreign aid in 2014 represented 42% of Burundi's national income, the second highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009; the country is also a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the (practically dormant) Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).

Although political stability, aid flows, and economic activity improved following the end of the civil war in the 1990s, the underlying structural weaknesses - a high poverty rate, poor education rates, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, overburdened utilities, and low administrative capacity - have prevented the government from implementing planned economic reforms. Government corruption has also hindered the development of a private sector as companies have to deal with ever changing rules.

Since 2010, Burundi has recorded average annual growth of 4% despite difficult international conditions. These have been characterised by rising world prices for fuel and food, leading to significant inflationary pressure. In 2014, real GDP growth was estimated at 4.7% compared to 4.5% in 2013, due mainly to agriculture through an upturn in coffee production and a dynamic construction sector implementing large-scale infrastructure projects (fibre optic, roads, etc.). However, the Economist Intelligence Unit⁷ believes that Burundi's real GDP will contract in 2016, followed by tentative but positive economic growth in 2017 as the security situation shows signs of improvement. The expected economic downturn in 2016 is largely due to the political turmoil over President Nkurunziza's controversial third term. This led to blocked transportation routes disrupting the flow of agricultural goods, as well as a sharp reduction in official development aid, thus further increasing

⁶ Burundi's land scarcity is further exacerbated by soil erosion which occurs as a result of overgrazing and the expansion of agriculture into marginal lands, as well as deforestation because of the uncontrolled cutting of trees for fuel.

⁷ See: <http://country.eiu.com/burundi>

Burundi's budget deficit of currently 5.2% of GDP. When the unrest ends, regional infrastructure improvements driven by the EAC and funded by the World Bank may help improve Burundi's transport connections, and lower transportation costs.

Although much of the violence has subsided in recent years, extreme poverty, a lack of law and order and ongoing human right violations, as well as the difficulty of integrating former rebels into state institutions, continue to be major barriers to stability and sustainable peace in the country.

As part of its long-term planning process Burundi has developed its "Vision 2025" as a document of national consensus and roadmap towards economic and social development. Vision 2025 is based on eight pillars with the aim of putting Burundi on the path of economic growth and fight against poverty. Those eight pillars are: (1) good governance and capacity building of the state, (2) human capital, (3) economic growth and fight against poverty, (4) regional Integration (5) demographics, (6) social cohesion, (7) territorial planning and urbanization, and (8) partnerships. In line with Vision 2025 the Government initiated the development of the second generation of the Strategic Framework for Growth and the Fight against Poverty (PRSP II), which places *job creation and growth* at the centre of future poverty reduction programs.

Burundi's Multidimensional Fragility

The Fund for Peace⁸ considers Burundi as the 18th most fragile country out of 178 reviewed in 2016. The ILO "Meta Index of Africa's Fragile States"⁹ ranks Burundi at the third most fragile country (after South Sudan and Somalia) among the 14 African member states of [the g7+ group of \(self-declared\) fragile states](#). This groups defines fragility as follows: "A state of fragility can be understood as a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and state building activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery."

Burundi is affected by many different factors of fragility, namely:

- *Demographic pressure*: a very high population density (450 persons per km²) combined with a low urbanization rate (12%) and the youthfulness of the population (65% of all Burundians are less than 25 years of age). The large majority of Burundians depend on small-scale agriculture for their livelihood, but the average farm family plot is only 0.8 hectares (two acres) and will shrink further if population growth continues. Moreover, food crops compete with export crops (mainly coffee and tea), which contribute 90% of the country's exports.
- *Refugee movements*: The UNHCR estimates that 200,700 Burundians have fled the country while 78,900 people are internally displaced. In addition, Burundi hosts 54,100 refugees from third countries, and must reintegrate thousands of former rebel fighters.
- *Armed conflict, civil strife and political instability*: as described above Burundi has been plagued by recurrent outbreaks of violence since independence. In most cases such violence was caused by the tension between the two main population groups, namely Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, Burundi has been affected by the instability prevailing in the East of the DR Congo. And thirdly, the country has witnessed 4 coups d'état and 12 (mostly violent) regime changes since its independence in 1962.

⁸ See: <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/2015-burundi>

⁹ Decent Work in Fragile States - An operational strategy, ILO ROAF (J.Schwettmann), June 2016

- *Poverty*: The IMF estimates Burundi's GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity at 951 \$ in 2015; by this measure Burundi would be the fifth poorest nation in the world. Moreover, some 95% of all Burundians must eke out a living in the informal economy and in subsistence agriculture and are therefore not covered by any type of formal social protection systems.
- *Governance issues*: Burundi ranks very low on three of [the World Bank's governance indicators](#), namely control of corruption (9.62 out of 100), government effectiveness (14.9 of 100), and rule of law (16.83 of 100). In 2016 Burundi ranks 152 (out of 187) in the World Bank "doing business" index.
- *Economic Factors*: Burundi is plagued by a high budget deficit (5.1% of GDP) and a very high dependency on donor funding, including for the national budget; the country is therefore exposed to the cascading effects of sudden cuts in ODA¹⁰, such as those that occurred in mid-2015.

The above factors are strongly inter-related; and while it is not always easy to distinguish between the causes and effects of fragility, one might argue that in the case of Burundi, a combination of high demographic pressure, lingering ethnic tension and poor governance has been at the origin of widespread poverty, civil strife and political upheavals.

Employment and Livelihoods

Jobs and the factors of fragility

The present think piece suggests that the creation of jobs and livelihood opportunities can address two of the three root causes identified above:

- *More jobs* will obviously create income and thus alleviate poverty
- *New jobs* in non-agricultural occupations can reduce the demographic pressure.

In fact, Burundi is not *overpopulated as such*; but its population density is too high for an essentially rural society whose members rely primarily on a combination of subsistence farming, pastoralism and small-scale cash crop production. Alternative job and livelihood opportunities in non-farm occupations, for example in small scale industries, artisanal mining, tourism, labour-intensive services such as data processing, etc., would reduce the pressure on scarce land and encourage people to move from dispersed rural dwellings to cities and urban areas, where public services are more readily available. Burundi's private sector, government and its development partners should therefore promote:

- *More jobs*: in all sectors, both in the private and public sphere, through the promotion of self-employment, small enterprises, collective entrepreneurship¹¹ and wage employment;
- *Better jobs*: gradually improving working conditions, including minimum wages, extending a minimum level of social protection to all workers, and formalizing the informal economy. This is an area where sound social dialogue between workers, employers and government can play an important role.

¹⁰ One example: the cut of general budget support to the Ministry of Agriculture meant that this ministry was no longer able to subsidize agricultural inputs to small farmers. This in turn had significantly reduced agricultural productivity and incomes, thus affecting the rural economy as a whole.

¹¹ Collective entrepreneurship is being used here as an umbrella term encompassing cooperatives, informal economy associations, farmers' groups and similar organizations belonging to the social and solidarity economy.


- *Different jobs*: gradually moving out of small-scale agriculture into industry and services, as mentioned above. This would require investments in vocational training and skills development.

The failure to create jobs and livelihood opportunities, in particular for young women and men, might have a destabilizing effect and could exacerbate other factors of fragility affecting Burundi.

In addition, it will be important to support employment promotion programmes with interventions that reduce socio-economic vulnerabilities while fostering good governance through a vibrant and inclusive social dialogue.

Jobs and peace in post-conflict situations – a UN consensus

The centrality of jobs and livelihoods for peace and stability has long been recognized by the international community. The interdependence between jobs and peace lies at the heart of the United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration, which establishes a common understanding and framework for all UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes to act in concert for these critical goals. The Policy defines **three strategic tracks of intervention** to guide priority setting and the formulation of programmes in post-conflict contexts. These are illustrated in the chart below.



The three tracks start at different levels of intensity (in terms of political, human, financial resources and efforts invested) and progress in parallel according to diverging curbs along the timeline towards sustainable peace and development as tracks aim at a different peace building priorities, beneficiaries and stakeholders.

Track A: Stabilizing incomes and short-term employment creation

Programmes in this track target immediate and short-term job creation, for instance through cash-for-work initiatives in basic public infrastructures and social services; emergency public employment services and short cycle skills training to facilitate the matching between supply and demand of jobs and skills in particular in the (re)construction and aid sectors; and the protection of income levels and conservation/restoration of productive assets, for instance through basic livelihood and enterprise start-up grants and technical assistance.

Track B: Local economic recovery, employment opportunities and reintegration

Key programmes in this track support the recovery of organizational capacities to boost market mechanisms and inclusive growth, and the provision of services; this is done most often by building the capacities of public service authorities (including customary/traditional institutions), of the providers of financial and business development services, as well as other social services organizations (including unions and employers organizations, associations, non-governmental organizations). As fragility often has a strong local dimension, these efforts are often localised and involve participatory and community-driven processes. Consequently, there is often a close connection between local economic recovery and development, and the organisations and institutions of the social and solidarity economy¹² (SSE). In situations where public services¹² are inefficient or not at all available cooperatives, self-help organizations and other SSE associations can ensure the provision of basic economic and social services. Moreover, the SSE can play an important role in harnessing the economic potential of a certain territory, thus creating jobs and livelihoods through self-help and collective action. In addition, SSE organizations can facilitate access to markets, to agricultural inputs and to financial services, through organizations such as savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs or COPEC). Some 120 COPEC with around 250.000 members operate currently in Burundi (see: www.fenacobu.bi).

Track C: Sustainable employment creation and decent work

Key programmes in this track often involve an up scaling through national programmes and a mainstreaming through policy and institutional development of local successes conducted earlier on, for the benefit of the wider country or region; beyond that, the longer term perspectives to promote job-rich and inclusive growth are also tackled thereon, including the micro- and macro-economic and fiscal policies, social security systems, trade and investment regimes, industrial and other sectoral policies, access to finance and other key services for SMEs, as well as the legal environment for labour, freedom of association, and other fundamental rights in the world of work¹³. In this track as well cooperatives and the wider social and solidarity economy can play a crucially beneficial role.

Jobs in peace and state building

Job creation is also one of the five peace and state building goals adopted by the [International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building](#) which is supported by International Network on Conflict

¹² There is no universal definition of the term “social economy”, but a universal recognition of the principles guiding it. [A tripartite conference](#) organized in 2009 by the ILO Regional Office for Africa adopted the following definition: the social economy is a concept designating enterprises and organizations, in particular cooperatives, mutual benefit societies, associations, foundations and social enterprises, which have the specific feature of producing goods, services and knowledge while pursuing both economic and social aims and fostering solidarity.

¹³ See: <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Item-3f-Operational-Guidance-Note-Post-Conflict-Employment-Creation-Income-Generation-and-Reintegration.pdf>

and Fragility (INCAF), the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states (of which Burundi is a member), and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and State building (CSPPS). The five goals are:

- Legitimate politics: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.
- Security: Establish and strengthen people's security.
- Justice: Address injustices and increase people's access to justice.
- Economic Foundations: Generate employment and improve livelihoods.
- Revenues & Services: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

Burundi joined the g7+ in 2010 and has subsequently endorsed the New Deal; a Partners Coordination Group has been established as the framework for dialogue between the Government of Burundi and development partners.

Job creation is also at the centre of the ILO [“A framework strategy for ILO's engagement in promoting decent work in fragile states in the Africa region”](#) which was adopted by the 13th ILO Regional Meeting for Africa, held in December 2015 in Addis Ababa. One of ILO's five so-called “flagship programmes” is named “Jobs for Peace Resilience, and calls for a combination of employment-intensive investment strategies, skills development and enterprise promotion. Moreover, the 2016 and 2017 International Labour Conferences will discuss the revision of ILO Recommendation 71 which was adopted in 1944 under the title “Transition from War to Peace”. The new instrument, if adopted in 2017, shall place employment and decent work at the heart of efforts to overcome fragility, crisis and disasters.

Job creation for sustainable development

The Millennium Development Goals did not target employment creation specifically, although an employment-related indicator had been added to MDG 1 at a later stage. The post-2030 development agenda, however, includes a dedicated sustainable development goal (SDG 8) on economic growth, productive employment and decent work. Employment and livelihood related aspects are included under many other sustainable development goals and targets, including those that call for improved productivity and for greater access to finance, markets, resources etc.

None of the eight MDGs addresses fragility and peace building directly. The post-2030 agenda however includes SDG 16 entitled “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” which refers to the main building blocks of the New Deal.

The “Addis Ababa Action Agenda” (the outcome document of the 3rd Financing for Development Conference (2015) recognizes the importance of concentrating the scarce amounts of ODA on the poorest, most vulnerable and most fragile countries, because those countries suffer from the highest concentration of poverty.

Job creation: a cross-cutting concern

Jobs can be created in many different forms and sectors, and therefore requires the active participation of the broadest range of public and private actors, including social partners and civil society. Job creation is not the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and/or Employment; in fact, one might argue that other government authorities, such as the ministries of industry, tourism and agriculture, can play a greater role in creating employment opportunities than the Ministry of Labour. The greatest impetus for job creation, however, must come from the private sector.

Similarly, within the UN system, the objective of employment, jobs and livelihood creation cannot and should not be seen as the sole responsibility of the International *Labour* Organization. All other UN agencies can, and actually do, play a role in promoting employment. This was recognized through the adoption in April 2007 by the UN Chief Executive Board (CEB) of the “[Toolkit for Mainstreaming Employment and Decent Work](#)”. This publication is meant as a self-assessment tool for UN agencies at the headquarter level to examine the role of the respective agency in creating jobs and decent work; it has also been used by UN country teams to design joint UN employment generation programmes.

Next steps

Since the creation of jobs, employment and livelihoods is a cross-cutting concern the UN system in Burundi might consider initiating and/or supporting a coordination mechanism at three levels:

- Among the various UN agencies active in Burundi: this could take the form of a sub-group of the UN country team;
- Among development partners: establishment of a thematic group on employment and livelihoods under the umbrella of the Development Partners Group.
- Among government authorities: setting up of an inter-ministerial working group focusing on employment issues. Such a group would of course have to be formed by a government decision, but the UN could provide technical support.

The aforementioned CEB toolkit could play a useful role in supporting all three coordination mechanisms.

The overall objective of this approach would consist of promoting employment creation and social justice through a “virtuous triangle” of **opportunity, protection and empowerment** – as a means to achieving stability, peace and development in Burundi. This could be concretized through three complementary immediate objectives:

- Creating more and better employment **opportunities** through the better use of local resources, labour intensive infrastructure development, “green jobs” and livelihood diversification; this area would include the promotion of cooperatives, SACCOS/COPEC, and the wider social and solidarity economy with a particular focus on rural areas and the informal economy.
- Reducing vulnerabilities and adapting the UN concept of a **social protection floor** by building on existing, community-based practices of mutuality, reciprocity and solidarity; this could include the design of systems or mechanisms that combine social assistance or cash transfer schemes with employment and income generating activities in the public, communal or private spheres through, for example, infrastructure development, the provision of social services, apprenticeship and mentoring programmes (including in the informal economy), etc.
- Improving governance through the **empowerment** of the Burundian citizens; this could be achieved through enhanced social dialogue, a strengthened civil society and a vibrant social and solidarity economy.

In the spirit of SDG 17 (“global partnerships”) the actual implementation of this strategy could be achieved through a partnership involving government, the private sector, the UN system and the development partners.

Key Resources:

Operational-Guidance-Note-Post-Conflict-Employment-Creation-Income-Generation-and-Reintegration.pdf <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Item-3f->

A Framework Strategy for ILO's Engagement in Promoting Decent Work in Fragile States in the Africa Region http://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/africa/arm13/reports/WCMS_425045/lang--en/index.htm

ILO revises the Recommendation concerning Employment Organisation in the Transition from War to Peace http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/recovery-and-reconstruction/WCMS_396254/lang--en/index.htm

Employment and decent work in situations of fragility, conflict and disaster http://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Instructionmaterials/WCMS_141275/lang--en/index.htm

Tags: Poverty eradication, Fragile States, Employment, Decent work, Humanitarian-Development nexus

Regions and Countries covered: Africa, Burundi