



International
Labour
Organization

► Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa)

Tackling the youth employment challenge



► **Report on employment in Africa
(Re-Africa)**

Tackling the youth employment
challenge

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► Foreword

Coming after the 14th Africa Regional Meeting (14th ARM), this first edition of the report on Employment in Africa (Re-Africa) is timely. The Abidjan Declaration, *Advancing Social Justice: shaping the future of work in Africa*, is in complete accord with the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work, 2019, and a commitment to the ILO's tripartite constituents that takes a human-centred approach to the future of work. I regard this commitment to be an undertaking a) to make decent work a reality for Africa's youth; b) to strengthen the capacity of all people to benefit from the opportunities offered by a changing world; c) to promote inclusive and sustainable economic development; and d) to encourage synergies between the ILO and institutions in Africa.

This report provides vital statistics and information in support of the implementation of the Abidjan Declaration, focusing particularly on youth employment. In so doing, it gives an account of recent economic developments and highlights general trends of key indicators, such as real GDP, per capita GDP, labour productivity and wages.

Employment and social trends in Africa are presented in detail and priority given to key labour market indicators. First, labour force participation is discussed, with close attention to the supply side of labour in Africa. The gender dimension is considered and the gender gap analysed. Second, employment is considered in terms of growth and employment-to-population ratios, and most importantly, how it is characterized in the African context. Third, the report presents

an important discussion of unemployment and labour underutilization.

The focus then moves on to youth and the youth employment challenge. Trends in the youth labour force and working poverty, youth unemployment rates, youth that find themselves not in education, employment or training (NEET) and issues around youth labour underutilization are each discussed in depth. Consideration is given to what the implications might be for the status of youth in the continent's labour markets. Utilizing econometric models, the report analyses the determinants of employment, informality and wages among youth. This concludes with a trend analysis that forms the basis of the policy discourse that then follows.

This report is a first step towards a better understanding of Africa's labour market, examining as it does the dynamics at play in the continent's world of work and projecting future trends. For the most part, given the limited availability of data, the report's authors have had to dig deep in order to examine how labour market dynamics operate at the continental, regional and sometimes country level.

It is my hope that this report gives policy-makers in Africa important insights into the continent's labour markets that will prove useful in making the interventions that we seek to provide, for young women and men in particular.

(Note that the estimates used in this report do not take into account the effects of COVID-19.)

Cynthia Samuel-Olonjuwon

ILO Assistant Director-General
and Regional Director for Africa

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► Executive summary

The macroeconomic environment

It is important that African labour markets benefit from the positive economic outlook for the continent. However, although economic growth was expected to reach 3.8 per cent by the end of 2020, the effects of the COVID-19 are expected to hamper this growth substantially. The growth is underpinned on a heavy reliance on low value-added sectors characterized by poor pay and a dependence on domestic demand. Over the years, per capita incomes in Africa have remained low and growth rates volatile; in this respect, the continent lags behind all other regions, apart from the Arab States. According to the 2020 forecast for Africa, per capita growth will have either remained constant (Central Africa) or have declined in all other subregions between 2000 and 2020, with the exception of eastern Africa, which will have seen growth of up to 2.4 per cent. Again the final figures will depend on the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, a volatile per capita income rate has been accompanied by a slow growth in productivity, which has an apparent correlation with subdued real wages.

Key labour market trends

This report addresses the key issues impacting labour market trends in Africa. These are:

- Between 2000 and 2019, labour force participation rates were high and remained largely unchanged. (Indeed, standing at 63.1 per cent in 2019, the rate for Africa was higher than the global average of 60.1 per cent) Africa's labour force participation rate has been driven by eastern Africa and Central Africa. Gender gaps continue to be wide, although they have narrowed over time and are better than the world average.
- From 2000 to 2019, employment grew at an annual rate of between 2.5 and 3 per cent. This too has been driven by eastern Africa and Central Africa. Additionally, Africa's employment-to-population ratios (EPRs) are high compared to those globally. This is mainly owing to more people taking up employment – including informal employment – as they simply cannot afford not to work. Employment-to-population ratios are highest in eastern Africa and lowest in northern Africa. They are characterized by huge differences between men and women, with the EPR for men in 2019 over 17.3 percentage points higher than for women.
- With only a small decline in employment share, agriculture remains the sector employing most people in Africa. It is projected to account for 50.5 per cent of all employment in 2020, down from 53.5 per cent in 2011. Whereas the industry sector has continued to lag a long way behind, the services sector's share of employment increased to 36.1 per cent in 2019, up from 34 per cent in 2011. Furthermore, those employed in the agricultural sector in Africa are predominantly women (i.e. 54 per cent in 2019).
- There is a wide disparity in sectoral employment in Africa as a whole. Agriculture is the main sector for employment in eastern Africa, Central Africa and western Africa. Employment in southern Africa, on the other hand, is concentrated in the services sector and lowest in the agricultural sector. The employment share for industry is highest in northern Africa.
- The share of informal employment and its components in total employment ranges from 40.2 per cent in southern Africa to over 90 per cent in Central, eastern and western Africa. Subregions with higher informality in employment also registered higher agricultural employment, perhaps pointing to a link between agriculture and informality. A gender dimension is also observed, with close to 80 per cent of women's total employment being in the informal economy compared to only 68 per cent for men. Moreover, there is an education gradient within employment, with the less educated more likely to be employed informally.
- Nearly 34 million people were unemployed in Africa in 2019. Furthermore, the employment rate for women (7.5 per cent) was higher than for men (6.3 per cent). This was true at the sub-regional level as well: in western Africa, for instance, the unemployment rate for women was 6.6 per cent compared to 5.6 per cent for men. Total unemployment rates tend to be highest in southern Africa, mostly driven by South Africa.

- ▶ Regarding youth, this report recognizes that Africa is a young continent, with youth comprising more than a third (34.2 per cent) of the population, and that it is the only region in the world today whose labour force is expanding rapidly.
- ▶ Working poverty for youth is falling, albeit not as quickly as in other regions. In 2019, 63 per cent of young workers lived in poverty in Africa compared to 51 per cent of adults.
- ▶ There is a convergence between the unemployment rates for men and women in Africa. The youth unemployment rate was highest in southern Africa at 50.3 per cent in 2019. Eastern Africa had the lowest youth unemployment rate at 6.2 per cent in 2019.
- ▶ The not in education, employment or training (i.e. NEET) rates among youth in Africa are higher than the unemployment rates. In 2019, the NEET rate was 21.5 per cent. This indicates that possibly one in five young Africans neither has a job nor is enrolled in education or training.


Policy intervention

This report looks to the future and suggests some policy interventions to improve Africa's labour markets, particularly for youth. Key interventions proposed include stabilization of the macroeconomy; mechanizing the agricultural sector; advancing education and training aimed at improving demand and supply driven skills; promoting active labour market programmes; and adopting the advantages of a digital economy. In the wake of the impact of COVID-19 on labour markets, these policies will work to support the ILO's policy framework which is based on labour standards and has four key pillars: stimulating the economy and employment; supporting enterprises, jobs and incomes; protecting workers in the workplace; and relying on social dialogue for solutions.¹

¹ See *ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work*. 2nd Edition: Updated estimates and analysis. Available at: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_740877.pdf [15 Apr. 2020].

▶ 1

▶ The macroeconomic context in Africa



1.1 Does growth mean more jobs?


Africa has sustained solid economic growth for almost five years (2016–20). This is a record for the continent and a welcome change from a previous five years (2012–16) of decline (figure 1.1). Up from 2.1 per cent in 2016 to 3.2 per cent in 2019, growth was expected to reach 3.8 per cent by the end of 2020, representing an increase of 1.7 percentage points between 2016 and 2020. Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic however, growth will be substantially subdued. Otherwise this growth would have been quite substantial considering that during the 2012–16 period growth slowed from 6.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent, a decrease of 4.7 percentage points. In 2019, at the subregional level, output was mainly driven by eastern (5 per cent), followed by western (3.7 per cent) and northern Africa (2.3 per cent), whereas the gross domestic product (GDP) of Central and southern Africa grew by a modest 1.6 and 0.8 per cent, respectively.

Surpassed only by Asia and the Pacific, output growth in Africa was higher than in the Americas, the Arab States and Europe and Central Asia during the period 2012–20. Although the determi-

nants of economic growth differ between regions, Africa needs to at least maintain its economic growth. In African countries, as well as in many other developing countries, the key macroeconomic determinants of economic growth include foreign direct investment (FDI), trade openness, human capital development, demographics, natural resources, and political and financial institutions (Chirwa and Odhiambo, 2016). For Africa, domestic and foreign finance is vital for growth (Kedir, 2017). Many factors, such as abundant natural resources, domestic resource mobilization (through savings and tax revenue) and emerging and strengthened trading and investment partnerships are driving sustained growth in Africa (ibid.).

Africa's economic growth relies heavily on low value-added sectors, such as the oil and mining sectors (the main sources of revenue for most African governments) and commodity exports (ILO, 2019a), with relatively low pay and hence little positive impact on domestic demand. Moreover, it has been derived from a consistently high growth in population and an expansion in economic activity, and not necessarily through a process of structural transformation and enhanced productivity. Consequently, per capita

► Figure 1.1 Real GDP growth (annual percentage change)



Source: IMF,² World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019.

² The source for per capita and GDP growth is generally the IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2019. Data is aggregated using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. However, for some regions/subregions for which the IMF has incomplete or missing data, the ILO research department made some basic computations in order for their model to operate completely for the whole continent. This could cause a small difference. We have therefore used the IMF numbers for the level of aggregation where available, otherwise the ILO's own calculations.

growth has been subdued and even negative in some years (see figure 1.2). At the region's current rate of growth, the number of jobs created will be insufficient to absorb a fast growing labour force (ILO, 2019b). During the period 2000–14, for example, a 1 per cent increase in GDP was associated with only a 0.41 per cent increase in employment, meaning that the employment elasticity of current economic growth is too low to create a meaningful number of jobs (AfDB, 2019).

This so-called jobless growth can partly be explained by the small contribution made by the manufacturing sector to GDP (table 1.1) and by the fact that those sectors driving economic growth, namely, oil, mining and gas, are not labour intensive. By way of comparison, for every US\$1 million of greenfield FDI, the manufacturing sector creates 2.75 jobs, whereas the extractive sector creates only 0.6 jobs for the same amount of investment (ILO, 2019c). Regarding sectoral value-added, the percentage share of manufacturing value-added in total GDP is low in Africa compared to the global average. Interestingly for both sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa the manufacturing sector's share of GDP was lower in 2018 (10.9% and 13.9% respectively) than in 2010 (12.6% and 18.1% respectively). Nevertheless, only 6 per cent of all jobs created between 2000 and 2018 were in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for just 6.2 per cent of total employment in Africa (ILO, 2019a). The majority of employment is still to be found in agriculture and characterized by mainly subsistence activities. Consequently, the relatively large contribution made by this sector to GDP

growth may not translate into significantly more jobs. Finally, rapid population growth puts pressure on a labour market not yet able to absorb all the available labour supply; meanwhile, each year since 2015 and until 2035, a new cohort of half a million 15-year-olds is added to the continent's labour market (Bah et al., 2015, p. 14).

1.2 Has growth been associated with better welfare?

The recovery of economic growth in Africa has been widely credited. However, far less is known about the extent to which this is associated with improvements in welfare for the population in general and with poverty reduction in particular (Arndt et al., 2016). Although economic growth is welcome and can be celebrated, it is also important to consider the extent to which it has been translated into better living conditions for workers and for the population as whole. In 2019, per capita growth was negative (–0.13 per cent), indicating a levelling out of living standards which are projected to rise by only 0.74 per cent in 2020; this is roughly a third (30 percent) of what it was a decade ago in 2010 when it stood at 2.5 per cent. Overall, living standards have continued to lag behind economic growth, which begs the question: *Where does the growth go?*


Figure 1.2 shows that GDP per capita growth over the last decade has been volatile and on a downward path in all the regions, including Africa. This emphasizes the critical relationship

► Table 1. Sectoral value added (percentage of GDP)

| | Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP) | | | | | Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) | | | | | Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP) | | | | | Services, value added (% of GDP) | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|------|------|------|------|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|---|------|------|------|------|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 | 2017 | 2018 | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 | 2017 | 2018 | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 | 2017 | 2018 | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 | 2017 | 2018 |
| World | 4.9 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | – | 17.1 | 15.9 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 27.2 | 25.6 | 25.4 | – | 60.2 | 63.2 | 64.9 | 65.0 | – |
| Middle East & North Africa | 6.4 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 18.1 | 14.1 | 12.9 | 13.5 | 13.9 | 44.6 | 46.2 | 38.5 | 39.1 | 42.3 | 45.8 | 47.4 | 54.6 | 53.9 | 51.2 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 17.5 | 16.0 | 15.4 | 15.8 | 15.6 | 12.6 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 30.7 | 28.0 | 24.6 | 25.4 | 25.0 | 46.3 | 50.7 | 52.9 | 51.8 | 51.9 |

Source: World Development Indicators.

► Figure 1.2 GDP per capita growth (annual percentage change)




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019.

between economic growth, employment, poverty and inequality. For example, the Afrobarometer survey suggests that, despite high reported growth rates, poverty at the grassroots level in Africa remains little changed (Dulani et al., 2013). As stated above, it is also worth noting that, while economic growth in Africa has been on the rise generally and registering figures in excess of any region except Asia and the Pacific, welfare as measured by per capita growth is still much lower than for any region apart from the Arab States

(see figure 1.2). Africa has grown rapidly over the last decade economically, but a curious feature of this growth is that it has been accompanied by little structural change towards non-traditional tradable goods and services such as manufactures that can lead to the creation of better jobs and a reduction in poverty (Rodrik, 2016).


One may argue that regional or country-specific analyses can help us comprehend better the extent to which growth has not been accompanied

► Figure 1.3 Per capita growth by subregion, 2000 and 2020



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019.

► Figure 1.4 Growth in labour productivity, 2010–20



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

by structural change and better living standards in Africa, and why. For example, figure 1.3 shows some heterogeneity in the per capita growth rate within regions. Over the last two decades, between 2000 and 2020, eastern Africa has been the only region where per capita growth increased. Northern and western Africa each registered a slowing in per capita growth during the same period, but it nevertheless remained positive. Southern Africa's per capita growth rate was positive in 2000, but is expected to turn negative in 2020, while Central Africa started the millennium with negative growth and will have a negative growth rate into 2020. Overall, initial conditions such as infrastructure, human capital development, legal and financial institutions, business environment and political stability do really matter when seeking to understand the link between economic growth and poverty reduction in Africa.


Besides a low per capita growth rate and an economy unable to absorb a growing labour force, productivity has also been low in Africa. As shown in figure 1.4, labour productivity on the African continent remains below that of both the Asia and the Pacific and Europe and Central Asia regions, but above that of the Arab States and the Americas. When juxtaposed with real wage growth (figure 1.5), it becomes apparent that the growth seen in labour productivity has slowed at the same time as real wages have declined. In 2019, labour productivity grew by 1.1 per cent and is projected to increase to only 1.4 per cent in 2020.

1.3 Labour productivity and wage growth

At the subregional level, there is a considerable variation in labour productivity. In 2019, the increase in productivity per worker in eastern Africa (2.4 per cent) and northern Africa (2.3 per cent) was more than twice that in southern and western Africa, while Central Africa registered negative growth. It should be noted, however, that labour productivity in Africa is difficult to measure, due to the large proportion of labour devoted to subsistence activities (ILO, 2019a).

Labour productivity can be an engine for eradicating or reducing income inequality and working poverty if the gains from increased productivity are evenly distributed between businesses owners, investors and workers (ILO, 2019a). In respect of wages, Africa has experienced lower wage growth from 2013 onwards and wages have declined since 2015 (see figure 1.5). Indeed, real wage growth has been declining since 2013, even though labour productivity rose on average between 2013 and 2017. These trends support the view that the gains from increased productivity are not shared equally and this partly explains the high rates of working poverty and income inequality in Africa.


► Figure 1.5 Labour productivity and wage growth in Africa



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

▶ 2

▶ Employment and social trends



2.1 Labour force participation

As a concept, labour force is a broader measure than employment because it includes those persons of working age who are employed as well as those who are unemployed. The labour force represents the current supply of labour available for the production of goods and services within a given period, in a country through market transactions in exchange for remuneration.

At 63.1 per cent in 2019, Africa's total labour force participation rate was higher than the global average (60.7 per cent), signaling a generous

supply of labour (table 2.1). This can be largely explained by the presence of a large working age population seeking to survive economically and that cannot afford not to work finding itself in informal employment, with formal jobs opportunities becoming scarcer (ILO, 2018c). While the participation rate has changed only minimally over the last decade (from 65.1 per cent in 2000 to 63.1 per cent in 2019), the continent's labour force has increased markedly in size during the same period, from 302.1 million in 2000 to 489.7 million in 2019, and is projected to reach 518 million by 2021. In the subregions, in 2019, the total labour participation rate ranged between 45.7 per cent

► Table 2.1 Total labour force participation, 2000–21

| Region | Labour force participation rate (%) | | | | | | | Volume of Labour force participation (in million) | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 2000 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Africa | 65.1 | 63.2 | 63.1 | 63.0 | 63.1 | 63.1 | 63.1 | 302.1 | 451.3 | 463.2 | 476.0 | 489.7 | 503.8 | 518.0 |
| Central Africa | 73.9 | 69.1 | 69.1 | 69.0 | 68.8 | 68.7 | 68.5 | 38.5 | 59.7 | 61.6 | 63.6 | 65.7 | 67.8 | 69.9 |
| Eastern Africa | 78.5 | 77.6 | 77.5 | 77.3 | 77.3 | 77.4 | 77.4 | 109.0 | 175.8 | 181.3 | 187.0 | 193.3 | 199.8 | 206.3 |
| Northern Africa | 47.1 | 46.5 | 45.8 | 45.7 | 45.7 | 45.7 | 45.6 | 51.2 | 71.5 | 71.7 | 73.0 | 74.3 | 75.7 | 77.0 |
| Southern Africa | 56.0 | 56.5 | 57.1 | 56.9 | 56.9 | 56.9 | 56.9 | 18.8 | 25.3 | 25.9 | 26.2 | 26.7 | 27.1 | 27.5 |
| Western Africa | 64.5 | 58.7 | 58.7 | 58.7 | 58.5 | 58.4 | 58.3 | 84.5 | 119.1 | 122.6 | 126.2 | 129.8 | 133.5 | 137.2 |
| World | 64.7 | 61.2 | 61.0 | 60.9 | 60.7 | 60.5 | 60.3 | 2 777.6 | 3 376.8 | 3 413.3 | 3 449.2 | 3 482.4 | 3 515.0 | 3 545.7 |

Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

► Table 2.2 Gender gap in labour force participation rate (percentage points)

| | 2000 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Africa | 21.3 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 17.8 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 17.5 |
| Central Africa | 5.5 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 |
| Eastern Africa | 11.1 | 10.0 | 9.6 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.1 |
| Northern Africa | 52.5 | 48.0 | 47.6 | 47.5 | 47.3 | 47.2 | 47.0 |
| Southern Africa | 20.6 | 13.8 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 12.9 | 12.7 | 12.5 |
| Western Africa | 13.3 | 12.0 | 11.8 | 11.6 | 11.7 | 11.8 | 11.9 |
| World | 27.5 | 27.2 | 27.1 | 26.9 | 27.0 | 27.0 | 27.1 |

Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, July 2019.

in northern Africa to 77.3 per cent in eastern Africa.

While policy-makers emphasize the need for women to participate in the labour market, gender gaps in labour force participation rates remain high throughout the region (table 2.2). In 2019, Africa as a whole recorded a gender gap in the labour force participation rate of 17.7 percentage points, though it should be said that this is still lower than the global gender gap of 27.0 percentage points. The size of these gender gaps highlights the need for policies that support women's participation in the labour market. This is especially so for northern Africa, as in 2019 it had by far the greatest gender disparity in labour force participation seen on the continent, at 47.3 percentage points.

2.2 Employment


Decent employment is crucial to providing sustainable income and creating pathways out of poverty. The term 'employment' comprises all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, such as one week or one day, were in: a) paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not at work); or b) self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work).³ Since 2000, total employment in Africa

has grown by between 2.5 and 3 per cent (figure 2.1); this is lower than for real output growth. Employment grew at 2.9 per cent in 2019, while growth in real output was 3.2 per cent in the same year.

Employment has grown particularly strongly in eastern and Central Africa with both subregions registering rises of above 3 per cent since 2000, albeit with a slight dip below 3 per cent in 2009. Southern Africa, on the other hand, has experienced an acute volatility in employment characterized by different episodes. There was acceleration after the millennium but a sharp decline followed, mainly due to the financial crisis of 2008. Nevertheless, there has been a recovery from 2010 onwards. As for northern Africa, the Arab Spring uprisings of the early 2010s severely affected employment, although there has been some recovery since 2016. Western Africa's employment growth ranged between 2.4 per cent in 2016 and 2.9 per cent in 2019, peaking at 3.2 per cent in 2017.

In Africa, the employment-to-population ratio (EPR) tends to be higher than what it is for the rest of the world, although the difference has been shrinking over time. This is due to more people in Africa taking employment of any form than they do elsewhere. In the most recent year (2019), the EPR for Africa differed by only 1.4 percentage points from that for the rest of the world

► Figure 2.1 Employment growth in Africa (per cent)



Source: Computed from ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

³ Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization, adopted by the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, October 2013: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_230304.pdf.

► Table 2.3 Employment-to-population ratios and total employment, 2000–21


| | Employment-to-population ratio | | | | | | | Employment (in million) | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 2000 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Africa | 60.0 | 58.8 | 58.7 | 58.7 | 58.8 | 58.8 | 58.8 | 278.6 | 420.2 | 430.7 | 443.3 | 456.3 | 469.7 | 483.1 |
| Central Africa | 70.5 | 65.7 | 65.7 | 65.7 | 65.6 | 65.4 | 65.3 | 36.8 | 56.7 | 58.6 | 60.6 | 62.5 | 64.6 | 66.6 |
| Eastern Africa | 75.1 | 75.1 | 74.9 | 74.8 | 74.8 | 74.8 | 74.9 | 104.3 | 169.9 | 175.3 | 180.9 | 187.0 | 193.3 | 199.6 |
| Northern Africa | 39.9 | 40.6 | 40.0 | 40.0 | 40.1 | 40.2 | 40.3 | 43.5 | 62.4 | 62.6 | 63.8 | 65.3 | 66.7 | 68.0 |
| Southern Africa | 39.4 | 41.8 | 42.1 | 42.0 | 41.4 | 41.3 | 41.0 | 13.2 | 18.7 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 19.4 | 19.6 | 19.8 |
| Western Africa | 61.7 | 55.4 | 55.1 | 55.1 | 55.0 | 54.9 | 54.8 | 80.7 | 112.4 | 115.0 | 118.5 | 122.0 | 125.5 | 129.0 |
| World | 61.0 | 57.7 | 57.7 | 57.6 | 57.4 | 57.2 | 57.0 | 2 617.5 | 3 185.5 | 3 223.4 | 3 263.4 | 3 294.7 | 3 324.7 | 3 352.0 |

Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

(table 2.3). Within Africa, marked subregional disparities exist. Eastern Africa had the highest EPR of all in 2019 (74.8 per cent), while northern Africa had the lowest (40.1 per cent). Although EPRs for the continent are getting closer to global values, those of northern and southern Africa are much lower than for the rest of the world. Northern and southern Africa (67.3% and 40.2%, respectively) have the two lowest rates of informal employment on the continent (table 2.4).

There is also evidence that the growth in employment and in the working-age population is proportional, as the ratios remain largely unchanged within regions. In respect to this, in the period 2000 to 2019, the EPR in eastern Africa only altered from 75.1 per cent to 74.8 per cent, those of western Africa remained around 55 per cent between 2016 and 2019 down from 61.7 per cent in 2000. Those of northern and southern Africa oscillated around 40 per cent while Central Africa

► Figure 2.2 Employment-to-population ratio by gender, 2019



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

recorded a relatively high reduction from 70.5 per cent in 2000 down to 65.6 per cent in 2019.

With regards to gender, the differences are huge in Africa between the EPRs recorded for men compared to those for women (figure 2.4). For the most recent year (2019), the EPR for men stood at 67.5 per cent. This was 17.3 percentage points higher than for women. Globally, in 2019, the EPR for men was as high as 70.3 per cent and that for women as low as 44.6 per cent, a difference of 25.7 percentage points. The higher EPRs for men highlight a need for efforts to be made to promote women's employment. Moreover, a high EPR does not in any way signal decent work; it requires many indicators, such as working poverty, labour productivity, unemployment rates, among others, to get a true picture of labour markets dynamics.

2.2.1 Characteristics of employment


2.2.1.1 Employment by broad economic activity

Agriculture is still the sector employing most people in Africa (figure 2.3). Agriculture as a proportion of total employment decreased from 53.5 per cent in 2011 to 50.7 per cent in 2019. This downward trend is expected to continue into 2020 and agriculture to fall to 50.5 per cent of all employment. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector, where decent work deficits are not uncommon, is still a crucial provider of jobs in

Africa. This means that the kind of structural transformation was witnessed in other regions, such as Asia and the Pacific, has not yet happened in Africa. In 2020, for example, it is projected that 43 per cent of workers will be employed in the services sector against only 31.7 per cent in the agricultural sector (ILO, 2018a). That said, the share for the services sector in total employment has grown somewhat, increasing from 34.1 per cent in 2011 to 36.1 in 2019, and is projected to reach 36.2 per cent by 2020 and 36.4 per cent by 2021. It is also noteworthy that the number of jobs in the wholesale and retail trade has grown, and that the number of people employed in motor vehicle repair, which stood at 46 million in 2010, is projected to reach over 64 million by 2020, representing an increase of 40 per cent.⁴

A salient feature of African agriculture is that it is women-dominated. In 2019, close to 54 per cent of women worked in this sector compared to 49 per cent of men. The proportion of women dropped only marginally between 2011 (57.4 per cent) and 2019 (53.7 per cent) and is projected to be 53.4 per cent by 2020 and 53.2 per cent by 2021 (figure 2.4). One consequence of the a majority of women working in the not very productive and largely informal agricultural sector – where incomes and working conditions are consistently worse than in other sectors – is that they face greater decent work deficits in the labour market than do men.


► Figure 2.3 Employment distribution by broad economic activity in Africa, 2011–21 (per cent)



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

⁴ Author calculation based on ILOSTAT.

► Figure 2.4 Sectoral employment distribution by sex across economic activities, 2011–21 (per cent)




Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

2.2.1.2 Sectoral employment by subregion

Looking at the region as a whole, however, masks substantial differences in sectoral employment between the subregions. In eastern, Central Africa and western Africa, employment is predominantly in the agricultural sector, whereas northern and southern Africa depend on the services sector for jobs (figure 2.5). This contrast shows the differing levels of structural transformation and economic advancement between the


subregions. A critical aspect of the development process is structural transformation – shifting capital and labour from low- to high-productivity sectors. Numerous studies, initiatives and frameworks have underlined the importance of investment diversification in Africa (ILO, 2019c). In this context, agricultural transformation ought to entail moving away from a subsistence-oriented and farm-centred agricultural sector towards one that is more commercialized and productive (Timmer, 1988). Attaining higher productivity

► Figure 2.5 Employment distribution by broad economic activity, by subregion, 2011, 2018 and 2019



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

► Figure 2.6 Status in employment



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

in agriculture would mean additional resources are spent in the sector thereby stimulating demand for goods, services and jobs in the non-farm sectors of the economy. This would induce labour to shift gradually from farming to non-farm activities, encourage rural-to-urban migration and slow population growth in rural areas (Jayne and Ameyaw, 2016). As a result, employment in agriculture and the agricultural sector itself, in terms of proportion of total GDP, would decline over time. Such transformation is generally driven by technological innovation, economies of scale, globalization and financial development. Northern Africa is a perfect example of this phenomenon: it was the top FDI destination for Africa in 2018 (ILO, 2019c) and has a shrinking agricultural sector and an expanding services sector. For Africa, this means in essence that an increase in employment in high-productivity sectors depends on the development of the agricultural sector; employment growth in the non-farm economy does not rise either on its own or spontaneously. Filmer and Fox (2014), cited by Jayne and Ameyaw (2016), predict that about 40 per cent of all Africans entering the labour force over the next decade will be primarily engaged in agriculture. Therefore productivity growth in the agricultural sector is essential, if incomes are to rise in general and for money to circulate in rural areas and stimulate non-farm goods and services (Jayne and Ameyaw, 2016).

2.2.1.3 Status in employment in 2019

Decent work deficits are widespread in Africa (ILO, 2019b). Being in employment does not necessarily give a decent living. Out of a working-age

population of 776 million persons, a majority 456 million (58.8 per cent) are in employment, 33 million (4.3 per cent) unemployed and 286 million (36.9 per cent) outside of the labour force altogether (figure 2.6). Among the employed, 68 per cent of workers are either own-account workers or contributing family workers. Disaggregated by sex, the proportion of men who are own-account workers closely tracks that for women (64.7%). The proportion of women who are contributing family workers is 32.3 per cent against only 13.0 per cent for men. This typically means that most women find themselves having to take jobs in the agricultural sector, which is typically associated with informality, low pay, poor access to social protection and generally inferior working conditions. More generally, people pushed out of agriculture due to its low productivity, limited profitability and lack of adequate social protection, are more likely to move into low-wage or own-account work, often in the informal sector. According to ILO estimates, 85 per cent of own-account workers operate in the informal economy (ILO, 2018a).

By contrast, it is generally accepted that – as the process of economic development and structural transformation proceeds – an increasingly large share of a workforce will enter waged or salaried employment (across all skill levels and sectors). Historically, this has been the main path to sustainable and broad-based prosperity and the eradication of mass poverty (Gindling and Newhouse, 2012). In Africa, this process has so far been slow and unsustainable, and it will be important to reinvigorate a push for more and better wage jobs, especially in Africa's private sector.

► Table 2.4 Informal employment in total employment (per cent)

| Category | Africa | Northern Africa | Central Africa | Eastern Africa | Southern Africa | Western Africa |
|--|--------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Share of informal employment and its components in total employment | 85.8 | 67.3 | 91.0 | 91.6 | 40.2 | 92.4 |
| Share of non-agricultural informal employment and its components in total employment | 71.9 | 56.3 | 78.8 | 76.6 | 36.1 | 87.0 |

Source: ILO (2018b).

2.2.1.4 Proportion of informal employment in total employment


The proportion of informal employment and its components in total employment ranges from 40.2 per cent in southern Africa to 67.3 per cent in northern Africa to over 90 per cent in Central, eastern and western Africa. As seen earlier, a high prevalence of agricultural employment is correlated with a high level of informality in work, with subregions where agricultural employment is high also recording higher levels of informality. Informal employment rates also vary according to gender and educational attainment. In Africa, a larger proportion of women's employment (79 per cent) than of men's (68 per cent) is in the informal sector, except in northern Africa. In all regions, people with lower educational attainment are more likely to be informally employed. Informality is highest among workers with no education; in

fact, 94 per cent of workers with no education are informally employed (AfDB, 2019).

For Africa as a whole, the proportion of informal employment and its components in total employment is high at 85.8 per cent (table 2.4). This highlights the enormous challenge informality presents businesses and workers alike in Africa. A similar trend is seen when the proportion of non-agricultural informal employment and its components in total employment is considered (see table 2.4). Southern and northern Africa again have the lowest rates when compared to western (87.0 per cent), Central (78.8 per cent) and eastern Africa (76.6 per cent).

Another important feature of African labour markets is the association between high informality and low unemployment rates (figure 2.7). It is a general rule that low-income countries have

► Figure 2.7 Unemployment rate and proportion of informal employment (countries for which data are available)



Source: Computed from ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

high rates of informality, while middle-income ones tend to experience higher unemployment (AfDB, 2019). This finding is consistent with jobless growth. Economic growth in Africa has not been pro-employment. Economic growth and job creation require a structural transformation that shifts resources away from low- towards high-productivity firms and sectors, as discussed above.

2.3 Unemployment and labour underutilization

2.3.1 Unemployment

Close to 34 million persons were unemployed in Africa in 2019. Of these, 12.2 million were youth aged between 15–24 years (Annex 8). This was 6.4 million more than in 2010 and represents an increase of close to 1.5 million in the number of unemployed youth. The regional unemployment rate of 6.8 per cent was significantly higher than the world average of 5.0 per cent, implying that unemployment is a key labour market issue in Africa. Although unemployment is low, as mentioned, the majority of the employment found in Africa is informal.

With reference to gender, it is notable that since 2010 the unemployment rate for women has been consistently higher than the one for men (see table Annex 8). In 2019, it was as high as 7.5 per cent compared to 6.3 per cent for men. Within regions, the unemployment rates for women and men vary, and in some cases the difference is significant. For instance, in 2019 in western Africa, it was 5.8 per cent compared to 5.0 per cent for men. Similarly, the unemployment rate for women in southern Africa was 29.0 per cent, while only 24.5 per cent for men.

In 2019, at the subregional level, the highest unemployment rate recorded was 26.5 per cent for southern Africa; a figure inflated by South Africa's particularly high rate of 27.0 per cent. At 11.8 per cent, northern Africa also recorded a high unemployment rate in the same year. The rate was lowest in eastern Africa at 3.8 per cent. Reductions were noted in the rates for Central Africa, eastern Africa, and northern Africa between 2015 and

2019. However, those of southern and western Africa actually increased from 24.6 per cent to 26.5 per cent and from 5.0 per cent to 5.4 per cent, respectively, in the same period. The high unemployment rate for southern Africa is consistent with the smaller informal economy in that subregion.⁵

Youth unemployment in Africa has been falling, albeit slowly (see Annex 8). Between 2000 and 2019, the youth unemployment rate fell by 3.0 percentage points. One characteristic feature of youth unemployment in Africa that has persisted is the relatively small difference observed between the rates for men and for women: in 2019, the youth unemployment rate for men was 11.8 per cent while that for women was 12 per cent.

In 2019, southern Africa's youth unemployment rate reached 50.3 per cent and is projected to increase further in subsequent years. At only 6.2 per cent – an eighth of what it is in southern Africa – eastern Africa had the lowest youth unemployment rate for the region in 2019. Central Africa (10 per cent) also recorded a relatively modest youth unemployment rate.

2.3.2 Labour underutilization

However, the unemployment rate is only one measurement of underutilization within a labour market; others include time-related underutilization and potential labour force. Together, they are the headline indicators forming the basis of labour market monitoring. A number of measures of labour underutilization can be computed, including LU1, LU2, LU3 and LU4.⁶


By 2021, labour underutilization is expected to comprise 120.5 million persons (LU4), up from 114.6 million in 2019. This increase is primarily driven by sub-Saharan Africa, which by 2021 is projected to have 99.4 million people in total labour underutilization compared to 21 million for northern Africa. On the same projection, the total labour underutilization rate is expected to hover around 22 per cent for Africa as a whole, 24.7 per cent for northern Africa and 21.5 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 (ILO, 2020).

⁵ The share of informal employment in total employment for southern Africa is 40.2 per cent, while the share of non-agricultural informal employment in total employment is 36.1 per cent: see ILO (2018b).

⁶ For a full definition and how the different measures are calculated, see Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization, adopted by the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Geneva, October 2013: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_230304.pdf.

▶ 3

▶ Youth employment trends



3.1 The youth challenge

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.6 is concerned with the promotion of youth employment, education and training. Specifically, SDG target 8.6.1 undertakes that “by 2020, [countries will] substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training [NEET].” In other words, the target is to reduce significantly the NEET rate of young people.⁷ In Africa, this task is all the more challenging and important, given that in stark contrast to other regions of the world its youth population and consequently labour force is expanding rapidly and projected to continue doing so for the foreseeable future. To date, and in common much of with the rest of the world, it appears unlikely that Africa will be able to meet the target. The ILO estimates that in 2015 – when the SDG target was set – the youth NEET rate in Africa was 20.0 per cent. It is projected to increase to 20.7 per cent in 2020.⁸ This is actually a small increase, not a ‘substantial reduction’ in the NEET rate.⁹ More needs to be done.

It should come as no surprise then that fostering opportunities to address the unemployment and underemployment of youth is fast becoming a key priority for almost every African country. Several key instruments have been developed to guide youth development in Africa. Key among them is the African Youth Charter (AYC), adopted in July 2006. To ensure the implementation of this charter, and to respond to the need for strengthened national capacities to deliver more effectively on youth empowerment and development, the Youth Decade (2009–2018) Plan of Action (DPoA) was developed and is in its final year of implementation at the time of writing. Moreover, African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and its first ten-year implementation plan addresses the issue of youth and youth employment under aspirations 1 and 6. African development needs to be people-driven, particularly by unleashing the potential of Africa’s women and youth. With a view to transforming the potential of Africa’s large youth population – often referred to as the “youth bulge” – into a demographic dividend, the

AU Assembly Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.601 (XXVI) of January 2016 nominated the year 2017 as the year of youth under the theme “Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth”. The political commitment of the African Union to tackling youth unemployment is either directly or indirectly reflected in the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA 16-25), the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA-2024), the Continental Strategy for TVET to Foster Youth Employment and the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) action plan.

3.2 The nature of the challenge

3.2.1 Trends in the youth labour force and working poverty

The African labour force is young and growing rapidly. In 2020, young people aged 15–24 years comprise under a quarter (23.6 per cent) of the world’s working-age population. This is in contrast to Africa where they comprise over a third (34.2 per cent). Indeed, Africa is the only region in the world where the youth labour force is expanding quickly and on an upward trend (figure 3.1).


In most regions of the world, the youth labour force has remained stable or else fallen in absolute terms since 1990. In Africa, it has almost doubled during that time from 61.8 million in 1990 to 115.8 million in 2020. Moreover, it is projected to have further grown by over 25 per cent (i.e. by nearly 30 million young people) by 2030, by which time it is expected there will be 144 million young labour force participants on the continent. This presents a big challenge: jobs, especially decent jobs, are required for all these new labour market entrants. At the same time, in an era in which global concerns are becoming ever more focussed on how to support a quickly ageing population, such a rapidly expanding young labour force represents – at least potentially – a key resource. Realizing this potential will in most countries depend on reinvigorated structural

7 By definition the (youth) NEET rate is, “the proportion of young people who are neither in employment, education or training” (<https://ilostat.ilo.org/resources/methods/description-youth-neet>). It comprises almost all the unemployed plus all those who are not in the labour force, but who are also not in education or training. Not all the unemployed are included, since according to the ILO (i.e. the standard international) definition it is possible to be unemployed but also in education. Readers are referred to the ILOSTAT metadata for a complete set of definitions of the concepts used in this report: ilostat.ilo.org/resources/methods/#indicatorDescriptions.

8 This is, in fact, very similar to the global picture. The ILO estimates the global youth NEET rate to have been 21.7 per cent in 2015, projecting it to rise to 22.4 per cent in 2020. See ILOSTAT database: ilostat.ilo.org/data.

9 Indeed, given the youth population’s fast rate of growth in Africa discussed below, the number of young people classified as NEET is projected to have increased by 7.7 million between 2015 and 2020.

► Figure 3.1 Youth labour force, by region, 1990–2030 (millions)¹⁰



Note: This figure reports estimates and projections of the size of the youth (aged 15–24 years) labour force in absolute terms (millions of young people).


Source: ILO modelled estimates, July 2019; based on UN population estimates and projections, July 2019.

transformation guided by dedicated policy action to initiate such a process.

It is evident that in recent years African labour markets have not been completely successful in meeting this challenge. Although working poverty

among young people is falling, it is not doing so as quickly as in other regions of the world, most notably Asia and the Pacific (figure 3.2). Working poverty among young people (and adults aged 25 years and over) is also much higher in Africa than elsewhere.

► Figure 3.2 Working poverty among young people, by region, 1990–2020 (per cent)




Note: This figure reports estimates and projections of (extreme and moderate) working poverty for young people (aged 15–24 years).

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

¹⁰ Throughout this report, unless otherwise indicated, the numbers and rates reported refer to (typically modelled estimates of) annual averages.

► Figure 3.3 Youth unemployment rates, global and by African sub-region, 2000–20 (per cent)



Note: This figure reports estimates and projections of (extreme and moderate) working poverty for young people (aged 15–24 years).

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

Between 2000 and 2020, the prevalence of working poverty among young Africans fell by just over 14 per cent (i.e. 10.5 percentage points).¹¹ In Asia and the Pacific, the corresponding decrease in youth working poverty was over 65 per cent (45.4 percentage points) and in the Americas and Europe, where working poverty was already much lower, the falls were of 67 per cent and 66 per cent respectively. Only the Arab States fared worse than Africa, and this is almost entirely attributable to the dire situations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen; most other Arab States have working poverty rates of close to zero. The conflict-driven increase in this region brought the overall prevalence in youth working poverty in Arab states in line with Asia and the Pacific at around 25 per cent of young workers – this is still well under half the working poverty rate among young Africans. Globally, the average fall in youth working poverty was 45 per cent. In 2020, 63 per cent of young workers live in poverty in Africa compared to 50 per cent of adult workers (aged 25 and over). In the early 1990s, the Asia and the Pacific region experienced similar or even higher youth working poverty rates than Africa. So, while the fall in working poverty in Africa is to be welcomed, much more needs to be done to bring it down further.

3.2.2 Youth (aged 15–24 years) unemployment rates


Youth unemployment rates in Africa are, on average, close to the global rate; however, they vary widely across the sub-regions of Africa, from over 50 per cent in southern Africa to under 6 per cent in eastern Africa (figure 3.3). The relatively moderate rates of youth unemployment in Central, eastern and western Africa are not to be considered an indicator of (relatively) good labour market performance in that region. As the working poverty rates reported above highlight, youth unemployment rates, particularly in countries with little or no social protection, are not a good indicator of the health of youth labour markets. Despite having been supplanted by the NEET rate – which will be discussed below – as the main SDG indicator for the good functioning of youth labour markets, the youth unemployment rate is still the most widely reported indicator for this purpose.

As evident also from figure 3.3 above, the highest rates of youth unemployment are to be found in the northern- and southern-most reaches of the continent, although mapping national rates allows for a little more nuance (figure 3.4). Youth unemployment rates range from 2.3 per cent in Liberia (2016) to 57.1 per cent in South Africa (2019)¹²; indeed, there is a strong positive cor-

¹¹ It is also the case that working poverty is both significantly higher and falling more slowly among young people than it is among adults aged 25 and over. Between 2000 and 2020, working poverty among Africans aged 25 and over fell by 23.4 per cent (or by 15.4 percentage points, from 65.7 per cent to 50.3 per cent).

¹² Based on the latest actual information available in the ILOSTAT database [accessed 16 Mar. 2020].

► Figure 3.4 Youth unemployment rates in Africa, by country, 2020



Note: This figure maps ILO-modelled estimates of national youth unemployment rates.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

relation (= 0.54 in 2016¹³) between unemployment rates and IMF estimates of GDP per capita (PPP). This means that countries with a high level of GDP per capita tend to have a high youth unemployment rate, which makes no sense if the youth unemployment rate is intended as a measure of the (ill-)health of youth labour markets. At best, youth unemployment rates provide only a very partial – and non-intuitive – description of young people's labour market experiences. As discussed earlier, a compendium of indicators is required as a basis for labour market monitoring, including measures of underemployment, informality, employment status and working poverty. This is particularly the case in the context of Africa.

3.2.3 Young people not in employment, education or training (NEET)


Given the relatively high levels of poverty in Africa evidenced above and the paucity of developed social protection systems on the continent, the problems of youth entry into the labour market

do not manifest themselves primarily in terms of high levels of youth unemployment. For this reason, the concept of NEET (not in employment, education or training) has been proposed as a more meaningful indicator. Over the last decade, dissatisfaction with the usefulness of the unemployment rate as an indicator for youth labour market performance, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, has led to its adoption as the key target indicator for SDG 8.6 on decent work for young people.

Examination of NEET rates in Africa – and the world – over time (figure 3.5) brings to light a number of points. The African NEET rate closely tracks the global average and the ranking of African sub-regions by NEET rates is the same – since at least 2017 – as their ranking by unemployment rates. However, global and African regional and sub-regional NEET rates are all very much higher than the corresponding youth unemployment rates. Since youth unemployment rates are defined as a proportion of youth labour market participants and NEET rates are defined as

13 Author calculations, based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx [accessed 9 Apr. 2019]

► Figure 3.5 Youth NEET rates, global and by African sub-region, 2005–20 (per cent)



Note: This figure reports estimates and projections of (extreme and moderate) working poverty for young people (aged 15–24 years).

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

a proportion of the relevant youth population, the numbers of NEET young people are much greater than the number of young unemployed. It should also be recalled that young NEETs include most (but not quite all) of the unemployed.¹⁴ As noted above, in 2020, the NEET rate for Africa is estimated at 20.7 per cent, meaning that more than one in five of *all* young Africans have neither a job nor are they participating in education or training. The ILO estimates that in Africa 12.4 million young people are unemployed in 2020, whereas 53.5 million (well over four times as many) are NEET.

One characteristic of NEET rates in Africa that can be inferred from figure 3.5 and which is apparent contrast with the global picture is the unequivocally positive relationship between country income and NEET rates. This is made more explicit in figure 3.6. NEET rates globally are, in contrast, consistently highest among lower middle-income countries reflecting the fact that, up to a point,

the NEET rate tends to increase with income per capita, after which it falls with further increases in income.¹⁵ In Africa, this turning point has evidently not been reached.

However, within Africa the difference between NEET rates in northern and southern Africa on the one hand and central, eastern and western Africa on the other, are much less pronounced than they are with youth unemployment rates. In southern Africa the NEET rate in 2020 is estimated as 32.8 per cent; just over double the NEET rate of 14.0 per cent in eastern Africa. The youth unemployment rate in southern Africa is 52.4 per cent which is almost ten times the 5.6 per cent found in eastern Africa.


As with youth unemployment rates, there is considerable variation in the NEET rate between countries on the continent (figure 3.7). National NEET rates vary from 6.2 per cent in Burundi (2017) to 68.6 per cent in Niger (2017).¹⁶

¹⁴ It is possible to be unemployed but not NEET, if a young person is in education and unemployed at one and the same time. More specifically, if a young person is participating in education and not working but actively seeking to do so, they are not included in the NEET category (because they are in education) but they are identified as unemployed (by virtue of their lack of a job and active job search) according to the standard definitions. Otherwise, NEET (by definition) includes all the unemployed as well as all others who are not employed or in education.

¹⁵ The strong positive relationship visible in Africa is clearly driven by the extraordinarily high rates of youth unemployment in southern Africa, and in particular in South Africa. Obviously other factors also play a role. The point here is to contrast NEET rates with unemployment rates, which tend to rise continuously with income per capita.

¹⁶ Based on the latest actual information available in the ILOSTAT database [accessed 16 Mar. 2020]. Note that the ILO modelled estimates and the actual figures based on micro-data calculations differ quite markedly. This is due to the application in some countries – but not others – of the ICLS 2013 resolution on the definition of employment which, since the new definition excludes subsistence farming and contributing family work from employment, has led to a drastic reduction in recorded (youth) employment in those African countries which apply the new definition. For comparability purposes, the ILO modelled estimates are based on the old definition. This leads to quite marked differences in some cases.

► Figure 3.6 Youth NEET rates, global and by country income level in Africa, 2005–20 (per cent)




Note: This figure reports ILO-modelled estimates of aggregate global and income-grouped NEET rates, 2005–20.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

The vast majority – two out of three – of young people neither in employment, education or training throughout the world are young women (figure 3.8). The gender imbalance is largest in

emerging (i.e. middle-income) countries. In Africa, the ratio of female to male rates (1.6 female NEETs to every male NEET) is below the global average (2.2) even where it is most marked in northern


► Figure 3.7 National youth NEET rates in Africa, 2020



Note: This figure maps ILO-modelled estimates of national youth unemployment rates.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.


► Figure 3.8 Youth NEET rates by gender, global and African sub-region, 2020 (per cent)



Note: This figure reports ILO-modelled estimates of NEET rates for northern Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and globally by country income levels and gender, 2020.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.


► Figure 3.9 Gender imbalance in youth NEET rates in Africa, 2020



Note: This figure reports the ratio of women's to men's NEET rates for Africa in 2020 based on ILO-modelled estimates of NEET rates by gender. A ratio of more than one implies a NEET rate higher for young women than for young men and *vice versa*. A value of 2, for example, implies that young women are twice as likely as young men to be NEET.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

► **Figure 3.10 Labour underutilization (LU3) of young people (aged 15–24 years), by gender and region (per cent), 2020**



Note: This figure reports the LU3 index by region in 2020 based on ILO-modelled estimates.

Source: ILO modelled estimates, November 2019.

Africa, the ratio only reaches two-to-one. The gender imbalance is not as strong in Africa – even in northern Africa – as it is elsewhere, for example, in southern Asia, where the NEET rate for women is estimated to be 3.5 times as high as that for men.¹⁷

At the national level, throughout Africa, the NEET rate is higher for young women than young men¹⁸ (figure 3.9).

The disproportionate representation of NEET among young women is also reflected in rates of labour underutilization; in particular, labour underutilization index LU3 which comprises the unemployed plus the potential labour force.¹⁹ Here too there is a clear – albeit less pronounced than with NEET – gender gap globally and throughout African sub-regions, most particularly in northern Africa (figure 3.10). Interestingly however, in contrast to NEET, the gender disparity in labour underutilization is **more** marked in Africa (with a female-to-male ratio of 1.2) than it is globally (female-to-male ratio of 1.1). Certainly, it is evident that the disproportionate representation of

African young women among the NEET cannot be explained by large numbers of young women not wanting to work.

3.2.4 Job quality: the key issue


Arguably the key issue facing African youth in their search for work concerns the types of jobs available. Put another way, in Africa, the inadequacy of job opportunities for young people manifests itself primarily in terms of the unavailability of decent work rather than a lack of work itself. As has been shown here, although Africa is the poorest region in the world in terms of GDP per capita (PPP), youth unemployment and NEET rates are not especially high in Africa; indeed, as noted above, youth unemployment rates are highest in some of the higher income countries on the continent and there is a strong positive correlation between average incomes and youth unemployment and NEET rates at the country level.

¹⁷ Based on ILO modelled estimates (November 2019) for 2020 from <https://ilostat.ilo.org/data>.

¹⁸ The map is based on ILO-modelled estimates. According to these modelled estimates, the NEET rate for young women is very slightly lower than for young men in Madagascar in 2020. But here too, the most recent actual data – from 2012 and 2015 – suggest higher NEET rates amongst young women than young men.

¹⁹ Which, in turn, comprises all young people who are not in employment and who are either unemployed or who express an interest in working and for whom existing conditions limit their active job search and/or their availability.

► **Figure 3.11 Prevalence of informal employment in different regions, young people (aged 15–24 years) and older workers, latest year (per cent)**



Note: This figure reports the prevalence of informal employment for young people across different regions and for young people and adults in Africa.

Source: ILO (2018b).

In any event, it is very clear that African countries, on the whole, suffer particularly from poor job quality. As noted above, working poverty is especially pronounced among young Africans. A second notable aspect of poor job quality concerns the high prevalence of informal employment among young people (figure 3.11). According to the latest available estimates (ILO, 2018b), 95 per cent of young African workers are in informal employment.²⁰

Going into a more detail – and expanding the definition of youth to include those aged 15–29 years²¹ – one may observe the African pattern of informal employment and how this differs across age and gender. Broadly speaking, informal employment can be divided into: a) employment in the informal sector; and b) informal jobs in the formal sector. In the context of Africa,

informal employment among young people is overwhelmingly concentrated in the informal sector. Elsewhere in the world the proportions are more equally divided between informal sector employment and informal employment in the formal sector. At the global level, informal employment falls sharply as young people get older (O'Higgins, 2017). Among the twelve African countries included in the ILO's School-to-Work Transition Surveys (SWTSs),²² the downward trend in informal sector employment with age is far less marked (figure 3.12).


A similar picture emerges when one examines self-employment (as opposed to wage employment) and, in particular, own-account employment and contributing family work. A clear majority of young Africans with jobs are engaged in the former (figure 3.13). Indeed, more

20 Here, as with other indicators, we adopt the standard ILO approach. Informal employment refers to "all employment arrangements that do not provide individuals with legal or social protection through their work, thereby leaving them more exposed to economic risk". This definition includes both workers employed in the informal sector and workers in informal employment outside the informal sector (ILO, 2013). In more detail, informal employment includes: (a) paid employees in "informal jobs", i.e. jobs without a social security entitlement, paid annual leave or paid sick leave; (b) paid employees in an unregistered enterprise with fewer than five employees; (c) own-account workers in an unregistered enterprise with fewer than five employees; (d) employers in an unregistered enterprise with fewer than five employees; and (e) contributing family workers. We also distinguish below between employment in the informal sector and informal jobs in the formal sector. Subcategories (b)–(d) are used in the calculation of "employment in the informal sector", subcategory (a) applies to "informal jobs in the formal sector" and subcategory (e) can fall into either grouping, depending on the registration status of the enterprise that engages the contributing family worker (Elder and Koné, 2014).

21 In what follows, we look at youth employment in terms of the experiences in work of those aged between 15 and 29 years. The expanded definition makes sense when talking about young workers (as opposed to young people as a whole) since, with rising educational attainment on the continent, increasing numbers of young Africans who continue education through to tertiary level will not enter the labour market until they have (almost) reached the 25-year-old threshold. Including only those tertiary graduates who do may give a misleading picture, particularly in respect of the role of education.

22 www.ilo.org/employment/areas/youth-employment/work-for-youth/WCMS_191853/lang-en/index.htm.

► **Figure 3.12 Prevalence of different types of informal employment in selected African countries, males and females (aged 15–29 years)**



Note: This figure reports the two basic categories of informal employment (and their sum) as a percentage of total (age-specific) youth employment. For details on the School-to-Work Transition Surveys (SWTSs) used here and how aggregation was undertaken across the survey to arrive at regional and “global” estimates, see O’Higgins (2017). Countries included are Benin, Congo, Egypt, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

Source: Author calculations, based on SWTS data.


► **Figure 3.13 Employment status by gender in selected African countries, young African workers (aged 15–29 years), 2006 and 2016**



Note: This figure reports the percentage share of different employment forms for young men and women (aged 15–29 years) between 2006 and 2016 (or nearest available years). Self-employment comprises own-account and contributing family workers. The figure is based on 14 countries: Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

Source: Author calculations based on National Labour Force Survey held in the ILO micro-data repository.

► Figure 3.14 Changes in contractual forms of young workers in Africa between 2006 and 2016



Note: This figure reports the percentage point change in the shares of different forms of employment between 2006 and 2016 (or nearest years for which data is available for young people (aged 15–29 years). The divisions broadly correspond to the standard ILO classification of status in employment, however: a) employees are divided into three categories according to contractual status – permanent employees are those with written contracts hired without a time limit, temporary employees are those with written contracts hired for a fixed period of time, and without contract employees are those who do not have a written contract; b) own-account workers (OAW) include also employers.

Source: Author calculations on National Labour Force Survey held in the ILO micro-data repository.

generally, the status in employment of African youth has not changed much since 2005. This is contrary to global trends where there has been a major shift from self-employment to wage employment in both emerging and developing countries alike (ILO, 2017). More favourably, there has been an appreciable reduction in the proportion of young women in self-employment. Thus, the gender gap has narrowed over the last decade or so, with a significant increase in the percentage of young women in wage employment from 17.0 per cent in 2005 to 21.7 per cent in 2015. However, differences between young women and young men remain significant: the prevalence of wage employment among young women (21.7 per cent) is still 10 percentage points below that of young men (31.7 per cent).

An increase in wage employment among young people has not, however, brought greater job security; most of the increase that has occurred is accounted for by increases in informal and temporary formal wage employment rather than in more secure standard employment with permanent contracts (figure 3.14).


3.3 Issues and discussion

3.3.1 Where do young people work (and where might jobs come from)?

The successful transition of young people into the labour market will depend in part on where jobs are available. An examination of changes in sectoral employment over the last decade lends some insight into those sectors that may provide jobs for young people (aged 15–29 years) in the near future. Likely shifts in sectoral employment are influenced by a variety of factors, including macroeconomic and sectoral policies, skills and human capabilities, policies and access to markets (Salazar-Xirinachs, Nübler and Kozul-Wright, 2014), some of which are considered in detail below.

Employment in construction and service sectors has been growing among young people, albeit modestly, but agriculture remains the main source of employment for both young people and adults alike (figure 3.15). During the last decade or so, construction has increased its share of youth employment by two percentage points. Outside of construction, however, there is little evidence of, in particular, high value-added sectors beginning to employ significantly more young

► Figure 3.15 Sectoral employment shares and changes for young people and adults in Africa, 2006 and 2016



Note: This figure reports African estimates of: a) the number of workers (young and adult) employed in each sector as a percentage of total employment in 2016 (or nearest year); b) the percentage point change between 2006 and 2016 (or nearest years for which data is available) in employment share for young people (aged 15–29 years) in each of the sectors; c) and the percentage point change between a year before the financial crisis (ca. 2006) and the most recent year for which data on employment share for adults (aged 30–64 years) is available for sector. These figures are based on 14 countries: Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

Source: Labour force micro-database v1.5 and author calculations.

people. For the time being, a move away from agricultural employment is much more detectable among adults than young people.

The development of non-agricultural employment opportunities for young people on the African continent is very modest when compared to trends in, for example, Asia and the Pacific: the share of young workers employed in agriculture dropped by under 4 percentage points in Africa between 2006 and 2016, whereas in Asia and the Pacific it fell by a full 17 percentage points during the same time period. Another way of looking at this is that, in absolute terms, the youth population (aged 15–29 years) grew by 22.4 per cent between 2005 and 2015, but the number of non-agricultural jobs grew by only 5.6 per cent.²³ In other words, non-agricultural employment growth in Africa is not keeping pace with a rapidly expanding youth population.

As mentioned above, having more young people is a potential resource, but in the short run it can exert pressure on the labour market. In economies where job opportunities outside of agriculture are increasing only slowly, the entry of large numbers of young people into the labour force may force many to remain in low productivity agricultural employment, thereby acting as a brake on productivity and economic growth.

3.3.2 What role is there for education and training?

Any strategy to increase good quality youth employment requires attention to the basics: macroeconomic and political stability and adequate infrastructure.²⁴ It cannot rely solely on supply-side measures aimed exclusively at enhancing the skills of the young workforce. Without the

²³ Author calculations on ILO micro-database.

²⁴ The importance of infrastructure development has recently been emphasized by Monga, Shimeles and Woldemichael (2019).

basic conditions for quality employment creation and growth, more highly skilled young people will not find a market for their talents. Indeed, chapter four of the most recent edition of the ILO's *Global employment trends for youth* (ILO, 2020) suggests the existence of an excess supply of tertiary graduates in a number of African – and some other – countries which has led to a fall in the returns to tertiary education in the continent over the last decade or so.²⁵

There is no doubt, however, that skills gaps and, more generally, issues relating to education and training are of central importance. This is in regard not just to the overall level of preparation for work, but also the appropriateness of competences learnt through education and training, both from the point of view of the firm demanding skills and that of the young person seeking decent work. Higher and better levels of education can facilitate entry into better jobs; a lack of these is cited by less qualified young people as a major obstacle to finding decent work (AfDB et al., 2012).

The nature of the relationship between education and unemployment can, however, be misleading. In Africa, more often than not, unemployment rates are larger amongst those with higher levels of educational attainment. This is largely due to: a) a positive relationship between family income and educational participation; and b) the consequent willingness and ability of better educated young people, on average, to wait longer for better employment opportunities to arrive. That misleading is obvious once employment is also considered; that is, both employment and unemployment rates²⁶ increase with educational attainment. In other words, as educational attainment rises so too does labour force participation, regardless of whether the young people concerned actually find work; those with higher levels of educational attainment are relatively more likely to be labour force participants and more likely to be unemployed, because (see point a. above), on average, they will come from families with a higher level of income and so can afford to extend their job search for a longer period. Poorer young people cannot afford to wait as long. So, it is income rather education in itself that drives the

relationship between unemployment rates and educational participation.

The same consideration underlies cross-country comparisons. As noted above, there is a strong positive correlation between youth (and adult) unemployment rates and country GDP per capita. Countries with a higher GDP per capita have a higher unemployment rate, on average. This is, rather obviously, not because countries with a higher per capita GDP have fewer employment opportunities; it is because in higher income countries young people can, on average, afford to spend longer time looking and waiting for better and more appropriate jobs, thus leading to higher unemployment rates. By contrast, higher levels of educational attainment clearly facilitate access to better jobs. Of course, there can be – and, as noted, certainly is in the context of Africa – educational imbalance; however, this is not the main factor driving the positive relationship between educational attainment and unemployment rates.²⁷

Educational participation and attainment in sub-Saharan Africa have increased significantly in recent years. This is a result of substantial investment and the role played by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in encouraging participation in education and subsequently by their successor SDGs. For example, between 2000 and 2017, the literacy rate of young people in sub-Saharan Africa rose from 65.9 per cent to 75.4 per cent. Although this is well below the global average of 91.4 per cent, it does represent a significant improvement (UNESCO, 2019, table 13.1, p. 180). Nevertheless, educational attainment remains low by international standards. The three African countries that participated in the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in 2016 (Egypt, Morocco and South Africa) were the three lowest ranked countries in the comparison. It was a similar outcome for mathematics and science evaluated in 2015 by the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), where the same three countries did only slightly better.²⁸

Moreover, the strong link between field of study and unemployment and employment rates suggests that educational mismatch has an im-

25 Similarly, the NEET rate in Africa does not fall markedly with level of education as it typically does in other regions (ILO, 2020, chapter 4).

26 The employment “rate” is defined here as the employment-to-population ratio (and not the employment-to-labour force ratio as is sometimes used).

27 In practical terms, this only becomes obvious once one looks at “older young people” – say those between 25 and 29 years of age – or adults as a whole, since most 15–24-year-olds who will obtain tertiary level qualifications are still in education at this age.

28 See: <https://timssandpirls.bc.edu> [accessed 24 Apr. 2019].

portant impact, particularly in more developed countries (AfDB et al., 2012). Recent ILO research (ILO, 2020) also suggests that educational imbalances at the tertiary level have an adverse impact on low- and middle-income countries, manifested in terms of falling returns to education in the last decade or so – including in Africa.

Hence, the skills-related employment problems facing the continent's young people are three-fold: a) although improving, the extent of educational participation in Africa remains low by international standards; b) in so far as information is available, international indicators of educational achievement suggest that the quality of education in Africa is relatively poor; and c) there is evidence also of skills mismatches, particularly in the more developed African economies and at the higher levels of educational attainment.


Data on educational attainment reported in the UNDP's Human Development Indices and Indicators 2018 update²⁹ also suggest that gender disparities in educational participation are particularly marked in Africa, although this disparity has fallen significantly over the last twenty years almost everywhere. The situation is most serious in the least developed countries in the

region, such as the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Guinea, where the main problem appears to be initial access to primary education, as, once in school, girls seem to do as well as boys. On the other hand, in some of the more developed economies, gender disparities in educational participation have been eliminated. This is the case in Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritania, Uganda and Senegal. Although eliminating gender disparities in educational participation by no means implies the elimination of gender-based disparities overall, this is certainly a step in the right direction.

3.3.3 Digging deeper: determinants and consequences of informality?

Given the predominance of informal employment among young people in Africa, it is all the more important to explore who exactly is affected by it, and why. That is say, what factors, characteristics and attributes are pushing (or pulling) young people into jobs in the informal sector or informal jobs in the formal sector? This section examines the determinants of informal employment and their relative importance.

► **Figure 3.16 Prevalence of informal employment among the young (aged 15–29 years) in Africa by educational attainment (per cent)**




Note: This figure reports the two basic categories of informal employment (and their sum) as a percentage of total youth employment by educational attainment level. For details on the SWTS and how aggregation was undertaken across the survey to arrive at regional and “global” estimates, see O’Higgins (2017). Countries included are Benin, Congo, Egypt, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Sierra Leone, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

Source: Author calculations, based on SWTS data.

²⁹ See: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update>.

► Figure 3.17 Prevalence of informal employment in Africa, by age and educational attainment (per cent)



Note: This figure reports informal employment as a percentage of total youth employment by age, distinguishing between different levels of educational attainment. For details on the SWTS and the countries included and how aggregation was undertaken across the survey to arrive at regional and “global” estimates, see O’Higgins (2017). In this case, given the high degree of disaggregation across age and educational level, a three-year unweighted moving average is reported giving the figure that corresponds to the upper limit, so that, for example, the number reported for age 17 is the average for the three years 15, 16 and 17. The related dotted lines show the average slope of the moving averages in order to emphasise the differences in the slope – and hence the implied exit rates from informality – for different levels of education.

Source: Author calculations, based on SWTS data.

We have already seen that informal employment in Africa falls, albeit modestly, with age. This lends some support for the notion that exiting from informality is reasonably common; or, to put it differently, even though informal employment typically has serious negative effects on socio-economic outcomes, it may be largely a temporary phenomenon for most young people. But, the case of Africa does not support this notion.³⁰ The fall in informality with age is very modest in the region, and informality tends to be concentrated among the least educated in the labour force such that the prevalence of informality unambiguously falls as educational attainment rises (figure 3.16). The form informality takes also shifts significantly, from informal sector employment to informal (wage) employment in the formal sector. Moreover, and importantly, young people with higher levels of education, on average, enter the labour market later than those with lower levels. Thus, informality falling with age and education is consistent with the idea

that a high proportion of those young people entering the labour market relatively early with few educational qualifications gravitate towards the informal sector (and remain there), while those entering later and with higher levels of education are less likely to enter informality.

Thus, the modest inverse relation between age and informality is largely explained by the late entry into the labour force of those (with higher educational qualifications) who are less likely to be engaged in the informal economy, rather than by the tendency of young people to move from informality to formality as they get older. Figure 3.17 plots informal employment rates by age, controlling for educational level, and suggests that this scenario is indeed plausible. More precisely, it suggests two significant refinements to the relationship between age, educational attainment and informal employment. First, *conditional on age*, the likelihood of being informally employed falls sharply with educational attainment, as is also suggested by figure 3.15. Second, the *higher*

³⁰ Nor indeed does the global one. See O’Higgins (2017, chapter 7).

level of education, the more that informality falls with age. For those with less than primary education, the rate of informality hardly falls, if at all, with age; for those with only primary education, it falls slightly; while among those who achieve secondary, or even more so tertiary education, the gradient becomes significantly steeper. This implies that for young Africans with a low level of education, informality is an almost permanent state, whereas those entering informal employment having achieved secondary or tertiary educational qualifications are much more likely to subsequently make the transition to formal employment. This is because a) individuals with at least secondary education have a considerably lower probability of being informally employed when graduating and b) the chances of finding formal employment improve continuously after graduation.

Thus, the difficulties faced by those who want to make the transition from informality to formality are greatest at the lower end of the educational scale. This is not particularly surprising, but it does emphasize the need to pay special attention to those most at risk of remaining permanently in informal employment: namely, informally employed young people with a low level of educational attainment.

Besides education, other factors may also be important in explaining why some individuals find themselves persistently in informal employment throughout their youth and, indeed, their entire working lives. In the case of Latin America, it has been argued that initial poor labour market integration becomes a hard-to-overcome obstacle, and that this is particularly true for less educated youth (ILO, 2015). Thus: “The first job and its work conditions largely determine the employment and personal paths of young people. A formal, quality first job with good working conditions improves working conditions in subsequent jobs by at least 50%. This advantage intensifies with age” (Dema et al., 2015, p. 39).

To shed more light on the determinants of informality among young people, we now turn to some simple micro-econometric models. As the above discussion has suggested, it is important to

examine whether and to what extent an informal first job (relative to a formal first employment) determines future labour market outcomes. Unfortunately, while the SWTS contains retrospective panel information on the employment and educational histories of respondents, it does not contain complete information on the formality or informality of jobs held prior to the current one. It does, however, for some countries, contain information on whether or not a past job as employee was based on a contract.

In their analysis of Peru, Caverio and Ruiz (2016) have used information on whether or not an individual's first employment was contract-based wage employment as an indicator for a high-quality first job to understand better the determinants of currently holding a high-quality (i.e. formal) job now (as opposed to an informal one).³¹ Although this does not directly confront the issue of persistence in informality, it is strongly indicative for the Latin American context. The study found that having a ‘formal’ first job was an important determinant of whether young people currently held a formal job in Peru. Specifically, the authors found that having had a first job which was formal raised the probability of currently being in formal employment by between 12 and 16 percentage points³² – a substantial impact.

Turning to results for African countries included in the SWTS, table 3.1 shows the results of an analysis of the determinants of (1) the probability of employment for labour market participants (cols 1–4) and (2) the probability of being in a formal job for all those in employment (cols 5–8). The model was estimated separately for young women and young men. Results are reported both for the 12 African countries and, for comparison purposes, the 22 non-African ones (denoted RoW) included in the SWTS.³³

The key results from estimating the probability of being in employment (cols 1 & 2 for Africa and 3 & 4 for the rest of the world) and formal (vs. informal employment; cols 5–8) suggest a number of things. While in the rest of the world (hereafter RoW) the likelihood of finding employment clearly increases with education, more so for women than men, this is not the case in Africa. Although

31 Specifically, a high-quality job now is equated with current formal employment. A high-quality *first job* is defined as a first job which was wage employment with a contract. In other words, they use contract-based wage employment as a proxy for the first job being formal.

32 According to whether selection into employment is controlled for or not.

33 Likelihood ratio tests refute the null hypothesis of no statistically significant difference between the parameter estimates for Africa and RoW (for both men and women) and analogously for the parameter differences between men and women (for Africa and RoW) at – usually well below – $p < 0.001$. That is, statistical tests confirm that the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent ones (employment, and informality) are different between Africa and RoW and between men and women.

► Table 3.1 Determinants of employment and informality among African (and RoW) youth

| Explanatory variables | (any) Employment vs. NEET | | | | Formal vs. informal employment | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| | Africa – young women | Africa – young men | RoW – young women | RoW – young men | Africa – young women | Africa – young men | RoW – young women | RoW – young men |
| Secondary education | -0.127*** (0.030) | -0.088*** (0.033) | 0.119*** (0.026) | 0.078*** (0.027) | 0.150*** (0.055) | 0.347*** (0.044) | 0.278*** (0.053) | 0.240*** (0.034) |
| Tertiary education | 0.118** (0.050) | -0.182*** (0.050) | 0.497*** (0.037) | 0.177*** (0.039) | 0.891*** (0.082) | 0.980*** (0.063) | 0.697*** (0.067) | 0.529*** (0.047) |
| Rural area | 0.203*** (0.025) | 0.128*** (0.027) | -0.030 (0.020) | 0.053*** (0.020) | -0.196*** (0.045) | -0.253*** (0.035) | -0.150*** (0.031) | -0.132*** (0.024) |
| Married | -0.262*** (0.026) | 0.265*** (0.038) | -0.509*** (0.021) | 0.184*** (0.025) | -0.077 (0.047) | 0.094** (0.043) | -0.017 (0.030) | 0.072*** (0.026) |
| Age group 20–24 years | 0.146*** (0.031) | 0.137*** (0.035) | 0.157*** (0.028) | 0.327*** (0.026) | 0.042 (0.056) | -0.031 (0.048) | 0.176*** (0.062) | 0.188*** (0.043) |
| Age group 25–29 years | 0.295*** (0.034) | 0.487*** (0.041) | 0.392*** (0.030) | 0.580*** (0.030) | 0.133** (0.061) | 0.188*** (0.051) | 0.213*** (0.067) | 0.232*** (0.048) |
| Ln(employment duration, in months) | – (0.011) | – (0.009) | – (0.012) | – (0.010) | -0.037*** (0.011) | -0.019** (0.009) | 0.098*** (0.012) | 0.084*** (0.010) |
| First experience: self-employed | 0.147*** (0.037) | 0.119*** (0.036) | 0.287*** (0.034) | 0.274*** (0.033) | -0.350*** (0.053) | -0.033 (0.042) | -0.433*** (0.046) | -0.259*** (0.032) |
| First experience: Training | -0.221*** (0.058) | -0.235*** (0.056) | -0.353*** (0.052) | -0.247*** (0.051) | -0.185** (0.092) | 0.147* (0.079) | -0.079 (0.074) | -0.011 (0.059) |
| First experience: NEET | -0.760*** (0.035) | -0.769*** (0.034) | -0.972*** (0.023) | -0.898*** (0.023) | -0.389*** (0.060) | -0.013 (0.049) | -0.100*** (0.036) | 0.040 (0.029) |
| First experience: Other/missing | -1.336*** (0.045) | -1.218*** (0.053) | -1.957*** (0.047) | -1.932*** (0.046) | -0.576*** (0.113) | -0.086 (0.110) | -0.142 (0.127) | 0.008 (0.115) |
| Age when leaving education | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.019*** (0.003) | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.016*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.005) | -0.046*** (0.004) | 0.053*** (0.007) | 0.060*** (0.005) |
| Observations | 15 507 | 14 771 | 27 458 | 26 420 | 8 690 | 11 250 | 11 969 | 19 299 |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ln likelihood | -7 658 | -6 203 | -12 535 | -11 696 | -2 244 | -3 541 | -5 548 | -8 815 |
| Chi-square test | 5 179*** | 5 340*** | 9 688*** | 9 281*** | 4 483*** | 5 684*** | 3 161*** | 5 608*** |

Notes: This table reports probit estimates of two models: a) the probability of being in employment (as opposed to being NEET); b) the probability of being in formal employment (as opposed to being in informal employment). Estimates are provided for a) African countries in the SWTS (cols 1–2 and 5–6); and b) non-African countries in the SWTS (RoW, cols 3–4 and 7–8). Ln stands for natural logarithm. In order to get a better sense of the relative importance of different variables in the African and RoW contexts, the raw probit coefficients are reported rather than the often used “marginal effects”. This is in order to get a better sense of the size of the relative importance of different variables in the context of the large difference in base probabilities between employment and especially informality rates in Africa and RoW (as well as between young women and young men). For details on the survey, the non-African countries included and how aggregation was undertaken across surveys to arrive at regional and “global” estimates, see O’Higgins (2017). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: Author calculations, based on SWTS data.

obtaining tertiary education, raises the chances of being in employment for young African women, this is not the case for young African men who actually see their chances of finding employment fall as their educational attainment increases in line with the positive relation between educational attainment and unemployment and NEET rates observable at the aggregate level and which was discussed above. As noted already, there is a plausible supply-side explanation for this. On the other hand, educational attainment is, as was suggested, important in determining job quality (see cols 5–8) – crucially so for young African young women and men. The coefficients on tertiary education are much higher in Africa than in RoW.

Similarly, living in a rural area increases significantly the chances of finding work in Africa (but not in RoW), but reduces the chances of finding formal (as opposed to informal) employment in both Africa and RoW – but more so in Africa.

Perhaps of most importance, for young men and young women in both Africa and RoW, becoming self-employed (as opposed to the default of being in wage employment) immediately on leaving school increases the chances of being in employment (cols 1–4) later on, but lessens the chances that this employment is formal (as opposed to informal; cols 5–8). However, the impact of early self-employment is much more pronounced in RoW than in Africa.

Also of major importance, the impact of the duration of previous employment experience on finding formal (as opposed to informal) employment is statistically significantly and positive in RoW, whereas it is statistically significant and negative for young Africans. This suggests that whereas in RoW there is some movement out of informal into formal employment which depends on the time spent in a job, in Africa, the longer one spends in informal employment, the more likely one is to remain there. Although caution is needed in the interpretation of the coefficients in this type of model – particularly as regards presumptive causality – the results are certainly consistent with the idea that escaping informality is more difficult in Africa than in the RoW. Not so surprising given the relative paucity of formal employment opportunities in this continent.

In general, with a couple of exceptions, such as the “impact” of living in a rural area on being employed³⁴, the coefficients are much smaller in Africa and/or less statistically significant. Thus, overall, results seem to suggest that getting a job and getting a “good” (formal) job is a *relatively* arbitrary process in Africa, compared to other regions. Perhaps owing to the predominance of informal employment on the continent and, among other things, the necessity driven obligation to find any kind of employment, other factors associated with positive job outcomes are weaker in the region. This reflects the systemic nature of informality in the context of Africa; individual characteristics are of far less importance.

But what about the costs to the individual of informality? One aspect of this concerns the wage penalty for those in informal jobs. Table 3.2 reports the results of simple Mincerian regressions of (log) wages as a function of education, experience and other (primarily individual) characteristics likely to affect earnings. One may observe immediately that the raw informality penalty is more than twice as large in Africa as it is in the RoW. Interpreted literally, the coefficient on informal employment (col. 1) implies that young workers in the informal economy in Africa, on average, have an hourly wage of less than half that earned by formal workers, whereas in other low- and middle-income countries, informal workers’ hourly wage is, on average, three-quarters that of formal workers.³⁵ The wage gap between informal and formal employment is wider in Africa than it is, on average, in non-African low- and middle-income countries. Thus, one may also observe that the disadvantage associated with having been in self-employment early in a person’s working life in terms of the reduced chance of finding a formal job later is more pronounced in RoW than in Africa, whilst the opposite is true with regard to the wage penalty.

The discussion of the individual effects of informality is important also because informality matters on a much broader scale – it impedes development. The informal sector is typically populated by small, unproductive firms largely disconnected from the formal economy and with little potential for growth. These labour-intensive firms are for the most part run by poorly educated micro-entrepreneurs and their potential for inte-

34 Which is also fairly obviously endogenous.

35 Since of course, $d\ln(Y)/dX = (dY/Y)dX$; i.e. the percentage change in Y associated with a change in X . Since inclusion of a dummy variable – in this case informality – involves a discrete shift, the relation is approximate here.

► Table 3.2 Impact of informality on hourly wages

| Explanatory variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Ln wages 1 Africa | Ln wages 1 RoW | Ln wages 2 Africa | Ln wages 2 RoW |
| Informal | -0.544*** (0.039) | -0.227*** (0.008) | -0.365*** (0.042) | -0.171*** (0.008) |
| Secondary | | | 0.097*** (0.031) | 0.124*** (0.011) |
| Tertiary | | | 0.374*** (0.043) | 0.273*** (0.013) |
| Rural | | | -0.112*** (0.027) | -0.046*** (0.008) |
| Female | | | -0.384*** (0.029) | -0.206*** (0.008) |
| Married | | | 0.067** (0.032) | 0.019** (0.009) |
| Aged 20–24 years | | | 0.194*** (0.040) | 0.096*** (0.014) |
| Aged 25–29 years | | | 0.337*** (0.042) | 0.176*** (0.015) |
| Ln(duration of employment, in months) | | | 0.035*** (0.008) | 0.021*** (0.003) |
| First_job_self-employment | | | -0.081** (0.037) | 0.023 (0.015) |
| Constant | 4.470*** (0.098) | 4.401*** (0.012) | 4.120*** (0.098) | 4.178*** (0.019) |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4 858 | 18 607 | 4 858 | 18 607 |
| R-squared | 0.197 | 0.122 | 0.269 | 0.190 |

Notes: The table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of the determinants of the (natural logarithm of) hourly wages estimated for 33 low- and middle-income countries in the SWTS; 12 African countries and 21 non-African ones. In this case separate estimates for males and females are not reported given the relatively small sample sizes of the gender segregated data with appropriate wage data. Ln stands for natural logarithm. For details on the survey, countries included and how aggregation was undertaken across the survey to arrive at regional and “global” estimates, see O’Higgins (2017). Two specifications are reported: a) with only an informality dummy; and b) adding basic information on education and job experience. Log stands for natural logarithm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

More generally, examining columns 3 and 4 one can see that, along with informality itself, age, education, the duration of employment experience and gender have a bigger impact on young people’s hourly wages in Africa than they do in other low- and middle-income countries in the surveys.

► Table 3.3 Gini coefficient of wage inequality, formal and informal workers

| | Formal workers | Informal workers |
|------------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Benin | 0.20 | 0.41 |
| Congo | 0.30 | 0.55 |
| Egypt | 0.28 | 0.30 |
| Liberia | 0.18 | 0.50 |
| Madagascar | 0.27 | 0.36 |
| Malawi | 0.45 | 0.58 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.17 | 0.67 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 0.48 | 0.55 |
| Togo | 0.30 | 0.64 |
| Tunisia | 0.14 | 0.27 |
| Uganda | 0.31 | 0.47 |
| Zambia | 0.44 | 0.63 |
| Africa | 0.35 | 0.49 |
| <i>World</i> | <i>0.25</i> | <i>0.36</i> |

Source: Author calculations, based on SWTS data.


gration into the formal sector is limited (Elbadawi and Loayza, 2008; Gatti et al., 2011; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, 2014). Additionally, for a given level of public spending, a higher informal employment share implies an increasing tax burden on the formal sector, which might hold back new and productive (formal) firms that – in contrast to their counterparts in the informal economy – may have growth potential. Furthermore, while informal workers and firms use and congest public infrastructure, they do not contribute to the tax revenues required to maintain and renew it (Gatti et al., 2011). It is therefore not surprising that informality puts a brake on growth.

Informal employment is not, however, only related to level of economic development and a country's capacity for growth. The same factors cited above linking informality and growth are also largely responsible for the clear association that exists between the size of the informal economy and income inequality (Perry et al., 2007; Loayza, Servén and Sugawara, 2009).

Analysis of the SWTS data confirms this general finding to also be the case for young Africans. Table 3.3 displays Gini coefficients – a standard measure of inequality – of the wages of young people in both formal and informal employment in Africa. In Africa as a whole, as well as for each country on the continent included in the SWTS – and indeed, globally – wage inequality is higher in informal work than it is in the formal economy. The generality of this observation is also confirmed in other regions (O'Higgins, 2017, chapter 7). However, as with the informality-associated wage gap, the inequality induced through informality is greater in Africa than elsewhere. Again, this does not come as a great surprise, yet it is an important confirmation; and it provides one more good reason for making the improvement of job quality and the formalization of employment priority policies for Africa.

▶ 4

- ▶ Looking to the future:
policy consideration
-



The challenges facing African youth in their search for decent work are substantial. It has been argued here that for most African young people, the main issue is access to decent quality employment rather than an absence of work. Certainly, the quality and appropriateness of education and training can be improved and this will continue to bring substantial benefits, as has been seen over the last two decades. However, approaches that overly rely on supply-side interventions, and which often dominate the youth employment policy debate in Africa, cannot resolve these challenges on their own. It is balanced demand and supply-side interventions that are required. Some of the issues concerning the possible areas for intervention are now considered in more detail.

4.1 Translate economic growth into sustainable decent jobs

Economic growth does not automatically translate into new jobs. More specifically, the sectors that contribute the most to economic growth are not necessarily those which underlie substantial employment growth. Notably, most African countries depend heavily on natural resources and generate substantial revenues from extraction, but this leads to only low employment. Taking into account all the foreign firms for which data are available, the manufacturing sector creates 2.75 jobs for every US\$1 million of FDI. Measured by the same criteria, customer contact centres create 61 jobs for every US\$1 million of greenfield FDI, whereas the extractive sector creates only 0.6 jobs for every US\$1 million of FDI. Although the indicators do not cover job quality, it is important to note that the sector which attracts the most FDI may not necessarily be the most labour intensive one that creates the most jobs (ILO, 2019c). One possible explanation for the persistence of jobless growth in Africa may be the fact that government revenues from oil exports, and more generally from the exploitation of natural resources, are more likely to subsidize current consumption than they are to be invested in measures to further economic and employment growth in the longer term (e.g. investments in infrastructure, education and social protection).

Economic growth needs to be shaped in a way that ensures employment opportunities and better well-being. This will require accelerated and

sustained structural transformation, which would include a shift in investment away from resource extraction towards higher value-added sectors, such as manufacturing and specific types of services. Together, an efficient means of extraction allied to the manufacturing and service industries can help guarantee a positive link between economic growth and decent employment in Africa.

Structural transformation is an integral part of the process of economic development. A core element of this is the gradual transfer of labour from low-paying, unproductive occupations into productive decent wage jobs. There is a clear move in this direction underway at the global level (ILO, 2017); however, as has been shown, the shift of African youth away from own account and contributing family work and into decent jobs has to-date been relatively slow. Furthermore, a shift to wage employment and sustainable youth entrepreneurship, itself a result of structural transformation, would also further support economic development by strengthening domestic purchasing power and stimulating demand for consumer goods. It would also free up market space for viable businesses and lessen competition by reducing the spread of survivalist micro-enterprises.

Youth employment can be promoted by focusing on those sectors and enterprises best able to create productive wage and salaried jobs. In turn, it is also clear that focussing on “traditional” sectors and forms of production, such as small-holder farming in rural areas, may be counter-productive in this regard. This is not to discount the importance of agriculture; on the contrary, investments in agricultural production are essen-

tial for economic transformation to occur. Rather, the issue is the type of agricultural businesses that are promoted; clearly, the focus should be on viable, competitive, emerging farms that operate at a scale too large to rely on family labour alone.

In any event, a strategy for employment growth, especially in youth employment, requires a systemic macroeconomic policy approach, including but not only trade, FDI and interregional integration policies. The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), for example, has the potential to boost intra-African trade, stimulate structural transformation and deliver prosperity to the continent's population (UNCTAD, 2015). Perhaps most importantly, it will produce more decent jobs for Africa's bulging youth population (ATPC, n.d.). As mentioned, extractive exports, on which Africa's trade is currently based, are less labour intensive than the manufactured and agricultural goods that are set to benefit most from CFTA. By encouraging more labour intensive intra-trade, CFTA generates more employment (*ibid.*). It is anticipated that CFTA may raise the proportion of intra-African trade in total trade for the continent from around 10.2 per cent up to 15.5 per cent between 2010 and 2022 (UNCTAD, 2015).

4.2 Moving from subsistence farming to agro-industrialization

Agriculture remains the most important employer in Africa. In 2019, around half (51 per cent) of all workers were employed in the sector, very commonly under conditions of informality and working poverty. A progressive shift to higher value-added sectors, such as agroprocessing, manufacturing or other industries, will have the double benefit of more employment in higher productivity sectors, as well as an increase in markets and incomes for farmers. In this way, off-farm employment ought to be boosted as well, since a rise in agricultural incomes is likely to stimulate demand for other goods and services. In addition, commercializing the agricultural sector ought to significantly increase business formalization; though even today, because many of Africa's poor work in the informal sector, moving into off-farm employment still generally means remaining in the informal sector.

4.3 A central role for education and training

Skills gaps and more generally issues related to education and training are also of central importance. This is in regard both to the overall level of preparation, but also to the appropriateness of the competences learnt. Moreover, education and training need to be seen not just from the point of view of the firms demanding skills, but also from that of the young people seeking decent work. A lack of higher and better levels of education is cited by less qualified young people as a major obstacle to finding decent work (AfDB et al., 2012). In research by the World Bank, upwards of 40 per cent of small, medium and large firms in eight African countries identified a lack of appropriate skills as the biggest constraint on their business. Moreover, those firms employing more than 20 employees are the most likely to report such skills constraints, together with export-oriented firms (Campbell, Egger and Ronas, forthcoming).

Education and training in Africa have undergone major improvements in recent decades. However, it is also evident that there is much more that can be done. For instance, purposive skills development with a keen focus on new sectors and occupations is required, as well as the creation of social protection systems for vulnerable groups.

Most of the continent's skills systems suffer through a lack of involvement from social partners. As a consequence, supply-driven skills development can become misaligned with the developmental aspirations of a country and threaten its sustainable funding. Developing better performing skills systems through active social dialogue at the national, sectoral and local level and aligning them better with economic development and employment creation is key. A dearth of good skills systems is also, in large part, due to a general lack of policy coordination. Employment policies, for example, are often not designed to accommodate skills and do not coordinate those sectors that could add more value to the economy with the specific skills that would support their development.

Access to good quality and relevant skills development remains an issue, particularly so for African youth in rural areas who find themselves in low-paying, low-productivity jobs in the informal economy. Informal apprenticeships continue to be the major source of skills development in Africa, and in some countries they account for

over 90 per cent of the training received by young workers (AfDB et al., 2012, p. 217). Embedded in social norms and traditions, this system underperforms on several counts: outdated skills get perpetuated, skills recognition is low and apprentices may be engaged in unacceptable forms of work.

Women and minorities are at a significant disadvantage with respect to access to adequate education and skills development, principally in rural areas. In many countries in Africa, access is denied because of cultural issues or poverty. Young women are often engaged exclusively in domestic chores and grow older without having had an opportunity to enrol in the education system. Many families living below the poverty line, again in rural areas particularly, enter young boys into the educational system, but leave the girls behind at home.

Countries affected by political instability and/or climate change face the toughest challenges. In many African countries this leads to population displacement, conflict, erosion of socioeconomic institutions and, in some cases, destruction of infrastructure. This in turn can create an even more challenging scenario for young people; one aggravated by insecurity and constant conflicts, where training or employment opportunities are absent. For these countries, providing local and targeted skills development and reinvestment in infrastructure and institutions reduces vulnerability and fosters sustainable development.

Enhancing the quality of apprenticeships, upgrading informal apprenticeships and increasing other types of work-based learning programmes can boost the employability of youth by providing practical work experience and the skills required by the labour market. This can reduce skills mismatch and improve the transition from school to the world of work. Upgrading informal apprenticeships would also strengthen the linkage between informal apprenticeship and formal systems and further the formalization of the informal economy.

The importance of acquiring appropriate competences and combating skills mismatch means that technical and vocational education and training (hereafter TVET)³⁶ is higher on African member States' agendas than ever before. There is now a growing consensus among stakeholders (i.e. the African Union Commission [AUC], Regional Economic Communities [RECs], AU Member

States and governments and continental development partners) as to the importance of TVET in fostering youth employment, contributing to economic development and gaining competitiveness in the global market. An important goal of African TVET systems is ensuring that institutions focus on developing relevant skills that are up-to-date, sought after in the jobs market and, ultimately, help trainees either find employment or become successful entrepreneurs (see the AU's Continental Strategy for TVET to Foster Youth Employment). Globally as well, three of the seven targets under SDG 4 relate to TVET, highlighting the pivotal role it plays in transforming society. As a step forwards in this direction, the Heads of State and Government in July 2017 through decision Assembly/AU/Dec.652 (XXIX) declared the 2018–27 period to be the “African Decade for Technical, Professional, Entrepreneurial Training and Youth Employment”. It also instructed the AUC, in collaboration with Burkina Faso and Developing Partners, to develop a “Plan of Action for the African Decade for Technical, Professional, Entrepreneurial Training and Youth Employment”.

Generally speaking, an efficient investment in human capital can provide the opportunity to create decent work, facilitate the formalization of those in informal employment and end working poverty. The ILO's humanity-centred agenda (ILO 2019d, 2019e) identifies three pillars of investment:

1. Investing in people's ability to acquire new skills, reskill and upskill and tendering support as they undergo transitions in employment over their life course.
2. Investing in the institution of work, by ensuring a future for work that includes freedom, dignity, economic security and equality.
3. Investing in decent and sustainable work, and shaping rules and incentives as so to align economic and social policy and business practice.

Lastly, although a lack of skills and/or skills mismatches are important, without the basic conditions for job creation and employment growth, more highly skilled people will have no outlet for their talents. However, by harnessing transformative technologies, demographic opportunities and the green economy, the three pillars of investment can be powerful drivers of equity and sustainability in the present and into the future generation (ILO, 2019d).

³⁶ Integral to the education sector, TVET can, in principle, be incorporated from primary through to tertiary educational levels.

4.4 Active labour market programmes and public employment services

Active labour market programmes, and the development of public employment services more generally, can have a significant impact on the employment and employability of young people. In Turkey, for example, employment subsidies have been effective, not only in improving the employment prospects of participants, but also in encouraging the formalization of those firms wanting to access the subsidy (Betcherman, Daysal and Pagés, 2010).

One major example of such a programme in Africa is a wage subsidy scheme introduced in South Africa in 2014 called the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI). A pilot implemented in 2010 had been successful in raising the employment prospects of participants in the short but also, albeit more moderately, in the medium term. Since then, the programme's roll out on a national scale – accompanied by numerous design changes – has proved less successful, at least in terms of the employment prospects of participants (box 4.1).³⁷ Nevertheless, in a show of faith, the government of South Africa has recently extended the ETI scheme by further 10 years until February 2029.

► Box 4.1 The youth wage subsidy pilot and the Employment tax Incentive in South Africa

South Africa is characterized by extremely high youth unemployment rates, especially among black Africans: by comparison, close to two-thirds of non-white South Africans aged 20–24 years were unemployed in 2012 (Levinsohn et al., 2014). To tackle this problem, a pilot wage subsidy programme was launched in 2010. The programme had an RCT (randomized control trial) design: vouchers were handed out to randomly selected unemployed young people between the ages of 20 and 24 years. Each voucher entitled its holder to a subsidy with a total value of 5,000 South African rand (ZAR), which could be claimed in instalments over a minimum period of six months until the total amount was exhausted. The maximum monthly amount of the subsidy was half the wage or ZAR833 (whichever was lower). This monthly cap corresponded to about 40 per cent of the median wage in the target group. The subsidy was also transferable between companies before exhaustion.

After the pilot, which reported significant gains in the post-programme employment probability of participants, plans for implementation on a national scale were worked out and debated. A simulation based on a structural search model (Levinsohn and Pugatch, 2014) estimated that a wage subsidy of ZAR1,000 per month would lead to a fall in the proportion of long-term unemployed youth of 12 percentage points. A firm-level survey conducted in 2011 (Schöer and Rankin, 2011) investigated employers' reactions to a hypothetical youth wage subsidy. Results indicated that the majority of the firms surveyed would have considered hiring more young workers, although they also suggested that they would not necessarily increase the labour force but would substitute younger workers for older ones.

In 2013, President Jacob Zuma signed the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) Act, which introduced the wage subsidy nationwide. In contrast to the original scheme, which offered direct payments at a relatively high level, the new scheme offered tax incentives for up to two years to employers who, after 1 October 2014, hired low- to middle-level wage earners (those earning below ZAR6,000) aged between 18 and 29 years.

This measure has received substantial media attention ever since its first planning phase. The Congress of South African Trade Unions has opposed the wage subsidy with demonstrations and the threat of strikes, fearing the displacement of older workers and rising levels of unemployment.

Evaluations of the full programme have been disappointing, suggesting no appreciable impact on aggregate youth employment rates (Ranchhod and Finn, 2016), although more recent evidence suggests a statistically significant moderate positive impact on youth (and adult) employment in small and medium-sized (up to 200 workers) firms (Ebrahim, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod, 2017). The latter finding is suggestive at least of broader externalities (macro effects) from the subsidy.

Source: O'Higgins (2017) updated.

³⁷ Although there is some suggestive evidence of broader macroeconomic impacts.

More generally, with the notable exception of those providing support of one kind or another to youth entrepreneurship (considered below), active labour market policies (ALMPs) have not been widely implemented in Africa. Numerous factors must be borne in mind in the design and implementation of such programmes, if they are to be effective. It is crucial that appropriate targeting and conditionalities are included in the programme design; these can enhance the efficiency of programmes by, among other things, reducing deadweight and substitution costs.

In order to promote the longer-term employment prospects of young people beyond the duration of the programme itself, such interventions need to increase in participants' longer-term employability. This can be achieved by the informal acquisition of job-related skills through on-the-job learning or via an explicit training component incorporated into the programme design. To this end, programmes need to be of sufficient duration to allow participants to acquire job-related competences and "prove themselves" in a specific work environment.

As the discussion of the South African example suggests, it is important to take account of possible interactions between ALMPs, the economic context and, indeed, other labour market institutions. Subsidized employment is likely to be particularly useful where the overall demand for young workers is low and where there is a clear need to expand existing employment opportunities, as is the case in Africa. Complementarities and interactions with other labour market institutions are also important, and programmes should be aware of their presence and likely impact. For example, the presence, regulation, conditionality and level of passive labour market policies may well affect the willingness of young people to participate in such programmes.

Moreover, in the context of rapid structural change, a central role can be played by effective public employment services (PES). One consistent result from the evaluation literature going back at least to Fay (1996) concerns the high relative cost-effectiveness of the job search assistance and job matching functions of PES. It is true that such services do not in themselves create employment; however, they can greatly enhance the efficiency of labour markets, as well as support a move towards greater formalization. Appropriate use of new technologies can also simplify and reduce the cost of such functions.

4.5 Harnessing the benefits of the digital economy

There has been as much enthusiastic discussion of the potential for the digital economy to generate new employment opportunities as there has been of the possible enhanced employment prospects for young people arising from the provision of digital skills.³⁸ What is the potential of either to provide new decent work opportunities for young people? A recent report prepared for the ILO (Ameli et al., 2019) identified three major sectors that could potentially increase employment opportunities for young people in Africa: agriculture, tourism and financial services. The report goes on to predict that employment in the "gig" economy is likely to grow rapidly on the continent. Moreover, that there is certainly capacity to increase the level of digital skills among youth, as such skills are relatively low among Africans relative to the global average.

However, several considerations ought to be borne in mind.

- ▶ The size of the digital economy, although expanding rapidly, is likely to remain moderate into the foreseeable future. MGI (2013) estimate that in 2012, so-called iGDP (the total of economic activities linked to the creation and use of the Internet) constituted 1.1 per cent of African GDP. This is projected to grow rapidly to reach at least 5–6 per cent by 2025; however, this remains a relatively moderate proportion of total African GDP. Similarly, in 2016, the continent's Digital Adoption Index (DAI) was estimated at 0.33 compared to an average for the top ten countries globally of 0.85 (World Bank, 2016).
- ▶ Much of the economic value of information and communications technologies lies in their potential for enhancing productivity and reducing inefficiency. While in the long term this should lead to economic growth and consequent job creation, it is likely that in the short run there will be significant disruption and loss of jobs which, given their vulnerable position in the labour market, is likely to adversely affect young people disproportionately.
- ▶ While, on average, there is a relative paucity of digital skills on the continent, the extent to which this is the case varies widely, as do the shortages of specifically digital skills reported

³⁸ Along with fears regarding the potential for automation to destroy existing employment opportunities.

by firms (as opposed to skills shortages as a whole) (Ameli et al., 2019). In Benin, for example, Ameli and colleagues calculate that only 6 per cent of employees have fewer digital skills than required for the job, whereas in Sierra Leone this figure reaches 61 per cent.

- Some care is needed when assessing the effects of digitization on job quality. Although digital technologies do afford opportunities for the formalization of economic activities (Chacaltana, Leung and Lee, 2018), there is a risk that in some sectors digitization can, to the contrary, encourage informality. The gig economy, for example, may contribute to the casualization of youth labour markets and threaten job quality more generally by proliferating self-employment through digital platforms (Bellagio Center, 2017).
- Perhaps most seriously, an excessive focus on digital skills risks perpetuating – indeed exacerbating – existing inequalities in youth labour markets, as the distribution of digital skills – and hence the potential to use them to advantage – is skewed towards better the educated, wealthy, urban men among the youth population.

Thus, there clearly are significant gains to be had in terms of expanding and enhancing employment opportunities for young people through the adoption of digital technologies and the diffusion of digital skills. However, this cannot be the only solution to youth labour market difficulties, and care is required to ensure that the benefits do not also exacerbate existing inequalities.

4.6 Reducing the NEET rate – and particularly the NEET rate among young women: is a new approach needed?

Young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET) comprise a highly heterogeneous group. Being a 'NEET' indicates the absence of a characteristic – specifically, the lack of a job or an educational/training opportunity – rather than the possession of any common feature. The variety of circumstances underlying NEET status has important policy consequences. Differences among young NEETs necessarily affects the policy response appropriate for the different subgroups.

A shift of focus away from youth unemployment and towards a reduction of the NEET rate as a policy target has a number of implications. The consequent broadening of the scope of youth employment policy implies that more focus needs to be placed on removing obstacles to the effective engagement and participation of young people – and above all young women – who may be detached from the labour market.

Last but not the least, Africa needs *to mobilize resources for an effective labour market information system (LMIS)*. The biggest challenge to conducting research on Africa is a paucity of frequent and up-to-date data. Many African countries lack the most vital data on employment and other labour market indicators. In all countries, efforts are needed to put in place a functional and active LMIS to provide regular information and build up a labour market data bank. This will require the adequate funding of a relevant national statistics bureau.


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► Annexes



► Annex 1: Total population, both sexes combined (thousands)

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Africa (region) | 1 039 304 | 1 066 410 | 1 094 343 | 1 123 045 | 1 152 434 | 1 182 439 | 1 213 041 | 1 244 222 | 1 275 921 | 1 308 064 | 1 340 598 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 836 364 | 859 611 | 883 473 | 907 934 | 932 975 | 958 577 | 984 734 | 1 011 429 | 1 038 627 | 1 066 283 | 1 094 366 |
| Eastern Africa | 339 318 | 348 908 | 358 746 | 368 825 | 379 137 | 389 671 | 400 427 | 411 397 | 422 563 | 433 905 | 445 406 |
| Burundi | 8 676 | 8 958 | 9 246 | 9 540 | 9 844 | 10 160 | 10 488 | 10 827 | 11 175 | 11 531 | 11 891 |
| Comoros | 690 | 707 | 724 | 742 | 759 | 777 | 796 | 814 | 832 | 851 | 870 |
| Djibouti | 840 | 854 | 868 | 883 | 899 | 914 | 929 | 944 | 959 | 974 | 988 |
| Eritrea | 3 170 | 3 214 | 3 250 | 3 281 | 3 311 | 3 343 | 3 377 | 3 413 | 3 453 | 3 497 | 3 546 |
| Ethiopia | 87 640 | 90 140 | 92 727 | 95 386 | 98 094 | 100 835 | 103 603 | 106 400 | 109 224 | 112 079 | 114 964 |
| Kenya | 42 031 | 43 178 | 44 343 | 45 520 | 46 700 | 47 878 | 49 052 | 50 221 | 51 393 | 52 574 | 53 771 |
| Madagascar | 21 152 | 21 744 | 22 347 | 22 961 | 23 590 | 24 234 | 24 894 | 25 571 | 26 262 | 26 969 | 27 691 |
| Malawi | 14 540 | 14 962 | 15 396 | 15 839 | 16 290 | 16 745 | 17 205 | 17 670 | 18 143 | 18 629 | 19 130 |
| Mauritius | 1 248 | 1 251 | 1 253 | 1 255 | 1 257 | 1 259 | 1 262 | 1 264 | 1 267 | 1 270 | 1 272 |
| Mayotte | 209 | 215 | 221 | 227 | 234 | 240 | 246 | 253 | 260 | 266 | 273 |
| Mozambique | 23 532 | 24 188 | 24 863 | 25 561 | 26 286 | 27 042 | 27 830 | 28 649 | 29 496 | 30 366 | 31 255 |
| Réunion | 831 | 837 | 844 | 851 | 857 | 863 | 870 | 876 | 883 | 889 | 895 |
| Rwanda | 10 039 | 10 293 | 10 550 | 10 812 | 11 084 | 11 369 | 11 669 | 11 981 | 12 302 | 12 627 | 12 952 |
| Seychelles | 91 | 92 | 93 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 98 |
| Somalia | 12 044 | 12 376 | 12 715 | 13 064 | 13 424 | 13 797 | 14 186 | 14 589 | 15 008 | 15 443 | 15 893 |
| South Sudan | 9 508 | 9 831 | 10 114 | 10 355 | 10 555 | 10 716 | 10 833 | 10 911 | 10 976 | 11 062 | 11 194 |

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 44 347 | 45 674 | 47 053 | 48 483 | 49 961 | 51 483 | 53 049 | 54 560 | 56 313 | 58 005 | 59 734 |
| Uganda | 32 428 | 33 477 | 34 559 | 35 695 | 36 912 | 38 225 | 39 649 | 41 167 | 42 729 | 44 270 | 45 741 |
| Zambia | 13 606 | 14 023 | 14 465 | 14 927 | 15 400 | 15 879 | 16 363 | 16 854 | 17 352 | 17 861 | 18 384 |
| Zimbabwe | 12 698 | 12 894 | 13 115 | 13 350 | 13 587 | 13 815 | 14 030 | 14 237 | 14 439 | 14 645 | 14 863 |
| Middle Africa | 131 622 | 135 913 | 140 315 | 144 829 | 149 458 | 154 203 | 159 065 | 164 039 | 169 122 | 174 308 | 179 595 |
| Angola | 23 356 | 24 221 | 25 108 | 26 016 | 26 942 | 27 884 | 28 842 | 29 817 | 30 810 | 31 825 | 32 866 |
| Cameroon | 20 341 | 20 906 | 21 485 | 22 077 | 22 682 | 23 298 | 23 927 | 24 566 | 25 216 | 25 876 | 26 546 |
| Central African Republic | 4 387 | 4 419 | 4 436 | 4 448 | 4 464 | 4 493 | 4 538 | 4 596 | 4 666 | 4 745 | 4 830 |
| Chad | 11 952 | 12 361 | 12 785 | 13 220 | 13 664 | 14 111 | 14 562 | 15 017 | 15 478 | 15 947 | 16 426 |
| Congo | 4 274 | 4 395 | 4 510 | 4 623 | 4 737 | 4 856 | 4 981 | 5 111 | 5 244 | 5 381 | 5 518 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 64 564 | 66 755 | 69 021 | 71 359 | 73 767 | 76 245 | 78 789 | 81 399 | 84 068 | 86 791 | 89 561 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 944 | 987 | 1 031 | 1 076 | 1 122 | 1 169 | 1 215 | 1 262 | 1 309 | 1 356 | 1 403 |
| Gabon | 1 624 | 1 685 | 1 750 | 1 817 | 1 884 | 1 948 | 2 008 | 2 065 | 2 119 | 2 173 | 2 226 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 180 | 185 | 188 | 192 | 196 | 199 | 203 | 207 | 211 | 215 | 219 |
| Southern Africa | 58 383 | 59 252 | 60 161 | 61 099 | 62 045 | 62 985 | 63 915 | 64 834 | 65 739 | 66 630 | 67 504 |
| Botswana | 1 987 | 2 015 | 2 040 | 2 063 | 2 089 | 2 121 | 2 160 | 2 205 | 2 254 | 2 304 | 2 352 |
| Eswatini | 1 065 | 1 072 | 1 079 | 1 087 | 1 095 | 1 104 | 1 114 | 1 125 | 1 136 | 1 148 | 1 160 |
| Lesotho | 1 996 | 2 004 | 2 015 | 2 029 | 2 043 | 2 059 | 2 075 | 2 092 | 2 108 | 2 125 | 2 142 |
| Namibia | 2 119 | 2 157 | 2 195 | 2 234 | 2 273 | 2 315 | 2 358 | 2 403 | 2 448 | 2 495 | 2 541 |
| South Africa | 51 217 | 52 004 | 52 833 | 53 687 | 54 544 | 55 386 | 56 208 | 57 010 | 57 793 | 58 558 | 59 309 |
| Western Africa | 307 040 | 315 538 | 324 251 | 333 182 | 342 336 | 351 718 | 361 327 | 371 160 | 381 202 | 391 440 | 401 861 |
| Benin | 9 199 | 9 461 | 9 729 | 10 005 | 10 287 | 10 576 | 10 872 | 11 175 | 11 485 | 11 801 | 12 123 |

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Burkina Faso | 15 605 | 16 082 | 16 571 | 17 073 | 17 586 | 18 111 | 18 646 | 19 193 | 19 751 | 20 321 | 20 903 |
| Cabo Verde | 493 | 499 | 505 | 512 | 518 | 525 | 531 | 537 | 544 | 550 | 556 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 20 533 | 21 029 | 21 547 | 22 088 | 22 648 | 23 226 | 23 823 | 24 437 | 25 069 | 25 717 | 26 378 |
| Gambia | 1 793 | 1 848 | 1 905 | 1 964 | 2 024 | 2 086 | 2 149 | 2 214 | 2 280 | 2 348 | 2 417 |
| Ghana | 24 780 | 25 388 | 25 996 | 26 608 | 27 224 | 27 849 | 28 482 | 29 121 | 29 767 | 30 418 | 31 073 |
| Guinea | 10 192 | 10 420 | 10 652 | 10 893 | 11 151 | 11 432 | 11 738 | 12 068 | 12 414 | 12 771 | 13 133 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1 523 | 1 563 | 1 605 | 1 648 | 1 692 | 1 737 | 1 782 | 1 828 | 1 874 | 1 921 | 1 968 |
| Liberia | 3 891 | 4 017 | 4 136 | 4 248 | 4 360 | 4 472 | 4 587 | 4 702 | 4 819 | 4 937 | 5 058 |
| Mali | 15 049 | 15 515 | 15 979 | 16 450 | 16 934 | 17 439 | 17 965 | 18 512 | 19 078 | 19 658 | 20 251 |
| Mauritania | 3 494 | 3 599 | 3 707 | 3 817 | 3 931 | 4 046 | 4 164 | 4 283 | 4 403 | 4 526 | 4 650 |
| Niger | 16 464 | 17 115 | 17 795 | 18 504 | 19 240 | 20 002 | 20 789 | 21 602 | 22 443 | 23 311 | 24 207 |
| Nigeria | 158 503 | 162 805 | 167 229 | 171 766 | 176 405 | 181 137 | 185 960 | 190 873 | 195 875 | 200 964 | 206 140 |
| Senegal | 12 678 | 13 034 | 13 402 | 13 782 | 14 175 | 14 578 | 14 994 | 15 419 | 15 854 | 16 296 | 16 744 |
| Sierra Leone | 6 416 | 6 563 | 6 713 | 6 864 | 7 017 | 7 172 | 7 329 | 7 488 | 7 650 | 7 813 | 7 977 |
| Togo | 6 422 | 6 596 | 6 774 | 6 955 | 7 138 | 7 323 | 7 510 | 7 698 | 7 889 | 8 082 | 8 279 |
| Northern Africa | 202 940 | 206 799 | 210 870 | 215 111 | 219 459 | 223 862 | 228 307 | 232 793 | 237 294 | 241 781 | 246 233 |
| Algeria | 35 977 | 36 661 | 37 384 | 38 140 | 38 924 | 39 728 | 40 551 | 41 389 | 42 228 | 43 053 | 43 851 |
| Egypt | 82 761 | 84 529 | 86 422 | 88 405 | 90 425 | 92 443 | 94 447 | 96 443 | 98 424 | 100 388 | 102 334 |
| Libya | 6 198 | 6 247 | 6 286 | 6 320 | 6 362 | 6 418 | 6 492 | 6 581 | 6 679 | 6 777 | 6 871 |
| Morocco | 32 343 | 32 782 | 33 242 | 33 716 | 34 192 | 34 664 | 35 126 | 35 581 | 36 029 | 36 472 | 36 911 |
| Sudan | 34 545 | 35 350 | 36 194 | 37 073 | 37 978 | 38 903 | 39 847 | 40 813 | 41 802 | 42 813 | 43 849 |
| Tunisia | 10 635 | 10 742 | 10 847 | 10 953 | 11 063 | 11 180 | 11 304 | 11 433 | 11 565 | 11 695 | 11 819 |
| Western Sahara | 480 | 488 | 496 | 505 | 515 | 526 | 539 | 553 | 567 | 582 | 597 |

Source: World Population Prospects 2019.

► Annex 2: Real GDP growth (annual percentage change)

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Africa (region) | 5.9 | 3 | 6.8 | 3.7 | 4 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 7.1 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 3.1 | 1.4 | 3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.9 |
| Central Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Burundi | 5.1 | 4 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 4.5 | -4 | -1 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Cameroon | 3.4 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 5 |
| Central African Republic | 4.6 | 4.2 | 5.1 | -36.4 | 0.1 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Chad | 13.6 | 0.1 | 8.8 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 1.8 | -5.6 | -2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 5.3 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 7.1 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 8.5 | 9.5 | 6.9 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 5.8 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 4.5 |
| Congo | 8.7 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 6.8 | 2.6 | -2.8 | -1.8 | 1.6 | 4 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 0 |
| Equatorial Guinea | -8.9 | 6.5 | 8.3 | -4.1 | 0.4 | -9.1 | -8.8 | -4.7 | -5.7 | -4.6 | -5 | -5.3 | -5.6 |
| Gabon | 6.3 | 7.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.5 |
| Rwanda | 7.3 | 8 | 8.6 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 8.9 | 6 | 6.1 | 8.6 | 7.8 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 6.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 4 | 4.5 |
| East Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Comoros | 3.8 | 4.1 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 3 | 3 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Djibouti | 4.1 | 7.3 | 4.8 | 5 | 7.1 | 7.7 | 6.9 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Eritrea | 10.9 | 25.7 | 1.9 | -10.5 | 30.9 | -20.6 | 7.4 | -9.6 | 12.2 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 4 | 7.2 |
| Ethiopia | 10.6 | 11.4 | 8.7 | 9.9 | 10.3 | 10.4 | 8 | 10.1 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 7 |
| Kenya | 8.4 | 6.1 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 4.9 | 6.3 | 5.6 | 6 | 5.8 | 5.8 |
| Madagascar | 0.3 | 1.4 | 3 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 4.9 |

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|------------------------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Mauritius | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4 |
| Seychelles | 5.9 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 6 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 4 |
| Somalia | no data | no data | 1.2 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 1.4 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Southern Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Angola | 4.9 | 3.5 | 8.5 | 5 | 4.8 | 0.9 | -2.6 | -0.2 | -1.2 | -0.3 | 1.2 | 2.9 | 3.3 |
| Botswana | 8.6 | 6 | 4.5 | 11.3 | 4.1 | -1.7 | 4.3 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 5.9 | 3.9 |
| Eswatini | 3.8 | 2.2 | 5.4 | 3.9 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 2 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Lesotho | 6.3 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 0.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | -0.2 | 3.7 | 4.5 |
| Malawi | 6.9 | 4.9 | 1.9 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 4 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6 |
| Mozambique | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 7.4 | 6.6 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| Namibia | 6 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 1.1 | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 3.2 |
| South Africa | 3 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.8 |
| Zambia | 10.3 | 5.6 | 7.6 | 5.1 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 2 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Zimbabwe | 19.7 | 14.2 | 16.7 | 2 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 4.7 | 3.5 | -7.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| West Africa | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Benin | 2.1 | 3 | 4.8 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 1.8 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
| Burkina Faso | 8.4 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 5.8 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 6.8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Cabo Verde | 1.5 | 4 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2 | -4.9 | 10.9 | 9.3 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 8 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7 | 6.7 |
| Gambia | 5.9 | -8.1 | 5.2 | 2.9 | -1.4 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 5.6 | 5.4 |
| Ghana | 7.9 | 17.4 | 9 | 7.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 8.1 | 6.3 | 7.5 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
| Guinea | 4.2 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 10.8 | 10 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6 | 6 | 5.3 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 4.6 | 8.1 | -1.7 | 3.3 | 1 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 5.9 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5 | 5.1 |

| Subregion/country | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Liberia | 6.4 | 7.7 | 8.4 | 8.8 | 0.7 | 0 | -1.6 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 1.6 | 1.3 | -1.3 |
| Mali | 5.3 | 3.2 | -0.8 | 2.3 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 5 | 5 | 4.9 | 4.9 |
| Mauritania | 4.8 | 4.7 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 9.2 |
| Niger | 8.4 | 2.2 | 11.8 | 5.3 | 7.5 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6 | 5.6 | 11.9 |
| Nigeria | 11.3 | 4.9 | 4.3 | 5.4 | 6.3 | 2.7 | -1.6 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| Senegal | 3.6 | 1.5 | 5.1 | 2.8 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 6 | 6.8 | 7 | 8.4 |
| Sierra Leone | 5.3 | 6.3 | 15.2 | 20.7 | 4.6 | -20.5 | 6.4 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 5 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.6 |
| Togo | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.4 |
| North Africa | 4.3 | -0.2 | 12.1 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 4.8 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| Algeria | 3.6 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 |
| Egypt | 5.1 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6 | 6 |
| Libya | 3.2 | -66.7 | 124.7 | -36.8 | -53 | -13 | -7.4 | 64 | 17.9 | -19.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Morocco | 3.8 | 5.2 | 3 | 4.5 | 2.7 | 4.5 | 1.1 | 4.2 | 3 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.3 |
| Tunisia | 3.5 | -1.9 | 4 | 2.9 | 3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.8 |

Source: FMI, 2019.

► Annex 3: Share of manufacturing employment in total employment (per cent)

| Subregion/country | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Africa (region) | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Central Africa | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Burundi | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1.8 | | | 1.8 | |
| Cameroon | 6.8 | | | | | | | 8.6 | | | | | | | 10.3 | | | | |
| Congo | | | | | | 16.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | | | | | | 3.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rwanda | | | 1.3 | | | | | | | | | | 2.7 | | 2.1 | | | 5.3 | 6.4 |
| Eastern Africa | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| Ethiopia | | | | | | 5.3 | | | | | | | | 5.1 | | | | | |
| Kenya | | | | | | 3.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Madagascar | | | | 5.6 | | 2.8 | | | | | | | 5.2 | | | 6.7 | | | |
| Mauritius | 28.7 | 25.8 | 25.1 | 22.7 | 22.3 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 20.4 | 19.6 | 18.2 | 17.0 | 16.5 | 15.7 | 21.9 | 21.3 | 21.8 | 21.2 | 19.9 | 19.2 |
| Seychelles | | | | | | | | | | | | 9.3 | | | 6.8 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 5.4 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 1.6 | | | | | | 3.2 | | | | | | | | 3.0 | | | | |
| Southern Africa | 14.1 | 14.6 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 15.0 | 14.6 | 14.5 | 14.1 | 13.4 | 12.8 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 11.7 | 11.4 | 10.8 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 10.3 |
| Angola | | | | | 3.0 | | | | | 2.1 | 2.4 | 1.7 | | | 1.2 | | | | |
| Botswana | 8.8 | 8.7 | | 9.6 | | | 6.7 | | | 6.6 | 2.5 | | | | | | | | |
| Eswatini | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 15.8 | | |
| Mozambique | | | | 0.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | 4.1 | | | |

| Subregion/country | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Namibia | 5.3 | | | | 6.2 | | | | 6.3 | | 4.8 | | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.0 | | 6.5 | | 7.2 |
| South Africa | 14.9 | 15.5 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 16.1 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.1 | 14.3 | 13.8 | 13.3 | 13.3 | 12.6 | 12.2 | 11.6 | 11.2 | 10.7 | 11.1 | 10.8 |
| Zambia | 2.8 | | | | | 4.0 | | 3.5 | | | | | 4.1 | | | | | 7.4 | |
| Zimbabwe | | | | | 5.9 | | | | | | | 5.0 | | | 4.0 | | | | |
| Western Africa | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.6 |
| Benin | | | | | | | | | | | 7.6 | 15.3 | | | | | | | |
| Burkina Faso | | | | | | 3.7 | | | | | | | | | 15.2 | | | | |
| Cabo Verde | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6.9 | | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5.4 | 8.0 | | | 5.7 | | 9.1 |
| Gambia | | | | | | | | | | | | | 9.4 | | | | | | |
| Ghana | | | | | | 11.4 | | | | | 10.7 | | | 8.9 | | 14.0 | | | 13.7 |
| Guinea | | | 2.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberia | | | | | | | | | | | 6.4 | | 5.7 | | 4.0 | | | | |
| Mali | | | | | 11.5 | | | | | | | | | | 5.0 | 4.8 | 3.9 | | 4.2 |
| Niger | | | | | | | | | | | | 6.7 | | | | | | | |
| Nigeria | | | | | 9.8 | | | | | | | 6.5 | | 7.9 | | | | | |
| Senegal | | 7.8 | | | | 7.8 | | | | | | 13.1 | | | | 6.2 | | | |
| Sierra Leone | | | | 2.6 | 0.5 | | | | | | | | | | 2.8 | | | | |
| Togo | | | | | | | | | | | | 10.9 | | | 9.8 | 8.4 | | | |
| Northern Africa | 11.8 | 11.8 | 11.5 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.4 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 10.9 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 11.2 |
| Algeria | | 10.2 | | 9.2 | 10.9 | | | | | | | | | | 11.3 | | | 10.7 | |
| Egypt | 11.9 | 12.1 | 11.6 | 10.9 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 11.7 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 9.8 | 11.1 | 10.7 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 11.4 | 12.0 | |
| Morocco | 21.4 | 20.9 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 12.0 | 11.6 | 11.5 | | | | | 11.0 | 10.5 | | | | | | |
| Sudan | | | | | | | | | | | | 7.7 | | | | | | | |

Source: ILO modelled estimates.

► Annex 4: Employment-to-population ratio (per cent)

| Subregion/country | 15+ employment-to-population ratio | | | Youth (aged 15-24 years) employment-to-population ratio | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------|-------|---|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| | 2010 | | | 2010 | | | 2020 | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women |
| Africa (region) | 59.3 | 69.5 | 49.4 | 59.2 | 68.0 | 50.5 | 41.0 | 45.7 | 36.2 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 68.3 | 74.1 | 62.7 | 68.0 | 73.0 | 63.1 | 49.9 | 52.3 | 47.5 |
| Central Africa | 66.5 | 70.0 | 63.1 | 65.2 | 68.6 | 61.9 | 24.9 | 39.6 | 9.8 |
| Burundi | 77.9 | 76.4 | 79.3 | 77.7 | 75.9 | 79.5 | 42.2 | 41.2 | 43.2 |
| Cameroon | 72.8 | 78.6 | 67.1 | 73.5 | 78.9 | 68.1 | 59.7 | 62.5 | 56.9 |
| Central African Republic | 67.5 | 74.7 | 60.6 | 67.4 | 75.1 | 60.0 | 14.6 | 17.2 | 12.0 |
| Chad | 70.4 | 77.8 | 63.0 | 69.6 | 76.2 | 63.0 | 34.7 | 37.9 | 31.5 |
| Congo | 59.6 | 62.5 | 56.8 | 61.8 | 64.3 | 59.3 | 22.1 | 37.9 | 5.8 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 63.7 | 65.5 | 61.9 | 60.4 | 62.6 | 58.2 | 46.1 | 46.5 | 45.7 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 56.8 | 62.5 | 49.3 | 56.9 | 61.7 | 50.0 | 41.2 | 38.6 | 43.9 |
| Gabon | 39.2 | 49.5 | 28.3 | 42.1 | 51.9 | 31.6 | 25.3 | 30.6 | 19.9 |
| Rwanda | 83.9 | 84.3 | 83.5 | 82.9 | 82.5 | 83.3 | 56.3 | 65.1 | 47.2 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 50.7 | 69.5 | 32.4 | 51.4 | 69.3 | 33.9 | 55.7 | 50.4 | 60.6 |
| Eastern Africa | 74.0 | 79.3 | 68.9 | 73.8 | 78.5 | 69.2 | 27.9 | 30.6 | 24.7 |
| Comoros | 40.8 | 48.1 | 33.5 | 42.7 | 49.1 | 36.3 | 53.7 | 58.2 | 49.1 |
| Djibouti | 54.5 | 64.5 | 44.5 | 56.1 | 63.7 | 48.5 | 41.6 | 47.3 | 35.6 |
| Eritrea | 74.5 | 80.9 | 68.2 | 75.3 | 81.6 | 69.1 | 46.8 | 49.0 | 44.6 |
| Ethiopia | 79.3 | 87.3 | 71.5 | 79.0 | 85.4 | 72.8 | 56.1 | 56.1 | 56.0 |
| | | | | | | | 25.9 | 28.2 | 23.1 |
| | | | | | | | 52.3 | 56.1 | 48.4 |
| | | | | | | | 36.6 | 39.5 | 33.6 |
| | | | | | | | 48.3 | 50.9 | 45.8 |
| | | | | | | | 53.0 | 52.7 | 53.3 |

| Subregion/country | 15+ employment-to-population ratio | | | | | | Youth (aged 15–24 years) employment-to-population ratio | | | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|---|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | 2010 | | | 2020 | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women |
| Kenya | 59.7 | 63.8 | 55.7 | 60.1 | 62.5 | 57.7 | 14.0 | 13.8 | 14.2 | 13.0 | 12.4 | 13.7 |
| Madagascar | 85.2 | 88.1 | 82.5 | 85.2 | 88.1 | 82.3 | 30.4 | 30.2 | 30.6 | 33.5 | 33.0 | 34.0 |
| Mauritius | 53.9 | 70.8 | 37.5 | 53.8 | 67.8 | 40.4 | 35.7 | 31.7 | 39.8 | 32.1 | 28.5 | 35.8 |
| Somalia | 39.3 | 64.3 | 14.7 | 40.0 | 64.4 | 16.3 | 36.5 | 42.1 | 30.8 | 33.5 | 37.8 | 29.2 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 83.7 | 86.7 | 80.9 | 81.4 | 85.8 | 77.1 | 39.5 | 41.3 | 37.6 | 35.8 | 36.6 | 35.0 |
| Uganda | 68.2 | 73.7 | 63.0 | 69.8 | 73.9 | 65.9 | 26.2 | 42.6 | 9.0 | 21.1 | 31.1 | 10.7 |
| Northern Africa | 42.8 | 68.4 | 17.5 | 40.8 | 64.6 | 17.2 | 49.2 | 51.1 | 47.4 | 47.8 | 49.2 | 46.4 |
| Algeria | 38.1 | 64.4 | 11.6 | 35.8 | 59.6 | 11.8 | 62.8 | 67.3 | 58.3 | 62.1 | 66.4 | 57.5 |
| Egypt | 44.9 | 72.1 | 17.6 | 42.9 | 67.9 | 17.8 | 17.6 | 21.9 | 13.2 | 17.1 | 20.4 | 13.8 |
| Libya | 41.5 | 65.2 | 16.8 | 43.3 | 67.1 | 19.5 | 72.8 | 77.9 | 67.6 | 70.4 | 74.4 | 66.5 |
| Morocco | 45.3 | 68.8 | 23.1 | 41.0 | 63.9 | 19.0 | 12.0 | 15.0 | 8.8 | 11.2 | 13.6 | 8.8 |
| South Sudan | 63.8 | 66.9 | 60.7 | 63.8 | 65.7 | 61.9 | 36.3 | 41.9 | 30.8 | 35.9 | 41.1 | 30.7 |
| Sudan | 41.2 | 65.8 | 17.3 | 40.9 | 63.4 | 18.8 | 38.0 | 39.8 | 36.2 | 35.8 | 38.1 | 33.3 |
| Tunisia | 40.6 | 62.1 | 19.8 | 38.9 | 60.2 | 18.6 | 44.1 | 39.0 | 49.4 | 42.5 | 36.7 | 48.4 |
| Southern Africa | 40.2 | 47.5 | 33.4 | 41.4 | 48.0 | 35.3 | 32.0 | 34.8 | 29.1 | 29.0 | 30.8 | 27.1 |
| Angola | 70.7 | 73.5 | 68.1 | 71.9 | 74.4 | 69.6 | 30.9 | 39.1 | 22.5 | 30.0 | 36.9 | 22.9 |
| Botswana | 49.5 | 57.4 | 42.0 | 59.4 | 66.9 | 52.1 | 30.9 | 31.9 | 29.9 | 28.9 | 29.0 | 28.7 |
| Eswatini | 36.4 | 47.8 | 26.1 | 40.9 | 51.7 | 31.3 | 19.4 | 31.0 | 7.3 | 19.2 | 30.0 | 8.0 |
| Lesotho | 49.3 | 58.3 | 41.1 | 51.6 | 59.9 | 44.0 | 74.4 | 76.4 | 72.3 | 74.1 | 76.7 | 71.5 |
| Malawi | 72.5 | 77.8 | 67.4 | 73.4 | 78.8 | 68.3 | 57.9 | 59.6 | 56.2 | 59.8 | 62.0 | 57.5 |
| Mozambique | 79.3 | 78.6 | 80.0 | 75.7 | 76.9 | 74.6 | 53.4 | 61.5 | 45.1 | 46.3 | 49.9 | 42.6 |

| Subregion/country | 15+ employment-to-population ratio | | | | Youth (aged 15-24 years) employment-to-population ratio | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|---|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|
| | 2010 | | | 2020 | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | | |
| Namibia | 44.9 | 50.1 | 40.2 | 47.4 | 52.2 | 43.0 | 24.0 | 32.4 | 15.4 | 20.6 | 27.8 | 13.1 |
| South Africa | 39.4 | 46.6 | 32.6 | 40.1 | 46.6 | 34.0 | 30.7 | 37.0 | 24.3 | 31.0 | 37.0 | 24.8 |
| Zambia | 66.4 | 71.1 | 62.0 | 69.9 | 73.7 | 66.2 | 29.9 | 43.6 | 16.0 | 20.1 | 30.0 | 9.9 |
| Zimbabwe | 78.4 | 84.4 | 73.0 | 79.7 | 85.1 | 74.7 | 60.4 | 56.7 | 64.0 | 58.4 | 58.5 | 58.3 |
| Western Africa | 57.8 | 64.4 | 51.3 | 56.7 | 62.2 | 51.1 | 67.8 | 73.8 | 62.0 | | | |
| Benin | 70.3 | 72.3 | 68.4 | 70.1 | 72.0 | 68.2 | 17.2 | 20.4 | 14.1 | 19.8 | 23.4 | 16.3 |
| Burkina Faso | 66.9 | 78.6 | 55.9 | 62.2 | 71.8 | 52.8 | 70.1 | 82.6 | 58.6 | 71.6 | 83.7 | 59.3 |
| Cabo Verde | 59.4 | 66.7 | 52.2 | 60.9 | 64.5 | 57.4 | 24.9 | 27.1 | 22.7 | 18.2 | 20.3 | 16.1 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 56.5 | 67.4 | 44.9 | 55.8 | 64.4 | 47.0 | 68.8 | 69.5 | 68.1 | 62.3 | 62.6 | 62.0 |
| Gambia | 53.5 | 63.8 | 43.7 | 54.3 | 63.4 | 45.7 | 32.5 | 47.9 | 16.8 | 30.1 | 44.2 | 15.8 |
| Ghana | 65.8 | 69.0 | 62.7 | 62.7 | 66.6 | 58.9 | 30.4 | 41.4 | 19.5 | 25.7 | 31.2 | 20.1 |
| Guinea | 62.2 | 63.2 | 61.2 | 62.3 | 62.1 | 62.5 | 32.8 | 27.3 | 38.1 | 25.7 | 20.0 | 31.3 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 69.0 | 75.4 | 63.0 | 70.1 | 75.8 | 64.7 | 23.5 | 38.2 | 9.0 | 24.8 | 39.4 | 10.2 |
| Liberia | 55.1 | 58.0 | 52.3 | 54.9 | 56.2 | 53.6 | 13.2 | 15.4 | 11.0 | 12.1 | 14.5 | 9.6 |
| Mali | 65.4 | 77.1 | 53.9 | 63.9 | 73.8 | 54.2 | 51.1 | 48.8 | 53.4 | 49.4 | 46.5 | 52.2 |
| Mauritania | 41.6 | 58.9 | 24.5 | 41.5 | 57.3 | 25.5 | 22.2 | 34.7 | 9.5 | 20.2 | 31.4 | 8.7 |
| Niger | 78.8 | 90.6 | 67.5 | 78.5 | 90.1 | 67.1 | 72.3 | 73.8 | 70.8 | 68.8 | 71.5 | 66.3 |
| Nigeria | 52.9 | 58.3 | 47.4 | 51.8 | 56.1 | 47.3 | 63.1 | 62.4 | 63.8 | 61.3 | 61.2 | 61.4 |
| Senegal | 43.7 | 59.3 | 29.5 | 43.4 | 55.2 | 32.5 | 22.1 | 30.3 | 13.6 | 20.8 | 28.2 | 13.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 58.9 | 59.1 | 58.7 | 55.3 | 55.2 | 55.4 | 52.3 | 55.4 | 49.1 | 52.0 | 54.8 | 49.2 |
| Togo | 77.1 | 78.5 | 75.8 | 76.1 | 77.7 | 74.6 | 44.5 | 46.0 | 43.0 | 46.3 | 46.7 | 45.8 |

Source: ILO modelled estimates.

► Annex 5: Labour force participation rate (per cent)

| Subregion/country | 15+ labour force participation rate | | | | | | Youth (aged 15-24 years) labour force participation rate | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|--|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | 2010 | | | 2020 | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women |
| Africa (region) | 63.6 | 74.1 | 53.5 | 63.5 | 72.6 | 54.6 | 46.6 | 51.6 | 41.5 | 44.4 | 48.1 | 40.7 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 68.3 | 74.1 | 62.7 | 68.0 | 73.0 | 63.1 | 65.7 | 62.7 | 68.6 | 62.7 | 63.2 | 62.1 |
| Central Africa | 70.3 | 74.0 | 66.7 | 68.7 | 72.4 | 65.1 | 32.8 | 48.3 | 16.8 | 28.7 | 40.9 | 16.0 |
| Burundi | 79.3 | 78.2 | 80.4 | 79.0 | 77.5 | 80.3 | 49.9 | 52.3 | 47.5 | 47.3 | 49.5 | 45.1 |
| Cameroon | 75.9 | 81.4 | 70.6 | 76.0 | 81.2 | 70.8 | 47.2 | 46.3 | 48.1 | 44.6 | 43.6 | 45.6 |
| Central African Republic | 72.5 | 79.7 | 65.7 | 72.1 | 79.9 | 64.6 | 64.9 | 67.8 | 62.1 | 61.8 | 64.6 | 59.0 |
| Chad | 71.5 | 79.1 | 64.1 | 71.3 | 77.8 | 64.9 | 28.5 | 31.5 | 25.5 | 27.9 | 30.6 | 25.2 |
| Congo | 69.5 | 71.5 | 67.4 | 69.0 | 71.3 | 66.7 | 37.8 | 41.2 | 34.3 | 34.2 | 37.1 | 31.2 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 66.3 | 68.7 | 63.9 | 63.1 | 66.1 | 60.3 | 28.2 | 46.7 | 9.2 | 24.5 | 40.4 | 7.9 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 61.9 | 67.9 | 54.1 | 62.7 | 67.8 | 55.5 | 58.0 | 58.4 | 57.6 | 56.9 | 57.0 | 56.8 |
| Gabon | 49.2 | 58.1 | 39.9 | 52.4 | 60.2 | 44.0 | 42.1 | 39.2 | 45.1 | 42.2 | 38.9 | 45.6 |
| Rwanda | 84.8 | 85.2 | 84.4 | 83.8 | 83.4 | 84.1 | 39.0 | 43.2 | 34.8 | 45.6 | 48.5 | 42.8 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 58.7 | 76.5 | 41.5 | 59.4 | 76.0 | 43.2 | 59.9 | 68.2 | 51.5 | 51.2 | 58.0 | 44.2 |
| Eastern Africa | 77.8 | 83.1 | 72.7 | 76.7 | 81.5 | 72.1 | 34.7 | 49.7 | 18.9 | 31.2 | 42.0 | 19.8 |
| Comoros | 42.6 | 50.1 | 35.1 | 44.4 | 50.8 | 37.9 | 57.5 | 52.7 | 61.9 | 51.7 | 46.4 | 57.0 |
| Djibouti | 62.3 | 73.3 | 51.3 | 63.1 | 71.1 | 55.0 | 57.3 | 61.4 | 53.1 | 55.4 | 59.1 | 51.6 |
| Eritrea | 80.0 | 86.6 | 73.6 | 80.6 | 87.0 | 74.2 | 51.3 | 57.9 | 44.4 | 47.7 | 50.9 | 44.6 |
| Ethiopia | 81.3 | 88.9 | 73.8 | 80.5 | 86.5 | 74.5 | 53.5 | 55.5 | 51.5 | 54.7 | 57.1 | 52.3 |

| Subregion/country | 15+ labour force participation rate | | | | Youth (aged 15–24 years) labour force participation rate | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|--|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|
| | 2010 | | | 2020 | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | | |
| Kenya | 66.1 | 70.7 | 61.7 | 66.3 | 69.0 | 63.6 | 57.7 | 57.9 | 57.6 | 55.4 | 54.8 | 55.9 |
| Madagascar | 89.1 | 91.0 | 87.1 | 86.6 | 89.4 | 83.8 | 15.4 | 15.5 | 15.4 | 14.2 | 13.7 | 14.7 |
| Mauritius | 58.3 | 74.1 | 43.1 | 57.8 | 71.1 | 44.9 | 43.4 | 42.9 | 43.9 | 43.7 | 43.6 | 43.9 |
| Somalia | 46.0 | 74.9 | 17.6 | 46.5 | 74.5 | 19.3 | 38.5 | 34.9 | 42.1 | 34.9 | 31.8 | 38.1 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 86.3 | 88.9 | 83.9 | 82.9 | 87.0 | 79.0 | 40.3 | 46.7 | 33.9 | 34.7 | 38.9 | 30.4 |
| Uganda | 70.9 | 76.0 | 65.9 | 71.2 | 75.0 | 67.4 | 50.8 | 52.9 | 48.6 | 45.6 | 46.1 | 45.0 |
| Southern Africa | 53.2 | 61.3 | 45.7 | 56.6 | 63.7 | 49.8 | 53.3 | 55.2 | 51.5 | 51.7 | 53.1 | 50.3 |
| Angola | 77.8 | 80.5 | 75.3 | 77.5 | 79.9 | 75.3 | 39.7 | 43.3 | 36.1 | 35.4 | 37.6 | 33.2 |
| Botswana | 60.3 | 67.3 | 53.6 | 72.8 | 79.0 | 66.8 | 49.6 | 56.9 | 42.1 | 44.5 | 51.6 | 37.4 |
| Eswatini | 50.1 | 64.0 | 37.5 | 53.4 | 66.3 | 41.9 | 32.0 | 32.7 | 31.2 | 29.7 | 29.7 | 29.8 |
| Lesotho | 67.7 | 75.5 | 60.7 | 67.2 | 75.3 | 59.8 | 32.5 | 48.2 | 16.2 | 33.2 | 47.4 | 18.5 |
| Malawi | 77.3 | 81.8 | 73.1 | 77.5 | 82.4 | 72.9 | 79.8 | 80.5 | 79.2 | 76.1 | 78.5 | 73.8 |
| Mozambique | 82.5 | 82.0 | 82.9 | 78.2 | 79.5 | 77.0 | 63.2 | 64.2 | 62.2 | 64.3 | 66.3 | 62.3 |
| Namibia | 57.6 | 62.9 | 52.9 | 61.6 | 66.5 | 57.2 | 59.7 | 66.7 | 52.6 | 60.7 | 64.3 | 57.0 |
| South Africa | 52.4 | 60.5 | 44.7 | 55.4 | 62.5 | 48.7 | 28.7 | 38.2 | 18.8 | 24.5 | 32.8 | 16.0 |
| Zambia | 76.5 | 82.2 | 71.1 | 75.2 | 79.7 | 70.8 | 40.0 | 45.5 | 34.3 | 40.6 | 45.4 | 35.6 |
| Zimbabwe | 82.6 | 88.4 | 77.4 | 83.8 | 89.1 | 78.9 | 36.3 | 53.4 | 19.1 | 25.8 | 38.2 | 12.8 |
| Western Africa | 60.5 | 67.3 | 53.8 | 59.9 | 65.5 | 54.3 | 73.8 | 79.5 | 68.3 | 73.2 | 78.8 | 67.6 |
| Benin | 71.1 | 73.0 | 69.2 | 71.4 | 73.3 | 69.5 | 30.6 | 33.5 | 27.8 | 36.0 | 38.7 | 33.3 |
| Burkina Faso | 70.4 | 81.7 | 59.7 | 66.3 | 74.8 | 58.1 | 70.6 | 83.5 | 58.8 | 71.8 | 84.2 | 59.3 |
| Cabo Verde | 66.5 | 74.4 | 58.7 | 69.5 | 73.2 | 65.9 | 27.6 | 30.2 | 24.9 | 22.6 | 25.0 | 20.2 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 60.6 | 72.3 | 48.2 | 57.2 | 65.8 | 48.4 | 70.0 | 70.5 | 69.4 | 63.3 | 63.4 | 63.3 |

| | 15+ labour force participation rate | | | | Youth (aged 15-24 years) labour force participation rate | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|--|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|
| | 2010 | | | 2020 | 2010 | | | 2020 | | | | |
| | Total | Men | Women | Total | Total | Men | Women | Total | Men | Women | | |
| Gambia | 59.3 | 68.7 | 50.3 | 59.6 | 67.7 | 52.0 | 40.9 | 56.2 | 25.3 | 37.8 | 51.9 | 23.5 |
| Ghana | 69.4 | 72.5 | 66.6 | 67.3 | 71.4 | 63.4 | 35.1 | 45.8 | 24.5 | 28.2 | 33.8 | 22.6 |
| Guinea | 65.0 | 66.7 | 63.2 | 64.6 | 65.0 | 64.2 | 35.1 | 30.2 | 39.9 | 28.1 | 23.0 | 33.1 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 72.2 | 78.7 | 66.1 | 73.1 | 78.9 | 67.6 | 31.9 | 51.4 | 12.6 | 33.0 | 52.1 | 14.0 |
| Liberia | 56.4 | 59.3 | 53.6 | 56.0 | 57.4 | 54.7 | 26.8 | 29.5 | 24.2 | 25.9 | 28.3 | 23.4 |
| Mali | 71.1 | 82.0 | 60.5 | 71.0 | 80.9 | 61.3 | 63.9 | 62.2 | 65.6 | 61.5 | 59.0 | 64.0 |
| Mauritania | 46.5 | 65.0 | 28.2 | 46.2 | 63.1 | 29.3 | 30.4 | 43.7 | 16.9 | 27.8 | 39.8 | 15.4 |
| Niger | 79.2 | 91.1 | 67.8 | 78.6 | 90.4 | 67.2 | 76.8 | 78.0 | 75.6 | 71.3 | 73.6 | 69.1 |
| Nigeria | 55.0 | 60.7 | 49.2 | 55.2 | 59.6 | 50.7 | 65.0 | 64.7 | 65.3 | 62.9 | 63.2 | 62.6 |
| Senegal | 48.8 | 64.7 | 34.3 | 46.5 | 58.5 | 35.4 | 31.3 | 42.0 | 20.2 | 31.7 | 42.9 | 20.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 61.2 | 61.9 | 60.5 | 57.8 | 58.2 | 57.4 | 55.4 | 58.4 | 52.3 | 53.6 | 56.2 | 50.9 |
| Togo | 78.6 | 80.3 | 77.0 | 77.4 | 79.3 | 75.6 | 60.9 | 62.8 | 58.9 | 54.9 | 55.7 | 54.0 |
| Northern Africa | 47.7 | 73.9 | 21.8 | 46.2 | 71.0 | 21.6 | 46.6 | 41.6 | 51.6 | 44.5 | 38.9 | 50.2 |
| Algeria | 42.4 | 70.1 | 14.4 | 41.0 | 66.8 | 14.9 | 33.5 | 36.5 | 30.0 | 31.8 | 34.5 | 28.7 |
| Egypt | 49.2 | 75.7 | 22.6 | 48.2 | 73.2 | 23.1 | 71.1 | 75.8 | 66.4 | 70.2 | 74.7 | 65.5 |
| Libya | 50.4 | 77.2 | 22.5 | 52.4 | 78.9 | 25.8 | 34.9 | 41.4 | 28.3 | 32.7 | 38.0 | 27.4 |
| Morocco | 49.8 | 75.6 | 25.6 | 45.1 | 70.0 | 21.2 | 75.5 | 80.1 | 70.8 | 72.4 | 75.9 | 68.9 |
| South Sudan | 73.4 | 76.0 | 70.8 | 73.1 | 74.2 | 72.0 | 18.7 | 21.8 | 15.5 | 17.4 | 19.7 | 15.0 |
| Sudan | 47.5 | 72.8 | 23.0 | 47.0 | 70.2 | 24.4 | 41.9 | 46.4 | 37.5 | 40.9 | 45.1 | 36.8 |
| Tunisia | 46.7 | 69.7 | 24.5 | 46.0 | 69.4 | 23.7 | 42.7 | 44.2 | 41.2 | 41.4 | 44.2 | 38.5 |

Source: ILO modelled estimates, July 2018.

► Annex 6: Working poverty rate (percentage of employed living below US\$1.90 PPP)

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Africa (region) | 2000 | 46.8 | 52.9 | 44.7 | 42.8 | 50.5 | 40.3 | 52.4 | 55.7 | 51.1 |
| Africa (region) | 2010 | 37.7 | 43.6 | 35.9 | 34.1 | 41.5 | 32.0 | 42.5 | 46.3 | 41.3 |
| Africa (region) | 2020 | 31.5 | 37.8 | 29.8 | 28.7 | 37.0 | 26.5 | 35.3 | 38.8 | 34.3 |
| Algeria | 2000 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Algeria | 2010 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Algeria | 2020 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Angola | 2000 | 27.9 | 35.7 | 26.3 | 26.2 | 36.8 | 23.9 | 29.7 | 34.3 | 28.8 |
| Angola | 2010 | 29.2 | 35.2 | 27.3 | 27.9 | 36.8 | 25.2 | 30.4 | 33.6 | 29.4 |
| Angola | 2020 | 29.1 | 35.1 | 27.2 | 27.8 | 36.8 | 25.1 | 30.4 | 33.5 | 29.4 |
| Benin | 2000 | 45.9 | 48.3 | 44.9 | 45.8 | 50.8 | 43.8 | 46.1 | 45.7 | 46.3 |
| Benin | 2010 | 49.3 | 53.6 | 48.2 | 57.2 | 60.9 | 56.4 | 41.3 | 47.1 | 39.7 |
| Benin | 2020 | 40.4 | 45.8 | 39.0 | 49.3 | 54.4 | 48.1 | 31.2 | 38.3 | 29.3 |
| Botswana | 2000 | 26.2 | 34.5 | 24.2 | 24.3 | 35.6 | 21.7 | 28.7 | 33.2 | 27.6 |
| Botswana | 2010 | 12.5 | 18.3 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 19.0 | 9.8 | 14.0 | 17.2 | 13.5 |
| Botswana | 2020 | 9.8 | 14.5 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 15.1 | 7.6 | 11.3 | 13.7 | 11.0 |
| Burkina Faso | 2000 | 74.6 | 75.6 | 74.1 | 73.1 | 77.1 | 70.8 | 76.4 | 73.6 | 77.8 |
| Burkina Faso | 2010 | 50.8 | 53.2 | 49.7 | 48.4 | 55.2 | 45.1 | 54.0 | 50.3 | 55.5 |
| Burkina Faso | 2020 | 35.8 | 39.7 | 34.3 | 32.9 | 41.6 | 29.4 | 39.6 | 36.9 | 40.5 |
| Burundi | 2000 | 82.1 | 83.4 | 81.6 | 81.2 | 84.4 | 79.8 | 83.0 | 82.4 | 83.3 |
| Burundi | 2010 | 73.3 | 74.7 | 72.7 | 72.0 | 76.8 | 70.4 | 74.4 | 73.1 | 74.9 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Burundi | 2020 | 72.7 | 74.4 | 72.3 | 71.0 | 76.4 | 69.6 | 74.3 | 72.9 | 74.7 |
| Cameroon | 2000 | 26.0 | 28.5 | 24.9 | 22.7 | 25.2 | 21.6 | 29.5 | 32.0 | 28.5 |
| Cameroon | 2010 | 21.4 | 21.9 | 21.2 | 19.0 | 20.3 | 18.6 | 24.1 | 23.8 | 24.2 |
| Cameroon | 2020 | 17.3 | 17.9 | 17.1 | 15.0 | 16.4 | 14.5 | 19.9 | 19.6 | 20.0 |
| Cape Verde | 2000 | 14.6 | 18.7 | 13.0 | 14.7 | 19.7 | 12.5 | 14.5 | 17.1 | 13.5 |
| Cape Verde | 2010 | 4.4 | 6.3 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 6.9 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 4.2 |
| Cape Verde | 2020 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 2.9 |
| Central African Republic | 2000 | 71.9 | 73.4 | 71.5 | 71.4 | 73.8 | 70.7 | 72.6 | 73.0 | 72.5 |
| Central African Republic | 2010 | 66.0 | 68.8 | 65.1 | 65.0 | 69.2 | 63.8 | 67.1 | 68.3 | 66.7 |
| Central African Republic | 2020 | 69.8 | 72.1 | 68.9 | 69.0 | 72.5 | 67.8 | 70.7 | 71.6 | 70.3 |
| Chad | 2000 | 64.7 | 66.9 | 63.8 | 64.2 | 67.5 | 63.0 | 65.3 | 66.2 | 64.9 |
| Chad | 2010 | 42.0 | 46.5 | 40.1 | 41.0 | 48.1 | 38.2 | 43.3 | 44.9 | 42.6 |
| Chad | 2020 | 36.0 | 41.1 | 33.9 | 34.8 | 42.8 | 31.8 | 37.5 | 39.4 | 36.5 |
| Comoros | 2000 | 11.4 | 16.9 | 10.5 | 10.4 | 17.9 | 9.4 | 13.0 | 15.8 | 12.4 |
| Comoros | 2010 | 12.9 | 18.9 | 12.1 | 11.6 | 19.9 | 10.7 | 14.6 | 17.8 | 14.1 |
| Comoros | 2020 | 13.4 | 19.7 | 12.8 | 12.0 | 20.8 | 11.3 | 15.3 | 18.7 | 14.9 |
| Congo | 2000 | 50.2 | 56.0 | 49.1 | 46.9 | 55.5 | 45.4 | 53.7 | 56.4 | 53.1 |
| Congo | 2010 | 37.9 | 45.4 | 36.4 | 34.5 | 45.1 | 32.6 | 41.5 | 45.7 | 40.6 |
| Congo | 2020 | 36.0 | 43.3 | 34.4 | 32.8 | 43.1 | 30.8 | 39.3 | 43.5 | 38.4 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 2000 | 93.3 | 93.0 | 93.4 | 93.1 | 93.0 | 93.1 | 93.5 | 93.1 | 93.7 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 2010 | 85.1 | 85.1 | 85.2 | 84.7 | 85.0 | 84.7 | 85.6 | 85.2 | 85.7 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 2020 | 69.2 | 70.9 | 68.8 | 68.2 | 71.0 | 67.6 | 70.3 | 70.7 | 70.2 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2000 | 24.4 | 28.2 | 23.0 | 22.9 | 29.9 | 20.7 | 27.0 | 25.6 | 27.6 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2010 | 26.8 | 31.2 | 25.6 | 25.1 | 33.4 | 22.9 | 29.6 | 28.2 | 30.0 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2020 | 23.8 | 28.0 | 22.7 | 22.1 | 30.5 | 19.9 | 26.3 | 24.9 | 26.7 |
| Egypt | 2000 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| Egypt | 2010 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.6 |
| Egypt | 2020 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 2000 | 10.6 | 14.5 | 9.8 | 10.1 | 15.2 | 9.1 | 11.4 | 13.5 | 11.0 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 2010 | 7.5 | 10.5 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 11.1 | 6.4 | 8.1 | 9.7 | 7.8 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 2020 | 5.8 | 8.3 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 8.8 | 4.9 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 6.1 |
| Eritrea | 2000 | 47.8 | 51.4 | 46.0 | 47.1 | 52.6 | 44.3 | 48.7 | 49.9 | 48.1 |
| Eritrea | 2010 | 51.2 | 54.8 | 49.6 | 50.4 | 55.9 | 47.9 | 52.2 | 53.5 | 51.6 |
| Eritrea | 2020 | 45.7 | 50.1 | 44.1 | 44.7 | 51.3 | 42.2 | 46.9 | 48.6 | 46.3 |
| Eswatini | 2000 | 4.7 | 6.9 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 7.2 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 6.4 | 4.9 |
| Eswatini | 2010 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 2.8 |
| Eswatini | 2020 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 2.5 |
| Ethiopia | 2000 | 53.6 | 56.1 | 52.3 | 53.2 | 57.2 | 51.2 | 54.1 | 54.8 | 53.8 |
| Ethiopia | 2010 | 33.9 | 36.8 | 32.4 | 33.5 | 38.6 | 30.9 | 34.3 | 34.6 | 34.2 |
| Ethiopia | 2020 | 18.8 | 22.1 | 17.3 | 18.4 | 23.7 | 15.9 | 19.3 | 20.2 | 18.9 |
| Gabon | 2000 | 6.0 | 7.9 | 5.7 | 4.5 | 7.2 | 4.1 | 8.5 | 9.2 | 8.4 |
| Gabon | 2010 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 2.3 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.2 |
| Gabon | 2020 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Gambia | 2000 | 56.0 | 60.7 | 54.3 | 55.1 | 61.4 | 53.1 | 57.3 | 59.9 | 56.2 |
| Gambia | 2010 | 21.9 | 27.6 | 20.1 | 20.9 | 28.5 | 18.4 | 23.4 | 26.3 | 22.5 |
| Gambia | 2020 | 7.9 | 10.4 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 11.0 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 9.7 | 8.0 |
| Ghana | 2000 | 28.2 | 33.3 | 26.7 | 27.7 | 36.8 | 25.0 | 28.7 | 29.7 | 28.4 |
| Ghana | 2010 | 14.8 | 19.7 | 13.7 | 13.7 | 20.7 | 12.0 | 16.0 | 18.6 | 15.4 |
| Ghana | 2020 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 5.9 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 4.2 |
| Guinea | 2000 | 62.5 | 69.0 | 60.4 | 58.9 | 71.4 | 55.5 | 66.2 | 67.1 | 65.9 |
| Guinea | 2010 | 49.1 | 56.9 | 46.5 | 45.5 | 60.6 | 41.3 | 52.8 | 53.9 | 52.4 |
| Guinea | 2020 | 32.9 | 41.7 | 30.3 | 30.0 | 47.0 | 25.6 | 35.9 | 37.6 | 35.3 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2000 | 49.7 | 53.4 | 48.3 | 48.9 | 54.5 | 46.8 | 50.7 | 52.2 | 50.0 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2010 | 63.7 | 66.8 | 62.6 | 62.6 | 67.4 | 61.0 | 64.9 | 66.3 | 64.4 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2020 | 60.2 | 64.1 | 59.0 | 58.7 | 64.6 | 57.1 | 61.8 | 63.5 | 61.3 |
| Kenya | 2000 | 30.4 | 36.8 | 28.4 | 29.3 | 38.1 | 26.4 | 31.7 | 35.3 | 30.6 |
| Kenya | 2010 | 35.6 | 42.3 | 34.0 | 34.3 | 43.3 | 32.1 | 37.0 | 41.1 | 36.1 |
| Kenya | 2020 | 28.7 | 36.2 | 27.3 | 27.4 | 37.3 | 25.4 | 30.1 | 34.9 | 29.2 |
| Lesotho | 2000 | 48.0 | 54.3 | 45.9 | 49.4 | 57.5 | 45.9 | 46.1 | 47.5 | 45.8 |
| Lesotho | 2010 | 48.7 | 54.7 | 46.9 | 49.8 | 58.2 | 46.9 | 47.2 | 48.6 | 46.9 |
| Lesotho | 2020 | 43.6 | 50.1 | 42.1 | 44.4 | 54.1 | 41.9 | 42.6 | 43.8 | 42.3 |
| Liberia | 2000 | 68.4 | 72.7 | 67.3 | 66.4 | 73.1 | 64.8 | 70.5 | 72.1 | 70.1 |
| Liberia | 2010 | 58.3 | 64.2 | 56.9 | 56.1 | 64.7 | 54.1 | 60.7 | 63.5 | 60.1 |
| Liberia | 2020 | 37.9 | 45.5 | 36.3 | 35.7 | 46.2 | 33.4 | 40.2 | 44.7 | 39.2 |
| Libya | 2000 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Libya | 2010 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Libya | 2020 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Madagascar | 2000 | 63.0 | 68.1 | 60.8 | 61.8 | 68.4 | 59.1 | 64.2 | 67.9 | 62.6 |
| Madagascar | 2010 | 76.2 | 79.6 | 74.6 | 75.2 | 79.6 | 73.3 | 77.2 | 79.7 | 76.1 |
| Madagascar | 2020 | 71.7 | 75.9 | 70.0 | 70.7 | 75.9 | 68.4 | 72.9 | 75.9 | 71.6 |
| Malawi | 2000 | 63.6 | 63.5 | 63.7 | 59.9 | 63.2 | 58.9 | 67.6 | 63.7 | 69.0 |
| Malawi | 2010 | 68.2 | 68.1 | 68.3 | 65.2 | 67.9 | 63.9 | 71.6 | 68.3 | 73.1 |
| Malawi | 2020 | 64.8 | 65.0 | 64.7 | 61.4 | 64.8 | 59.9 | 68.6 | 65.2 | 70.1 |
| Mali | 2000 | 66.4 | 68.0 | 65.6 | 64.9 | 68.2 | 63.4 | 68.2 | 67.8 | 68.4 |
| Mali | 2010 | 49.6 | 52.9 | 48.2 | 47.7 | 53.2 | 45.4 | 52.2 | 52.5 | 52.1 |
| Mali | 2020 | 46.3 | 50.4 | 44.8 | 44.2 | 51.0 | 41.8 | 49.2 | 49.7 | 49.0 |
| Mauritania | 2000 | 15.7 | 20.4 | 13.8 | 14.9 | 20.8 | 12.8 | 17.6 | 19.6 | 16.6 |
| Mauritania | 2010 | 5.7 | 8.1 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 8.3 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 7.6 | 6.2 |
| Mauritania | 2020 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.2 |
| Mauritius | 2000 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Mauritius | 2010 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Mauritius | 2020 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Morocco | 2000 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 6.9 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 6.1 |
| Morocco | 2010 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.2 |
| Morocco | 2020 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Mozambique | 2000 | 80.3 | 80.0 | 80.4 | 77.6 | 76.5 | 78.1 | 82.3 | 82.5 | 82.3 |
| Mozambique | 2010 | 65.9 | 66.0 | 65.9 | 62.8 | 62.3 | 63.0 | 68.6 | 69.3 | 68.4 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Mozambique | 2020 | 53.0 | 54.4 | 52.4 | 48.9 | 49.7 | 48.5 | 56.8 | 59.0 | 56.0 |
| Namibia | 2000 | 30.0 | 38.1 | 28.6 | 27.1 | 34.6 | 25.8 | 33.6 | 42.5 | 32.1 |
| Namibia | 2010 | 15.8 | 21.6 | 14.9 | 13.9 | 19.4 | 12.9 | 17.9 | 24.7 | 17.0 |
| Namibia | 2020 | 5.8 | 8.7 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 7.5 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 10.4 | 6.3 |
| Niger | 2000 | 76.8 | 78.4 | 76.2 | 77.1 | 79.0 | 76.4 | 76.4 | 77.6 | 76.0 |
| Niger | 2010 | 52.9 | 56.4 | 51.4 | 53.1 | 57.3 | 51.2 | 52.7 | 55.3 | 51.6 |
| Niger | 2020 | 38.5 | 42.2 | 36.5 | 38.8 | 43.5 | 36.1 | 38.1 | 40.3 | 36.9 |
| Nigeria | 2000 | 54.2 | 62.2 | 51.9 | 57.1 | 67.8 | 54.3 | 50.4 | 55.8 | 48.6 |
| Nigeria | 2010 | 48.0 | 60.0 | 45.6 | 48.7 | 65.0 | 45.6 | 47.1 | 54.0 | 45.7 |
| Nigeria | 2020 | 44.3 | 58.3 | 42.3 | 44.7 | 63.1 | 42.1 | 43.7 | 52.0 | 42.6 |
| Northern Africa | 2000 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 6.0 | 5.2 |
| Northern Africa | 2010 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Northern Africa | 2020 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
| Rwanda | 2000 | 75.5 | 76.9 | 74.8 | 74.7 | 77.3 | 73.4 | 76.3 | 76.5 | 76.1 |
| Rwanda | 2010 | 60.0 | 62.9 | 58.9 | 58.9 | 63.8 | 56.8 | 61.1 | 62.0 | 60.8 |
| Rwanda | 2020 | 43.9 | 48.8 | 42.3 | 42.7 | 50.3 | 40.1 | 45.0 | 47.2 | 44.3 |
| Senegal | 2000 | 52.4 | 58.5 | 49.8 | 51.2 | 56.8 | 48.7 | 54.9 | 62.3 | 52.0 |
| Senegal | 2010 | 39.2 | 47.3 | 36.5 | 37.4 | 45.4 | 34.5 | 42.7 | 51.5 | 40.0 |
| Senegal | 2020 | 31.6 | 41.1 | 29.2 | 29.3 | 39.1 | 26.8 | 35.2 | 44.1 | 33.0 |
| Sierra Leone | 2000 | 66.1 | 71.5 | 64.5 | 63.1 | 69.1 | 61.6 | 68.9 | 73.3 | 67.4 |
| Sierra Leone | 2010 | 55.3 | 62.4 | 53.5 | 52.2 | 60.5 | 50.5 | 58.3 | 63.7 | 56.7 |
| Sierra Leone | 2020 | 44.2 | 53.8 | 42.4 | 40.8 | 52.3 | 39.1 | 47.5 | 54.7 | 45.8 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|------------------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Somalia | 2000 | 68.3 | 72.1 | 67.3 | 68.7 | 72.6 | 67.7 | 66.5 | 70.1 | 65.5 |
| Somalia | 2010 | 64.7 | 69.3 | 63.4 | 65.1 | 69.9 | 63.8 | 62.9 | 67.1 | 61.8 |
| Somalia | 2020 | 64.5 | 69.3 | 63.0 | 64.9 | 69.9 | 63.4 | 62.8 | 67.0 | 61.5 |
| South Africa | 2000 | 16.9 | 24.8 | 15.9 | 13.5 | 22.7 | 12.4 | 21.7 | 27.7 | 21.0 |
| South Africa | 2010 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.4 |
| South Africa | 2020 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 7.0 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 2000 | 54.7 | 59.5 | 53.0 | 53.3 | 59.6 | 51.1 | 56.3 | 59.3 | 55.2 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 2010 | 44.5 | 49.1 | 43.0 | 43.3 | 49.5 | 41.3 | 46.0 | 48.7 | 45.1 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 2020 | 36.6 | 40.9 | 35.3 | 35.4 | 41.4 | 33.6 | 37.9 | 40.4 | 37.1 |
| Sudan | 2000 | 24.5 | 22.8 | 24.9 | 26.4 | 24.1 | 26.9 | 18.9 | 19.9 | 18.5 |
| Sudan | 2010 | 9.9 | 8.5 | 10.2 | 10.9 | 9.1 | 11.3 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.2 |
| Sudan | 2020 | 6.5 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 7.3 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 2000 | 83.1 | 84.1 | 82.7 | 81.9 | 82.7 | 81.4 | 84.4 | 85.4 | 83.9 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 2010 | 49.9 | 53.7 | 48.2 | 47.8 | 52.1 | 45.9 | 52.0 | 55.4 | 50.4 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 2020 | 37.1 | 41.9 | 35.1 | 35.0 | 40.3 | 32.7 | 39.4 | 43.5 | 37.6 |
| Togo | 2000 | 51.5 | 57.1 | 49.0 | 52.2 | 62.4 | 47.9 | 50.7 | 52.2 | 50.1 |
| Togo | 2010 | 46.8 | 51.4 | 45.1 | 47.5 | 56.0 | 44.2 | 46.2 | 46.9 | 45.9 |
| Togo | 2020 | 37.1 | 41.8 | 35.4 | 37.9 | 46.6 | 34.8 | 36.4 | 37.0 | 36.1 |
| Tunisia | 2000 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 |
| Tunisia | 2010 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Tunisia | 2020 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Uganda | 2000 | 62.6 | 60.8 | 63.4 | 60.9 | 59.3 | 61.5 | 64.6 | 62.5 | 65.6 |

| Subregion/country | Time | Total | | | Men | | | Women | | |
|-------------------|------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years | 15+ years | 15-24 years | 25+ years |
| Uganda | 2010 | 37.0 | 37.3 | 36.9 | 34.8 | 36.6 | 34.0 | 39.6 | 38.1 | 40.2 |
| Uganda | 2020 | 35.6 | 35.9 | 35.4 | 33.2 | 35.2 | 32.4 | 38.1 | 36.6 | 38.7 |
| Zambia | 2000 | 43.1 | 47.8 | 41.0 | 41.9 | 49.1 | 38.8 | 44.3 | 46.3 | 43.4 |
| Zambia | 2010 | 60.7 | 64.6 | 59.4 | 59.1 | 65.0 | 57.1 | 62.4 | 64.0 | 61.9 |
| Zambia | 2020 | 50.6 | 55.9 | 48.8 | 48.5 | 56.7 | 45.9 | 52.8 | 55.2 | 52.0 |
| Zimbabwe | 2000 | 14.3 | 17.3 | 12.7 | 13.9 | 18.5 | 11.4 | 14.8 | 16.0 | 14.2 |
| Zimbabwe | 2010 | 19.1 | 22.7 | 17.3 | 18.5 | 24.1 | 15.5 | 19.7 | 21.2 | 19.0 |
| Zimbabwe | 2020 | 17.8 | 21.8 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 23.0 | 14.6 | 18.6 | 20.3 | 18.0 |

Source: ILO modelled estimates, July 2018.

► Annex 7: FDI inflows, by subregions and countries (millions of US dollars)

| Subregion/country | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|------------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Africa | 9 651.2 | 19 972.8 | 14 765.9 | 18 178.1 | 17 676.3 | 29 437.5 | 34 625.1 | 51 062.4 | 58 060.4 | 56 652.3 | 46 620.1 | 45 633.4 | 56 853.7 | 50 074.8 | 53 906.0 | 56 874.1 | 46 482.4 | 41 389.8 | 45 902.2 |
| Northern Africa | 3 250.1 | 5 357.6 | 3 871.6 | 5 265.6 | 6 441.0 | 11 613.1 | 21 594.2 | 23 096.6 | 22 205.1 | 18 141.2 | 15 745.9 | 7 548.1 | 15 759.0 | 11 964.4 | 12 039.1 | 12 255.7 | 13 832.8 | 13 353.1 | 14 307.0 |
| Algeria | 280.1 | 1 113.1 | 1 065.0 | 637.9 | 881.9 | 1 145.3 | 1 888.2 | 1 743.3 | 2 631.7 | 2 753.8 | 2 301.2 | 2 580.4 | 1 499.5 | 1 696.9 | 1 506.7 | -584.5 | 1 637.0 | 1 232.3 | 1 506.3 |
| Egypt | 1 235.4 | 509.9 | 646.9 | 237.4 | 2 157.4 | 5 375.6 | 10 042.8 | 11 578.1 | 9 494.6 | 6 711.6 | 6 385.6 | -483.0 | 6 031.0 | 4 256.0 | 4 612.0 | 6 925.2 | 8 106.8 | 7 408.7 | 6 797.6 |
| Libya | 141.0 | -133.0 | 145.0 | 143.0 | 357.0 | 1 038.0 | 2 064.0 | 3 850.0 | 3 180.0 | 3 310.0 | 1 909.0 | - | 1 425.0 | 702.0 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Morocco | 422.0 | 2 807.1 | 480.7 | 2 314.5 | 894.6 | 1 654.0 | 2 449.4 | 2 804.5 | 2 487.1 | 1 951.7 | 1 573.9 | 2 568.4 | 2 728.4 | 3 298.1 | 3 561.2 | 3 254.8 | 2 157.1 | 2 686.0 | 3 640.4 |
| South Sudan | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 161.0 | -793.0 | 44.0 | -71.0 | -17.0 | 80.0 | 191.0 |
| Sudan | 392.2 | 574.0 | 713.2 | 1 349.2 | 1 511.1 | 1 617.1 | 1 841.8 | 1 504.4 | 1 653.1 | 1 726.3 | 2 063.7 | 1 734.4 | 2 311.0 | 1 687.9 | 1 251.3 | 1 728.4 | 1 063.8 | 1 065.3 | 1 135.8 |
| Tunisia | 779.5 | 486.5 | 820.8 | 583.6 | 639.1 | 783.1 | 3 308.0 | 1 616.3 | 2 758.6 | 1 687.8 | 1 512.5 | 1 147.9 | 1 603.2 | 1 116.5 | 1 063.8 | 1 002.7 | 885.0 | 880.8 | 1 035.9 |
| Other Africa | 6 401.0 | 14 615.2 | 10 894.4 | 12 912.6 | 11 235.3 | 17 824.4 | 13 030.8 | 27 965.8 | 35 855.3 | 38 511.1 | 30 874.2 | 38 085.4 | 41 094.7 | 38 110.4 | 41 867.0 | 44 618.5 | 32 649.6 | 28 036.7 | 31 595.1 |
| Western Africa | 2 131.1 | 2 075.0 | 2 913.3 | 3 363.9 | 3 655.8 | 7 124.3 | 7 047.5 | 9 555.4 | 12 357.5 | 14 764.2 | 12 024.3 | 18 926.3 | 16 874.3 | 14 479.9 | 12 147.9 | 10 185.3 | 12 721.0 | 11 194.3 | 9 564.9 |
| Benin | 59.7 | 43.9 | 13.5 | 44.7 | 63.8 | 53.0 | 53.2 | 255.2 | 169.8 | 134.3 | 176.8 | 161.1 | 281.6 | 360.2 | 405.2 | 149.7 | 131.7 | 200.4 | 207.5 |
| Burkina Faso | 23.1 | 6.3 | 15.0 | 29.1 | 14.3 | 34.2 | 33.6 | 343.5 | 105.8 | 100.9 | 34.6 | 143.7 | 329.3 | 490.3 | 355.9 | 231.8 | 390.4 | 2.6 | 480.0 |
| Cabo Verde | 43.4 | 12.7 | 38.5 | 33.5 | 68.0 | 81.6 | 130.6 | 190.4 | 209.2 | 174.3 | 158.8 | 154.7 | 125.6 | 69.6 | 180.4 | 115.8 | 127.2 | 111.1 | 99.6 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 234.7 | 272.7 | 212.6 | 165.4 | 283.0 | 311.9 | 318.9 | 426.8 | 446.1 | 377.1 | 338.9 | 301.6 | 330.3 | 407.5 | 438.8 | 494.2 | 577.5 | 972.6 | 912.9 |
| Gambia | 43.5 | 35.5 | 42.8 | 10.7 | 55.5 | 53.7 | 82.2 | 76.5 | 70.1 | 39.4 | 37.1 | 36.1 | 41.2 | 25.5 | 35.6 | 12.5 | -27.7 | 17.7 | 29.1 |
| Ghana | 114.9 | 89.3 | 58.9 | 110.0 | 139.3 | 145.0 | 636.0 | 855.4 | 1 220.4 | 2 897.1 | 2 527.4 | 3 237.4 | 3 293.4 | 3 226.3 | 3 357.0 | 3 192.3 | 3 485.3 | 3 255.0 | 2 989.0 |
| Guinea | 9.9 | 1.7 | 30.0 | 82.8 | 97.9 | 105.0 | 125.0 | 385.9 | 255.8 | 140.9 | 101.4 | 956.1 | 606.5 | 134.0 | 77.1 | 53.3 | 1 618.4 | 577.4 | 482.7 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0.7 | 0.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 9.2 | 8.0 | 17.3 | 18.6 | 5.1 | 17.5 | 33.2 | 25.0 | 6.6 | 19.6 | 28.9 | 18.6 | 24.0 | 15.7 | 17.3 |
| Liberia | 20.8 | 8.3 | 2.8 | 372.2 | 75.4 | 82.8 | 107.9 | 131.6 | 283.8 | 217.8 | 450.0 | 785.3 | 984.6 | 1 061.3 | 276.7 | 627.0 | 453.2 | 247.8 | 122.2 |

| Subregion/country | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Mali | 82.4 | 121.7 | 243.8 | 132.3 | 101.0 | 223.8 | 83.4 | 72.8 | 180.3 | 748.3 | 405.9 | 556.1 | 397.9 | 307.9 | 144.0 | 275.4 | 356.2 | 561.8 | 365.9 |
| Mauritania | 40.1 | 76.7 | 67.3 | 102.0 | 404.1 | 811.9 | 154.6 | 139.4 | 342.8 | -3.1 | 130.5 | 588.7 | 1 388.6 | 1 125.7 | 501.0 | 502.1 | 271.2 | 587.2 | 70.8 |
| Niger | 8.4 | 22.9 | 2.4 | 11.5 | 20.3 | 30.3 | 50.5 | 129.0 | 340.4 | 790.8 | 940.3 | 1 065.8 | 841.3 | 719.1 | 821.9 | 529.3 | 301.1 | 337.9 | 460.1 |
| Nigeria | 1 309.7 | 1 277.4 | 2 040.2 | 2 171.4 | 2 127.1 | 4 978.3 | 4 897.8 | 6 086.7 | 8 248.6 | 8 649.5 | 6 099.0 | 8 914.9 | 7 127.4 | 5 608.5 | 4 693.8 | 3 064.2 | 4 448.7 | 3 503.0 | 1 997.5 |
| Saint Helena | -3.8 | 0.2 | - | - | -0.7 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Senegal | 62.9 | 31.9 | 78.1 | 52.5 | 77.0 | 44.6 | 220.3 | 297.4 | 397.6 | 320.0 | 266.1 | 338.2 | 276.2 | 311.3 | 402.6 | 409.0 | 472.1 | 586.8 | 629.3 |
| Sierra Leone | 39.0 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 8.6 | 61.2 | 83.2 | 58.8 | 96.6 | 57.6 | 110.8 | 238.4 | 950.5 | 722.4 | 429.7 | 375.1 | 252.4 | 138.0 | 128.9 | 599.0 |
| Togo | 41.5 | 63.6 | 53.4 | 33.7 | 59.4 | 77.0 | 77.3 | 49.2 | 23.9 | 48.5 | 85.8 | 711.1 | 121.5 | 183.5 | 53.9 | 257.8 | -46.3 | 88.3 | 102.0 |
| Central Africa | 670.4 | 1 591.0 | 2 221.3 | 2 678.6 | 1 514.4 | 2 032.3 | 1 388.3 | 5 274.0 | 4 469.3 | 5 457.0 | 7 799.2 | 5 551.9 | 5 460.8 | 5 428.3 | 5 305.7 | 8 306.7 | 5 390.3 | 9 102.0 | 8 847.5 |
| Burundi | 11.7 | -0.0 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 3.8 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 3.4 | 0.6 | 7.4 | 47.1 | 7.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| Cameroon | 158.8 | 73.3 | 601.7 | 336.3 | 86.1 | 234.0 | 16.4 | 191.0 | -24.2 | 668.3 | -0.6 | 355.4 | 739.2 | 567.2 | 726.5 | 627.4 | 663.8 | 814.0 | 701.7 |
| Central African Republic | 0.9 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 11.3 | 15.1 | 10.1 | 34.7 | 56.8 | 117.1 | 42.3 | 61.5 | 36.9 | 70.0 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 18.0 |
| Chad | 115.2 | 459.9 | 924.1 | 712.7 | 466.8 | -99.3 | -278.4 | -321.7 | 466.1 | 374.9 | 313.0 | 281.9 | 579.8 | 520.2 | -675.5 | 559.6 | 244.5 | 335.0 | 662.2 |
| Congo | 165.9 | 77.3 | 136.8 | 323.1 | -8.5 | 585.2 | 553.6 | 1 467.6 | 2 031.9 | 1 272.9 | 928.4 | 186.3 | -282.8 | 609.4 | 1 659.5 | 3 803.3 | 1 610.5 | 4 406.0 | 4 313.1 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 94.2 | 102.2 | 187.6 | 391.3 | 409.0 | 266.6 | 256.1 | 1 808.0 | 1 726.8 | 663.8 | 2 939.3 | 1 686.9 | 3 312.1 | 2 098.2 | 1 843.2 | 1 673.5 | 1 204.7 | 1 340.2 | 1 493.9 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 154.5 | 940.7 | 323.4 | 689.8 | 340.9 | 769.1 | 469.5 | 1 242.7 | -793.9 | 1 636.2 | 2 734.0 | 1 975.0 | 985.3 | 582.9 | 167.9 | 233.3 | 54.0 | 304.1 | 395.9 |
| Gabon | -42.6 | -89.1 | 37.0 | 206.1 | 193.7 | 242.3 | 267.8 | 710.7 | 760.2 | 664.0 | 521.7 | 874.9 | -220.9 | 771.2 | 1 047.7 | 990.8 | 1 241.1 | 1 498.0 | 845.8 |
| Rwanda | 8.1 | 18.5 | 1.5 | 4.7 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 30.6 | 82.3 | 102.3 | 118.7 | 250.5 | 119.1 | 255.0 | 257.6 | 458.9 | 379.8 | 342.3 | 356.4 | 398.5 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 15.7 | 38.0 | 36.0 | 79.1 | 15.5 | 50.6 | 32.2 | 22.5 | 12.2 | 27.1 | 28.6 | 22.2 | 41.0 | 17.5 |
| Eastern Africa | 1 123.9 | 1 122.5 | 1 022.7 | 1 312.3 | 1 419.5 | 1 868.3 | 2 409.2 | 4 315.8 | 5 026.0 | 5 483.1 | 5 496.3 | 5 872.5 | 6 560.8 | 7 253.0 | 6 615.0 | 6 872.8 | 7 694.5 | 8 665.1 | 8 965.6 |
| Comoros | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 13.8 | 8.3 | 23.1 | 10.4 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 7.9 |
| Djibouti | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 14.2 | 38.5 | 22.2 | 108.3 | 195.4 | 228.9 | 74.7 | 36.5 | 79.0 | 110.0 | 286.0 | 153.0 | 124.0 | 160.0 | 165.0 | 265.0 |

| Subregion/country | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|
| Eritrea | 27.9 | 12.1 | 22.8 | 25.0 | 24.1 | 1.4 | 15.4 | 7.2 | 39.0 | 91.0 | 91.0 | 39.0 | 41.4 | 43.9 | 46.5 | 49.3 | 52.3 | 55.5 | 61.0 |
| Ethiopia | 134.6 | 349.4 | 255.0 | 465.0 | 545.1 | 265.1 | 545.3 | 222.0 | 108.5 | 221.5 | 288.3 | 626.5 | 278.6 | 1 343.9 | 1 855.1 | 2 626.5 | 3 989.0 | 4 017.1 | 3 310.3 |
| Kenya | 110.9 | 5.3 | 27.6 | 81.7 | 46.1 | 21.2 | 50.7 | 1 107.5 | 488.0 | 1 491.3 | 1 197.6 | 1 450.5 | 1 380.2 | 1 118.8 | 820.9 | 619.7 | 681.3 | 1 275.4 | 1 625.9 |
| Madagascar | 83.0 | 93.1 | 61.1 | 95.5 | 95.2 | 86.0 | 294.5 | 740.5 | 1 392.7 | 1 269.4 | 764.7 | 788.1 | 777.6 | 551.3 | 313.7 | 435.8 | 450.6 | 389.1 | 349.1 |
| Mauritius | 276.8 | -25.6 | 32.1 | 62.1 | 11.2 | 41.6 | 105.3 | 339.1 | 382.9 | 247.8 | 430.0 | 433.4 | 589.0 | 293.3 | 455.6 | 216.5 | 378.8 | 442.9 | 371.5 |
| Mayotte | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | 5.0 | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Reunion | - | 0.2 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Seychelles | 24.3 | 64.7 | 47.7 | 58.4 | 37.4 | 85.9 | 145.6 | 181.6 | 182.1 | 171.4 | 210.8 | 207.4 | 261.4 | 170.3 | 230.0 | 194.5 | 155.2 | 191.9 | 123.9 |
| Somalia | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.9 | -4.8 | 24.0 | 96.0 | 141.0 | 87.0 | 108.0 | 112.0 | 102.0 | 107.3 | 258.0 | 261.0 | 303.0 | 334.0 | 384.0 | 409.0 |
| Tanzania, United Republic of | 282.0 | 467.2 | 387.6 | 308.2 | 330.6 | 935.5 | 403.0 | 581.5 | 1 383.3 | 952.6 | 1 813.3 | 1 229.4 | 1 799.6 | 2 087.3 | 1 416.1 | 1 560.8 | 864.0 | 937.7 | 1 104.8 |
| Uganda | 180.8 | 151.5 | 184.6 | 202.2 | 295.4 | 379.8 | 644.3 | 792.3 | 728.9 | 841.6 | 543.9 | 894.3 | 1 205.4 | 1 096.0 | 1 058.6 | 737.7 | 625.7 | 802.6 | 1 337.1 |
| Southern Africa | 2 475.6 | 9 826.7 | 4 737.1 | 5 557.8 | 4 645.5 | 6 799.6 | 2 185.8 | 8 820.6 | 14 002.6 | 12 806.8 | 5 554.5 | 7 734.6 | 12 198.8 | 10 949.3 | 17 798.3 | 19 253.7 | 6 843.8 | -924.7 | 4 217.1 |
| Angola | 878.6 | 2 145.5 | 1 743.5 | 3 577.0 | 2 197.2 | -1 303.8 | -37.7 | -893.3 | 1 679.0 | 2 205.3 | -3 227.2 | -3 023.8 | -1 464.6 | -7 120.0 | 3 657.5 | 10 028.2 | -179.5 | -7 397.3 | -5 732.5 |
| Botswana | 61.2 | 30.7 | 408.0 | 418.0 | 391.0 | 421.4 | 486.4 | 494.7 | 520.9 | 208.7 | 218.4 | 293.2 | 146.5 | 67.1 | 515.2 | 378.6 | 122.2 | 177.1 | 228.7 |
| Eswatini | 105.8 | 28.2 | 96.4 | -63.9 | 69.6 | -45.9 | 121.0 | 37.5 | 105.7 | 65.7 | 119.6 | 108.4 | 31.5 | 84.7 | 25.5 | 41.3 | 21.1 | -56.0 | 25.4 |
| Lesotho | 32.4 | 29.7 | 28.4 | 43.9 | 56.7 | 29.0 | 28.1 | 84.8 | 61.8 | 91.3 | 51.3 | 149.5 | 24.4 | 84.1 | 65.8 | 40.5 | 47.6 | 43.1 | 39.3 |
| Malawi | 39.6 | 39.4 | 38.7 | 13.3 | 58.9 | 99.1 | 121.6 | 34.6 | 123.9 | 194.5 | 46.1 | 93.3 | 80.9 | 88.5 | 387.1 | 509.7 | 115.7 | 90.2 | 101.6 |
| Mozambique | 139.3 | 255.4 | 347.3 | 336.7 | 475.5 | 107.9 | 112.6 | 398.7 | 591.6 | 898.3 | 2 531.7 | 3 558.5 | 5 629.4 | 6 175.1 | 4 901.8 | 3 866.8 | 3 093.4 | 2 293.1 | 2 711.1 |
| Namibia | 186.4 | 365.2 | 181.4 | 148.7 | 225.8 | 385.2 | 386.6 | 733.0 | 720.3 | 841.2 | 283.8 | 817.1 | 1 060.8 | 769.9 | 441.2 | 933.3 | 353.6 | 461.2 | 195.8 |
| South Africa | 887.3 | 6 783.9 | 1 569.2 | 733.7 | 798.0 | 6 646.9 | 311.5 | 6 538.1 | 9 209.2 | 7 502.1 | 3 635.6 | 4 242.9 | 4 558.8 | 8 300.1 | 5 770.7 | 1 729.4 | 2 235.0 | 2 006.9 | 5 334.0 |
| Zambia | 121.7 | 145.0 | 298.4 | 346.6 | 364.0 | 356.9 | 615.8 | 1 323.9 | 938.6 | 694.8 | 1 729.3 | 1 108.5 | 1 731.5 | 2 099.8 | 1 488.7 | 1 304.9 | 662.9 | 1 107.5 | 569.0 |
| Zimbabwe | 23.2 | 3.8 | 25.9 | 3.8 | 8.7 | 102.8 | 40.0 | 68.9 | 51.6 | 105.0 | 165.9 | 387.0 | 399.5 | 400.0 | 544.8 | 421.0 | 371.8 | 349.4 | 744.6 |

Source: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).

► Annex 8: Unemployment and unemployment rate, by subregion and sex, total (aged 15+ years) and youth (aged 15–24 years), 2000–21

| | Total | | | | | | | | | | | Men | | | | | | | | | | | Women | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | | | |
| Unemployment (million) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Africa | 23.5 | 24.4 | 25.5 | 29.2 | 31.1 | 32.4 | 32.7 | 33.5 | 34.1 | 34.8 | 13.6 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 15.3 | 16.1 | 16.9 | 17.0 | 17.4 | 17.7 | 18.1 | 9.9 | 11.2 | 12.4 | 13.9 | 15.0 | 15.6 | 15.7 | 16.1 | 16.4 | 16.7 | | | |
| Central Africa | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | | | |
| Eastern Africa | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | | | |
| Northern Africa | 7.7 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 9.3 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 | | | |
| Southern Africa | 5.6 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | | | |
| Western Africa | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | | | |
| World | 160.0 | 176.7 | 187.8 | 188.4 | 191.3 | 190.0 | 185.8 | 187.7 | 190.3 | 193.7 | 95.0 | 103.7 | 112.4 | 112.7 | 114.2 | 113.3 | 111.0 | 112.3 | 113.8 | 115.9 | 65.0 | 73.0 | 75.4 | 75.7 | 77.1 | 76.6 | 74.8 | 75.4 | 76.5 | 77.8 | | | |
| Unemployment (rate) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Africa | 7.8 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 7.9 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 7.7 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.4 | | | |
| Central Africa | 4.5 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 5.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | | | |
| Eastern Africa | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | | | |
| Northern Africa | 15.1 | 12.8 | 10.6 | 13.1 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.5 | 12.1 | 11.9 | 11.7 | 13.5 | 10.7 | 7.5 | 10.2 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 9.1 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 20.7 | 19.9 | 20.1 | 22.2 | 22.2 | 22.2 | 22.1 | 21.5 | 21.0 | 20.4 | | | |
| Southern Africa | 29.6 | 28.7 | 24.5 | 24.7 | 26.0 | 26.3 | 26.1 | 27.2 | 27.5 | 27.9 | 25.4 | 23.4 | 22.5 | 22.7 | 23.9 | 24.5 | 24.4 | 25.5 | 25.6 | 25.7 | 35.4 | 35.6 | 27.0 | 27.1 | 28.4 | 28.5 | 28.2 | 29.3 | 29.8 | 30.4 | | | |
| Western Africa | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | | | |
| World | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.7 | | | |

| | Total | | | | | | | | | | | Men | | | | | | | | | | | Women | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | | | |
| Youth unemployment (million) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Africa | 10.5 | 10.8 | 11.0 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 12.0 | 12.2 | 12.4 | 12.6 | | 6.2 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.7 | | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.9 | |
| Central Africa | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | |
| Eastern Africa | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | |
| Northern Africa | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | |
| Southern Africa | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |
| Western Africa | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | |
| World | 71.1 | 77.9 | 74.5 | 69.6 | 69.9 | 68.9 | 67.2 | 67.6 | 67.9 | 68.2 | | 43.9 | 47.2 | 46.0 | 43.7 | 43.8 | 43.1 | 42.2 | 42.6 | 42.8 | 43.0 | | 27.3 | 30.7 | 28.5 | 25.9 | 26.2 | 25.8 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 25.1 | 25.2 | |
| Youth unemployment (rate) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Africa | 13.2 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 10.6 | | 13.9 | 12.3 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 10.4 | 10.4 | | 12.2 | 12.0 | 12.2 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 11.6 | 11.3 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 11.0 | |
| Central Africa | 8.0 | 6.8 | 10.0 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 9.1 | | 9.5 | 7.9 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 10.1 | | 6.6 | 5.7 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | |
| Eastern Africa | 7.2 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.7 | | 7.3 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | | 7.0 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | |
| Northern Africa | 30.5 | 28.0 | 24.2 | 31.5 | 31.0 | 31.2 | 31.1 | 30.2 | 29.8 | 29.6 | | 28.4 | 24.5 | 18.3 | 28.4 | 27.5 | 27.7 | 27.6 | 26.4 | 25.7 | 25.3 | | 36.1 | 37.4 | 40.9 | 39.1 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 39.5 | 39.7 | 39.8 | 40.3 | |
| Southern Africa | 51.7 | 53.7 | 48.8 | 48.2 | 50.9 | 50.8 | 50.7 | 52.5 | 52.4 | 52.7 | | 47.3 | 47.2 | 45.4 | 44.2 | 46.0 | 46.4 | 46.5 | 48.8 | 48.5 | 48.7 | | 57.5 | 62.0 | 52.9 | 53.1 | 57.1 | 56.2 | 55.9 | 57.2 | 57.2 | 57.8 | |
| Western Africa | 8.1 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 9.5 | 9.9 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 9.9 | | 8.3 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 8.7 | | 7.8 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 9.6 | 11.6 | 11.9 | 11.7 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.3 | |
| World | 12.5 | 13.3 | 13.3 | 13.6 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 13.5 | 13.6 | 13.7 | 13.8 | | 12.9 | 13.4 | 13.5 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 14.0 | 13.8 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 14.1 | | 12.0 | 13.2 | 13.0 | 13.1 | 13.4 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.2 | |

