



MNSSP Review Brief – Social Cash Transfer Stakeholder Review




What is the most important or interesting fact about the programme?

- Transfers are being paid to those who would otherwise have no support
- Delivery of benefits directly to ultra-poor
- Dependency ratio as a criterion for selection
- Positive impact on household wellbeing, school retention and enrollment, consumption, and asset accumulation

What are the successes of the programme in the last four years?

- Setting up of institutional structures and creating of standards and processes
- Targeting is effectively reaching intended beneficiaries
- Well-functioning MIS used by all partners
- Payment of transfers on time
- Expansion of SCT from 7-18 districts, reaching 170K + beneficiaries
- Development partners and Government interested in the program
- Good leadership from MoGCDSW




What are the issues that did not go well?

- Inadequate financial commitment from Government
- Inadequate financial management
- Universal application of 10% cut-off excluding poor and vulnerable
- National coverage not achieved
- Government implementation of the SCT in Thyolo
- Human capacity at central and district level
- Poor incentives and salary structure
- Infrequent revision of transfers levels

How do you feel about the programme?

- Very optimistic – Donors are there to support
- Optimistic – Donors are listening and there good progress in the implementation of the SCT
- Optimistic – Transfers directly reach the ultra-poor and donors will keep supporting the SCT
- Cautiously Optimistic – For donors to stay Government has to show more commitment
- Cautiously Optimistic – Need to be mindful that SCT competes with other equally important donor priorities



What has been learned?

- Human face should reign supreme, social justice and human rights
- E-payments can work in the Malawian context
- Arrears allow for faster accumulation of assets
- SCT has changed the perception of social protection from labour-focused to labour-constrained
- Small transfers can make a large difference to beneficiaries
- Coordination key in Social Protection
- Regularity of payments very important
- SCT needs to be flexible and responsive to changing environments




MNSSP Review Brief – Social Cash Transfer Stakeholder Review

This brief summarizes key discussion points and recommendations made at the MNSSP Review workshop on Public Works Programmes, held at Crossroads hotel on the 4th of May 2016 in Lilongwe.

The purpose of the workshop was to evaluate the progress made by Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) against the MNSSP (2012-2016) results matrix and facilitate a critical discussion amongst programme implementers on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, institutional capacity, and sustainability of the Social Cash Transfer Programme under the MNSSP.

Summary of key challenges observed



Traffic Light Evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Programme: Strategic Intervention Targets

Stakeholders were asked to study the MNSSP results matrix as completed by the MoGCDSW and evaluate whether the MoGCDSW's completion of the matrix accurately reflects the implementation of the SCTP. In addition, stakeholders were asked to offer their own assessment of the progress made in relation to the results matrix.

Strategic Intervention Targets							
Intervention	Indicator	Baseline	Source	Target	2016	Source	Comments
Provide Monthly Cash transfers	Number of households reached with the monthly cash transfers	30,451	District M&E Reports; MGCSW Quarterly Reports	193,400	170,000	SCT MIS	
	Proportion of times beneficiaries received the transfers on time	50%		80%	95%	SCT MIS	Stakeholders' comments: Stakeholders discussed payment frequency of the SCT as a key indicator of the programme's operational effectiveness. According to Ayala Consultants' (the team of consultants maintaining the SCT MIS at the MoGCDSW) calculations, about 95% of beneficiaries in EU/KfW funded districts currently receive their transfers on time, which is a significant improvement from 2015.
	% of delivery cost to the total monthly transfer	15%		15%	12%		Stakeholders' comments: Stakeholders discussed the indicator on transfer costs (% of delivery cost to the total monthly transfer) and criticized that unclear wording. Delivery costs refer to the cost of delivering transfers and not total program administration cost. It was agreed that there is a need to have a standard



							definition of 'delivery cost' to ensure comparability across modalities. According to Ayala Consultants, non-transfer costs currently make up 12 percent of total programme cost. This applies only to EU/KfW districts and needs to include the remaining districts. It was suggested that non-transfer costs are high in relation to transfers at the early stages of the programme, with the extension of the programme the percentage is expected to go down. It was further mentioned that non-transfer costs are usually around 10 percent of total costs and that the SCT's costs structure is in line with global experiences.
Develop sustainable funding mechanism	% of the government contribution to the total required budget	8%	MoF Budget Statement	40%	11%	MoGCDS W	Stakeholders' comments: It was noted that Government financial commitment to the programme has fall considerably short of the MNSSP's target of 40 percent. In fact, Government financial contribution has only increase by three percentage points over 4 years. It was recognized that such low levels of contribution negatively affect programme sustainability and Government ownership.
Develop & Implement M&E systems and tools	Proportion of districts with fully functional databases	14%	MGCSW Quarterly Reports MGCSW Quarterly Reports	100%	100%	SCT MIS	All districts operate based on a fully functional web based MIS.
	Number of quarterly district visits	1		4	4		This includes financial verification visits that take place every two months; also included supervisory visits which happen every transfer term.
	Number of Annual National M&E reports	1		4	4		

1) How relevant is the Social Cash Transfer Programme?

Objectives of the SCT: Reduce poverty and extreme hunger amongst ultra-poor and labour constrained households; increase school enrolment of children in beneficiary households; and improve the nutrition, economic and general well-being of beneficiary households.

Key questions on the relevance of the SCT

- **Children:** Is there a sufficient focus on children, in the view of long term investment in human capital?
- **Nutrition:** Evidence suggests that SCTs on their own have limited impact on nutrition due to multidimensional nature. What complementary nutrition interventions could be implemented?
- **Focus on labour constained households:** The ultra-poor not living in labour-constrained households are excluded from the SCT. Are they effectively covered under other schemes?
- **Graduation:** Can households be expected to graduate through the SCT without complementary measures?
 - What complementary support could enable the graduation of SCT beneficiaries?
 - Where should SCT beneficiaries graduate to?
 - Can all beneficiaries be expected to graduate or will some require ongoing transfers?

Stakeholder discussion

Stakeholders discussed the concepts of graduation out of poverty, ultra-poverty, and vulnerability in the context of the SCT and whether or not the current implementation of the SCT has the potential to contribute, and is geared towards, a sustainable exit from poverty and vulnerability for its beneficiaries.



A starting point of the discussion on graduation was the recognition that most SCT beneficiaries, despite evidenced improvements in livelihoods, resilience and wellbeing, do not graduate out of ultra-poverty.

There was considerable skepticism whether the SCT in its current form can be expected to empower households to graduate out of poverty. The provision of about MK 55,000 with little complementary support was considered inadequate by stakeholders if the SCT's objective is to sustainably graduate households out of poverty, especially given the demographic characteristics of SCT beneficiary households.

A consensus emerged from the discussion that the SCT's objectives with respect to graduation need to be clarified and if graduation is expected, changes would need to be discussed with respect to the design and potentially targeting criteria of the programme. In a SCT that is designed towards poverty graduation, distinguishing between households with productive capacity and those in need of ongoing support is key.

The group stressed that if graduation is to be an explicit objective of the SCT, a stronger focus should be placed on complementary support services. It was recognized that the SCT's effectiveness, whether the focus is on graduation or not, has been undermined by an insufficient development of a system for linkages to complementary services and interventions. It was seen as very important to clarify expectations towards graduation, develop policies, guidelines, and processes that reflect these expectations, and ensure that all stakeholders involved in programme implementation, and especially beneficiaries, are aware of the resulting implications.

Another issue that was discussed was the fact that the SCT's targeting criteria leaves out the ultra-poor with labour. It was recognized that PWP only provide very limited social protection coverage. Stakeholders suggested to review the alignment of the SCT and PWP with a view to close coverage gaps amongst the (ultra-)poor.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **Clarify objectives of the SCT with respect to the question of graduation:** Is the SCT a programme that has the objective to graduate beneficiaries out of poverty?
- 2) **Develop graduation strategy:** If graduation is to become a stated objective a concept of how to adjust the SCT implementation towards that goal
- 3) **Define support for those unable to graduate:** If graduation is to become a stated objective, a strategy should be developed on what forms of social support would be provided to those who either fail to graduate out of poverty or are expected to be unactable of doing so and will require ongoing support
- 4) **Strengthen the sustainability of impacts:** Develop a strategy on how complementary services can support sustainability of SCT impacts
- 5) **Linkages and referral systems should be strengthened as an integral part of the SCT**
- 6) **Gap analysis:** Review the alignment of the SCT and PWP with a view to close coverage gaps amongst the (ultra-)poor



2) What is the impact of Social Cash Transfer Programme?

Evidence discussed by stakeholders

Food and nutrition	SCT found to contribute to improved food consumption, food diversity, and food security. Evidence on nutrition is inconclusive
Health	Evaluations of the SCT consistently find a positive impact on curative health care usage. Evidence encouraging for child and adult health outcomes
Education	Positive enrolment effects are particularly pronounced for students transitioning from primary to secondary school. SCT found to decrease dropout rates
Labour supply	SCT lead to a substantial reduction in ganyu labour and a shift towards increased agricultural activities on households' farms
Resilience	Evidence of improved resilience among beneficiaries. However, often beneficiaries are excluded from other formal or informal resilience mechanisms
Poverty	Large (14.2 percentage point) reduction in ultra-poverty (endline evaluation). SCT is likely to have a significant impact on national poverty indicators once implemented nationwide

Key questions on the impact of the SCT

- How can programme design work towards improved nutrition?
- Are there lessons from improved education outcomes to support improvements in nutrition and health outcomes? Could there be a health bonus conditional on, for instance, growth monitoring?
- Does the fact that impacts are particularly strong among the poorest beneficiaries imply that the transfer share of pre-transfer income is too low for some beneficiaries to have impacts?
- Does the targeting of the ultra-poor and labour constrained limit the potential for productive impacts?
- Beneficiaries seem to prioritise non-productive durable assets and productive agricultural assets over productive non-agricultural assets. Should the SCT encourage investment in productive non-agricultural assets?

Stakeholder discussion

Stakeholders present recognized that the current programme design does not adequately focus on improving nutritional outcomes. While there may be improvements the nutritional status of SCT beneficiaries, especially of children, these impacts are very difficult to measure.

As the SCT currently does not have a fully-developed nutrition component, reductions in nutrition deficiencies require multidimensional support, and impacts on nutritional outcomes are difficult to assess, stakeholders question whether the SCT should maintain an explicit objective on nutrition. If the objective is to stay, implementers should develop a comprehensive approach on nutrition within the context of the SCT, focussing on complementary services and interventions.

Stakeholders discussed whether the SCT targeting criteria limit the potential for productive impacts of the transfer. As a starting point, stakeholders acknowledged that the SCT already has quite significant impacts of productivity of beneficiaries, often in the form of increased usage of improved agricultural techniques. Nonetheless, it was recognized that, while most SCT households have some labour capacity, the targeting of ultra-poor and labour-constraint households places certain limits on productive impacts of the SCT.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **If nutrition is to remain an objective of the SCT, there is a need to develop a strategy on nutrition in the context of the SCT:** Some donors considers to design an aligned nutrition project either within the SCT or in a complementary manner



3) How effective is the Social Cash Transfer?

Evidence discussed by stakeholders

Coverage	Implemented in 18 out of 28 districts and even within covered districts the SCT does not reach all ultra-poor and labour constrained households
10 percent threshold	District coverage is targeted at 10 percent of the population, which in 2006, was the percentage of the national population that corresponded to both eligibility criteria. A geographically uniform cut-off point leads to significant inclusion and exclusion errors at the district level and distortions in allocations of funds amongst districts
Exclusion of households	How many labour constrained and ultra-poor households are excluded because of the 10% cut off? What alternative social protection support do those who are excluded receive?
Payment value	With the May 2015 transfer value, 40 percent of beneficiaries have a transfer share below 20 percent of their original consumption and the median is 23 percent. High inflation and the declining value of the Kwacha makes it vital to adjust the transfer value frequently

Key questions on the effectiveness of the SCT

- Should the SCT discontinue the 10% cut-off point and cover all ultra-poor and labour constrained household in line with the programme objectives? Will districts and stakeholders accept varying coverage rates?
- For 40 percent of beneficiaries the transfer is less than 20 percent of pre-transfer consumption and inflation is high. Are transfer levels adequate and should they be annually adjusted with a link to inflation?
- How is the case management system functioning? Are there ways it needs strengthening? Are potential beneficiaries aware of effective appeals procedures?

Stakeholder discussion

In discussions of the district level 10 percent eligibility threshold, stakeholders agreed that the current approach is inequitable, leads to distortions of resources at the district level and excludes a significant number of theoretically eligible households. Stakeholders considered the threshold as undermining the effectiveness of the programme, contradicting its objectives, and creating confusion and friction amongst theoretically eligible beneficiaries in districts that have relatively large eligible populations.

Stakeholders suggested that, once the programme has reached national scale, and after an inclusive dialogue with relevant stakeholders, the SCT should cover all ultra-poor and labour-constrained households.

Stakeholders discussed payment frequency of the SCT as a key indicator of the programme's operational effectiveness. According to Ayala Consultants' (the team of consultants maintaining the SCT MIS at the MoGCDSW) calculations, about 95% of beneficiaries in EU/KfW funded districts currently receive their transfers on time, which is a significant improvement from 2015.

With respect to transfer levels, the plenary criticized the lack of predictability and consistency in their calculation. At the moment, transfer levels are set based on resources available rather than a consistently applied formula. It was further recognized that currently adjustments in transfer levels are done infrequently, on an ad-hoc bases, and take long to implement.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **Establish an annual automatic review of transfer levels:** Transfer level should be based on a clear and consistent formula.
- 2) **Discuss the 10% eligibility threshold:** A discussion on the future of the 10% eligibility threshold discussion should be tabled in a dedicated forum within the MNSSP review. Stakeholders suggested that the threshold should be discontinued.



4) How efficient is the Social Cash Transfer Programme?

Evidence discussed by stakeholders

Administrative cost	The SCT has comparatively low administrative costs of 12 percent of total programme cost, which is in line with international standards.
Targeting challenges	Evaluations found targeting outcomes to be less than satisfactory as the eligibility criteria are subject to interpretations, with proxies of poverty are variedly applied in different contexts at community level.
Community understanding of targeting	Evidence raises questions as to whether communities understand the 10% cut-off and the notion of ultra-poverty. Increases in social tensions are reported, conceivably due to limited community understanding of eligibility and the 10 percent cut-off.
Payment system	Currently payments are delivered primarily manually, requiring beneficiaries to travel long distances to the few payment points per village cluster.

Key questions on the efficiency of the SCT

- Are there reforms that could improve targeting efficiency (simplifying eligibility criteria, using easily observable categorical criteria, etc.)?
- How can beneficiary selection be reformed to improve community understanding of the process and community cohesion?
- Are there ways to improve the efficiency of the payment system? What can be learned from the various e-payment pilots? In the future, can the SCT's payments be done entirely electronically?
- Which is most effective payment rhythm, monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly?

Stakeholder discussion

Stakeholders discussed the indicator on transfer costs (% of delivery cost to the total monthly transfer) and criticised that unclear wording. Delivery costs refer to the cost of delivering transfers and not total program administration cost. It was agreed that there is a need to have a standard definition of 'delivery cost' to ensure comparability across modalities.

According to Ayala Consultants, non-transfer costs currently make up 12 percent of total programme cost. This applies only to EU/KfW districts and needs to include the remaining districts. It was suggested that non-transfer costs are high in relation to transfers at the early stages of the programme, with the extension of the programme the percentage is expected to go down. It was further mentioned that non-transfer costs are usually around 10 percent of total costs and that the SCT's costs structure is in line with global experiences.

With respect to targeting, stakeholders recognized a number of challenges of the current model, in particular the pervasiveness of deep poverty in rural Malawi and the lack of community understanding of the targeting criteria. It was suggested to discuss potential targeting reforms in a separate forum. UNICEF's forthcoming processes evaluation was considered to provide a good basis for a discussion on targeting challenges.

The plenary further discussed operational support arrangements the district and community levels. A key challenge is the lack of resources at the district levels, especially with respect to transport. At the moment, district level implementer and especially community volunteers do not have adequate resources to adequately fulfil their mandates.

Stakeholders observed that the high workloads and multiple responsibilities of district level staff places significant pressure on staff, which to a significant results from requirements of manual payment. These payments require a large number of district staff to be in the field for weeks. Stakeholders suggested that e-payments or third-party payments could be a possible solution for the high workload.

There was some discussion as to whether payments are usually made on time. It was suggested that the lack of harmonization of financial and operational cycles are a key cause that has led to delays in payments. The use of



common operational cycles but different financial cycles was claimed to affect the regularity of payments. Lack of common financial rules and requirements and the misalignment of operational and financial cycles causing delays. However, others suggested that, if financial and operational cycles are well aligned it doesn't really matter with respect to pay-outs from which donor the money comes from.

In the end it was suggested that aside from Thyolo (Government implementation district), Dedza and Nkathabay (still targeting) payments are paid overwhelmingly on time. The challenges in Thyolo are unique and a result of limited Government capacity and funds. In Dedza and Nkathabay targeting is still ongoing. Overall, once districts are targeted there are little delays in pay-outs. Payments are done on time between 80-90 percent, including the above mentioned districts, which weigh down the average. On-time payment varies between 78% - 95% (according to Ayala Consultants' data).

A key difference between districts is that in EU/KfW funded districts Ayala Consultants support the MoGCDSW in financial management. Lack of financial management support does not seem to affect regularity of payments directly but adherence to financial management, which may affect audit outcomes, etc.

Funding modalities are the same for EU/KfW/IA but the LDF has different procedures. The LDF directly funds District Councils directly, unlike EU/KfW/IA who transfer funds to the MoGCDSW. The MoGCDSW said it had no direct influence over LDF district. From the LDF's perspective, Ministries should not implement programmes but rather set standards, provide sectorial guidance, supervise and monitor. The districts should implement.

Some stakeholders warned that there is a risk of developing two parallel implementation systems, fragmenting programme implementation.

Stakeholders suggested that district financial units are not reliable and lack capacity to execute basic reporting functions, which means that central staff has travel to the districts on a bi-monthly basis to meet financial standards and produce reports. It was agreed that there is a serious capacity gap with respect to financial management at district level. However, some suggested that the issue is not necessarily the lack of district capacity but rather the desire of central staff to receive allowances that drives these expensive missions.

Stakeholders discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various transfer systems, in particular e-payment vs. hard cash. There was a consensus that e-payment systems have the potential to reduce the workload for district staff, increase cost-efficiency of pay-outs, as well as encourage savings amongst beneficiaries. However, concerns were raised about the relatively underdeveloped network of banking agents in rural Malawi.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **Review operational support arrangements the district and community levels:** Focus on whether implementers have adequate funding and infrastructure
- 2) **Review current targeting approaches:** Stakeholders agreed to review the targeting approaches of the SCT in light of the pervasiveness of ultra-poverty and the challenges of community member to understand the targeting criteria.
- 3) **Harmonize financial rules and requirements and the align operational and financial cycles of donors**
- 4) **Harmonized implementation arrangements:** Develop a harmonized implementation arrangement used by all donors
- 5) **Strengthen capacity of district financial units to execute reporting and financial management functions**
- 6) **Review the challenges and opportunities of moving towards an e-payment system**
- 7) **Review whether e-payment or third-party payment systems would be able to reduce workload for district level staff**



5) What is the intuitional capacity of Social Cash Transfer Programme implementers?

Evidence and discussion points discussed by stakeholders

Leadership and management	Inadequate leadership and management capacity at all levels. Frequent transfers of senior leadership and managers, with negative impacts on programme performance. Capacity for institutional memory is weak
Communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms	Weak institutional communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms. Failure to meet regularly by structures such as the NSSSC, DSSC and CSSC, due availability and low commitment among members, inadequate operational resources, and multiple responsibilities
Financial management	Weak public financial management system. Challenges evidenced by consecutive adverse audits of the SCT
Staffing levels	Vacancy level at 39% for SCT positions and 71% for Principal Social Welfare Officers. Shortages prevail for all categories of staff especially at district and community levels
Transfer of systems and capacity building	Inadequate transfer of systems and capacity building. Ayala Consultants to provide on the job coaching in areas of data and financial management. Questions as to whether this is an integral part of the current arrangement
M&E	Inadequate M&E personnel, operational resources, and capacity building measures both at national and district level. Infrequent meetings by coordinating mechanisms that serve to track progress
Workload	DC support staff are committed to serve the programme, they are not fully released to the SCT (except in Balaka). Combine SCT activities with other work. This dual obligation negatively affects implementation of SCT activities
Operational support	SCT has a significant investment budget. However, procurement often faces significant delays, resulting in borrowing of infrastructure and inadequate equipment

Key questions on the institutional capacity of the SCT

- How can the transfer of systems and capacity within the Ministry be improved?
- How can institutional communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms be strengthened?
- What lessons can be learned from the consecutive adverse financial audits? How can financial management systems and capacity be improved?
- How can staffing levels be improved? How can the turnover of senior leadership and managers be reduced?
- What is the necessary investment cost of putting in place adequate operational support infrastructure is in place?
- How are voluntary community structures maintained and supported? Are there enabled to sustainably and effectively serve the programme?

Stakeholder discussion

Some stakeholders suggested that implementation challenges are not a related to capacity shortfalls and inadequate operational and technical skills but rather a question of perverse incentives. Civil servants will comparatively low salaries are incentivized to spend a lot of time travelling in the field in order to receive travel and subsistence allowances. This is an issue that affects the entire Government and civil service and there may be limited scope within the SCT implementation to address this. However, the issue of a misalignment of incentives has significant impacts on programme implementation and must be acknowledged, in particular the practice of unnecessary travel often results the absence of key staff at the central level.

Stakeholders recognized the challenges of implementing the SCT largely on the basis of volunteerism. It was suggested that the reliance on community level volunteers should be reconsidered, taking into account the high workload and opportunity cost of participation in programme implementation. It was discussed whether a more



professional approach towards community level implementation could yield better results and whether volunteers should be financially compensated for their contributions.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **Review what support district staff needs to be provided to reduce the need for central staff to frequently travel to districts**
- 2) **Explore capacity constraints and incentives of Community Social Support Committee (CSSC) members:** Consider switching to a 'professionalization' of community level programme implementation

6) How sustainable is the Social Cash Transfer Programme?

Evidence and discussion points discussed by stakeholders

Financial sustainability	Current levels of donor funding raise financial sustainability concerns. Government contribution to the SCT is around 11 percent, leaving the programme vulnerable to changes in donor priorities. Low Government funding levels affect implementation and raises question of ownership.
Cost as a % of GDP	In Nov. 2015, the SCT reaches 159,857 households with an estimated cost of 0.57 % of GDP.
Cost at national scale	Reaching 319,000 households, covering the 10 % poorest labour-constraint households in each district, SCT would cost about 1.1 % of GDP.

Key questions on the sustainability of the SCT

- Will the Government take on greater ownership of the programme?
- Are there any reforms that could make the programme more financially sustainable and attractive to Government? Are there lessons to be learned from the FISP?
- How do political economy considerations play into this?
- What strategy could lead to donors to gradually reduce their contribution to the programme in relative terms?

Stakeholder discussion

It was noted that Government financial commitment to the programme has fall considerably short of the MNSSP's target of 40 percent. In fact, Government financial contribution has only increase by three percentage points over 4 years. It was recognized that such low levels of contribution negatively affect programme sustainability and Government ownership.

While recognizing the low levels of Government funding to be one important indicator of programme ownership, stakeholders suggested that programme ownership speaks to more than just the level of financial contributions. Stakeholders worry that low Government financial contributions will undermine the sustainability of the SCT. The risk of donors 'losing patience' with the Government was considered to be real risk for the SCT.

Donors were expected to be unwilling to keep funding a programme that does not benefit from Government ownership and is not seen receiving adequate financial and political support from the Government. There was a strong consensus that increased Government ownership is key to ongoing donor support and the sustainability of the SCT.

Stakeholder recommendations

- 1) **Develop a strategy on increased Government financial commitment to the SCT**
- 2) **Develop a 'business case' for SCT funding that appeals to stakeholders that make financial decisions, in particular the Treasury:** Develop a strong case on local economy impacts, investments in human capital, increased productivity of beneficiaries, etc.



Traffic Light Evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Programme: Outputs and Activities

Strategic Outputs and Activities		
Strategic Output Target 1: Provide monthly cash transfers		
Strategic Activity		Comments
Conduct 1 day sensitization meeting with key development structures for 25 DEC meetings targeting 1,350 DEC members.		Done for 18 districts which currently implementing the programme
25 District Council Meetings targeting 1,350 Council members.		Done for 18 district council committees currently on the programme
375 ADC meetings across the country 11,100 ADC members.		Members were either incorporated at VC level in case GVH during first community meeting and trainings or in case councillors and TAs, they were part of district consultative meeting
Refurbish 25 district offices across the country.		Done for at least 17 districts where the programme is running
Procure office equipment and supplies.		As above
Conduct 19 day trainings for trainers targeting 12 TOTs for each of the 19 districts.		
Conduct 6x5 day refresher day trainings in 6 already covered districts.		During retargeting all 7 KfW districts went through a refresher in targeting processes.
Implement the cycle of targeting for 1,656 village clusters across the country targeting 165,600 beneficiary households.		Done for all 17 out of 18 districts. Thyolo is still outstanding with 7 TA yet to be targeted.
Implement cycle of retargeting for 278 village clusters.		Done for KfW districts as well as EU and Irish aid districts. For Thyolo half is covered.
Conduct 1 day 645 Community meetings to establish linkages with other programmes.		The linkages system is currently under development
Provide transport (21 vehicles) and conduct 1,642 cash delivery trips to Beneficiary Households.		
Deliver cash transfers to 193,400 households.		171,000 households currently on transfers
Strategic output Target 2: Development of the sustainable funding mechanisms		
Conduct three 1-day regional sensitization meetings with civil society organization and the private sector with 50 participants in each workshop.		Not planned neither funded. But ministry developing strategic document to support resource mobilisation and scale up efforts for SCTP
Conduct three 1-day regional awareness and sensitization meetings for 193 Members of Parliament to lobby for budgetary support.		Not planned neither funded. But occasionally ministry has engaged the social and community affairs committee of parliament to apprise with development in SCTP and lobby for budgetary support. Minister MOGCSW has also constantly rose in parliament to lobby for increased funding for SCTP.
Conduct 4 internal study tours with 7 key Ministers.		But the programme has been conducting the MOGCSW minister on tour of SCTP
Conduct 3 meetings with Donors and Partners to establish a SWAp for Social Support Programs.		
Strategic output Target 3: Develop and Implement M&E systems and tools		
Setup and install an MIS (25 database and website development) for the SCT.		
Conduct 5 (3 days) training workshops for 104 officers in SCT M&E in 25 districts (25 MISO, 25 M&EO, 25 Data Clerks, 25 Desk Officers and 4 National level staff).		One for the officers in 18 implementing districts and national level staff.
Conduct 3 day internal monitoring and supervisory visits per district, 4 national level officers per visit.		Applicable to 18 implementing districts
Conduct 4 quarterly review meetings per district involving 12 officers (DSPC).		
Conduct 4 quarterly review meetings per district involving 12 officers (DSPC).		