


Les réformes du marché du travail en Europe

19 février 2016



Coe-Rexecode

Hétérogénéité des évolutions du chômage en zone euro



Un mouvement de réformes structurelles du marché du travail en Europe depuis la crise


→ 3 axes

- Protection de l'emploi
- Décentralisation de la négociation collective, flexibilité interne
- Baisse du coût du travail
- Règles d'indemnisation du chômage
- Politiques actives du marché du travail


Protection de l'emploi

- Réduction de la segmentation du marché du travail
- Diminution des inégalités insiders-outsiders via un allègement des protections des contrats à durée indéterminée
 - *Clarification des motifs de licenciement (ES, NL, PT)*
 - *Simplification des procédures de licenciement et réduction des durées (ES, PT, UK)*
 - *Encadrement des indemnités (DK, ES, NL, PT, SE)*
 - *Limiter les contentieux : conciliation (IT, UK), ruptures conventionnelles (IT, NL), meilleure efficacité de la justice (IE), durcissement des conditions de contentieux (IT, UK)*
 - *Assouplissement des licenciements collectifs (ES, NL, PT)*
- Les contrats temporaires ont plutôt vu leur régime se durcir
 - *Frein à l'enchaînement des contrats (ES, NL, SE), majoration des indemnités de rupture, période de carence entre deux contrats (ES, IT, NL)*
 - *Mais quelques allègements également : Allongement de la durée maximale des contrats (IT) et fin de la justification des recours aux CDD inférieurs à une certaine durée (IT, SE)*

Différents degrés de dualisme en Europe



Un taux de rotation de près de 180% en France en 2011



Champ : France métropolitaine, salariés du privé

Source : enquête emploi

Décentralisation de la négociation collective/flexibilité interne


- Décentralisation de la négociation collective
 - *Opt out par rapport aux accords de rang supérieur (ES, IE, IT, PT)*
 - *Accords d'entreprise avec des représentants élus (IT, PT)*
- Flexibilité interne, modification du contrat de travail
 - *Modification unilatérale du contrat (ES, IT)*
 - *Modulation du temps de travail (PT)*
 - *Recours aux heures supplémentaires (SE)*

Modération du coût du travail

- **Modération des salaires**
 - *Maîtrise des minima salariaux (IE, PT)*
 - *Modération des revalorisation (ES, DK, IE, IT)*
 - *Flexibilité interne sur les heures travaillées (PT)*
- **Baisse du coin social**
 - *Allègements généraux (ES, IT, SE)*
 - *Incitations à l'embauche en CDI (ES, IT)*


Evolution des salaires et de la productivité en zone euro

Evolution des coûts salariaux unitaires de l'industrie manufacturière



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Evolution des coûts salariaux unitaires de l'industrie manufacturière en France



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Assurance chômage

- Baisse des montants d'indemnisation et dégressivité (ES, IT, PT, SE)
- Baisse de la durée d'indemnisation (DK, IE, NL, PT, SE), hausse en Italie
- Conditionnalité à la recherche d'emploi renforcée (ES, IT, NL, PT)
- Considérations budgétaires ou incitation au retour à l'emploi ?
- Parallèlement élargissement : hausse de la durée minimale (DK, PT), extensions à certains non salariés (IT, PT), régimes d'assistance (DK, PT, UK)

Politiques actives

- Rapprochement indemnisation et accompagnement (IE, IT, NL)
- Recentralisation des SPE (DK, ES, IT, SE), hausse en Italie
- Offre de service plus adaptée aux différents profils (DK, DE, IE, PT, SE)
- Accompagnement plus externalisé
- Réforme/développement de l'apprentissage, mobilisation de la formation professionnelle

Salaire minimum : préjudiciable en particulier à l'emploi des jeunes

Table 2. Collective bargaining and minimum wages

Topic	Short term	Long term	Business cycle
<i>Overall employment effects of the minimum wage</i>	Most of the evidence points to negative employment effects of the minimum wage, especially for the least skilled (Flinn, 2002; Neumark et al., 2004; Neumark and Wascher, 2007). However, not all studies find negative effects on employment (Card and Krueger, 1994), and publication seems biased against studies finding no effects (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).	In the United States, no adverse employment effects (Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2011).	
<i>Employment effects of the minimum wage on the young</i>	Most studies point to a negative effect of minimum wage hikes on youth employment (Abowd et al., 1999; Kramarz and Philippon, 2001; Anton and Muñoz de Bustillo, 2011). Sometimes, no effect is detected (Shannon, 2011; Stewart, 2004).	With data from Portugal, a study finds that minimum wage hikes reduced hiring of young workers. But it also highlights a "supply effect": young people aged 19 and under had a greater tendency to keep their jobs. It also gives some evidence of a positive participation effect (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006).	
<i>Effects of collective bargaining coverage</i>	Extensions of collective bargaining coverage negatively affect employment and may increase the informal sector (Martins, 2014).	- Unionization reduces wage inequality especially for men (Card et al., 2004). - A study on Spain shows that employees covered by firm-specific contracts earn about 10% more than those covered by industry-level contracts (Card and de la Rica, 2006).	Decentralisation of collective bargaining increases the correlation of wages and productivity over the business cycle (Gnocchi, 2015).



Salaire minimum : un effet ambigu sur les inégalités

<i>Effects on labour productivity</i>		In the United Kingdom, the introduction of a minimum wage in 1999 positively affected average wages and, consequently, negatively affected profits. Nevertheless, no significant effect is found on employment and firms' productivity. (Draca et al., 2011).	
<i>Distributional issues</i>		In the United States, an increase in the minimum wage reduces wage inequality (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999) but has an ambiguous impact on the poverty rate because it raises the income of the worker if her job is not destroyed and lowers it if the job is destroyed (Addison and Blackburn, 1999; Neumark et al., 2005; Sabia and Burkhauser, 2010; Brown, 1999).	

Assouplissement de la protection de l'emploi : effet positif sur les embauches qui met du temps à se matérialiser

Table 3. Employment Protection Legislation

Topic	Short term	Long term	Business cycle
Effects on layoffs	Reforms increasing flexibility via reductions in EPL tend to increase lay-off rates and hence unemployment (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Von Below and Thoursie, 2010; Marinescu, 2009)		- Judges tend to be more protective of workers in bad times, as they feel that under such circumstances, workers should be more heavily protected against dismissals than in a buoyant labour market (Ichino et al., 2003). - The nature and stringency of EPL enforcement vary across countries and over time and are influenced by labour market conditions (Bertola et al., 1999).
Effects on hiring	- Short-run effects on hiring are limited as it takes time for employers to anticipate the lower costs of job termination in hiring decisions (Behagel et al., 2008). - Reforms increasing flexibility at the margin by liberalising labour contracts only for new hires tend to have initially a positive "honeymoon effect" on employment, as firms still face very high costs of dismissals for the stock of employees with open-ended contracts while they can almost fire at will new hires (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006).	The transient "honeymoon effect" fades away as the stock of permanent workers is gradually replaced with flexible contracts (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006).	

Un assouplissement accroît la volatilité de l'emploi, se traduit par une hausse des taux d'emploi...

Employment effects		- Firm size becomes more persistent when EPL is reinforced but the magnitude of such an effect is fairly small (Garibaldi et al., 2003; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008). - Stronger EPL reduces the employment rate, and the effects on skilled and experienced workers take time to materialize (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Autor et al., 2006; Ahsan and Pagés, 2009).	Reforms reducing EPL involve an increase in the volatility of unemployment and employment (Bentolila et al., 2012; Gnocchi et al., 2014).
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...réduit le dualisme, accroît la productivité et diminue le sentiment d'insécurité sur le marché du travail

Employment effects		Reducing contractual dualism, i.e. the difference in the asymmetry between open-ended and temporary employment contracts, increases relative employment with open-ended contracts (Kugler et al., 2005)	
Effects on productivity	Job protection can lower the effort (measured by poor work performance or absenteeism) of workers because there is less threat of lay-off (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Olsson, 2009).	- Stringent employment protection legislation discourages firms from experimenting with new technologies that may exhibit higher mean returns but also higher variance (Bartelsman et al., 2014; Pierre and Scarpetta, 2005; Cingano et al., 2013). - Job protection has a negative impact on productivity (Autor et al., 2007; Micco and Pagés, 2006; Bassanini et al., 2009; Martins, 2009)	
Effects on labour market segmentation		- Stringent regulation of permanent jobs increases labour market duality (Kahn, 2007). - More stringent regulation is associated with stronger feelings of job insecurity not only for temporary workers but also for permanent workers (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009)	

La durée d'indemnisation accroît la durée effective au chômage, mais améliore (légèrement) l'appariement

Table 5. Unemployment insurance

Topic	Short term	Long term	Business cycle
Generosity	- The elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to the replacement ratio varies between 0.4 and 1.6. An increase of a week in the potential duration of benefit payments leads to an increase in the duration of unemployment ranging between 0.1 and 0.4 of a week (Tatsiramos and van Ours, 2014).	- The existing evidence on the relationship between benefit provision and job match quality is mixed, a number of studies finding positive but in most cases small effects, while others find no effects (Tatsiramos, 2014)	In the United States, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the level of unemployment benefit is weaker when the local unemployment rate is high (Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2014; Landais, 2014). Hence, the optimal unemployment benefit should be counter-cyclical: it should increase when the unemployment rate increases.
	- The exit rate from unemployment to employment rises more at the end of the entitlement period for better qualified job-seekers (Dormont et al., 2001)	- The peak observed at the exhaustion of benefits is markedly more pronounced if all types of exit from unemployment are taken into account. It depends on institutional factors and labour market conditions that include the availability of post-exhaustion benefits (Card et al., 2007)	

Les programmes d'activation / accompagnement accélèrent sur la sortie du chômage

Job search assistance	- Help given to job seekers significantly reduces the duration of unemployment (Björklund and Regnér, 1996; Dolton and O'Neill, 1996; Crépon et al., 2005). - Mandatory participation in active labour market programmes (ALMPs) programmes shorten unemployment duration (Rosholm and Svarer, 2008; Black et al., 2003). - Disadvantaged individuals seem to benefit more than well qualified ones from job search assistance (Van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006).		Reinforcing job search assistance during downturns has a positive impact on the return to employment (Martins and Pessoa e Costa, 2014).
Threats and sanctions	- It is difficult to isolate the effect of threats and sanctions from the effect of job search assistance per se (Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). - The ex-ante impact (the threat) and an ex-post impact (the effective application of the sanctions) both contribute to reducing the duration of unemployment (Lalive et al., 2005; Van den Berg et al., 2004)	The quality of the jobs found might be negatively affected by the system of sanctions associated with insufficient search effort (Arni et al., 2009; Van den Berg and Vikström, 2009).	

Conclusion

- Assouplissement des réglementations les plus strictes sur les contrats à durée indéterminée :
 - Politique de croissance (dynamise les gains de productivité en facilitant les réallocations de main d'oeuvre)
 - Réduit le dualisme
- Développement et l'amélioration de la formation : complément indispensable
 - Nouvelles sécurités pour les salariés (flexicurité)
 - Concilie durablement diminution du chômage et montée en gamme de l'économie
 - Difficulté : système coûteux → quel ciblage ? Quel financement ?