



**ILO's Intervention on Post-Conflict Employment Creation,
Income Generation and Re-integration:
The Case of Mindanao, Philippines**

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Acronyms Used

ACT (for Peace Programme) – Action for Conflict Transformation
AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
CES – Community Enterprise System
Co-Fund – Community Fund Scheme
CTEC – Community Training and Employment Coordinators
DOLE – Department of Labor
DSWD – Department of Social Welfare and Development
EXCOM – Executive Committee
FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization
FPA – Final Peace Agreement
FUMBMWMPC – Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives
GRP – Government of the Republic of the Philippines
ILO – International Labour Organization
LED – Local Economic Development
LGU – Local Government Units
MDP – Multi-donor Programme
MEDCO – Mindanao Economic Development Coordinating Office
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
NEDA – National Economic Development Authority
NGO – Non-government Organizations
NSO – National Statistics Office
OP – Office of the President
PAC – Project Advisory Committee
PMU – Project Management Unit
PNP – Philippine National Police
PROCEED – Project for Community Enterprise and Economic Development
RCA – Rapid Community Assessment
RCBW – Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women
RPDO – Regional Planning and Development Office
RWA – Rural Workers Association
SF – Social Fund (ARMM)
SLDF – SZOPAD Livelihood Development Foundation
SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SPEED – Strategic Project for Education and Economic Development
SRO – Sub-Regional Office (ILO)
SZOPAD – Special Zone of Peace and Development
TEP – Transition Enterprise Project
TESDA – Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
TREE – Training for Rural Economic Empowerment
TWG – Technical Working Group
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF – United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USDOL – United States Department of Labor
VTED – Vocational Training for Enterprise Development
WB – World Bank

ILO's Intervention on Post-conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Re-integration: The Case of Mindanao, Philippines¹

I - Executive Summary

Post-conflict economic rehabilitation is aimed at promoting lasting peace and human security through the re-integration of former rebels and their communities into the mainstream of peace and national development. However, based on ILO's experience and lessons learned in Mindanao, peace and human security appears to be a state of mind. It is a matter of public and individual perception. It is an attitudinal and psychological plane that constantly shifts depending on the effectiveness of peace and development programmes especially those that impact on the social and economic status of the ex-combatants and the affected civilian populace.

ILO SRO Manila organized and implemented three successive projects from 1997 to 2006: the first two were funded through the UN Multi-donor Programme (MDP). The third was funded by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL)². The projects started with adaptation of ILO's tested methodologies, systems, and procedures in community-based or rural vocational training. The projects produced their assigned outputs and outcomes.³ The methodology, which was henceforth called the ILO TREE Methodology has been adapted by partner agencies particularly the national training agency – Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM and the MNLF through its women sector, the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives (FUMBMWMP). It was likewise adapted in part by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the autonomous government. But beyond the quantifiable outputs are the impact that the projects produced – the intangibles that contributed in holding and making peace work in the Mindanao.

The concrete effect and acceptance of ILO interventions in Mindanao was exhibited and manifested during the third project - the USDOL-funded Training for Rural Economic Empowerment Project (TREE) when the Secretary General of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) accepted the role of Chairperson of the project's Executive Committee (EXCOM) composed of five government line agencies of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the rebel group. His acceptance of the job was driven by ILO's effective service delivery through its direct partnership with the Front's local leaders during the first two projects.

The ILO projects have learned and shared valuable lessons in working with various factors and elements in a post-conflict environment. Project reports cited lessons in dealing with conflicting interests between the government functionaries and the progressive and sometimes radical ideas of the former rebels. The projects learned not to supplant the roles of the real stakeholders with their activities and how to recognize the efforts of the ex-combatants in pursuing income-generation activities through the ILO projects.

¹ 10 July 2007 by Mr. Rodolfo R. Baldemor, Chief Technical Adviser, CB-TREE project in Sri Lanka and former National Project Coordinator, VTED and TREE Projects, Mindanao Philippines. (1997-2000, 2003-2006, respectively)

² Vocational Training and Enterprise Development (VTED) and Project for Community Empowerment and Economic Development (PROCEED) Projects under the MDP and TREE Project by USDOL

³ Please refer to the section on ILO's intervention



Note: Map of Mindanao reprinted from Encarta Encyclopedia 2006

Mindanao, the second largest island of the country, is home to 23.87 percent of the Philippine population. In 2000, this translates to about 18 million people (NSO, QuikStat, 2000) of highly diverse ethnicities, cultures and ways of life. Among such diverse groups are the members of 13 Islamized ethnolinguistic groups (more popularly known collectively as Moro/Bangsamoro) and more than 18 groups of indigenous peoples referred to by the Mindanao NGO community as the "Lumad" groups. The third group of diverse populations in Mindanao is the descendants of migrants or settlers to the island who migrated to the island since the early years of the American regime. The Islamized populations in Mindanao include three of the largest groups: the *Maguindanaon*, the *Maranaws* and the *Tausugs*, the majority group that composed the Moro National Liberation Front or MNLF.

The Special Zone for Peace and Development or SZOPAD that the ILO covered as a member of the UN country team in the UN Multi-donor Assistance Programme in Mindanao is composed of the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte including their inclusive cities of Marawi, Cotabato City, General Santos City and Isabela in Basilan province. It also covered the island province of Palawan (not shown in the Map) which is located at the northeast of Mindanao. It administratively belongs to Region IV in Luzon but claimed by the Muslims as part of their ancestral land.

Some of the historical factors that caused the war in Mindanao were; social alienation, political and administrative discrimination, religious and cultural persecution, economic disparities and the marginalization of Muslims and other indigenous groups by Christian settlers from the south. These were brought into fore through discriminatory policies, the media and other forms of information medium. Years of neglect have spawned discontent and anti-government sentiments among the Muslims and other minorities in Mindanao. Centuries-old property rights, for example, have been replaced by western land titling procedures which caused the loss of land ownership of Mindanawans. Muslims have lesser opportunities for employment in Christian-owned businesses in the urban areas. This is exacerbated by the lack of Muslim-owned enterprises that could absorb Muslim workers and employees.⁴

However, together with these factors it was massive and chronic poverty brought about by the lack of employment, self-employment and income-generation opportunities that actually triggered the three decades of war for separation and self-determination. Poverty is manifested by the economic situations in the areas of conflict: the 14 poorest provinces in Mindanao and by the economic profile of the combatants that persevered in the struggle.

Based on ILO's experiences, post-conflict projects require long-term perspectives. They should be well-phased, guided by policies and strategies that are popularly accepted. Economic re-integration cannot be forced. It must undergo a period of transition. The Mindanao experience proved that in order for this to happen at least a minimum of ten years is necessary. A whole decade of change in the individual, family, community and the local economy is necessary to create and sustain peace. This period represents a whole cycle of a profitable enterprise, a time for a child of war to finish at least secondary education, and a time for harsh memories to be forgotten. It must be a gradual process and hence, must not be hurried.

The ILO projects learned that in order to achieve their goals and objectives it has to gain first the respect, thrust, and confidence of the primary target group – the MNLF by involving them in the process of project implementation, building their capabilities through the utilization of the project methodology, systems and procedures, and by recognizing and openly affirming their accomplishments and contribution to the overall goal of the peace process. This is the first step towards achieving positive results. The Projects literally worked with the MNLF. From such relationship the projects introduced change ideas and persevered to promote the transformation of the rebel movement into civilian organization by showcasing high impact income-generating training projects, teaching them on the utilization of its system and methodology and providing programme assistance in building their planning and managerial capabilities. Thus, for example, the women sector of the MNLF was organized into cooperatives, their institutional and managerial capabilities were developed. Currently the women's group has prepared and is now in the process of implementing their corporate five-year strategic development plan with facilitation assistance from ILO.

This women's group is now a Federation of 120 primary cooperatives with more than 17,000 members in Mindanao. They are organized and registered as the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives. It now operates a Women Training and Development Center in Cotabato City and is engaged in various economic and training activities such as soap production,

⁴ Employment study in General Santos City, Davao City -USAID SPEED Mindanao Project, Maguindanaon Development Foundation Inc, Marbel, South Cotabato, 1997.

training and production in various food processing products, training in basic computer literacy programmes and in participating in women-related actions in Mindanao. They have their Co-Fund (Community Fund) scheme, a community-owned and managed community revolving fund project based on Islamic economic principles and traditions.



The Women Training and Development Center of the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives is a showcase of ILO's patient strategy in post-conflict intervention. The core building was a product of a training-cum-production scheme under the 1st phase VTED project. The improvement of the structure was continued under the 2nd phase PROCEED project through further training in various home-related skills for women such as landscaping and interior arrangement. A final technical support was received by the center from the 3rd phase TREE project through training in food processing trades where training equipment were supplied and trainers were trained. Today, the center is not only engaged in training for food trades, but also engaged in processed food production, soap making, basic computer literacy and application training, and in various human resource development programmes. It is also the operational base for their Co-Fund lending project. The Federation has just completed the preparation of their 5-year Strategic Plan under ILO guidance and facilitation. The center supports various resource generation activities.

From a mere sector in the Central Committee of the MNLF, the TREE Project made the women's group a separate member of the project's Executive Committee with voting rights and privileges equal with its mother unit – the MNLF. As in war, women have great role and influence in peace building. This is one of the greatest lessons learned by the ILO projects in Mindanao.

Another factor that helped the ILO projects in Mindanao is the strategy of working within the formal structure and informal networks of the rebel organization. The formal strategy means the recognition of their leadership hierarchy in the identification, assessment and endorsement of project proposals from the villages to the municipal, provincial and national commands. The informal strategy involves individual and personalized consultations on the proposals outside of organized meetings or workshops. The rebels were not treated as a beneficiary group but as partners in the projects. They were trained on the policies, systems and methodology of the projects. They were enabled to directly implement training programmes for

their own and other non-MNLF members of their communities which became their means for empowerment. This also assured the sustainability of the projects through direct “ownership” of the process and outputs. Their active and actual participation in needs assessment, planning and project implementation were deliberate strategies in achieving concrete and intangible objectives as well as in their individual and group transformation. These strategies assisted them in overcoming concerns affecting their vulnerabilities.

In service delivery the ILO projects learned that in order to win the hearts and minds of the former rebels there is a need for fast, efficient and effective delivery of training projects. The value given to the service has been equated with the timeliness of its delivery. Hence, a delivery mechanism was adapted by integrating into standard forms and flowcharts, local practices and norms for project planning, preparation of project proposals, their assessment and approval and final conduct delivery of training. This strategy was achieved through the organization of the Executive Committee at the regional level and the Technical Working Groups (TWG) at the local level). The forms and flowcharts became the working system for the project organizational units in the implementation of the methodology and project management policies.

Developing the methodology and implementation strategies were made through actual practices. Draft materials were prepared and presented for discussion during seminar workshops. Such workshops were less of theories but rich on the application of practical tools on the ground. The approach created a sense of ownership of the methodology; hence, the partners had enough time to appreciate and internalize the materials and easily made them a part of their systems and procedures.

II - The ILO intervention

Peace building programmes in Mindanao started after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in September 2, 1996 between the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Mr. Nur Misuari. The goals for lasting peace in Mindanao were spelled out. Such goals were, however, considered huge and practically unachievable if left only at the hands of the former war adversaries. Hence, the government requested the UN for assistance. In response, the UN organized a multi-donor assistance programme and immediately made available its international expertise and donor resources to assist in the peace process. In 1996, UN agencies led by the UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNICEF, UNFPA developed and implemented a UN Multi-donor Programme with financing support from donor countries such as Australia, Spain, Belgium, Canada and other bilateral organizations. The programme was officially called the SPCPD-NEDA⁵ UN Multi-

⁵ SPCPD-NEDA – Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development – National Economic Development Authority. The SPCPD was a transitional government agency organized by virtue of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. It was manned by officers of the MNLF. It had an administrative unit and a Consultative Assembly composed of 81 representatives coming from various sectors & ethnic groups in Mindanao. The SPCPD was headed by Mr. Nur Misuari, the Chair of the MNLF Central Committee. One of the roles of SPCPD was to act as the coordinating arm in the planning and implementation of development projects in the SZOPAD areas. It had a life of three years, which was supposed to self-destruct upon the formalization of the expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The SPCPD lasted up to 2003, after which some of its functions were either absorbed by the ARMM or by the Office of the President through the Mindanao Economic Development Council or MEDCO. Hence the first phase of the UN multi-donor programme was implemented through the SPCPD with support from the NEDA as the national planning agency. As of

donor Assistance Programme. ILO was assigned to take charge of the vocational training component as a strategy to help solve unemployment and under-employment by building the productive capacities of the target groups in skills and entrepreneurship. Skills training was likewise intended to help in the development of local economic resources for income-generation in the villages especially in the former camps of the MNLF.

ILO located its project implementation offices in Mindanao: VTED and PROCEED had their offices in Cotabato City while TREE was located in Davao City⁶. VTED and PROCEED covered the 14 provinces inclusive of their cities, the areas that composed the Special Zone of Peace and Development or SZOPAD:

1. Lanao del Norte
2. Lanao del Sur
3. Maguindanao
4. North Cotabato
5. South Cotabato
6. Sarangani
7. Sultan Kudarat
8. Davao del Sur
9. Zamboanga del Sur
10. Zamboanga del Norte
11. Basilan
12. Sulu
13. Tawi-Tawi
14. Palawan

As part of the UN team and sensitive to the local situation, the ILO designed its projects to help promote lasting peace and development through the following general strategies:

1. By helping develop trust and confidence between and among the parties involved in the conflict,
2. By helping heal social wounds and install mechanism to prevent the conflict from happening again, and
3. By helping in the process of civil assimilation or mainstreaming of the rebel group in society so that they can participate in the affairs of the state and the national economy.

Hence, project policies covered five critical and very important aspects of project management and implementation.

1. Commitment to the realization and sustainability of both project outputs and outcomes and their impact on the socio-economic development of the target groups and their communities;⁷
2. Development/ adaptation of appropriate field methodology including practical implementing tools and instruments necessary to achieve the goal;

this writing the programme is already in its 4th phase and is being executed by the government through MEDCO.

⁶ The location of the TREE project implementation office in Davao City was in consonance with the UN Security advice in 2003 to re-locate all UN field offices outside of Cotabato City for security reasons.

⁷ In the language of the UN Multi-donor project in Mindanao the term used in its reports are “tangibles” and “intangible outputs”

3. The development of participatory project governance structure and service delivery mechanism involving the major parties in the peace agreement;
4. The development and utilization of operation strategies and tactics that are culturally sensitive and consistent with the social dynamics and actual situation on the ground;
5. The mobilization, organization and capability building of national/local partners to ensure continuity and institutionalization of project policies, systems and strategies.


These fundamental/ micro policies and strategies were adapted by the ILO projects through nine years of participation in the Mindanao peace building. They have evolved and eventually tempered by actual and day-to-day experiences in dealing with various kinds and levels of re-integration issues in the various communities that it covered. In line with its role in the UN programme ILO's projects dealt with creating opportunities and capacities for income generation of the primary target groups through skills training, entrepreneurship, and promotion/ creation of community-based economic support mechanisms.

ILO designed and implemented its projects in accordance with the general phase of post-conflict intervention adapted by the UN team in Mindanao:

1st Phase – Emergency and relief

2nd Phase – Socio-economic rehabilitation and reconstruction

3rd Phase – Area Development



The VTED started one year after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement. It was designed to bolster the process of confidence building following the end of emergency and relief phase and getting into the rehabilitation phase. It started in 1997 and ended in the year 2000. Hence the strategy adopted was rapid response

and deployment of training programmes, spread out coverage among the 16 “states”⁸ of the MNLF, construction of physical infrastructure (e.g. enterprise centers) through training –com-production, and direct participation of the local MNLF commands in the planning and implementation of the projects.

PROCEED followed the VTED Project. Funded also through the UN Multi-donor programme, PROCEED (majority of the funding came from Spain) was implemented from 2001 to 2004 within the period of socio-economic rehabilitation. Hence, the strategy was focused on the post-training follow-up, group organizing, enterprise development and linking the beneficiaries with their communities and the formal sector.

The TREE project, which was funded through a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of Labor (USDOL), started in January 2003 and was programmed to end in September 2005.⁹ The TREE project was designed to support the period of area and institutional development – focusing on building the capability and capacity of the expanded ARMM to take over the responsibility of regional development. Hence, the strategy adopted by the TREE project was consolidation and intensification of intervention in the five provinces of the ARMM and in installing the methodology in the relevant agencies of the autonomous government. The TREE project, therefore, has been consolidating the experiences and lessons learned in post-conflict economic rehabilitation in Mindanao.

Quantitative outputs of the ILO Projects

In the absence of concrete baseline data and statistics on the socio-economic status of the MNLF communities during the 30-years war the UNDP conducted rapid assessment studies of the target areas in 1999. The study revealed the following socio-economic problems of the former rebels and their communities:

- high (visible) rate of unemployment¹⁰
- low educational attainment (6 years or less)
- limited range of livelihood activities and skills
- lack of alternative livelihood and exposure to modern techniques of production
- lack of access to capital, limited access to outside technical assistance
- poor access to, or lack of production and post-harvest support facilities
- low productivity due to lack of extension services and poor quality inputs

These general issues were considered qualitative base-line information of the ILO projects. Hence, the project designs and methodology targeted both short-term and long-term goals related to the three phases of post-war economic rehabilitation adopted by the UN.

1. Vocational Training and Enterprise Development project or VTED (June 1998 to May 2001)¹¹ - As a confidence building strategy the UN Multi-donor funded project focused in response to the immediate needs for training and income-

⁸ “States” refer to geographical operational areas similar to the provinces. The 16 “states” of the MNLF covers the 14 provinces of SZOPAD.

⁹ The TREE Project had a series of no-cost extension until June 2007.

¹⁰ Visible unemployment rates in Mindanao range from 13% to 35%. High unemployment rates prevails in the ARMM provinces and also in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato – OI DCI-WB study report, December 2001


¹¹ Although the project actually took off in Mindanao in 23 June 1998, the project officially started in January of the same year.

generation of the target groups which were articulated in previous economic and market assessment studies of the UN. Some of these training needs were in the (*Hala*) food processing, (traditional) garments and clothing, manufacturing of (local) farming machineries and transportation facilities, making and improvement of fishing gears, building construction for their cooperative enterprises and other community-identified skills training programmes. Subsequently, the ILO Projects conducted its own assessments and henceforth enhanced and rationalized the methodology to make it more attuned and relevant to the changing situation.

Summary of quantifiable targets and outputs of the VTED Project

Targets	Outputs
1,200 MNLF members trained in various skills & entrepreneurship	1,089 trained in 126 training programmes (90.7% of target)
64 new community enterprises created by the trainees	108 community enterprises created giving income opportunities to 867 MNLF cadres and indirectly affecting 2,851 family members and dependents (168% of target)
16 MNLF state cooperatives covered and their management systems enhanced	20 Enterprise Centers constructed and State leadership trained in group and enterprise management in the 16 "states" or camps of the MNLF through training-cum-production approach (100% of target)
320 partner/actors trained in the methodology and strategies	350 actors from partner agencies trained in the Project's methodology and strategies (109% of target)

The VTED project introduced the ILO-CBT methodology but modified it in accordance with the need for rapid deployment of training resources, direct participation of the target groups (MNLF), training-cum-scheme in the construction of community enterprise centers and other related approaches. These strategies in service delivery has gained the respect of the MNLF and subsequently made the succeeding phases of intervention a lot easier.



2. Project for Community Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Development or PROCEED (June 2001 to August 2004) – The second UN Multi-donor funded project was designed as a follow-up to VTED. After gaining the trust and

confidence of the target groups through its initial intervention projects and strategies, the need was to provide quick and effective follow-ups of the projects in the villages. Hence, PROCEED enriched the training methodology and expanded it into a programme for combined skills formation and enterprise development.

Training under the methodology was focused on producing marketable products and services instead of manipulative or operative skills only. The concept of training package based on specific products or services was introduced. Enterprise development component of the training was simplified into forecasting techniques instead of preparing long business feasibility studies (which they were mostly not qualified to prepare due to literacy levels) where the trainees were taught on how to plan for specific number of products in a certain period of time (usually 4 months), and to solve the production costs and profits.

The project also introduced the concept of community enterprise system in order to create internal market structures in the communities. It started research and development of an Islamic micro-finance scheme to support the small capital requirements of the beneficiaries.¹²

The Community Fund concept (or Co-Fund) was developed in view of the need of the target groups for an Islamic way of credit provision where "interest" on capital is prohibited. Basically, Co-Fund is based on the concept of "Ummah" or Muslim Community. The financial capital is owned and managed by the "community" in accordance with Islamic principles and practices. The financial transactions are based on partnership and profit and loss sharing. Transactions are covered by partnership contracts between and community and the member-borrowers. Co-makers are not utilized but all transactions have witnesses.

Hence, while the entry point was still on skills training, entrepreneurship development was given increased emphasis. The PROCEED Project improved the training methodology used in VTED by improving the enterprise development materials and strengthening the post-training component through linking with other actors involved in markets, technology and credit in the target areas.

Summary of quantifiable targets and outputs of the PROCEED Project

Targets	Outputs
3,600 beneficiaries trained	2,414 trained in 152 training programmes 114 of the 152 groups training have established their own group enterprise (75% of target)
32 community groups organized	38 community groups organized and operating their Co-Fund projects (122% of target) 633 group members trained in community enterprise systems 7 Barangay Health Centers constructed through training-cum-production approach


¹² The scheme later was named Community Fund Scheme (Co-fund). The study was prompted by the requests of the MNLF for an Islamic way of credit and a proposed study prepared by the WB for the study on Islamic finance for the community development assistance component of the ARMM Social Fund, November 2002.

generation of the target groups which were articulated in previous economic and market assessment studies of the UN. Some of these training needs were in the (Halal) food processing, (traditional) garments and clothing, manufacturing of (local) farming machineries and transportation facilities, making and improvement of fishing gears, building construction for their cooperative enterprises and other community-identified skills training programmes. Subsequently, the ILO Projects conducted its own assessments and henceforth enhanced and rationalized the methodology to make it more attuned and relevant to the changing situation.

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¹² The scheme later was named Community Fund Scheme (Co-fund). The study was prompted by the requests of the MNLF for an Islamic way of credit and a proposed study prepared by the WB for the study on Islamic finance for the community development assistance component of the ARMM Social Fund, November 2002.

The PROCEED project consolidated the training and post-training component of the methodology in order to enhance the income-generating capacities of the beneficiaries. Having gained the respect, trust and confidence of the target groups ILO proceeded through expansion of its methodology of intervention with group organizing, community enterprise system development, and linking the beneficiaries with the mainstream communities and the formal sector. At this instance, PROCEED linked with the TREE Project by experimenting on the Islamic approach of micro-financing which has been referred to as Community Fund Scheme or Co-Fund. The TREE project provided the research and development component while PROCEED provided the initial capital to pilot the scheme in its target areas.

3. Training for Rural Economic Empowerment or TREE (January 2003 – September 2005)¹³ – TREE was implemented by the ILO and funded by the US Department of Labor (USDOL). It was designed to consolidate the gains of VTED and PROCEED and make ILO's position in Mindanao more visible considering the gains achieved in the previous projects. Hence, the focus of intervention was the ARMM region only instead of the whole SZOPAD areas. The goal was to intensify, concentrate, and consolidate resources, systems and methodology in order to develop a more comprehensive, integrated and convergent approach in planning, delivery, and post-training support. Furthermore, its objectives were not only focused in creating sustainable income opportunities among its beneficiaries but also to institutionalize the methodology by mobilizing and organizing its local partners and building their capabilities for implementation.

The TREE Project further enriched the ILO methodology with the development of process evaluation component called Tracer Study which looks at the impact of the skills training on the beneficiaries 4-6 months after completion of training programme. The study primarily looks at the outcome of training in terms of the skills utilization, the immediate result in wage employment or self-employment, the rate of increase of family incomes as a result of the training, and the multiplier effects of the intervention to the rest of the family members. In addition to the tracer study, the TREE Project has also developed materials to follow-up the outcomes of group organizing interventions including the effect of the provision of the community-owned and managed Co-Fund. The TREE Methodology is now in Manual form.

Summary of quantifiable targets and outputs of the TREE Project

Targets	Outputs (as of EO December 2007)
1,220 beneficiaries trained in various skills and entrepreneurship 70% or 1,743 found engaged in employment/self-employment	1,660 beneficiaries trained 91% - Average rate of employment/self-employment 80% - Rate of increase in family incomes 96% - Economic activities directly related to training
16 pilot community groups organized 75% or 12 of the groups are operating 400 officers and members trained in group and micro-credit management	59 community groups organized or assisted in organizing 737 members trained and engaged in economic activities
8 partner institution's capabilities	193 officers and staff of the 8 partner

¹³ The TREE Project had a series of no-cost extension till June 2007

developed 75% or 6 of the partners having demonstrated such capacity 18 new training programmes/ packages developed for TESDA-ARMM	institutions trained on the TREE Methodology 6 of the partners have institutionalized the whole or a part of the methodology in accordance with their mandates 16 new training packages developed and under utilization by TESDA-ARMM
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Qualitative outcomes and impact

As only one of many project implementors under the UN Team in Mindanao, the ILO might not have covered all of the geographical areas or sectors needing its assistance. But the ILO has shown an example of the impact of its approach and strategies, its methodology, system, and procedures. The ILO projects, especially the first two phases, worked within the organizational structure of the MNLF. The TREE worked directly with both the MNLF and the ARMM government. The strategy was a deliberate act to achieve three qualitative goals - factors which were considered critical in achieving not only the quantitative but most of all the qualitative objectives:

1. Developing trust and confidence¹⁴ – manifested by the MNLF's continuing participation in ILO projects and requesting for ILO's technical advice and assistance in the planning and implementation of their development projects – even those funded by other agencies¹⁵. It is also proven by their continuing quest for the development and transformation of the MNLF organization, especially its women sector. The MNLF had developed great confidence and belief on ILO's technical capabilities and relied on ILO's assistance.
2. Civil Assimilation – manifested by the acceptance by the MNLF of ILO project policies on handling of community project funds;¹⁶ undertaking the required bidding and canvassing of project materials; doing formal banking transactions; obtaining government licenses and registrations of their enterprise projects; coordination with other development partners including the government; donating own lands for community projects; joining community social activities; participating in the democratic political process¹⁷, sending children to school to pursue professional careers, and even in singing of the Philippine national anthem.¹⁸
3. Healing process – was manifested by their act in sharing project benefits with non-MNLF members, pride in displaying the names of their enterprise projects, acknowledging their donors through the awarding of Plaques of Appreciations, , spearheading project-related ceremonies, public declaration of their personal desires for peace and their ambitions for their children and families, friendly visits and calls to (ILO) project office, officials and staff, sharing of personal views and

¹⁴ The ILO has always been an invitee in MNLF-organized forums and in anniversary celebrations.

¹⁵ The TREE Project is the de-facto technical adviser of the Bangsamoro Women group in planning and implementing development projects. ILO helped the organizing themselves into the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives. The Federation is composed of 120 primary cooperatives with a total membership of 17,669 all over the SZOPAD area.

¹⁶ The ILO Projects made the MNLF as direct partners by making them as intermediaries and/or fund conduits of training projects in the communities.

¹⁷ Some members of the MNLF became municipal and city mayors and members of local legislative bodies – through popular elections

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4. Enhanced role and participation of women - This was one of the more significant achievements of ILO in Mindanao. The establishment of the Women's Training Centre in Cotabato City is a manifestation of the new courage and determination of the women in Mindanao and in asserting their role not only in the peace process but also for a sustained and real economic empowerment.

Independent project evaluation

The external independent evaluator hired by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) for the TREE Project in December 2005 submitted the following report:²⁰

"The benefits to the target groups are increased self-esteem, hope for the future, and the ability to contribute to family welfare. As a result of training, beneficiaries—both women and men—are empowered with skills and have the confidence to set up small businesses in their local communities. These community enterprises can be expected to have an increasingly greater impact as enterprises mature and support local economic development.

The project has had a wider impact on peace and order in the ARMM. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1996, the concern has been how to convince people to support the peace process, that there is something good, something to wait for, something to expect from the peace process. The project addresses the major problems of poverty and unemployment in the ARMM by providing people, who have been left out, with skills training to take advantage of economic opportunities." (Italics ours)

The above-mentioned manifestations and recognition of the qualitative results/outcomes of peace by ILO have been generating interest among multi/bilateral partners in the on-going peace and development programmes in Mindanao.

Such achievements have catalyzed the adoption of the training methodology by partner agencies in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), particularly of the national office of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) which is now in the process of pilot-testing the methodology in two municipalities of Tantonan and Noralla in South Cotabato province. Reports on the pilot projects will be discussed by ILO SRO Manila and TESDA as soon as the projects are completed.

The ILO TREE Methodology is under adaptation by the ACT for Peace programme – the fourth phase of the UN Multi-donor Programme which is now under execution by the Philippine Government through Mindanao Economic Development Council or MEDCO²¹, an agency under the Office of the President. There has been much

¹⁹ Training projects always start and end with revelry and indigenous/religious ceremonies spearheaded by the former combatants including women

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synergy and integration and interaction going on between TREE and Act for Peace Projects. The TREE Project is expected to end in September, 2007.²²

These outcomes are definitely helping sustain peace and minimize the threat of a re-escalation of the armed conflict coming from the MNLF. It was the hope of the ILO to influence related government policies in order to come up with an effective tool to help reach out to other rebel groups in Southern Philippines and other parts of the country²³.

III– The Mindanao conflict

Mindanao, with 18.1 million population²⁴ is the biggest and admittedly the most naturally endowed island of the Philippines, has been historically characterized by heroisms and betrayal. As a result, the land had been engulfed in social tensions, economic stagnation, which led to massive poverty. The Muslims, the first settlers in Mindanao fought all colonial attempts to conquer their lands and suppress their inalienable rights. Islam has been introduced in the island a century earlier than the coming of Christianity through the Spaniards.²⁵

Historical causes²⁶

The 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement ended almost 30 years of war waged by the Moro National Liberation Front. It was a war for separation which was anchored on the Bangsamoro people's²⁷ quest for self-determination. Five of the most articulated historical causes of the war are the following:

1. Economic marginalization - referring to systematic eviction of the original settlers in Mindanao from the choicest parts of the island by new settlers from the mainland initiated by the central government, the lack of means of economic participation, exclusion in exploitation of natural resources, discrimination/lack of access to credit, discrimination in employment, etc.
2. Political marginalization – referring to the acts of colonization, “filipinization”, the concept of an “imperial Manila”, Muslims discriminated in political appointments in government and in the military, continuing shrinking of local political influence of Muslim and ethnic leaders

²² Please see Appendix A – The ACT for Peace Programme

²³ As of this writing the Philippine government has announced increase budget for poverty reduction projects to curve insurgency and rebellion not only in Mindanao but also in other parts of the country. This includes areas under the influence of the communist New Peoples Army (NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

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3. Moro²⁸ grievances in the preservation of their identity and in their general feelings of physical insecurity
4. Moro's perception that the government is responsible or the party to blame for much of their sufferings and insecurities.
5. Moro's perceptions of the hopelessness of their condition under the existing political & economic order in Mindanao.

Immediate causes

This capsulated history of the cause of the Mindanao war was, in fact, a strong motivation for rebellion. But it needed specific events to happen and trigger the actual hostilities.

These events started to happen in the late nineteen sixties. There were a number of political events that actually led to the beginning of organized armed struggle for separation and independence by the Moro people. Famous among these events were: the Jabidah massacre on March 17, 1968 where 28 young Muslim soldiers were allegedly murdered by their Christian superiors in the island of Corregidor, the criminal acts committed by the "Ilagas"²⁹ against Muslims and their communities - believed to be under covert instructions from the military, the atrocities attributed to Martial Law in the 1970s, and the biases especially of Manila-based media against the Muslims.³⁰

As a result of these events, almost three decades of war erupted led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) under its Chairman, Professor Nur Misuari. The war reportedly claimed more than 120,000 lives and millions of dollars in physical and economic damages. Thousands of civilians were displaced, communities were destroyed, and under-development and deprivation further stunted the growth of Mindanao in spite of its vast agricultural and other natural resources.³¹

Triggering issues

These social and economic factors were the bedrock of dissent and revolutionary attitudes in Mindanao. But massive and chronic poverty resulting from years of neglect and government indifference has finally forced the people to accept the bitter pill to take up arms and finally bring the issues to fore. Poverty became the most visible and understandable rallying point for the 30 years war.

Data of the Philippine government, identifying the 20 poorest provinces of the country, included 14 that are found in Mindanao. Out of these 12 are located in the areas covered by Central and Western Mindanao and the ARMM). These areas were the center of the 28 years of armed conflict. The average poverty incidence is 50% in 1994 compared to the national average of 34% - 40%. More than half of the total number of municipalities (267) belongs to the 5th and 6th class category³².

Functional literacy rates in these areas range between 48% in Basilan province to 88% in other parts of Mindanao compared to 92% for the National Capital Region and other

²⁸ Moro – referring to local Muslims

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The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement ³⁵

Sensing the worsening peace and order situation in Southern Philippine the administration of then President Fidel V. Ramos initiated peace efforts with the MNLF. Four years of intense negotiations here and abroad with the help of the Organization of Islamic Conference member states, resulted into the signing of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement in September 2, 1996. In order to create a mechanism for implementing the agreement, the President, through an Executive Order, created a transitory office called the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development or SPCPD. It was essentially manned by senior officers and members of the MNLF. The new office was to be supported by a tri-people³⁶ Consultative Assembly composed of 81 members from various sectors.

The first phase of the agreement included major activities such as a joint military ceasefire, the absorption of at least 7,500 MNLF combatants to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), the acceleration of social and economic development in the Special Zone for Peace and Development or SZOPAD to eradicate chronic poverty, and the passage of the implementing law by Congress and the submission of the same to a plebiscite to determine the expanse and coverage of the new autonomous area.

Interestingly, the agreement did not rule on dis-armament.

The second phase of the peace accord was the establishment of the new expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to be determined by a new law in Congress. These activities would have to be initiated through the SPCPD as the transitory governing body and would have realized the cherished dream of the Bangsamoro People of having the chance to exercise their inherent rights for self determination. In effect, Phase I of the agreement was within the powers of the President to approve. Phase II would depend on the political will of the Legislative Branch and the subsequent approval by the people who will be affected by the new autonomous government.

The Peace Agreement was hailed by the international community as an unprecedented document earning for President Ramos and Chairman Nur Misuari the respect and admiration of the free world. Henceforth, the UN organized the Multi-donor Programme which was called the SPCPD-NEDA UN Multi-donor Programme. The programme was supported by multi/bi-lateral donors and UN Agencies.

³³ Philippine Human Development Report 2000

³⁴ National Statistical Coordination Board 1996

³⁵ Please refer to Appendix B - The 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, and Appendix A2 – The Tripoli Agreement

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Interestingly, the agreement did not rule on dis-armament.

The second phase of the peace accord was the establishment of the new expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to be determined by a new law in Congress. These activities would have to be initiated through the SPCPD as the transitory governing body and would have realized the cherished dream of the Bangsamoro People of having the chance to exercise their inherent rights for self determination. In effect, Phase I of the agreement was within the powers of the President to approve. Phase II would depend on the political will of the Legislative Branch and the subsequent approval by the people who will be affected by the new autonomous government.

The Peace Agreement was hailed by the international community as an unprecedented document earning for President Ramos and Chairman Nur Misuari the respect and admiration of the free world. Henceforth, the UN organized the Multi-donor Programme which was called the SPCPD-NEDA UN Multi-donor Programme. The programme was supported by multi/bi-lateral donors and UN Agencies.

³³ Philippine Human Development Report 2000

³⁴ National Statistical Coordination Board 1996

³⁵ Please refer to Appendix B - The 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, and Appendix A2 – The Tripoli Agreement

³⁶ Tri-people concept includes Muslims, Christians and Indigenous Peoples

IV – Assessment studies and situation analysis

ILO's record in its post-war intervention in Mindanao may be attributed to its basic instinct of studying history and a continuing assessment of the project environment. But it did not stop there. The ILO Projects, particularly VTED, conducted further validation and analysis of the situations on the ground.

Two practical assessment studies were conducted as inputs to the actual designing of the methodology and its implementing tools and instruments. These studies were conducted through informal interviews (ex-combatants, their families and sympathizers) through workshops (the topics were incorporated in group discussion during capability-building training of the MNLF target beneficiaries), and through documentary researches.

The poverty trap in the eyes of a "Mujahedeen" ³⁷

In connection with the objective to design an appropriate methodology that will address the needs of the target groups in keeping with the goals of peace process the ILO projects' conducted an informal but in-depth analysis on the normative and behavioral characteristics of the former rebels.

The purpose was to extract a clear picture of their attitudes, feelings, and outlook towards society, and most of all, about their poverty – from their own point of view. The investigations centered on why they are poor, in what way they can improve themselves, and how government or other development agents should work with them to achieve their life goals, in the most effective manner, and taking into consideration their culture, traditions, and socio-economic preparation vis-à-vis the strong and deep-rooted influence of their "enemies" in the affairs of politics and the national economy. This is to have a clear interpretation of their concept of "self-determination" which is their main battlecry.

One of the VTED projects' major findings is that the former rebels are not much concerned with macro policies and huge socio-economic programmes and projects of the government. Large infrastructure like economic zones, industrial complex, irrigation facilities, fishing ports, roads and bridges, communication exchanges, creation of new government agencies, etc., are too abstract for them to understand, to relate with, and/or to appreciate. They do not have direct effect on their daily needs. In fact these "solutions" even exacerbate the poverty feeling especially because they cannot make use of them, nor do they directly result into quantifiable and material improvements in their daily livelihood. In short, it even contributes to the perpetuation of a poverty trap.³⁸

³⁷ Islamic warrior

³⁸ **The "Poverty trap"** – This concept of a poverty trap was a result of the study of the VTED project in years 1998-99 conducted through the interviews and workshops with the MNLF trainees and officers. This was part of the activities of the formal and informal networking activities conducted by the project staff with the MNLF hierarchy. The target groups see poverty as a result of a "series of events" that affects their daily lives while they interact with the social, economic and political forces around them. The configuration appears in the form of six elemental components that are strongly interlocked together in a never-ending sequence of cause and effect. The six (6) elements of the poverty chain-trap viewed from a community by the former rebels are the following:

1st element: Basic poverty – The typical MNLF combatant's family has minimal productive assets. Most of them have no lands to till, no farm animals, no fish boats or gears, financial capital, etc. In view of this they have lesser opportunity to get into economic undertakings that could

Rural life according to the former combatants

In order to move closer to the objective of crafting the tools and instruments, the VTED conducted practical research on the rural economy. The result is its characterization into four groups of concerns according to the former combatants:

Concerns on individual/family incomes – The target groups had very practical needs. They are primarily related to their capabilities such as:

- How to acquire/use appropriate tools, machines
- How to access product designs
- How to produce better/competitive products, goods & services
- Where to get capital or obtain credit
- Where to access production inputs
- How to market their products or services
- How to manage and/or expand their enterprise or livelihood

Concerns on group projects (production or cooperatives) – Organized, or those planning to organize themselves had very clear needs. They were more related on capacities such as:

generate enough income to buy them their basic personal and home necessities. They are marginally educated, and most are unskilled aside from traditional farming and fishing skills.

2nd element: (Some) development interventions - Through some GO/NGO interventions, small assistance programs are delivered. They come in the form of training, community organizing, health services, literacy programs, water systems, animal dispersal, etc. However, most of the assistance is ad-hoc in character, actor-driven, short-lived, individual-focused, and loosely coordinated. Very few are based on long-term development goals.

3rd element: New hope & expectations – This assistance creates new hope especially those that are related to the accumulation of direct income or expense savings to families. These temporary gains increase expectations and develop confidence.

4th element: Entrepreneurial adventurism – These expectations results into an entrepreneurial more. The problem is that engaging into new enterprise, or expanding existing ones new or additional financial capital. In the rural areas, in the absence of savings and/or animals to sell, working capital is provided through local moneylenders or loan sharks, middlemen/traders, or by NGOs if there are any. Money lenders normally demand guarantees, business track records, or the filling up and submission of voluminous official paper requirements, strict repayment schedules, high interests rates (which is prohibited in Islam) and service fees, etc. Most of the target groups do not have the means and capabilities to meet these requirements and therefore get frustrated in their new initiatives. The few, who are lucky enough to comply with the requirements, fall prey into the next (5th) element.

5th element: Realization of personal limitations – The lucky ones who are able to source out capital come to a point of reality; their capability is not enough to manage, sustain, or improve on their economic undertakings. Some realize that there no market for their products, they cannot cope up with demands for quality and/or quantity, enterprise is too small quantity to be viable. For those engaged in farming or fishing; poor harvest/fish catch, bad weather affecting production, pressing family needs. This is made more difficult by piling interest rates and penalties, inadequate managerial skills

6th element: Loss of resources, economic means, and confidence - Non-settlement of obligations results into painful “confiscation” guarantees, loss of credit worthiness, and the cutting-off of opportunities to apply for further loans. These events ultimately erode the self-confidence of the new economic adventurers.

Result: This situation drives back the poor to poverty – multiplies their frustration with the government and ultimately cause them to hate society and then finally take up arms in order to claim their rights and dignity!

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Result: This situation drives back the poor to poverty – multiplies their frustration with the government and ultimately cause them to hate society and then finally take up arms in order to claim their rights and dignity!

- How to manage their groups
- How to develop democratic leadership
- Where to get/how to generate group capital
- How to manage revolving credit fund
- How to establish & manage common facilities
- How to link with formal markets
- How to link with external resources, technology etc.

Concerns with their surrounding communities - The problems of former combatants in mainstreaming with the rest of the economy are related to basic development issues:

- How to make the surrounding communities as viable markets
- How to secure capital or credit from the surrounding communities
- How to generate public support & cooperation on their activities

Concerns with the national government— Relating with the national economy is a more complex issue. The needs and aspirations of the former rebels may have found understanding and sympathy among those who worked for peace during the years of negotiations. But the government is a complex bureaucracy run by people with varied interests and backgrounds. Since the peace agreement was an executive commitment, for instance, the legislative branch of government had to be convinced of its effect before they could pass laws that would ultimately realize its long-term goals – especially those related to social and economic development. In the eyes of the MNLF their problems in relating with the national government structures and policies are on the following:

- How to catalyze the creation of culturally relevant support agencies
- How to secure culturally sensitive programs to build their capabilities
- Where and how to access credit from poor-friendly financial institutions
- How to link with new technologies, bigger markets
- How to request for needed support infrastructures such as community roads, power, water, communication, etc.

Post-war perceptions and attitudes

The most directly relevant input to the development of project strategies and methodology is the one related to the evolving perceptions and attitudes of the major beneficiaries. The former rebels react to various external interventions in an infinite variety of ways – especially depending on their promptness and impact on their daily lives. These ever-changing perceptions became the greatest influence in the conduct of project activities and in face-to-face dealings with the former rebels. They also contributed much in the development of the tools and instruments of the methodology.

The target groups have been candid in showing a number of indicative attitudes and reactions to government and foreign interventions:

- Upbeat on change – Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement the target groups were generally happy and feeling victorious, having been recognized in their cause by virtue of the peace accord. They were expecting for meaningful changes to happen, upbeat that the government will answer their needs and the issues that they have been fighting for. They were looking at the international community as a savior who will listen to their issues and

gripes and to provide solutions. They started to have a clearer and long-term vision for peace, development and a better life for all.

- Assessment fatigue – After some period of time, however, they became tired of endless assessment conducted by various “experts” deployed by various actors but without follow-up programmes. Hence, they demanded direct and active participation in the exercise and the immediate implementation of the results of assessment and planning.
- Training fatigue – The target groups have been reported to be weary of numerous capability building and values development programmes conducted by many organizations and designed to promote the culture of peace and development. Most of these training programmes just take most of their time and were not delivering immediate/direct benefits to their families.

The ILO projects’ series of methodologies, ending with the TREE, have provided solutions to some of these concerns through implementation of different components. For example the individual concerns and issues on literacy levels were incorporated in the training materials for enterprise development. The issue on interests in micro-credit was answered through the Co-Fund Scheme. The concerns with the surrounding communities were addressed through advocacy on the post-training support activities. The national issues were discussed in public forums as a form of advocacy.

V – ILO Projects’ strategic responses

Project management

Following the experiences derived from the fruitful participation of the MNLF and other partners in project management in VTED the PROCEED and the TREE Project started to follow a four-stage operating component. This development was a result of the need to formalize and systematize the methodology as the effects of the rapid implementation of training was starting to demand a more rationalized and integrated approach. A systematic project implementation framework was considered as best way to make partners participate more actively as they start to understand the intricacies involved in project implementation.

1st Component - Development/adaptation of a comprehensive and convergent methodology in response to problems and issues gathered in area studies and situation analysis and in the field experience of VTED

2nd Component – Development of a responsive project governance structure and service delivery system that involve local partners and the main target groups (former rebels)

3rd Component – Training of the partners and target groups and developing their capabilities to adapt and utilize the methodology, systems and procedures

4th Component – Delivery of training programmes and catalyzing of post-training assistance mechanism through the partners and in direct partnership with the main target groups

New/adapted approaches and concepts

In order to respond to the clamor for change by a clearly marginalized but emotionally charged target group, the ILO, starting with VTED decided to adapt new concepts and approaches.

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New/adapted approaches and concepts

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- In consideration of the limited social preparation of the target groups and the economic characteristics of the rebel communities, and in order to address the need for immediate response, and minimize the effect of assessment fatigue the VTED project introduced a Rapid Community Assessment technique (RCA). VTED, and henceforth PROCEED and TREE discontinued the utilization of paper surveys and the preparation of formal and long-term feasibilities studies as a precondition to the delivery of skills training. Instead RCA which was a practical and highly participative community meeting techniques was developed. Enterprise idea development was simplified and training proposal preparation was translated into standard forms for easy and fast accomplishments by the target beneficiaries.
- As a replacement of formal feasibility studies, which the educationally marginalized target groups were not qualified to prepare, VTED introduced a Transition Enterprise Project planning technique or TEP. The TEP is an adult-oriented material for business planning based on problem solving and business forecasting. It differed from the current module used by the ILO since the target groups had exhibited the need for a shorter and more practical approach in creating income-generation projects (as gathered from field and situation analysis studies. Furthermore, the target groups have relatively low literacy level and educational preparation. The TEP is prepared by the trainees during the conduct of the skills training and is based on the enterprise idea identified and agreed during the RCA meeting. The TEP is directly linked with the skills being learned. It is required to be implemented by the trainees immediately after training. This approach ensured the direct application of learning and immediate realization of incomes which added more value to the intervention.



Barangay Sibakloon is a sea-side village in Tandubas, an island municipality in the Province of Tawi-Tawi in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Most of the residents are Muslim small fishermen that usually rent pump-boats made of ? in order to engage in fishing. A trained TREE coordinator from the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA, a TREE partner, facilitated the conduct of rapid community assessment and submitted a training proposal in pump-boat making and how to use the small sea crafts in fishing. As a result of the training, 10 small but modern-designed fishing boats made of local lumber materials were constructed that now adorn the seashore of Barangay Sibakloon every morning with their happy and proud owners.

- In the absence of formal market structures in the target areas, VTED introduced the concept of the enterprise value chain in order to create internal market structures through the forward and backward linkages of small enterprise projects. This was called the Community Enterprise System or

CES. The concept is a take-off from the TEP and is introduced in the target communities as part of the post-training support mechanism. The CES is designed to promote internal velocity of money among the members of the community and therefore make the local economy more dynamic and the fangs of poverty reduced.

In answer to the need for a locally available and culturally sensitive micro finance facility the ILO developed the Community Fund Scheme or Co-Fund. The Co-Fund scheme is a social finance programme which was developed in direct partnership with the MNLF based on Islamic teaching and principles. It introduced a non-interest, non-usurious, credit assistance facility that is owned and managed by the community using venture partnership and profit and loss sharing (not interest-based) as its major credit transaction. However, the research on Co-Fund also considered market economic principles, indigenous practices and Islamic traditions and teachings which are also part of ILO's Social Finance Program (SFP).³⁹

Basic/ indigenous theories and principles

The above-mentioned project concepts are derived from accepted economic theories and development principles including indigenous practices and religious (*Islamic*) teachings that have characterized un-organized but successful community work by NGOs and other un-attached civil society groups in Mindanao.

- Social equity & real free enterprise through the expansion of the ownership & management structure of capital from financial institutions to the communities
- Community-driven & people-centered economic projects strategically linked with the formal economic sector
- Catalyzing creativity, corporate strategies & social entrepreneurship to fight apathy, indifference & civic inertia
- Demand-driven and needs-based capability-building programmes particularly in skills, entrepreneurship, management, leadership and community development
- Preserving basic community spirit through the use of trust & confidence in financial and economic transactions
- Equal participation and economic and political empowerment of women

The field methodology

The field methodology cumulatively developed by the ILO Projects is based on the agency's system approach in community-based training. In its latest structure, it shows a multi-dimensional framework involving skills development, enterprise development, community group organizing and installation of post-training support mechanism that promotes the creation of small internal market system and the operation of a community-owned and managed micro-finance scheme. The objective was to provide opportunities for the former rebels to work on a practical rural economic concept that will allow them to start, expand, and sustain their enterprise projects until they are ready and able to compete and mainstream with the rest of the surrounding communities and the formal sector. The Methodology covers at least six critical technical concerns in community-based training:⁴⁰

³⁹ These new concepts and ideas are all discussed and embodied in the new TREE Methodology Manual. The Co-Fund Scheme has been so far expanded to cover other credit transactions other than venture partnership/ profit and loss sharing.

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
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The ILO TREE Methodology



- Institutional organization and planning – involving mobilization and capability building of partners involved in project implementation and utilization of the methodology
- Community assessment and planning which involves the identification of economic opportunities and training needs assessment, training designing and preparation of project proposals by the target groups through the partners
- Delivery or conduct of training – which includes skills training, preparation of the TEP and its implementation immediately after the training
- Implementation of Transition Enterprise Projects by the beneficiaries
- Installation of post training support mechanisms – which involve organizing the trainees, training them on community enterprise systems and managing the community fund scheme
- Monitoring and evaluation – which involves the conduct of documentation of training, analysis of results, conduct of tracer studies and evaluation of TEP and other enterprise projects by the community groups

Local Economic Development objectives or LED and Gender issues are both mainstreamed elements of TREE Methodology. Training proposals derived from the communities are discussed in the Technical Working Group meeting and are linked with local development plans of the municipalities. The choice of training programmes, the schedule of training hours and the need for male participation in relatively manual projects (ex. Oven operation in bakeshops) are considered in the assessment and endorsement of training proposals.

Tools of the Methodology ⁴¹

The methodology is translated into implementing tools and instruments which are designed to be used by field workers. Hence, they compose the major materials for training partners' focal persons and community facilitators and coordinators. There were a number of tools under each process. The tools are handbooks of operations that provides instructions to the users, the trained community coordinators, on how to proceed with certain activity in order to achieve the objective of each component of the methodology. They were developed in order to provide handy materials that will guide them in their work while following the TREE Methodology.

- How to identify economic/training opportunities
- How to develop enterprise project ideas
- How to prepare a training proposal
- How to prepare skills training syllabus
- How to teach transition enterprise planning
- How to establish & operate Co-Fund projects
- How to monitor training programmes
- How to conduct tracers studies of graduates
- How to assess transition enterprise projects
- How assess Co-fund communities

Systems and procedures developed

The structures, components, field methodology, and training programmes are just resources and products that are objects of delivery to the intended beneficiaries. The Project management teams were not prepared to do direct service delivery. Hence, service delivery mechanisms were developed where actual project implementation is coursed through. The mechanism has been the most difficult aspect of project management. It demands the adoption of synergies between the existing logistics support system and financial management policies of ILO and the demand on the field. It has to be consistent with the field methodology and the implementation policies agreed by the project's partners and target groups.




The Pagalungan Women's' Kauyagan Association is a group composed of 25 women; most of them are internally displaced persons or IDP. Their communities have been affected by armed encounters in the municipality of Pagalungan in Maguindanao province. They were organized by Arlene Matalam a TREE trained coordinator and a focal person of the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women. The group got training in Food Processing and immediately opened their shop.

Immediately after their training the women started producing processed foods such as corned beef, beef tapa, beef and chicken balls, tocino and other local delicacies. The small undertaking grew into a busy enterprise. In a few weeks' time demands for their products increased. With an advance payment strategy from buyers learned from the TEP approach the group was able to increase their sales and generate savings to increase their capital.

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The service delivery system describes the procedures related to the assessment and approval of project proposals, the release of project funds and its audit, and field monitoring on the output and outcomes. Hence, the system does not only prescribe the flow of actions and the events. Most important is it designates the names of the units or actors/partners/ target group representatives who are responsible for such actions and events. The system also implements the policies on selection of target beneficiaries, communities, projects, and intermediaries. It also implements project policies on costs of financial assistance by the Project in terms of per-capita, per training programme, per community, or per project partner. Most important, it is concerned with the faithful compliance with the sub-contracting agreements with intermediaries. The ILO Projects have translated these systems and procedures into standard operating forms that embodied all data and information for appropriate action of the concerned actors in the system.

Project Institutional Frameworks

The VTED and PROCEED Projects implemented by the ILO SRO Manila, operated under the UN Multi-donor institutional framework. The ILO projects were considered components of the whole programme although ILO was given leeway in developing its own methodology and implementation strategies.

The multi-donor programme had an Executive Committee that acted as the policy making unit. The Committee was headed by heads of UN Agencies including representatives from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)⁴² and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). ILO SRO Manila sits at the EXCOM. At the implementation level, the programme had the Management Committee composed of the local heads of each UN Agency programmes and the SPCPD. Meanwhile, each component project implemented by the UN agencies has also their own micro-level organizational and service delivery strategies. ILO was responsible for skills training, livelihood/enterprise development and income-generation. Other UN agencies were also given specific areas to intervene: FAO was assigned to agricultural training and development, UNICEF was assigned to handle children and family welfare development, UNFPA to health and related issues. UNDP played the role of administrative agent and resource mobilizer in addition to overall coordination and oversight


The UN Agencies based in Manila relates Mindanao activities with the UN country agenda through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This is aside from their active participation in the more localized programme implementation policies and strategies in the Multi-donor programme in Mindanao where they sit as members of the UN-MDP Executive Committee.

With the USDOL-funded TREE project, ILO had the opportunity to design its own project organizational structure and decide on the members of the governance and delivery mechanism. Hence, the TREE project had its own Executive Committee composed of eight members which are also represented at the technical working groups at the local (provincial levels).

In the VTED and PROCEED projects, the National Project Coordinator sits as member of the Management Committee of the UN-MDP Programme. They did not have their Project's Executive Committees, however, at the field the ILO projects have their Technical Working Groups composed of local leaders of the MNLF and

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partner agencies such as local government representatives and line agencies notably TESDA.



VI – Problems encountered

One decade of post-conflict intervention in Mindanao had provided ILO, especially the SRO in Manila, with the opportunity to experience various types and levels of problems in the field. These problems have been converted into lessons learned and ultimately have helped the ILO projects in crafting subsequent concept notes containing not only project-level strategies but administrative policies as well.

These problems and issues are differentiated into dealing with the rebel group, the partners especially from government, the communities, and the expansion and sustainability of the income generating projects of the beneficiaries. However, as were experienced by the ILO in almost ten years of post-conflict project interventions in Mindanao, these problems and issues can be summarized into the following:

Dealing with the personalities of the former rebels and their organization:

The combatants, although bonded by their common battlecry for “self-determination” are also bounded by their stratified social and economic status. The top leaders are more focused on gaining political powers; the middle-level officers were more concerned with maintaining their social positions in the communities, while the foot soldiers were mainly after the improvement of their economic status. These various levels of war objectives created the necessity to individualize the approach in project intervention in order to be effective.

Dealing with the traditional systems and attitudes of project partners:

Most of ILO’s project partners, especially from the government, were products of the traditional mode of development assistance which are bureaucratic and control-oriented. They are not sufficiently grounded on the issues of the conflict. In fact most

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
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of them are more concerned with safeguarding their comfort zones rather than going down to the communities and understand the situation. Meaningful and real change is a huge task for the partners to understand and consider.

Linking the rebels with the political and administrative structures of government:

The former rebels have primarily broken ties with government because of the perceived oppressive system of governance and service delivery. After the peace agreement, most of the policies, systems and procedures are still intact. The culture of bureaucratic governance is still the same, in fact they are still run with the same power structures and personalities that were there before the war.



Musing Minongkil

Musing is a former operative of the MNLF. He was trained as a Community Training and Enterprise Coordinator or CTEC covering the former Camp Imbrahim Sema in Bago-Enged, Datu Odin Sinsuat Municipality in the province of Maguindanao. As a CTEC he was instrumental in the planning and delivery of several training programmes in the area and in the organization of the beneficiaries into a cluster of 3 Rural Workers Association or RWA composed of 75 members under the TREE Project

Since under-going training in Community Assessment and Planning he has already assisted 10 Muslim communities organize and register with the Department of Labor and Employment of DOLE. The agency has adapted the strategy of TREE and expanded its registration programme to cover TREE group beneficiaries, especially from the MNLF so that they can access government assistance.

Generating support of partners with varied mandates and interests:

The ILO methodology is a convergence of various tasks and objectives that are not necessarily carried out by the mandate of one and single agency. For Instance TESDA ⁴³, the vocational training agency, is not involved in community organizing. On the other hand, DSWD ⁴⁴ is not involved in skills training. To ask these agencies to work together under a convergent programme for peace building will involved a massive re-orientation and training, not to mention additional financial resources to back up such new and additional assignment. Compartmentalized service delivery is hard to break hence, a convergent approach, which is needed in the communities, is hard to achieve.

Developing the capabilities of local actors not appointed to do the required tasks:

Most of the required skills, knowledge and experience in implementing post-conflict development assistance are new and additional duties to existing actors both from the government sector and the civil society groups. The social dynamics obtaining in target groups under normal circumstances are totally different in post-conflict environments. The emotional content in service delivery is high but must be

⁴³ TESDA – Technical Education and Development Authority

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controlled and calculated which needs special type of people and training. Rebels have to be differentiated from terrorists and ordinary delinquents and criminals.⁴⁵ They are apart from social activities since they have gone several notches higher when they took the risks of expressing their views through the barrel of the gun. They have sacrificed their lives, lost their families, relatives, friends and properties. In most cases they have lost their personal values in their communities and therefore have declared themselves as enemies of society and the state even before society and the state have considered them as such. These are the challenges that ILO faced in recruiting project staff and building their capabilities for post-conflict interventions.

Institutionalizing policies, systems and methodology in the partner organizations:

As mentioned earlier community-based approaches, especially in peace building, is a convergent approach where different programmes and services that are normally coming from different agencies are required to be brought together in order to achieve better results. These community-centered elements are usually absent and/or anathema to bureaucratic practices of most government agencies. Hence, ILO resorted to simple but rationale advocacy strategies such as direct participation in project research, development and implementation.

Expansion and sustainability of the economic projects of the beneficiaries

Most of the beneficiaries of the ILO projects are foot soldiers that belong to the poor and marginalized sectors of Mindanao. They lack the skills, education, and opportunities to engage into economic activities. As discovered in the VTED project study, they are prisoners of a vicious poverty trap. Regrettably, the type of post-conflict interventions, especially skills training, is just short-term in character. They may be able to create opportunities to start income-generating activities, but they are not necessarily enough to provide continuing support for their expansion and sustainability. The success of economic projects initiated would still depend on the overall performance of the national and local economy and the support of the mainstream public and private sectors.

Sustaining the project impact on the overall peace and development process:

Peace process is not a straight line as observed in Mindanao. The line goes in curves, sometimes up and sometimes down. There are even moments when the line seems to go back – as when one renegade group of the MNLF resumes fighting to push for a new agenda. Sustaining the gains of project intervention in peace building depends not only on their impact. It also depends on their relevance to the target groups, their communities, and to the overall policies and goals of the government. Conversely, however, sustainability of project impact also depends on the sustainability of peace and security in the area. Hence, the final goal of the peace and development process will not be achieved if peace will not be allowed to reign in the first place.

VII – Lessons learned

From the ground, ILO project staff have learned important lessons in dealing with partners and target groups in crisis situation and in producing tangible results that are necessary in achieving the end goal of post-conflict intervention. Foremost of these

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Lessons in working under a post-conflict environment

1. The importance of continuing assessment of the situation and project environment – The ILO project staff in Mindanao are made conscious of the war, its history and background. They have been made to study the Peace Agreement and its related documents as an important piece of information. The Project's acquired technical books and materials and also published materials related to the conflict and the on-going peace building. Office discussions often include Islamic economic principles, practices and traditions. The staff maximize the use of the internet to study peace building programmes around the world – especially those that involve Muslims and other minorities. All these have been part of the experiences and lessons for the project staff and the people who are participating in ILO's peace projects in Mindanao.

Infrastructure building through training-cum-production scheme or TCP:

The ILO project introduced training scheme where MNLF cadres were trained in building construction skills and used the training materials to build actual building structures. This was an experimental approach but the scheme produced 21 enterprise centers in the community base or camps of the MNLF under the VTED project. It also produced a number of health and multi-purpose centers in non-MNLF communities under the PROCEED project. The buildings thus erected were utilized and are being taken care of the training beneficiaries and the communities more that the same kind of infra-structures provided by the government under normal construction and delivery modes.

The official turn-over ceremonies of such buildings to the beneficiaries are proud moments that give them the chance to prove and show to the public their capacities to produce economic goods if given the chance. The reading of the building markers of the newly constructed centers is emotional moments that they dedicate to their relatives and friends who died in the war "so that others may live in peace and prosperity"

2. The needs to develop programme strategies that promote the civilian transformation of the organizational structure of the former rebels – The ILO projects deliberately worked on transforming the rebel organization into civil society groups that would assimilate, support, and sustain the changes that has been agreed and developed through the period of intervention. The changes cover individual, family, group and institutional values as well as local economic development and decent work principles related to the continuance of peace, development, stability, and human security. Thus, for example, the women sector of the MNLF was developed into cooperatives. Post-conflict projects must be ready and determined to dismantle firewalls of traditional systems and procedures that cause social divisiveness and political and economic marginalization. This goal is imperative in peace building. The TREE methodology contains certain "leftist" and "socialist" principles and ideologies but was rationalized by positive results and acceptance by the target groups.
3. Peace and security can be achieved if there are tangible, positive, and sustainable changes in the lives of those negatively affected by the war as direct results of programme interventions – Projects such as the community enterprise

centers built by the VTED project and the Women Training and Development Center are tangible, positive and sustainable manifestation of change. When people and families are busy managing their economic projects, there is no chance to think of acquiring guns and other tools of war in order to survive. Insurgency, rebellion, or any form of anti-state movement are fanned by social, economic, and political marginalization of the minorities mostly in the rural areas. In view of this lesson in Mindanao, preventive programmes in community-centered or local economic development should be made a major policy of all governments. Making training projects as a post-crisis solution is costly and more difficult to produce results. It is hard to correct the causes of war and make them as the central object of post-war programmes for peace. It is more difficult to heal the wounds or to remove the scars than to prevent them.

4. Post-conflict projects should have a long-term, well-planned, popularly accepted, and deliberately-phased intervention – Post-conflict economic re-integration is a mission that cannot be achieved in a short time. It has to undergo a period of transition. The Mindanao experience proved that in order for income-generation, wage employment and/or self-employment environment to take roots, a minimum of ten years is necessary. A whole decade of change in the individual, family, and community is necessary to create and sustain post-war peace.

Generally there are three phases of intervention which the UN followed in Mindanao: emergency relief, socio-economic rehabilitation, and area development. In the case of Mindanao, ILO took a right timing. It started intervention only one year after the signing of the peace agreement. Rightly so because this was still a period of chaos and the target groups have not yet developed the feeling of security and sense of permanence. It was not yet time for acquiring new skills and knowledge. It was a period of “coming home” and reflecting on what’s next after the end of the war. It is a period of social adjustments and preparation.

5. Peace building projects should be consistent with the terms of the peace agreements - Intervention must be in support to the nature and objectives agreed in the peace accord. There are expressed sensitive provisions which have direct impact on the type and strategies of intervention. In Mindanao, for example, the peace agreement did not specifically deal with dis-armament. The MNLF was allowed to keep their arms but under self-regulations. Hence, the ILO projects never considered actions or adopted conditions related to arms control in its field activities. It only focused on its job of facilitating the delivery of training and post-training assistance irrespective of the sights of military hardware in the target communities.
6. Peace is not a military matter, it is a state of mind – Ceasefires, dis-armament, surrender or stockpiling of military hardware and related control and management of guns do not imply peace. Neither do volumes of reports on government policies, infrastructure and economic development projects, or the exposition of peace building programmes guarantee peace, stability, and human security. In Mindanao the ILO Projects discovered that peace is a matter of perception, a psychological state of mind. It is a wavering variable manifested by the people’s day-to-day reactions and attitudes towards unfolding processes and events. It is a result of critical discernment and individual calibration of the sincerity, commitment and dedication of the actors involved in peace building. It is affected by the manner by which activities are planned, organized, delivered, and monitored and how they directly affect their daily lives.

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The official turn-over ceremonies of such buildings to the beneficiaries are proud moments that give them the chance to prove and show to the public their capacities to produce economic goods if given the chance. The reading of the building markers of the newly constructed centers is emotional moments that they dedicate to their relatives and friends who died in the war "so that others may live in peace and prosperity"

2. The needs to develop programme strategies that promote the civilian transformation of the organizational structure of the former rebels – The ILO projects deliberately worked on transforming the rebel organization into civil society groups that would assimilate, support, and sustain the changes that has been agreed and developed through the period of intervention. The changes cover individual, family, group and institutional values as well as local economic development and decent work principles related to the continuance of peace, development, stability, and human security. Thus, for example, the women sector of the MNLF was developed into cooperatives. Post-conflict projects must be ready and determined to dismantle firewalls of traditional systems and procedures that cause social divisiveness and political and economic marginalization. This goal is imperative in peace building. The TREE methodology contains certain "leftist" and "socialist" principles and ideologies but was rationalized by positive results and acceptance by the target groups.
3. Peace and security can be achieved if there are tangible, positive, and sustainable changes in the lives of those negatively affected by the war as direct results of programme interventions – Projects such as the community enterprise

centers built by the VTED project and the Women Training and Development Center are tangible, positive and sustainable manifestation of change. When people and families are busy managing their economic projects, there is no chance to think of acquiring guns and other tools of war in order to survive. Insurgency, rebellion, or any form of anti-state movement are fanned by social, economic, and political marginalization of the minorities mostly in the rural areas. In view of this lesson in Mindanao, preventive programmes in community-centered or local economic development should be made a major policy of all governments. Making training projects as a post-crisis solution is costly and more difficult to produce results. It is hard to correct the causes of war and make them as the central object of post-war programmes for peace. It is more difficult to heal the wounds or to remove the scars than to prevent them.

4. Post-conflict projects should have a long-term, well-planned, popularly accepted, and deliberately-phased intervention – Post-conflict economic re-integration is a mission that cannot be achieved in a short time. It has to undergo a period of transition. The Mindanao experience proved that in order for income-generation, wage employment and/or self-employment environment to take roots, a minimum of ten years is necessary. A whole decade of change in the individual, family, and community is necessary to create and sustain post-war peace.

Generally there are three phases of intervention which the UN followed in Mindanao: emergency relief, socio-economic rehabilitation, and area development. In the case of Mindanao, ILO took a right timing. It started intervention only one year after the signing of the peace agreement. Rightly so because this was still a period of chaos and the target groups have not yet developed the feeling of security and sense of permanence. It was not yet time for acquiring new skills and knowledge. It was a period of “coming home” and reflecting on what’s next after the end of the war. It is a period of social adjustments and preparation.

5. Peace building projects should be consistent with the terms of the peace agreements - Intervention must be in support to the nature and objectives agreed in the peace accord. There are expressed sensitive provisions which have direct impact on the type and strategies of intervention. In Mindanao, for example, the peace agreement did not specifically deal with dis-armament. The MNLF was allowed to keep their arms but under self-regulations. Hence, the ILO projects never considered actions or adopted conditions related to arms control in its field activities. It only focused on its job of facilitating the delivery of training and post-training assistance irrespective of the sights of military hardware in the target communities.
6. Peace is not a military matter, it is a state of mind – Ceasefires, dis-armament, surrender or stockpiling of military hardware and related control and management of guns do not imply peace. Neither do volumes of reports on government policies, infrastructure and economic development projects, or the exposition of peace building programmes guarantee peace, stability, and human security. In Mindanao the ILO Projects discovered that peace is a matter of perception, a psychological state of mind. It is a wavering variable manifested by the people’s day-to-day reactions and attitudes towards unfolding processes and events. It is a result of critical discernment and individual calibration of the sincerity, commitment and dedication of the actors involved in peace building. It is affected by the manner by which activities are planned, organized, delivered, and monitored and how they directly affect their daily lives.

7. As in war, women have great role and influence in peace building – One of the greatest lessons learned by the ILO projects in Mindanao is the important role of the women sector in the rebel movement both in war and during peace building. This lesson has driven the ILO projects to pursue the institutional development of the women group. From a mere sector in the Central Committee of the MNLF the TREE Project made the women's group, through the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-purpose Cooperatives, a separate member of the TREE project's Executive Committee with voting rights and privileges equal with its mother unit – the MNLF.

Lessons learned in implementing skills training projects for post-war peace building

8. Work within the formal and informal structures of the rebel organization – Partnering directly with the rebel group is a short-cut to developing trust and confidence. The rebels are not a beneficiary group as far as the ILO projects is concerned. They were considered and treated as partners. They were trained on the policies, systems and methodology of the projects. They were made to directly implement training projects for their members and their communities. Their active and actual participation in needs assessment, planning and project implementation are surefire strategies in achieving both the tangible and intangible results. But the strategy necessitated the understanding of the whole MNLF organizational structure including the informal networks within their ranks.
9. Sustainability is promoted through the ownership of projects and empowerment of target groups - Ownership of economic projects starts from the active and enlightened participation of target groups in the planning, implementation and follow-up of community projects.⁴⁶
10. Timely delivery of services is a secret to win hearts and minds ⁴⁷– In the battle for the hearts and minds, the value of the service is directly proportional to the time of its delivery”, this is a popular phrase among ILO staff in Mindanao. The projects, starting from VTED whose funding came through the UNDP, have always strived to deliver a properly planned training project on time. The staff adhered to the strategy of “timing” as a principle in service delivery. Just-in-time delivery was achieved through sound management strategies:
 - Project governance and management structure – the projects have a governance and management structure composed of a national-level policy making unit (e.g. Project Advisory Committee), and a Project Management Unit at the field level (e.g. PMU) who undergo proper screening and training in post-conflict intervention. The major stakeholders in the peace process are mobilized and included in the structures. In the TREE project, the Chair of the Executive Committee is the MNLF represented by its Secretary General.
 - Technical field Methodology – There must be a field methodology that is highly participative, comprehensive, culturally sensitive, and innovative whose instruments are designed to provide solutions to the causes of the war and avoiding their destructive repetition. The methodology which was adapted in VTED and formalized in TREE is prepared with implementing guidelines, users' handbooks, and implementing forms and instruments. It is based on

⁴⁶ This is a major emphasis of the community planning process of the TREE Methodology.

⁴⁷ One of the famous anecdotes of the project staff is “delivery a P10, 000 project at the time that the target group needs it and it will be valued at P100, 000. But deliver a P100, 000 project when it is no longer needed and it will be valued at P10, 000”.

relevant, tested, and accepted theories and principles. The methodology is also premised on generally accepted principles in community-centered and people-oriented development which generally characterize the changes that the minority groups or rebels demand. More importantly the methodology is has been designed consistent with national development policies on empowerment, devolution, local autonomy and rural development.⁴⁸

The development and preparation of appropriate tools in enterprise development (TEP or Transition Enterprise Project) and micro-finance (Co-fund) was prompted by the clamor for the introduction of new and effective tools by the former rebels – needs which were articulations of their quest and demand for “self-determination”.

- Service delivery system – The field methodology needs to be utilized and the projects delivered through a service delivery system. The system is managed by a structure at the field level. This unit is composed of partners who are directly responsible in field implementation. The system uses standard management forms that are based on agreed project policies and the roles of the project staff, partners, and target groups. The service delivery mechanism is a critical aspect in the ILO projects’ management. It is the mechanism where real partnership, coordination, cooperation and convergence actually happen with actors, stakeholders and target groups.
11. Building the capabilities of local partners – The ILO projects depended on local partners for service delivery. They were organized and trained by ILO project staff. The programme designs revolved around the policies, goals, objectives, systems and procedures, the field methodology including the utilization of its handbooks, tools and instruments. The objective of capability building includes the eventual acceptance and institutionalization of the systems and methodology among the partners and target groups.
 12. Proper selection of project staff and conduct a focused training programme for them – The nature of job in post-conflict economic rehabilitation is more than technical or bureaucratic. It is a mission for peace, security, and humanity and therefore need special skills, knowledge and attitudes. For this reason there is a need for a continuing and deliberate training and development programme for people who will be involved in this undertaking. In Mindanao, the project staff are Muslims recruited and seconded from government agencies and organizations.⁴⁹
 13. Direct participation of partner government agencies is a smoother strategy to institutionalize the methodology – All the ILO projects have adopted the strategy of direct participation of the partner agencies in the process of developing the methodology including its manuals. The process included the preparation of draft materials, discussions of the materials during capability-building workshops, training on their utilization. It also involves the delivery of training projects as well as monitoring and process evaluation. The approach created a sense of ownership of the methodology – hence, the partners have easier time to appreciate and internalize the materials and easily made them a part of their systems and procedures.

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14. Focus process and impact evaluation on both the quantifiable (tangible) and quantitative (intangible) goals of peace building – The tangibles are quantifiable indicators that can be measured through numbers, concrete and visible projects. The TREE Methodology includes evaluation materials that are based on the goals and objectives of the projects. There are no time and resources wasted even in the process of determining outputs and outcomes of the project interventions.

Epilogue

ILO's experience in Mindanao may be only a very area/situation-specific example of post-conflict economic intervention having been implemented in only a part and clearly defined region of a country. It can also be only an illustration of a very sector-specific crisis situation having been designed for, and implemented in predominantly Muslim areas. Furthermore, Mindanao may be a very unique environment where peace has been achieved through a peace agreement without the necessity of disarmament and demobilization of rebel combatants.

But the historical and immediate causes of the war, as well as the assessment of contemporary issues relative to poverty and marginalization of minorities are popularly accepted causes of war recognized by people who have been studying, working, and who are genuinely concerned with the promotion of sustainable global peace and human security in war-torn nations all over the world. The approach, methodology, systems and procedures, and the field strategies utilized by ILO in achieving project goals for decent work and local economic development were direct products of historical studies, actual assessments and practical analysis of the real situations on the ground in addition to the opinions of technical and academic experts. They are products of actual and real day-to-day engagements with the entrenched systems that caused the Mindanao war.

The future of Mindanao is still uncertain. Its fate shall still be dictated by a confluence of local and global events. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) a breakaway group of the MNLF is still waging a war for separation. A small faction of the MNLF loyal to Nur Misuari, are still holding on in their demand for complete autonomy and the release of their leader.⁵⁰ A communist group, the New People's Army, is also engaged in a protracted war not only in Mindanao but also in other parts of the country.

In 2003 the Philippine Government requested the World Bank to study the possibility of establishing a multi-donor trust fund for the reconstruction and development of conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. The trust fund was set up in 2005 with at least 6 donors pledging their support. The trust fund is primarily designed to initiate the reconstruction and development programme but will eventually transfer the responsibility to a local partner – the Bangsamoro Development Agency, an agency organized by the MILF. The trust fund programme, however anchored on the signing of a peace agreement of the MILF.

This new and upcoming programme provides hope for Mindanao. But its success will depend on what it is supposed to deliver, for whom, and how it will be delivered. The

⁵⁰ Nur Misuari is still in jail for rebellion charges following an armed action while he was still the governor of the ARMM citing insincerity of the government in implementing the 1996 peace agreement. In the recent local elections in May 2007 he filed and lost his candidacy as provincial governor of the province of Sulu, the very seat of the MNLF rebellion which he led.

MNLF have grievances that are still to be addressed by the government. The coming of new foreign assistance facilities for the MILF might be hard to understand on the part of the MNLF and other militant groups in Mindanao.

But, in fact, this is precisely the problem with Peace – it is a matter of perception; It is a state of mind which is influenced by perceived or actual lack of justice, good governance and representative voice in the affairs of the people in their communities.

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- A – The ACT for Peace Programme
- B – The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement
- C – The Tripoli Agreement
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Appendix A

ACT for Peace Programme Component Details

Overview

1. The ACT for Peace is a peacebuilding and conflict transformation programme. Beyond merely responding to the physical and social reconstruction of areas affected by armed conflict, it seeks to respond to the complex situation of conflict in Mindanao, which involves a range of ongoing, potential and post-conflict situations in the target areas. It thus entails interventions to support and sustain peace as well as build human security in these conflict situations, such as, among others: a) relief and rehabilitation of areas affected by ongoing armed conflict, and also in post conflict areas; b) building local capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in areas of potential conflict, as well as in post-conflict situations; c) basic service delivery and capacity-building for conflict prevention in conflict and post-conflict areas.
2. The Programme seeks to strengthen peacebuilding efforts and sustain the gains for peace and development in Southern Philippines. It shall work with multiple stakeholders and promote peaceful change at different levels. Social capital, which is essential to peacebuilding, shall be strengthened through the consolidation of people's organizations and other community-based social formations. To support the promotion of human security objectives, the Programme shall assist people affected by violent conflicts; provide access to basic services; promote good governance, articulate common goals while recognizing and strengthening distinct cultural identities; and encourage strategic alliances for peace work involving civil society organizations, communities, religious groups and government. The conflict transformation capacities of local governments will be enhanced.
3. The ACT for Peace Programme is consistent with the national framework, particularly EO #3, Chapter 14 of the 2004-2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan and Agenda #9 of the 10 Point Agenda. It shall build on the gains of the GOP-UN MDP3 and shall seek to collaborate and converge with other peace and development initiatives operating in the area.
4. The succeeding sections describe in detail the *sectoral and other issues* that each Component will address, the *areas of assistance* that are meant to effectively respond to the issues, *specific interventions* that are consistent with the principles that govern the Programme, and *strategies for implementing and delivering the assistance*.

Principles that Guide Programme Implementation

5. The implementation of the ACT for Peace shall be guided by strategies, approaches, interventions, principles, processes, that promote the establishment and strengthening of horizontal and vertical relationships which are essential for peacebuilding.

a. Principles for Building and Strengthening Horizontal Relationships (Binding)

- **Peace-oriented interventions.** Refer to initiatives that are acknowledged to be consistent with generally accepted tenets of peace efforts; hence, they can be described as peace-based, peace-sensitive, or peace-promotive.
- **Rights-based approach to local governance and development management.** This means that the human rights framework and principles/concepts of rights entitlements and state obligations and the normative content of every right are applied systematically and methodically to development and governance processes at the strategic development planning, policy and legislation, administrative functions, programs and service delivery levels.
- **Participatory.** Deliberate efforts to identify and meaningfully involve and engage stakeholders that are regarded as important to the development undertaking. This suggests the desirability of engaging as many stakeholders as possible and the intentional inclusion of marginalized groups; and also suggests the need to build consensus among the engaged groups.
- **Demand-driven.** A conscious approach of service providers to identify, design, respond to, and serve the expressed needs of clients. This requires a supporting process that encourages the active and informed participation of clients.
- **Flexible.** Guided by the principles and approaches that define the Programme framework, Programme implementation shall nevertheless take off from concrete and current conditions and actual capacities and concerns of participants and stakeholders; and shall be iterative. Programme processes such as regular monitoring, and systematic exchange of field information among implementers, the PMO and the OIA shall ensure effective and quick response to pressing developments.
- **Culture-sensitive.** Premised on respect for local (which can be traditional or indigenous) practices, beliefs and traditions. It also refers to the ability to adapt and innovate implementation strategies and approaches that are appropriate to the local culture.
- **Gender-responsive.** Recognizing that women and men are affected by conflict differently with the former most affected by its negative consequences, the Programme's concern for women's rights will address the gender dimensions of conflict. Ensuring improved access by women to services and resources, and increasing awareness and knowledge on women's rights not only among women but also of the larger community (e.g., LGU, judiciary, military, and police, etc.) are peace promotive and conflict preventive initiatives.
- **Concern for the Environment.** The Programme will integrate concern for the environment in its initiatives. Accountability for the environment is among the paths to peace promoted in the Culture of Peace and is embedded in the sustainable integrated area development strategy exemplified by PDCs. The design and appraisal of projects will include measures to ascertain whether the planned activities will have any impact on

the environment. For instance, mitigating measures will be required of construction activities (e.g., barangay health stations, etc.) that will have negative impact on the environment. Farm projects will emphasize conservation of genetic, water and soil resources and the regeneration of the agricultural and upland ecosystems. As for non-farm economic projects, care will be taken so that the Programme will not assist pollutive or resource-depleting activities.

- **Convergence.** Pooling of initiatives and resources to achieve a common set of objectives. It suggests a shared understanding of the philosophy or the framework that governs the collaboration. It also indicates willingness of stakeholders to come together in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development interventions, and in the management of risks. Convergence could also contribute to the attainment of the specific mandates and objectives of the individuals/groups involved.

b. Principles for Establishing and Strengthening Vertical Relationships (Linking)

- **Mainstreaming.** Purposeful efforts to bring into the “mainstream” (formal agencies/institutions, established norms, etc.) development efforts and changes that may have been initially undertaken “outside of the mainstream or at the periphery.” This suggests bringing in the changes that have been developed outside the mainstream, and possibly, scaling them up.
- **Institutionalization.** Deliberate efforts to “make the changes stick;” expressed in terms of regularizing and integrating the changes in policy, procedures, processes, roles and behavior of individuals and groups to enhance accountability and to optimize application/utilization. Change needs to be “managed” to ensure that the application is sustained beyond the initial development intervention.

Towards achieving:

- **Sustainability.** The result of the melding and aggregation of the effects of “horizontal and vertical” relationships and changes brought about by peacebuilding; suggests the improved capacity of individuals and groups to be generally “self-propelled” (not requiring major external stimuli) and to have better and more effective initiatives in responding to new and more complex challenges.
- **Impact at the community level.** The Philippine Peace Framework recognizes the community-based nature of peace work. Promoting changes at the community level will address factors such as deprivation of group access to opportunities, political marginalization and pronounced state neglect that are regarded as roots of violent conflicts. Community-based approaches will also facilitate changes in the behavior of individuals, households and groups which are essential towards developing and promoting a culture that is oriented for peace.

15. Programme delivery shall be carried out in a manner that promotes convergence and integration of the component strategies and approaches. It is very important that those involved in the execution and management of the Programme as well as those mobilized to implement projects and assistance, to provide support and to collaborate level off on the

framework (concepts, principles and strategies) that inform ACT for Peace. The Components shall systematically build on each other's gains. Programme mechanisms and processes such as regular meetings to discuss and thresh out concerns and to jointly respond to issues shall be set in place to put complementation among Components and concerned agencies into effect.

16. ACT for Peace shall actively collaborate, complement and partner with other peacebuilding and development-oriented programs to avoid overlaps and duplication, and to ensure the sustainability of the gains and the mainstreaming of the successes of Peace and Development Communities.¹

A Programme Approach that is Peace-Sensitive and Promotive of Human Security

17. To be an effective peace-oriented effort, the implementation of the ACT for Peace Programme needs to spring from shared perspectives among actors and institutions and a common appreciation of peace and development work, its processes and requirements, and what can be reasonably achieved given concrete challenges and existing capacities of stakeholders. A common Programme framework can inform and guide the stakeholders in pursuing their contributions to the achievement of ACT for Peace objectives. The key concepts of the Framework are initially defined in this Programme Document but can be enhanced further in the course of Programme implementation by learnings coming out of Programme and other experiences. These include key concepts such as conflict transformation, human security, and culture of peace; analyzing through "peace lenses;" the use of peace-sensitive principles, processes and tools; and the development and installation of peace-sensitive measures of Programme performance. The concepts are defined in the Glossary of this document.
18. Conflict transformation is "a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interest, discourses, and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict." (Hugh Miall) The culture of peace "consists of values, attitudes and behaviors that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence, endeavor to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development processes of their society." This definition, originally put forward by UNESCO, was adopted by the UN General Assembly.
19. It is also critical for Programme stakeholders to distinguish between development strategies at large and assistance that targets specific causes of conflict. The lack of clarity on how development efforts affect violent conflict (and hence, peace work) has hobbled many initiatives in the past. It is also an acknowledged learning around the world that not all development positively affects violent conflict.²

¹ Some examples are the USAID-Growth with Equity for Mindanao (GEM), KALAHI-CIDSS, Mindanao Rural Development Program (MRDP), the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), the Philippines-Canada Local Government Support Program (LGSP) and The Asia Foundation.

² *Conflict Prevention NHDR Thematic Guide Note*, UNDP; August 2004, p.9

20. The incorporation of human security in the ACT for Peace Programme Framework is an advantage. Understood as “the safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities,”³ human security as a framework element is useful for linking violent conflict (or the prevention of it or the responses to it) and human development.⁴ It is acknowledged that most of all the elements necessary for peace building already exist in the Philippines but problems hobble successful implementation.⁵ A human security policy framework will signal a move beyond the national security approach and will facilitate an integrated and holistic approach to implementing peace work in the country, particularly to peacebuilding in Southern Philippines.
21. In 2003, Mindanao Bishops articulated their concern for human security in the document “A Human Security Agenda for Mindanao.”⁶ The five components of ACT for Peace are consistent with this Human Security Agenda, particularly with regards to protecting people in violent conflict (refugees, internally displaced persons); providing minimum living standards (work-based security, secure livelihoods, access to land, credit, training), providing access to basic health care, articulating common goals while developing multiple identities (inter-religious dialogue, culture of peace), empowering communities for good governance (engaged citizenship, social auditing, meaningful elections) and forging alliances among civil society groups, including churches, government agencies and local communities.

Addressing Gender

22. Conflict affects women and men differently. Invariably, it is the former, along with children and the elderly, which are more severely affected by violence. Women affiliated with the MNLF and who have been widowed by the war, and those who have been orphaned are among those identified in the GoP-UN MDP3 Stakeholders’ Consultation series as deserving of support from the successor programme. Even in a post-conflict setting, they can end up being relegated to the sidelines because of stereotypes and because their roles in helping families and communities through the conflict are not understood. Studies bear out that the objectives of rebuilding communities and getting them on the road to sustainable peace and development are well served by an approach that recognizes changes in gender relations in relation to conflict and harnesses gender-sensitive perspectives.
23. The ACT for Peace strategies with respect to gender is two-fold: mainstreaming gender⁷ and promoting gender balance. The Programme will mainstream gender in all situational and problem analysis and in project and activity design to ensure that development initiatives incorporate roles, needs and participation of both women and men. To the extent possible, the Programme will also encourage a balance in the participation of women and men

³ Human Security in the HDR 1998

⁴ In the Tabang Mindanaw website, Ambassador Howard Q. Dee is quoted as saying “human security attacks the root causes of rebellion by focusing on the well-being of people.”

⁵ *From National Security to Human Security in Mindanao*, Dr. Paul Oquist, UNDP; July 2003, p.10 - 11

⁶ From a presentation made by Bishop Antonio Ledesma, SJ, D.D., to the Joint Annual Meeting of Task Force Tabang Mindanao and Mindanao Bishops in January 2003

⁷ UNDP defines gender mainstreaming as “Taking account of gender concerns in all policy, programme, administrative and financial activities, and in organizational procedures, thereby contributing to a profound organizational transformation” as quoted in the UNDP publication “Essentials” (July 2003)

recognizing that the presence, involvement and dominance of one group in bodies that make decisions and allocate resources can have a differential impact. Constraints likely to affect involvement of women and men, particularly in light of cultural and religious considerations, will be discussed and realistic measures of addressing them identified.

24. These strategies will be further elaborated in each Component. The Programme shall also endeavor to have gender disaggregation as a feature of its information management system.
25. Responsibility for incorporating and keeping track of gender considerations and information in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development activities is shared by members of the Programme staff and implementing partners alike. To ensure that this is systematically undertaken, responsibility for gender mainstreaming will be formally lodged with the Area Manager, with advice to be provided by specialists.
26. Because gender equality is a concern shared by other members of the development community, the Programme is prepared to pursue collaboration with other development programs to strengthen gender rights advocacy and to improve the gender perspectives of participant groups, among others.
27. The ACT for Peace will provide capacity building support for gender to target participants, staff and implementing partners. Gender-aware guidelines and gender dimensions will be incorporated in processes, steps and tools with respect to project appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and in contract and TOR formulation which shall be contained in the Programme Operations Manual.

Year to Year Programme Emphasis

28. The new Programme shall strengthen existing PDCs (referring to those served under the GoP-UN MDP3) and link them with mainstream sources of support. ACT for Peace will also expand to and cover new areas. To balance these two points of emphasis, the Programme will apply a phased approach which is described by the following table:

Table ACT for Peace Yearly Programme Emphasis

Year	Programme Emphasis	Description
1	Consolidation and mainstreaming of existing PDCs; and expansion to new sites (identification and social preparation of new sites)	Assistance to actors and institutions in areas covered by the GoP-UN MDP3. Undertake initial preparations for the new sites identified as expansion areas.
2 - 3	Mainstreaming of existing PDCs and continuing the expansion process to other sites	Provision of assistance to expansion sites while continuing services to previous sites. Existing sites are into/moving into application of learning and are being linked with mainstream sources of support.
4	Consolidation, mainstreaming and sustainability of PDCs	Provision of assistance in further application of learning and institutionalization of gains

Year	Programme Emphasis	Description
		(processes, systems, function/tasks in peacebuilding and development, ongoing partnership projects, etc.)
5	Sustainability of PDCs; and Programme phase-out	Assistance to enhance institutionalization and to move towards sustainability. Programme Phase-out

Programme Implementation Framework

29. Programme implementation is generally premised on a framework that is meant to rationalize the assistance and interventions to be undertaken over five years. Consisting of five (5) levels, each level represents a point of focus on which Programme efforts and resources will be invested. The levels build on each other and provide a reference with which assistance to the target participants can progress. The application of the five levels will take into consideration the degree of awareness, agreements, access and application already achieved by the 163 PDCs that participated in the GoP-UN MDP3. This framework will also guide the formulation of a stage by stage advancement in the condition and capacities of LGUs and other non-community based peace stakeholders in the course of their participation in the ACT for Peace which will be used for benefits monitoring.

- a. First Level: **Awareness.** Refers to efforts to generate consciousness and appreciation among target Programme participants and stakeholders of key concepts and principles. It can also refer to the degree to which participants come to an appreciation of realities (issues, problems and challenges). It is a key level in that it triggers interest among participants and stakeholders to be involved in the ACT for Peace Programme.
- b. Second Level: **Agreement.** Refers to efforts and processes to secure initial commitment among participants and stakeholders. Depending on the nature of the Component, "agreements" can refer to group formation (i.e., forming an organization or association), collective priorities (i.e., Barangay Development Plan; community economic development projects, etc.), and roles and responsibilities (LGU support to PDCs, etc.), among others. These agreements provide bases on which the ACT for Peace Programme can further ground the assistance that it will provide to the participants. These ensure that Programme support will be relevant because it is grounded on the expressed priorities of participants. In turn, this ensures participant acceptance, support and enthusiasm for the Programme assistance and will contribute towards the sustainability of the assistance or of its gains.
- c. Third Level: **Access.** Refers to the degree to which participants are afforded access to services, resources and support whether directly provided by the ACT for Peace or accessed through mediation by the Programme. ACT for Peace support will ensure participant and stakeholder access to interventions that are consistent with the identified areas of assistance per Component. The specific interventions generally include a) direct services, b) technical assistance, c) Culture of Peace, d) policy, and e) linkages and partnerships.

- d. Fourth Level: **Application**. Refers to the process by which participants are able to apply new found “capacities” owing to the support that they were able access in the previous level. ACT for Peace support in this level will ensure that new or enhanced capacities are applied, thus further cementing the learning through “learning by doing” approaches. Successful implementation though on a modest scale and sometimes, pilot or model basis, leads to improved confidence on the part of the participants and stakeholders. The initial application will also provide a “track record,” which many resource institutions require from groups that obtain assistance from them, and which the participants often lack.
 - e. Fifth Level: **Adaptation**. Refers to process by which participants and stakeholders are able to determine the adjustments that they will make in their household, community, group or enterprise practices in order to sustain the capacities or benefits that they were obtain from their participation in the ACT for Peace Programme. Adaptation can also signal the institutionalization of practices and measures at certain levels or the “mainstreaming” of such in established institutions (government agencies, LGUs, etc.)
30. The implementation framework will guide the preparation and delivery of the Programme annual work and financial plan and will guide the development and implementation of projects and activities involving the ACT for Peace participants, in particular, communities, local governments and other non-community-based peace stakeholders.

PDC Stages of Development

31. The PDC or Peace and Development Community is central to the community-based approach of the ACT for Peace Programme. The PDC is the basic social unit upon which the whole peace and development framework of the GoP-UNMDP peace-building programme is founded. Conceptualized as an area where opportunities for development, access to basic services, participation in governance and capability-building for managing and resolving conflicts may take place, the PDC has provided a distinct peace-building dimension to the GoP-UN MDP3.

A PDC may consist of a barangay, or a barangay and adjacent households marked by a convergence of peace-building and development activities. A PDC is a marginalized conflict-affected community which becomes actively engaged in a process of mainstreaming with the help of development partners. Social and economic transformation takes place in the PDC through strengthening the capacity of its community organizations; rebuilding livelihoods through sustainable agriculture and micro-enterprises; rebuilding community infrastructure, and forging linkages with local service providers, including local government units and NGOs, to secure improved access to basic services.


A PDC is also a key production area, which serves as a “resource center” managed by an active cooperative or community association to ensure the equitable spread and distribution of resources among community members, as they build up over time from self-sustaining efforts and external assistance. Such resources may include: community organizations, trained development leaders, trained para-technicians, education facilities, health centers,

household savings pools, enterprise centers, a pool of farm production equipment and farm animals, a cooperative production supply and marketing trading center.

The PDC concept was recognized under GoP-UN MDP3 to ensure sustainability and maximize benefits among stakeholders. The PDCs also serve to facilitate complementation of various inputs from different Programme components as well as other donor-assisted projects. A PDC is marked by the convergence of efforts in a particular area for greater impact.

32. Based on field experience, the GoP-UN MDP3 posits that a PDC evolves and generally goes through six stages of development which are illustrated below. Conceptualized as a ladder and a progression, each stage builds on the achievements of the previous one. The PDC Stages of Development Framework is a social instrument to measure the progress or lack of progress of a PDC. From Stage 1 - the lowest level, a PDC is expected to mature and fully develop over time to reach Stage 6, the highest level. The stages of PDC development and their corresponding indicators are further discussed in detail as Annex C while the status of the GoP-UN MDP3 partner PDCs are presented in Annex D.

Illustration PDC Stages of Development



33. It is estimated that of each stage would entail a certain length of time to successfully accomplish. The table below makes the link between the PDC stage of development and the levels of the Programme Implementation Framework.

Table Correlating Estimated Amount of Time per PDC Stage of Development with Programme Implementation Levels

PDC Stages of Development vis-a-vis Programme Implementation Levels		Estimated Amount of Time ⁸	
		Minimum	Maximum
PDC Stage 1 <i>Confidence Building</i>	Programme Implementation 1 st Level <i>Awareness</i>	6 months	1 year
PDC Stage 2 <i>Peace and Development Organizing</i>	Programme Implementation 2 nd Level <i>Agreement</i>	1 year	1 year
PDC Stage 3 <i>Peace and Development Planning</i>	Programme Implementation 2 nd Level <i>Agreement</i>		
PDC Stage 4 <i>PDC Plan Implementation</i>	Programme Implementation 3 rd Level <i>Access</i>	2 years	2 years
PDC Stage 5 <i>PDC Strengthening</i>	Programme Implementation 4 th Level <i>Application</i>		
PDC Stage 6 <i>PDC Empowerment</i>	Programme Implementation 5 th Level <i>Adaptation</i>	6 months	1 year
Total		4 years	5 years

Projected No. of PDC Taken Up Annually

34. The annual number of PDCs taken up by the Programme will be calibrated such that interaction with PDCs will be at its peak during the first three year with a marked tapering off by the final two years of the Programme. PDCs will be assisted until they “graduate” (i.e., reach the more advanced stages of development as illustrated by Table 3).

Table ACT for Peace Annual PDC Uptake and Progression along the Stages of Development⁹

PDC Stages	Programme Years					Total PDCs over 5 years
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	
Stage 1	3 & 40 new	60 new				263
Stage 2	5					
Stage 3	38	48	60			
Stage 4	75	38	48	60		
Stage 5	42	75	38	48	60	
Stage 6	0	42	75	38	48	

⁸ Based on the experience of the GOP-UN MDP3 and other related peace and development programs.

⁹ Indicative only. The calculated progression of PDC development indicated in Table 3 is based on the pacing of development achieved by PDCs during the Phase Three implementation of the GOP-UNMDP. Data on the status of each PDC is as of June 2004.

PDC Stages	Programme Years					Total PDCs over 5 years
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	
Total PDC Taken Up Per Year	203	263	221	146	108	

Key Activities for Year 1

35. There are key activities that need to be undertaken by the Programme executors and management on the first year. The extent to which they are successfully conducted will impact on participation and performance of key stakeholders in the succeeding years.

- Orientation for the management offices and stakeholders
- Preparation of the Annual Work and Financial Plan (AWFP) through consultative and technical processes
- Selection of sites through consultative and technical processes
- Conduct of baseline study for participating communities and LGUs
- Entering into partnership arrangements with Programme stakeholders and for new PDCs
- Programme systems development and installation (Programme planning system, performance measurement system, monitoring and evaluation, financial management information system, etc.)
- Selection and further capacitation of Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs)

Peace-Sensitive Barangay Development Plan

36. Learnings from the GOP-UN MDP3 affirm the importance of Barangay Development Plans as instruments for communicating the priorities of the PDCs to potential resource providers and as a way of mainstreaming PDC concerns into local governance processes. The ACT for Peace recognizes the importance of peace-sensitive Barangay Development Plans to achieve community priorities, to mainstream peacebuilding and human security and to facilitate the implementation of the Programme.

37. A peace-sensitive Barangay Development Plan is marked by the incorporation of the following elements:

- a. Was formulated in a participatory and inclusive manner
- b. Was formulated with the use of conflict analysis and other tools for identifying development challenges
- c. Has clearly articulated objectives and programs/projects/activities (PPAs) that promote Human Security (at the minimum covering Basic Services and Community Economic Development)
- d. Has clearly articulated objectives and programs/projects/activities (PPAs) that promote a Culture of Peace (COP)
- e. Has clearly articulated objectives and programs/projects/activities (PPAs) that promote the development of conflict transformation capacities of local governments (barangay, municipalities) and communities/groups
- f. Addresses gender issues, the needs of vulnerable groups, and inter-ethnic concerns.

38. The ACT for Peace will assist in the formulation or review and refinement of BDPs, as appropriate, in the existing PDCs and in areas that will be targeted as expansion sites. It is recognized that the BDP will be "broader" in that it will necessary address the institutional concerns of the Barangay Council, etc.
39. The ACT for Peace Programme can opt to focus direct assistance on human security, conflict transformation and COP concerns contained in the formulated BDPs. To make sure that the other priorities of the plan are pursued and addressed, the Programme can help develop the barangay's capacity for resource generation and mobilization, and for monitoring and evaluation.
40. The Programme can also partly derive the priorities for capacity building of target municipal LGUs from the BDP. The Components can have additional processes after the BDP to further generate information on areas that have been identified by the communities as their priority areas for assistance. The information from processes such as mini-Feasibility Studies for livelihood and enterprises and capacity needs assessments (CNAs) for LGUs, etc. will help in the design of Programme assistance.
41. Some of the indicative processes that the Programme may choose to undertake prior to the projected November 2005 Barangay elections are as follows:
- a. Improving the BDP process and tools to strengthen conflict analysis, human security, conflict transformation and COP aspects
 - b. Developing relationship and partnership with the Barangay leadership and Council
 - c. Assisting the Barangay and the PDCs in preparing the information requirements (CBMIS, MBN, etc.) to support effective and peace-sensitive planning
 - d. Supporting social preparation activities in particular the reconstitution of the Barangay Development Council (BDC) and the conduct of Barangay Assemblies

ACT for Peace Component 1

Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding

A. Sectoral Issues

1. Eight years after the negotiated peace settlement of the GRP-MNLF armed conflict, both parties have made strides towards the attainment of lasting peace in Southern Philippines. This can be seen in the community economic and social rehabilitation and reconstruction projects being undertaken in hundreds of communities in the region, including the 163 PDCs supported by the GOP-UN MDP3.
2. Within the 163 PDCs, there are 155 people's organizations that are able to implement projects based on identified needs in their respective Barangay Development Plans. The same POs were able to access basic services and livelihood assistance from the GOP-UNMDP3, government programs and other development agencies such as the USAID-LEAP resulting in better living conditions.¹⁰
3. Serving as internal catalysts, about 363 peace and development advocates (PDAs) are working with these POs and PDCs. PDAs are MNLF constituents, some of them former combatants, who engage in community peacebuilding work on a voluntary basis. They perform multi-faceted roles, from community organizing to conflict management, facilitating development interventions, and frontline relief and rehabilitation activities, among others.¹¹ The PDAs are organized under Peace and Development Advocates' Leagues (PDALs), numbering to 15 provincial leagues and one Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan-wide league known as the MPDAL.
4. Other than the POs and the PDAs, there are other community-based mechanisms by which residents of PDCs collectively carryout the peacebuilding strategies. These mechanisms include formal and informal structures, otherwise known as local social formations (LSFs), which include indigenous, traditional and constitutionally created formations at the village level. Among these local social mechanisms are the Madrasah, Tri-People Peace Movement, Council of Elders, community gatherings and the Barangay Government, *pahina* or *bayanihan* system (helping a member of a community finish a task), *kumpare-kumare* system (an inter-family system of caring for children), among others. Residents identified these mechanisms as essential to peacebuilding work in their communities.¹² Generally, LSFs have evolved in community settings out of the people's need for mechanisms to address issues of governance, economic cultural cooperation and development. Being so, the LSFs are structures that exist based on the people's support for them.
5. Amid these strides in social capital development, there are gaps that have to be addressed.¹³

¹⁰ *An Evaluation of the GOP-UNMDP3: Assessment of Performance and Results*, June 2004; Davao City, p.136

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.31

¹² *Selected Community Practices of the Culture of Peace*, Julio Cesar L. Benitez, GOP-UNMDP3, May 2004; p. 32.

¹³ Expressed by participants during the series of Consultation Workshops conducted from August to September 2004 to evolve the successor programme to the GOP-UNMDP3.

6. One, leadership, organizational management and human resource development knowledge, skills and attitudes of the existing POs need to be enhanced to meet requisites for institutionalization and sustainability. PO leaders also expressed the need to have a grasp in implementing and managing community projects and enterprises. The need to actively involve more women in organizational development and management was also articulated.
7. Two, the MNLF representatives expressed the desire for more active participation in community development processes. Enhancing their participation in community development work may facilitate more harmonious links between the government and the MNLF former combatants.
8. Three, there exist various conflicts in many PDCs and other areas (i.e., resource based conflicts, *ridu*, cattle rustling, tribal, governance conflicts, etc.), which the community residents feel that they should be able to manage and resolve. However, they need the knowledge, skills, capacity and mechanisms to do so. The same capacity gap is seen in the need to address relationship issues between the community and the AFP and the MILF towards safeguarding peacebuilding gains. In like manner, capacity enhancement in the area of promoting multiculturalism and strengthening tri-people partnerships were also expressed as a need.
9. Four, there are other MNLF communities that have yet to be assisted by the government. Social capacity interventions in these communities will have to start with the initial stages of community organizing, i.e. awareness raising, development of peace and development volunteers and formation of people's organizations.
10. Five, the Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) that were developed in the GOP-UN MDP3 and the previous phases expressed willingness to assist in the development of social capital in these other MNLF communities and other conflict-affected areas. They also expressed the need for knowledge and skills enhancement that would enable them to perform community development and community conflict transformation services more effectively and perhaps take on more pronounced roles as Peace and Development Facilitators (PDFs).
11. Six, there are other social groupings in the PDCs whose needs remained unmet. These are the widows and orphans and the MNLF combatants who have been described as in a state of "war-shock." As special groups, there remains a gap in bringing them to the mainstream of community development and facilitating their access to social and economic services.
12. Seven, among the indigenous peoples (IPs), gaps include high illiteracy rate and poverty born out of a lack of access to social and economic services.

Areas of Assistance

13. "Social capital is defined as 'the norms, values and social relations that bond communities together, as well as bridges between communal groups (civil society) and the state' (Colletta and Cullen 2000:4) Social capital has both integrating and linking aspects that are important to peacebuilding. Informal and horizontal relationships, such as trust, reciprocity

and cross-cutting networks contribute to the integration of social capital; vertical relationships, such as with the state or market, provide crucial linkages for strengthening social capital. Conversely, weaknesses in integration and linking increase the potential for violent conflict (Colletta and Cullen 2000).”¹⁴

13. As a means of developing social capital for peacebuilding, the Component shall contribute to the continuing transformation of PDCs and other conflict-affected areas and harness community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace, the component on Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding shall focus on the following specific areas of assistance:
 - Strengthening People’s Organizations and Local Social Formations (LSFs)
 - Expanded peace constituencies and inter-PDC/barangay peace initiatives
 - Local social healing and peacebuilding practices complementation
14. As an area of service, the focus on *People’s Organizations and Local Social Formations* will address the need for equitable access to community development processes. It will address the organizational and human resource development needs of the POs and LSFs in the PDCs and other conflict-affected and vulnerable areas. POs and LSFs will be assisted so that they will arrive at new or improved awareness of group processes and their importance in peacebuilding and the promotion of human security. They will be capacitated in arriving at concrete agreements or plans regarding priorities that would be promotive of peacebuilding and human security. The component will support the formulation of peace-based Participatory Rural Appraisal- Barangay Development Planning (PRA-BDP) in expansion areas and in prioritized existing PDCs. The component will ensure that community members, particularly widows, orphans, MNLF former combatants, IPs and women will have equal access to opportunities to participate in group formation and strengthening processes and will be able to apply and adapt these new or enhanced group capacities. It will also respond to the need for creating new PDCs and will reach out to other post-conflict, conflict-affected, and conflict-vulnerable communities that have minimal or no access to government support. PDAs will be further strengthened and mobilized in strengthening social capital in the expansion areas.
15. The focus on *Expanded Peace Constituencies and Inter-PDC/Barangay Peace Initiatives* will address the need to establish cooperation, mutual help, and resource sharing among peace constituents and PDCs to achieve scaling up, mainstreaming and institutionalization of peace promotion. Community members in expansion area will be made aware and appreciative of peacebuilding and human security objectives, concepts and processes and will be assisted in arriving at agreements to actively work together. These community members will be engaged in initiatives that will build, apply and further adapt their capacity to collaborate for the promotion of peacebuilding and human security. As an offshoot of such, it is expected that additional communities will be declared as peace zones. Existing PDCs will be encouraged to engage in inter-barangay or inter-PDC peace efforts such as

¹⁴ *Building Peace in the Conflict Setting: Conflict Transformation Processes in the Tuluhan Peace Zones*, Alma R Evangelista, 2004; p.7

peace festivals leading towards the formation of provincial or inter-municipal peacebuilding structures.

16. The focus on *Local Social Healing and Peacebuilding Practices Complementation* will help strengthen local capacities for peace that would address various existing conflicts at the community level. It will enhance tri-people reconciliation and unity and evolve practices of promoting multi-culturalism. Healing processes of all those who suffered from the past conflict shall be addressed, including the widows, orphans and war-shocked former combatants who may need psycho-social healing. This area of assistance will also facilitate improved stakeholder (both community-based and those that are not based in communities) awareness of local social healing and peacebuilding practices. Stakeholder agreement and support will be critical in studying and promoting specific local social healing and peacebuilding practices for mainstreaming in appropriate agencies such as government institutions, academe-based peace institutions and other CSOs. In this connection, conflict and local peace practice mapping and community-based action research on peacebuilding shall be undertaken. Improved access and exposure of mainstream agencies to local social healing and peacebuilding practices will cause better appreciation of the applicability/relevance, effects and requirements of such practices leading to their replication in other conflict-affected or vulnerable communities.
17. The Programme will integrate concern for the environment in its initiatives. Accountability for the environment is among the paths to peace promoted in the Culture of Peace and is embedded in the sustainable integrated area development strategy which is exemplified by the PDC approach.

Specific Interventions

18. The component shall consolidate POs and LSFs towards mainstreaming and institutionalizing their participation in peace-based development planning and implementation processes. It shall work on the existing 163 PDCs and shall expand to 100 more new areas that are affected by various conflicts. Qualified local PDAs shall be engaged for this endeavor with provisions for cost of living allowances and mobility. They shall conduct training needs analysis and implement/conduct on-site/community-based capability building sessions for POs and LSFs, and facilitate community conflict transformation processes. The ACT for Peace Programme shall provide the PDAs and other implementing partners with the necessary tools and abilities needed in the implementation of these strategies.
19. Further, as the enhancement and mobilization of LSFs are distinct from the usual organizing and formation of people's organizations, the ACT for Peace Programme shall provide the PDAs and other engaged community development facilitators with guides on how best to undertake such strategy. This is complemented by efforts at continuing studies and knowledge generation on LSFs and their role in peacebuilding.
20. The partnership between the Programme and the different PDA Leagues is critical to the delivery of Component 1 assistance. In like manner, the cooperation of the DOLE-BRW and the CDA shall be enlisted to facilitate the registration of the POs and to provide technical

support. Partnership with CSO service providers shall be forged to provide organizational strengthening and consolidation services for the PDAL and MPDAL as well as to enhance the capabilities of its members.

21. The consolidation of the POs and LSFs shall be undertaken within the ambit of the Culture of Peace promotion. Community sessions on the culture of peace shall be conducted.
22. The proposed strategies for PO Formation and LSF Mobilization Strategies for Participation are outlined below. They are not prescriptive and should be adapted and expanded to meet actual community and field conditions:
 - a. PO Formation, Strengthening and Consolidation
 - PO Diagnosis and Capacity Needs Assessment (for expansion areas)
 - Developing Peace and Developing Facilitators (i.e., assessing PDA capability to support PO Strengthening)
 - b. Enhancement of Informal Groups/IP Structures/Self-help Groups/Natural Social Formations
 - c. Continuing Participatory Strategy Formulation
 - d. Peace-based BDP-PRA
 - Incorporating conflict analysis in PDC Needs Scanning and Profiling
 - Conduct and vulnerability analysis and gender analysis to inform decision-making on the gender dimension of post-conflict development plan formulation as part of the BDP-PRA process
23. Essential to the development of social capital for peace is a broad-based peace constituency. This enables resource sharing among peace advocates and at the same time multiplies their access to governance, participation and development resources.
24. Peace alliance building is best carried out based on strengthened POs; hence social capital strengthening should proceed on its full course of intervention and processes. Expansion of peace constituencies and building of inter-PDC/barangay peace alliance will be carried out by PDCs that have attained Level 4 of development and by POs that have already been strengthened. PDALs through the PDAs shall be the anchor of the alliance building while the PDCs shall be its base. While PDCs form the backbone of alliance building, peace constituency building becomes more inclusive with the efforts of Component 5 to promote COP among the media, academe and CSO, and with the efforts of Component 4 to mainstream COP among the LGUs and other social formations at the municipal, provincial and regional level.
25. The proposed strategies are outlined below. They are not prescriptive and Programme options are not limited to and by them:
 - a. Development and engagement of PDAs and other community development facilitators

- b. Community Commemorations of Peace Struggles
 - c. Community Cultural Celebration of Peace
 - d. Declaration of Zones of Peace
 - e. Inter-barangay/PDC dialogues, consultations, planning and collective actions
 - f. Inter-barangay/PDC Cultural Peace festivals
 - g. Inter-PDCs/Alliance Assemblies
26. Local social healing and peacebuilding practices are part of the social capital of the community. It is important that they are identified and interfaced/complemented with the Programme peacebuilding interventions. This is to ensure that the interventions are peace-promotive and culture-sensitive, and are able to harness the synergy of internal-external complementation of strengths.
27. Local conflicts and peace practices shall be mapped to support the selection of peace practices that can lend themselves to replication and as well to provide benchmarks for the formulation of PO and LSF consolidation strategies. The component will purposively identify and map out these local peace practices and mechanisms for codification and documentation. These local capacities for peace shall be further enhanced through exchanges and study tours, celebrations and commemorations. Community truth-telling and dialogues processes shall be conducted to facilitate healing and enable the victims of war to fully regain confidence in themselves and participate in community peacebuilding and development processes.
28. The competence of PDAs that will be involved in the implementation of this component shall be built up to enable them to participate in the implementation of the above strategies. To complement the efforts of the PDAs, community youth groups shall be encouraged to use culture and arts to enliven the peace-promotive cultural practices of the community. Local healers shall be mobilized in the community effort to achieve a healing process.
29. Partnerships with other peace stakeholders such as community-centered cultural groups, academe-based groups, local schools, madrasahs, other CSOs, religious/spiritual groups and government agencies shall be established to enhance stakeholder participation and support for community peace processes. In turn, these peace stakeholders can gain learnings that they can then replicate or apply in other conflict-affected areas.
30. This strategy shall benefit from the tools for the conduct of conflict and peace practices mapping as well as guides for the conduct of dialogues, truth telling and healing sessions that shall be produced by Component 5.
31. The strategies for promoting participation in the enhancement of local/indigenous social healing and peacebuilding practices strategies, which are not prescriptive are not limited to the ones outlined below:
- a. Conflict and Local Peace Practice Mapping

- b. Documentation of local (including indigenous or traditional ones) peace practices
- c. Enhancement of effective peace practices
- d. Cross-visits, exchange and study tours to facilitate replication
- e. Tri-people truth telling processes, dialogues and healing sessions

32. The range of interventions by specific areas of assistance is detailed and captured in the matrix provided for in the next page.

ACT for Peace Component 1: Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding
Matrix of Areas of Assistance and Specific Interventions

Specific Interventions	Strengthening People's Organizations and Local Social Formations	Expanded Peace Constituencies and Inter-PDC/Barangay Peace Alliances	Local Social Healing and Peacebuilding Practices Mainstreaming
Inputs and Services	▪ Involvement of PDAs and other community development facilitators ▪ PO Diagnosis and Training Needs Assessment ▪ Conduct vulnerability analysis and gender analysis as part of the BDP-PRA process to inform decision-making on the gender dimension of post-conflict development plan formulation ▪ Provision of peace-based barangay planning tools and manual ▪ PDA Capability Assessment Tool RE: PO Strengthening ▪ Provision of Peace-based Community Organizing Tools and Manuals ▪ Provision of Capability Building Training Modules	▪ Development and engagement of more PDAs ▪ Provision of venues and mobilization resources for inter-PDC dialogues, consultations, planning, festivals, assemblies	▪ Mobilization and deployment of technical assistance and expertise of service providers ▪ Establishment of Community Peace Spaces for Truth Telling, Dialogue and Healing Sessions
Capability Building	▪ Training and coaching on human resource development and managing organizational change ▪ Training and coaching on managing and transforming community conflicts	▪ Knowledge, skills and attitudinal training for PDAs on alliance building for local healers	▪ Training of local facilitator for truth telling, dialogues and healing sessions. ▪ Capacitating community youth to harness culture and arts for peacebuilding ▪ Sensitization session
Linkaging/ Partnership	▪ Program, PDAL/MPDAL and CSO Partnership ▪ Cooperation with DOLE-BRW	▪ Partnership with Community-centered cultural groups/CSO ▪ Partnership with local schools and	▪ Partnership between the ABC and PDAL ▪ Collaboration with CSOs

Specific Interventions	Strengthening People's Organizations and Local Social Formations	Expanded Peace Constituencies and Inter-PDC/Barangay Peace Alliances	Local Social Healing and Peacebuilding Practices Mainstreaming
COP	▪ Cooperation with CDA ▪ Conflict and Local Peace Practice Mapping	madrasah ▪ Provision of guidelines for Inter-barangay/PDC dialogues, consultations, planning and collective actions ▪ Provision of guidelines for inter-PDC dialogues, truth-telling and healing sessions ▪ Legislation of the integrated area peace zones	▪ Provision of Conflict and Local Peace Practice Mapping Tools ▪ Provision of guidelines for dialogues, truth-telling and healing sessions ▪
Policy	▪ Accreditation and support by LGUs of peace-promotive POs and formations ▪ Integration of the local participatory conflict mapping into the planning process of the LGUs ▪ Accreditation and support by LGUs of peace-promotive POs and formations	▪	▪ Local and national legislations strengthening those local social formations that contribute to peacebuilding in the communities

Strategies for Implementing the Component and Delivering the Assistance

33. The component on Strengthening Social Capital for Peacebuilding is concerned with the harnessing of human potentials, as well as local social institutions and organizations, in the pursuit of peacebuilding and development of the community. It recognizes that empowered people are the primary determining factor in peacebuilding development process. Hence, the focus is on technical assistance, mainly through capacity building, modules and materials development, and community activities.
34. Capacity building covers the development of the knowledge, skills and attitudes of individuals as well as the capacity of institutions. The latter is expressed in terms of policy, systems, processes and practices. It involves the establishment or enhancement of organizational, social and institutional mechanisms and processes that will enable people to facilitate healing and reconciliation, relationship-building and conflict transformation, and increasingly reject violence and adopt a peaceful way of life and strategies for community development. This includes building the capacity of the community to access basic social services, like health or rehabilitating the community from the ravages of war or a natural calamity.
35. Necessarily, it is within a community peacebuilding framework that the component shall be carried out. This means that:
 - a. The community organizing processes shall be anchored on the Culture of Peace and the promotion of individual and collective rights.
 - b. The approach will be inclusive of various approaches to community organizing so long as it is firmly anchored on community needs (demand-driven and necessarily so, flexible) and are culture-sensitive and gender-responsive.
 - c. These community needs are contained in the Barangay Development Plans that are evolved, through participatory process and with the broadest possible participation of the various sectors of farmers, fisher folk, laborers, and women, including the Local Government Units and the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front. This process ensures that the strategies being employed are demand driven, are informed by conflict analysis, and are culture-sensitive. These community peace and development plans are evolved within the contexts of the pursuit of peace, promotion of people's rights and the attainment of human security. To the extent possible, the PDC plans should be incorporated in the barangay and municipal level development plans such as the Executive and Legislative Agenda.
 - d. The Barangay Development Plans shall be the basis for the convergence of development efforts and support. The Programme shall endeavor to verify from and work with other programs in ARMM that support or undertake BDP-preparation to avoid duplication and overlaps.
36. Based on the foregoing, the efforts to strengthen and mobilize POs and LSFs is purposively based on the community-identified and analyzed needs. Operationally this means that PO strengthening and LSF mobilization is based on the key priority strategies and programs/projects that are contained in the Barangay Development Plan. This

includes determining the kind of PO that shall be formed or strengthened and the LSF mobilization strategies that shall be employed.

37. Operationally, the Programme shall take off from the current status of the 163 PDCs and 155 POs. Most of these PDCs are in Stages 3 (38 PDCs or 23%), 4 (75 PDCs or 46%) and 5 (42 PDCs or 26%)¹⁵. For PDCs that are on Stage 3 the initial effort will be on establishing POs and commencing the implementation of the community peace and development plans. For PDCs on Stage 4, the initial efforts will be on strengthening the POs, building local savings mobilization capacity, and strengthening the involvement of the LGU in peacebuilding.
38. On the other hand, the targeted 100 new PDCs or expansion in other conflict-affected areas shall be considered as being on Stage 1. Initial efforts shall be focused on developing local peace champions and advocates, awareness building and addressing immediate community issues through small community projects.
39. Mainstreaming and institutionalization of the POs, LSFs and other peacebuilding practices will be planned out together with Component 4 (Building Stakeholders' Capacity Building for Conflict Transformation), which takes care of the capacity building for LGUs and other non-community stakeholders.
40. To ensure sustainability and impact at the community level, Component 1 needs to closely interface with the strategies of the other components. Social capital development prepares the ground for the implementation of the strategies of the other components and continues to solidify to ensure community harmony and common direction.
41. A balance between consolidation of the POs and LSFs in existing PDCs and the expansion to other conflict affected areas and newly created PDCs shall be maintained in such a way that the old and consolidated areas shall be a springboard for expansion to new areas. Scaling up peacebuilding and advocacy shall be among the rationale for expansion to other conflict affected areas and should be undertaken in consideration of the geographical, political and cultural impact that a cluster of PDCs can generate. (This strategy for expansion jives with the concept of economies of scale that may be achieved by clustered PDCs, which the component on livelihood generation may consider.) This strategy is reflected in the schedule of PDC uptake below.

**PDC Indicative Cumulative Uptake and Progression
along the Stages of Development¹⁶**

PDC Stages	Programme Years					Total PDCs over 5 years
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	
Stage 1	3 & 40 new	60 new				263
Stage 2	5					

¹⁵ This refers to the Six Stages of Development of a PDC developed under the GOP-UNMDP 3 implementation. Data is as of June 2004

¹⁶ The calculated progression of PDC development indicated in Table 1 is based on the pacing of development achieved by PDCs during the Phase Three implementation of the GOP-UNMDP.

PDC Stages	Programme Years					Total PDCs over 5 years
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	
Stage 3	38	48	60			
Stage 4	75	38	48	60		
Stage 5	42	75	38	48	60	
Stage 6	0	42	75	38	48	
Total PDC Taken Up Per Year	203	263	221	146	108	

42. It is projected that the progression of a PDC from Stage 1 to Stage 6 will roughly take a minimum of four years of intensive community intervention. This shall be the basis for the deployment of Peace and Development Advocates or the PDAs, performing the role of social capital development facilitators and supported by other implementing partners or service providers.

Implementation Strategies

43. Following the development track of the GOP-UN MDP3 phases, the Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) surfaces as among the possible implementers for this component. One PDA shall be deployed for every three PDCs.
44. The PDAs were trained in community organizing and development work during the Phase 2 of the GOP-UN MDP and served as community facilitators and project implementers during the Phase 3. They have organized themselves into provincial league consolidated under the MinSuPala Peace and Development Advocate League (MPDAL). They have expressed the desire to be directly involved in the implementation of the ACT for Peace Programme, not only as a matter of "being-able-to-do-so," but more so as a rightful claim to participate in development endeavors in Southern Philippines. The PDA Leagues, particularly the MPDAL, shall be among the partners that the ACT for Peace shall work with in implementing Component 1.
45. However, there are expertise areas that the PDAs are not yet equipped with, particularly in the area of culture and arts-based community training and mobilization and in psycho-social healing processes. For these purposes, the Programme, under the Component on the Culture of Peace shall contract the services of qualified implementing partners, such as CSOs, to work in partnership with the MPDAL/PDALs. The Programme shall also engage the services of CSOs with high capability on organizational development and strengthening to assist the MPDAL.
46. Moreover, as the Programme endeavors to expand and broaden the peace constituents in Southern Philippines, the participation of other agencies and civil society groups shall be sought in the conduct of social preparation and peacebuilding work in the community. With broad participation, the praxis of social preparation and peacebuilding strategies will be further enriched.

47. The implementation of this Component necessitates the support of the Barangay, Municipal and Provincial Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Association of the Barangay Captains (ABC). These agencies shall provide the favorable environment for the broadening of the base of peace constituents through peace-promotive legislation, accreditation of POs from the PDCs and supporting the formation of peace alliances.
48. The Programme shall collaborate with the Bureau of Rural Workers of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE-BRW) and the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). As collaborating partners, they shall assist in the registration of the POs and shall render technical assistance.
49. The Programme shall also enter into a memorandum of cooperation with the DOLE-BRW and the CDA for the purpose stated above and to sustain the POs.
50. In the spirit of complementation, the resources of Components 4 shall be mobilized to support the implementation of Component 1. In particular, Component 4 shall facilitate the forging of a Memorandum of Cooperation with the LGUs, the ABC and other stakeholders to promote the objectives of Component 1.
51. One consideration that needs to be addressed by the Programme is the facilitation of a formal dialogue between MNLF, MPDAL/PDALs and the Programme management. This dialogue is needed to formalize and reaffirm the role of the PDAs as the community-based mechanism of the MNLF to pursue active participation in community development work in Southern Philippines.
52. The resources and expertise of UN agencies can be harnessed to assist in securing the deliverables of Component 1. UNDP's global experience in building social capital in post-conflict and conflict-vulnerable communities can be valuable input to the managers and implementers of ACT for Peace.

ACT for Peace Component 2

Promoting Human Security through Improved Access to Basic Services

Sectoral Issues

1. The basic requirements for survival, which include food and nutrition, health, water and sanitation, are still unmet in most areas in Southern Philippines, particularly in ARMM. According to stakeholders¹⁷, the lack of health personnel, inadequate health equipment, supplies, and facilities, lack of access to potable water supply, and the increased number of malnutrition cases pose a concern. Another survival need is family planning. The biggest percentages of families without access to family planning services are in Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. (Annual Poverty Indicators Survey, Oct.1999).
2. The State of the Women of Mindanao Report 2003 highlighted the poor health statistics like infant mortality rates, maternal mortality rates which are high in three regions in Mindanao¹⁸, attributed to poor access to basic health services, lack of women's participation in health decisions and management.
3. Aside from being poor, the communities that are conflict-affected are poorly served. The World Bank Filipino Report Card on Pro Poor Services revealed that residents of Mindanao and rural areas and the poor are more likely to visit government primary facilities and traditional healers. Service public primary facilities (barangay health stations) are mostly frequented by the poor. Improving the quality of these facilities and stressing the delivery of needed services would make them more pro-poor. The Report Card also revealed that children drop out from school primarily because of poor health reasons followed by economic reasons.
4. Most rural communities in Mindanao lack access to potable water supply¹⁹ and this situation is evident in conflict-affected areas. Water consumption by the poor is unacceptably low, barely meeting human water requirement. There is increased vulnerability to diseases like malaria, gastroenteritis, dengue fever and typhoid which is induced by scarce, contaminated water.²⁰
5. It is acknowledged that women play different roles during and after conflict. Women also suffer most from loss of property, livelihood, absence of potable water and health services, and disruption of their children's education when they return to their communities.²¹

¹⁷ Stakeholders' Consultations with the Provinces of Sulu, Basilan, Tawi Tawi, Maguindanao, UNMDP3 staff, Government agencies and KII,

¹⁸ The State of the Women of Mindanao Report 2003: Highest infant and child mortality. Among the Country's Bottom 5 regions with the highest number of deaths among infants, children under five, and children age one to four, three were in Mindanao, namely, Region IX, Caraga, ARMM. Maternal mortality rates just as dismal. In ARMM only 16 out of 100 women had births attended by health professionals. This was not surprising considering that Mindanao LGUs have the lowest number of employed doctors, compared to the national average of 2,943. Mindanao had only an average of 90 LGU employed doctors.

¹⁹ Filipino Report Card on Pro Poor Services, The World Bank

²⁰ *ibid.* p.11

²¹ The State of the Women of Mindanao Report 2003

6. One of the Ethics of Peace Practice is honoring the peace that belongs to the people who make it. People and societies must create conditions and develop processes for achieving and sustaining their own peace. Based on the stakeholders consultation, the need to mobilize local partners like BangsaMoro Women Foundation for health services delivery can be explored (to facilitate application of culturally sensitive reproductive health programs in pilot areas) and developing community health professionals from within the community to address dependency from outside help thus enabling the community in finding solutions to their health needs and concerns.

Areas of Assistance

7. Component 2 aims to contribute to the sustained transformation of PDCs and other conflict-affected areas and to the promotion of human security by providing access to an integrated health program. Assistance will be needs-driven, culturally appropriate and will mainstream women's participation. The delivery of an integrated health program that includes reproductive health, nutrition, water and promotion of women's rights will engage various stakeholders aside from the DOH and LGU through a convergence approach at the PDC level.
8. There are three major interventions in health service delivery: Health education and information, delivery of services and management of health services. Health education and information related to nutrition, safe water supply, reproductive health and promotion of women's rights will contribute to the improvement of the health status in the target areas. Health-based functional literacy classes, especially rights literacy for women, will be conducted. A community-based management information system (CBMIS) will be installed in each community for baseline and responsive planning tool. The installation/enhancement of the CBMIS will provide guidance in the conduct of the participatory barangay planning and the provision of appropriate basic service delivery intervention per PDC. This will eventually improve health care delivery system and make the community members aware of their health conditions. An understanding of the information will ultimately challenge the community to address their own health problems.
9. The health referral system will be enhanced to build capacities at different levels of care. The referral system will include the inventory and capacity assessment of the different levels of care, both in terms of skills and facilities (barangay, municipal, district, provincial, regional) and determining when to refer various cases without prejudice to the welfare of the client. Overcrowding of highest level of care (secondary and tertiary) means ineffective preventive and promotive health programs not to mention problems in the timely referral of cases itself. It is therefore necessary to invest in the preventive and promotive aspects of care, stressing the services needed by the poor and as a consequence making health service delivery more peace-promotive.
10. In the area of reproductive health, Component 2 will provide information and services on five (2) thematic areas: family planning, maternal health, STD/HIV/AIDS prevention, adolescent reproductive health, prevention and management of violence against women. The

reproductive health package puts emphasis on attaining the “Quality of Care.” The RH goal is to improve the quality of life.

11. The health and nutrition program, in complementation with the agriculture assistance provided by Component 3, will ensure food security both at the household and community level. Promotion of breastfeeding, appropriate complementary feeding practices and micronutrient supplementation as promoted by the Department of Health will be an integral part. Malnourished children under 5 years of age will be given supplemental feeding while their families are educated on proper nutrition.
12. The Component will work with the Local Health Providers Development Program to train community health volunteers or qualified candidates using a ladder type curricula for training health human power education (Davao Medical School Foundation and UP School Of Health Sciences Palo, Leyte). This will ensure the availability of a skilled health provider at the barangay level as a response to the lack of doctors, nurses and midwives in the community. The Component will also promote and enhance the role of the BangsaMoro Women Foundation (BMWF) as health service providers and the mobilization of the Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs) for social preparation and community organizing.
13. The installation of the safe water supply systems will contribute to the decrease of incidence of waterborne diseases by providing access to safe sources of water. Organized barangay water associations (BAWASAs) will maintain and sustain the operations of the water system and its safety. Health education on environmental sanitation will also focus on the use of sanitary toilets and proper waste disposal.
14. Recognizing that women and men are affected by conflict differently with the former most affected by its negative consequences, the Programme’s concern for women’s rights will address the gender dimensions of conflict. Ensuring improved access by women to services and resources, and increasing awareness and knowledge on women’s rights not only among women but also of the larger community (LGU, judiciary, military, and police) are peace-promotive and conflict-preventive initiatives. Advocacy efforts will endeavor to show the links between women’s rights and customary law.
15. Relief and Rehabilitation will only be provided as an emergency response. The component will focus only on emergency relief operations and will link the need of IDPs particularly for shelter with another program, the GoP-UNDP Programme for Rehabilitating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Communities in Southern Philippines.
16. In keeping with the principle of environmental sustainability, the design and appraisal of projects will include measures to ascertain whether the planned activities will have any impact on the environment. For instance, mitigating measures will be required of construction activities (e.g., for barangay health stations, etc.) that will have negative impacts on the environment.

Strategies for Implementing the Component and Delivering the Assistance

17. Component 2 assistance will be implemented and delivered through the convergence of health and emergency services for men, women, men, adolescents, and children; capacity building; health education and information campaign, networking and linking; and resource mobilization.
18. Component 2 will be implemented in keeping with principles that build and strengthen horizontal relationships such as peace-oriented interventions, and approaches that are rights-based, participatory, demand-driven, flexible, culturally sensitive, gender-responsive and promotive of convergence. It will not be a stand alone component; the implementation and delivery of assistance will be integrated with the other ACT for Peace Programme components.
19. To ensure sustainability and impact at the community level, the strategies will balance equality (access for all) and equity (needs-based and focused) in the selection of health care providers, health beneficiaries and communities. Expansion PDCs need to be socially prepared prior to any basic services intervention. For PDCs that were covered by the GoP-UN MDP3, activities will focus on the enhancement, promotion and monitoring and consolidation of community-based health efforts. Community-based health initiatives will be mainstreamed, and eventually be institutionalized. Support from the barangay LGU will be generated for a sustainable community based health program as reflected in the PRA-BDP.
20. Component 2 shall work with a range of partners. Barangay LGUs, with support coming from the municipal LGU, specifically the offices of the Rural Health Unit, the Municipal Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist or Agricultural Officer, shall be among the implementing partners. In some instances, Civil Society Organizations (BangsaMoro Women Foundation, peoples organizations, NGOs, etc.) will be selected as health service providers depending on the community need. Peace and Development Advocates will be involved in the social preparation and mobilization. Collaborating agencies such as Regional Health Offices (now the Center for Health and Development or the CHD), Mindanao Health and Development Office or MHDO and Mindanao Emergency Relief Network (MERN) will facilitate the delivery of the component assistance and complement the efforts of the Programme. Monitoring and evaluation will be done at all levels (implementing, support and collaborating agencies). The M&E system will be installed at the start of the Programme implementation. Well-informed partners on M&E will promote transparency and accountability at all levels.
21. By their nature and experience, UN agencies can uniquely contribute to the implementation of Component 2. UNDP can coordinate emergency relief operations. UNFPA can provide strategic and technical advice for reproductive health services, including education and information.

ACT for Peace Component 2: Promoting Human Security through Improved Access to Basic Services
Matrix of Areas of Assistance and Specific Interventions

Interventions	COMPONENT ASSISTANCE AREAS				
	Health & Nutrition	Reproductive Health	Water	Women's Health & Rights	Relief & Rehab
Inputs and Services	- Vaccines for immunization - Supplemental feeding, micronutrient supplementation, seedlings/cuttings for vegetable gardens, herbal gardens - IEC materials	- Construction materials for BHS construction and improvement - Equipment and facilities - Drugs & medicines - CBMIS, IEC and advocacy materials, RH classes - Basic IEC	Materials for water system installation	- IEC on women's rights - Directory of organizations	- Medicines - Food - Water - Latrine - Temporary shelter (canvas) - Psychosocial - Trauma healing
Capability Building	- Trainings on BEMOC, Primary Health Care, Maternal and Health and Nutrition (MHN), Child health and Nutrition (CHN), Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) Health Education & Advocacy, Food Security - Health-based	- Training on the 5 thematic areas (family planning, maternal health, STD/HIV/AIDS prevention, adolescent RH, prevention and management of violence against women) - Trainings in Integrated RH, Interpersonal communication skills, ARH, VAW, Quality of	- Organizing Barangay Water and Sanitation Associations - Trainings on organizational development - Water systems operations management	Training on Women's Rights, Linkaging, networking, advocacy	Training on EWPW, M&E

Interventions	COMPONENT ASSISTANCE AREAS				
	Health & Nutrition	Reproductive Health	Water	Women's Health & Rights	Relief & Rehab
	Functional Literacy ▪ Step ladder type of curriculum for qualified health volunteer ▪ Cross visits	Care and functional literacy ▪ Management of RH programs to include supervision and mentoring, community based monitoring, and results-based management			
Linkaging and Partnership	▪ LGU (RHU, MSWD, MA)	▪ LGU, CHD, MHDO ▪ BMWF, other CSOs ▪ Muslim Religious Leaders	▪ LGU	▪ Mindanao Commission on Women and other organizations ▪ Judiciary, military, police	▪ MERN, disaster coordinating councils, Office of Civil Defense, DSWD, DOH, NGOs (CRS for psychosocial-trauma healing)
Culture of Peace	▪ Health as a basic human right, understanding peacebuilding processes	▪ Module on Peace and Development in RH/ARH ▪ Popularization of the Fatwa on RH ▪ Promotion of Mussawarah	▪ Do No Harm policy	▪ Women's health rights ▪ Women's rights and customary law	▪ Psychosocial-trauma healing

Interventions	COMPONENT ASSISTANCE AREAS				
	Health & Nutrition	Reproductive Health	Water	Women's Health & Rights	Relief & Rehab
Policy	▪ All health workers should be involved in all the different activities. ▪ Promotion of herbal medicines at the Botika sa Barangay ▪ Policy support for the health referral system ▪ Service contract for community scholars that will undergo step ladder education	▪ Informed choice, responsible parenthood, birth spacing, contraceptive self reliance, facility based birthing ▪ BMWF as RH service provider (pilot)	▪ Recognition of the BAWASA and provision of support for the strengthening of the association	▪ Advocacy for the utilization of the 5% gender fund for promotion of women's rights ▪ Establish link between women's rights and customary law	▪ To prioritize the vulnerable and sick ▪ Immediate response

ACT for Peace Component 3

Promoting Human Security through Community Economic Development

Sectoral Issues

1. The GoP-UN MDP3 Stakeholders Consultation results point to the need to promote convergence in all efforts (interventions and activities) that involves income generation and enterprise development. Income generation covers all activities -- "farm related" or non-farm activities including self-employed skills -- that are designed to generate products and services for monetary gain. Whereas enterprise development is understood to mean the optimal use of human and other productive resources.
2. Most of the covered communities are classified among the most depressed / impoverished areas in the country. The current food level is below RDA. Food products, raw and processed are imported from neighboring "more progressive" communities or provinces.
3. The ACT for Peace Programme area covers Mindanao and Palawan. In these areas, the productive base (natural, financial and human resource) for both agricultural productivity and micro enterprise operations are marginal. Thus the income levels of the communities are directly affected.
4. Increases in output are constrained by inadequate post harvest facilities, by poor marketing systems, and limited employment and enterprise opportunities prevailing in the covered communities. Post-harvest losses continue to take its toll on productivity. Current marketing systems render the farming and fishing communities' income potentials relatively low. These have a direct effect on enterprise potentials in the communities considering the resulting marginal "money in circulation" or "disposable incomes" of residents.
5. Violent conflicts affect production factors and the total productivity of these factors. In many areas in Southern Philippines, physical capital such as croplands and forestlands has been destroyed. Human capital has diminished due to "brain drain" caused by massive evacuations and dislocation. The negative impact of violent conflict on the total productivity of these factors can be seen in the forms of diminished social cohesion, increased transaction costs, diversion of productive capital into emergency spending, and the adoption of shortsighted policies, among others.²²
6. In particular, conflict areas are generally plagued by "capital flight" out of the affected communities. There is an enormous need for capital to fund projects that would trigger economic activities in the communities. Internally generated capital would be insufficient to reverse the current flow. The need for external resources especially those from the Government and other service providers/development programs can not be underscored.
7. Enterprise potentials, especially for the non-farm sector, are directly affected by low productivity and the weak state of "community financial resources". Low incomes from the farming and fishery sector translate to less demand for products and services including

²² PNUD as cited in *Conflict Prevention NHDR Thematic Guide Note*, UNDP; August 2004, p.23

employment. When opportunities are wanting, people would have less resource with which to access or procure adequate food. This leads to malnourished / impoverished conditions that render the poor weak and unable to work efficiently on their farms or enterprise leading to less income and so forth and so on. This describes the so-called "circular causation" of the factors resulting to "reverse sustainability," keeping the people in the community resource poor, and in many cases, poorer than their pre-conflict levels.

8. A vibrant local economy would enhance community efforts towards human security (and harmony) at their levels. Community members would be productively engaged. Poverty, among others, has been identified as one of the key factors that "fueled" conflicts in poor communities.
9. There have been fairly successful models of economic development support provided to post-conflict communities. In the experience of the GOP-UN MDP3, the CoFUND scheme and the Community-based Training on Enterprise Development (CBTED) introduced by ILO-PROCEED, and the Sustainable Livelihood approach of FAO were recognized as viable models. Furthermore, to effect purposeful development of the community economy, there needs to be critical considerations of reciprocity between and among enterprise and livelihoods including the farming sector in the community.
10. The experience of the GoP-UN MDP3 and other programs operating in Southern Philippines also bear out the following observations:
 - a. The informal and rural nature of economy in ARMM renders the formal type or center-based vocational training programs non-adaptable. The informal economy needs informal systems of training that are more direct, product and service-oriented, short-term and less expensive.
 - b. There is a need for a practical and transitional enterprise development component that is not included in the present program curriculum of vocational training institutions.
 - c. Capital investments are low and commercial market structures absent resulting to the shortage of wage employment opportunities.
 - d. There is need for self-employment activities for income generation in the rural areas based on abundant local resources and local demands.
 - e. There is a significant number of unemployed women with zero costs of productive labor, that are willing and proven in their participation in social movements for economic and self-determination.
 - f. Poor Muslims and indigenous peoples are often socially excluded from the already limited formal credit programs in the region
11. There are still outstanding land tenurial issues in the areas covered by the ACT for Peace Programme. These need to be adequately understood and satisfactorily addressed by government. Lack of tenure can limit the access of households affected by violent conflicts

to productivity support and benefits. In the medium to long term, lack of access to land can also contribute to the escalation of or the breakout of new conflict.

12. Many conflicts are borne out of disagreements over access to and use of natural resources such as conflicts over mining and concerning water. A significant number of populations in need, for instance upland farmers and subsistence fisherfolk, depend on the resource base for their daily sustenance. Unfortunately, given the depleted and polluted state of the country's environment, the economic activities of many poor people add to the pressures on the ecosystems.

Areas of Assistance

13. The component on economic development shall work with the existing (unserved) 63 PDCs from MDP3 and service the 100 expansion PDCs over the next five (5) years.
14. The component shall contribute to the promotion of human security through Community Economic Development. The component shall build capacity of the target stakeholders in the local (community) economy to articulate their interests, organize themselves, plan, implement and supervise economic initiatives that help improve their living conditions. This approach, which has been applied in the promotion of Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs) as a component of the UNDP-PRODERE or Programme for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees in post-conflict areas of Central America,²³ has been proven to be highly effective in providing an immediate response to the needs of conflict affected countries to create employment, rebuild communities and achieve reconciliation.
15. To foster economic development, the Component aims to increase productivity and incomes in the target communities. Hence, the Component shall promote employment creation and income generation for both farm and non-farm areas through the optimal use of human and other resources in the PDCs.
16. The component on Community Economic Development will be guided by the following principles:
 - a. Consensus building
 - b. Strengthening local capacities
 - c. A bottom-up, participatory approach
 - d. Striving for synergy
 - e. Acting as catalyst
 - f. Linking the local economy to regional and national economies
 - g. Raising public awareness
17. Local structures and mechanisms will be enhanced towards the generation of increased farm incomes and employment opportunities (including self employment). Agriculture-

²³ UNDP charged UNOPS with the execution of PRODERE. UNOPS in turn subcontracted ILO as responsible for the promotion of Local Economic Development Agencies in each area covered. The LEDAs was found to be the crucial factor in the success of PRODERE

related and non-farm sectors include “pre-micro”, and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME).²⁴

18. Target communities will be assisted in designing and utilizing environmentally sound and sustainable agricultural technologies and enterprise development activities in both community and individual livelihoods.
19. In designing and delivering key economic development interventions, service providers will practice convergence to generate maximum results.
20. Program interventions that provide production inputs and community fund among others would generate early favorable impact on local communities and possibly spill over to include neighboring areas.
21. As part of a comprehensive peacebuilding programme, the Component shall not operate as a “stand alone” poverty alleviation initiative. It shall converge with the components to generate a synergistic (multiplied) effect thereby enhancing overall efforts to mainstreaming and ultimately sustain gains from the ACT for Peace Programme.
22. In line with the Programme intent to contribute to environmental sustainability, farm projects will emphasize conservation of genetic, water and soil resources and the regeneration of the agricultural and upland ecosystems. As for non-farm economic projects, care will be taken so that the Programme will not assist pollutive or resource-depleting activities.

Farm Assistance

23. The component shall support the transformation of conflict-affected areas by promoting food security specifically strengthening local capacity to produce sufficient food and/or obtain access to it.
24. The Component will address immediate subsistence requirements in the target communities through staple food production projects. Simultaneous interventions on entrepreneurial development and employable skills training would provide capacities to procure food for their respective households. During the consolidation phase, focus would be on the commercialization of farm projects without losing sight on “self-provisioning” of food in the community.

²⁴ Definition of SME:

Enterprise Levels	By Asset Size (Magna Carta for Small Enterprises and the Barangay Micro Business Enterprises Act of 2002)	By Employment Size (recognized by ILO)
Micro	Less than Php 3,000,000	1-9 employees
Small	Php 3,000,001 – Php 15,000,000	10-99 employees
Medium	Php 15,000,001 – Php 100,000,000	100-199 employees

25. Crop and farming systems diversification will be introduced as a means to identify compatible commodities and services anchored on the local resource base and possible value adding activities

Non-Farm Assistance

26. The Component's assistance would endeavor to address the "talents exodus" or emigration observed in conflict-affected communities. In general, it has been noted that those who are at least "knowledgeable" or skilled and at productive ages (16-35 years old) in the communities leave for greener pastures. Together with the PDCs, component activities would identify appropriate needs for developing employable and entrepreneurial capacities that would advance the economic agenda set by the community. These interventions would have to take into consideration Component 1 efforts to further develop People's Organizations (i.e., as associations, as cooperatives, etc.).
27. To achieve the objectives of increasing productivity and incomes in the target communities, the capacities of target households, communities and other stakeholders will be enhanced through:
 - a. Training and workshops which should fit the informal and rural nature of covered communities' economy and give due considerations to available local resources and demand
 - b. Demonstrations and hands-on exercises which will include advising and coaching
 - c. Provision of start-up inputs (roll-over) for the farm sector and for the non-farm sector using the ILO-PROCEED's Community Fund scheme model to get the communities to embark on viable and sustainable endeavors. Other resources shall be tapped through networking with other service providers to sustain access to capital that would further enhance community economic activities.
28. The Component would also focus on capacitating the communities to access other sources of "capital" like the Barangay Micro Business Enterprises for enterprises with assets of not more than Php 3,000,000.00 (RA No. 9178 – An Act to Promote the Establishment of Barangay Micro Business Enterprises –BMBEs, Providing Incentives and Benefits Therefore, and For Other Purposes.)
29. The impact on perceptions would hopefully trigger other sources of capital (both formal and informal) to consider investing or providing financial assistance to PDCs livelihood and enterprises.
30. Coupled with start-up inputs/capital, the technologies and know-how imparted to the communities would enable them to generate marketable commodities and services, spurring trade within and outside the communities. When more products are traded, the potential for more investments both internally and externally generated from formal or informal sources are expected to also increase. This would also help reduce outbound migration and possibly reverse the local trend. The presence and dynamic interrelation among emigration, capital

and trade would lead to a favorable increase in economic activities in the community. At the same time, these factors tend to re-enforce each other thus further contributing to the creation of a vibrant and economically empowered community.

31. For target participants that are already implementing enterprises, Component assistance shall also include critical interventions that address key marketing-structure and concerns to effect maximized returns on outputs (products and services)

Strategies for Implementing the Component and Delivering the Assistance

32. The Component shall engage, cooperate and collaboration with partners to attain the Component objective and deliverables, to ensure the social, political, technical and financial sustainability of Component initiatives and interventions, and to sustain changes and capacities gain at the level of the target participants:

- TESDA
- National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
- Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
- Department of Agriculture (DA)
- Department of Agriculture and Fishery DAF – ARMM
- Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) - ARMM and other region
- Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) - ARMM and other region
- Department of Science and Technology (DOST) - ARMM and other region
- Non Government Organizations
- Other Development Programs
- Local Government Units
- State Colleges and Universities
- Business Associations / Chambers of Commerce
- Government and Commercial Financial Institutions

33. Cognizant of the expertise and resources within the UN system, the involvement of key agencies in the Component is envisioned as follows:

ILO. For non-farm sector entrepreneurial development and training for employable skills

FAO. For farm sector support including farming systems, technology, and marketing assistance

ACT for Peace Component 3: Promoting Human Security through Community Economic Development
Matrix of Areas of Assistance and Specific Interventions

Specific Intervention	COMPONENT ASSISTANCE AREAS	
	Sustainable Agri-based Livelihood	Community-Based Enterprise Development
Inputs	Provision of production inputs on a cost recovery scheme	Skills Development with Micro Finance scheme
Capability Building	Farm and related activities - Rapid Rural Appraisal - Trainings: - Agri-technology - Environment / Natural Resource management - Organization and management of farm enterprises - Extension / comprehensive range of support services (technology and management techniques) - Farming Systems / Diversification (aside from new crops, livestock, tree species and aquatic/fishery), value adding activities enhancement - Techno Demo Farms - Help mobilize resources and facilitate access to credit, markets other services	Non – farm activities - Strengthen / enhance capacity for self employment and wage employment in non-farm economic activities in PDCs - Skills Development - Training for self employment & income generation - For skills for wage employment - Capacity building of PDCs - Rapid assessment of community resources - Identifying potential economic activities - Organize Corporate Community Groups (CCGs) - Transition Enterprise Plan - Community-Fund Scheme - Upgrading skills (using modules such as <i>Start Your Business</i> (SYB) and <i>Improve Your Business</i> (IYB)) - Formal linkages with private/corporate sector and financial institutions
Linkaging/ Partnership	- Market Linkages to ensure competitive prices accrue to farming sector - Alliances with commodity / Industry Associations and Resource/Service Providers - Partnership with other stakeholders and service providers (PDALs, LGU, Government Agencies, other Development Programs and Donors, etc.)	- Strengthen partnerships and capabilities of partner agencies, government and NGOs through training and participation - Strengthening cooperation among partner agencies in implementing the Community-Based Training and Co-Fund - Networking/partnerships with Industry Associations,

Specific Intervention	COMPONENT ASSISTANCE AREAS	
	Sustainable Agri-based Livelihood	Community-Based Enterprise Development
		Chambers of Commerce, Business Support Organizations etc.
COP	Economic Activities leading to equality and equitable opportunities to the communities and ensure “enculturation” of peace building concerns / efforts that is rights based, participatory, culture sensitive and demand driven	- Continuity to integrate local/Islamic practices under the Co-Fund Scheme - Strategic Fit of enterprise and Skills Development with local norms/culture
Policy	- Advocacy for sustainable farming systems - Sound environment management. - Safety nets for vulnerable commodities/sector - Agrarian and Land Tenure Policies - Promote investments in agribusiness (within the community and from outside)	- Advocacy for sustained/enhanced skills and enterprise development - Creation of favorable climate for the creation and growth of small enterprises - Promote entrepreneurship and MSME development

ACT for Peace Component 4

Building Stakeholders' Capacity for Conflict Transformation

Sectoral Issues

1. Peacebuilding is a commitment that needs to engage more active participation of multiple stakeholders. In Southern Philippines, this includes the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Local Government Units (LGUs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and other key actors and institutions (academe, media, etc.). Their critical roles in peace and development processes are acknowledged. These stakeholders help create an enabling environment for the Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) while they implement their plans. As well, these stakeholders can nurture peacebuilding processes and structures. In effect, these stakeholders contribute to the institutionalization of support mechanisms for peacebuilding and the promotion of human security at particular levels.
2. Experiences in the GOP-UN MDP3 manifested how different stakeholders provided helpful support to community-based peace initiatives through advocacy; endorsement of PDC projects to other development programs; technical assistance; facilitation of decision-making processes; enactment of policies supportive and promotive of PDCs; allocation of resources and sharing cost of projects; accreditation of people's organizations; and linkage building.
3. The creation of MINDACOMNET by 32 regional agencies in Region IX; the issuance of executive orders for the PDTF in 7 provinces and 24 municipalities; the adoption of the PDC as a convergence strategy by a regional body, two provinces and 15 barangays⁷ attest to such support. Several LGUs also allocated resources to fund PDC projects. Government agency efforts to mainstream PDC concerns in agency PPAs were indicated by reports from the DILG, DA, DAR, DSWD, DOH, TESDA, and DOLE, among others. On the other hand, civil society organizations have been relentless in advocacy initiatives and provision of technical assistance along peace and development.
4. In spite of these contributions, gaps exist in the participation of the above identified stakeholders due to a number of factors. These are, among others, inadequate capacities of actors and institutions; lack of appreciation for peace and development; and non-recognition of their roles in peacebuilding. The perception that opportunities to participate in peacebuilding are limited; and the absence of structures for enjoining participation, or inefficiencies and weaknesses when and where the structures do exist, compound the situation.
5. Results of consultation workshops, key informant interviews⁸ and review of related reports and materials reveal other issues confronting the sectors. These issues as presented below can be responded to by the ACT for Peace Programme through Component 4:

⁷ An Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Programme: Assessment of Performance and Results, June 2004, Davao City, pp. 11-12

⁸ Consultations Workshops conducted in August-September 2004 and participated in by various programme stakeholders (MNLF, LGUs from Region IV to ARMM, GAs, PDAs, CSOs, private sector, media, religious sector,

- a. The need for common and shared perspectives and appreciation for peace and development, its processes and requirements among actors and institutions. A common framework can guide them in pursuing their individual and collective efforts in peacebuilding.
- b. An understanding of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement among all sectors is necessary to advance and accomplish peace and development purposes in Southern Philippines.
- c. The need to institutionalize policy support for peace and development in programs and in government plans for purposes of continuity and sustainability.
- d. Several stakeholders view peace and peacebuilding as a sectoral concern⁹ being the responsibility of the military and the police.
- e. The need to improve organizational competencies of key sectors to enable them to participate meaningfully, to perform and sustain their critical roles in peace and development:

MNLF: Clarifying and enhancing strategic directions and policies; strengthening competencies on leadership, decision-making, negotiations, monitoring and evaluation

LGUs: Integrating human security and peacebuilding in their plans and targets; strengthening local structures (POC, LDCC, LSB, LHB, PDTF); strengthening the Katarungang Pambarangay; adopting peace-sensitive processes; enjoining participation of CSOs, MNLF, POs in governance; enacting peace-sensitive policies; developing capacity for conflict analysis and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) and early warning and prevention; allocating resources for peace and development undertakings; linking PDCs to higher levels (from barangay, municipal, provincial, regional), enhancing peace building skills of selected personnel

NGOs, POs (PDALs, BMWs, etc.): Enhancing peacebuilding skills; using conflict analysis, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) and other peace-sensitive tools in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; resource mobilization; strengthening coaching and mentoring skills so that they can better provide assistance to the PDCs, BDCs, etc. and participate more in peacebuilding efforts. Enabling civil society groups and individual champions who may opt to play the role of third-party observer, adopting an inter-positioning stance and advocacy at the community level or other levels.

Government Agencies: Integrating peace and development in their programs, plans and activities; applying peacebuilding tools such as conflict analysis, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) and other peace-sensitive tools in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; enhancing competence in conflict transformation (especially

GOP-UN MDP 3 current and previous staff); Interviews with MNLF leaders and representatives, MDP 3 staff, LGUs, Line Agencies.

⁹ Source: JICA, comprehensive Basic Survey of ARMM, Governance Sector Final Report, December 2003

for agencies mandated to perform peace-related functions, i.e., OCD, DILG, NCIP, OMA, DSWD, PNP, AFP, other law enforcement bodies, Sharia'h, etc.)

Religious, Academe, Media: Integrating peace and development concerns in their programs, plans, products and services to enable them participate more in advocacy, information dissemination, dialogues

- f. The need to strengthen relationships among key stakeholders (among others, PDCs and LGUs, MNLF and LGUs, government agencies in ARMM and non-ARMM areas and PDCs, CSOs and LGUs) so that they can work together in pursuing peacebuilding.
6. There are also broad issues that require higher levels of intervention or a combination of interventions coming from various sectors. The ACT for Peace Programme is one among many undertakings that respond to peace and development needs in Southern Philippines. This calls for coordination with different sectors, sharing and dissemination of information, policy advocacy, complementing resources and programs and strong national government directives and action. The issues include:
- a. Fulfillment of GRP-MNLF FPA provisions that have not been completed; this is perceived to erode trust among government and MNLF and other sectors
 - b. Arrangements and structures for a fully operational ARMM have not been satisfied (i.e., non-devolution of critical agencies – DBM, CSC, NAPOLCOM or some agency functions and personnel of devolved offices are still under central management; flow of budgets and services bogged down)¹⁰
 - c. Mainstreaming of MNLF as political party in democratic governance remains a challenge.
 - d. Addressing land tenure concerns (land ownership and security of tenure) in communities. This has been a long- standing cause of tension and conflict.
 - e. The need to curb corruption and similar practices at all levels in government. Left as is, corruption slashes away resources that are needed for critical services, demoralizes the critical mass, and creates more conflict;
 - f. Gaps in the judicial system: Perception that the system is unable to expedite cases fairly and swiftly; Sharia'h courts are not fully staffed; inefficient processes, incapable personnel

Areas of Assistance

7. The assistance to be provided by Component 4 shall be responsive to the needs of the stakeholders and shall address the issues identified as covered by the ACT for Peace:

¹⁰ Source: JICA, comprehensive Basic Survey of ARMM, Governance Sector Final Report, December 2003

- a. **Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies** of key actors so that they can better fulfill their roles in promoting human security and undertaking peace and development efforts. Select key persons from MNLF, LGUs and other institutions (government agencies, NGOs, BMW, PDALs, academe, religious, etc. that are involved in peacebuilding) shall be the targets of this intervention. Competencies shall focus on conflict analysis, prevention, management, and resolution. At the same time, all critical actors and institutions shall undergo activities on building a culture of peace, understanding the FPA, and appreciating peace and development principles and processes.
- b. **Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations.** This area of assistance responds to the need of LGUs to become more peace-oriented and promotive of peace-sensitive governance. Likewise, it will address the concern of MNLF on further enhancing their institutional capacities and leaders' competencies so that they can better participate in the ACT for Peace Programme as an organization and in other local peacebuilding initiatives and to be more ready to mainstream in democratic governance. The capacity gaps of other peacebuilding actors/institutions will also be targeted to enable them to intensify efforts in peace and development.
- c. **Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives.** Assistance shall be afforded to these actors and institutions as they pursue and sustain peacebuilding initiatives. Information, technologies, knowledge management, policy advocacy and other facilitating mechanisms will aid the stakeholders in advocating and performing functions on human security and peacebuilding as well as delivering services to PDCs and other local development initiatives.

Specific Interventions

8. The assistance aims to secure the following outputs:
 - a. Enhanced appreciation of stakeholders of peace and development principles, concepts and approaches
 - A shared perspective/framework among stakeholders is an imperative in peacebuilding efforts. Collective accountability for peace shall be promoted, rather than treating peace as a concern of specific sectors (i.e., police, AFP, etc.).
 - Orientation workshops, sessions and activities to meet said output shall involve the topics/themes: Understanding Peace and Development, Human Rights, Human Security, Gender, Understanding the FPA, Building and Promoting a Culture of Peace, and Mapping Responsibilities
 - b. Improved competence among stakeholders, including the MNLF, to undertake or participate in community organizational processes that promote conflict transformation, human security, peacebuilding and culture of peace principles, concepts and approaches

Some interventions that will be provided to improve competencies include:

- Understanding human security concepts
- Rights-based approach to local governance and development management
- Planning and implementing human security and peacebuilding undertakings
- Skills building on conflict analysis, prevention, management and resolution
- Using peacebuilding and conflict transformation tools (PCIA, EWPM, conflict mapping, negotiation, mediation, monitoring and evaluation, coaching, etc.)

In response to capacity needs expressed, interventions shall be provided to enable the MNLF to involve themselves more meaningfully in governance processes as well as in peace and development efforts. Below are some activities that will serve the purpose:

- Reinforcing organizational commitment for peace
 - Leadership development
 - Building/Enhancing skills in negotiating, influencing, mediating, monitoring and evaluation, etc.
 - Building and strengthening partner relationships for peace and development
 - Participating in governance
- c. Improved responsiveness of LGUs to needs of conflict-affected communities and peace and development concerns

Acknowledged as the established structure at the local level, the component endeavors to directly assist the LGUs so that they would be able to critically address requirements of peacebuilding in their respective areas and sustained these efforts.

In particular, the Programme recognizes that local governments play strategic roles in conflict transformation. Being at the frontline, they can intervene to prevent the escalation of conflicts into violence. The ACT for Peace shall enable LGUs to undertake effective conflict analysis, particularly the capacity to understand the context, causes, actors and dynamics of conflicts. The Component shall also endeavor to promote a rights-based approach to local governance and development management. This means that the human rights framework and principles/concepts of rights entitlements and state obligations and the normative content of every right are applied systematically and methodically to development and governance processes at the strategic development planning, policy and legislation, administrative functions, programs and service delivery levels.

The interventions may involve:

- Supporting peace-responsive BDPs
- Rights-based approach to local governance
- Reinforcing LGU commitment for peace
- Integration of and resources allocation for peace in plan, programs and activities
- peace sensitive legislation
- Peace-oriented structures and processes
- Strengthening of the Katarungang Pambarangay
- Partnering for peace and development
- Resource accessing and mobilizing for peace and development
- Participatory governance

- d. Enabling mechanisms supportive of stakeholders' initiatives in promoting or advancing human security and peacebuilding

The component will endeavor to create mechanisms/structure that would support and facilitate efforts toward peace and development. Within this, assistance along policy advocacy, research and development, knowledge management, development information, etc. will be provided.

Strategies for Implementing the Component and Delivering the Assistance

9. Component 4 shall be carried out through the provision of capacity building (CB) and development interventions for the target actors and institutions following a needs-assessment (CNA) process. The prioritization of needs as well as the identification of interventions responsive to their needs and scheduling of activities shall be done in a participatory manner. Participation in the CB will be inclusive, regardless of gender but will deliberately involve women to ensure balance. The interventions shall respect culture and exercise flexibility to accommodate differences.
10. All key actors and institutions shall participate in activities that shape a Culture of Peace. The extent and levels of assistance however shall vary per area depending on the needs of the targets. Initially working in the areas covered by GoP-UN MDP3 (15 provinces, 14 cities, 84 municipalities, and 160 barangays), Component 4 shall expand its services to other geographic areas that have been identified as hosts of new PDCs. This is presented in the table below:

Table Indicative List of LGUs to be involved in the ACT for Peace

LGU	Existing	Expansion	Total
Barangay	160	100 PDCs = +/- 100 Barangays	=/- 260
Municipalities	84	50	134
Cities	14	0	14
Provinces	15	0	15
Total	273	150	423

11. Learning methods to be adopted for the CB interventions will be mixed. The range includes formal, face-to-face training, study missions and site visits, consultations and dialogues, informal, coaching and mentoring especially during application/practicum and follow-through activities.
12. The component shall emphasize that to be effective, conflict transformation strategies need to be context-specific, as well as community and problem-specific, with strategies for vertical integration to address the institutional and policy dimensions of the particular conflict being addressed.

13. The Component shall promote the principle of convergence where the focus is on building a conducive and enabling environment for PDCs to become successful in their development undertakings and for peace and development to prevail. The capacity of key sectors (LGUs, MNLF, others) shall be enhanced, thus enabling them to provide assistance required by the PDCs in their development stage. As regards the LGUs, priorities for their capability building shall be partly derived from the BDP requirements. Interventions in this component shall run parallel to the phased approach of programme implementation shown below:

Table Component 4 Year to Year Areas of Emphasis

Year	Programme Emphasis	Component 4
1	Consolidation of (Existing PDCs) and Expansion (Identification and Social Preparation of New Sites)	Assistance (Competence building and Organizational Strengthening) to actors and institutions in existing areas. In synch with Component 1 (and other components), undertake initial preparations for the new sites identified as expansion areas.
2 - 3	Expansion and Consolidation (of both Existing and Expansion PDCs)	Provision of assistance to expansion sites while continuing services to existing sites. (Existing sites are in/moving into application of learning)
4	Consolidation and PDC Sustainability	Provision of assistance in application of learning and institutionalizing gains (processes, systems, function/tasks in peacebuilding and development, ongoing partnership projects, etc.)
5	PDC Sustainability and Programme Phase-out	Assistance to enhance institutionalization and to move into sustainability. Component Phase-out

The timing of the interventions shall also consider the scheduled electoral processes, i.e., Barangay elections in 2005.

14. Promotive of partnership building, Component 4 will enjoin the pooling of resources and expertise in the conduct of interventions and in the implementation of stakeholders' programs and projects so that better effects and benefits are created at the community level. It shall also endeavor to partner and coordinate with other development programs currently implemented in the areas and providing similar or complementary services – i.e., LGSPA, GEM, LEAP, STARCM, ECHO, ARMM Social Fund, AusAid, UNDP and other UN agencies, etc. Interfacing with related national government programs, projects and activities will likewise be pursued. By doing so, resources are optimized and duplication of services is avoided.
15. The sustainability of peace and development efforts and functions shall be secured through the strengthening of local structures, by ensuring active and continuous participation of CSOs in governance and peace building efforts, as well as by building local capacities. Passage of peace-sensitive instruments, the integration/mainstreaming of peace and development concerns as well as gender and multiculturalism in agency plans and

programs, regular monitoring and evaluation and reporting to constituency will also promote sustainability.

16. Guided by the “1 ProDoc, 1 WFP, 1 M & E & 1 Report” principle, Component 4 shall work with other components in synchronizing the conduct of common activities (i.e., Programme Orientation and Advocacy, Culture of Peace, partnership building, monitoring and evaluation for same participants/actors/sectors), sharing of information and resources. More so, building on each other’s gains (i.e., effective basic services require executive policy support from LGUs), and regular meetings among component teams to discuss and thresh out concerns and jointly responding to issues will enable complementation among components and concerned implementing agencies.

Implementing Arrangements

17. The delivery of Component 4 shall enlist the participation of various stakeholders who shall be responsible for providing the required services. They shall be carefully selected considering their track record in performing relevant tasks. However the Component will be open to accommodate new partners provided they share the goal of peacebuilding and are committed (i.e., are available, carries a “learning mode” paradigm, willing to partner, etc.) to engage in the Programme. Local-based actors and institutions shall be enjoined to participate in the undertaking.
18. The following shall be considered in the delivery of Component 4:
 - a. **Implementing Partners:** CSOs (such as NGOs, POs and associations), academic, resource and training institutions, government agencies, the private sector and UN Agencies will be tapped to provide technical assistance – deliver training, facilitate workshops, conduct required interventions and submit required reports
 - b. **Support Providers:** Resource institutions, the academe and CSOs and UN Agencies will be mobilized to provide services on research and development tasks, and documentation of learning and good practices. Likewise, the media can provide necessary support and services for information dissemination and advocacy.
 - c. **Collaborating Agencies:** Government agencies, LGUs, CSOs and other partners (MEDCO, UN agencies, etc.) can perform collaborating tasks to facilitate assistance and provide complementary services to the interventions of Component 4.
 - d. **Monitors and Evaluators:** Government agencies (among others, DILG, LGUs, OMA, DSWD, NEDA, MEDCO) and representatives from the MNLF, NGO, CSOs, resource institutions and the UN Agencies shall be responsible for tracking the component’s progress and results and providing feedback to the concerned sectors and the programme.
19. A memorandum of agreement/understanding signals the formal involvement of said partners. Meetings to assess status, share information and updates shall be regularly

conducted. Timely submission and review of required reports will also be helpful in establishing progress as well as determining areas for improvement.

ACT for Peace Component 4: Building Stakeholders' Capacity for Conflict Transformation

Matrix of Areas of Assistance and Specific Interventions

1. Local Government Units (LGUs)

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Inputs & Services	- Advocacy and IEC materials: GOP-MNLF FPA, Peace Building, Rights-Based Approach to Local Governance and Development - management, Women's Rights; How To's on Peace-Sensitive Enactment - Framework: Peace and Development; Human Security; "Do No Harm" Principles	- Manuals and Guides: Participatory Governance, ELA, Peace and Development Framework - Tools – Conflict Analysis, PCIA and other Peace building tools - Materials on peace-sensitive governance - Peace sensitive local development planning processes	- Compendium of Resource Institutions - Policies affecting/enabling peace and development efforts - Results of research conducted - Peace and conflict transformation indicators developed and provided - Mechanisms for partnerships

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Capacity Building	- Using conflict analysis, PCIA, EWPM - Skills in negotiating, arbitration, mediation, dispute resolution - Partnering for Peace and Development - Enhancing Participatory Governance - Women's Human rights - Using peace indicators in M & E - Resource mobilization for peace and development projects	- Integrating peace plans - Strengthening local structures – Peace and Order Councils, Local Disaster Coordinating Councils, Local Health Board, Local School Board, Peace and Development Task Force - Ensuring participation of CSOs, women's groups, youth, traditional leaders, MNLF in governance - M & E on Peace & Development undertakings - LGUs facilitating resources mobilization PDC projects - Implementing the peace plans; - Monitoring performance of the local structures and providing interventions - Application of learning and institutionalizing processes - Promoting rule of law; exercising transparency in transactions	- Documentation of good/sound practices - Technologies, manuals, techno-guides, policy advocacy materials
Culture of Peace	- Promotion of COP - Conflict mapping-Municipal & Provincial - Resolving land conflict between migrants, IPs, Muslims	- A system for resolving land conflict - Exercising peace-sensitive governance - Assistance in application and monitoring	Research into status of land tenure and security in the areas covered

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Linkages/ Partnerships	Identifying and mobilizing areas for linkages and partnerships	- Convergence of resources for peace and development activities/projects (among Barangays-Municipalities-Provinces) - Complementation of programs and projects among LGUs and Agencies; - LGUs and schools working on integration of COP in curriculum	- PDC projects and LGU peace and development programs integrated in partner institutions plans - Policy requirements of peace efforts advocated to ARMM-RLA and LGUs
Policy	Integrating human security, peace in policy formulation	- Enactment of peace-sensitive, gender-responsive ordinances and adherence to policies - Tracking implementation of peace sensitive, gender-responsive policies	Advocacy for policy requirements, policy advocacy materials

2. Other Peace Building Stakeholders – Non-Government Organizations, Civil society Organizations (Bangsa Moro Women, PDAL, POs), MNLF, Government Agencies involved in peacebuilding, Media, Religious, Academe, etc.

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Inputs & Services	- Advocacy and IEC materials: GOP-MNLF FPA, Peace Building, RBA, Women's Rights - Peace-sensitive planning, implementation and monitoring - Women's Human Rights - Framework: Peace and Development; Human Security; "Do No Harm" Principles	- Advocacy and IEC materials: GOP-MNLF FPA, Peace Building, Women's Rights - Peace-sensitive planning implementation and monitoring	- Compendium of resource institutions; - Policies affecting/enabling peace and development efforts; - Results of research conducted; peace reportage modules - Results of research conducted - Peace and conflict transformation indicators - Mechanisms for partnerships

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Capacity Building	▪ Skills on using PCIA, EWPM, other peace building tools, conflict Prevention, management and Resolution; Enhancing skills on coaching and mentoring, mediating, dispute resolution; ▪ Producing peace reportage/peace sensitive publications ▪ Application of learning For MNLF: ▪ Leadership Development (for State and Zone leaders) ▪ Skills in negotiating, influencing, arbitration, mediating ▪ Using conflict Transformation Tools ▪ Monitoring and Evaluation ▪ Partnering for Peace and Development ▪ Participating in Governance ▪ Women's Human Rights ▪ Provision for follow-through activities: application of learning	▪ Integration of peace and development in plans and programs ▪ Resource mobilization ▪ Partnership building ▪ Application of learning ▪ Institutionalizing gains ▪ Enhancing processes ▪ Pursuing institutionalization of strategies and activities	▪ Documentation of good/sound practices ▪ Manuals, techno-guides, materials

Specific Interventions	Areas of Assistance		
	Improving Conflict Transformation Competencies	Strengthening Peace-Responsive Organizations	Providing Enabling Mechanisms to Support Stakeholders Initiatives
Culture of Peace	▪ Promotion of COP ▪ Applying other tools	▪ Promotion of COP ▪ Pursuing mediator, observer, third party ▪ Assistance in applying and provision for follow through activities ▪ Promotion of inter/intra-MNLF dialogues ▪ Monitoring outcomes of dialogues	▪ Research into status of land tenure and security in the PDCs covered/locality ▪ Guidelines in the conduct of dialogues
Linkages/ Partnerships	▪ Identifying and mobilizing areas for linkages and partnerships	▪ Complementation of programs and projects for peace; Partnership building; CSOs participation in governance ▪ Participation of the MNLF as an organization in governance and in the peacebuilding efforts ▪ Sustaining participation/partner relations	▪ Opportunities for linkages with other resource institutions ▪ Materials on building and nurturing partnership
Policy	▪ Formulating peace-sensitive policies ▪ Adherence to covenants forged ▪ Formulation, implementation and tracking	▪ Adherence to policies ▪ Tracking implementation of peace-sensitive policies ▪ Policy formulation and adherence to policies ▪ Formulation, implementation and tracking	▪ Advocacy for policy requirements ▪ Policy research and advocacy materials

ACT for Peace Component 5

Promoting and Advocating a Culture of Peace towards Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation

Sectoral Issues

1. "Perhaps, nowhere in the history of Mindanao has interest in peacebuilding reached a mass proportion than after the breakthrough signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement in September 2, 1996."²⁵ There is a growing concern for sustaining the gains of the peace accord and expanding this gain to include the peaceful resolution of the armed struggle waged by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This may have led to the growth of peace institutes, organizations and individual advocates.
2. The current emphasis, while not dropping the call for justice that was prevalent in the 1970s, is on peace and reconciliation. The change is significant, since now the focus is not to be in conflict or in opposition, but the thrust is towards the resolution of conflict, changing of attitudes towards reconciliation, forgiveness, healing of wounds, peace and full human development.²⁶
3. The GoP-UN MDP3 has contributed in the growth of the peace movements through its advocacy of the Culture of Peace. It has facilitated the transformation of former combatants to peace and development advocates and conflict-affected areas to PDCs, and had fostered PDC-LGU partnerships for peace and development in 163 localities in the region.²⁷
4. The upswing in the peace movement in the region presents a great opportunity for the promotion of the Culture of Peace towards peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Southern Philippines. This opportunity must be seized to further consolidate, mainstream and institutionalize the grassroots-based infrastructure for peacebuilding and development.
5. As expressed by the participants during the series of Consultation Workshops conducted from August to September 2004 to evolve the successor programme to the GOP-UN MDP3, there remains a great need for the continued promotion of the Culture Peace.
 - a. Various conflicts -- resource based, conflicts, ridu, cattle rustling, tribal, social and cultural conflicts, and unstable peace and order situation -- still affect many PDCs and other localities in the region. Name calling, labeling, stereotyping Muslims as rebels, misunderstanding because of biases and discrimination, and racism are still part of the mainstream culture.
 - b. Human rights abuses still occur; ancestral domain claims of the indigenous peoples remain unaddressed.

²⁵ Kami Rin May Kapayapaan: *Determinants of Peaceability in Selected Communities in Mindanao*, I. Julio Cesar L. Benitez; GOP-UNMDP3, Davao City, May 2004, p.23.

²⁶ William Larousse, *Walking Together Seeking Peace: The Local Church of Mindanao-Sulu Journeying in Dialogue with Muslim Community (1965-2000)* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001) 408

²⁷ *An Evaluation of the GOP-UNMDP3: Assessment of Performance and Results*, June 2004; Davao City, p.v.

- c. The members of the MNLF still see the need to build healthy relationships with the local government units and other structures of governance, which they feel have yet to appreciate the significance of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.
 - d. At the grassroots level, residents have to build and manage relationships with the warring groups —AFP, MILF, NPAs. This, as expressed by residents of some PDCs, is important so that the development efforts of their community will be spared from armed conflicts. Building and managing the relationship of communities with armed groups do not necessarily mean a condonation of violence, but rather a proactive and creative local way of asserting the people's desire for non-violence and protecting the community from getting caught in the crossfire between warring groups.
6. Finally, stakeholders have expressed the need to institutionalize conflict transformation competencies among various governing agencies, beneficiaries, advocates, and partners. There is also a need to strengthen tri-people partnerships and promote multi-culturalism.
 7. In the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), there are peacebuilding initiatives pursued by the national, regional, LGUs, CSOs and other donors. Despite this, the participation of all agencies and sectors in these efforts still needs to be ensured. Many stakeholders continue to view peacebuilding as the sole responsibility of the military and particular groups. More so, the tracking of peacebuilding efforts in the region, and their status and gains remain inadequate. Likewise, information dissemination on policies, guidelines (i.e., on loose firearms registration) have to be extensively done.²⁸
 8. Moreover, it is perceived that existing peacebuilding initiatives in Southern Philippines have yet to optimize their impact on the level of policy. Policy can be defined as being the sum of government activities acting directly or through its agents intended to influence the lives of its citizens.²⁹ From a peacebuilding and human security promotion point of view, policies can be used to protect rights, improve the allocation of scarce resources and redistribute burdens and benefits for the general welfare. Learnings and experiences from peacebuilding programs can be systematically developed for policy purposes, and referred to government for appropriate action.
 9. Policy development suggests a systematic approach to the identification of issues and concerns that specify a policy response, the mapping out and evaluation of options leading to the selection of a policy measure that can then be pursued with the concerned government institution.

Areas of Assistance

10. To respond to these opportunities and sectoral concerns, Component 5 (Promoting and Advocating a Culture of Peace towards Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation) shall cut

²⁸ Comprehensive Basic Survey of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Governance Sector, ARMM Government, December 2003

²⁹ As defined in the Policy Advocacy Handbook, KAISAHAN Policy Research and Advocacy Unit

across all other components of this Programme with specific areas of assistance focusing on the following:

- Enhancing the Local Capacities for Peace
- Partnership Building for Promotion of the Culture of Peace
- Enhancing the Environment for Culture of Peace Promotion and Support

11. The first two areas of assistance shall support the other components in implementing strategies and approaches that promote and are consistent with the Culture of Peace.
12. As a specific area of assistance, “Enhancing Local Capacities for Peace” shall support Components 1, 2, 3 and 4 by profiling and establishing the pre-Programme capacities and condition of participating communities and LGUs. Implementing partners will be equipped with advanced knowledge, tools and methodologies for integrating the culture of peace, peacebuilding, human security and conflict transformation in the assistance that they provide to the communities and LGUs. In consideration of the capacities of community partners, implementing groups may be asked to include functional literacy in their delivery of peace education courses.
13. Partnership building as an area of assistance will enhance the capacity of government agencies, LGUs and social structures at the provincial and regional levels to appreciate and apply COP and peacebuilding practices. These mainstream institutions will be assisted in gaining the abilities to adapt and sustain COP and peacebuilding practices
14. LGUs and line agencies at the provincial and regional levels have the option of either creating or enhancing existing structures relevant to conflict transformation and ensuring that policies in place are peace-sensitive. This will address the need for vertical linkage and integration of the Culture of Peace, and will support mainstreaming towards institutionalization.
15. “Enhancing the Environment for Culture of Peace Promotion and Support” shall address the concerns for inter-generational and multi-cultural perspective on the significance of culture of peace and human security to ensure that the future generation will continue to respect and abide by the peace accord. This area of assistance shall provide institutional support for the popularization of the Culture of Peace through the mass media, integration into the education curriculum, through the involvement of religious/spiritual leaders and, by supporting policy development to further mainstream peacebuilding and the Culture of Peace in government.
16. Improved awareness by mass media practitioners will pave the way for mass media establishments to agree to adopt a more active peace-promotive public information agenda. Groups of peace practitioners/champions among the members of the academe, schools, churches/spiritual groups and madrasahs shall also be established.
17. MEDCo, the Overall Implementing Agency for ACT for Peace, has the mandate to “promote and coordinate the active participation of all sectors to effect the socio-economic

development of Mindanao through a wholistic and integrated approach.”³⁰ This puts in the position to engage in policy development in support of peacebuilding. Policy Research and Advocacy is one of the development strategies of MEDCo. Components 1 to 4 of the ACT for Peace also identified specific policy measures as aspects of the assistance that would be rendered in order to address issues and achieve the Component planned output level results.

Specific Interventions

18. As a component that cuts across the other Programme component, strategies to attain this particular output are spread out in the COP strategies of the other components. Thus the responsibility of this component is to provide technical and training assistance to the other components in area of the promotion of COP.
19. The pre- and post-Programme capacities, concerns and condition of the ACT for Peace target participants (PDCs, LGUs and non-community-based peace stakeholders) will be profiled to generate information that would be used in designing and assessing appropriate and responsive interventions. As well, the information will be used for purposes of performance management by tracking the benefits that the ACT for Peace brings about or contributes to.
20. Management staff and implementing partners will be oriented on the ACT for Peace Programme principles, implementation framework and on the PDC stage of development framework that they may design or adjust the delivery of their assistance in manner that is consistent with the values that drive Programme.
21. The second targeted output of this component is the establishment of partnerships among and between agencies, LGUs and social structures at the provincial and regional levels for the institutionalization of the Culture of Peace. Conflict analysis and peace-sensitivity trainings and workshops for government agencies and provincial LGUs (DOH, DILG, DENR, Provincial Development Councils, and Provincial Peace and Order Councils, etc.) will be conducted. Technical assistance will be provided to help government agencies be more effective in addressing conflicts and promoting peace, The Programme will network with provincial and regional social formations (CSOs, etc.) to support efforts to promote peace.
22. Four main groups of stakeholders are targeted in enhancing the enhancing the environment for promoting and advocating the Culture of Peace. They are: a) established media institutions and practitioners; b) educational institutions and teachers; c) CSOs and the individual peace champions from the religious or spiritual groups; and government institutions.
 - a. For the mass media sector, the intention is to influence the media institutions to adopt peace-promotive reportage and news and features programming and to transform values of the media practitioners towards balanced and peace-oriented news coverage and reporting. The package of intervention includes the promotion of public peace

³⁰ MEDCo website

journalism, facilitating media practitioners' exposure and integration in PDCs, conduct of summer courses on peace reporting and supporting the Mindanao Media Peace Summits.

- b. For the Education Sector, the intention is to initiate the process of enculturation via the enhancement of the education curriculum using the Culture of Peace and promoting appreciation of the significance GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement in the history of Southern Philippines. At a minimum, the strategy is focused on generating policy studies on the matter for the consideration of the Department of Education and the Commission on Higher Education. The high-end target, on the other hand, includes the conduct of instructional enhancement seminars for primary, secondary and tertiary educators on the Culture of Peace.
- c. For CSOs, the intention is to strengthen and build the momentum of broad and mass peace advocacy. This is to be achieved through support for CSOs peace advocacy initiatives, support for peace champions such as those coming from the religious or spiritual groups or from the grassroots, and initiating electronic exchange of information and ideas. The Programme shall also support the Mindanao Week of Peace and the National Peace Month.
- d. For government institutions, the OIA will be supported in further developing its capacity and abilities to develop and mainstream strategic policy initiatives that are supportive of peacebuilding, human security promotion and conflict transformation. A favorable policy environment that enables peace stakeholders to do their work will ensure the successful accomplishment of Legacy #9.

Strategies for Implementing the Component and Delivering the Assistance

- 23. The practice of the Culture of Peace is diverse and distinct in each locality or social grouping. Its diversity and distinctiveness is mainly because of four factors: 1.) The practice of culture of peace is nestled in the people's cultures and traditions; 2.) People's past experiences influence current practice; 3.) Current realities continue to challenge practice, and; 4) The collective desire of the community for a better future continuously innovates the practice of the Culture of Peace.³¹
- 24. Yet amidst the diversity and distinction in the practice of the Culture of Peace, local capacities for peace fall within the categories of community traits or ethos, homegrown community strategies, and indigenous and self-help mechanisms.³² These ethos, strategies and mechanisms are what this Component aims to enhance, to be complemented, mainstreamed and institutionalized, and enculturated in the collective way of life of the people in Southern Philippines as opposed to the prevailing atmosphere of culture of war and violence.

³¹ *Selected Community Practices of the Culture of Peace*, Julio Cesar L. Benitez, GOP-UNMDP3, May 2004; p. 19.

³² *Ibid*, p.45.

Appendix B

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE OMNIPOTENT, THE MERCIFUL PEACE AGREEMENT

THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) AND THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF THE SIX AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

WHEREAS, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos has pursued a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict under the principle of peace with honor and to serve the paramount ends of national unity, solidarity and progress for Filipinos;

WHEREAS, the MNLF, led by Professor Nur Misuari, inspired by their quest for peace and prosperity, had in the past asserted the right of the Moro people to freely determine their political status and pursue their religious, social, economic and cultural development;

WHEREAS, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), upon the request of the GRP initiated the First Formal Peace Talks between the GRP and the MNLF during its Third Ministerial Conference in Jeddah. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, the document, which served as a basis for a just, lasting, honorable and comprehensive solution to the problem in Southern Philippines within the framework of the Philippine Constitution;

WHEREAS, by the grace of the Almighty God and owing to the bold and innovative initiative of the Philippine Government, under H.E. President Fidel V. Ramos. and the dedication and the perseverance of his duly appointed representatives, headed by Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process Manuel T. Yan, coupled with the highly positive and laudable response of the MNLF leadership under its founding Chairman, H.E. Prof. Nur Misuari, a peace process has been conducted and pursued successfully for the last four (4) years, with the most constructive and beneficial participation of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, headed by its distinguished Chairman, H.E. Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, and his four (4) able assistants as facilitators of the talks, namely: H.E. Ambassador S. Wiryono. H.E. Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, H.E. Ambassador Pieter Damanik, and H.E. Ambassador Abu Hartono, and the OIC Secretary General, H.E. Dr. Hamid Algabid, and his deputy, H.E. Ambassador Mohammed Mohsin, and with special mention to Libyan Ambassador, H.E. Rajab Azzarouq;

WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge the valuable role of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in promoting and upholding the rights, welfare and well-being of Muslims all over the world;

WHEREAS, the parties likewise, acknowledge the role of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six comprising the nations of Indonesia as Chair, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Senegal and Somalia in the search of a just, comprehensive and durable Peace in Southern Philippines;

WHEREAS, in accordance with the Statement of Understanding signed in Tripoli, Libya on October 3, 1992 and the subsequent Statement of Understanding signed in Cipanas, West Java on April 14, 1993, the parties agreed, through the good offices of The Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, inspired and guided by its great leader, H.E. Colonel Muammar Khadafy, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia under the Wise and able leadership of H.E. Bapah President Soeharto, and H.E. OIC Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Algabid, to hold formal peace talks to discuss the modalities for The full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement in letter and spirit, to include Those portions of the Agreement left for further discussion and the transitional Implementing structure and mechanism;

WHEREAS, the parties affirm their solemn commitment in the aforementioned Statements of understanding as well as the Memorandum of Agreement signed in the First Round of Formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta, Indonesia on October 25 - November 7, 1993; the Interim Agreement signed in the 2nd Round of Formal Peace Talk held in Jakarta on September 1-5, 1994; the Interim Agreement signed in the 3rd Round of formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta on November 27 - December 1, 1995; the Intern Agreement signed in the 4th Round of Formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta on August 29, 1996; and in the nine (9) meetings of the Mixed Committee held in various places and dates in the Philippines and Indonesia;

WHEREAS, all these agreements resulted from the consensus points reached by the Mixed Committee and the Support Committees (Support Committee No. 1 - National Defense and Security; Support Committee No. 2 - Education; Support Committee No. 3 - Economic and Financial System, Mines and Minerals; Support Committee No. 4 - Administrative System, Right of Representation and Participation in the National Government, and in all Organs of the State; Support Committee No. 5 - Shariah and the Judiciary; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Transitional Implementing Structure and Mechanism in meetings held in various places in the Philippines and Indonesia;

WHEREAS, the parties have rationalized and consolidated all the agreements and consensus points reached, with the assistance of the Mixed Committee and the various support committees established for the purpose, into a final peace agreement;

WHEREAS, the parties affirm the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, this final peace agreement constitutes the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement.

NOW THEREFORE, THE PARTIES DO HEREBY AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING:

I. IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM OF THIS AGREEMENT

1. Phase 1 shall cover a three (3) year period starting after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly.

During this phase, the process of the joining in of the MNLF elements with The Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The joining in of MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment programmed will also take place in this phase.

2. Phase 2 shall involve amendment to or repeal of the Organic Act (RA 6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through Congressional action, after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy thereof.
 - a. While peace and development programs are being implemented in the SZOPAD, a bill to amend or repeal the RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1 (1996-1997). The bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the Final Peace Agreement and the expansion of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite affected areas, within two (2) years from the establishment of the SPCPD (1998).
 - b. The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/ choose to join the said autonomy (1998). It may be provided by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous Muslim dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s), which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region.

II. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (PHASE-1)

Phase 1 shall be implemented as follows:

3. There shall be established a Special Zone of Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (SZOPAD) covering the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato. Sarangani

and Palawan and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa. Within the next three (3) years, these areas shall be the focus of intensive peace and development efforts. Public and private investments shall be channeled to these areas to spur economic activities and uplift the conditions of the people therein.

4. There shall be established a Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), composed of one (1) Chairman, one (1) Vice Chairman and three (3) Deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Cultural Communities. They shall be appointed by the president.
5. The SPCPD shall be assisted by the Darul Iftah (advisory council), which shall be created by the Chairman of the SPCPD.
6. The local government units in the area including the ARMM shall continue to exist and exercise their functions in accordance with the existing laws.
7. Appropriate agencies of the government that are engaged in peace and development activities in the area, such as but not limited to the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA), shall be placed under the control and/or supervision of the Council as its implementing agencies to ensure that peace and development projects and programs are effectively accomplished.

Based on the foregoing, the following agencies or entities will be placed under the control and/or supervision of the SPCPD, to wit:

- a. The Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) may be attached to the SPCPD and be placed under the latter's direct supervision insofar as SPDA offices and projects in the SZOPAD are concerned. The SPCPD can exercise a further degree of control over SPDA by allowing the Council to submit recommendees to the President for appointment as officials of SPDA.
- b. The Regional and Field Offices of the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) which are situated and operating within the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), shall be placed under the direct supervision of SPCPD, provided that the coordination, linkages and complementation between the central OMA and SPCPD shall be defined by a Presidential issuance;
- c. The Regional and field Offices of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) which are situated and operating within the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), shall be placed under the direct supervision of SPCPD, provided that the coordination, linkages and complementation between the central OSCC and SPCPD shall be defined by a Presidential issuance;

- d. Task Force Basilan, which shall be reorganized into the Basilan Development Task Force, to undertake development activities in Basilan shall be placed under the control and supervision of SPCPD;
- e. Task Force MALMAR - to be reorganized into the Central Mindanao Development Task Force, to undertake development activities in Central Mindanao shall be placed under the control and supervision of SPCPD;
- f. Sulu Development task force - an inter-agency task force that shall be organized to undertake development projects in Sulu -- shall be placed under the control and supervision of SPCPD; and
- g. Special Development Planning Group - this is an ad hoc body composed of staff (officers and planning experts from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and other concerned agencies which could be organized to directly support the staff planning requirements, shall be placed under SPCPD.

The foregoing enumeration of agencies or entities shall not preclude the President from exercising his power or discretion to delegate, subject to existing laws, certain powers or functions to the SPCPD, or to place under agencies or entities under the control and/or supervision of the latter.

- 8. The SPCPD, in consultation with the Consultative Assembly utilizing the funds from the National Government shall monitor, promote and coordinate the development efforts in the area, including the attraction of foreign investment, especially from OIC member-countries and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- 9. The powers and functions of the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly are derivative and extension of the powers of the President the powers referred to here are only those powers of the President that could be delegated under the Constitution and existing laws.
- 10. There shall be established a Consultative Assembly with 81 members composed of the following:
 - a. The Chairman of the SPCPD shall be the head and presiding officer of the assembly;
 - b. The Governor and the Vice Governor of the ARMM, and 14 Governor's of the provinces and the 9 City Mayors in the SZOPAD;
 - c. 44 members from the MNLF: and

- d. 11 members from various sector recommended by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs).
11. The Consultative Assembly shall exercise the following functions and powers:
 - a. To serve as forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns;
 - b. To conduct public hearings as may be necessary and to provide appropriate advice to the SPCPD; and
 - c. To formulate and recommend policies to the President through the chairman of the SPCPD and make rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area.
12. The OIC shall be requested to continue to extend its assistance and good offices in monitoring the full implementation of this agreement during the transitional period until the regular autonomous government is firmly established and for this purpose, help generate broad international support for the Zone of Peace and Development.
13. A Joint Monitoring Committee composed of members coming from the GRP and the MNLF, with the help of the OIC, shall continue to meet to review and identify agreements that can be immediately implemented, and monitor the implementation of this Agreement during Phase 1.
14. The provisions of the 1994 and 1995 Interim Agreements and subsequent agreement entered into by the GRP and the MNLF (that would not require legislative action) shall be implemented during Phase 1.
15. The funds for the operations of the Council and the Assembly shall be initially sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Funding for development programs and projects shall come from the appropriations of Congress as may be drawn from the General Appropriations Act. A supplementary budget for the year 1996 will be recommended to Congress for the purpose.
16. The term of the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly shall be for a period of three years and may be extended by the President upon recommendation of the Council itself.
17. The term of office of the SPCPD and the Assembly shall coincide with the three-year term of office of the officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elected in 1996.
18. The powers and functions of the Council shall be as follows:

- a. To take charge in promoting, monitoring and coordinating the improvement of peace and order in the area.
 - b. To focus, on peace and development efforts more particularly in the depressed areas and cause the in implementation of peace and development projects;
 - c. To provide support to local government units as necessary;
 - d. To exercise such other powers and functions necessary for the effective implementation of its mandate as may be delegated by the President;
 - e. To assist in the preparation for the hiding of elections, referenda or plebiscite and people's initiative in the area as may be duly deputized by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC);
 - f. To cause the creation of such offices or instrumentalities as shall be necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the areas. There shall be approval from the Office of the President for budgetary purposes.
19. The joining of die MNLF elements with the Philippine National Police (WP) and the Provision of Security Protection for Certain Officials of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development;
- a. During the transitional phase (phase 1), there shall be a program or process to allow the joining of MNLF elements into the PNP and to be part of the PNP Command in accordance with guidelines and procedures under existing laws. The Philippine Government shall allocate one thousand five hundred (1,500) PNP vacancies for this purpose to be filled up by MNLF elements during the transition period, and another two hundred fifty (250) items for special or auxiliary services.
 - b. The processing of MNLP elements will start upon the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). The police training programs to be undergone by the joining MNLF elements shall be as prescribed by existing laws and rules and regulations, and shall be conducted by the PNP.
 - c. The concerned of officials of the Council (e.g. the Chairman and his Deputies) shall be provided security and protective assistance by the national government, the security situation warrants and as part of confidence-building measures. An AFP/PNP security detail shall be immediately and particularly assigned lo the Council. This special APP/PNP security detail shall be composed of former MNLF regulars who shall have been granted AFP or PNP appointments and duly integrated into the AFP or PNP. This security detail shall be of appropriate size in accordance with the needs of the situation, without prejudice to augmentation by regular AFP or PNP units as the need

arises and in coordination with the AFP and PNP commanders concerned. This security detail which shall not be utilized for law enforcement, but solely for [he security and protection of SPCPD officials concerned, shall conduct themselves in accordance with existing policies and regulations in order to prevent undue alarm to the population during movements of concerned officials.

- d. To have good coordination between the AFP and PNP on the one hand and the SPCPD on the other, a liaison system will be set up composed of the AFP, PNP and SPCPD senior officials.
20. The joining of the MNLF forces with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP):
- a. Five thousand seven hundred fifty (5,750) MNLF members shall be integrated into the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP), 250 of whom shall be absorbed into the auxiliary services. The government shall exert utmost efforts to establish the necessary conditions that would ensure the eventual integration of the maximum number of the remaining MNLP forces into the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government There shall be a special socio-economic, cultural and educational program to cater to MNLF forces not absorbed into the AFP PNP and the SRSF to prepare them and their families for productive endeavors, provide for educational, technical skills and livelihood training and give them priority for hiring in development projects.
 - b. In the beginning, the MNLF forces will join as units distinct from AFP units. They will be initially organized into separate units within a transition period, until such time that mutual confidence is developed as the members of these separate-units will be gradually integrated into regular AFP units deployed in the area of autonomy. Subjects to existing laws, policies, rules and regulations, and appropate authorities shall waive the requirements and qualifications for entry of MNLF forces into the AFP.
 - c. One from among the MNLF will assume the functions and responsibilities of a Deputy Commander of the Southern Command. AFP, for separate units that will be organized out of the MNLF forces joining the AFP. The Deputy Commander will assist the Commander of the Southern Command. AFP in the command, administration and control of such separate units throughout the aforementioned transition period. The Deputy Commander will he given an appointment commensurate to his position and shall be addressed as such.
 - d. The government recognizer the skills, capabilities and achievements of the MNLP and its capacity to develop its members for the highest echelons of military and civilian leadership. The ranks and grades of MNLF forces joining the AFP shall be subject to the decision of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP along the principles of universality, non-

discrimination, equity and preferential treatment for the poor and underprivileged.

- d. The government shall take affirmative measures to continually improve the capabilities of those MNLF forces joining the AFP to enhance their opportunities for professional advancement in the military service. It shall undertake initiatives to provide professional training and military schooling in foreign countries to former MNLF members absorbed into the AFP in consonance with the education and training programmes with the AFP.
- f. All other matters regarding the joining of MNLF forces into the AFP not expressly covered by this agreement shall be prescribed by the President in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the APP.

III. THE NEW REGIONAL AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT (PHASE-2)

The following provisions shall be implemented after a law amending or repealing the Organic Act of ARMM shall have been enacted by Congress and approved by the people in the concerned areas in a plebiscite therefore. Accordingly, these provisions shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law.

A. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

- 21. Executive power shall be vested in the Head of the regular Autonomous Government duly elected at large by direct vote of the people of the Autonomous Region. There shall also be a Vice-Head of the Regional Autonomous Government also elected in the same manner. The Head of the Regional Autonomous Government may appoint three (3) Deputies. The Head, the Vice-Head and the three (3) Deputies shall comprise the Executive Council of the area of Autonomy.
- 22. The President shall exercise general supervision over the Regional Autonomous Government and all local government units in the area of Autonomy through the Head of the Regional Autonomous Government to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

The Head of the Autonomous Government shall exercise general supervision over all local government units in the area of autonomy to ensure that national and regional laws are faithfully executed, and see to it that they act within their assigned powers and functions.

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

23. Legislative power shall be vested in the Regional Legislative Assembly.
24. The Legislative Assembly shall be composed of members elected by popular vote, with three (3) members elected from each of the Congressional Districts.
25. There shall be sectoral representatives in the Legislative Assembly whose number shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the total number of elected Members of the Legislative Assembly coming from the labor, disabled, industrial, indigenous cultural communities, youth, women, non-government organizations, agricultural, and such other sectors as may be provided by Regional Law to be appointed by the Head of the Autonomous Government from among the nominees of the different Sectoral groups; provided, however, that the youth representative shall not be less than 18 years of age nor more than 21 years of age at the time of his appointment.
26. The people's initiative, by way a plebiscite or referendum, is recognized.
27. The Regional Legislative Assembly shall exercise legislative power for application in the area of autonomy except on the following matters, to wit:
 - a. Foreign Affairs;
 - b. National Defense and Security;
 - c. Postal Service
 - d. Coinage. Fiscal and Monetary Policies,
 - e. Administration of Justice except on matters pertaining to Shariah;
 - f. Quarantine;
 - g. Customs and Tariff;
 - h. Citizenship;
 - i. Naturalization Immigration and Deportation;
 - J. General Auditing, Civil Service and Elections;
 - k. Foreign Trade;
 - l. Maritime, Land and Air Transportation and Communications that affect areas outside the autonomous region: and
 - m. Patents. Trademarks, Tradenames and Copyrights.

28. The Legislative Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units in the area of autonomy in accordance with the criteria laid down by law subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political units affected. It may also change the names of such local government units, public places and institutions.
29. Any member of the Legislative Assembly who accepts an appointment and qualifies for any position in the Government, including government-owned-and/or controlled corporations or institutions and their subsidiaries, shall automatically forfeit his seat in the Legislative Assembly.
30. No member of the Legislative Assembly may personally appear as counsel before courts of justice or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with or in any franchise or privilege granted by, the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned-and/or-controlled corporation or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
31. In case of vacancy in the Legislative Assembly occurring at least one year before the expiration of the term of office, a special election shall be called to fill the vacancy in the manner prescribed by law; provided, that the member elected shall serve for the unexpired term.
32. The Legislative Assembly shall elect from among its member a Speaker and such other officers as the rules may provide. The speaker shall appoint the personnel of the administrative organization of the Legislative Assembly.
33. The powers, functions, responsibilities and structure of the different Departments, agencies, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the regional government including regional government-owned-and controlled corporations in the areas of the autonomy shall be prescribed and defined by the Regional Legislative Assembly.
34. No person shall be elected member of the Legislative Assembly, unless he/she is:
 - a. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
 - b. At least 21 years of age on the day of election;
 - c. Able to read and write;
 - d. A registered voter of the district in which he/she shall be elected on the day he/she files his/her certificate of candidacy; and

- c. A resident thereof for a period of no less than five years immediately preceding the day of election.
35. Every member of the Legislative Assembly shall take an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before taking his/her seat.
 36. The Legislative Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure by a majority vote of all its Members including the selection of members of its standing communities and the suspension or expulsion of its Members.
 37. A Majority of all the Members of the Assembly shall constitute a quorum to do business, but & smaller number may adjourn from day-to-day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under such penalties, as the Assembly may provide.
 38. The Legislative Assembly or any of its committees may conduct inquiries or public consultations in aid of legislation in accordance of its rules. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
 39. The Legislative Assembly shall keep a journal of its proceedings and a record of its caucuses and meetings. The records and books of account of the Assembly shall be preserved and be open to public scrutiny. The Commission on Audit shall publish an annual report of the itemized list of expenditures incurred by the Members of the Assembly within sixty (60) days from the end of every regular session.
 40. The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly shall, within, ten working days from approval thereof, submit to the President and to both Houses of Congress a certified true copy of all laws and resolutions approved by the Legislative Assembly.
 41. No member shall be questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Assembly or in any committee thereof.
 42. The Chief Executive of the Autonomous Government shall approve the budget of the Autonomous Region, if, by the end of any fiscal year the Legislative Assembly shall have failed to pass the regional appropriation a bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the regional Appropriations Act for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed automatically re-enacted and shall remain in Force and effect until the regional appropriations bill is passed by the Legislative Assembly.
 43. No provision or enactment shall he embraced in the regional appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates

44. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Legislative Assembly shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies of the Regional Government.
45. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the Regional Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
46. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular offices shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by regional law.
47. All money collected on any regional tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such special purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall accrue to the general funds of the regional government.
48. Trust funds shall only be paid out of the regional treasury upon fulfillment of the specific purpose for which said funds were created or received.
49. Except as provided by its rules, the Legislative Assembly shall meet in open session. Regular session shall commence on the 4th Monday of April and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as may be determined by the Assembly until thirty (30) days before the opening of its next regular session.
50. The Legislative Assembly shall meet in special sessions at the request of one-third (1/3) of all its Members or by call of the Chief Executive. Such special sessions must be convened with specific agenda.
51. No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members three (3) days before its passage, except when the Chief Executive certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
52. Every bill passed by the Legislative Assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Chief Executive. If he approves the bill, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return it with his objections to the Legislative Assembly, which shall enter the objections at large in its journal and proceed to consider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Legislative Assembly shall agree to pass the bill, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the veto shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in the journal. The Chief Executive shall communicate his veto of any bill to the Legislative Assembly within thirty (30) days after the receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

53. The Legislative Assembly may request the presence of the Chief Executive, Vice-Chief Executive, Cabinet members or their deputies, as the rules shall provide, for questioning on matters falling within the scope of their assigned powers and functions.
54. Subject to the rules of the Legislative Assembly, the legislative power to inquire on matters relating to the exercise of administrative functions by an agency of government within the Autonomous Region shall be in the form of written questions.
55. The Chief Executive shall submit to the Legislative Assembly not later than two (2) months before the beginning of every regular session, as the basis of the regional appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
56. The fiscal year of the Autonomous Region shall cover the period January 1 to December 31 of the same year.
57. The Legislative Assembly may not increase the appropriations recommended by the Chief Executive for the operation of the Autonomous Government as specified in the budget. The form, content and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by regional law, provided, however, that pending the enactment of such regional law, the budgeting process shall be governed by existing national laws and rules and regulations prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management.
58. The Chief Executive shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation or revenue bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The veto may be reconsidered by the Assembly by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members.
59. The financial accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the Autonomous Region shall be audited by the Commission on Audit.
60. No money shall be paid out of the Regional Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by regional law.
61. No regional law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the Chief Executive, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Presiding Justice of the highest Shariah Court may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the Regional General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

62. The Regional Autonomous Government shall have the power to enact its own Regional Administrative Code and Regional Local Government Code consistent with national laws and the Constitution provided that it shall not in any way diminish the powers and functions already enjoyed by Local Governments Units.

RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND IN ALL ORGANS OF THE STATE.

General Principles:

63. Representation in the National Government by the inhabitants of the autonomous region may be effected through appointment or elections and must be subject to standards and guidelines prescribed for the position. When representation is done by appointment. The inhabitants of the Autonomous Region will be appointed by the President of the Philippines to herein specified positions which are policy determining, highly technical, primarily confidential and supervisory upon recommendation by the Head of the Autonomous Government.
64. Right of representation shall not be construed in such a way that applicant from the Autonomous Region, especially Muslims and Cultural Communities, for lower positions in the above organs of the government cannot be appointed anymore thereto.

Manner of Representation and participation

Executive

65. It shall be the policy of the National Government that there shall be at least one (1) member of the Cabinet (with the rank of Department Secretary) who is an inhabitant of the Autonomous Region ¹ be recommended by the Head Of the Autonomous Government.
66. It shall likewise be a policy that there shall be at least one (1) official in each of the departments and the constitutional bodies of the national government who shall be appointed in executive, primarily confidential, highly technical or policy determining positions, from among the inhabitants of the Autonomous Region upon recommendations by the Head of the Regional Government. The Head of the Autonomous Government shall participate as ex-officio member of the National Security Council on all matters concerning the Autonomous Region and such other matters as may be determined by the President.
67. Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) or institutions and their subsidiaries in the area of autonomy:

Where Government -Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) are operating mainly or with a subsidiary in the area of autonomy, as a policy, the Regional

Autonomous Government shall be given some representation in the Board of Directors or in the policy-making body of said GOCCs or their subsidiaries consistent with their respective charters.

Legislative

68. It shall be the policy of the National Government that the Regional Autonomous Government shall have one (1) representative Congress as Sectoral Representative. This is aside from the representative/congressmen elected from the congressional districts located in the autonomous region.

Judicial

69. It shall be a policy of the national government that at least one (1) justice in the Supreme Court and at least (2) in the Court of Appeals shall come from the autonomous Region. For this purpose, the Head of the Autonomous Government may submit the names of his recommendees to the Judicial and Bar Council for consideration. This is without prejudice to the appointment of qualified inhabitants of the Autonomous Region to other positions in the judiciary in accordance with their merits and qualifications.
70. The GRP shall endeavor to cause the appointment, as a member of the Judicial and Bar Council, a qualified person to be recommended by the Head of the Regional Autonomous Government.
71. The GRP shall request the Supreme Court to create the Office of the Deputy Court Administration for the Area of Autonomy, and to appoint thereto a qualified person recommended by the Head of the Regional Autonomous Government.

Civil Service Eligibilities

72. The civil service eligibility requirements for appointment to government position shall be applicable in the Autonomous Government. As necessary, the Civil Service Commission shall hold special civil service examinations in the region to further increase the number of eligible therein. For a period not longer than five (5) years from the establishment of the Regional Autonomous Government, the GRP will endeavor to provide for appropriate civil service eligibility to applicants in the Autonomous Region, provided, the minimum educational qualifications for the position are met.

B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL REGIONAL SECURITY FORCES FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION (PHASE-2 OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT)

General Principles

73. When the new regular Autonomous Regional Government shall have been established, there shall be created or constituted a PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, which shall be the Special Regional Security forces (SRSP) as referred to in Paragraph 8. Article III of the Tripoli Agreement.
74. The Regional Legislative Assembly may enact laws governing the PNP Regional Command for the Autonomous Region/SRSF consistent with the constitutional provision that there shall be one police force in the country which is national in scope and civilian in character.
75. The PNP Regional Command for the-Autonomous Region/SRSP shall be composed of the existing PNP units in the area of autonomy, the MNLF elements and other residents of the area who may later on be recruited into the force.
76. The powers and functions of the PNP Regional Command for the Autonomous Region/SRSP, which shall be exercised within the territories covered by the Regional Autonomous Government (RAG), shall be the following:
- a. Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;
 - b. Maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety;
 - c. Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution;
 - d. Exercise the general powers to make arrest, search and seizure in accordance with the Constitution and pertinent laws;
 - c. Detain and arrest person for a period not beyond what is prescribed by law, informing the person so detained of all his rights under the Constitution and observing the inherent human rights of the citizens; and
 - f. Perform such other duties and exercise all other function as may be provided by law.
77. The PNP Regional Command for the Autonomous Region/SRSF shall be charged with the maintenance and preservation of peace, law and order, and protection of life, liberty and property in the region in consonance with the Constitution.

Organization of the PNP Regional Command for Autonomous Region/SRSF

78. It shall be civilian in nature or character.
79. It shall be regional in scope of operations.

80. It shall be headed by a Regional Director who shall be assisted by two (1) Deputies, one (1) for Administration and one (1) for Operations.
81. It shall have regional, provincial, and city or municipal offices.
82. At the provincial level, there shall be a provincial office, headed by a Provincial Director.
83. At the city or municipal level, there shall be an office/station, which shall be headed by a Chief of Police.

Powers of the Head of the Regional Autonomous Government over the PNP Regional Command for the Autonomous Region/SRSF.

84. Act as the Deputy of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) in the region and shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM).
85. Exercise operational control and general supervision and disciplinary powers.
86. Employ/deploy the elements of the Regional Command through the Regional Director.
87. Assign/reassign officers and other personnel through the Regional Director.
88. Recommend to the President the appointment of the Regional Director and his two (2) Deputies.
89. Oversee the preparation and implementation of the integrated regional public safety plan.
90. Impose, after due notice and summary hearings of citizen's complaints, administrative penalties on personnel of the Regional Command except Presidential Appointees.

Creation of the Regional Police Commission

91. There shall be created a Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM) by the Regional Legislative Assembly consistent with the Constitution.
92. The REPOLCOM shall be under the supervision of the NAPOLCOM.
93. The Chairman of REPOLCOM shall be an ex-officio Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM.

C. EDUCATION

The Integrated System of Education

94. The Regional Autonomous Government shall have an education component comprising of existing schools, colleges and universities in the present area at autonomy and such other schools and institutions in the future expanded area of autonomy, with the possible inclusion of state universities and colleges (SUCs) to be decided later on. The relationship of the Regional Autonomous Government educational body with the national educational system shall be that of a system and sub-system with emphasis on the autonomy of the sub-system. In the event that SUCs should be included as part of the educational component of the Regional Autonomous Government, the autonomous government recognizes the fiscal autonomy and academic freedom of the SUCs as mandated by their respective charters.
95. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall, among others, perpetuates Filipino and Islamic ideals and aspirations, Islamic values and orientations of the Bangsamoro people. It shall develop the total spiritual, intellectual, social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects of the Bangsamoro people to make them God-fearing, productive, patriotic citizens, conscious of their Filipino and Islamic values and Islamic cultural heritage under the aegis of a just and equitable society.

The Structure of Educational System

96. The elementary level shall follow the basic national structure and shall primarily be concerned with providing basic education; the secondary level will correspond to four (4) years of high school, and the tertiary level shall be one year to three (3) years for non-degree courses and four (4) to eight (8) years for degree courses, as the case maybe in accordance with existing laws.

Curriculum

97. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system will adopt the basic core courses for all Filipino children as well as the minimum required learning and orientations provided by the national government, including the subject areas and their daily time allotment. Teaching materials and curriculum contents shall promote solidarity, unity in diversity, Filipino and Islamic values.
98. The addition of more required learning and instructional materials shall be the prerogative and responsibility of the Autonomous Government.
99. The minimum requirements and standards prescribed by Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS), Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) will be followed by the Autonomous Region.

100. The same textbooks of the National Government will be used by schools in the Autonomous Region. The formulation, shaping and revision of textbooks are the responsibilities of the Regional Autonomous Government and the National Government and within agreed norms, academic freedom and relevant legal limits, the formulation and revisions shall emphasize Islamic values or orientation, in addition to Filipino values which include Christian values and values of indigenous people, modern sciences and technology as well as the latest educational thrusts. Having adopted the core curriculum of the national government in consideration of achieving the highest quality of education, student and graduates of the education system of the Autonomous Region shall be fully accredited when they transfer to non-autonomous regions.
101. The integration of Islamic values in the curriculum should be done gradually after researches and studies are conducted.
102. The teaching of Islamic values, as well as Filipino values, shall be incorporated in Good Manners and Right Conduct in appropriate grade levels including the tertiary level subject to agreed norms, academic freedom, and legal limitations.
103. Muslim culture, mores, customs and traditions which are mainly based on Islam, as well as the cultures, mores, customs, and traditions of Christians and indigenous people, shall be preserved through the regular public and special schools in the Autonomous Region, considering that schools are perpetuating vehicles of the values of the people.

Administration of Educational System

104. The management and control, and supervision of the entire education system in the area of autonomy shall be the primary concern of the Regional Autonomous Government, consistent with the declared policies of national educational bodies. The national education bodies shall monitor compliance by the regional educational system with national educational policies, standards and regulations in collaboration with the educational authorities of the autonomous region. The head of the educational system of the Regional Autonomous Government shall have the right to participate in policy and decision-making activities of the national educational bodies.
105. The Regional Autonomous Government shall be represented in the Board of SUCs in the region as co-chairman or at least, co-vice-chairman, as may be provided by law. Appointment to SUC Boards shall be made by the President of the Philippines.
106. The Regional Autonomous Government will be responsible for specific administrative, management functions and powers, educational supervision and school administration, and regulation over private schools.

117. The Organizational structure of the educational system in the autonomous region shall follow the basic structure of the national educational system. The Regional Legislative Assembly may add special structures, if necessary. It shall follow whatever organizations of the curricular years as found in the national set-up.
108. Locally funded programs will be the responsibility of the Regional Autonomous Government.
109. The selection, requirement appointment and promotion of teachers and employees shall be responsibility of the Regional Autonomous Government in accordance with general qualification standard prescribed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) provided that the Regional Autonomous Government can initiate regionally-defined standards which are not below national standards.
110. The selection, requirement, appointment and promotion of elementary, secondary and tertiary education employees shall be the responsibility of the Regional Autonomous Government in accordance with general standards of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and other existing recognized bodies.
111. Primary disciplinary authority over officials and employees of the Regional Autonomous Government will be the area of concern of the Regional Autonomous Government in accordance with Civil Service Commission (CSC) rules and regulations. Administrative sanctions deemed appropriate and reasonable as determined by the Civil Service Commission will be the area of concern of the Regional Autonomous Government.

Religious Instruction

112. Religious instruction in public schools should be optional, with the written consent of the parent/guardian, taught by the authorities of the religion to which the student belongs, and should not involve additional costs to the government in accordance with national policies.

Medium of Instruction

113. Filipino and English shall be the medium of instruction in the areas of the Autonomy; provided that Arabic shall be an auxiliary medium of instruction.
114. Regional languages may be used as auxiliary official languages in the region as well as auxiliary medium of instruction and communication.
115. Arabic shall be recognized as a medium of instruction in Madaris (schools) and other Islamic institutions.
116. Arabic shall be taught as a subject in all appropriate grade levels as presently required in the existing laws for Muslims, and optional, for non-Muslims.

Madrasah Education

117. Existing *Madaris*, including *Madaris Ulya* shall be included under the Regional Autonomous Government educational system as presently organized in the area of autonomy.
118. *Madaris* teachers shall receive compensation out of the funds of the Regional Autonomous Government provided they are employed in the public schools.

Non-formal and Specialized Education

119. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall develop the full potentials of its human resources, respond positively to changing needs and conditions and needs of the environment, and institutionalize non-formal education.
120. The educational system shall respond positively and effectively to the changing needs and conditions of the times as well as regional and national needs of the environment through the proper use of the latest educational technology, development, planning, monitoring, evaluation, and appropriate and timely educational intervention as well as linkages with national and international institutions.
121. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system shall institutionalize non-formal education in scope and methodology, to include literacy, numeracy and intensive skills training of the youth and adult, to allow them to participate actively and productively in the mainstream of regional and national life.

Scholarship Grant and Assistance

122. Universities and colleges in the areas of autonomy may seek and receive overseas donations for educational purposes.
123. The Regional Autonomous Government educational system will handle, by administrative arrangement with the national DECS, CHED, and TESDA scholarship programs, both local and foreign, including those provided by the autonomous region pursuant to the provision of existing laws.
124. Disadvantage but deserving students will be given financial assistance by the Regional Autonomous Government out of funds given by the national government for the purpose and from other sources of funds.

Funds for Education:

125. Funds for education constituting the share of the Regional Autonomous Government as contained in the General Appropriation Act should be given directly to the Autonomous Government.

D. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM, MINES AND MINERALS

126. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall establish its own Regional Economic and Development Planning Board chaired by the Head of Government in the area of autonomy. The Board shall prepare the economic development plans and programs of the Autonomous Government.
127. The pivotal role of the banks and other financial institutions for development in the area of autonomy is recognized.
128. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy has the power to promote tourism as a positive instrument for development provided that the diverse cultural heritage, moral and spiritual values of the people in the area of autonomy shall be strengthened and respected.
129. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall have the power to grant incentives including tax holidays within the power and resources in the area of autonomy.
130. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy advocates equal opportunities for all the inhabitants of the area of autonomy regardless of ethnic origin, culture, sex, creed and religion.
131. In enacting tax measures, the Regional Legislative Assembly shall observe the principle of uniformity and equity in taxation and shall not impose confiscatory taxes or fees of any kind.
132. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall have the power to enact a Regional Tax Code and a regional Local Tax Code applicable to all local government units within the area of autonomy.
133. All corporations, partnerships or business entities directly engaged in business in the area of autonomy shall pay their corresponding taxes, fees, and charges in the province, city or municipality in the area of autonomy where the establishment is doing business.
134. All corporations, partnerships, or business entities whose head of offices are located outside the area of autonomy, but doing business within its territorial jurisdiction, either by using, exploiting, and utilizing the land. Aquatic and all natural resources therein, shall pay their income taxes corresponding to their income realized from their business operation in the area of autonomy through the province, city or municipality where their branch offices are located. In case the

- business establishment has no branch in the area of autonomy, such business establishment shall pay through the city or municipality where its operation is located.
135. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy as a corporate body may contract domestic loans.
 136. The Regional Autonomous Government recognizes the pivotal role played by banks and other financial institutions in the economic development of the area of autonomy. Toward this end, the Autonomous Government shall:
 - a. Encourage the establishment of banks and bank branches in the area of autonomy;
 - b. Encourage the entry and establishment of off-shore banking unit of foreign banks in the area of autonomy.
 137. The Regional Autonomous Government may accept foreign financial and economic grant for the development and welfare of the people in the region.
 138. The Regional Autonomous Government may issue its own treasury bills, bonds, promissory notes, and other debt papers in consultation and coordination with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
 139. The Regional Autonomous Government may contract foreign loans within the purview of national laws and pertinent monetary and fiscal policies.
 140. In the pursuit of the region's economic growth, development and welfare the autonomous government shall have the right to formulate economic and financial policies and implement economic and financial programs, taking into account national laws and policies.
 141. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall encourage, promote and support the establishment of economic zones, industrial centers and ports in strategic area and growth centers to attract local and foreign investments and business enterprise.
 142. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall undertake, encourage, promote and support the establishment of economic zones and industrial centers. And, in order to attract local and foreign investments within the area of the zones and outside but within the area of autonomy, the government in the area of autonomy may grant incentives to investors as may be defined in an Autonomous Investment Act to be formulated by the Regional Legislative Assembly within one year from its organization.

143. The resident in the area of autonomy shall have preferential rights over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources in the area of autonomy respecting existing rights on the exploitation, exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
144. The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall enjoy fiscal autonomy in budgeting its own revenue resources and block subsidies granted to it by the National Government and foreign donors. Budgeting includes planning, programming and disbursing of funds.
145. The National Government shall appropriate for the of autonomy a sufficient amount and for a period (both to be determined later) for infrastructure projects which shall be based on a development plan duly approved by the Regional Autonomous Government taking into account national policies.
146. Except strategic minerals, which will be defined later, the control and supervision over the exploration, exploitation, development, utilization and protection of mines and minerals in the area of autonomy shall be vested in the Regional Autonomous Government.
147. In the regulation of the exploration, utilization, development, protection of the natural resources inclusive of mines and minerals. Except strategic minerals, which will be defined later, the government in the area of autonomy shall enact rules and regulation and shall impose regulatory fees, taking into account national policies.
148. An Islamic Banking Unit shall be established in the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas which shall be staffed by qualified Islamic banking experts nominated by the Governor of the Regional Autonomous Government. The Governor of the Regional Autonomous Government shall nominate at least three (3) qualified persons from the area of autonomy, from which nomination the appointing authority shall appoint the Head of the Unit. The same procedure shall be observed as regards the rest of the positions in the unit.
149. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall have a Regional Office with full banking service in the capital of the government of the Autonomous Government to respond to the growing needs of the banking community in the area of autonomy which shall be established within one (1) year from the establishment of the Autonomous Government. The Governor of the Autonomous Government shall submit a list of qualified recommendees to the appointing authority from which the staff of the regional office may be chosen: provided that staff who are now occupying and already appointed to positions in the regional office are considered as recommended by the Governor of the Regional Autonomous Government.

150. The Regional Autonomous Government shall establish a body in the area of autonomy with the same powers as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) consistent with the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
151. All current year collections of Internal Revenue taxes within the area of autonomy shall, for a period of five (5) years, be allotted for the Regional Autonomous Government (RAG) in the Annual General Appropriations Act; provided, that;
 - a. The Bureau on Internal Revenue (BIR) shall continue to collect such taxes and the BIR Collection Districts/Offices concerned shall ream such collections and remit the same to the RAG through an approved depository bank within thirty (30) days from the end of each quarter of the current year;
 - b. Out of said internal revenue tax collections, fifty percent (50%) of the tax collected under section 100 (Value-added tax on sale of goods), 102 (Value-added tax on sale of services), 112 (Tax on persons exempt from value-added tax), 113 (Hotel, motels and others), and 114 (Caterers) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, in excess of the increase in collections for the immediately preceding year shall be shared by the RAG and-the local government units (LGUs) within the area of autonomy as follows:
 - (1) Twenty percent (20%) shall accrue to the city or municipality where such taxes are collected, and
 - (2) Eighty percent (80%) shall accrue to the RAG.

In all cases, the RAG shall remit to the LGUs their respective shares within sixty (60) days from the end of each quarter of the current year.

Provided, however, that provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the area of autonomy shall continue to receive their respective shares in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), as provided for in Section 284 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Provided, finally, that the five-year (5) period herein above mentioned may be extended upon mutual agreement of (be national and Regional Autonomous Governments.

E. SHARI'AH AND JUDICIARY

152. The Regional Legislative Assembly of the area of autonomy shall establish Shari'ah Courts in accordance with the existing laws.

F. TOTALITY CLAUSE

153. This Peace Agreement, which is the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, embodies and constitutes the totality of all the agreements, to covenant and understandings between the GRP and the MNLF respecting all the subject matters embodied herein. This Agreement supersedes and modifies all agreements, consensus, covenants, documents and communications not referred to or embodied in this Agreement or whose terms and conditions are otherwise inconsistent herewith. Any conflict in the interpretation of this Agreement shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws.

G. EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE

154. This Agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing hereof by the parties, unless otherwise provided herein.


Done in the City of Manila on the 2nd day of September 1996.

For the GRP:




H.E. AMBASSADOR MANUEL T. YAN
Chairman of the GRP Peace Panel

For the MNLF:




H.E. PROF. NUR MISUARI
Chairman of the MNLF Peace panel

With the participation of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six and the Secretary-General of the OIC.



H.E. MR. ALI ALATAS
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Of the Republic of Indonesia
Chairman of the OIC Ministerial
Committee of the Six



H.E. DR. HAMID AL-GABID
Secretary-General of the OIC

Appendix C

The Tripoli Agreement

Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

In accordance with the Resolution No. 4 Para. 5 adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Islamic conference in its Fourth Session held in Benghazi, Libyan Arab Republic during the month of Safar 1393 H. corresponding to March 1973, calling for the formation of Quadripartite Ministerial Commission representing the Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Somalia, to enter into discussions with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the situation of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines.

And in accordance with the Resolution No. (18) adopted by the Islamic conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in Jumada Alakhir 1393 H. corresponding to June 1974 A.D. which recommends the searching for a just and peaceful political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines through the negotiations.

And in accordance with the Resolution No. 12/7/S adopted by the Islamic conference held in Istanbul in Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. corresponding to May 1976 A.D. empowering the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference to take the necessary steps for the resumption of negotiations.

And following the task undertaken by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference and the discussions held with H.E. President Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines.

And in realization of the contents of Para. 6 of the Joint Communiqué issued in Tripoli on the 25th Zulgeda 1396 H. corresponding to 17th November 1976 A.D. following the official visit paid by the delegation of the Government of the Philippines headed by the First Lady of the Philippines, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, to the Libyan Arab Republic and which calls for the resumption of negotiations between the two parties concerned in Tripoli on the 15th of December 1976 A.D.

Negotiations were held in the City of Tripoli during the period between 24th Zulhija 1396 H. to Second to Moharram 1397 H. corresponding to the period from 15th to 23rd December 1976 A.D. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presided over by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, and comprising of the Delegations of:

1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, led by Honorable Carmelo Z. Barbero, Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations.
2. Moro National Liberation Front, led by Mr. Nur Misuari Chief of the Front.

And with the participation of the representatives of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission:

The Libyan Arab Republic - represented by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - H.E. Salah Abdalla El-Fadl, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Libyan Arab Republic.

The Republic of Senegal - Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, Representative of the Republic of Senegal and Charge d'Affairs of Senegal in Cairo.

Democratic Republic of Somalia, Libyan Arab Republic.

With the aid of H.E. Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and a delegation from the Secretariat General of the Conference composed of Mr. Qasim Zuheri, Assistant Secretary General, and Mr. Aref Ben Musa, Director of Political Department.

During these negotiations which were marked by a spirit of conciliation and understanding, it has been agreed on the following:

First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall comprise the following:

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Basilan | 8. Sultan Kudarat |
| 2. Sulu | 9. Lanao del Norte |
| 3. Tawi-tawi | 10. Lanao del Sur |
| 4. Zamboanga del Sur | 11. Davao del Sur |
| 5. Zamboanga del Norte | 12. South Cotabato |
| 6. North Cotabato | 13. Palawan |
| 7. Maguindanao | |

Third:

1. Foreign Policy shall be of the competence of the Central Government of the Philippines.
2. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central Authority provided that the arrangements for the joining of the forces of the Moro National Liberation Front with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed later.
3. In the areas of the autonomy, the Muslims shall have the right to set up their own Courts which implement the Islamic Shari'ah laws. The Muslims shall be represented in all Courts including the Supreme Court. The representation of the Muslims in the Supreme Court shall be upon the recommendation from the authorities of the Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees will be issued by the President of the Republic of their appointments taking into consideration all necessary qualifications of the candidates.

4. Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the right to set up schools, colleges and universities, provided that matters pertaining to the relationship between these educational and scientific organs and the general education system in the state shall be subject of discussion later on.
5. The Muslims shall have their own administrative system in compliance with the objectives of the autonomy and its institutions. The relationship between this administrative system and the Central administrative system to be discussed later.
6. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have their own economic and financial system. The relationship between this system and the Central economic and financial system of the State shall be discussed later.
7. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall enjoy the right of representation and participation in the Central Government and in all other organs of the State. The number of representatives and ways of participation shall be fixed later.
8. Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy for the Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the Central security forces shall be fixed later.
9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for the Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative Assembly shall be constituted through a direct election, and the formation of the Executive Council shall take place through appointments by the Legislative Assembly. A decree for their formation shall be enacted by the President of the Republic respectively. The number of members of each assembly shall be determined later on.
10. Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence of the Central Government, and a reasonable percentage deriving from the revenues of the mines and minerals be fixed for the benefit of the areas of the autonomy.
11. A Mixed Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front. The Mixed Committee shall meet in Tripoli during the period from the Fifth of February to a date not later than the Third of March 1977. The task of said Committee shall be charged to study in detail the points left for discussion in order to reach a solution thereof in conformity with the provisions of this agreement.
12. Cease-fire shall be declared immediately after the signature of this agreement, provided that its coming into effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A Joint Committee shall be composed of the two parties with the help of the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire.

The said Joint Committee shall also be charged with supervising the following:

- a. A complete amnesty in the areas of the autonomy and the renunciation of all legal claims and codes resulting from events which took place in the South of the Philippines.
- b. The release of all the political prisoners who had relations with the events in the South of the Philippines.

c. The return of all refugees who have abandoned their areas in the South of the Philippines.

d. To guarantee the freedom of movements and meetings.

13. A joint meeting be held in Jeddah during the first week of the month of March 1977 to initial what has been concluded by the Committee referred to in Para. 11.

14. The final agreement concerning the setting up of the autonomy referred to in the first and second paragraphs shall be signed in the City of Manila, Republic of the Philippines, between the Government of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

15. Immediately after the signature of the Agreement in Manila, a Provisional Government shall be established in the areas of the autonomy to be appointed by the President of the Philippines; and be charged with the task of preparing for the elections of the Legislative Assembly in the territories of the Autonomy; and administer the areas in accordance with the provisions of this agreement until a Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly.

16. The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.

Fourth: This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date of its signature.

Done in the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. corresponding to 23rd December 1976 A.D. in three original copies in Arabic, English, French languages, all equal in legal power.

For the Government of the Republic of the Philippines:

Hon. Carmelo Z. Barbero
Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations

For the Moro National Liberation Front:

Professor Nur Misuari
Chairman of the Front

Dr. Ali Abdusaalam Treki
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Libyan Arab Republic and Chairman of the Negotiations

Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye
Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

Appendix D

Current Situation in Mindanao

(Excerpts from the Project Document of the UN Multi-donor Assistance Programme Phase 4 named “ACT for Peace Programme”)

1. Southern Philippines, comprising of Palawan and Mindanao, is abundant in productive resources. It is home to a population that is often described as “tri-people” referring to Christians, Muslims and indigenous peoples. The bountiful and diverse nature of Southern Philippines has unfortunately been a cause of contention among groups. Iniquitous relationships developed among peoples, between Southern Philippines and central authority, and between Filipino and external interests. Southern Philippines has been the site of intense armed conflicts between the government and other armed entities for a long period of time.
2. Respite came with the successful conclusion of the peace process between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in September 1996 between the two parties was recognized nationally and internationally as a major milestone for peace in Southern Philippines.
3. However, there are still challenges to peace in Southern Philippines. Violent and destructive conflicts continue, even as peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflicts involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the National Democratic Front are being pursued. Other local armed conflicts exist involving disputes over power relations, property and beliefs. The proliferation of loose firearms in Southern Philippines fuels the escalation of conflict into open violence.
4. Armed conflict has exacted great costs on the people and resources of Southern Philippines. Massive dislocation of the civilian population and economic losses occur after encounters between government troops and other armed groups. Women, children, the aged and indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to the effects of displacement. Respect for human rights remains a concern; there are many reported abuses of civil and political rights.
5. Unpeace in Southern Philippines has not gone unnoticed; there have been and continue to be many initiatives from government and non-state parties to bring about peace. The government and the MILF continue to explore the possibility for a peace settlement. Similar processes are happening between the government and the NDF. Civil society organizations such as the Bishop-Ulama Conference and peace networks also contribute to the clamor for peace with their efforts to build a constituency for peace through peace education and advocacy, to facilitate dialog, healing and reconciliation among warring parties and among community members, and to provide relief and rehabilitation support to affected communities.
6. The United Nations system in the Philippines has been involved in peace efforts, particularly in support of the GRP-MNLF FPA. The first two phases of the GoP-UN Multi-Donor Programme (GoP-UN MDP), which lasted from 1996 to 2001, assessed the needs of selected MNLF communities and provided assistance in the form of basic services, livelihood and enterprise development, confidence and governance leadership training.

following: promoting the rule of law, tolerance of minority and opposition groups, transparent political processes, a commitment to eradicate corruption, and independent judiciary, an impartial police force, a military subject to political control, a free press, vibrant civil society institutions, and meaningful elections. Ultimately, it means respect for human rights above all aspects.⁴

16. Conflict prevention policies are in synch not only with Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) but more importantly, the Millennium Declaration.
17. The new Programme is consistent with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Outcome # 5, which calls for the reduction of the level of violent conflict, and the promotion of human security and the culture of peace nationwide.
18. Human security, which addresses individual and collective needs⁵ through non-coercive means, is at the core of peacebuilding. It involves both the creation of opportunity and the construction of structures and processes that decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. Beyond the absence of violent conflict, human security encompasses human rights, good governance, access to services, the protection of the vulnerable, and the creation of opportunities and choices to fulfill human potentials. This leads to the reduction of poverty, achievement of economic growth and the prevention of conflict.⁶

⁴ *Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Towards a Culture of Prevention* by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, September 1999

⁵ For security, identity, recognition and participation (International Alert, 1996:21)

⁶ From the Commission on Human Security, 2003 as cited in the document Common Country Assessment Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding