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▶ 2021 LABOUR OVERVIEW

Latin America and the Caribbean



ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

▶ 2021 LABOUR OVERVIEW

Latin America
and the Caribbean



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First published, 2021

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Labour Overview 2021

Lima: ILO / Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2021. 268 p.

Employment, unemployment, labour market, wage, minimum wage, gender pay gap, labour statistics, working conditions, Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean.

13.01.3

ISSN: 2305-0268 (print edition)

ISSN: 2305-0276 (web pdf edition)

ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

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Printed in Peru

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► Foreword

Two years after the onset of a pandemic that caused a deep crisis in the labour markets of Latin America and the Caribbean, economic recovery has been insufficient to return employment to its 2019 levels.

There remains a high degree of uncertainty in the region's world of work due to the ongoing health emergency, slow economic growth forecast for this year, and structural problems, which contributed to amplifying the impact of the crisis, namely inequality, informality, and low systemic productivity.

The 2021 Labour Overview describes a mixed bag scenario for employment and suggests that pre-pandemic levels will be reached by 2023 or even 2024.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on labour markets in this region. From late 2019 through the second quarter of 2020, a little over 49 million jobs were lost, with massive departures from the workforce, many companies- especially SMEs- pushed into bankruptcy, and an unprecedented drop in revenues.

Since the second half of 2020, signs of economic recovery began to appear; in 2021, they were stronger albeit with varying degrees in countries and sectors. After such a deep crisis, the regional growth average in 2021 reach 6.2 percent, because of the "rebound effect". Yet, the latest forecasts for 2022 estimate a slow growth of 2.1 percent, a rather moderate level.

The economic recovery has translated into a slight improvement in labour indicators.

The regional unemployment rate for the first three quarters of 2021 was 10 percent and is expected to be 9.6 by the end of the year. This rate would be below 10.7 percent reached in 2020, yet well above the 8 percent of 2019. Due to the crisis, around 4 million people have joined the ranks of the unemployed. Overall, more than 28 million people are currently looking for a job and cannot find one.

At the end of 2021, around 4.5 million jobs remained to be recovered, including unemployed people and those who have not yet returned to the workforce. Most of these people are women. Unemployment rates for women have not changed. The average rate for the first three quarters of 2020 and 2021 was the same: 12.4 percent.

In this stage of recovery, young people have returned to work faster than adults. However, regional youth unemployment rate is still 21.4 percent (average for the first three quarters of 2021), which is higher than the pre-pandemic rate: 18 percent-a figure already considered excessively high. In addition, many young people tend to start their first job under informal conditions.

Informality is endemic in this region and can be considered as a "social comorbidity" in this pandemic. In 2019, one in two employed persons was working under informal conditions. At the beginning of the crisis, the informality rate dropped due to the enormous loss of this type of jobs; however, most of the jobs recovered since then have been under informal conditions.

This report shows that the proportion of jobs recovered in the informal sector, which was 80 percent, has dropped to 70 percent in 2021, which indicates a recovery in formal employment. As of the third quarter, the average regional informality rate is 49 percent, the same as before the pandemic. However, this could increase as more people enter the workforce in a context of low growth and insufficient formal job creation.

Likewise, this Labour Overview includes a special section on the challenges of digital transformation and its impact on labour markets in the region. Due to its characteristics, the current crisis has also accelerated work trends leading to new forms of employment and automation.

Technological changes have had significant economic, social, and environmental impacts as evidenced in the quantity and quality of employment, productivity, international trade, productive structures, qualifications required, company dynamics, and people's welfare.

The exponential increase in teleworking and employment on digital platforms were two of the most visible signs of these transformations. To leverage upon the opportunity offered by an era of change

Clearly, to overcome this crisis it will be necessary to create more and better jobs for women and men in Latin America and the Caribbean. This can have a direct impact on the improvement of social indicators, including those of poverty and inequality.

will require strategies that range from professional training to supporting companies, entrepreneurs, and workers.

The crisis caused by the pandemic has marked a turning point for this region, one of the world's hardest-hit regions in economic and social terms, and in the number of infections and deaths.

Clearly, to overcome this crisis it will be necessary to create more and better jobs for women and men in Latin America and the Caribbean. This can have a direct impact on the improvement of social indicators, including those of poverty and inequality.

The ILO's message is that a broader, comprehensive, far-reaching, people-centred policy agenda needs to be adopted; it should, particularly, focus on the creation of formal employment. Without a set of coherent and far-reaching measures, the impacts of the crisis will be prolonged and will leave deep long-term social and labour scars in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The discouragement and frustration generated by difficulties in accessing decent work are often reflected in social unrest, which, in turn, affects stability, prosperity and even governance at all levels.

Vinicius Pinheiro
ILO Regional Director
for Latin America and the Caribbean

► Acknowledgments

The *2022 Labour Overview for Latin America and the Caribbean* was coordinated by Roxana Maurizio, ILO Regional Specialist on Labour Economics for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The labour report was prepared by Roxana Maurizio and Juan Jacobo Velasco in collaboration with a team composed of Fabio Bertranou, Gerhard Reinecke and Andrés Marinakis. External collaborators provided inputs for this report, specifically Osvaldo Kacef (assessment of the regional macroeconomic situation and the global environment), Ana Paula Monsalvo (dynamic analysis of the labour market) and Silvana Martinez (analysis of administrative records, income and inequality).

The special topic was coordinated and prepared by Roxana Maurizio with contributions from the following colleagues and external collaborators: Claudio Maggi, Andrés López, Ramiro Albrieu, Megan Ballesty (digital transformation and productive development), Fabio Bertranou (digital labour platforms), Ana Laura Fernández (automation, occupations and job-tasks), Sol Catania (teleworking) and Francesco Carella, Gonzalo Graña, Rodrigo Filgueira and Ana Ermida (the role of vocational training, focusing particularly on young people).

Database processing and a large part of the indicators in this report, including the tasks of systematization and consistency, were carried out by the ILO Labour Information and Analysis System for Latin America and the Caribbean (SIALC) based in Panama, led by Horacio Barría and his team composed of Rigoberto García and Leo Mendoza.

The ILO Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Vinicius Carvalho Pinheiro, expresses his appreciation to the work team responsible for preparing the 2021 Labour Overview. The region's national statistical institutes and offices deserve a special mention for their contributions to the development of SIALC/Panama. Their contributions have made possible the publication of the Labour Overview for Latin America and the Caribbean every year since 1994.

Carola González and Mariella Mujica were responsible for the layout, image and style of this edition, with oversight from Luis Córdova. Luis Córdova was also in charge of disseminating the report to the media, with support from Alejandro Iturrizaga and the ILO regional communications team. The support services of the ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly colleagues in the Programming and Finance units, were very valuable at different stages of the report preparation process.

Acknowledgement to Andrés Marinakis

The 2021 Labour Overview team would like to specially recognition in this edition our colleague Andres Marinakis, who will be retiring from the ILO in 2022.

Andrés Marinakis has been an important contributor to the *Labour Overview* for more than 20 years. With dedication and professionalism, he has participated in analysing the evolution of wages in the region, the different areas linked to labour policies and the changes in the dynamics of the world of work. In addition, he has made important contributions to arrange the contents of several editions of this report. His work has certainly been a very relevant contribution to the prestige and continuity of the *Labour Overview* for more than two decades.

2021 Labour Overview Team

► Executive Summary

Slowing economic recovery, accelerating inflation, and shrinking fiscal space threaten the path to improve the labour market and incomes

- After the sharp contraction of the economic activity level in 2020 of -7 percent, the region grew 6.2 percent in 2021, according to the latest estimates released by ECLAC.
- A significant slowdown of the growth rate is expected for 2022. According to ECLAC, it will be at around 2.1 percent.
- The slowdown in economic growth will be more evident in developing countries than in developed economies increasing the asymmetry between the two groups of countries.
- The evolution of the economic activity level during 2021 will not be enough to return to pre-pandemic values. According to ECLAC, only 11 countries out of 33 will have recovered said value by 2021 and 3 will do so by 2022. In other words, by the end of 2022, three years into the pandemic, more than half of the countries in the region will have a lower GDP compared to that of 2019. Moreover, 2019 closed the worst five-year period in Latin America in terms of growth since the GDP per capita contracted by 4 percent because between 2014 and 2019.
- The gradual normalization of economic activity coexists with an emerging acceleration of inflation that is pushing rates to levels not seen for some time in the region. This has led to a tightening of monetary policies and an increase of interest rates, hindering the path of economic recovery.
- These growing difficulties coexist with the persistent challenges of Latin American and Caribbean economies to overcome a situation structurally characterized by stagnation and inequality. This challenge will have to be faced with the double difficulty of reduced fiscal space and high levels of indebtedness, so the task ahead for the countries of the region will not be easy.

►► Nearly two years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the third quarter of 2021, the employment rate and economic participation rate were still lower than the 2019 records, while the unemployment rate was higher than in that year.

In a complex macroeconomic context, the recovery of labour market indicators has been insufficient to return to pre-pandemic values

- Nearly two years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the third quarter of 2021, the employment rate and economic participation rate were still lower than the 2019 records, while the unemployment rate was higher than in that year.
- When comparing the average figures for the first three quarters of 2021 with the same period two years earlier, we notice a lower employment rate by about 2.8 percentage points (54.9 percent and 57.8, respectively), a 2.2 percentage point lower economic participation rate (61.1 percent and 63.2

percent, respectively), and a 1.3 percentage point higher unemployment rate (10 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively).

- In addition, when analysing the evolution of the total volume of jobs from the onset of the pandemic until the third quarter of 2021, it is possible to size the magnitude of two opposing behaviours: the reduction in employment between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 of over 49 million, and the subsequent partial recovery of about 44.6 million. **There are still 4.5 million jobs to be recovered in the region.** In the third quarter of 2021, the quantity of jobs was about 2 percent lower than in the fourth quarter of 2019.
- Given that the absolute number of people in the workforce in the third quarter of 2021 was similar to that observed prior to the outbreak of the pandemic¹, the quantity of jobs that have not been recovered is similar to the additional number of unemployed people. There were about 4 million more unemployed people in the third quarter of 2021 than in the fourth quarter of 2019.
- The asymmetry between the duration of the contractionary phase of employment and that of the recovery phase is evident. It will take more than 5 quarters to recover the total number of jobs lost in the region during the first two quarters of 2020.
- However, in most of the countries of the region, the speed of the employment recovery was similar or even faster than that observed in the level of activity. In fact, in some countries, both indicators -employment and activity- reached similar values by the third quarter of 2021, even though the initial contraction of employment was more severe than that of output.
- The third quarter of 2021 was the first quarter since the onset of the pandemic in which all countries with information available in the region experienced increases in their employment rates.
- The number of hours worked increased much more than that of the employment level, after having experienced a greater contraction than that of the volume of employment in 2020. Despite such recovery of hours, levels have not returned to pre-pandemic values.

The employment recovery has been more difficult for women and young people. However, there are many significant labour gaps that still persist

- **After enduring the most intense impacts of the crisis in 2020, the recovery of female employment has been more intense than that experienced by male employment. Likewise, the recovery of women's job opportunities was also more intense than that of men. In other words, during 2021, the difference between the employment rate of men and women did not widen, nor did the participation gap by gender.**
- Nevertheless, this dynamic has not been sufficient to offset for the greater job loss and the greater reduction in women's job opportunities in the first half of 2020. In the third quarter of 2021, the female employment rate was 5.6 percent lower than that observed prior to the onset of the pandemic. This gap was more than double compared to the one observed in the male employment rate. Meanwhile, the labour participation rate for women was 3.6 percent lower than that recorded in the fourth quarter of 2019 while for men this percentage difference was 1.4.
- Between the second quarter of 2020 and the third quarter of 2021, about 25.5 million jobs held by men were recovered. This figure was similar to the male job loss recorded between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020. However, of the 23.6 female occupations lost, around 19.3 million were recovered in the same period. In other words, more than 4 million jobs held by women have yet to be recovered.

¹ This is the result of a lower economic participation rate that is offset by a higher total volume of the working-age population during the two periods compared.

►► The major historical difficulties experienced by young people in the region's labour markets continue. They face greater labour intermittency that can be explained by the intense inflows and outflows of the workforce. Greater occupational instability, in turn, is associated with a higher prevalence of informal, precarious, low-skilled activities.

- In fact, as of the third quarter of 2021, the average unemployment rate for women is 12.4 percent, the same as in 2020, which shows that there has been no improvement, and that it must drop significantly to return to the 9.7 percent of the first three quarters of 2019.
- Almost two years into the pandemic, the employment situation of women in most countries in the region is worse than that of men in 2019. In this context, gender mainstreaming is becoming increasingly important in developing strategies to accelerate job creation, especially formal employment.
- The greater initial proportional loss of occupations among young people is a widespread phenomenon in the region. However, during the recovery phase, young people returned to employment faster than adults. When comparing the third quarter of 2021 and the same period of 2019, it can be seen that the regional employment rate of young people is the same (40.5) while that of adults drops almost 3 percentage points (61.1 and 64, respectively). This is partly explained by the behaviour of labour informality and the evolution of certain sectors with a higher advocacy of youth employment.
- Yet, youth unemployment continues to be of concern in the region and remains at unprecedented levels. Before the pandemic, it hovered around 18 percent, which was considered high. But with this crisis it quickly exceeded the 20 percent limit. As of the third quarter of 2021, the cumulative youth unemployment rate (15-24 years old) was 21.4 percent, a figure lower than the 23 percent of 2020. But there is still some way to go to return to pre-pandemic levels.
- The major historical difficulties experienced by young people in the region's labour markets continue. They face greater labour intermittency that can be explained by the intense inflows and outflows of the workforce. Greater occupational instability, in turn, is associated with a higher prevalence of informal, precarious, low-skilled activities. For adolescents who enter the labour market early and for young people with little work experience and less developed job skills, the high occupational turnover hinders the possibility of accumulating specific qualifications, thus hindering their future work experience. In contexts of low labour demand, less experience reduces their probability of accessing a job and increases their chances of being fired. This situation may be accompanied by an increase in the discouragement effect that results in lower incentives to look for a job and to start or continue studies.

Recovery led by informal occupations, but with an increasing contribution of formal jobs to employment growth

- The dynamics of formal and informal employments have differed from those noted in previous economic crises. Frequently, when formal employment falls, informal employment plays a countercyclical role and increases its level. But in this crisis, both formal and informal employment

experienced significant contractions, but the latter with greater intensity than the former. Therefore, this “traditional mechanism” was strongly weakened during the first half of 2020. This led to a significant reduction in the informality rate in the countries of the region at the height of the crisis, in mid-2020.

- However, the partial recovery of employment has been led by the growth of informal employment. These occupations have reported between 60 and 80 percent of net job creation between the second quarter of 2020 and third quarter of 2021.
- Nevertheless, the growth contribution of informal jobs has been declining from the third quarter of 2020 to the same period in 2021. Thus, the simple average of 7 countries in terms of the contribution of informal employment, in the first phase of recovery in the third and fourth quarters of 2020, was 80 percent, and around 70 percent in the third quarter of 2021.
- In countries that have returned to the pre-pandemic employment rate, or are very close to it, the informality rate is no higher than in 2019, despite the increasing trend of this indicator after the sudden contraction in the second quarter of 2020.
- This has been partly associated with more formal paid jobs in the private sector, especially during 2021. However, only in the last few months have about half of the countries reached the same or similar levels of early 2020. This data is based on information taken from administrative records.
- But countries that still show significant differences with regard to the volume of occupations registered in 2019 could experience a closing of this gap with higher informality rates than those observed in that year.
- Unless a significant number of formal jobs are created to recover the workforce, the risk of increases in the rate of labour informality will continue. Moreover, in contexts of sharp contraction of family income, some family members may enter the labour market for the first time to try to overcome, at least partially, the loss of family monetary resources. Therefore, it is necessary to implement policies not only to retain existing formal employment but also to support the creation of new formal jobs in the region.

Moderate adjustments to minimum wage and unfavourable performance of real average incomes

- By 2020, some countries had already made periodic adjustments to the minimum wage, prior to the pandemic. Other countries that used to make irregular adjustments postponed the decision for the following year or adopted moderate adjustments. In 2021, moderate readjustments of the nominal value of the minimum wage prevailed.
- In addition, in 2021, several countries in the region experienced significant increases in their inflation rate. If this trend consolidates, it may lead to future falls in real wages and to an increase in the distributive bid, as long as the readjustments of this institution do not keep pace with inflationary dynamics.
- During 2021, negative (or positive but close to zero) variations continued to be observed in the real average earnings of those who remained employed. In a context of accelerating inflation, there is an increased risk that salaries will continue to lose purchasing power.

The increase in the total mass of real labour income in 2021 did not fully offset the contraction experienced in 2020

- Increase in employment between the second and fourth quarters of 2020 and the second and third quarters of 2021 generated a positive variation (or reduced the fall risk) in the total mass of labour

► In 2021, several countries in the region experienced significant increases in their inflation rate. If this trend consolidates, it may lead to future falls in real wages and to an increase in the distributive bid, as long as the readjustments of this institution do not keep pace with inflationary dynamics.

incomes. Despite this, the indicator in 2021 was still in the vast majority of countries, below the aggregate labour income generated by the end of 2019.

- In the third quarter of 2021, the percentage of households without any labour income exceeded those recorded prior to the onset of the pandemic, even if there was an increase compared to 2020 due to the partial recovery of employment.

The COVID-19 pandemic intensified trends toward greater digitalization, generating new opportunities and challenges in the labour markets of the region

- The COVID-19 pandemic intensified the trends towards greater digitalization and there is agreement that in the future the influence of digital technologies will be even greater than in the past. Although this process is taking place within a framework of great uncertainty, there seems to be no doubt about the significant impact that new technologies have and will have on different dimensions that affect the well-being of societies.
- Two of the clear manifestations of technological progress during the pandemic have been the significant increase in teleworking and digital labour platforms.
- Teleworking allowed a number of companies to continue their operations and certain groups of workers to maintain their employment relationships. However, the transition from face-to-face to remote work involved challenges for companies and workers, who had to quickly implement new working methods during lockdown.
- Work based on digital platforms increased significantly amidst the pandemic and the measures implemented to prevent the spread of the virus. Because many delivery activities were considered "essential", digital platform workers continued working due to an increasing demand for their services. But along with the employment opportunities created by digital platforms, there are significant challenges to guarantee labour rights and social protection for these workers in the region.
- There is a clear need to adapt the content and scope of vocational training in order to improve the match between the supply and demand of skills, develop skills required in the future and reduce the disruptive impacts of technology on labour markets.
- The region's agenda for digital transformation is as necessary as it is demanding and intensive in terms of public policies that help to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of this transformation and to ensure that this transition leads to the creation of more and better jobs.

- New technologies can be very valuable tools in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of different strategies and policies to recover decent employment. Technology can facilitate greater coverage of social protection, simplify worker registration, improve access to financial services, strengthen skills development and improve training systems to reach those in the informal economy, support labour inspection, and encourage and facilitate compliance with labour laws.

Outlooks: high unemployment and labour informality in a context of a slowdown in economic recovery, accelerating inflation, and less fiscal space. An ambitious set of far-reaching policies focused on people and, in particular, on the creation of formal employment is required

- The average unemployment rate during the first three quarters of 2021 was 10 percent, a lower figure than that observed for the same period in 2020: 10.7 percent. **The forecast average for 2021 is around 9.6 percent.** This represents a reduction compared to the 2020 value (10.6 percent) but an increase compared to the 2019 record (8 percent).
- The 2022 forecast indicates that the recovery of Latin American and Caribbean economies observed in 2021 slows down significantly. There is still uncertainty about the possible trajectory of the effects associated with new outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effects that a period of higher interest rates and discontinuity of the fiscal stimulus observed until 2021 may have on aggregate demand and labour markets in the countries of the region.
- In this regard, **by 2022 the regional unemployment rate is likely to decrease slightly, between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points, remaining above 9 percent.** However, besides the aforementioned factors, this value will be strongly influenced by the behaviour of the labour supply in a context where the participation rate is still lower than the pre-pandemic value.
- This means that the unemployment rate in 2022 will still be higher than the average value experienced in 2019 (8 percent). This value was already 1.9 percentage points higher than the value registered in 2014, the lowest record since 2010 in the region.
- In addition, there has been a significant increase in the average length of unemployment episodes as a result of this crisis. Moreover, this increase was verified even during 2021 when the unemployment rate experienced a decreasing trend. This picture is even more worrisome when considering that most of the job loss were from informal workers who do not have access to an unemployment insurance when they are unemployed. In most cases, this represents the loss or reduction of the most important source of individual and family income.
- In addition, extended periods of unemployment may come with a reduction in other available sources of income, but also may deteriorate the worker's human capital and thus reduce the likelihood of finding a job in a near future.
- In the third quarter of 2021, the informality rate was almost 49 percent, similar to the record of 2019 and to that of 2012. In other words, around one out of every two workers in the region is informal. The stability of this record at an extremely high value over almost a decade reveals that labour informality continues to be one of the most important challenges in the labour markets of the region. Moreover, in a context of lower economic growth projected for 2022, the lower intensity of job creation may bias employment towards the generation of informal jobs.
- According to the projections included in the recently published "World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2022", ILO (2022), the average weekly hours worked in the population aged 15- 64 in the region for 2022 (25.5) will continue to be lower than those recorded in 2019 (26.0).

- Likewise, the negative impact on real wages and income distribution of the aforementioned increased inflation rates in Latin America and the Caribbean is another factor that affects the possibilities of the region's countries to consolidate the recovery of their economies. It should also be noted that, in most cases, the acceleration of inflation has been driven by the increase in food prices, which aggravates the consequences on poverty and inequality indicators that were already in a process of marked deterioration even before the pandemic.
- In view of this critical context, it is necessary to continue with some of the measures implemented in the region in 2020 and 2021, but more importantly to adopt a broader agenda of comprehensive and far-reaching policies focused on people and, in particular, on the creation of formal employment. Without a set of coherent and far-reaching measures, the impacts of the crisis will be prolonged and will leave deep long-term social and labour scars in Latin America and the Caribbean. The different speeds of employment recovery among various groups of workers and the high levels of inequality and poverty may not only severely limit economic growth, but may also aggravate the degree of social unrest in the region.

▶ **2021 LABOUR
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► 1. The economies of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2021. Taking stock and looking ahead


1.1 The world economic situation: different speeds of recovery

The COVID19 pandemic triggered simultaneous supply and demand shocks all around the world. Countries had to face their impacts (both health and economy) in a context of great uncertainty since there was no historic precedent.

The pandemic has had a significant negative impact on the global economy. According to IMF estimates, global GDP would have contracted by 3.3 percent. However, in a context of widespread economic contraction, Latin America and the Caribbean was the region most affected by the health crisis, with declines of 6.8 percent or 7 percent in 2020, according to ECLAC or IMF estimates, respectively.

After the widespread economic contraction in 2020, the global economy recovered strongly in 2021; albeit in an uneven manner and with the prospect of slowdown by 2022. Figure 1.1. shows the latest IMF estimates point to global GDP growth of 5.9 percent in 2021 and project growth of 4.4 percent in 2022 (0.5 percentage points below the October 2021 projections). For 2021, growth forecasts for emerging and developing economies are above the world average (i.e. 6.5 percent). By contrast, developed economies are expected to grow below the world average (i.e. 5 percent). It is noteworthy that within the emerging and developing economies as a whole there is a great deal of heterogeneity, with the Chinese and other Asian economies on the one hand and Latin America and the Caribbean on the other growing well above the world average, while the economies of the Middle East and Central Asia and the African economies are expected to grow well below the average. **In 2022, the global economy is expected to slow down; this would be more pronounced in the developing world than in developed economies.**

► Figure 1.1. Economic Growth Rates in the COVID-19 Era




Source: International Monetary Fund.

After the widespread economic contraction in 2020, the global economy recovered strongly in 2021; albeit in an uneven manner and with the prospect of slowdown by 2022.

Differences in the availability of resources to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic, in access to vaccination and in the evolution of the health emergency mark the different rates of recovery of economic activity.

Indeed, one of the reasons for this disparate evolution is the different behaviour of the pandemic and of the measures that the authorities of the countries applied in order to contain the spread of contagion. To analyse the extent of the restrictions applied by countries to contain the spread of the virus, we will use the data compiled and systematised by the University of Oxford¹. As Figure 1.2. shows, developed countries eased restrictions more quickly than the rest of the world, as the health situation improved in the second quarter of 2021. This scenario began to change towards the end of the year with the arrival of a new variant. The rapid spread of the Omicron wave in the northern hemisphere forcing developed economies to tighten measures again. The data for December did not yet reflect the impact of this variant in the rest of the world. However, given the speed of spread of this new variant, it will not be surprising to see more governments imposing restrictions and health measures.

► **Figure 1.2.** Mobility Constraint Index (2021)




Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

The disparity shown in Figure 1.2 stems from not only the natural evolution of the health emergency, but also the impact of vaccination campaigns where access to vaccines was highly unequal. As Figure 1.3 shows, access to vaccination has been highly uneven according to the countries' income. High-income countries were able to complete the vaccination schedule for over 70 percent of their populations. By contrast, lower-middle income countries were only able to vaccinate less than 40 percent of their populations with two doses and, the poorest countries were barely able to vaccinate 5 percent of their population with the full scheme.

¹ The Oxford University Covid-19 Government Responses to Covid Tracking Indicator (OxCGRT) compiles information on various policy measures taken by governments in more than 180 countries. Data is systematised into 18 indicators. These indicators have been grouped into four general indicators: a) restrictions on mobility and activity; b) government responses; c) health and containment measures; d) financial assistance.


► **Figure 1.3.** Vaccination coverage as of January 2022 (percentage of population)



Source: Our World in Data.

The third pillar underpinning the explanation for the faster speed of recovery in advanced economies compared with lower relative income economies is the difference in the number of resources available to implement measures to offset or cushion the effects of restrictions on mobility and on the pursuit of some economic activities and the loss of income that this implied for households and firms. Conversely, the gradual normalisation of economic activity, in the context of tightening fiscal space, rising debt levels and concerns about inflationary pressures, has led governments in many emerging and developing economies to significantly reduce the expansionary bias of their macroeconomic policies in 2021.

► **Figure 1.4.** Measures to contain the economic impacts of COVID-19 (percentage of GDP)




Source: IMF.

The recovery of economies fed back into broad-based growth in international trade, particularly in the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021. Export volumes by emerging and developing economies have increased even quicker than economic activity levels; in October 2021, trade levels were 10.2 percent higher than those at the end of 2019. While the recovery in export volumes has been fairly broad-based, at least until the first quarter of 2021, China and emerging Asia clearly stood out, with exports growing 22.8 percent and 15.5 percent, respectively, compared to pre-pandemic levels. The volume of exports from advanced economies, meanwhile, increased by only 1.2 percent over the same period. However, it is worth noting that from the second quarter of 2021 onwards there is a significant slowdown in the pace of international trade growth, as shown in Figure 1.5.

▀▀ The recovery of economies fed back into broad-based growth in international trade, particularly in the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021.

► **Figure 1.5.** World Exports - Seasonally Adjusted Volumes 2020=100 (three month moving average)




Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

The recovery in international trade was accompanied by sharp increases in commodity prices. As of the second quarter of 2020, international prices climbed to levels way above pre-pandemic prices. International food and metal prices reached levels similar to the peaks of this century, yet such prices trended to stabilise as of the second half of 2021 (Figure 1.6.) This is in line with the slowdown in international trade growth and the evolution of the level of industrial activity in China, which has stopped growing and is estimated to have reached a level similar to the end of 2020 in seasonally adjusted terms by the end of 2021.

Energy commodity prices fell sharply at the peak of the health crisis; but a marked upward trend was observed from the second half of 2020 onwards. In fact, energy prices quadrupled from pandemic lows and, although such prices have partially declined in recent months, they are now approaching the peaks reached in the first decade of this century.


► **Figure 1.6. Commodity Prices. 2019-2021 (2010=100)**



Source: World Bank.

Moreover, rising commodity prices and the emergence of bottlenecks disrupting supply-chains of some productive inputs, in a context of rising demand for goods and services in parallel with the normalisation of economic activity, are generating inflationary pressures in both advanced and emerging and developing economies. Although it is too early to tell whether this is a turnaround or a transitory issue, inflation rates are jumping to levels that we haven't seen in many years. As a response to accelerating inflation, central banks are gradually easing the expansionary bias of their monetary policies. This trend is expected to continue in 2022.

► **Figure 1.7. Annual Inflation Rates (in percentages)**



Source: OECD.

1.2 Regional economic outlook: Latin American and Caribbean economies have grown again, but most will take time to recover from the 2020 losses

Since mid-2020, the GDP of almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries began to recover, as the health emergency receded and governments in the region eased restrictions on mobility and on the conduct of various activities. **Thus, with very few exceptions, all countries in the region grew in 2021, and this growth is expected to continue in 2022.** Tables 1.1 and 1.2 detail the growth projections for 2021 and 2022 made by ECLAC and the IMF.

► **Table 1.1.** Latin America Growth Projections (percentages)

	ECLAC		IMF	
	2021	2022	2021 ⁽¹⁾	2022 ⁽¹⁾
Argentina	9.8	2.2	10.0 ⁽²⁾	3.0 ⁽²⁾
Bolivia	5.2	3.2	5.0	4.0
Brazil	4.7	0.5	4.7 ⁽²⁾	0.3 ⁽²⁾
Chile	11.8	1.9	11.0	2.5
Colombia	9.5	3.7	7.6	3.8
Costa Rica	5.5	3.7	3.9	3.5
Cuba	0.5	3.5	n.d.	n.d.
Ecuador	3.1	2.6	2.8	3.5
El Salvador	10.0	3.8	9.0	3.5
Guatemala	5.4	4.3	5.5	4.5
Haiti	-1.3	1.4	-0.7	1.3
Honduras	9.0	4.5	4.9	4.4
Mexico	5.8	2.9	5.3 ⁽²⁾	2.8 ⁽²⁾
Nicaragua	7.4	3.0	5.0	3.5
Panama	12.4	7.3	12.0	5.0
Paraguay	4.6	3.8	4.5	3.8
Peru	13.5	3.0	10.0	4.6
Dominican Republic	10.4	5.5	9.5	5.5
Uruguay	3.9	3.1	3.1	3.2
Venezuela	-3.0	3.0	-5.0	-3.0
Latin America	6.3	2.0	6.8⁽²⁾	2.4⁽²⁾

Source: ECLAC and IMF.

(1) Estimates for October 2021, except otherwise indicated (2).

(2) Estimates for January 2022.

► **Table 1.2** The Caribbean. Growth Projections (percentages)


	ELAC		IMF	
	2021	2022	2021 ⁽¹⁾	2022 ⁽¹⁾
Antigua and Barbuda	1.8	4.2	1.0	7.0
Bahamas	2.3	8.5	12.8	7.5
Barbados	1.5	7.5	3.3	8.5
Belize	2.7	6.2	8.5	5.4
Dominica	3.2	4.6	3.4	7.9
Granada	0.7	4.0	2.7	6.2
Guyana	18.5	46.0	20.4	48.7
Jamaica	4.0	5.7	4.6	2.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis	-1.8	3.9	-1.0	10.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-6.1	3.7	-6.1	8.3
Saint Lucia	6.3	15.8	3.5	13.1
Surinam	-1.0	1.5	0.7	1.5
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.0	5.7	-1.0	5.4
Caribbean	3.0	11.0		
Caribbean (excl. Guyana)	1.2	6.1		
Caribbean (tourism-dependent economies)			2.3	4.1
Caribe (exporters of commodities)			5.6	21.1

Source: ECLAC and IMF.

(1) Estimates as of October 2021.

However, **economic growth of most Latin American countries in 2021 was mainly driven by a statistical carry-over from the recovery observed in the second half of 2020² and, once this effect disappears, growth rates decline significantly** (Figure 1.8), specially as from the third quarter of 2021. In contrast, Caribbean economies are expected to grow higher; both those that produce and export goods based on the exploitation of natural resources and those that are heavily dependent on international tourism.

2 The annual change in GDP is calculated by comparing the annual average growth rate of a given year (t+1) with the annual average growth rate of the previous year (t). Where economies suffer a deep contraction at the beginning of the year because of COVID, and then recovered towards the end of that period, year t ends up having a GDP that is above the average of the four quarters. Thus, if GDP stops growing in year t+1 and remains at the same level of the last quarter of year t, the average of year t+1 will be higher than that of year t (since the level of the fourth quarter will be higher than the average for that year). When comparing the averages of both years are compared, the variations will have a positive sign indicating an annual growth. However, such amount will only be the result of the statistical carry-over of the growth observed at the end of year t via a vis year t+1.

► **Figure 1.8.** Effect of Statistical Carry-over on Projected Growth in 2021. Selected countries

Source: National Statistics Offices (NSOs).

As stated above, Table 1.3 shows the quarterly evolution of economic activity levels in Latin American countries and demonstrates that, in most cases, seasonally adjusted levels fell in the second quarter of 2021, owing to factors associated with the evolution of the pandemic, and only partially recovered in the third quarter.

► **Table 1.3.** Economic Activity Indicators. Quarter-on-quarter change excluding seasonality

Countries	IQ20	IIQ20	IIIQ20	IVQ20	IQ21	IIQ21	IIIQ21
Argentina	-4.1%	-15.1%	11.9%	4.6%	3.1%	-0.8%	4.2%
Brazil	-1.2%	-10.0%	8.4%	3.0%	1.4%	-0.4%	-0.1%
Chile	2.2%	-12.3%	5.0%	6.1%	3.8%	1.6%	4.9%
Colombia	-2.3%	-14.5%	9.4%	5.6%	2.6%	-1.1%	5.1%
Costa Rica	-1.5%	-8.4%	1.3%	4.5%	1.8%	3.7%	2.9%
Ecuador	0.5%	-23.4%	19.8%	5.8%	3.8%	-0.4%	6.6%
El Salvador	-2.0%	-18.4%	12.3%	8.2%	2.7%	-0.7%	0.1%
Guatemala	-1.4%	-8.1%	8.1%	5.0%	0.5%	0.8%	1.9%
Honduras	-5.0%	-14.9%	12.7%	2.5%	5.1%	2.1%	2.3%
Mexico	-0.6%	-17.9%	13.4%	3.8%	0.8%	-1.1%	-1.4%
Paraguay	0.3%	-9.1%	8.2%	2.2%	-0.1%	2.3%	-0.1%
Peru	-5.6%	-25.9%	30.5%	7.8%	1.1%	-0.3%	0.6%
Dominican Republic	-4.8%	-15.4%	13.8%	5.7%	2.9%	1.0%	1.5%

Source: National Statistics Offices (NSOs).

South American economies, where the impact of COVID was hardest in the second quarter of 2020 and 2021, have seen their GDP recover as of the second half of 2020, though interrupted once again in the second quarter of 2021. Subsequently, as of the third quarter of 2021, most South American economies recovered once again. By contrast, Brazil is an important exception as the economy reflected the impact

of COVID in the second quarter and did not recover in the following quarter. This behaviour could be due to the tightening of monetary policy due to rising inflation and deteriorating expectations.

In Central American countries, the economy evolved differently, as the impact of the second wave was not felt as strongly as in South America and these countries continued to grow in the second quarter.

The other special case is Mexico, where the economy continued to grow the second quarter, but started to contract in the third quarter. This may reflect the change in monetary policy bias, on one hand, and the health issue, on the other, due to the expansion of the delta variant in the northern hemisphere. This was also observed in the US economy, with which the Mexican economy is strongly connected.

Moreover, it is worth noting that despite the quick recovery of the region's economies, this will be insufficient in many cases to recover their 2019 GDP per capita levels. Figure 1.9 shows that, if ECLAC's new projections for 2021 and 2022 are confirmed, GDP per capita in Latin America would be 0.7 percent lower than that in the year before the pandemic, and in 9 out of the region's 20 economies, it would be below their 2019 level. It is worth remembering that **2019 closed the worst five-year period in Latin America in terms of growth; between 2014 and 2019, GDP per capita contracted by 4 percent.**

In the case of the Caribbean, as Figure 1.10 shows, the extraordinary performance of Guyana, which has recently become an oil-producing country, brings the regional average above that of 2019 (2.5 percent). Excluding Guyana, however, the average comparative loss would reach 8.1 percent and is even higher for more than half of the economies considered. For the Caribbean as a whole, GDP per capita in 2019 was 0.8 percent lower than that of the prior five years.

► **Figure 1.9.** Latin America - Projected GDP per capita in 2022 compared to 2019 (percentages)




Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on ECLAC and CELADE data.

► **Figure 1.10.** Caribbean - Projected GDP per capita in 2022 compared to 2019 (percentages)

Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on ECLAC and CELADE data.

The evolution of the pandemic and the restrictions imposed by governments to contain the spread of the spread of contagions conditioned the recovery of the region's economies, particularly in the second quarter of this year, when the arrival of a new wave of contagions required a tightening of restrictive measures or prevented their easing, as was the case in developed economies. The impact of new restrictions was reflected in a slowdown in growth in some cases or a decline in the level of activity on others. Nevertheless, most countries in the region returned to growth in the second half of 2021, as mentioned earlier. The arrival of a new wave of contagion based on the omicron variant is likely to impact -in varying degrees- the development of the region's economies in 2022. However, it is not expected to have such a hard impact as previous waves since this strain appears, at least initially, to cause less severe illness although it spreads more easily than previous ones.


► **Figure 1.11.** Latin America and the Caribbean. Stringency Index (2021)

Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

As regards access to vaccination, Figure 1.12 shows that, by the end of 2021, 16 out of the 33 countries considered in Latin America and the Caribbean had managed to vaccinate with at least one dose to a

percentage higher than the global average of around 60 percent. Among the countries that made the most progress with their vaccination programmes, 10 countries had achieved vaccination coverage of at least one dose for more than 70 percent of their population. In fact, 5 of those countries had completed the vaccination schedule for more than 70 percent of their population. At the opposite end of the list, 11 countries had not reached 50 percent of their population with at least one dose.

► **Figure 1.12. Latin America and the Caribbean. Percentage of Vaccination Coverage.**
By the end of 2021



Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker – Our World in Data.

In addition to health measures, the countries of the region deployed a wide array of economic support measures to counteract the impacts of COVID-19. Such measures aimed at offsetting the impacts of declining working activity and reduction in workers' income caused by both the pandemic and the restrictions applied to control the outbreak. These measures were taken in both the fiscal area (increasing public spending and tax reductions or deferrals) and the finance area. In the latter case, measures were


geared towards improving the liquidity conditions of economies, lowering interest rates, and granting or increasing guarantees to facilitate access to funding, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises.

►► In addition to health measures, the countries of the region deployed a wide array of economic support measures to counteract the impacts of COVID-19. Such measures aimed at offsetting the impacts of declining working activity and reduction in workers' income caused by both the pandemic and the restrictions applied to control the outbreak.

It is worth noting, that the size of such economic support varied significantly from one country to another. Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show that among Latin American economies, only 4 of the 18 considered had implemented measures whose impact was above the regional average of 6.6 percent of the GDP. Meanwhile, among the Caribbean economies,


only 3 of the 14 analysed had implemented measures whose impact exceeded the regional average of 4.1 percent of GDP.

► **Figure 1.13.** Latin America-Economic support measures between January 2020 and June 2021 (percentage of GDP)



Source: IMF.

► **Figure 1.14.** Caribbean-Economic support measures between January 2020 and June 2021 (percentage of GDP)



Source: IMF.

It is worth noting that most of the impacts of these measures occurred in the second half of 2020. As of 2021, the size of such support measures declined significantly, partly because fiscal spaces generally narrowed and partly because economic activities were gradually returning to normal since the health situation was better. Figure 1.15 shows that in most countries, except Chile and Colombia, the primary fiscal balances of the countries in the region partially offset the 2020 shortfalls; such fiscal consolidation is projected to continue in 2022.


► **Figure 1.15.** Latin America. Change in the primary fiscal balance (percentage of GDP)



Source: IMF.

Along the same lines, a gradual reversal of the expansionary bias of countries' monetary policies was observed throughout 2021; this led to a generalised, albeit varying intensity, increase in interest rates. Figure 1.16 shows that most of the central banks surveyed started to raise interest rates, as part of their monetary policy, in the third quarter of the year. The exceptions were: Brazil, where concerns about rising inflationary pressures led the monetary authority to raise interest rate a quarter earlier and more sharply than other central banks in the region. Costa Rica, where the increase in the benchmark policy rate occurred near the end of the year.

► **Figure 1.16.** Latin America. Monetary Policy Interest Rates




Source: Central Banks.

Hence, the following is true: **the evolution of economic activity levels was tightly linked to the evolution of the pandemic and vaccination campaigns; nevertheless, the measures applied by governments in the region prevented even greater damage than that recorded and laid the foundations on which the region's economies began to recover as of the second half of 2020.** With the normalisation of economies, however, macroeconomic policy stimuli will tend to diminish.


On the other hand, **the push coming from the international context was also positive. The evolution of international prices in the last year led to an increase in the region's terms of trade to a level above the average of the last 20 years** (Figure 1.17). At the same time, there was an increase in exported volumes as of the second half of 2020, and further accelerated in the first half of the year, although such upward trend has stabilised in the second half of 2021 (Figure 1.18).

► **Figure 1.17.** Latin America. Terms of trade (12 month moving averages. Average of 2011-2021=100)



Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.


► **Figure 1.18.** Latin America. Evolution of Exported Volumes (2018=100)



Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

Another factor that significantly drove economic recovery of economies through its impact on household income, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, has been the positive evolution of remittances from migrant workers, especially from the United States. Figure 1.19 shows that, in most cases analysed, remittances increased in 2020 over the previous year, especially since the recovery of the world economy in the second half of last year. These increases were higher in those countries whose main emigration destination is the United States, compared to those countries where the most important destination is Spain (Colombia, Ecuador) or other South American countries (Bolivia, Peru). Moreover, in the first 9 months of 2021, such increase was not only generalised, but also reached levels higher than those achieved last year and record levels are projected for this year's inflows.


► **Figure 1.19. Migrant Workers' Remittances. Selected Countries-Percentage Change**



Source: prepared by the authors hereof based on official data.

Conversely, the contributions of tourism activity in the Caribbean—which had been negative in 2020—worsened in the first 9 months of 2021. According to information from the World Tourism Organization (see Figure 1.20), the decline in passenger arrivals in the first 9 months of 2021 has been significant compared to the same period in 2019, further deepening in many cases the contraction observed in what turned out to be the worst year on record for the tourism industry. On the supply side, the arrival of new waves of infection and the emergence of new variants of the virus meant that restrictions were maintained or even increased in many countries. On the demand side, fear of infection continued to discourage passenger arrivals. Furthermore, although the Caribbean countries have been most affected given the relevance of tourism in their economic activity, the fall in tourism flows has also been significant in Mexico (-31 percent), Central America (-62 percent), and South America (-85 percent).

► **Figure 1.20. Caribbean. Annual change in passenger arrivals (percentage)**




Source: World Tourism Organization.

In contrast to what happened in 2020, in the first half of this year, as the recovery consolidated, tourism increasingly relied on domestic demand. In this regard, based on a disaggregated analysis of the

evolution of the national accounts of 6 countries, Figure 1.21 shows that, in all cases, the most dynamic element of demand in the first three quarters of 2021 has been gross capital formation, especially in Peru and Argentina. By contrast, with the exception of Chile and to a lesser extent Colombia, the recovery of household consumption has been slower. This fact can be partially explained by the upsurge in the pandemic observed in the second quarter of 2021 and the slow recovery of employment. Nonetheless, the contribution of the main demand component has been positive in all cases. At the same time, in line with the aforementioned evolution of public finances in the countries of the region, the contributions of government consumption declined, although it remained high in Chile and Colombia. Finally, the contribution of net exports has been negative, due to the sharp increase in imports driven by the recovery of the economies.

► **Figure 1.21.** Evolution of GDP and Demand. Nine months of 2021/Nine months of 2020 (percentage)



Source: prepared by the authors hereof based on official data.

Table 1.4 analyses the reaction of the supply of goods and services in the first half of 2021. The most significant contributions, in terms of their weight in GDP, came from industry and trade in the 9 cases analysed. The sectors most affected at the beginning of the crisis also had a marked recovery in most cases. Construction made a positive contribution to growth in all countries, but was particularly important in Jamaica, Peru and Argentina. Similarly, the provision of personal and social services (with the exception of Jamaica, Costa Rica and Mexico) increased sharply in Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Argentina. In Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Jamaica, there was a significant contribution from the transport and storage services sector. Financial, real estate and business services made a significant contribution in the South American countries included in the analysis and in Guatemala. The primary sector made a significant contribution in Jamaica.


► **Table 1.4.** Latin America and the Caribbean. Contributions to GDP growth
(9 months of 2021 - 9 months of 2020)

	Argen- tina	Brazil	Chile	Colom- bia	Costa Rica	Guate- mala	Jamaica	Mexi- co	Peru
Agriculture, livestock, game, forestry and fishing	-0.5%	-0.1%	1.6%	1.8%	3.7%	4.2%	13.0%	1.2%	1.5%
Mining and quarry exportation	2.4%	0.5%	-1.4%	-1.1%	0.6%	1.7%	-5.9%	1.5%	8.9%
Manufacturing industry	32.9%	21.0%	11.1%	23.6%	31.4%	15.1%	11.8%	28.8%	20.2%
Energy, gas and water	1.0%	-0.2%	1.6%	1.8%	1.9%	1.6%	-0.8%	-0.1%	1.4%
Construction	10.4%	9.6%	6.5%	1.6%	3.2%	6.4%	19.1%	9.3%	20.3%
Wholesale and retail commerce	22.0%	15.1%	25.5%	13.6%	13.4%	26.3%	23.9%	35.4%	15.5%
Accommodation and restaurants	1.2%	n.d.	4.9%	16.4%	2.0%	4.5%	18.9%	6.6%	4.5%
Transport, storage and communications	4.2%	19.7%	8.9%	9.6%	17.3%	9.3%	11.4%	15.7%	9.9%
Financial, real estate and company services	12.5%	10.8%	17.5%	11.5%	22.4%	15.2%	7.5%	-2.4%	9.5%
Public administration	2.0%	4.1%	1.8%	2.4%	-0.9%	1.7%	1.0%	-0.5%	1.7%
Education, health and other services	11.8%	19.5%	22.2%	19.4%	4.9%	14.1%	0.1%	4.4%	6.9%


Source: prepared by the authors hereof based on official data.

Finally, among the highlights of recent developments in the region's economies, the generalised increase in inflation rates cannot go unmentioned. With greater intensity in some countries than in others, the gradual normalisation of economic activities coexists with an incipient acceleration of inflation that is pushing inflation rates to levels not seen for some time in the region. (Figures 1.22 and 1.23).

► **Figure 1.22.** Latin America (selected countries). Annual Inflation Rate 2019-2021



Source: prepared by the authors hereof based on official data.

► **Figure 1.23.** The Caribbean (selected countries). Annual inflation rate 2019-2021

Source: prepared by the authors hereof based on official data.

►► As a result of the supply shock, which has not been completely neutralised in certain sectors, **new bottlenecks have started to appear, hindering the supply of some inputs and affecting the activity in some sectors.**

1.3 Taking stock and looking ahead for the economies of the region

After an unprecedented crisis, in terms of its characteristics, magnitude and global scope, the world economy recovered in 2021. This recovery, however, was not as fast everywhere for several reasons. On one hand, the pandemic did not affect all countries equally, and, on the other, developed economies had much greater access to vaccines and greater capacity to implement expansive fiscal and financial policies to counteract the negative effects of the health emergency.

In addition, it should be noted that the growth rates of activity and international trade recorded in 2021 were, largely, the result of the statistical carry-over from the strong recovery in the second half of 2020, once the worst of the pandemic is over.

As a result of the supply shock, which has not been completely neutralised in certain sectors, **new bottlenecks have started to appear, hindering the supply of some inputs and affecting the activity in some sectors. As a result of these issues, the dynamic recovery of economic activity levels and international trade has slowed down. At the same time, there is an incipient trend towards inflationary acceleration** that is putting on the table the possibility of gradually withdrawing stimuli to demand that enabled economies to recover relatively quickly from the crisis that the world economy faced in the first half of 2020.

The situation of the region's economies was not spared from the picture outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Economic activity in Latin America and the Caribbean have partially recovered in 2021 and this process shall probably continue in 2022, although not as fast.

If the projections are confirmed, **many of the region's countries' GDP per capita in 2022 will be lower than those prior to the pandemic and will still need one or two more years, depending on each country, to return to where they were at the onset of this crisis in 2019. That starting point, as will be recalled, actually marked the end of the worst five-year period in terms of growth, at least since ECLAC has been collecting regional statistics.**


Furthermore, **the economic outlook is not risk-free. On the one hand, there is still some uncertainty regarding the evolution of the pandemic** and, in particular, the potential emergence of new variants of the virus that prove to be vaccine-resistant and which could further deteriorate the health situation and halt the recovery of the economies. In this sense, as noted above, the evolution of the economies of Latin American and the Caribbean is likely to be negatively impacted by the third wave of infections triggered by the omicron variant.

This possibility shall be compounded with others: the supply problems mentioned above, and the existence of a very large volume of resources to be poured into the demand side due to the forced savings resulting from the restrictions on people's mobility. All of these factors have led some economists to warn about the possibility that world economy is heading towards a process of stagflation (economic stagnation and inflation). This is similar in its effects-but not in its origin- to the situation experienced in the 1970s after the increase in oil prices.


The acceleration of inflation is already reflected in a tightening of monetary policies and interest rate hikes that may deepen throughout the year if the phenomenon persists. This is a cause for concern because much of the efforts that countries have made to control the health emergency has been financed by debt issuance which, in many cases, has pushed debt levels to historically high levels.

Although current interest rates are low, the eventual increase in interest rates could make it difficult for many countries to pay their obligations. In this regard, Figures 1.24 and 1.25 show that several Latin American and Caribbean economies recorded significant increases in their Debt-to-GDP ratios in 2020.

► **Figure 1.24. Latin America (selected countries). Debt/GDP ratios (percentage)**




Source: ECLAC.

► **Figure 1.25.** Caribbean (selected countries). Debt/GDP Ratios (percentage)

Source: ECLAC.

Likewise, the negative impact on real wages and income distribution of the aforementioned increase in inflation rates in Latin America and the Caribbean constitutes an additional condition for the economies of the region to consolidate the recovery of their economies. It should also be noted that, in most cases, the acceleration of inflation has been driven by rising food prices, which aggravates the consequences for poverty and inequality indicators. These indicators were already in a process of marked deterioration even before the pandemic (Figure 1.26).

► **Figure 1.26.** Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries). Changes in consumer price indices and the “food and beverages” item

Source: Own elaboration based on official data.

▀▀ The perennial challenge for the economies of Latin American and the Caribbean is to overcome a situation structurally characterized by stagnation and inequality. This challenge will have to be faced with the double difficulty of limited fiscal space and high levels of indebtedness, so the task ahead for the region's countries will not be easy.

The perennial challenge for the economies of Latin American and the Caribbean is to overcome a situation structurally characterized by stagnation and inequality. This challenge will have to be faced with the double difficulty of limited fiscal space and high levels of indebtedness, so the task ahead for the region's countries will not be easy. Unlike the situation before the pandemic, the region has several factors in its favour: higher commodity prices, which are the core of the South American economies' export supply. It also faces the possibility that the US economy can maintain high growth rates which will support the dynamics of the main export market of Mexico and Central American economies, and improve prospects for tourists' arrivals to the Caribbean. This would make it possible to ease, at least temporarily, the external constraints which recurrently condition the region's growth.

At the same time, **greater support from international financial institutions will be necessary to strengthen the capacity of the region's governments to promote measures aimed at inclusive and environmentally sustainable development.** In this sense, the allocation of SDR (Special Drawing Rights) by the IMF is an important contribution that, hopefully, will be an indicator of a greater commitment by multilateral banks to financing the development of low- and middle-income economies.

Overcoming the weaknesses that chronically affect the performance of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and the possibility that these countries may face a development strategy that is economically, environmentally and socially sustainable, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations, highlights the need to define an agenda that includes a multiplicity of issues.

Economic sustainability requires, among other issues, the design of a strategy aimed at diversifying the export supply, which is currently too concentrated in a few products, in a few destination markets, and in a combination of both, depending on the country. Environmental sustainability raises the need to redefine the energy matrix towards a supply increasingly based on renewable energies and to promote an efficient use of resources through sustainable consumption and production patterns, as well as the provision of environmentally friendly infrastructures. Lastly, social sustainability urgently demands the need to resume the path towards overcoming the inequality that strongly affects the region and that the pandemic has aggravated. **To this end, it is essential to implement productive and labour policies that create quality jobs; their insufficiency generates frustration among the population and undermines social cohesion and the very foundations of democratic systems.**

► 2. Participation, employment and unemployment rates


Regional Aggregate Analysis: incomplete recovery of labour indicators almost two years into the COVID-19 pandemic

Latin American and the Caribbean is one of the regions in the world most affected by the economic and employment impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. A number of factors evidence this impact among which are: an unprecedented reduction in the level of economic activity, decline in employment and hours worked, a sharp deterioration in the productive capacity and closure of enterprises, significant contractions in average incomes, and increases in poverty and indigence.

In spite of the subsequent recovery, **nearly two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, employment rates and economic participation rates in the third quarter of 2021 were still lower than in 2019, while the unemployment rate was higher than in that same year** (Figure 2.1).

The drastic reduction in the level of economic activity during 2020 analysed in the previous section impacted on employment, and it did so with an intensity that is unprecedented in the region. **The employment rate in 2020 dropped by 10 percent compared to the previous year, more than the fall in GDP (6.8 percent), implying an extremely high employment-product elasticity of almost 1.5.** This means that, for every one point of contraction in the level of economic activity, employment contracted by almost 50 percent more, showing a very strong response of employment in this economic crisis.

► **Figure 2.1.** Evolution of Employment Rate, Unemployment Rate and Participation Rate. Latin America and the Caribbean. 2010-2021



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO.

This very sharp decline in aggregate employment and its large magnitude *vis-à-vis* the level of activity is the result of the particular and exceptional characteristics of the recession experienced in the region in 2020. The pandemic and the restrictions imposed that limited or prevented the continuation of certain economic activities or occupations triggered a number of unprecedented responses that account for this behaviour.

During 2021, and without labour indicators having returned to their pre-pandemic levels, the new waves of contagion had a negative impact on economic dynamics and, through this channel, on the evolution of labour market indicators.


Thus, over the period from the outbreak of the pandemic to the third quarter of 2021, it is possible to identify four distinct phases in the dynamics of labour markets in the region (Figure 2.2). In the first of these, during the first half of 2020, the average employment rate at the regional level fell sharply, by about 15 percent. In fact, consistent with the evolution of the level of activity described in the previous section, given the manner and speed with which the virus expanded in Latin America and the Caribbean, the most significant effects on the level of employment occurred in the second quarter of 2020³, mainly in April and May, though the contraction in the volume of employment continued in several countries for a few more months.

In addition to the unprecedented magnitude of the macroeconomic shock and the high employment-output elasticity, as documented in previous reports (ILO 2020a, 2021a), labour market adjustments in this crisis have differed significantly from those in previous crises in the region.

In particular, the drastic contraction in the number of jobs during the second quarter of 2020 caused transitions into unemployment, but mostly there were strong outflows from the labour force⁴. This was a consequence of both confinement and social distancing measures and unfavourable expectations about the chances of finding work in this context. These factors reduced the incentives for those who lost their jobs to seek employment opportunities. These labour force outflows strongly mitigated the impact of job losses on the unemployment rate. Figure 2.2 shows the labour participation rate dropped by 8 percentage points, while the unemployment rate rose by just over 2 percentage points between the first and second quarters of 2020.

Thereafter, **towards mid-2020, the region began to transition into a second phase associated with a partial recovery of employment** as the level of economic activity picked up. The employment rate rose by 3 percentage points (6.3 percent) in the third quarter, and by 2.8 percentage points (5.6 percent) in the fourth quarter of 2020.

► **Figure 2.2.** Quarterly Evolution of the Employment Rate, Unemployment Rate and Participation Rate. Latin America and the Caribbean. Q3 2019 - Q3 2021



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO.

In parallel, the gradual easing of mobility restrictions (stringency) during the second half of 2020 caused some people who were outside the workforce to move directly into work, but also others who had lost their jobs at the beginning of the pandemic to start an active search. These latter movements meant that,

3 Although the comparison between quarters may be affected by seasonality, it is used in order to observe in greater detail the short-term impacts of the economic crisis.

4 Since national statistics offices in the region have treated differently employed persons who are temporarily absent from work, the series presented here are not always strictly comparable across countries. However, they represent a very good approximation of the trajectories experienced by these variables during the period under analysis.

►► As the region resumed the path of economic recovery since mid-2021 (depending on the country) on the back of a higher vaccination rate and better control of the health situation, **labour indicators returned to positive changes in the second quarter and, slightly more strongly, in the third quarter of 2021 [...].**

between the second and third quarters of 2020, the regional unemployment rate did not fall (11.3 percent and 11.6 percent respectively) despite positive employment developments. The continued recovery in employment did result in a reduction in the unemployment rate of just over 1 percentage point in the fourth quarter of that year.

However, job gains in the second half of 2020 failed to fully offset the prior deterioration in labour markets. This meant that, in the fourth quarter of 2020, the employment rate still remained well below -by around 4 percentage points- the value recorded in the same quarter one year earlier. In that quarter, the unemployment rate was 2.5 percentage points higher than in 2019, in a context where the participation rate was 3 percentage points lower than in the last quarter of that year (Figure 2.2).

The partial recovery of labour indicators, however, came to a halt at a regional level in the first months of 2021. **In the first quarter of 2021 (third phase), these indicators did not show significant changes** with respect to those observed in the previous quarter. The employment rate remained at around 54 percent (with a very slight reduction) and the economic participation rate at around 60 percent. The unemployment rate increased by 0.5 percentage points (Figure 2.2).

Some of the factors associated with the weak demand for labour demand experienced in the first half of 2021 in the region are: new waves of contagion and measures to contain them in the face of insufficient speed in the vaccination rate, uncertainty about macroeconomic and sectoral developments, the greater reaction of working hours to job creations, and the complex situation faced by a significant number of enterprises, particularly smaller ones. In addition, some of these movements may have been influenced by the seasonal behaviour usually observed in the first quarter of each year.

Subsequently, as the region resumed the path of economic recovery since mid-2021 (depending on the country) on the back of a higher vaccination rate and better control of the health situation, **labour indicators returned to positive changes in the second quarter and, slightly more strongly, in the third quarter of 2021, the last quarter with information available at a regional level (fourth phase).**

The employment rate rose by 1.1 percentage points (2 percent) in the second quarter and by 1.4 percentage points (3 percent) in the third quarter. The economic participation rate rose by around 0.7 percentage points in each quarter. As a net result of both developments, the unemployment rate fell by 0.6 percentage points (-6 percent) in the second quarter and by 1.1 percentage points (-10 percent) in the following quarter.

However, as mentioned, these recovery phases were not strong enough to return to pre-pandemic values.

A comparison of the average figures for the first three quarters of 2021 with the same period two years earlier shows an employment rate around 2.8 percentage points lower (54.9 percent and 57.8, respectively), a 2.2 percentage points lower economic participation rate (61.1 percent and 63.2

Average rates for the first three quarters

2021 vs 2019

Employment
rate

Participation
rate

Unemployment
rate

2021

54.9

61.1

10.0

-
2.9
pp.

-
2.1
pp.

+
1.3
pp.

2019

57.8

63.2

8.7

Unemployment rate
expected at the end of 2021

9.6%




percent, respectively) and a 1.4 percentage points higher unemployment rate (10 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively) (Figure 2.1).

In addition, when analysing the evolution of the total volume of jobs from the beginning of the pandemic until the third quarter of 2021, it is possible to gauge the magnitude of two opposing behaviours: **the reduction in employment between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 of just over 49 million jobs, and the subsequent partial recovery of around 44.6 million jobs. In other words, 4.5 million jobs are still to be recovered in the region. In the third quarter of 2021, the volume of employment was about 2 percent lower than in the fourth quarter of 2019.**

Figure 2.3 shows the asymmetry between the duration of the contractionary phase of employment and that of the recovery phase: **It will take more than 5 quarters to recover the total number of jobs lost in the region during the first two quarters of 2020.**

► **Figure 2.3.** Evolution of Total Number of Jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021. Index 100= Q4 2019



Source: Own elaboration based on household surveys and employment surveys, as well as population projections based on CELADE/ECLAC.

Moreover, given that the absolute number of people in the labour force in the third quarter of 2021 was similar to that observed prior to the outbreak of the pandemic⁵, the number of jobs that have not yet been recovered is similar to the additional number of unemployed people. **There were around 4 million more unemployed people in the third quarter of 2021 than in the fourth quarter of 2019.**

Certainly, as will be analysed in greater detail later, the unemployment rate will continue to be a critical variable at least in the medium term. This is so because of its high current value, and because it is taking place in a context where the labour participation rate has not fully recovered from the sharp contraction experienced during the first half of 2020. Furthermore, at this juncture, the “additional worker” effect could appear, adding a new flow of people entering the economically active population as they need to generate income. This could lead to an increased number of unemployed people.

Also, the return to pre-pandemic levels implies a return to an already very complex labour market context in the region. Figure 2.1 shows that the employment rate in 2019 was slightly lower than in 2012, while the unemployment rate was higher at around 8 percent. As will be discussed later, one out of two employed persons was an informal worker before the pandemic. This picture also helps to understand the profound negative impacts of the crisis on labour markets in the region.

Analysis by subregion and country: heterogeneous behaviours in countries

In addition to the regional outlook, a sub-regional and country level analysis is required to understand the nuances and heterogeneities of the effects of the pandemic on the labour markets in Latin America and the Caribbean (Table 2.1). As discussed above, while all countries in the region experienced an economic contraction in 2020 and a partial recovery in 2021, their magnitude was different and this impacted labour markets in varying degrees.

In particular, one of the most important aspects when analysing the regional indicators is to take a look at the behaviour of the labour markets in Brazil and Mexico. These two labour markets have a decisive influence on the subregional and regional averages because of their size. The two together account for nearly two thirds of the region's EAP. Although these two countries experienced very sharp contractions in their labour supply and demand, and increases in their unemployment rate in 2020, these

⁵ This is the result of a lower economic participation rate that is offset by a higher total volume of the working-age population during the two periods compared.

contractions were smaller than that of all other countries together, which attenuated the impact on the regional average.

In 2021, on the other hand, a different evolution is observed. While the region (excluding Brazil and Mexico) experienced an even sharper increase in the participation rate and in the employment rate (3.8 percentage points and 4.4 percentage points, respectively), the increases in these indicators were significantly lower in Brazil (1.6 percentage points and 1.3 percentage points, respectively) than the regional average. Meanwhile, the opposite was observed in Mexico (3.6 percentage points and 3.5 percentage points, respectively). On the other hand, at the regional level, the average unemployment rate decreased by 1.7 percentage points, while the indicator fell by only by 0.2 percentage points in Mexico and increased by 0.3 percentage points in Brazil.

At the sub-regional level, impacts in the labour market indicators are also different. It is not possible to have subregional averages for all the countries of Central American and Mexico and the English-speaking Caribbean countries. However, it is possible to notice that in South America the impact of the reactivation observed in 2021 was particularly greater in the Andean Countries than in the Southern Cone. In fact, participation and employment rates in the Andean countries increased over the first three quarters of 2021 by 5.1 percentage points and 5.8 percentage points respectively. In turn, the subregion's unemployment rate declined by 2.0 percentage points. By contrast, in the Southern Cone countries, participation and employment rates increased by around 2 percentage points, while the unemployment rate declined by 0.1 percentage points. Nonetheless, removing the effect of Brazil's performance, the subregion shows increases of more than 3 percentage points in the participation and employment rates, together with a decrease of 1.6 percentage points in the unemployment rate.

► **Table 2.1.** Latin America and the Caribbean: Main Labour Market Indicators, by subregion. National averages as of Q3 2020 and 2021 (percentages)

Region	Participation rate			Employment rate			Unemployment rate		
	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}			Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}			Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}		
	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)
Latin America and the Caribbean	58.2	61.1	2.9	52.0	54.9	2.9	10.7	10.0	-0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean w/o Brazil	57.5	61.2	3.7	52.6	56.7	4.1	8.6	7.4	-1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean w/o Mexico	59.2	61.8	2.6	51.9	54.6	2.7	12.4	11.7	-0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean w/o Mexico and Brazil	59.1	62.9	3.8	52.7	57.1	4.4	11.0	9.3	-1.7
Brazil	59.2	60.8	1.6	51.1	52.4	1.3	13.6	13.9	0.3
Mexico	54.9	58.5	3.6	52.5	56.0	3.5	4.5	4.3	-0.2
Central America and Mexico ^{b/}	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
English-speaking Caribbean ^{c/}	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
South America ^{d/}	58.9	61.8	2.9	51.6	54.4	2.8	12.6	11.9	-0.7

► Continues...

Region	Participation rate			Employment rate			Unemployment rate		
	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}			Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}			Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{a/}		
	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)	2020	2021	Variation (p.p)
Andean Countries ^{e/}	59.7	64.8	5.1	52.9	58.7	5.8	11.5	9.5	-2.0
Southern Cone ^{f/}	58.7	60.6	1.9	51.1	52.8	1.7	13.0	12.9	-0.1
Southern Cone w/o Brazil	56.8	59.8	3.0	50.7	54.3	3.6	10.8	9.2	-1.6

Source: ILO pursuant to the data obtained from household surveys in each country.

General note: the average data for the third quarter

The quarter and January-September 2020 period may present problems of comparability with the respective data for 2019 due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the NSOs implemented due to the health crisis. Preliminary data.

a/ The average from Q1 to Q3 includes countries that have submitted data in any of the quarters and comprises 18 countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia (the Plurinational State of...), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia and Uruguay.

b/ Central America: The data available for the countries of the Central American subregion are not sufficient to obtain a representative average for the subregion.

c/ English-speaking Caribbean: The data available for the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean subregion are not enough to obtain a representative average for the subregion.

d/ South America includes: Argentina, Bolivia (the Plurinational State of...), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

e/ Andean countries includes: Bolivia (the Plurinational State of...), Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

f/ Southern Cone includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Participation and employment gaps between rural and urban areas narrowed in 2020, but widened again in 2021

A set of indicators on participation, employment and unemployment rates show that during the pandemic, the gaps between rural and urban areas narrowed. In fact, Table 2.2 shows that, although participation and employment rates declined for both rural and urban areas, such reduction was sharper in urban areas than in rural ones. This led to a narrowing of the gap between the urban and rural participation rates, from 4.1 percentage point in 2019 to 2.3 percentage points in 2020. While, this gap was reversed in the employment rate between rural and urban areas, from 1.1 percentage points higher urban to rural in 2019 to 1.0 percentage points higher rural to urban in 2020. Conversely, the unemployment rate increased more in urban areas, increasing the gap between urban and rural areas from 3.9 percentage points in 2019 to 4.9 percentage points in 2020. As will be further discussed later, these differentiated behaviours are partly related to the heterogeneous impacts of the crisis across activity sectors. An example of this is the tourism sector (hotels and restaurants), greatly impacted by the pandemic and is more prevalent in urban areas. The opposite is true for primary activities.

When the information regarding the average of the first three quarters in 7 countries of the region is analysed, the indicators show that the reduction in gaps observed in 2020 is reversed in 2021. Indeed, the participation (3.6 percentage points) and employment (0.4 percentage points) gaps in rural and urban areas in 2020 increased in 2021 (5.5 and 1.9 percentage points, respectively). Despite the improvement in labour indicators during 2021 observed in both geographical areas, neither returned to the 2019 levels.

► **Table 2.2.** Latin America ^{a/}: Participation, Employment and Unemployment Rates, by geographical area. 2018-2021

Year	Participation rate		Employment rate		Unemployment rate	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
2018	63.7	59.7	58.0	57.1	8.9	4.8
2019	64.0	59.9	58.3	57.2	8.8	4.9
2020	59.1	56.8	52.4	53.4	11.3	6.4
I-III 2019 ^{b/}	64.5	57.7	58.3	54.4	9.6	5.7
I-III 2020 ^{b/}	58.6	55.0	51.7	51.3	11.9	6.7
I-III 2021 ^{b/}	61.8	56.3	54.7	52.8	11.4	6.1


Source: ILO pursuant to the data obtained from household surveys in each country.

a/ Weighted average. The urban weighted average including Argentina considers 17 countries and the rural weighted average only 16 countries (excluding Argentina).


b/ Is the weighted average of the first three quarters of each year in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.

Lastly, at the country level, the different phases mentioned above are also visible, albeit with different intensities, in both 2020 and 2021. In particular, the sharp contraction in employment during the first half of 2020 was observed in all countries in the region. In all of them, the drop exceeded 10 percentage points between the first and second quarters of 2020. Similarly, the largest contraction in employment relative to the level of activity recorded at the regional level during that period was observed in all the countries included in Figure 2.4. However, the gap in behaviour between them has been dissimilar. In some countries, the drop in employment was significantly higher than the fall in output.

► **Figure 2.4.** Change in the Level of Economic Activity and Employment. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019 - Q3 2021



► Continues...



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household surveys and employment surveys, as well as official data on the evolution of the level of economic activity.


In the following quarters, two elements appear characteristic of most of the countries considered here. On one hand, as previously stated for the region as a whole, there is an asymmetry between the short but intense phase of employment contraction and the long phase of recovery. On the other hand, however, **the speed of employment recovery in most of the region's countries considered here was similar or even quicker than that observed in the level of activity.** In fact, in some countries, both indicators -employment and activity- reached similar values by the third quarter of 2021, even though, as previously stated, the initial contraction of employment exceeded that of output.

Since the start of the pandemic, the third quarter of 2021 was the first one in which all countries in the region with available data experienced increases in their employment rates. In fact, this trend is continuing in countries having more updated information on the evolution of employment.

However, despite this, except for Bolivia and Argentina, and to some extent Paraguay, the rest of the countries had not yet seen their employment rates in the third quarter of 2021 recovered to the values recorded two years earlier (Figure 2.5). In other words, **17 of the 19 considered countries have not returned to pre-pandemic employment rates. In more than half of them, the gap was by 3 percent or more.**

► Since the start of the pandemic, the third quarter of 2021 was the first one in which all countries in the region with available data experienced increases in their employment rates.

► **Figure 2.5.** Change in Employment Rate. Selected countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Q3 2019- Q3 2021



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on SIALC/ILO.


Complementary to the analysis carried out so far, the study of labour flows allows us to observe in greater depth the intensity and direction of labour transition during these contrasting phases since the onset of the pandemic. In particular, the sharp initial contraction in employment was the result of both the rising outflow rates from a job and, as shown in Figure 2.6, the drop in inflows into an occupation⁶.

► **Figure 2.6.** Entry and Exit Rates from a Job and Net Change in Total Employment. Selected countries in Latin America. I2019-III2021 (% of the total employment)



► Continues...

⁶ This figure presents the employment entry rates (blue column), the exit rates (light blue column) and the net change between the two (light blue triangle). The entry rate is calculated as the percentage of non-employed persons in a given quarter and employed in the following quarter out of the total working-age population. The exit rate is calculated as the percentage of employed persons in a given quarter and non-employed in the following quarter out of the total working-age population. This data was obtained for six countries in the region for which it is possible to build short data panels from their household or employment surveys. For more details, see Maurizio (2021).



Source: Own elaboration based on household surveys and employment surveys.

Although both types of transition account for the fall in employment in the first half of 2020, except in Brazil, **the acceleration in job exit rates explains most - between 60 and 80 percent- of the total job destruction during that period** (Table 2.3).

► **Table 2.3.** Contribution of Inflows and Outflows to Employment Contraction between Q1 and Q2 2020. Selected countries in Latin America

Country	Employment reduction percentage explained by:		Total
	Increase in exit rate	Reduction in entry rate	
Argentina	72	28	100
Brazil	32	68	100
Costa Rica	78	22	100
Mexico	74	26	100
Paraguay	56	44	100
Peru	77	23	100

Source: Own elaboration based on household surveys and employment surveys.

Symmetrically to what happened in the first half of 2020, the partial recovery of jobs since mid-2020 is explained in all the countries mostly by a reduction in the rate of job destruction (Table 2.4). In other words, this process has been led primarily by a greater stability in existing jobs rather than by an acceleration in the creation of new jobs (except in Paraguay). In a way, this result is expected given the weak dynamism of the level of economic activity, especially during the first months of 2021. This is

also consistent with the fact that, as shown below, working hours, rather than aggregate employment, have been more responsive to the economic recovery during this period.

► **Table 2.4.** Contribution of Inflows and Outflows to Employment Growth between Q2 2020 and Q3 2021. Selected countries in Latin America

Country	Employment increase percentage explained by:		Total
	Reduction in exit rate	Increase in entry rate	
Argentina	76	24	100
Brazil	76	24	100
Costa Rica	68	32	100
Mexico	69	31	100
Paraguay	42	58	100
Peru	66	34	100

Source: Own elaboration based on household surveys and employment surveys.

Consistent with the above, and mainly as a result of what happened in the second and third quarters of 2021, when the average of the first three quarters of this year is considered and compared with the same period in 2020, the employment rate increased in 16 of the 18 countries included in Table 2.5. In particular, 8 countries experienced an increase of more than 3 percentage points, with Grenada (13.3 percentage points) and Peru (9.7 percentage points) standing out. The employment rate, however, decreased in Saint Lucia and Nicaragua.

► **Table 2.5.** Latin America and the Caribbean (18 countries): Labour Market Indicators, by country. National Averages as of Q3 2020 and 2021 (percentages)

Country	Participation rate			Employment rate			Unemployment rate		
	Average 1st-3rd Quarter			Average 1st-3rd Quarter			Average 1st-3rd Quarter		
	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)
Latin America									
Argentina	54.1	58.9	4.8	47.8	53.4	5.6	11.7	9.3	-2.4
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{a/}	64.7	72.1	7.4	59.4	66.6	7.2	8.3	7.5	-0.8
Brazil ^{b/}	59.2	60.8	1.6	51.1	52.4	1.3	13.6	13.9	0.3
Chile	55.9	56.8	0.9	49.9	51.4	1.5	10.9	9.4	-1.5
Colombia ^{c/}	58.4	60.5	2.1	48.6	51.7	3.1	16.8	14.6	-2.2
Costa Rica	60.0	60.4	0.4	48.5	49.9	1.4	19.5	17.4	-2.1
Ecuador ^{c/ d/}	62.3	65.5	3.2	56.3	62.2	5.9	9.7	5.0	-4.7
Mexico ^{e/}	54.9	58.5	3.6	52.5	56.0	3.5	4.5	4.3	-0.2
Nicaragua	68.6	67.5	-1.1	65.1	64.3	-0.8	5.0	4.8	-0.2

► Continues...

Country	Participation rate			Employment rate			Unemployment rate		
	Average 1st-3rd Quarter			Average 1st-3rd Quarter			Average 1st-3rd Quarter		
	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)	2020	2021	Var. (pp.)
Panama ^{c/ f/}	63.0	60.4	-2.6	51.3	53.5	2.2	18.5	11.3	-7.2
Paraguay	69.5	72.1	2.6	64.0	66.5	2.5	7.9	7.7	-0.2
Peru ^{g/}	61.3	70.5	9.2	56.5	66.2	9.7	8.0	6.1	-1.9
Uruguay ^{h/}	60.2	61.3	1.1	54.1	55.1	1.0	10.2	10.0	-0.2
Spanish-speaking Caribbean									
Dominican Republic	59.9	62.5	2.6	56.7	57.9	1.2	5.3	7.5	2.2
English-speaking Caribbean									
Belize ^{i/}	55.1	61.9	6.8	47.6	56.2	8.6	13.7	9.2	-4.5
Granada ^{j/}	60.9	67.5	6.6	43.6	56.9	13.3	28.4	15.7	-12.7
Jamaica ^{c/ k/}	63.5	63.2	-0.3	57.2	57.6	0.4	9.9	8.8	-1.1
Santa Lucia	68.8	69.9	1.1	55.5	53.7	-1.8	19.4	23.1	3.7
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{l/}	58.2	61.1	2.9	52.0	54.9	2.9	10.7	10.0	-0.7

Source: ILO pursuant to the data obtained from household surveys in each country. NB: average data as of Q3 2020, may present comparability problems with the respective data for 2019 due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the NSOs have implemented due to the health crisis. Preliminary data.

a/ The annual data for 2020-2021 urban coverage.

b/ New re-weighted series published by IBGE.

c/ The data for participation rate and unemployment rate include hidden unemployment.

d/ The survey was not conducted in the first quarter (March) of 2020, the average data of the second quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.

e/ Data up to the first quarter of 2020 come from ENOE (National Occupation and Employment Survey), data for the second quarter of 2020 come from ETOE (Telephone Occupation and Employment Survey), and data for the third quarter of 2020 comes from the new edition of ENOE.

f/ The 2020 data come from the telephone survey conducted between September and October, and the 2021 survey was conducted in October.

g/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.

h/ The annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data of the first quarter of 2020 come from the January and February ECH (Continuous Household Survey), from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from Telephone ECH. From July 2021 onwards, the data come from ECH 2021.

i/ Data for 2020 and 2021 come from September of each year.


j/ The survey was not conducted in Q2 2020.

k/ The survey was not conducted in Q2 (April) 2020, the 2020 annual average comes from data for Q1, Q3 and Q4.

l/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.

Figure 2.7 allows to consider together the changes in the employment rate and the economic participation rate in the countries of the region during the first three quarters of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020. In fact, considering that the 45-degree line indicates that the change in participation and employment rates is of equal magnitude in the 3 countries below the line, the participation rate increased more sharply than the employment rate, or decreased less, leading to an increase in the unemployment rate. This was the case of Saint Lucia, Dominican Republic and Brazil. In contrast, in the rest of the countries at or above the 45-degree line, the increase in the employment rate was proportionally larger than the increase in the participation rate, or its fall was comparatively smaller (Nicaragua) or the employment rate increased while the participation rate decreased (Dominican Republic). As a result, all these changes meant reductions in the unemployment rate.

► **Figure 2.7.** Latin America and the Caribbean (18 countries): Change in Participation Rate and Employment Rate. Q1-Q3, 2020 and 2021 (in percentage points)



Source: ILO pursuant to the data obtained from household surveys in each country.

In fact, the unemployment rate declined in 15 countries, with the most significant percentage point drops observed in Grenada, Panama and Ecuador (Table 2.5). However, **the average unemployment rate of the first three quarters of 2021 in 16 out of 19 countries was higher than in the same period in 2019. This is in a context in which the participation rate in the vast majority of countries (17 out of 19) has not yet returned to pre-pandemic values.**


Furthermore, in addition to the unemployment rate, another indicator of labour market difficulties in the context of this crisis has been the duration of unemployment. Figure 2.8 shows an example in three countries in the region, the proportion of unemployed with one or more years has experienced an increasing trend in the context of the pandemic. In particular, as shown there, there was massive outflows from employment in the first quarters of 2020 which then (partially) translated into inflows into unemployment. This increased the share of unemployed persons with less than three months in unemployment. Subsequently, to the extent that not enough jobs were created, the share of low-duration unemployed declined while the next tranche (between 3 months and 1 year) increased. Finally, since the fourth quarter of 2020, and with greater intensity in 2021, there was a growing trend in the share of the “long-term” unemployed, those unemployed for more than one year. These are the “pandemic unemployed”.

In other words, not only has unemployment not returned to its pre-pandemic values levels, but the average elapsed duration of unemployed episodes has increased sharply as a result of the crisis. Moreover, this increase was further verified during 2021 when the unemployment rate experienced a decreasing trend.

This picture is even more worrying when considering that, as shown below, most of the exits from an occupation were experienced by informal workers. The latter, in turn, have no access to contributory unemployment insurance when they are unemployed. In most cases, this implies the loss or reduction of the most important source of individual and family income.

Moreover, extended periods of unemployment may not only be accompanied by a reduction in other sources of disposable income, but may also erode the worker’s human capital and thus further reduce the likelihood of finding a job in the near future.

► **Figure 2.8.** Distribution of Unemployed by Duration of Unemployment. Selected countries in Latin America. Q3 2019- Q3 2021 (percentage)



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on SIALC/ILO.


► 3. Hours worked: a global indicator of the impacts of the crisis and partial employment recovery

The sharp drop in the number of employed persons at the onset of the economic crisis is a clear indicator of the profound impact of the pandemic and the isolation measures (stringency) on work. However, it underestimates the impact as there were simultaneous falls in the number of hours worked by those who remained employed (including those who did not work an hour). In fact, **the reduction in the total number of hours worked during the first half of 2020 was more intense than the reduction in the total number of employed persons** (Figure 3.1).

In some countries, for example Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, hours fell proportionally almost twice as much as employment between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020. The difference was even larger in Brazil, Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In Costa Rica and Chile, the gap between the two indicators was 50 percent. in Peru, the gap between the two indicators was smaller but still significant.

This shows, then, that the total number of hours worked fell between these periods both because of the decline in the number of employed persons and because of the average hours actually worked. In regards to the latter, its dynamic is, in turn, the product of two factors. On the one hand, the sharp increase in the proportion of those who were absent, that is, those who did not work any hours⁷. On the other hand, the reduction in the number of hours worked by those who worked at least one hour or more.

► **Figure 3.1.** Change in Total Employment and in Total Hours Worked. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019- Q3 2021



► Continues...

7 Strictly speaking, it refers to those who did not work even one hour in the reference week of the surveys, which is the week before the interview was conducted.



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO.

a/ The data for Argentina and the Dominican Republic correspond to Q2 2021.

The proportions in total employment of those who had not worked one hour during the fourth quarter of 2019 were between 1 percent and 3 percent, with the highest value in Chile at 6 percent. These low figures could be considered as the norm. At the worst moment of the employment situation, six months later, these values had risen to over 15 percent, reaching 20 percent in Argentina and Paraguay. One of the important reasons for this high number of employed persons who did not work even for one hour would be the use of the figure of temporary suspension. Indeed, in several countries, the highest percentage of employed persons who worked no hours corresponds to formal wage earners, where this option was legally available. But there is also a significant increase between informal wage earners and non-wage earners (formal and informal), showing that, even in those cases, several people kept their jobs but were unable to effectively carry out their activities in the context of lockdown⁸.

Since mid-2020 and symmetrically to the first part of the year, hours worked expanded quicker than employment (Figure 3.1). However, this did not allow for a full recovery of the initial loss.


The higher increase in hours worked relative to employment is to be expected inasmuch as the increase in the use of workforce in recovery phases is initially observed through a more intense use of the existing workforce and then-only if the increase in demand for workers continues- it is also verified through the creation of new jobs. This finding is, in turn, complementary to what was previously mentioned regarding

⁸ For an analysis of the measures to retain the employment relationship which included the temporary suspension, see ILO (2020), ECLAC/ILO (2021).

the fact that it has been the higher retention rate in employment, rather than the acceleration in the creation of new jobs that accounts for the partial recovery of employment.

This whole process took place in a context where **Latin America and the Caribbean was the region with the largest contraction in working hours around the world, with an estimated loss as high as 16.2 percent during 2020 compared to 2019. This is almost double the global estimate of 8.8 percent.** According to the 8th edition of the ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work (ILO, 2021a), and as shown in Figure 3.2, the region continued as one of the most affected during 2021, with an estimated fall in hours worked by around 8 percent in the first quarter and around 6 percent in the following two quarters. Globally, these contractions were 4.5 percent, 4.8 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively. The projection for the fourth quarter shows a smaller decline compared to fourth quarter of 2019, both globally and regionally (ILO, 2021c).

► **Figure 3.2.** Change in Total Hours Worked in the World and in Latin America and the Caribbean. Comparison with Q4 2019



Source: Own elaboration based on the ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. 8th Edition (ILO, 2021a).


► 4. Composition of the labour market

4.1 Employment and activity rate by gender

As analysed in previous reports (ILO, 2020; Maurizio, 2021a, 2001b; ECLAC-ILO, 2021) the negative effects of the crisis in the region have been significantly higher among women than among men. This was expressed, among other indicators, in a sharper contraction in female employment (20 percent) than in male employment (15.8 percent) between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 (Figure 4.1).

As analysed in previous reports (ILO, 2020; Maurizio, 2021a, 2001b; ECLAC-ILO, 2021) the negative effects of the crisis in the region have been significantly higher among women than among men.

► **Figure 4.1.** Change in Employment Rate by Gender. Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021 (in percentage)



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO data.

The ILO report (2021b) also notes that **the Americas experienced the greatest reduction in women's employment as a result of the pandemic.**

The most intense impact on women in the region is associated with, on the one hand, the greater presence of women in economic sectors strongly affected by the crisis, such as hotels and restaurants, and in other service activities and the household sector. On the other, the higher incidence of informality among women. In highly feminized economic sectors, such as domestic work, the rate of informality exceeds 80 percent.

As mentioned, given the scarcity of employment alternatives in this critical context, job losses initially translated not only into transitions into unemployment but mostly into an unprecedented level of outflows from the labour force. Again, these flows were seen more markedly among women. In the second quarter of 2020, the female economic participation rate recorded a low of 43.5 percent, a drop of 9 percentage points compared with the same quarter of 2019. In turn, compared with the fourth quarter of 2020, the fall in this indicator was 17.2 percent, which compares with a loss of 12.2 percent in the male labour supply (Figure 4.2).

Women's employment

Average
unemployment
rate for women

(As of the 3rd quarter
of 2020 and 2021)

12.4

2020
2021


There has been no improvement in the average unemployment rate. It still has to reduce to get back to the of the first three quarters of 2019 and...

9.7%

2019

More than 4 million jobs occupied
by women still need to be recovered.

► **Figure 4.2.** Change in Economic Participation Rate by Gender. Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021 (in percentage)



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on SIALC/ILO data.

This was associated, in addition to the factors just mentioned, with the growing difficulties of reconciling paid work with family responsibilities in a context in which education and care services were profoundly altered by health measures to distance and reduce people's mobility.

■ ■ In the third quarter of 2021, the female employment rate was 5.6 percent lower than that observed prior to the onset of the pandemic. This gap was more than double that observed for the male employment rate (2.4). Meanwhile, the female labour participation rate was 3.6 percent lower than that recorded in the fourth quarter of 2019, while for men this percentage difference was 1.4 percent.

The larger outflows of women from the labour force meant that the stronger impact of the reduction in female employment did not translate into stronger increases in the unemployment rate relative to men in the first half of 2020.

Subsequently, **at the regional level, the recovery of female employment has been more intense than that experienced by male employment** (Figure 4.1). Similarly, **the recovery in the labour supply of women was also stronger than that of men** (Figure 4.2). In other words, during 2021, the difference between the employment rate of men and women did not widen during 2021, nor did the gender participation gap.

However, this dynamic has not been sufficient to compensate for the greater job loss and the greater reduction in the supply of women in the first half of 2020. Thus, in the third quarter of 2021, the female employment rate was 5.6 percent lower than that observed prior to the onset of the pandemic. This gap was more than double that observed for the male employment rate (2.4). Meanwhile, the female labour participation rate was 3.6 percent lower than that recorded in the fourth quarter of 2019, while for men this percentage difference was 1.4 percent.

In absolute terms, **between the second quarter of 2020 and the third quarter of 2021, about 25.5 million jobs held by men were regained. This figure was similar to the loss of male employment between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020. However, of the 23.6 female jobs lost, around 19.3 million were recovered in the same period. In other words, just over 4 million jobs held by women have yet to be recovered.**

Figure 4.3 shows that the pattern exhibited at the regional level by female employment *vis-à-vis* male employment is repeated in most of the countries considered. In particular, the largest initial contraction is found in nearly all of them, except for Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Uruguay. The difference in the fall between both groups in the first quarter of 2020 was 8 to 10 percentage points in some countries.

Then, in almost all countries, the recovery was stronger for female employment than for male employment. However, when comparing the situation in the third quarter of 2021 with the one observed in the last quarter of 2019, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, it is higher for women in Argentina, Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Ecuador, where total employment is higher than at the end of that year. On the other hand, Costa Rica and Uruguay also show a net favourable behaviour for female employment, but in a context where total employment has not yet reached pre-pandemic values. Finally, the rest of the countries show the same pattern as that for the regional as a whole: partial recovery of employment with a greater volume of jobs to be recovered in the case of women than in the case of men.

► **Figure 4.3.** Changes in Employment Rate by Gender (%). Selected countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO data.

Therefore, **almost two years into the pandemic, in most countries in the region the employment situation for women is proportionally worse in 2019 than for men.** In this context, gender mainstreaming is becoming increasingly important in terms of strategies that accelerate job creation, especially formal employment.

4.2 Occupation by age and educational level

The higher initial proportional loss of occupations among young people is a widespread phenomenon in the region. Although in percentage points, both young and adults experienced similar contractions (a drop of around 11 percentage points), in relative terms, this drop had a greater impact on young people because they had a lower employment rate (Figure 4.4). This more unfavourable behaviour stems both from the higher degree of informality among those employed under 25 years of age and from the worse performance of young people in all occupations during the first half of 2020.

However, **during the recovery phase, young people returned to employment faster than adults.** Moreover, unlike what happened with women, the net balance is more favourable for young people than for adults: **when the comparison is made between the third quarter of 2021 and the same period of 2019, the regional employment rate for young people is the same (40.5) while that for adults falls by almost 3 percentage points (61.1 and 64, respectively).** In part, the recovery of youth employment is associated, as will be seen later, with the behaviour of labour informality and of certain economic sectors with a greater presence of young people.

Youth unemployment



Youth unemployment continues to be a concern in the region and remains at unprecedented levels:


Before the pandemic, it hovered around 18 percent, which was considered high.

21.4%

Youth unemployment rate (15-24 years)
to the third quarter of 2021

It is less than the 23% of 2020, but **there is still a long way to go to return to pre-pandemic levels.**

► **Figure 4.4.** Change in Employment Rate by Age. Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021 (in percentage)



Source: Own elaboration based on SIALC/ILO data.

However, **when analysing the recovery of youth and adult employment at the country level, the picture is mixed. In 6 of the 12 countries with available data, there is a net balance in favour of the first group, while the other half shows the opposite situation.** The first group of countries includes

When analysing the recovery of youth and adult employment at the country level, the picture is mixed. In 6 of the 12 countries with available data, there is a net balance in favour of the first group, while the other half shows the opposite situation.


Brazil and Mexico, which, due to their size, have a significant influence on regional averages. In the second set of countries, net declines in youth employment exceed those observed among adults by 7 to 10 percentage points.

Likewise, the historically greater difficulties experienced by young people in the region's labour markets continue. Actually, they face greater labour intermittency, which is in part explained by the intense inflows and outflows from the labour force. Greater occupational instability, in turn, is associated with their greater prevalence in informal, precarious, low-skilled activities. For adolescents who enter the labour market early and, in general, for young people with little work experience and less developed work skills, the high occupational turnover hinders the possibility of accumulating specific qualifications, thus hindering their future employment trajectory. In fact, less experience reduces their chances of getting a job, especially in contexts of low labour demand, and increases their chances of being dismissed. This situation may be accompanied by an increase in the discouragement effect that results in lower incentives to look for a job and to start or continue their studies.


At the same time, **workers with lower levels of schooling have also experienced the most significant job losses since the outbreak of the pandemic.** This is observed in all the countries included in Figure 4.5.

The greater contraction of employment in this group of workers is due, on the one hand, to the greater weight that informality has among people with a low educational attainment. However, in most cases this process was reinforced because the jobs of less qualified also experienced larger than average declines within the different occupational categories.

► **Figure 4.5.** Change in the Number of Employed by Educational Level. Selected countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Q4 2019- Q3 2021 (in percentage)



► Continues...



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on SIALC/ILO data.

The process of employment recovery by educational attainment has been dissimilar across countries. In any case, in all countries, **the employment of low-skilled workers in the third quarter of 2021 had lost weight in total employment compared to before the pandemic.**

4.3 Occupation by occupational category and activity sector

Stronger recovery of non-wage jobs than wage and salary jobs in 2021

While in 2020 the health crisis had a profound impact on employment in both wage and non-wage categories, in 2021 there is a larger increase in employment among the latter. Among the 8 countries for which updated information is available for the first three quarters of 2021 and 2020, the significant change in the evolution of employment can be observed (Table 4.1). In particular, total wage-earning employment and self-employment shifted from a sharp contraction of 6.8 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively, in 2020 to an expansion of 3.9 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively, in 2021. On the other hand, there are stark differences within wage-earning employment. While in 2020, private wage-earning employment contracted by 9.7 percent and public wage-earning employment grew by 1.8 percent, in 2021 the former increased by 3.5 percent, and the latter remained unchanged. In 2021, different adjustments were also observed in other occupational categories. Thus, after the sharp contraction in employment among domestic service workers (-20.2 percent) and employers (-10.6 percent), there were slight improvements in 2021 (1.7 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively). However, it should be noted that in these categories, despite the recovery, there is still a long way to go to recover the job losses observed during the bulk of the impact of the health crisis, which is a challenge for the post-pandemic transition period.

► **Table 4.1. Latin America and the Caribbean (8 countries): Year-on-Year Change in Employed Persons by Employment Status.**
Q1 - Q3 2020 and 2021 (percentages)

Country	Total employed		Employees						Employers		Own-account		Domestic services		Others	
	Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Total employees		Private		Public		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter	
	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
Argentina ^{a/}	-10.1	10.9	-7.8	8.5	-11.7	7.0	3.8	12.1	-20.9	20.4	-11.4	24.5	-21.7	-10.5	-3.8	3.5
Brazil	-7.4	3.4	-6.4	1.4	-8.5	2.3	2.1	-2.1	-7.4	-6.7	-6.7	10.4	-18.7	1.7	-10.7	3.7
Chile	-12.5	4.6	-7.5	2.5	-9.4	3.6	1.6	-2.3	-24.2	-9.8	-22.5	17.6	-34.6	-3.6	-28.0	-0.8
Colombia	-12.5	7.7	-14.4	6.9	-15.3	7.4	-4.3	2.4	-21.7	1.9	-9.4	10.3	-27.4	12.5	-7.9	-2.9
Costa Rica ^{b/}	-11.0	4.4	-11.8	4.5	...	...	...	...	-17.4	-7.7	-8.0	7.9	...	...	-5.5	-16.2
Mexico ^{b/}	-7.8	8.3	-4.8	6.6	...	...	...	...	-7.5	11.1	-12.8	14.7	...	...	-17.7	3.7
Paraguay	-3.0	5.8	-6.1	7.9	-7.9	10.5	1.1	-1.3	-26.3	1.7	7.2	2.6	-16.5	16.0	10.3	0.5
Dominican Republic	-5.7	3.0	-5.6	-1.1	-7.6	-1.4	0.2	-0.2	-7.8	6.3	-3.4	6.7	-16.4	9.3	-18.7	27.9
TOTAL (8 countries) ^{c/}	-8.4	5.7	-6.8	3.9	-9.7	3.5	1.8	0.0	-10.6	0.8	-9.1	11.9	-20.2	1.7	-13.4	2.4

Source: ILO, based on official figures from household surveys.

a/ The average data for 2020 and 2021 comes from the average of Q1 - Q2 of each year.

b/ Wage earners include domestic service.

c/ Data for Q3 2021 is a preliminary estimate. Regional averages for private and public employees, as well as domestic service, only include countries reporting data.

The first three quarters of 2021 also show different intensities in the evolution of employment by occupational category at the country level. While wage-earning employment in Argentina and Paraguay increased by over 7 percent, in the Dominican Republic it fell by 1.1 percent. On the other hand, regional public employment remained stable, largely due to the increase this category in Argentina and Colombia. Meanwhile, self-employment increased by over 15 percent in Argentina and Chile, while in Paraguay this category rose by 2.6 percent. Finally, employment in domestic service grew significantly in Paraguay (16.0 percent) and Costa Rica (12.5 per cent), whereas it continued to decline in Argentina (10.5 per cent) and Chile (3.6 per cent).

Heterogeneous recovery of sectoral employment in 2021

Regional employment dynamics prior to the health crisis were characterized by a steady growth in the share of the service sectors, though this trend was attenuated in 2020. The composition of employment by branch of activity had varying dynamics in various sectors. Nevertheless, a progressive fall in employment in construction and agriculture, fishing and mining was observed since 2015, while the share of the manufacturing industry stabilized in 2018 and 2019. In contrast, between 2015 and 2019, the share of employment in the service sectors continued to increase, especially in community, social and personal services and in commerce; each accounting for more than one-fifth of total urban employment (table 4.2).

The 2020 health crisis reduced the share in total employment in several sectors, namely, trade; hotels and restaurants; and construction. In contrast, sectors such as agriculture and community, social and personal services increased their share in total employment. The heterogeneous behaviour of sectoral employment during that year was due to a number of factors, including whether or not the sector was declared essential during the quarantines and the physical proximity required to perform work in the sector. Thus, employment in public administration, education and health services had a lower risk of downfall. On the opposite end was employment in tourism and leisure-related sectors, mainly hotels and restaurants, which were the hardest hit by the restrictions on physical mobility and the measures necessary to contain the spread of the virus.

► **Table 4.2.** Latin America: Structure of the National Employed Population, by Year, by Economic Activity. 2012, 2015, 2019, 2020 (percentages) ^{b/}

Economic Activity	2012	2015	2019	2020
Total Employed	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture, fishing and mining	15.6	14.6	13.8	14.1
Power, gas and water	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Manufacturing industry	13.3	13.2	12.6	12.6
Construction	7.6	7.8	7.4	7.2
Commerce, hotels and restaurants	24.6	24.9	25.7	24.6
Transport, storage and communications	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.7
Financial facilities	5.3	5.5	5.6	5.6
Community, social and personal services	26.7	27.2	27.7	28.4
Non-specified activities	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

Source: ILO based on data obtained from country household surveys.

a/ Countries included: Argentina, (Plurinational State of) Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.

b/ Weighted average. The weighing used is the national employed population of each country, disaggregated by branch of activity.

Updated information is available for the first quarters of 2021 and 2020 for nine countries. This data shows that employment growth in 2021 was particularly significant in sectors such as construction (16.7 percent), trade (9.1 percent), and transport (6.7 percent), compared to 2020, when these sectors experienced sharp contractions.

In 2021, the aforementioned recovery in employment was led by the sectors most affected sectors in 2020 (Table 4.3). Updated information is available for the first quarters of 2021 and 2020 for nine countries. This data shows that employment growth in 2021 was particularly significant in sectors such as construction (16.7 percent), trade (9.1 percent), and transport (6.7 percent), compared to 2020, when these sectors experienced sharp contractions. At the same time, increases in employment were also experienced in the other branches, such as hotels and restaurants, industry and agricultural. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the recovery, particularly in hotels and restaurants (5.4 percent) does not offset the sharp job losses (17.6 percent) observed in 2020, which also presents a challenge for this sector in the post-pandemic period.

At the country level, employment in construction grew by more than 20 percent in Peru, Argentina, Chile and the Dominican Republic. In commerce, the strong increase in Peru (41.9 per cent) and the subdued growth of employment in Brazil and the Dominican Republic, around 3 per cent, stand out. While employment in the hotel and restaurant sector grew by over 9 percent in Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile and Mexico, it did not grow in the Dominican Republic and contracted in Brazil.

The recovery of employment in industry was also heterogeneous, with strong increases in Peru (21.5 percent) and Argentina (9.3 percent), moderate growth in Brazil and Chile (around 2 percent), modest growth in Mexico (0.5 percent), and contraction in the Dominican Republic (1.9 percent). Finally, in agriculture, employment performance showed mixed patterns across countries, with employment increasing in 5 countries, led by Argentina (29.5 percent), and contracting in 4.

► **Table 4.3.** Latin America and the Caribbean (9 countries): Year-on-Year Change in Employment by Sector of Economic Activity, by Country.
Average as of Q3 2020 and 2021 (percentages)

Country	Total employed		Agriculture		Industry		Construction		Trade		Transport		Hotels and restaurants		Others	
	Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter		Average 1st-3rd Quarter	
	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
Argentina ^{a/ b/}	-10.1	10.9	-22.2	29.5	-9.3	9.3	-21.8	23.8	-13.3	8.2	-10.4	21.1	...	...	-6.5	9.1
Brazil	-7.4	3.4	-4.1	8.2	-6.1	2.2	-12.0	12.6	-8.7	3.3	-7.4	2.1	-19.3	-0.3	-5.5	1.8
Chile	-12.5	4.6	-19.7	-2.9	-9.2	2.3	-21.6	21.9	-14.9	6.1	-14.5	5.6	-32.9	10.1	-6.5	2.2
Colombia	-12.5	7.7	-5.8	0.5	-15.2	5.5	-13.0	14.0	-13.2	11.4	-10.9	10.1	-15.7	13.3	-13.9	6.9
Costa Rica	-11.0	4.4	-4.6	-3.5	-9.9	0.5	-19.4	8.2	-12.0	10.4	-15.7	2.2	-22.2	15.5	-9.0	3.7
Mexico	-7.8	8.3	-6.7	6.5	-7.6	7.2	-11.5	14.9	-11.0	11.1	-9.5	9.5	-15.7	9.2	-3.2	6.1
Paraguay ^{a/}	-3.0	5.8	12.6	-2.1	-0.4	8.0	10.9	11.0	-15.3	14.8	...	...	...	...	-4.5	2.3
Peru ^{a/}	-17.5	18.9	13.8	0.3	-21.7	21.5	-20.8	51.1	-27.5	41.9	...	...	...	...	-28.2	19.2
Dominican Republic	-5.7	3.0	-4.7	-5.5	-0.5	-1.9	-8.8	21.9	-5.3	3.5	6.1	2.2	-13.1	-0.0	-7.5	3.2
TOTAL (9 countries) ^{c/}	-9.1	6.7	-2.3	4.4	-8.3	5.3	-13.2	16.7	-11.7	9.1	-8.7	6.7	-17.9	5.4	-8.0	5.0

Source: ILO, based on official figures from household surveys.

a/ In Argentina, Paraguay and Peru, trade data includes hotels whereas transport data is included in "others".

b/ Data for 2019 and 2020 come from the average of Q1 and Q2 of each year.

c/ The average of the 8 countries for Transport and Hotels does not include Paraguay and Peru.

Informal employment

2021

1 OF EVERY 2



employed persons in the region
is in **informal conditions**.



The partial recovery of employment
has been led by the
GROWTH OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT:

Between **60** and **80%**

of net job creation
between the second
quarter of 2020 and the
third quarter of 2021.

4.4 Formal and informal employment

Recovery led by informal occupations, but with increasing contribution of formal jobs to employment growth

As stated in previous reports, the dynamics that formal and informal employment have followed differ, in many cases, from those observed in previous economic crises. It is common for informal employment to play a counter-cyclical role as formal employment falls and its level rises. However, **in this crisis both formal and informal employment experienced very sharp contractions, but the latter more sharply than the former⁹. Thus, the “traditional mechanism” was greatly weakened during the first half of 2020.** That is, self-employment and, to some extent, informal wage-earning jobs, which usually moderate changes in aggregate employment, exacerbated their negative variation.

In Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay, for example, the reduction in informal jobs accounted for over 75 percent of the fall in total employment during the first half of 2020. In Costa Rica and Peru, this value was somewhat lower, around 70 percent, while in Chile and Brazil it was 50 percent (Figure 4.6).


Several factors may account for this behaviour. On the one hand, the higher rate of informality in some productive sectors that had to stop their activities because they were not included among the essential ones is one of the factors behind the greater contraction of these jobs. In addition, there is the greater ease of interrupting informal wage-earning relationship and the greater incidence of this type of occupation in smaller companies, which find it more difficult to withstand long periods of inactivity.

9 Except in Peru, where formal employment contracted more sharply than informal ones.

Further, a significant proportion of self-employed were not included in the exception of distancing and reduced mobility. At the same time, a large proportion of them are self-employed, did not work from home and the possibility of teleworking is limited, as detailed below.

Finally, as has been documented in detail in previous reports (ILO, 2020, ECLAC/ILO 2021), the countries in the region implemented different policies to support formal wage-earning employment during 2020 which contributed significantly to its sustainability. In particular, three types of interventions can be distinguished: (a) payroll subsidies; (b) extension of unemployment insurance to cover other events beyond unemployment due to dismissal; (c) more recently, subsidies to incentivize the return of furloughed workers or to hire new ones (see Box 1).

► **Figure 4.6.** Contribution of Formal and Informal Employment to the Fall and Recovery of Total Employment. Selected countries in Latin America



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

Likewise, **when analysing the dynamics of the different employment categories as of the second half of 2020, it can be observed that the dynamics have systematically been driven by the growth of informal employment.** Figure 4.6 shows these occupations have accounted for between 57 percent and 78 percent of net job creation between the second quarter of 2020 and third quarter (second in Argentina) of 2021.


This situation may be reflecting, on the one hand, that the increase in the level of activity did not completely require new formal workers, as companies coped with the growing production by increasing the hours worked, including the return to work of furloughed wage earners and temporarily absent employees. On the other, it accounts for the fact that, at least in part, self-employers, many of them

When analysing the contribution of informal jobs quarter by quarter from the third quarter of 2020 to the same period in 2021, it can be observed that it has been declining in most of the countries considered herein.

informal, were able to return to activities that had been interrupted by the restrictions. The increase in the number of informal wage-earning employments can also be linked, to some extent, to the reopening of small businesses (with an incidence of informality).

However, **when analysing the contribution of informal jobs quarter by quarter from the third quarter of 2020 to the same period in 2021, it can be observed that it has been declining in most of the countries considered herein** (except in Chile in the last quarter) (See Figure 4.7). Thus, the simple average among these countries in terms of the contribution of informal employment, in the first phase of recovery in the third and fourth quarters of 2020, was 80 percent, and around 70 percent in the third quarter of 2021.


► **Figure 4.7.** Cumulative Contribution of Informal Employment in the Recovery of Total Employment. Selected countries in Latin America. Q3 2020 - Q3 2021



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

In part, this has been associated with growth in formal wage-earning employments in the private sector, as shown in Figure 4.8, especially in 2021. However, only in the last few months have about half of the countries included there reached the 2020 value or similar. Encouragingly, however, in most of these countries, the upward trend continues, albeit with varying intensity across countries.

► **Figure 4.8.** Monthly Evolution of Formal Employment in the Private Sector. Selected countries in Latin America. January 2020- November 2021. Index 100 = January 2020




Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on administrative records.

Moreover, in countries that have returned to the pre-pandemic employment rate, or are very close to it, the informality rate is no higher than in 2019, despite the increasing trend of this indicator after the sudden contraction in the second quarter of 2020 (Figure 4.9). For example, in Argentina, the informality rate of 42.5 percent in the second quarter of 2021 is lower than the 45 percent rate in the fourth quarter of 2019. In Uruguay, the informality rate was 5 percentage points lower in the comparison between these quarters. For Brazil, the third quarter figures for 2021 are similar to the ones for the end of 2019. Conversely, in Mexico and Paraguay such figures were slightly lower. The only exception to this regional picture is Peru, where, given that formal jobs contracted more sharply than informal ones, the informality rate is higher than that observed prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.


► **Figure 4.9.** Quarterly Evolution of Formal Employment, Informal Employment and Employment Informality Rate. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019 - Q3 2021

Argentina: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour. IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)




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
Brazil: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour (moving quarters).
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)




Chile: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour.
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)




Costa Rica: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour.
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)




Mexico: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour.
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)




Paraguay: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour.
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)



Peru: Quarterly evolution of formal and informal labour.
IVQ19-IIQ21 (Base: IV19 = 100)



► Continues...



Source: Own elaboration based on household and employment surveys.

However, despite the fact that in the aforementioned countries, the nearly total recovery of employment has not been accompanied by greater informality, the regional landscape continues to be very complex. On one side, the countries that still exhibit significant differences with respect to the volume of occupations registered in 2019 could experience a closing of this gap with higher informality rates than those observed in that year. On the other hand, at the regional level (average of 12 countries) in the third quarter of 2021, this indicator was almost 49 percent, close to the 2019 figure. In other words, almost one out of every two workers in the region are informal.

As previously shown, formal private wage-earning employment has shown an upward trend. If a significant number of formal occupations are not created to return those in the workforce who remain outside, the risk of increases in the rate of labour informality continues. Moreover, as mentioned above, in contexts of sharp contraction of family income, other members may enter the labour market for the first time in an attempt to compensate, at least partially, for the loss of total family monetary resources. Hence, as detailed in Box 1, it is necessary to implement policies not only to retain existing formal employment but also to support the creation of new formal jobs in the region.

► **BOX 1.** From job retention to hiring subsidies: dynamics of employment policies in Latin America and the Caribbean during the pandemic

The economic and employment patterns associated with the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic have posed a number of challenges for the implementation of employment policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. In short, while in 2020 job retention programmes predominated in a context of widespread strict lockdowns, in 2021, with an incipient recovery and occasional lockdowns—that were shorter and covered smaller areas—there came a transition to other types of policies, and in particular hiring subsidies.

Given the extent of the economic contraction, the policies implemented in March 2020 were wide-reaching, seeking to cover the largest possible universe of people and productive units—depending on the fiscal space of each country—by strengthening or converting available institutional mechanisms (unemployment insurance, agreed adjustments to working hours and income, income transfers to informal workers) or by implementing some of these policies, when they did not exist previously. The use of employment support policies was widespread in most countries, with an approach that sought to reach all affected sectors and a large number of beneficiaries (ECLAC/ILO, 2020; ILO, 2020). Other measures that are not discussed in this report were applied to enable as many workers as possible to remain in their jobs. In several countries, for example, teleworking was regulated through new laws or decrees to prevent this mode of employment from falling into illegality (Maurizio, 2021a; ECLAC, 2021).

In 2021, there has been a pattern of gradual recovery in economic activity and employment, linked to the roll-out and progress of vaccination programmes and the productive and labour adaptations driven by a need to continue operating (and living) with the virus. As a result, although levels of employment and particularly wage earners have been better in 2021 than they were in 2020, they are still far from pre-pandemic levels, with marked differences among sectors and a greater relative impact on some groups of workers, such as women and young people.

In the context of recovery—which was more incipient when lockdowns were first eased and has become stronger with progress on vaccinations—support policies have shifted from ensuring wage earners are retained in employment relationships to specific subsidies for rehiring furloughed employees or incentives to hire earlier than planned. In some cases, as vaccination progresses, hiring subsidies have become more focused on sectors and groups that were hit hardest by the crisis. The target population for these subsidies are young people and women, especially if they are low-skilled workers (Vezza, 2021; ECLAC, 2021).

This has also entailed modifying or even creating instruments to facilitate the granting of these incentives. Specifically, the changes relate to the universe of beneficiaries (general or specific), the amounts allocated (whether they were increased, reduced or segmented by specific groups), the time over which the benefit applies (how much the duration has changed, whether it is contingent on the health situation), the type of benefit (direct cash transfer to companies or tax or contribution rebates or discounts to social security contributions) and the public institutions in charge of the benefits (a centralized entity or different public agencies).

In particular, this dynamic has arisen from the lessons learned from international experience. Thus, it is worth noting that retention policies were designed on the basis of policy lessons from the 2009 global financial crisis. In 2020, these measures included both short-term work agreements and wage subsidies. Thus, it is noted that the ILO estimates for the European Union (27 countries) show that losses in working hours reached 8.3 percent in 2020, although employment fell at a much lower rate (2 percent)¹⁰. This indicates that labour market adjustment in these countries was largely achieved through a reduction in working hours, supported by job retention plans. A sample of 20 OECD countries with data on such measure shows a positive and meaningful correlation—albeit with variations across countries—between approved applications for job retention programmes as a proportion of employees and the rate of employment growth in 2020 (Verick et al., 2021).

As countries have reopened their economies, policymakers have begun to shift the focus of measures to support hiring through subsidies, especially those that target specific groups of workers. Hiring subsidies can effectively (albeit temporarily) encourage firms to hire unemployed persons and, if they are targeted, can be cost-effective measures, even during recovery phases (Brown, 2015; Cahuc et al., 2018). In 2020 and early 2021, almost two-thirds of OECD and European Union countries have extended (or plan to extend) existing subsidies. Others, such as Australia, Latvia and the United Kingdom have introduced new measures (OECD, 2021).

The response of Latin America and the Caribbean to the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 has included numerous direct actions to sustain businesses, maintain jobs and mitigate loss of household income, especially for the most affected households, which tend to include people working in the informal economy. In this sense, it is possible to identify a set of measures aimed at protecting employment and recovering jobs as: i) cash measures and benefits within the framework of strategies to sustain employment relationships; and ii) support for direct hiring or a transition to employment.

► Continues...

10 See International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT [online database] <https://ilostat.ilo.org/>.

Regarding the first group of measures, international experience shows that employment support measures have successfully reduced falls in employment, and the available information for Latin America and the Caribbean shows that they have also done so in the region (ECLAC/ILO, 2021). However, there are some differences, especially regarding the scope of the benefit which in the region is more limited in time. The design of payroll subsidies in LAC mainly focused on wage-related requirements and, in many cases, the minimum wage as a benchmark to determine the amount of benefit, thereby principally targeting lower-income formal wage earners. This also highlights the importance of an instrument such as the minimum wage in guiding policies related to wage subsidies.

These employment support measures had specific conditions linked to the extent of the drop in income caused by the health crisis and to the beneficiary companies' compliance with regulations guaranteeing their formal status, in terms of paying taxes and social security contributions and maintaining formal employment relationships. The type of instrument also determined the mechanisms for delivering these benefits, which have taken the form of tax or social security exemptions, cash transfers or a combination of the two. Lastly, payroll subsidies notably sought to protect the employment relationship of as many wage earner as possible, and benefits linked to adjustments in working hours were made flexible.

In several countries that already had unemployment protection instruments, these were adjusted by expanding their coverage, changing eligibility requirements and injecting fiscal resources, enabling them to be used to protect employment relationships. However, with high labour informality and a lack of unemployment protection in many countries of the region, the design and implementation of these programmes were more limited in scope and covered fewer people than those of payroll subsidies.

Both regionally and in more developed countries, hiring subsidies include design features to reduce deadweight losses (hires that would have been made anyway, even without a programme) and turnover (staff leaving after a programme ends). Use of such instruments has increased in 2021 —albeit in only a few countries— in response to a need to boost formal job creation.

In terms of design, similarities can be observed with respect to some of the conditions of payroll subsidies and benefits for firms (encouraging tax compliance and formal employment), although there has been a shift from the wide-reaching approach of payroll subsidies to a focus on groups that have been especially affected by the health crisis, such as women and particularly young people. In addition, there are innovations, such as implementation of subsidies for both supply (workers) and demand (companies) in Chile, combination of different job integration and placement options for young people in Uruguay, and additional benefits for hiring non-binary people in Argentina.

Although it is possible to identify the design features of the programmes being implemented in the region, there is still not enough information on their effective coverage or impact. The recent strengthening of administrative record-keeping systems in several countries, however, will enable ongoing monitoring during implementation, to optimize incentives and draw useful lessons for future downturns in labour markets.

Lastly, not all countries in the region have specific programmes to encourage new hiring, perhaps because of budgetary constraints or weaknesses in the institutional framework needed to design and implement them. This would also explain the relatively limited duration of instruments in the countries that have implemented them. In that regard, maintaining these employment policy instruments for the current crisis and future crises is a challenge in terms of adaptability, design, and the financing and structure of the social and labour institutions that implement them.

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►► The minimum wage is a very important instrument for the regulation of the labour market in Latin American countries. All countries in the region have minimum wages that establish a floor for private sector wage scales and, with their periodic readjustments, provide a parameter for negotiated wage increases.

► 5. The evolution of the minimum wage, average income and distributive impacts

5.1 Minimum wage adjustments during the pandemic in Latin America

The minimum wage is a very important instrument for the regulation of the labour market in Latin American countries. All countries in the region have minimum wages that establish a floor for private sector wage scales and, with their periodic readjustments, provide a parameter for negotiated wage increases.

As discussed, labour markets were profoundly disrupted during the pandemic. Many workers lost their jobs, others saw their jobs temporarily suspended, many companies had to stop operations, among other impacts. This led to great concern regarding people's income, as well as the survival of companies. In this complicated context, what was the minimum wage policy applied by the countries of the region?

To answer this question, it should be noted whether minimum wage adjustments were made and to what extent they took into account workers' needs and economic considerations. Although it is true that when the minimum wage is adjusted, a wide range of variables are taken into consideration, it is possible to simplify the analysis by comparing the adjustments to the evolution of prices. In the context of a pandemic and a hard-hit labour market, what was done with the minimum wage? Did they go ahead with adjustments or did they decide to postpone them? Were moderate adjustments applied, close to past inflation, or was a more active policy followed?

At the time of adjustment of the minimum wage, information on accumulated inflation for the period since the last adjustment was available. By modifying the value of the minimum wage, it can be increased by the same amount that prices increased in the past period, thus compensating for the loss in purchasing power; it can be increased above past inflation, which would mean an initial improvement; or it can be adjusted below past inflation, which would mean an initial loss. Future inflation matters as much as past inflation, since the new minimum wage will apply in that future scenario. This information, however, is unknown at the time of establishing an adjustment and only estimates of that future inflation are available. Therefore, a first assessment of the minimum wage adjustments will arise from their comparison with past inflation (which was known at the time of the adjustment), as well as with the actual inflation during the validity of the minimum wage (that was unknown at the time of adjustment, but that is known over time).

This first analysis is easier to perform for countries that adjust their minimum wage periodically, at regular intervals. This is the case of 10 countries in the region, of which 8 apply annual adjustments in January

of each year, one applies annual adjustments in July (Paraguay) and one adjusts its minimum wage in January, but only once every two years (Panama). Table 5.1 presents the variation in the consumer price index for 2019, prior to the pandemic, the adjustments set in 2020, followed by the CPI for the same year.

Of the nine countries that adjust their minimum wages in January, only Bolivia did not adjust its minimum wage in 2020 due to political instability. The rest adjusted their minimum wage in that month, prior to the pandemic. In Brazil, Panama and Uruguay, the adjustments of the MW were close to past inflation, while in the remaining 5 countries, the adjustment was higher (the highest in Mexico, which started from low levels). In the case of Paraguay, the adjustment was due to be made in July, at one of the most uncertain times during the pandemic. Under these circumstances, the adjustment of the minimum wage was postponed. In general, inflation in 2020 was similar to that of the previous year or even lower (even negative in Ecuador and Panama).

The adjustment of January 2021, meanwhile, took place with the pandemic in full swing. Only Ecuador, one of the eight countries that regularly adjust their MW in January, decided to go ahead with the adjustment, most likely based on the -1 inflation recorded the previous year. The rest of the countries mostly made adjustments close to the previous year's inflation (in the case of Bolivia, based on the previous two years since it had not adjusted in 2020), except for Colombia and especially Mexico, which provided for a 15 percent increase. In this case, it was decided to continue with the policy of revaluing the minimum wage established at the beginning of the government's term in office, in spite of the pandemic. In July 2021, Paraguay adjusts the MW value to just over the accumulated inflation of the previous two years.

► **Table 5.1.** Countries Adjusting their Minimum Wage on a Regular Basis

	CPI	MW Adjustment	CPI	MW Adjustment	CPI
	2019	2020	2020	2021	2021
Bolivia	1.5	0.0	0.7	2.0	1.0
Brazil	4.5	4.7	4.5	5.3	10.3
Colombia	3.8	6.0	1.6	3.5	4.5
Costa Rica	1.5	2.5	1.0	0.3	2.1
Ecuador	0.1	1.5	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Honduras	4.1	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.6
Mexico	2.8	20.0	3.2	15.0	6.0
Panama	0.1	0.9	-1.6	0.0	2.5
Paraguay	0.5	0.0	2.2	4.4	6.4
Uruguay	8.8	8.7	9.4	10.0	7.4

NB: All countries adjust their minimum wage in January, except Paraguay, which adjusts in July. In Panama, adjustment is made once every two years.

The CPI figure for 2021 is actually the CPI from September 2020 to September 2021, so it is an approximation.

Among the countries that do not adjust their minimum wage on a regular basis, two groups can be distinguished. The first makes unscheduled adjustments more than one per year in an attempt to maintain purchasing power. This is the case of Chile and Argentina. In the latter, however, accelerating inflation has led to monthly adjustments of the minimum wage from March to October 2021 (inflation in the last 12 months was around 50 percent). In the second group, irregular adjustments have resulted in a real loss of minimum wages. In Guatemala, the minimum wage was adjusted in January 2020 by 3 percent, while accumulated inflation during the previous period was 5.8 percent. In Peru, the minimum wage has not been adjusted since April 2018, accumulating inflation of 10.2 percent since then. In the

Dominican Republic, the minimum wage was adjusted in August 2021 by 7.2 percent, while accumulated inflation during the previous period was 12 percent.

In summary, in 2020, countries with regular adjust periods had already made them before the onset of the pandemic. Countries that did not make adjustments on a regular basis postponed their decision to the following year or adopted moderate adjustments. Already in 2021, **moderate adjustments predominated, with the exception of Mexico, which continued with its minimum wage revaluation policy despite the pandemic.**

In 2021, several countries in the region experienced significant increases in their inflation rate. Such is the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Paraguay. **To the extent that this trend consolidates, it could lead to future falls in real wages and to an increase in the distributive struggle, as long as the adjustments of this institution do not keep pace with inflationary dynamics.**

5.2 The evolution of average wages and the effects of the changing composition of employment

Real earnings of the main occupation during the pandemic behaved in a way that, a priori, would not be expected in the context of a crisis such as the one experienced in the region: in the initial phase of the fall in employment, they showed, on average, positive variations.

However, this is explained by the strong changes in the composition of employment that have already been analysed. Indeed, comparisons between average labour incomes in the period following the application of the restrictions associated with the pandemic and those of previous months underestimate the fall, even within each of the groups of workers, and do not reflect the changes recorded in labour income of those who have remained employed and in the same categories.

One way to isolate the “composition effect” in the evolution of average labour income is to consider only the individuals who remained employed in the period under review. Table 5.2 contrasts, for a subset of countries with available information, the changes that arise from comparing quarterly values for the total of workers in each quarter with those calculated based on the aforementioned panels. That is, changes in average earnings of all workers (“quarterly comparison”) were compared with those of the incomes of those who continued to work in the same employment category (“panel”).

► **Table 5.2.** Change in Average Remuneration as derived from a Comparison of Quarterly Values (all workers) and Panel Data (employed in both quarters). Selected countries in Latin America

	Argentina		Brazil		Costa Rica		Mexico	
	Cross-section data	Panel data	Cross-section data	Panel data	Cross-section data	Panel data	Cross-section data	Panel data
II2020/I2020	5.2	-6.7	4.5	-0.8	2.6	-5.6	-1.7	-4.8
IV2020/III2020	-3.0	-1.0	-3.8	-2.4	-0.2	1.5	0.7	1.4
II2021/I2021	1.2	-0.7	-3.0	-2.3	5.9	2.2	-0.7	-0.9
III2021/II2021			-3.8	-1.3	-0.1	0.9	1.6	-0.2

Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

It shows that those who continued working after the outbreak of the pandemic experienced, on average, a reduction in their real earnings between the first and the second quarter of 2020. This contrasts with the increases experienced (except in Mexico) in the average earnings of all those

employed. This is basically explained by the **decline in relative weight of lower-earning occupations—informal jobs, for example – which tended to raise the overall average.**

This picture is, however, reversed in subsequent quarters. In particular, during the second half of 2020 - the first phase of partial employment recovery - average labour income fell or remained relatively stable (quarter-on-quarter comparison). However, **the composition effect also affected the average figures in this phase, but in the opposite direction to that previously indicated, since, as noted, it was informal employment that grew most strongly.** In fact, it can be seen that the labour income of those who remained employed (panel) fell less and even increased more than the average for all workers.

During 2021, the outlook is more heterogeneous as it depends on the recovery speed of formal and informal employment, which, in turn, has been different throughout the three quarters and across countries. However, in all cases, **negative (or positive but close to zero) changes in the real average earnings of those who remained employed continued to be observed during 2021. As previously mentioned, in a context of accelerating inflation, there is a higher risk that salaries will continue to lose purchasing power.**

5.3 The impacts of employment evolution in the total payroll dynamics

One indicator that summarizes the joint behaviour of employment and individual labour income is the aggregate of per capita labour income of the group of workers (including those who did not work even a single hour)¹¹. As expected, **between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of the following year, the aggregate per capita labour income declined in all the countries included in Table 5.3. The magnitude of these shocks, which occurred over a period of approximately two or three months, shows the depth of the crisis associated with the pandemic. The differences across countries are closely associated with those between the intensities with which total employment fell over the same period.**

► **Table 5.3.** Change in Total Mass of Labour Income per capita. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019- Q3 2021

	Total	Formal Jobs	Informal Jobs
II2020/IV2019			
Argentina	-21.7	-11.1	-50.7
Brazil	-7.5	-4.6	-18.3
Colombia	-85.6	-91.3	-75.1
Costa Rica	-23.0	-15.9	-45.0
Mexico	-21.7	-19.8	-24.2
IV2020/II2020			
Argentina	9.3	-3.4	72.2
Brazil	0.0	-0.8	3.7
Colombia	525.8	955.6	252.2

► Continues...

11 This indicator was built as the sum of labour income of household members with valid income divided by the total number of members belonging to those households. This indicator had to be calculated in order to make a comparable analysis with 2019 in view of the increase in lack of responses to income at household level in 2020.

	Total	Formal Jobs	Informal Jobs
Costa Rica	3.6	-0.4	22.9
Mexico	23.0	20.9	26.2
II2021/IV2019			
Argentina*	-3.3	-0.8	-10.4
Brazil	-8.6	-7.9	-11.4
Colombia	-13.3	-13.6	-12.8
Costa Rica	-14.1	-9.5	-28.5
Mexico	4.9	6.6	2.6
III2021/IV2019			
Brazil	-8.9	-8.7	-9.4
Colombia	-6.7	-8.7	-2.8
Costa Rica	-7.1	-3.9	-17.0
Mexico	6.8	10.2	2.1

Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

Likewise, **sharp contractions are seen in each country in the mass of earnings from both formal and informal jobs. However, consistent with what was previously mentioned regarding the behaviour of employment in each occupational category, the contraction between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 was substantially higher in the second group than in the first.**

The increase in employment between the second and fourth quarters of 2020, on one side, and between the second and third quarters of 2021 had a positive variation (or slowed the fall) in the mass of labour incomes per capita.


Despite this, **the mass of labour income for the second and third quarters of 2021 was still, in the vast majority of countries, below the aggregate labour income generated by the end of 2019.**

5.4 The uneven impacts of the crisis on labour and total household income

Inequality in the distribution of labour income (measured by the Gini Coefficient)¹² of all workers did not show significant changes during 2020 and 2021 (Figure 5.1). Although some countries showed certain initial increase, it then reversed, and by the third quarter of 2021, the values of this indicator were similar or slightly higher than those observed prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.

This, however, is the net result of opposing movements. While, on the one hand, labour income gaps between some groups of employed people widened, the initial decline in the proportion of informal workers -who have a high presence among those with low incomes- drove concentrations down. Changes in the opposite direction that took place in the recovery phase also meant that inequality levels remained significantly unchanged.

► **Table 5.1.** Inequality (Gini Coefficient) of Labour Income. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019 - Q3 2021




Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

However, the picture changes when the distribution of household income is considered. In particular, the fall in employment during the period when the initial impact of the crisis was felt was, as noted, particularly intense among informal jobs and lower-skilled workers. **These occupational dynamics were thus reflected in the increase in inequality in the distribution of household per capita labour income between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second of 2020.** The Gini coefficient rose in all countries for which data is available, and generally very significantly, as shown in Figure 5.2. There it is also evidence that the Gini coefficients computed exclusively among those households with positive amounts of labour income rose to a much lesser extent or remained significantly unchanged (except in Mexico where both increases were similar).

After the peaks in the second quarter of 2020, inequality levels declined and, in some countries, returned to 2019 values.

¹² The Gini Coefficient is a synthetic indicator of inequality that takes values between zero and one. The higher the value, the greater the degree of inequality in the distribution under consideration.

► **Figure 5.2.** Inequality (Gini Coefficients) of Per Capita Family Income Distribution. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019 - Q3 2021




Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

In addition, Figure 5.3 shows a sharp increase in the proportion of households with no income from work, particularly in the second quarter of 2020. Before the pandemic, around 20 per cent of households in the countries considered (except Peru) had no income from work. In most of them, the sources of income were allowances or pensions and cash transfers. In the second quarter of 2020, the proportion of households with no income from work rose between 6 and 30 percentage points in these countries, reflecting massive job losses in the most critical months of the pandemic.

Subsequently, as employment increased, these proportions declined. In any case, in the third quarter of 2021 in all these countries the percentage of households without labour income exceeded those recorded before the onset of the pandemic. This is consistent with what was previously noted regarding the partial recovery of job in these countries and in the region.

► **Figure 5.3.** Proportion of Households with No Labour Income. Selected countries in Latin America. Q4 2019 - Q3 2021



Source: Prepared by the authors hereof based on household and employment surveys.

Considering that the income from the labour market is the main source of income for the vast majority of households, its initial sharp contraction and subsequent partial recovery led to a sharp increase in poverty in the region, despite the important role played by cash transfer measures targeted to vulnerable households implemented in the region.

The negative impact of this crisis on average family income and on distribution not only imply significant setbacks in living conditions, but also demand, even more than in the past, the implementation and strengthening of policies to support and create more and better jobs, and strategies to provide income guarantees to the entire population, particularly those who have greater difficulties in the labour market. Informal workers, women and young people – particularly those with low qualifications for work – are groups that require different kinds of coordinated, comprehensive interventions that meet the specifics of their labour issues.

► **BOX 2.** Present and future of social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean¹³

The crisis triggered by the COVID-19 outbreak has made visible the gap that persists in the region to achieve comprehensive protection systems, based on social protection grounds which guarantees universal access to health and economic security throughout the life cycle.

However, most countries have reacted very quickly to this crisis, which was immediately reflected in the reinforcement of health measures and the support and expansion of social health protection for the population. Then, it was time to reinforce assistance to sectors that were already in a situation of extreme vulnerability before the pandemic and to begin to attend those who, having to bear the consequences of the economic standstill, had not been supported by public policies before this emergency.

Despite the fast implementation of these measures in the context of the pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean countries will face a complex combination of challenges to improve their social protection systems post-pandemic and strengthen the path to universal and

► Continues...

¹³ This box is based on the report "Overview of Social Protection Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Setbacks in the face of the Pandemic", ILO (2021c).

sufficient risk coverage, while being a pillar of support for strategies and policies that promote opportunities in current and future employment trajectories. The following are some of the most important challenges: (1) establish economic security programs for the population with insufficient income; (2) complete the horizontal expansion of existing programmes targeting children in the most vulnerable households, and improve their adequacy; (3) implement, maintain and expand unemployment insurance complemented by non-contributory schemes for informal workers, linking both closely with active employment policies; (4) maintain and expand contributory pension systems, making them sustainable and avoiding promising old-age benefits higher than those that can be financed with contributions; (5) incorporate or expand non-contributory social protection programmes for the elderly population that has no other income or requires supplementation given its insufficiency; (6) achieve universal and egalitarian coverage of public policy on social health protection, combining different sources of financing when necessary, but focusing on needs and not on household income; (7) strengthen the steering role of the public sector in the different components of social protection; (8) ensure macroeconomic balances, taking into account the financing possibilities available to each economy; (9) combine social protection policy with the promotion of decent work and the growth strategy of each economy, as an absolutely necessary condition for making social protection itself sustainable.

The mere listing of these complex challenges highlights the need for each country to redefine relevant policies and face complex transition processes where the search for new consensus is essential to consolidate strategies through effective social dialogue. Since social protection systems are so diverse in terms of their institutional organization, reform policies must focus on strengthening their governance and establishing processes that make them effective in achieving the objectives of coverage, sufficiency and sustainability.

►► The projection for 2022 indicates that the recovery of Latin American and Caribbean economies observed in 2021 slows down significantly. There is still uncertainty about the possible trajectory of the effects associated with new outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effects that a period of higher interest rates and discontinuity of the fiscal stimuli observed until 2021 may have on aggregate demand and labour markets in the countries of the region.

► 6. Regional labour market outlook

GDP growth projections have been reflecting the evolving impact of the pandemic on the region's economies. This has entailed numerous updates of economic and labour projections due to the changing health situation, with the arrival of new variants of COVID-19 in the region (Delta, Omicron), but in a context of progress in the vaccination process. Thus, the most recent estimates (ECLAC, 2022) point to a regional economic growth of 6.2 percent in 2021 and 2.1 percent in 2022.

The average unemployment rate for the first three quarters of 2021 (10.0 percent) was lower than the one observed for the same period in 2020 (10.7 percent). Projections of the indicator for the last quarter of 2021 should consider seasonal effects, along with the continuity of the economic recovery in the region. During 2020, the health crisis impacted the dynamics of the seasonality of the unemployment rate, which tends to decrease in the last quarter. This was because, under extraordinary circumstances, the relaxation of confinement measures had a relatively larger impact on the intensity of the return of people who are out of the labour force compared to the creation of jobs. Thus, the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter, which is historically well below the average of the first three quarters, was around the average of the first three quarters in 2020. In contrast, along with the lower unemployment rate dynamics observed in the first three quarters, the information available for the countries in the final months of 2021 shows that the seasonality that occurs in the last quarter of each year would return. Thus, the projection for the 2021 average would be around 9.6 percent, with a range between 9.4 and 9.9 percent. This represents a reduction from the 2020 value (10.6 percent) but an increase compared to the 2019 record (8 percent).

The projection for 2022 indicates that the recovery of Latin American and Caribbean economies observed in 2021 slows down significantly. There is still uncertainty about the possible trajectory of the effects associated with new outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effects that a period of higher interest rates and discontinuity of the fiscal stimuli observed until 2021 may have on aggregate demand and labour markets in the countries of the region. In this regard, in an environment of lower economic growth expected for 2022, it is likely that the regional unemployment rate for 2022 will decrease slightly in comparison to 2021, between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points, which would keep it above 9 percent. However, besides the aforementioned factors, this value will be strongly influenced by the behaviour of the labour supply in a context where the participation rate is still lower than the pre-pandemic value.

According to the projections included in the recently published "World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2022", ILO (2022), the average weekly hours worked in relation to the population aged 15- 64 in the region for 2022 (25.5) will continue to be lower than those recorded in 2019 (26.0).

This means that the unemployment rate in 2022 will still be higher than the average value experienced in 2019 (8 percent). This value was already 1.9 percentage points higher than in 2014, the lowest in the region since 2010. Therefore, a very critical situation is projected, especially considering that employment creation in the recovery phase has been led by informal jobs. In the third quarter of 2021, the informality rate was almost 49 percent, close to the record of 2019 and, in turn, of 2012. In other words, around one out of every two workers in the region are informal. The stability of this record at an extremely high level over almost a decade reveals that labour informality continues to be one of the most important challenges in the labour markets of the region. Moreover, in a context of lower economic growth projected for 2022, the lower intensity of job creation may bias employment towards the generation of informal jobs.

In view of this critical context, it is necessary to continue with some of the measures implemented in the region in 2020 and 2021, but more importantly to adopt a broader agenda of comprehensive and far-reaching policies focused on people and, in particular, on the creation of formal employment. This requires underpinning a path of economic growth with stability that generates more and better jobs together with the reconstruction of the productive capacity. This requires the creation of new companies and the growth in productivity of those that managed to survive this crisis.

The promotion of productive development policies and support for micro and small businesses so that they reach a minimum level of efficiency and economic profitability for the creation of decent work are fundamental pillars of these policies. In addition, it is necessary to move towards strengthening and expanding income guarantees and more permanent social protection floors, as well as structuring a comprehensive employment policy to accompany the economic recovery strategy, especially considering the new challenges associated with the digital transition.

Finally, without a coherent and comprehensive set of measures, the impacts of the crisis will be prolonged and will leave deep long-term social and employment scars in Latin America and the Caribbean. The dissimilar speeds of employment recovery among various groups of workers and the high levels of inequality and poverty may not only severely limit economic growth, but may also aggravate the degree of social unrest in the region.

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▶ **2021 LABOUR
OVERVIEW**

Latin America
and the Caribbean

▶ **Special Topic**

**Digital transition and labour
markets in Latin America
and the Caribbean**



Special Topic

Digital transition and labour markets in Latin America and the Caribbean

Technological changes have very significant economic, social, and environmental impacts as evidenced in the quantity and quality of employment, productivity, international trade, productive structures, qualifications required, company dynamics, and quality of employment. The linkages between innovation and these dimensions are multiple and are shaped, in turn, by institutions, regulatory and organizational frameworks, labour relations, relative prices, among other factors.

In recent decades, a rapid process of transformation of economic and social life has taken place worldwide in a context of massive diffusion of digital technologies. This has been exhibited through the emergence of new technological, productive and organizational paradigms in the main sectors of activity such as industry 4.0, precision agriculture (Agtech), online financial services (Fintech), electronic commerce (e-commerce), etc.

The COVID-19 pandemic intensified the trends towards greater digitalization and there is agreement that in the future the influence of digital technologies will be even greater than in the past. Even though this process is developed within a framework of great uncertainty, there seems to be no doubt about the significant impact that new technologies have and will have on a multitude of dimensions that affect the well-being of societies.

From the perspective of the world of work, the acceleration of technological advances in recent decades has increasingly exhibited through greater automation in the performance of tasks carried out in different occupations. Increasingly, “robots” can be programmed to perform routine tasks that can therefore be codified and automated. The object of study is not, therefore, directly the worker or the occupations, but rather the tasks and activities that are performed there. Thus, it goes from the “occupation approach” to the “task approach” to assess not only the impacts on the global creation and destruction of employment but also the probable differential impacts on groups of workers who perform tasks and activities depending on how routine they are.

As discussed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), on one side, there are those tasks that, due to their changing and flexible nature, are less likely to be codified by a computer and more likely to be complementary to technology. These include cognitive activities involving problem-solving, interpersonal interaction, creativity, among others. Thus, workers who mostly perform these types of non-routine tasks may even benefit from digitization and automation, since they allow them to increase their productivity and, probably, their relative demand and compensations. On the other hand, repetitive and routine tasks can be more easily codified and, therefore, the degree of substitutability by technology is higher. Likewise, depending on the prevalence of one or the other type of task, the complementarity or substitutability will vary across occupations and groups of workers.

The aggregated results on labour demand, however, are ambiguous. Among other reasons, because in addition to the substitution effect of certain types of tasks and workers, technological innovations can generate a “scale effect”, associated with the expansion of both markets and consumption and the appearance of new goods and services, which can go hand in hand with an increase in labour demand.

►► The COVID-19 pandemic intensified the trends towards greater digitalization and there is agreement that in the future the influence of digital technologies will be even greater than in the past.



Digital transformation



The region's agenda for digital transformation **is as necessary as it is demanding and intensive** in terms of public policies that help to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of this transformation and to ensure that this transition leads to the creation of more and better jobs.

From a distributional point of view, in developed countries, it is generally found that workers performing non-routine cognitive tasks are located at the top of the wage scale. However, there is another set of low-skilled workers who perform manual, physical, but also non-repetitive tasks (care service tasks or other types of services requiring interpersonal interaction), who are less likely to be replaced by a machine. These workers are mostly located in the lower part of the distribution. Finally, middle-skill workers who perform repetitive manual or cognitive tasks are in the middle of the wage scale. That is why in some of these countries it is observed that digitalization and automation have implied a relative growth of the employed located at both ends of the wage scale to the detriment of those in the middle of it (Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006); Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2014).

The effective realization of these impacts on the labour market, in the employment patterns, in wages, and the income distribution depends, however, on the combination of several important factors and local conditions. This is why the effects observed in the developed world are not necessarily the same as those verified in Latin America and the Caribbean (Messina et al., 2016; Bramilla et al., 2001; Apella and Zunino, 2017; Maloney and Molina, 2018; Maurizio and Monsalvo, 2021; Ballon and Dávalos, 2021; Zapata-Román, 2021; CIPPEC, 2021). Hence, the relevance of studying these dimensions in-depth in the countries of the region, taking into account the particularities that the region presents. Moreover, considering that the challenge of the regional digital transition finds us in a disadvantageous position associated with technological backwardness and with a progressive deterioration in the level of productivity vis-à-vis the rest of the emerging regions and the developed world in which last decades.

In addition, for developing countries, recent trends in “reshoring” or “nearshoring”, as opposed to “offshoring”, may also have significant economic, labour, and social impacts. Indeed, to the extent that the most routine tasks are performed in countries whose advantage is associated with low labour costs, their automation may erode these advantages to attract offshoring operations in certain sectors.

For said reason, the region's agenda regarding digital transformation is as necessary as it is demanding and intensive in terms of public policies that help to remove the obstacles found in the way of this transformation and to ensure that this transition leads to the creation of more and better jobs.

This part of the report addresses the discussion on the subject with an analysis of the challenges and opportunities posed by the digital transformation on productive development, the labour market, and labour relations in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Throughout the report, a medium- and long-term view is combined focused on what has happened in the context of the pandemic in the region. The first section studies the productivity trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, the challenges and opportunities associated with the new technological

paradigms in certain sectors of economic activity, and the impacts of the pandemic on the adoption of new technologies, emphasizing the heterogeneity of responses by country, sector of activity and type of firm. A discussion of the policies and institutional conditions needed to support an inclusive digital transition in the region is included.

The second section of this report analyses in detail the composition of the labour markets in a group of countries in the region in terms of occupations and types of tasks performed. The incidence of routine and flexible, manual, and cognitive activities is evaluated. In addition, the correlation between workers performing different types of tasks and their position on the wage scale is analysed. Relevant dimensions such as labour informality and gender are included here to visualize the heterogeneity of situations observed in the labour world associated with the new technological waves. The analysis of the differentiation between the type of tasks performed by young people and adults offers an intertemporal view of these phenomena. Overall, this analysis provides a regional view of the probable impacts of the automation and routinisation of tasks not only on aggregate employment but also on different groups of workers and, thus, on the distribution of labour income. Likewise, it also highlights the need to adapt the content and scope of vocational training in order to improve the match between the supply and demand of skills, to be better prepared for the skills required in the future and reduce the disruptive impacts of technology on labour markets.

Two of the clear manifestations of technological progress during the pandemic have been the significant increase in teleworking and digital labour platforms. The third and fourth sections of this report address the scope and characteristics of these modalities of work in the region. Regarding teleworking, it shows how it allowed a number of companies to continue their operations and certain groups of workers to maintain their employment relationships. However, the transition from face-to-face to remote work involved challenges for companies and workers, who had to quickly implement new working methods during lockdown. An important group of workers, due to the type of tasks they perform or because they do not have the necessary technological means, did not move towards telework during the pandemic. The study addresses these heterogeneities together with the advances and challenges in terms of regulation of this modality of work. All these dimensions become more relevant considering that, along with the acceleration of digitalization processes and the use of information technologies, it seems reasonable to expect that teleworking will be a form of work with increasing feasibility and prevalence in the world and the region.

Similar to what happened with teleworking, work based on digital platforms increased significantly in the context of the pandemic and the measures to contain the spread of the virus. Because many delivery activities were considered “essential”, digital platform workers continued working due to an increasing demand for their services. The fourth section of this report focuses on the employment opportunities generated by digital platforms as well as the challenges arising to guarantee the labour rights and social protection for these workers in the region.

Finally, the fifth section identifies some of the ways in which new technologies make it possible to advance in the transition from informality to formality for companies and workers. One of the major structural challenges facing the region’s labour markets is to achieve a sustained process of increasing decent employment. This not only requires recovering from the significant setbacks caused in these countries by the current crisis, but also making progress on the meagre results that the region had already been experiencing in the five years prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, both in terms of the volume of employment created and the quality of the employments generated. In addition to the above, new technologies can be very valuable tools in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of different strategies and policies to advance along this path. Technology can facilitate greater coverage of social protection, simplify worker registration, improve access to financial services, strengthen skills development and improve training systems to reach those in the informal economy, support labour inspection, and encourage and facilitate compliance with labour laws.

As a whole, the analysis offers very valuable elements to reverse the panorama of low innovation and high heterogeneity that structurally characterizes the region, and move towards a pattern of technological change that is both accelerated and inclusive. It is evident that a non-deterministic perspective of technological change is adopted here, both in terms of its adoption and its impacts. On the contrary, the approach from which these dimensions are analysed gives great preponderance to the economic, social

■ ■ As a whole, the analysis offers very valuable elements to reverse the panorama of low innovation and high heterogeneity that structurally characterizes the region, and move towards a pattern of technological change that is both accelerated and inclusive.

and political environment, as well as to the decisions adopted by key agents. In this sense, the public policy agenda for making digital transformation the basis for productive development in the region is challenging. It is necessary to reverse decades of relative backwardness, and efforts must be focused on such diverse issues as infrastructure, skills, financing, labour relations, among others, in order to move towards accelerated growth with increases in productivity and quality jobs.

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► 1. Digital transition and productive development in Latin America and the Caribbean: implications, challenges and opportunities in the post-pandemic scenario¹⁴

1.1 The global scenario of technological change


In recent years, there has been a rapid process of transformation of economic and social life, accompanied by a massive diffusion of digital technologies, expressed in the proliferation of electronic devices and systems that generate, store or process data. According to the United Nations Technology and Innovation Report, the global market size associated with the twelve main “frontier technologies” is estimated to grow from 350 billion in 2018 to US\$ 3.2 trillion in 2025 (UNCTAD, 2021).¹⁵

New technologies activate diverse changes in production processes, many of which are often grouped under the name of “automation”. In simple words, this channel makes it possible to do the same things as before, but at lower costs. The second channel refers to the creation of new products and services that enable the “*datification*” of practically everything, from entertainment platforms to collaboration applications. Knowledge-based services are a good example of this type of innovation. Finally, there is the channel of organizational innovation: new technologies allowing the association of decision-making with patterns emerging from data, as opposed to the organizational models of the past, based on hierarchical levels of decision-making.

These trends have varied impacts on the economy. The first group of effects is on productivity, as illustrated in Diagram 1.1, and also on the ways of organizing production and trade in the different value chains. A second group emerges in the area of labour, including qualifications, forms of contract, and work modalities (e.g. teleworking).

As a whole, these impacts imply the need for adaptations on the part of both companies and workers. For this reason, in much of the world, there are initiatives to facilitate the digital transition,, for example, reforms in education and training of the workforce, as well as assistance and financing for companies.

► **Diagram 1.1.** Channels linking technological change to aggregate productivity



Source: Albreu, Ballesty and López, 2021.

14 This section is based on the report prepared by consultants Ramiro Albreu, Megan Ballesty and Andrés López.

15 Based on a detailed projection for twelve leading-edge technologies: artificial intelligence, internet of things (IoT), big data, blockchain, 5G, additive manufacturing (3D), robotics, drones, gene editing, nanotechnology, and solar photovoltaic generation.

There is no dominant technology that accounts for these changes; rather, as The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) highlights in a recent report, it is a confluence of new technologies that reinforce each other, forming a scenario of digital transformation. Table 1.1 summarizes the main technologies in question for each basic area of innovation.

► **Table 1.1.** New digital technologies, areas of innovation, and economic and social impact

Basic innovation areas	Basic innovation objectives	Significant innovations	Economic and social impact
Networks, Communications	Create reliable, scalable and safe communication networks	Local area network (LAN), internet, broadband, wireless networks	Generalized use of internet, we and mobile phones in broad areas of economy and society; use of networks to operate vehicles, make transactions, teleconferences.
Systems, Architecture	Manage increasingly complex computers, increase the capacity of storage devises and distributed systems to improve their performance	Smartphones, the cloud, personal computers, microprocessors	More than 3 billion smartphones all over the world; in-cloud services; search technologies, systems for inter-company data sharing
Theory, Programming, languages	Create software more effectively; understand the nature of calculus and apply that knowledge to improve processes and create products	Scalable, reliable and agile software	Generalized use of optimization algorithms, digital reconstruction, DNA sequencing, cryptocurrency, blockchain
Data bases, analytics	Manage, discover, localize and analyse information	Software and corporate systems	Generalized use of data exchange and data storage; precision medicine; digital medical records; precision agriculture
Security and Privacy	Protect networks and computers from interruptions, theft and damages; allow persons and companies to control their information	Secure computing	Safer economic and financial transactions
Robotics, Cyber-physical Systems	Create systems which incorporate sensors and actuators which operate autonomously or semi-autonomously in cooperation with human beings; Manage the cyber-physical and physical-cybernetic interdependence.	Automation, robotics, sensors, control systems	Surgical robots, smart medical equipment, manufacturing 4.0, smart houses, predictive maintenance
Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, data science	Simulation of human-level intelligence, including language comprehension, vision, learning and planning.	Voice and image recognition, deductive reasoning, prediction, optimization	Medical diagnosis, sports training, grain management, predictive analytics,

► Continues...

Basic innovation areas	Basic innovation objectives	Significant innovations	Economic and social impact
Graphics, Simulation	Improve image and film quality, virtual modelling	Image and film visualization; virtual, augmented and mixed reality, GPUs	Videogames, animated movies, computer-supported design, advanced entertainment tools
Person-machine interactions	Improvement in the theory, design and technology to create useful and convenient user experiences	Web, social networks, digital interaction tools, tools for higher accessibility	Productivity and collaboration tools, recommendation tools, mobile apps, user experience design

Source: NASEM (2020).

Everything indicates that we are in a new technological revolution, which began to take shape in the early 2010s, comparable to the irruption of information technology and telecommunications (ICTs), which shaped a predominant techno-economic paradigm for more than four decades since the early 1970s. Mass datification and its application to decision-making through the use of the technologies listed in Table 1.1 are completely redefining the process and product spaces, as well as the requirements of capabilities and competencies of both workers and management areas.

Today, the adoption of new digital technologies is key. Digital transformation brings opportunities and challenges for the region. On the side of opportunities, there are basically two: a) stimulating a massive adoption of new technologies in order to raise the productivity of different groups of companies and reduce both the gap with the global frontier and the internal gaps; and b) promoting the emergence of new activities intensive in the use of digital technologies, thus helping the productive and export diversification of economies. This second type of opportunity can even be built on traditional commodity-producing sectors, through scaling processes in the type of tasks located in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) within the framework of the respective value chains.

1.2 The regional overview for the adoption of new technologies

How is LAC doing in terms of digital transformation? Even though, there are no comparable public data for all the countries of the Region, the available evidence points to a significant lag.

According to the Network Readiness Index (NRI), originally published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its latest edition (2020), among a universe of 134 countries, the best placed among Latin American countries is Uruguay (47), followed by Chile (50) and Costa Rica (54). At the other extreme, Paraguay, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela are below the 90th place (there is no data for Nicaragua). In the “access to technologies” pillar of this index, measuring access and coverage to Internet services and prices of mobile equipment, the 10 best-evaluated countries obtain an average of 87; for South America, the respective figure is 57, for Central America 45 and for Mexico 61, behind other regions such as Eastern Europe, members of the EU (80) and the ASEAN economies (65). In a second pillar, related to availability, investments and public procurement in emerging technologies, patent applications in ICT areas, use of robots, and software expenditure, the ten best-evaluated nations in the ranking reach an average value of 73, versus 22 for South America and 27 for Central America, and 27 for Mexico, always behind the Eastern European nations that are members of the EU (32) and the ASEAN economies (40).

Even though, the percentage of formal enterprises accessing internet exceeds 85 per cent in the countries for which data are available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), the use of electronic banking is less intense (with values of 47 per cent in Ecuador or 34 per cent in Peru, compared to 95 per cent in Colombia), and the number of enterprises obtaining inputs via the Internet is even lower: between 15 per cent in Peru and 66 per cent in Brazil, with an average of 37 per cent for the region as a whole, against values of 70 per cent in the OECD (Telecom Advisory Services, 2020; ECLAC, 2020a).

The challenge of the digital transition finds LAC at a disadvantage due to the progressive deterioration of its productivity level *vis-à-vis* the rest of the emerging regions and the developed world in recent decades.

Regarding the availability of their own websites, the figures range from less than 50 per cent in Mexico to almost 80 per cent in Chile; however, the use of digital sales channels is much lower, with levels of 10 per cent or less in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico or Peru (only in Colombia or Uruguay do adoption figures exceed 30 per cent). All this has a direct impact on productivity; according to OECD data (2020), in some countries of the region, the productivity difference between small and large companies that have their own website exceeds 30 percentage points.

The challenge of the digital transition finds LAC at a disadvantage due to the progressive deterioration of its productivity level *vis-à-vis* the rest of the emerging regions and the developed world in recent decades. In turn, productivity gaps by type and size of company are usually more pronounced than in other regions, revealing, for most of the smaller companies in the region, low technological absorption capacity and a relatively low level of workforce qualification, together with the high level of informality prevalent in the region (ILO, 2021).

Another factor associated with the region's poor performance in terms of productivity is the relatively slow progress made by the vast majority of LAC economies in terms of diversification and development of more complex activities in terms of knowledge and skills. Considering the 2018 economic complexity index¹⁶, only 3 Latin American nations are among the 50 economies with the highest relative complexity: Mexico (19), Costa Rica (47), and Brazil (49). In the case of Mexico and Costa Rica, a significant portion of the highest complexity activities, particularly manufacturing, are mainly based on assembly processes of sophisticated goods, but with relatively low levels of local integration.

Weaknesses in the region's predominant mode of integration into global supply chains (GSCs) feed back into low productivity levels, since one of the advantages of participating in more sophisticated activities within GSCs is to be part of processes of circulation and generation of knowledge, which in turn promote productivity gains. The comparative analysis of functional specialization¹⁷ of 40 countries based on trade data in value-added, employment, and wages (Timmer et al., 2018), validates a positive correlation between specialization in R&D activities within chains and per capita income levels.

Several studies show that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in LAC face multiple difficulties in entering and scaling up the complexity of tasks within the CMS, such as lack of financing, information, access to capabilities, and that in general, when they are inserted, they do so in the context of hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical relationships, with relatively little access to dynamic circuits of knowledge transfer

16 This index is based on Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011), who develop an indicator that depends on the complexity and diversity of the products exported by each country. If the goods exported by a country are sold by a few countries, it is assumed that they are more complex (because they demand a large amount of specific knowledge). However, it could be that this low ubiquity is not due to the existence of differential capabilities but to the availability of scarce natural resources. The authors then complement the ubiquity index with the diversity index (if countries that produce goods that are not very ubiquitous export many products, it is more likely that this situation reflects the existence of specific capabilities and not of "rare" raw materials). Thus, they correct through a process of iteration the diversity and ubiquity indices, in order to achieve a measure of economic complexity at the national level. Ver <https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/>.

17 This term refers to the type of specialization within a value chain. Unlike territorial or productive specialization, in this case, the relative insertion of a country's suppliers in functions relevant to the chain, such as R&D, logistics, design, marketing, among others, is evaluated (Dussel, 2019).

(Hernández et al., 2014; Red Sudamericana de Economía Aplicada, 2014). However, it is possible to find cases of insertion in links of greater complexity in certain CMS, such as Uruguay in financial services and more recently in knowledge-based services (Posthuma and Reinecke, 2019), and Costa Rica as a provider of digital services for the entire Caribbean.

The Latin American scenario contrasts with the experiences of several Asian countries that progressively scaled up from very basic levels of industrialization in the second half of the last century towards a more complex and sophisticated offer, in highly dynamic CMS (see, for example, De Vries et al., 2019).

As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, during the last two decades, the region has consistently shown a lower relative dynamism in its productivity trajectory, both labour and total factor. The divergent trajectories between LAC and Asia Pacific over the last five decades reflect not only differences in capability accumulation and macroeconomic and institutional contexts, but also the different development strategies prevailing in each region, which in turn also led to different public policy configurations in terms of integration and innovation (Kim and Nelson, 2000; McMillan, Rodrik and Sepúlveda, 2017).

► **Figure 1.1.** Comparative Labour Productivity Trends 2000 - 2020: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC v/s East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)¹⁸, (based on GDP in constant 2010 US\$)




Source: ILO (ILOSTAT).

One of the main sources of productivity growth is the use of new technologies already available that enhance the productive capacity of labour and capital, as well as their capacity to innovate. Total factor productivity (TFP) measures the part of the level of activity that is not directly explained by how much labour or capital (physical or human) is used in the productive process, but by how these productive factors are used. The increase in productivity is also the result of the reallocation of factors from lagging companies and/or sectors to others with greater dynamism and productivity.

18 EAP considers: Brunei Darussalam, China, Fiji, Philippines, Micronesia F.S., Guam, Hong Kong SAR - China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Kiribati, South Korea, Laos, Macau SAR - China, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Nauru, Palau, Papua - New Guinea, Rep. **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North)**, French Polynesia, Samoa, American Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Taiwan - China, East Timor, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vietnam, Vanuatu.


► **Figure 1.2.** Comparative TFP trends 2000 - 2020: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) v/s East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)



Source: World Bank.

Upon comparison of the TFP growth trajectories between the United States and LAC over the last 40 years, there is a striking difference: while in the former, TFP grew steadily since 1980, in LAC it has declined by almost 30 per cent. Comparison with the countries of Emerging Asia offers even worse results: in China, for example, TFP grew by 40 per cent in the same period (Figure 1.3).

► **Figure 1.3.** Evolution of Total Factor Productivity, for the U.S., China and LAC (1980=100)



Source: The Conference Board.

Note: China's trajectory considers the alternative estimate provided by the source.

In addition to the relative lag vis-à-vis other regions, another phenomenon that characterizes Latin American economies is their high level of structural heterogeneity in terms of productivity. According to ECLAC data (2020b), in 2016 the labour productivity of a medium-sized company was, on average, less than half of that corresponding to a large company; in small companies the productivity level was only 23 per cent of that of large companies, and in microenterprises it was only 6 per cent. These gaps are much larger than in other regions. For example, in the European Union, the productivity of medium-sized companies was 76 per cent of that observed in large companies, a proportion that dropped to 42 per cent in the case of microenterprises. Evidence from some countries in the region also reflects the difficulties of many small firms to reach minimum efficient scales, configuring a rather small segment

of medium-sized or “missing middle” firms in these economies (OECD, 2019).

Predictably, heterogeneity carries over to the levels of adoption of digital technologies (see Gallego and Gutiérrez, 2015). The low levels of adoption in the vast majority of SMEs in the region are associated, among other factors, with the lack of basic technological absorption capabilities (human resources, managerial and organizational skills) and of investments in complementary assets that would allow them to take advantage of the benefits of new technologies; the difficulty of access to financing operates in the same direction. Additionally, SMEs face relatively high security and privacy risks due to a lack of information, resources and expertise in this area (OECD, 2019d).

Thus, a negative dynamic emerges, fuelled by low capacities, weak and stagnant productivity, difficulties in accessing and using the best available technologies, in macroeconomic, institutional and public policy environments that are not functional to help close the gaps separating SMEs from the most advanced group of firms. At the same time, the low competitiveness in this segment hinders investments realization in human capital and technology required to improve their performance, causing them to remain in low-productive sectors, gear themselves to the domestic market, and even operate informally or at their margins. Thus, the digital transition scenario entails the risk of increasing productive heterogeneity or leading to the disappearance of a large part of this group of companies, without their workers necessarily having access to employments in other companies or more productive activities.

Therefore, to move towards greater productive diversification and promote a better insertion in value chains, it is a priority to address, in the most systemic way possible, diverse difficulties about i) shallow financial systems; ii) educational systems that do not always generate the knowledge and skills required by the digital transformation; iii) weak innovation systems, with low levels of investment in knowledge-creating activities, non-existent or limited technological extension mechanisms and difficulties in achieving effective linkages between system agents (companies, universities, science and technology institutes); iv) scarce development of pacts or bipartite agreements linked to comprehensive strategies for growth in production and productivity, and improvement of labour conditions¹⁹; and v) physical and communication infrastructures with problems of backwardness, coverage, quality, costs and/or lack of maintenance.

1.3 Accelerating and deepening technology trends in the context of the pandemic

As extensively analysed, the pandemic had unprecedented impacts on the economies of the region. It has also altered the dynamics of productivity and digital transformation around the world in several ways.

The crisis overview and uncertainty, in turn, further complicated the situation of productive ecosystems that were already struggling to generate conditions to invest and innovate in most of the countries of the region. On the other hand, the same limitations to operate in the context of the pandemic that explain the crisis, promoted an unforeseen acceleration of the digital transformation throughout the value chains that managed to at least partially sustain their activity.

However, it is clear that neither the economic shock nor the technological shock have been homogeneous between sectors, types and sizes of companies, groups of workers, or between countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since it was a sanitary emergency, one of the particularities of the crisis was that

► In addition to the relative lag *vis-à-vis* other regions, another phenomenon that characterizes Latin American economies is their high level of structural heterogeneity in terms of productivity.

19 An illustrative case in this matter is provided by Toyota's experience in Argentina: https://www.eldiarioar.com/economia/daniel-herrero-presidente-toyota-argentina-hicimos-15-000-tests-tuvimos-2-200-casos-6-500-empleados_128_8005096.html

the variables that explain the performance of different productive segments were not only economic, but also included sanitary issues and specificities of the production processes of the different activities.

In this sense, the sectoral impact varied, among other factors, depending on the capacity of companies to operate in contexts of health risk. As will be discussed in depth in Section III of the special topic, both the levels of physical proximity between people in their workplace and the compatibility of occupations with teleworking became key indicators of the adaptive capacity of the companies -and their workers- to the context of a pandemic (see, also, Albrieu and Ballesty, 2020). Examples of the most vulnerable sectors due to their high physical proximity and their low compatibility with teleworking are some traditionally considered to have low or medium productivity, such as domestic service, construction and commerce; but also others with high productivity, such as mining. According to a World Bank survey involving 60 countries (12 Latin American countries), sectors that are not very compatible with teleworking, such as hotels, cuisine and transportation, were among the most affected in terms of activity and job losses (Beylis et al., 2021). On the contrary, sectors such as software or financial services are highly compatible with teleworking.

In addition, as shown in the following section, faced with the need to reduce physical interaction in production processes, a debate that until now has been the most important issue in developed economies gained new relevance: the possibility of automating certain tasks and occupations. Finally, as detailed in Section IV of the special topic, the work based on digital platforms increased significantly in this context.

Thus, in the crusade for the low physical proximity economy, spaces and processes were redesigned to move them from the world of atoms to the world of bits. According to a global study by the World Bank, 35 per cent of companies increased their use of platforms and 20 per cent invested in digital technologies, both in response to the pandemic (World Bank, 2020). A recent IDB-INTAL study of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico found that the use of diverse advanced digital technologies doubled in the first year of the pandemic. The main among these was cloud computing, which, while already used by 29 per cent of the companies surveyed in 2019, this was incorporated by an additional 26 per cent in 2020. According to CAF (2020) and OECD (2020), teleworking, teleconferencing and internet traffic increased exponentially, in addition to a greater use of digital platforms and e-commerce specifically oriented to facilitate commercial and financial activities.

Therefore, the opportunities and challenges offered by technological transformation processes respond to different dynamics according to the economic sector under analysis. A review at the level of primary-extractive sectors (agriculture and mining), industry and services (traditional and knowledge-based) provides lessons and interesting elements for discussion in this regard at the regional level.

1.4 Digital transition: sectoral trajectories and perspectives for the post-pandemic scenario

Digital transition in the agribusiness sector

It is well known that agriculture is a very important sector for a large part of the region's economies. According to the World Bank, the weight of agriculture in the regional GDP is close to 6 per cent, but in some nations, such as Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras and Bolivia, it exceeds 10 per cent. The sector's influence is even greater considering export data. According to information provided by UNCTAD, the weight of the agricultural goods ²⁰ in total LAC exports is around 20 per cent, but in several countries it is well above that level, including, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay. In turn, the region is a major global player in international markets, such as the Mercosur countries in soybeans, beef and corn. Argentina also ranks sixth in the list of wheat exporters (FAO data for 2019).

The weight of agriculture in employment is also very relevant; although declining in recent decades, agriculture currently accounts for 14.2 per cent of employment in LAC (SIALC/ILO data for 2020). In

20 Including derivatives: categories 0, 22 and 4 of the Standard International Trade Classification.

countries such as Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador and Bolivia, this figure exceeds 20 per cent, reflecting production structures with a high proportion of small producers and family farming.

The agricultural sector, traditionally considered low technological dynamism, has undergone an intense process of incorporation of new technologies in recent decades. In addition to those derived from biotechnology (e.g. genetically modified seeds), there is the case of precision agriculture, defined by the USDA²¹ as an agronomic management strategy that uses large databases of crop sites to accurately and economically manage and optimize inputs and production techniques²². The incorporation of a set of complementary technological and digital tools allows improving productive yields, while also reducing the need for productive inputs, thus saving costs, gaining operational flexibility and generating lower environmental impacts (Lachman and Lopez, 2018).

However, the digital technologies application to the agricultural value chain goes beyond the field production stage. The concept of *Agtech* refers to a set of knowledge-intensive services, generally provided through digital technologies, which are applied to the various stages of the chain, including the industrialization, logistics, financing and marketing phases (Lachman et al., 2021).

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Three groups of technology providers associated with these new techno-productive paradigms can be distinguished (Lachman and López, 2018). The first is oriented to robotics and cyber-physical systems: it develops equipment that is implemented in agricultural machinery. A second group is made up of companies that generally base their services on a process that exploits large amounts of data captured through aerial, satellite images, sensor and/or weather station data, and processed through computational algorithms (data analytics). Finally, the third group of companies offers diverse services for the downstream links in agricultural value chains. These include logistics services, product traceability, smart contract design and financing through crowdfunding, among others.

Despite the limited availability of statistics allowing a reliable comparison of the adoption rates of precision farming practices in different countries, the available data provide an initial overview of the subject. Nowak (2021) reviews the available evidence on the diffusion of precision agriculture in developed countries, concluding that in 2016 between 70 and 80 per cent of farmers in those countries used guidance systems performance monitors, and around 60 per cent used automatic section controls, 33 per cent had adopted soil mapping and variable fertilizer dosing technologies, and only 20 per cent of them also included variable seed dosing. Adoption rates were higher in Canada and the U.S. than in the European countries included in the study.

To give a comparative perspective, in the 2018 National Agricultural Census in Argentina, included the question to producers about the adoption of any precision farming practices. The results indicate that only 4 per cent answered affirmatively. However, the figures are somewhat higher in the provinces with a

21 United States Department of Agriculture.

22 The redefinition of processes through data-intensive cyber-physical systems also has applications in animal husbandry, as we will see below. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will use the term precision agriculture, with the understanding that it also covers livestock applications.

greater commitment to grain and oilseed agriculture, such as Cordoba (13 per cent), Santa Fe (13 per cent) and Buenos Aires (7 per cent). Although the data are not strictly comparable due to the heterogeneity of the methodologies used, the contrast between Argentina and the U.S. is clear in terms of the level of adoption of Agtech technologies. Information presented in ECLAC (2021) goes in the same direction, and suggests that in the cases of Brazil and Colombia, adoption levels are even lower than in Argentina.

However, other indicators suggest that the adoption of precision agriculture tools is growing in some countries in the region. In Brazil, for example, an expansion of Agtech spending has been observed in recent years, with an average annual growth of 40 per cent expected for 2019-2021 (OECD, 2020). In Argentina, meanwhile, there has also been a steady increase in sales of precision farming equipment from the beginning of the new millennium to these days (Scaramuzza et al, 2016; Villarroel et al, 2020).

Nowak (2021) summarizes some arguments explaining the still low adoption rate of some Agtech technologies. Thus, on the one hand, it points out that farm size may be a limiting factor, since these technologies are more useful in larger fields (where there is greater variability among micro-environments), while larger producers are more likely to invest in their acquisition. It is noted that in general, small-scale farming is much more diversified in terms of crops, while many precision farming technologies are focused on the most important cash crops, which prevail in larger farms. On the other hand, the author distinguishes between technologies in which knowledge is incorporated into the equipment and those that are “information intensive”, which require greater involvement by producers and greater investment in complementary generation and processing tools of data.

Other studies, meanwhile, identify diverse characteristics of producers and plots that may influence their decision to adopt precision agriculture technologies, including age, years of education, years of experience as a producer, level of production specialization, use of computers, support from agronomic consultants and the level of indebtedness, among others (Lowengerg-DeBoer and Erickson, 2019). Expectations of the cost-effectiveness of adopting new technologies given their acquisition and implementation costs also play a role (Fusco et al, 2020). In the case of developing countries, however, some factors such as the low price of land or low wage levels can undermine the spread of precision agriculture.

It is evident that the adoption of Agtech technologies implies a change in the demand for skills in the agricultural sector in the countries of the region, tending in the future to generate strong productivity increases in strongly technologised agricultural production areas, as well as in related agro-export services that shorten the gap regarding other sectors while paradoxically widening, especially for the most vulnerable and smallest segments of producers.

Adoption of digital technologies in mining

Gradually but steadily, mining is undergoing a global transformation to meet rising demand from the growth of emerging economies and the development of metallic mineral-intensive sectors, such as renewable energy and technological devices. Latin America and the Caribbean is a privileged region to meet these needs: it has about 70 percent of the world's lithium reserves, 35 percent of copper and silver reserves, and 20 percent of conventional oil reserves. In addition, it has considerable reserves of unconventional oil and gas, and important deposits of a variety of minerals essential for productive activity (Sánchez, 2018).

Mining activity is important for many economies in the region. This represents the 4 per cent of value added in Latin America and 6.5 per cent in the Caribbean, but with large nuances between countries: it concentrates more than 10 per cent of activity in Guyana (15 per cent), Trinidad and Tobago (13 per cent), Bolivia (12 per cent), Chile (10 per cent), and Peru (10 per cent), and has a share of between 4 per cent and 7 per cent in Suriname, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina²³. In countries such as Peru and Chile, foreign direct investment announcements in metallic mining represented for between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of the investments announced in 2017. On the other hand, mining is responsible for 23 per cent of Latin America's exports (ECLAC, 2020c) and a significant proportion of tax revenues.

23 According to the average between 2017 and 2019 of the CEPALSTAT platform.

▀▀ Gradually but steadily, mining is undergoing a global transformation to meet rising demand from the growth of emerging economies and the development of metallic mineral-intensive sectors, such as renewable energy and technological devices. Latin America and the Caribbean is a privileged region to meet these needs [...].

This is why it is necessary to seek innovative solutions to consolidate its position as an agent of change: the company's productivity is falling due to the general decline in mineral quality, the need to exploit more remote and complex deposits, the volatility of input and output prices, and the need to minimize environmental impact, as well as to guarantee occupational health and safety.

In this context, trends towards digitalization and technological change offer solutions to revitalize the sector's productivity, which shows room for improvement, and to help it move towards a more socially beneficial and environmentally cleaner activity. Some examples representing the potential impact of digitalization and AI throughout the different stages of the activity, and that shape the vision of the so-called "smart mining" are intelligent systems for exploration which use data analytics and predictive models in the search for deposits, reducing costs and margins of error; teleoperation and autonomous mining that increases process efficiency and reduces accident costs through the use of advanced autonomous machinery operated remotely; mineral processing, which automates a large part of the separation and classification process of minerals and valuable metals; digital twins, consisting of operation optimization models based on virtual replicas of physical systems, which allows modelling the behaviour of machinery and equipment in order to optimize their use; and personal protection equipment with the incorporation of sensors, high-definition cameras, and virtual and augmented reality in devices to monitor risks, vital signs, and collect data and metrics relevant to productivity.

However, the adoption of these solutions is not yet widespread in the mining activity in the region. The level of digitalization of the sector is classified as "low" for the three countries in the region surveyed by McKinsey Global Institute, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. The IDB-INTAL Survey on Technology Adoption, Employment, and International Trade (Basco et al., 2020)²⁴, which covers companies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico reveals that, out of a sample of 160 mining companies surveyed, only 12 per cent report making investments in R&D&I²⁵, a percentage that drops to 9 per cent for companies with fewer than 50 employees, rises to 18 per cent for companies between 50 and 200, and 26 percent for those employing more than 200 workers.

The same survey shows that for the mining sector, the main technologies are digital platforms and mobile services, cloud computing, big data, and integration systems. The use of massive data is a necessary condition to move forward with artificial intelligence-based solutions, such as predictive systems and digital twins, which still report a less advanced stage of adoption.

When asked about the lack of personnel with specific skills²⁶, a third of the companies surveyed identified the main shortage as that of workers with STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) skills. The percentage drops to 20 per cent for companies in the sector with fewer than 50 employees,

24 We use microdata from the survey's 2019 edition, whose sample includes 1.159 companies in mining (14 percent of the total surveyed), computer and communications services, professional and consulting services, and various manufacturing industry groupings.

25 R&D&I: Research, development and innovation.

26 Including administration skills of resources; operation technical skills, maintenance and repair of equipment, programming, cognitive skills of creativity, reasoning and understanding of problems; social skills of emotional intelligence, negotiation and orientation; content comprehension, technological literacy and communication; process intervention skills, monitoring and self-organization, entrepreneurship and leadership skills; semantic skills of systems analysis and decision making; and complex problem solving skills.

indicating a lower demand for these skills by small companies. On the other hand, when asked about the conditioning factors for meeting companies' demand for skills, 33 percent ranked the low quality of the education system as very important²⁷, and 27 percent did the same for the shortage of workers with skills in new technologies.

It is worth mentioning that a substantial part of the value added of the mining activity is expressed through its productive chains, particularly between its suppliers and laterals or "knowledge". In the last decades of the 20th century, large companies in the sector began to delocalize tasks in the value chains, generating new opportunities for suppliers of associated goods and services. Developed countries with a strong participation of extractive industries such as Canada, Australia or Norway have managed to consolidate technology and knowledge-intensive services clusters for mining. Many of them became important sources of exports and employment, but also of innovation and productive diversification. The integration of this type of knowledge-based goods and services is considered a crucial factor in successful experiences of natural resource-based development (López, 2017).

It is essential to identify mechanisms to accelerate the transition towards natural resource production models based on science and development in the region (Castillo et al., 2018). In this context, the sector's potential for the incorporation of 4.0 technology has in many cases been accompanied by decisive policies to promote a chain of highly qualified service providers. For instance, in Brazil, during more than a decade the National Oil Industry Mobilization Program (PRONIMP) was managed by Petrobras with a target of increasing to 65 per cent the national content of the goods and services consumed. This program had axes of training, advice and links with science and technology networks to promote technological development and the competitiveness of suppliers (López, 2017).

In Chile, the Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) and a group of public institutions, companies and business groups worked to reach a consensus on a technological roadmap up to 2035 through the 2015 Chilean Mining Program Alta Ley. With a public-private participation logic, one of the main objectives is the development of local knowledge-intensive suppliers. Thus, the implementation of the Plataforma Expande project, for open innovation in mining, aimed at the development of technological solution providers to address challenges prioritized by the industry began in 2017 (Castillo et al., 2018).

Although the expansion of this type of supplier clusters has not yet reached the dimensions observed in countries such as Australia or Canada, they are still strategies that can both stimulate technological change and generate quality jobs in a sector characterized by being capital-intensive, while helping to diversify and sophisticate the export basket of mining-energy exporting countries.

► **Box 1.** The development of a cluster of knowledge intensive service providers for the oil and gas sector in Trinidad and Tobago

By the middle of the last decade, Trinidad and Tobago's energy services sector employed one-third of all oil and gas sector workers in the country. An important part of the sector is made up of companies that provide knowledge intensive services, in which a group of between 20 and 30 operated and exported regionally to Latin America and the Caribbean and sometimes even to other regions (Mohan et al, 2016).

Among the companies in the sector, the cases of Trinidad Offshore Fabricators (TOFCO), dedicated to the design and construction of offshore oil platforms, and Oil Mop Environmental Services and Kaizen International (environmental management and waste treatment services) highlighted. Firms providing knowledge-intensive services for oil and gas in Trinidad and Tobago generally introduced innovative products and services, and while most of these innovations came from external knowledge sources and imported and licensed technology, there are also cases of firms with their own R&D departments or groups (Mohan et al, 2016).

► Continues...

27 Defined as a score of 9 or 10 points out of 10.

The emergence and expansion of these firms was partly supported by the existence of local science and technology institutions, and the training of qualified personnel as well. However, there are insufficient incentives to stimulate demand for innovations and create the necessary linkages and interactions to enable knowledge sharing and spill generation. In addition, although the government and the private sector have expanded education and training opportunities, there is no close alignment between training institutions and companies to ensure that the workforce has the specific knowledge or know-how and skills required by the industry, including operators, technicians and engineers in the different relevant areas of the business (offshore exploitation, process technology, maintenance, electrical, mechanical, etc.). In turn, Trinidad and Tobago's local content policy for the oil and gas industry lacks the necessary legal provisions to ensure compliance and the necessary resources to monitor its implementation and measurement against targets. There is also a lack of funding and support for R&D and other innovation activities. This raises a number of challenges for the public policy agenda in the country, in order to help the continued growth and increasing sophistication of the knowledge-intensive services sector for the energy industry (Mohan et al, 2016).

New technologies in the industrial/manufacturing sectors

The set of new technologies applied to industrial sectors is known as advanced manufacturing, smart manufacturing, or industry 4.0. Recent IDB-INTAL studies allow for a characterization of three economies with relatively dynamic industrial structures: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Following the CNI methodology (CNI 2018), the following scenarios or technological stages are constructed in the studies, in order to capture the different degrees of integration, connection and intelligence used by industrial companies. In contrast to the previous technological generation, Industry 4.0 allows going beyond the IT support in purchasing, stock and payment processes in the relationship with suppliers and the integrated data management system for product development, enabling in this case the real-time tracking of orders and logistics as well as the creation of virtual development systems, respectively. In addition, they allow keeping communication channels between intelligent systems and machines (M2M), and monitoring customer lifecycle management and implementing automated business processes supported by artificial intelligence.

The first thing that stands out from the results is that in the three countries the diffusion of the fourth generation, also called Industry 4.0, is much lower than in advanced economies: while in the United States or Germany it reaches 10 per cent / 15 per cent of manufacturing companies, the average use of fourth generation technologies in functional areas is 2 per cent in Argentina, 1.6 per cent in Brazil and 1.2 per cent in Uruguay. Thus, the penetration of Industry 4.0 is still very incipient in these three countries.

In the outlook, companies in the three countries expect the technological backwardness to be reversed over the next decade. The percentage of them expecting to use third and fourth generation technologies in 10 years is more than double in all functional areas for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. However, the proportion of companies taking concrete actions to reduce the existing technological backwardness is very low. Only one or two out of 10 companies are actively working to promote digital transformation, and again, the percentage of companies that are taking corrective actions is three times higher in Brazil than in Argentina and Uruguay, when considering the average of the functional areas.

It is not surprising to detect a high degree of heterogeneity by type of company. Most of the lagging manufacturing companies are micro and small companies (85 per cent in the case of Argentina, for example), which operate in low-productivity sectors and invest very little in activities related to their technological development in particular. When asked about the obstacles they face for digital transformation, in addition to financing and the difficulty in finding the appropriate human resources, they find obstacles in internal factors of the company, such as lack of knowledge of new technologies or even the corporate culture.

The above emphasizes the matter of skills. In advanced manufacturing sectors globally, retraining of workers' skills through technical and professional training schemes has been a fundamental tool to ensure digital transformation. *Reskilling* occurs in basic skills to perform routine tasks, digital literacy,

soft skills training and foundational knowledge. However, the evidence for the region points to severe underinvestment in skills retraining, due on the one hand to gaps in the supply of available training, and on the other to demand factors, in that on average, first- and second-generation enterprises tend to stick mainly to routine skills, with low relative shares of investment in worker training.

The analysis of the use of 4.0 technologies in the region's industry gives five important messages. The first is that the diffusion of advanced technologies is still marginal: in no functional area does the percentage of firms with this type of technology exceed 4 per cent, while in countries such as the United States, this ratio reaches 15 per cent. The second is that there is a large majority of firms using lagging technologies: 86 per cent of Argentinean, 82 per cent of Uruguayan and 78 per cent of Brazilian companies still use first and second generation technologies. The third is that, although companies perceive that they are going to transform their processes, proportionally few are currently taking corrective actions to close the technological lag gap: less than 15 per cent of firms in Brazil and 5 per cent in Argentina and Uruguay. The fourth is that Brazil is comparatively better positioned to reverse the technological lag than countries such as Argentina and Uruguay. Fifth, the evidence of this first stage of adoption of 4.0 technologies points to the widening of gaps within the industry: the companies leading the change are large, dynamic and exporters.

New technologies and knowledge-based services

As with primary sectors, the service sector was traditionally defined as one with low productivity and lacking in innovative dynamism. This scenario has changed notably in the last decades. Not only do these services create most of the employment and GDP in developed nations and in large part of the developed world, but these have constituted one of the main focus generation and dissemination of innovation and productivity gains in modern economies (Jensen, 2013; Stehrer et al, 2012; Gotsch et al, 2011; Desmarchelier et al, 2013).

The activities which are behind the new trends are grouped under the name of knowledge-based services (SBC). The SBC sectors are characterised by: i) being intensive labour, biased in employing mid-high to highly qualified personnel; ii) their innovation activities are more based on intangibles such as human capital, use of software and databases, organizational management, brand values, among others; iii) the entry and leave barriers are reduced in most of the sectors due to the relatively low investment requirements in physical capital (Nayyar et al, 2021).

SBC sectors include services such as accounting, legal, management, consulting and advisory, analysis and market and financial intelligence, architecture, audiovisual, animation, engineering, software and IT services, advertising and marketing, research and development (R&D), health and education, among others. The activities of these sectors is mainly carried out in digital environments, a cyberspace unbound by geography.

With the outbreak of advanced manufacturing or industry 4.0, a substantial part of the added value of an industrial product is created in the world of services (R&D, design, software, branding, marketing, etc.), leading to the so-called "servification" of economy (Beylis et al, 2021). For example, considering the increased presence of integrated software in cars or different types of machines, the varied services and apps included in a smartphone or, the transformation of appliances drawing from the advent of the "Internet of things". Third is the explosive development of digital media and communication networks has lead to the emergence of new consumption patterns of entertainment and social interaction mediated by ICTs, which have boosted the rise and widespread of streaming platforms and the addition of audiovisual content in their many modes (movies, series, videogames, etc).

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In turn, the digital is increasingly permeating traditional activity sectors. The new techno-productive paradigms, such as *Agtech*, *Fintech*,²⁸ *Industry 4.0*, *Edtech*, *Healthtech*, among others, are intensive in digital services. Meanwhile, products which were previously manufactured in industrial facilities, such as a book for example, are now turned into intangibles which require no physical production, but a completely digital one.

The weight of SBC sectors have been growing in different regions, both developed and developing. Lopez (2018), with data for 2014, shows that the SBC represented 13 percent, 17 percent and 14 percent of the added value of the economy of the USA and Argentina, respectively. This indicates that, at least for developing countries where the SBC have already consolidated as relevant industry, their relative weight does not differ much from those observed in advanced nations.

The relevance of SBC has also grown significantly in the commerce area. Between 2005 and 2019, global exports from these sectors grew by 185 percent: from 915 thousand million to 2.6 hundred thousand. In the same period, the total exports of the rest of the services increased by 105 percent, and goods by 80 percent (data from UNCTAD). Indirect exports of SBC have also increased, this is, those incorporated in the sales of other goods and services (Heuser and Mattoo, 2017).

Also, these SBC sectors have an increasing weight in the total private R&D in developed countries, in line with the so-called *knowledge economy* (OECD, 2015). In 2017, a sector with the highest intensity of R&D on sales in the USA were scientific R&D services (25 percent), followed by software development (15 percent). In the fifth place, after pharmaceuticals and computers and electronics, is the computer system design and related services sector, with almost 9 percent (data from the National Science Foundation).

Meanwhile, studies based on the level of companies in the European Union show that SBC sectors are more prone to train their workers to introduce organizational innovations and cooperate with external agents (clients, competitors and universities) than their manufacturing peers (Gotsch et al., 2011).

The SBC can also be drivers of growth in developing countries (Di Meglio et al., 2015; Nayyar et al., 2021) by having characteristic previously exclusive to manufacturing, related to generating and mainstreaming innovations and developing upstream and downstream chains of production. In fact, the productivity of some SBC sectors can be higher than manufacturing. For example, for a sample of 20 developing countries selected in Nayyar et al (2021), the TPF of the telecommunications, software and computer service sectors resulted in 1.5 times higher than the one observed in the industrial sector. In the case of professional services, the TPF is also higher than the industrial sector, with an estimated lower difference, by 10 percent.

Developing economies, mainly Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe to a lesser degree, have gained grounds in the international SBC commerce. According to UNCTAD data, the total global exports of the aforementioned sectors increased from 17 to 24 percent from 2005 to 2019. LAC had also participated in the expansion process of SBC world markets. On one hand, many countries of the region have attracted investors of big multinational industries in areas such as software and computer services, business process outsourcing (BPO) and audiovisuals. The competitive advantages of Latin America and the Caribbean in these sectors essentially go through the existence of a workforce with qualification levels required at competitive costs and by their time zones and cultural affinity, appropriate to provide services requiring time zone alignments with the USA or other Latin American markets (López et al., 2014). Incentives for these activities have been established in many countries (Alvarez et al., 2021).

In addition to attracting foreign companies, the region has been the origin of a number of successful software and BPO service export companies which became global, including Globant (Argentina), TOTVS and Stefanini (Brazil), Sonda (Chile), Neoris (Mexico) or Genexus (Uruguay). Different digital “unicorns” have also emerged²⁹, such as Mercado Libre (*e-commerce*, Argentina), Ualá (*fintech*, Argentina), Nubank (*fintech*, Brasil), Kavak (*e-commerce*, Mexico) or Rappi and Loggi (logistics and distribution, Colombia and Brasil respectively).

28 The designation of Fintech industry groups an entrepreneurship segment aimed at financial brokerage, displaying all their operation through the Internet (deposits, transfers, credit grants, etc). These companies use digital tools to their fullest capacity and not only automatize transactions with clients, but also all their internal processes (Hayward and Pollari, 2015).

29 That is the name for startups which reached a valuation above 1000 million USD.

Despite these cases of success, LAC has lost relative weight in SBC markets. Its participation in global exports dropped by 12 percent in 2005 and 8 percent in 2019. LAC is lagging in both SBC participation in the total export services and in SBC exports per habitants against countries in Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe and the developed world. However, this hides a heterogeneous context. Some small nations, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, show very good export performance, as well as other bigger countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile. But even in some of these cases, such as Argentina or Chile, for example, the export dynamism in recent years was below the world average.

Among the factors which hinder the further progress of the region in these markets the following can be recorded: the insufficient availability of human capital with relatively higher qualification levels for increasingly specialized tasks, the predominantly low English level in great part of Latin American countries, infrastructure and regular digital environment deficiencies, and the generally weak innovation systems which determine the Region to be viewed as a non-attractive location to develop more complex tasks in SBC value chains, even when it is possible to recognize upgrade processes of specific segment in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay (Posthuma y Reinecke, 2019).

The expansion of the SBC is related to the phenomenon Baldwin and Forslid (2020) called “telemigration”³⁰, whose impacts on developing countries are not evident. On one hand, it grants income and learning opportunities for certain types of self-employed workers. On the other hand, however, telemigration is closely related to the so-called *gig economy* and, in turn, as further analysed, some aspects to be considered arise from the generation of decent work perspective. Additionally, a scenario where the relocation of SBC is done through direct relations between developed world companies and developing country workers (instead of company-company relations) will surely further hinder the possibilities of value chain scaling processes in service sectors, given the increased power and information asymmetry between employers and an increased difficulty for obtained learnings to transform into lasting organizational capacities, beyond the human capital gains which workers can obtain individually.

A critical aspect to promote the further expansion of SBC in the region is the availability of an English-speaking workforce. In addition to the persistent gaps in highly specific technological abilities for each sector/activity. All the region seems to share the diagnosis in which the demand for personnel with abilities in the systems and programming areas lag behind the respective offer. This has promoted the adoption of different short/medium term specific training initiatives in many countries (García and Bafundo, 2014). Meanwhile, another shares problem is the low graduation rate in STEM careers, which naturally affect the human capital supply for sectors such as informatics and engineering, among others.

The possible trend acceleration towards digitalization in the post-pandemic era, along with the increasing “servification” of economic activities, open new opportunities to export SBC for countries of the region (Baylis et al., 2021). Striving for a better competitive positioning in these services goes through the optimal reaction ability to tendencies towards automation tasks, which progressively and unavoidably erode the advantage associated to low labour costs to attract offshoring operations in these sectors, specially in those with a relatively lower qualification of task intensity. Likewise, another automation variant of relevant processes to provide these services is the one going from interaction with clients to Business Process as a Service (BpaaS), in which different company services are provided from the cloud.

Traditional services: the commerce transformation case

Finally, digitalization is also providing major transformation opportunities in traditional sectors such as commerce, financial services and passenger transportation, which now have a digitally-based counterpart in e-commerce, Fintech and transport platforms.

In the region, a 2018 report identified almost 1200 startups in the Fintech area. The three segments with a great number of entrepreneurship were payments and remittance, loans and corporate finance management (BID, BINVEST and Finnovista, 2018). Meanwhile, a more recent report (Latam Fintech Hub, 2021) shows strong financial growth for those startups in LAC in 2020, with almost 3 billion USD against the 2 billion USD in 2019 (and 199 transactions against 82).

30 It refers to the freelance worker recruitment to provide professional, creative or other “cloud-based” services to developed world companies.

The development of the *Fintech* sector in the region can play a key role to improve the access and financial inclusion level in the region, taking advantage of the high smartphone uptake. A significant part of the population and companies underserved and/or excluded from the formal financial system³¹, whether because they operate under informal conditions or due to the limitations or inefficiencies in the offer by traditional financial parties, which translates to high access costs and high interest rates. Fintech services can favour the access to banking services for micro and small businesses, as well as self-employed workers, through more effective and less expensive financial solutions (BID, BINVEST and Finnovista, 2018). This way, they can contribute in bridging the internal productivity gaps through the increased financial inclusion of small businesses.

As in a large part of the world, commerce is one of the heavyweight sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean, which represented over 25 percent until 2019, and a 24,4 percent of employment in the pandemic (data from SIALC/ILO) and 17 percent of the added value of the region (data from ECLACSTAT). Although defined by low productivity, in recent years, it has drastically transformed drawing from the arrival of electronic commerce (e-commerce). An increasing number of companies from different activity sectors offer the possibility to buy their products online, and specialized platforms (electronic online markets or marketplaces) have simultaneously emerged, whether general or specialised products from a specific sector, which allow them to connect buyers and sellers.

The existence of these platforms, with the prime global exponents being Amazon, eBay and AliExpress, among others, have contributed to democratise the access of small and medium manufacturers in broader markets, even foreign ones. This is because they increase their visibility through these platforms, also allowing them to have data analysis services based on the information generated from their own operations in their respective platforms, as well as their competitors, thus improving their marketing strategies, deeply knowing their target clients and predicting their consumption patterns.

The expansion of e-commerce has been notorious in recent years. In the EU, for example, the percentage of companies selling through that method increased from 17 to more than 20 percent between 2013 and 2019. Online sales of more than 10 people also increased from 14 percent to 18.5 percent of their total turnover, with 8 percent of these making online sales to other countries (European Commission, 2020a).

Latin America and the Caribbean are once again lagging behind on this matter. According to a Telecom Advisory Services report (2020), in the case of e-commerce, the family-level adoption rate is half of the one observed in OECD countries. The intraregional heterogeneity is determined once again: While 14 percent of the people older than 15 years old in the top 60 percent of the income distribution use the Internet to make purchases, barely 5 percent do so in the remaining 40 percent segment. For comparison purposes, the respective numbers in the OECD are 67 and 52 percent respectively, and 48 and 23 percent in Asia Pacific (Grosman, 2020). Likewise, the use of digital sale channels from companies has 10 percent marks or less in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, while the adoption numbers exceed 30 percent only in Colombia and Uruguay (Telecom Advisory Services, 2020).

In contrast, the region was the origin of e-commerce companies which have achieved successful internationalisation. The most relevant case is Mercado Libre of Argentina, with presence in almost all Latin America. Other relevant examples, although with more service specificity, include PedidosYa (Uruguay) and Rappi (Colombia); meanwhile, while aimed at its own internal market, the case of Brazil's B2W Digital is also noteworthy for its size.

E-commerce already showed a rising trend but, against the COVID-19 pandemic, it acquired a new scaling. Consumers, manufacturers and sellers found a relatively accessible solution in this modality to complete transactions and carry out operations which would otherwise be obstructed against the restrictions to access traditional commercial channels. During the first half of 2020, internet traffic in e-commerce websites increased by 157 percent in the region (Díaz de Astarloa, 2021).

31 It is estimated that 45 percent of adults of the region are still excluded from formal financial services (World Bank, 2017, quoted in BID, BINVEST and Finnovista, 2018).

The goods and services offer through digital channels did not lag behind. In Mercado Libre, the registration of new sellers quadrupled in the biggest markets of the region³² while the smallest ones³³ sextupled (Díaz de Astarloa, 2021). The possibility of operating with e-commerce have also expanded through the own companies' websites: ECLAC reported a growth in the number of websites by 800 percent in Colombia and Mexico, and by 360 percent in Brazil and Chile, focusing in transactional platforms³⁴.

COVID-19 and its associated stringency measures which hindered the common operations of economic showed the role of e-commerce as the activity enabler and resilience factor, and also as a powerful digital transition motor for micro and small companies, even in the informal sector. E-commerce is associated with a series of technologies and digital advanced solutions with a great potential to generate learnings and development capacities, in areas such as cybersecurity, browsing architecture, data analytics, translation and currency change algorithms, simulation models, among others.

Many of these processes can go unnoticed for the user companies themselves but, undoubtedly, the accelerated adoption of e-commerce triggered new digitalization and learning processes for those who operated online sales channels for the first time or opted to reinforce their digital strategies. A scenario of opportunities is set for the development of "knowledge" integrated production, as these are common technologies for other advanced solutions and expandable abilities –both digital and non-digital– towards other possible implementations. This opens new possibilities to reinforce the acquired capacities and accelerate digital transformation from and towards a greatly relevant sector in the region.

1.5 Final remarks

As with past technology revolutions with the advent of electricity, the steam engine before it, and basic CITs afterwards, the current technological change environment opens a context of potential opportunities to accelerate growth, increase productivity and create better jobs. The evidence available – mainly from advanced economies– aims at general purpose technologies: those with potential to radically change the way we produce, consume, exchange and, of course, how we work. These can also help in the inclusion of parties which find it difficult to participate in the most dynamic market sections, from Fintech (which enable the access to credits for companies with no financial history or with weak warranties) to e-commerce (which helps SMEs to gain visibility and broaden their markets), going through small rural producers which can improve their access to commercial and climatologic information or streamline and make the transaction and payment chain more transparent thanks to digital technologies.

The precedent technology waves put the window of opportunities into perspective, and these also warn that the region, as well as everything up to now, has not achieved to reap dividends in terms of growth and productivity which the successive technology change waves offered in the past. On the contrary, the history of LAC was that of trend lag in regards to dynamic economies, and heterogeneity inside national economic systems. A quick review of the available evidence in the region regarding new digital technologies forces the resignification of the Raúl Prebisch diagnostic by the end of the 1940s on the dissemination of technical progress: "*slow and unequal*".

In this respect, bigger companies have led the process of advanced technology incorporation while, for most small and medium companies, the need for digitalization highlights the obstacles and restrictions these face when addressing digital transformation, tending to rather deepen pre-existing gaps.

To change a context of low innovation and high heterogeneity and move towards an accelerated and inclusive technological change pattern, it seems that considering certain minimums in terms of institutional environments and certain sets of integrated policies seems to be necessary. The first one refers to macroeconomic stability, as it represents a necessary condition to boost technological change in a long-term view and bet. Additionally, this context requires specific plans to accelerate digital


32 This includes Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. The data corresponds to the growth in August 2020 regarding the year prior.

33 This includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Guatemala, Paraguay, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. The data corresponds to the growth in August 2020 regarding the year prior.

34 Interannual growth rate in August 2020.



The current technological change environment



As with past technology revolutions with the advent of electricity, the steam engine before it, and basic CITs afterwards, the current technological change environment opens a context of **potential opportunities** to accelerate growth, increase productivity and create better jobs.

transactions. The productive policies to be implemented must be inclusive by design and, at the same time, differentiated to promote the adoption of new digital technologies in the productive system of LAC, in accordance with the technological adoption progress and capacities for local companies.

At the same time, it is fundamental to facilitate the readjustment of abilities of persons in the labour market, in order to sustainably spread the acquisition of labour skills for the use and mastery of digital technologies, as well as, in a broader perspective, those needed for digital economy.

Additionally, taking advantage of digital transformation is required to improve the integration method of economies of the region in the global economy. This will contribute to make more companies participate and scale functions in the value chains, whether as direct exporters or through the provision of supplies, equipment and services to exporting companies. At the same time, that closer contact with global markets will help companies to improve their productivity and facilitate their knowledge, access and use of the new innovation waves associated with digital transformation.

Finally, the social dialogue and bipartite or tripartite agreements result in a key piece for this process in order to transit the complex path of digital transitioning in a framework of respect towards the rights of workers, work institutions and work relations.

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► The increasing incorporation of automated processes, digitalization, robotization and the application of artificial intelligence in production while boosting economic growth and the improvement of competitiveness, can have very significant disruptive effects in the labour market.

► 2. Digital transition, automation and tasks in Latin America³⁵

2.1 The debate on automation and the future of work

As indicated in the previous section, the increasing incorporation of automated processes, digitalization, robotization and the application of artificial intelligence in production while boosting economic growth and the improvement of competitiveness, can have very significant disruptive effects in the labour market. In fact, the technological advances can create new job opportunities, but can also generate difficulties for labour integration of certain types of workers. It is also expected that these dynamics imply transformations in industrial relations. In turn, the potential effect of technological advance on growth and competitiveness shall be influenced by the availability of workforce with the required qualifications.

The concern for the effects of technological changes in the labour market, income and inequality are not recent. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, there has been a renewed interest in these aspect by the acceleration of the automation and digitalization of economic activities.

Two approaches are adopted in the empiric literature. The first analyses the effects of technological change from the evolution of occupational structure. In the “occupational approach”, it is assumed that every work is homogenous in terms of tasks. This means that all workers performing an occupation carry out similar tasks. Initially, these studies faced the concern of work leaves due to technology, identifying the occupations whose tasks could be carried out by robots. Frey and Osbourne (2017) found that 47 percent of occupations in the United States faced high risks of becoming automatized in the following 20 years. Similar results were found in Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) for Finland, Bowles (2014) for European countries, Brzeski and Burk (2015) for Germany, among other studies.

Although these initial researches made alarming predictions on the possible massive destruction of jobs, other studies arose *a posteriori* with more nuanced conclusions. At the same time, many critics emerged in some of the methodologies used to make the respective predictions. One of the debated assumptions states that automation affects complete occupations, when every occupation is expected to involve a combination of different types of tasks: some of which can be automatised, but others could be complementary to technological incorporation. When considering occupations as wholly homogenous, this approach can overestimate the impact of technological change on the labour demand and income distribution.

This is the reason why the “occupational approach” moved to a “task approach” with the purpose of analysing in detail how automation and digitisation affect the way “things are done” in a specific job

³⁵ This section is based on the report drafted by consultant Ana Laura Fernández.

position and, just from there, evaluate the impacts of technology on certain types of occupations. The main argument in this approach is that the incorporation of new technologies enables the replacement of certain tasks while being complementary in others.

An important part of these group of researchers examined the impacts which have already been produced in the labour market in recent years, not only on the global employment demand, but rather, alternatively or complementary on its composition. In this respect, many studies show a reduction process on the relative weight of medium qualification jobs in favour of high and low qualification level ones (McIntosh, 2013). One of the factors which would be responsible of this trend is that it is simpler to automatise repetitive tasks (whether cognitive or manual), generally carried out by medium qualification workers, rather than “abstract” tasks (bound to problem resolutions, creativity, etc.) or “non-routine manual” ones (which require higher personal interaction, adaptability, etc.) (Autor et al., 2003).

In addition to this replacement process of work by capital when carrying out manual tasks, computer science advancements added the possibility to replace worker also in the implementation of routine cognitive tasks. Beyond the existence of limits in the capacity of computers to replace humans in cognitive functions, the field in which these can do it is increasingly broader, specially in tasks related to calculation, organization of activities and instructions, and communication. Among the tasks which people cannot yet be replaced by computers, those remaining are fundamentally associated to the need of flexibility and creativity.

Then, current technology has a higher chance of replacing workers which carry out routine tasks, which in turn contributes to rise the efficacy of non-routine work which, for example, is supported by computer-generated information. Likewise, the increased incorporation of computerised technology in their workplace could imply a higher job demand for troubleshooting, communications and organization.

Innovation can also generate significant distributive effects. This discussion is not new. During the dace of 1990, a consensus was reached on the technological change biased towards higher educational attainment levels, especially in developed countries. This was the canonical explanation regarding the increasing demand of highly qualified workers over those underqualified, which lead to an increase in the return to education. This process would have also been one of the contributing factors for the increase in labour income inequalities.

However, the most recent trends associated to automation and digitalisation would have somewhat different impacts on wage distribution. As previously stated, this process sees occupations at the centre of wage distribution as the most affected ones while both manual (in the lower distribution side) and abstract and troubleshooting (in the higher distribution part) non-routine occupations gain weight. This would generate wage reductions in the first group and an increase (or stability) in the second group of workers placed in both sides of wage distribution (Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013). This way, a dynamic U shape is formed, both in regards to a relative change in employment and wages. Meaning, the polarization in occupations would lead to income polarization. This, in turn, would also explain the increase in wage inequality during the last two decades in high income countries (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Goos et al., 2014; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2006).

There are other explanations for these trends such as, for example, the impact of task *offshorization* within the framework of productive fragmentation processes and global value chain deployment (Marcolin et al., 2016; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2015). This argument is based on the use of information and communication technologies promotes offshoring for part of the productive processes outside central countries within the framework of international specialization and the response of companies to the exposition impact to the foreign competition. This would be another way in which the relative demand of certain tasks is reduced, and occupations in developed countries are largely located in the medium part of this distribution.

Thus far, this is exclusively considering the so-called “substitution effect”, where technology replaces certain tasks in certain occupations. However, it can additionally operate a “scaling effect”, which refers to the possibility that cost reductions in the sector to be automatized translates to a higher demand in goods and/or services, leading to growth in their activities and, consequentially, in employment. The possibility that this compensating effect is produced, critically depends on the price elasticity of the demand in the sectors where automation is produced (and where there is enough market competition

for cost reductions to translate to price reductions) or, alternatively, where there are other sectors with highly elastic income demand in which saved income is spent due to the price reductions in the sector to be automatised³⁶. Finally, there are other mechanisms through which the current technological change wave could lead to compensating effects through job creation. This includes generating new investment opportunities or the emergence of new productive activities due to the advance in robotisation.

Unlike developed countries, studies focused on the impact of automation in the employment structure and the labour income inequality in the region are very limited. Among these, Maloney and Molina (2016) analyse the evolution of employment in developing countries without finding concrete evidence of income polarization, although a contraction in operative occupations was reported in Brazil and Mexico. Messina et al. (2016) analysed the occupational changes in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru in the decade of the 2000, and did not find consistent results with the polarization hypothesis, with the exception of Chile. In fact, in other countries, the weight of medium and high distribution jobs increased in relation to low- income jobs. Apella and Zunino (2017) analysed the composition of employment in Argentina and Uruguay between 1995 and 2015, and found that cognitive tasks grew as manual tasks shrunk in both countries.

On their behalf, Maurizio and Monsalvo (2021) did not find consistent results in Argentina regarding the polarisation hypothesis, they rather show that an excerpt of low qualification occupations and, to a lesser degree, those placed in the high part of distribution against those found in the medium part were verified during the new millennium. It shows that the evolution of occupations was not the same as for remunerations: In fact, incomes increased while the lower income occupations lost weight. The authors concluded that these results were compatible with the existence of other factors, in addition to technological change. Among these, we could mention, for example, the conditions of macroeconomy, the productive structure and the labour market institutions.

For the case of Chile, Zapata-Román (2021) did not find significant statistic results which confirm the presence of occupation or income polarisation. On the contrary, opposite income behaviours were found between 2000 and 2006, where medium qualified workers experienced the highest salary increases in real terms. Ballon and Dávalos (2020) also show that the drop of inequality in Peru observed during the 2004-2011 period is related to a higher medium qualification jobs weight at the expense of low qualification jobs. Likewise, a higher income increase was found in occupations located in the lower part of the distribution. However, they conclude that the complementarity of qualified work with technology is not necessarily one of the main factors to explain the evolution of inequality.

Therefore, it is evident that the analysis of this topic that the region requires to consider the specific characteristics of Latin America and the Caribbean, which could affect the relation between technological change, labour demand and wages.

On one hand, as extensively analysed before, the technological lag in the region –and its high heterogeneity between countries and within themselves– makes the exposition of occupations, tasks and worker to routinisation even be the present with least intensities compared to other regions. Messina and Silva (2018) agree with this argument by concluding that polarisation was not seen in Latin American countries due to the existence of technological barriers which delay its penetration.

On the other hand, the income distribution ranking of occupations based on routinary substance can differ between countries. For example, the occupations with the most routine degree in Argentina are in the lowest part of the wage distribution, not in the central part as largely seen in European countries. This implies that the global context will be different, even observing similar changes in the relative participation of each occupation –both in terms of job positions and wage distribution (Maurizio and Monsalvo, 2021).

In addition, as previously mentioned, the polarisation of occupations and income will also not necessarily or largely be results of technological change. As suggested in UNCTAD (2021), these trends could be reflecting the commerce patterns on international and *offshorisation* levels in parts of the production.

36 This way, as stated by Bessen (2017), the price elasticity of the demand tends to decline as sectors mature and productivity and price reductions waves are accumulated. On the other hand, Autor (2015) suggests there are technologically “delayed” service sectors, such as cleaning, personal care, gastronomy, etc., whose demand is highly income elastic as, as such, can also generate jobs in an increasing productivity context.

Workforce training, infrastructure, financing for companies and industrial relations regulations are some of the areas where policy decisions can contribute to model the way technology impacts the world of labour.

Finally, the impact which the adoption of new technologies can have over labour markets (in terms of volume and quality of employment) shall also be conditioned by the economic, social and political environment, and by the institutional framework it develops in. Particularly, workforce training, infrastructure, financing for companies and industrial relations regulations are some of the areas where policy decisions can contribute to model the way technology impacts the world of labour.

2.2 The type of tasks carried out by workers in Latin America

Considering the above-mentioned, and besides the particularities presented by the region, it is expected that (with higher or lower intensity) certain tasks keep on being on demand with increasing intensity. These are the ones requiring the use of information and communication technologies (CITs), communication and directional skills, ability to organise your own tasks, scientific or mathematical knowledge, creativity, critical thinking, teamwork and relatively complex decision-making, as well as those demanding personal interaction, to both coordinate tasks and for caregiving of persons.

Those frequently carrying out these tasks could be benefitted by the complementarity with technology which could even derive into improvements in productivity. On the contrary, tasks which could potentially be automatised are those involving manual routine activities and certain activities with higher cognitive content, but also with a certain routine degree.

In order to know which type of tasks are more frequently carried out by workers in the region are separated in six groups based on the information granted by the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), promoted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)³⁷. The Latin American countries included in this information source are Chile (2014), Ecuador (2017), Mexico (2017) and Peru (2017). The tasks were grouped to account for the different dimensions which are used to assess the possibilities of adaption to use new technologies. These are, however, the indirect indicators which are not fully decisive on the possible automation risk or technological complementarity.³⁸

- The first group references the tasks related to the use of CITs. The use of technologies allows to infer that workers with the skills needed to use them shall have more possibilities to interact with the technology to be incorporated in the future. Likewise, those writing or reading e-mail in their work probably perform occupations which require certain comprehension and content creation which do not make them easily replaceable by technology.
- The second group includes tasks related to the direction of the work of other individuals and interpersonal communication. In this case, it is expected that these workers have less possibilities of being replaced by technology due to the changing nature of this tasks.

37 For further details on this source, see Box 1.

38 Grundke et al. (2017) and Bustelo et al. (2019), among others, used similar task classifications to the ones here.

- The third group considers answers accounting for the possibility of making the way tasks are carried out more flexible. However, it is worth clarifying that part of this flexibility could be associated with the occupational category of the worker, as a self-employed worker by definition has more control over the productive process and an increased decision-making capacity on how to make certain tasks compared to an employed one, regardless of automated processes being part of the process themselves.
- A fourth group gathers some specific and problem-solving skills indicators associated with the ability of interacting with new technologies and complement them in carrying out tasks.
- A fifth group, on the contrary, gathers a set of activities which, still being cognitive, are presumed to be codifiable and, as such, automatable (tasks linked to calculation, marketing, etc).
- Finally, a sixth group identifies the execution of manual tasks. For this last case, the data is presented separately for workers performing occupations related to caregiving (considered as having a lesser degree of automation) for all other manual or physical activities.³⁹

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of workers which carry out the listed activities at least once a week, except for manual tasks and communication and information technology usage tasks (CITs) for which the proportion of employed workers carrying out these tasks every day was calculated. The results are shown for each of the four countries considered here (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) and for their average. Likewise, as a comparison, the average results for a set of OECD countries are included, excluding Chile and Mexico.⁴⁰

39 Regarding the last point, it is worth clarifying that the information source used do not detail manual or physical tasks carried out by workers, so that this information has to be analysed along with the occupation the person is placed in and in relation to other characteristics of the tasks carried out.

40 These were included among OECD countries: Germany, Belgium, Korea, Denmark, Spain, United States, Russian Federation, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Sweden.

► **Table 2.1.** Performance of different types of tasks in total employment.
Selected Latin American and OECD countries (in percentages)

		Chile	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru	Average 4 LAC countries	OECD
ICTs	use spreadsheets	18.2	14.9	12.9	10.1	14.0	22.2
	use word processors	19.3	17.8	13.8	12.7	15.9	27.9
	read letters, email or memos	35.0	26.5	29.0	18.6	27.2	52.3
	write letters, email or memos	30.3	18.0	28.2	15.2	22.9	44.3
	medium/advanced computer skills required	2.9	3.7	2.8	2.1	2.9	5.1
	Average	21.1	16.2	17.3	11.7	16.6	30.4
Direction and communications	negotiate	38.8	38.4	40.0	41.6	39.7	40.0
	plan other's activities	27.6	26.9	23.2	18.5	24.0	32.4
	teach or train	42.9	34.8	29.9	31.5	34.8	33.1
	give presentations	17.1	19.3	15.1	16.0	16.9	13.8
	Average	31.6	29.8	27.0	26.9	28.9	29.8
Organise their work	change order of tasks	38.0	42.4	42.1	20.1	35.7	48.6
	change the way tasks are carried out	42.0	49.6	52.9	25.5	42.5	49.8
	change working speed	47.4	53.3	55.8	34.5	47.8	49.5
	Average	42.5	48.4	50.2	26.7	42.0	49.3
Specialized knowledge and problem solving	create tables and figures	14.4	16.3	16.3	12.4	14.8	18.3
	use simple algebra	21.0	11.4	20.3	16.1	17.2	28.1
	use complex algebra	5.1	7.3	6.4	4.4	5.8	5.4
	solve complex problems	53.3	42.8	44.1	41.5	45.4	57.4
	Average	23.5	19.5	21.8	18.6	20.8	27.3
Marketing and accounting	read or issue invoices	29.2	25.9	25.0	20.3	25.1	31.3
	calculate costs	43.3	47.0	49.5	44.9	46.2	35.0
	use calculators	50.6	42.0	45.3	37.3	43.8	56.2
	make sales	34.6	43.2	43.4	46.8	42.0	28.7
	Average	39.4	39.5	40.8	37.3	39.3	37.8
Manual	care giving occupations	38.3	40.9	42.7	39.5	40.4	44.4
	Other occupations	41.7	47.0	50.1	48.8	46.9	39.7
	Average	41.0	45.1	48.4	46.3	45.2	40.7

Source: Own elaboration based on the PIAAC database.

Within the set of tasks using CITs, the four countries of the region are seen to have between 10 percent and 19 percent of the workers using worksheets or text processors in their work. The use (reading and writing) of e-mails is seen with more frequency (between 15 percent and 35 percent). The use of CITs is higher in Chile and lower in Perú, but in all cases it is lower than in developed countries. Particularly, the OECD average is less than double the average of the four Latin American countries. In turn, it is in this group of tasks where the differences in the average between both groups of countries seem to be more important.

These results are consistent with those indicated by ECLAC (2021) regarding the digital skills in the region. In 2019, less than 40 percent of the population had basic knowledge in computer science, such as copying a file or sending a file via e-mail. The proportions for intermediate activities such as the use of basic arithmetic formulas in a spreadsheet, the creation of electronic presentations with presentation software, and file transfers between computers and/or devices were below 30 percent. Less than 25 percent had more advanced informatic abilities such as connecting and installing new devices and searching, downloading and installing software. Finally, less than 7 percent of the persons informed having written an informatic program using programming language.

In average, around a third of the workers carries out activities related to direction and communication tasks. Within this group, task planning for other people appears with even less frequency, between 20 percent and 28 percent. When the average of the four countries of the region is considered, the use of this type of tasks results in 8 percentage points lower than in the average for OECD countries.

In terms of organization of work, referring to the possibility of having workers taking decision of the order, way and speed with which every task is carried out, significant differences also arise between countries. Let us remember the degree of task flexibility which are expected to correlate negatively with the possibility for codification and, as such, automation is attempted to be captured here. In Peru, for example, the percentage of workers able to take this type of decisions is located between 20 percent (change the order of tasks) and 34 percent (change the speed of work). Although the percentages of the other countries result higher, it is worth emphasizing that, as previously mentioned, this type of activities are inherent not only to employed workers in decision-making positions, but also to self-employed ones. That is why the high occurrence of this type of occupations in labour markets of the region can be increasing this percentage which is, anyways, lower than that seen in the OECD countries considered here.

The indicators referring to problem solving knowledge reflect a very low use (around 21 percent) to that seen in the group prior to tasks and lower than that registered in OECD countries (except in the case of complex algebra). The use of simple algebra reaches a maximum of 20 percent in Chile and Mexico, while reaching 16 percent and 11 percent in Peru and Ecuador respectively. It is worth clarifying that, although part of the use of these tools is replaceable due to the incorporation of technology (for example, data processing tools), workers carrying out these types of tasks are probably capable of interacting with technology and complement in case of its incorporation. In average, the occurrence of these tasks is around 11 percentage points lower than in the OECD. Likewise, although solving complex problems has the most widespread use in the region, the gap between OECD countries is of 12 percentage points in average.


Tasks associated with marketing and accounting activities (potentially automatable) are around 40 percent in the countries of the region. This value is higher in OECD countries. The gap is significantly higher in tasks involving cost calculation or sale making. Although, as shall be seen below, here we can also see some significant differences between employed and self-employed workers with a higher role in these type of tasks in the second group.

Finally, the occurrence of manual tasks is slightly higher in the average of the countries of the region (45 percent) than the average in OECD countries (41 percent). Mexico and Peru, in turn, register the highest values in this type of activities. However, it is interesting to distinguish between activities related to caregiving services from the rest of manual tasks. The first subgroup of tasks represents around 40 percent in the countries of the region, while reaching 44 percent in OECD countries. In contrast, manual tasks in other occupations represent higher percentages (between 42 percent and 50 percent). In average, around 40 percent of employed workers in higher income countries carry out manual tasks outside of service activities. As previously mentioned, making this distinction is relevant because the

manual tasks associated with caregiving are those carried out by highly qualified health and education professionals, as well as medium and low qualified workers as nursing auxiliaries and caregiving individuals. Even when this second case does not require the high educational attainment, these tasks are expected to not be easily replaceable by “robots” as they involve a certain degree of flexibility, but also to human interaction with persons receiving care or treatment. In that regard, it is interesting to note that the occurrence of tasks linked to caregiving services in the countries of the region is lower than for manual tasks while the opposite happens for OECD countries.

Therefore, as seen in Figure 2.1, the significant distinctions between countries of the region and OECD countries are observed. The latter ones register a more intensive use of tasks mainly requiring CITs, than those associated with flexibility to organise work and tasks requiring specialised knowledge or involving problem solving.

► **Figure 2.1.** Intensity of use of different groups of tasks in total employment. Selected Latin American and OECD countries (in percentages)



Source: Own elaboration based on the PIAAC database.

The differences seen in the use of CITs account for the digital gap separating these country groups. The gap in the use access and qualifications needed for the application of CITs impact both negatively and with higher intensity over the opportunities of the most vulnerable groups and imply more difficulties for the reduction of productive costs from the perspective of companies and increased barriers for the access to employment from the perspective of workers. In Latin American countries, less households have access to internet and a lower proportion of persons have abilities to use CITs in daily life. According to OECD (2020), among the 25.2 percent of adult persons in Chile and 43.6 percent in Peru have very low or null experience in the use of computers. The share of people with problem-solving skills in digital environments and average or strong use of computers is also significantly lower than in more developed countries: while in OECD countries it is 29.7 per cent on average, in Ecuador is only 5.2 percent; in Peru, 6.6 percent; in Mexico, 10.2 percent; and in Chile 14.6 percent. As noted, the use of such skills in a working life context allows for greater complementarity with digital technology.

2.3 Different composition of tasks between groups of workers

In addition to the assessment of the composition of tasks in total employment, and their digital complementarity or substitution, a growing concern refers to the different impacts that new technologies have on different groups of workers. This becomes even more important in a region such as Latin America and the Caribbean, with labour gaps and particularly high rates of inequality in labour markets.

■ ■ A growing concern refers to the different impacts that new technologies have on different groups of workers. This becomes even more important in a region such as Latin America and the Caribbean, with labour gaps and particularly high rates of inequality in labour markets.

For this reason, the composition of tasks in the occupations carried out by employees vis-à-vis self-employed; women vis-à-vis men; and adults vis-à-vis young people is analysed below.

As shown in Table 2.2, among self-employed workers, the tasks associated with greater flexibility in work organization have greater weight, as workers have control over how the production process is carried out. This is evident both in the region and in OECD countries. The literature on trends towards automation of tasks is usually focused on countries with higher incomes, which also present higher rates of employees. However, this situation could have different impacts on own-account workers, who are the majority of the self-employed in the region. On one hand, one may think that they would find it more difficult to access new technologies as a result of their reduced capacity for accumulation and physical capital. On the other hand, however, the generalised dissemination of the automation of certain processes could actually reduce work opportunities.

Self-employed workers also perform more tasks that could be considered routine cognitive, linked to costing, sales, etc. They also perform a higher share of manual tasks, especially those outside care-related occupations.

On the other hand, non-employees use fewer ICTs (resulting in a very high gap with employees) and apply less specialized knowledge and problem-solving skills in their work.

► **Table 2.2.** Different types of tasks performed by employees and non-employees.
Selected Latin American and OECD countries (in percentages)

		Chile		Ecuador		Mexico		Peru		Average 4 LAC countries		OECD	
		Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners
ICTs	use spreadsheets	8.4	22.6	8.1	20.1	4.4	17.1	3.9	16.5	6.2	19.1	15.0	23.5
	use word processors	11.3	22.8	10.2	23.4	5.2	18.0	5.6	20.0	8.1	21.1	20.1	29.2
	read letters, email or memos	25.4	39.2	18.8	32.2	18.4	34.1	10.5	27.0	18.3	33.1	47.3	53.2
	write letters, email or memos	20.7	34.6	11.7	22.7	17.0	33.6	8.0	22.6	14.4	28.4	36.0	45.8
	medium/advanced computer skills required	2.4	3.2	3.0	4.3	2.0	3.2	1.5	5.1	2.2	3.9	5.7	5.0
Direction and communications	Average	13.6	24.5	10.4	20.5	9.4	21.2	5.9	18.2	9.8	21.1	24.8	31.3
	negotiate	51.0	33.4	52.3	27.9	54.2	33.1	51.2	31.8	52.2	31.5	50.9	38.1
	plan other's activities	25.7	28.4	28.2	25.9	21.4	24.1	16.6	20.5	23.0	24.7	38.5	31.3
	teach or train	34.8	46.5	27.9	40.0	21.6	34.0	24.5	38.8	27.2	39.8	28.4	34.0
	give presentations	14.7	18.2	13.5	23.7	15.1	17.9	11.7	20.5	13.7	20.1	11.9	14.2
	Average	31.5	31.6	30.5	29.4	28.0	27.2	26.0	27.9	29.0	29.0	32.4	29.4
► Continues...													

► Continues...

	Chile		Ecuador		Mexico		Peru		Average 4 LAC countries		OECD		
	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	Non-wage earners	Wage earners	
Organise their work	change order of tasks	49.7	32.8	51.4	35.6	58.5	34.1	23.3	16.8	45.7	29.8	69.4	44.9
	change the way tasks are carried out	50.8	38.1	55.3	45.3	67.1	45.9	28.6	22.3	50.4	37.9	69.4	46.3
	change working speed	54.4	44.3	58.3	49.6	66.4	50.6	37.2	31.7	54.1	44.0	66.3	46.6
	Average	51.6	38.4	55.0	43.5	64.0	43.5	29.7	23.6	50.1	37.3	68.3	45.9
Specialized knowledge and problem solving	create tables and figures	12.2	15.4	11.4	20.0	10.6	19.1	7.8	17.0	10.5	17.9	13.9	19.1
	use simple algebra	18.8	22.0	7.8	14.2	17.1	21.9	13.0	19.3	14.2	19.3	25.8	28.5
	use complex algebra	5.5	5.0	6.1	8.3	4.1	7.5	3.2	5.6	4.7	6.6	4.5	5.5
	solve complex problems	52.8	53.6	42.0	43.5	41.4	45.4	36.7	46.4	43.2	47.2	58.2	57.3
Marketing and accounting	Average	22.3	24.0	16.8	21.5	18.3	23.5	15.2	22.1	18.1	22.8	25.6	27.6
	read or issue invoices	33.2	27.4	29.8	22.9	22.2	26.4	19.7	21.0	26.2	24.4	52.6	27.6
	calculate costs	60.8	35.5	63.5	34.5	66.8	41.1	56.1	33.5	61.8	36.2	57.9	30.9
	use calculators	55.3	48.5	43.1	41.1	46.3	44.8	34.0	40.7	44.7	43.8	63.4	55.0
Manual	make sales	53.2	26.3	60.4	30.2	64.1	33.3	60.6	32.7	59.5	30.6	50.2	24.9
	Average	50.6	34.4	49.2	32.2	49.8	36.4	42.6	32.0	48.1	33.7	56.0	34.6
	care giving occupations	35.0	40.3	42.8	39.0	44.1	41.6	41.3	37.4	40.8	39.6	41.8	44.8
	Other occupations	44.4	40.5	47.1	46.9	51.6	49.5	54.7	43.2	49.4	45.0	43.3	39.1
	Average	42.1	40.5	45.5	44.8	49.3	48.0	50.7	41.8	46.9	43.7	43.0	40.3

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

Therefore, it can be inferred from the incidence of the type of tasks performed by non-employees that they face greater difficulties in adopting and complementing themselves with technology in relation to the average of employees. In turn, considering the important weight of the first group of employed in the region, this situation significantly affects the overall results in terms of employment. Moreover, the gap between the two groups of workers in terms of ICTs use, skills and problem-solving is higher in the region than in the OECD average. This may reflect not only the significantly higher level of non-employment in the region, but also the fact that its internal composition, more skewed towards non-professional self-employment, differs markedly from that observed in countries with higher levels of development.

Another dimension of great importance in this difference is gender. Women are disadvantaged in different dimensions of the labour market as a result of multiple reasons. Additionally, as previously analysed in detail, women were more vulnerable to the impacts of the pandemic, thus accentuating gender labour gaps in the region.

Based on the analysis of technological change and digital transformation, it was not surprising that the impact of automation varied between men and women. The differences may be mainly attributable, among other factors, to differences in the types of occupations they carry out, the tasks they perform in each occupation and the type of employment that men and women have.

Some results for OECD countries show that women perform more of the tasks that have a higher risk of being automated than men, but also show differences between countries (Brussevich et al., 2018). Egana del-Sol et al. (2021) find for Latin America that the likelihood of being displaced by technology is higher in women than men. In particular, they show that men tend to be more involved in management and ICTs tasks and mathematical skills. If the risk of automation is lower for workers performing managerial tasks, the greater risk faced by women is partially associated with the widely documented greater difficulties they face in accessing positions in which such tasks are performed.

In turn, women tend to be employed in industries with a high average risk of automation (food & beverage, service activities and retail trade) (OECD, 2017). However, Brussevich et al. (2018) find that women perform more of the tasks that have a higher risk of being automated across all sectors and occupations. Likewise, they identify that women with lower levels of education, those aged 40 and older, and those employed in low-skilled occupations are expected to be more affected by automation.

Table 2.3 show differences between countries and dimensions. In relation to the average use of ICTs, the gap in favour of men is clearly observed in Chile, while Peru does not show significant differences between the two sexes. In Ecuador and Mexico, there is a greater use of these technologies among women. However, when analysed in detail, the tasks performed by men require the use of medium or high level computing more intensively than women.

According to ECLAC (2020), employment in the ICTs sector in Latin America is very low and even more so for women. While it accounts for approximately 1.6 per cent of female employment, about 0.9 per cent of female employment.

► **Table 2.3. Different types of tasks by gender. Selected Latin American countries (in percentages)**

		Chile		Ecuador		Mexico		Peru		Average 4 LAC countries	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
ICTs	use spreadsheets	20.5	15.4	13.7	16.8	12.2	14.1	10.3	9.9	14.1	14.1
	use word processors	18.3	20.5	15.2	21.6	12.3	16.2	12.1	13.5	14.5	17.9
	read letters, email or memos	37.1	32.3	25.2	28.3	27.5	31.2	18.9	18.2	27.2	27.5
	write letters, email or memos	31.7	28.5	16.8	19.7	26.2	31.2	15.2	15.3	22.5	23.7
	medium/advanced computer skills required	3.8	1.8	3.7	3.9	3.3	2.0	2.8	1.1	3.4	2.2
Direction and communications	Average	22.3	19.7	14.9	18.0	16.3	18.9	11.9	11.6	16.3	17.1
	negotiate	38.5	39.2	37.5	39.7	40.1	39.9	39.0	45.0	38.8	41.0
	plan other's activities	29.5	25.1	27.9	25.4	24.2	21.6	19.7	17.0	25.3	22.3
	teach or train	49.4	34.6	35.7	33.5	32.2	26.4	33.5	28.9	37.7	30.8
	give presentations	18.8	15.0	18.6	20.4	15.4	14.6	17.1	14.7	17.5	16.2
Organise their work	Average	34.1	28.5	29.9	29.7	28.0	25.6	27.3	26.4	29.8	27.6
	change order of tasks	35.3	41.5	41.0	44.5	41.2	43.5	19.0	21.6	34.1	37.8
	change the way tasks are carried out	39.7	44.9	48.3	51.6	50.8	56.0	24.3	27.2	40.8	44.9
	change working speed	44.7	51.0	54.0	52.4	53.0	60.1	34.1	35.1	46.4	49.6
	change the amount of hours worked	21.6	29.9	34.7	37.1	32.2	33.6	21.5	21.5	27.5	30.5
	Average	35.3	41.8	44.5	46.4	44.3	48.3	24.7	26.3	37.2	40.7

► Continues...

	Chile		Ecuador		Mexico		Peru		Average 4 LAC countries	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Specialized knowledge and problem solving	16.6	11.5	16.0	16.8	16.6	15.8	12.5	12.2	15.5	14.0
	24.4	16.7	11.2	11.7	20.6	19.9	17.4	14.4	18.4	15.7
	7.1	2.7	8.5	5.6	6.3	6.5	4.9	3.6	6.7	4.6
	57.2	48.4	43.9	41.2	46.6	40.3	44.9	37.0	48.1	41.7
Average	26.3	19.8	19.9	18.8	22.5	20.6	19.9	16.8	22.2	19.0
Marketing and accounting	29.9	28.3	24.7	27.6	25.6	24.1	19.5	21.4	24.9	25.3
	42.5	44.5	46.3	47.9	47.9	52.1	42.0	48.8	44.7	48.3
	48.4	53.3	38.7	46.8	42.2	50.2	37.3	37.3	41.6	46.9
	30.4	39.9	40.3	47.5	39.7	49.0	42.4	52.8	38.2	47.3
Average	37.8	41.5	37.5	42.5	38.8	43.8	35.3	40.1	37.4	42.0
Manual	35.3	39.9	46.1	37.7	51.1	37.1	41.4	38.7	43.5	38.3
	46.6	33.7	50.3	39.4	56.5	37.2	53.5	39.2	51.7	37.4
	45.3	35.6	49.5	38.6	55.6	37.2	51.7	38.9	50.5	37.6

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

Moreover, men outperform women in management and communication tasks. The gap is larger in Chile. Within this group of activities, the most significant differences appear in tasks linked to planning activities of others or training third parties. The higher intensity of men in these activities may be linked to the higher share of men in management positions. As shown in Figure 2.2, in the four countries analysed, men account for more than two thirds of these types of occupations.

► **Figure 2.2.** Composition of occupations by gender (ISCO, 2 digits).
Selected Latin American countries



Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

In addition, the incidence of tasks linked to the use of specialized knowledge is higher in male than women. This is verified in all components of the group, wherein the highest gap is present in complex problem-solving and mathematical skills.

On the other hand, however, women are more involved in marketing tasks, especially those linked to sales and/or those where the use of calculators or other calculation tools is required. As previously stated, these non-manual tasks are expected to be substituted by technology than to complement it.

Finally, only in activities where workers have to organize the work process, women have a greater incidence than men. For their part, men tend to perform more manual tasks.

Thus, overall, women appear to perform tasks with routine content to a greater extent than men. The next section provides more information about this dimension.

Finally, given the concern about the future of work in the context of digital transformation, it is also important to consider the differences between workers by age group. For this, the percentages of workers performing the different tasks are shown together for the four countries analysed, but are disaggregated by workers up to 25 years and workers 26 years and older.

As shown in Table 2.4, younger workers use fewer ICTs in their jobs and perform comparatively fewer tasks associated with management and communication, although the differences are not very significant. The gaps, on the other hand, increase in relation to autonomy in the performance of their tasks: workers up to the age of 25 are less likely to make decisions about how to carry out their work compared to older workers. This could be associated, at least in part, with a higher incidence of self-employment, which is higher among adults than among young people.

► **Table 2.4.** Different types of tasks by age group. Average of selected Latin American countries (in percentages)

		Total	Age	
			16-25 years old	26-65 years old
ICTs	use spreadsheets	13.1	12.2	13.4
	use word processors	14.5	12.4	15.1
	read letters, email or memos	27.5	24.9	28.1
	write letters, email or memos	25.1	22.1	26.0
	medium/advanced computer skills required	2.8	2.7	2.8
	Average	16.6	14.8	17.1
Direction and communications	negotiate	40.1	37.3	40.8
	plan other's activities	23.1	20.5	23.8
	teach or train	32.0	31.8	32.1
	give presentations	15.8	14.0	16.3
	Average	25.5	23.7	26.0
Organise their work	change order of tasks	37.5	31.9	39.0
	change the way tasks are carried out	46.3	40.2	47.9
	change working speed	50.7	48.3	51.3
	change the amount of hours worked	30.1	24.6	31.5
	Average	38.0	33.7	39.1
Specialized knowledge and problem solving	create tables and figures	15.3	14.5	15.6
	use simple algebra	18.9	19.5	18.7
	use complex algebra	5.9	7.0	5.7
	solve complex problems	44.5	43.5	44.8
	Average	24.5	23.6	24.8

► Continues...

		Total	Age	
			16-25 years old	26-65 years old
Marketing and accounting	read or issue invoices	24.6	28.8	23.5
	calculate costs	47.8	49.7	47.3
	use calculators	44.1	45.4	43.7
	make sales	43.1	46.8	42.0
	Average	36.8	38.9	36.3
Manual	care giving occupations	41.5	37.7	42.5
	Other occupations	48.7	44.4	49.9
	Average	46.9	42.7	48.1

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

Young people also appear to show a lower composition of complex problem-solving tasks, although this seems to be offset by a greater use of algebra. Finally, the incidence of marketing and accounting tasks is higher among young people while the opposite happens with care services.

The only type of task that appears most likely to be substituted by technology and has the lowest incidence among young people is manual outside the care sector.

Thus, in the aggregate, while in some type of tasks the differences between the two groups did not tend to be very high, young people in the region seem to be at a disadvantage compared to adults in terms of the potential automation of their most frequent tasks.

As noted in ILO (2020), while the generational digital gap may seem to put young people in an advantageous position in terms of their ability to adapt to the demands of digital skills by the labour market, which increasingly incorporates the intensive use of ICTs, employment outcomes do not necessarily confirm this situation. Moreover, the pandemic highlighted the digital gap existing between regions, countries, and, within countries, between young people with different educational, qualification and socio-economic levels, as well as between residents in different areas. By way of example, the risk of automation is higher in jobs performed by young people who have received vocational training than in those performed by young people who have completed university studies. Likewise, occupations that employ the largest number of young people, *i.e.* sectors with little dynamics and low productivity, are among the ones with the greatest risk of automation.

For this reason, as digital skills are increasingly demanded by the labour market, vocational training becomes essential to reduce the digital and skills gap among young people, as well as to ensure their employability and access to decent jobs. The last section of the special topic details a set of recommendations to advance this path in the region.

2.4 Routine-tasks intensity and occupations in Latin America, and their correlation to labour income


In order to have a summary indicator of tasks contents in each occupation, Figure 2.3 presents a scale of tasks for each country (considering the international classifier of occupations proposed by the ILO 2-digit ISCO) in an increasing form according to the routine index. The higher the index value, the higher the content of routine tasks vis-à-vis non-routine occupations. Box 1 details the construction of the indicator used.

First, the value of this indicator shows a very important variability through occupations in the four countries considered (Table A.1.1 of Annex 1 presents the list of values of this index). In Chile, the range fluctuates from -1.2 to 3; in Ecuador from -3.3 to 2.5; in Mexico from -0.9 to 3.1; and in Peru from -1.8 to 3.3.

Likewise, results appear to be as expected. Managerial occupations, scientific professionals and education workers show the lowest rate of routine. That is, they are qualified cognitive occupations that, on average, require tasks with a higher degree of flexibility.

In between the range of this distribution indicator are administrative occupations and industrial workers. Finally, among the occupations with a high content of routine are trade activities, low-qualification agricultural activities, construction and those of extractive industries. Most of these jobs are manual and require low human capital.

► **Figure 2.3.** Average routine index of occupations by country




Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

However, beyond this general picture, differences in the scale between countries are observed, which reflects the differences in the type of tasks that make up the occupations and, therefore, highlights the importance of having specific information for each country under analysis.

As mentioned, one of the concerns arising in the context of digital transformation is the different impacts that this process may have between workers with dissimilar characteristics and located in different ends of the wage distribution. To analyse this aspect, Figure 2.4 presents the correlation between the routine indicator, and each of its components, to the average labour income of each occupation.






In the three countries with available income information (Chile, Ecuador and Mexico), there is a clear negative correlation between the performance of routine tasks and the average income of each occupation. In other words, occupations with the highest content of routine tasks are those earning, on average, the lowest labour income. On the contrary, occupations in the higher end of the higher income distribution exhibit the highest content of flexible tasks, most likely to be complemented by technology.

► Figure 2.4. Average job task routine by average labour income




► Continues...

Ecuador



► Continues...




Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

When analysed in greater detail, each group of tasks within this indicator shows in all countries that the importance of non-routine tasks (both analytical and interpersonal cognitive) grows as the average income of occupations increases. Similar behaviour is observed among occupations with higher content of routine cognitive tasks (except in Mexico).

On the contrary, manual activities (mostly of a routine nature) exhibit an inverse behaviour in comparison with the average income level of the occupation. Within this type of activity, just under a quarter of people are engaged in care-related occupations. In other words, most workers are engaged in other types of routine manual activities that have a greater presence at lower income levels.

Another dimension of great importance in the region's labour markets is labour informality. Given the correlation to income, a similar picture to the one just mentioned can be observed. In particular, as the percentage of informal workers in an occupation increases, so does the degree of routine in the tasks carried out in each of them. In Ecuador and Peru, the positive correlation is stronger than in the other two countries (Figure 2.5).

► **Figure 2.5.** Average job task routine by incidence of labour informality

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data and household surveys.

Note: in Chile, labour informality was considered only among employees.

Therefore, the more unstable nature of informal positions is compounded by the higher exposure to substitution by technology in occupations where informality is higher. The greatest difficulties in accessing vocational training in the workplace and accumulating specific human capital are in turn exacerbated in this context. In addition, the intensification of labour transits associated with the increasingly changing nature of work may imply greater income instability for informal workers and, in particular, a lack of social protection.

In regards of the above-mentioned composition of tasks in female employment in relation to male employment, it is interesting to analyse to what extent this results in significant differences in the indicator of routine content between both groups of workers. For this, Table 2.5 presents the results of econometric estimates where the correlation of different variables, in particular gender, is measured with the value of the RTI. For each country, two specifications are presented, both with and without taking into account the type of occupation. A positive sign in the variable “woman” indicates that female employment correlates positively with a higher routine content of tasks.

► **Table 2.5.** Correlation between the indicator of routine tasks and gender.
Selected Latin American countries

VARIABLES	Chile		Ecuador		Mexico		Peru	
	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 1	Regression 2	Regression 1	Regression 2
Women	0.336***	0.349***	0.131***	0.177***	-0.00655	0.0212	0.0785**	0.150***
	(0.0463)	(0.0448)	(0.0503)	(0.0488)	(0.0444)	(0.0432)	(0.0368)	(0.0358)
Years of education	-0.157***	-0.0844***	-0.111***	-0.0647***	-0.134***	-0.0883***	-0.113***	-0.0758***
	(0.00685)	(0.00816)	(0.00711)	(0.00766)	(0.00567)	(0.00633)	(0.00414)	(0.00446)

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regression 1: controlled by age and area of activity.

Regression 2: controlled by age, area of activity and occupation.

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data and household surveys

As shown, in all countries (except Mexico) women spend more time on routine tasks than men. One aspect that is particularly important is whether this result is linked to the occupations in which each of them develops or whether, additionally or alternatively, it is explained by a different composition of activities within each occupation.

In order to identify which of these situations prevails in these countries for each of them, the results of two different specifications are shown in Table 2.4: the first without the occupation; the second one including said variable. In Chile, Ecuador and Peru the second shows a stronger correlation between being a woman and developing more routine tasks. This indicates that the greater routine in total female employment is not only due to a different composition of occupations, but to the ease of codifying most of the activities performed by women within such occupations.

There is also a significant and negative correlation between the routine content and the educational level: as expected, the higher the level of qualification, the lower the content of tasks with a greater chance of being codified and, therefore, of being replaced by technology.

Finally, according to IMF data (2021) for a group of developed and developing countries, job loss caused by the pandemic occurred mainly in more automation-exposed sectors, and reduced the participation of low-skilled jobs. There is still insufficient data to confirm or reject the hypothesis of greater permanent automation of production processes, beyond the growth of e-commerce, teleworking, platform work. However, for example, although teleworking was not an option for informal employees, it increased strongly in the higher income segments, as will be shown in detail in the next section.

Therefore, these data shape a complex landscape in the region where trends in digital transformation and automation could not only be affecting, and increasingly so in the future, a significant group of workers, but could also have negative effects for informal workers and those in the lower end of the distribution.

However, as previously stated, the way at which technological acceleration may happen and the impacts on employment volume, as well as its characteristics are influenced by an important set of factors that can reduce adverse impacts while enhancing the role of technology to improve productivity and the creation of more decent jobs in the region.

2.5 Final comments

In recent decades, the adoption of new technologies accelerated as the gaps between countries widened, deepening differences between central and peripheral countries. Technological changes do not only have an impact on jobs, wages and earnings, but also affect income distribution.

Studies aimed at predicting the impact of new technologies are often based on the potential substitution of work for capital in certain types of tasks and occupations, given the technological feasibility. The more optimistic stance suggests that adopting new technologies will increase efficiency and this will result in falls in consumer goods prices, causing an increase in demand. In turn, the technological transformation

►► In recent decades, the adoption of new technologies accelerated as the gaps between countries widened, deepening differences between central and peripheral countries. Technological changes do not only have an impact on jobs, wages and earnings, but also affect income distribution.

would in itself imply an increase in the demand for investment. Labour costs per unit of product would also be reduced by higher levels of efficiency. This would result in a full compensation for job losses caused by the displacement of labour by technology, as there would be an increased demand for labour (due to the increased consumption and investment), and a lower relative labour cost. Such compensation would be more or less automatic. The “scale effect” would compensate for the “substitution effect”. In a more pessimistic stance, on the other hand, a situation where the second impact prevails would strongly reduce the aggregate demand for employment thus exacerbating inequality levels.

These two perspectives often have in common the underlying idea that there is little space left for the implementation of policies that facilitate the transformation of production and work organization, that mitigate the negative aspects of the incorporation of new technologies and that, at the same time, enhance positive effects. A third perspective would then recognize not only the importance of the institutional framework in which technological change occurs, but also the importance of the macroeconomic, social, and political context in determining the pace of adoption of new technologies and their impacts on the labour market.

To understand the impact of the adoption of new technologies, it is necessary to consider the specific nature of the region. Factors that influence this transformation, in addition to the technological feasibility itself (taking into account the technological lag that characterizes the region), include productivity gains associated with technological change, the cost of technology (which includes acquisition and adjustment as well as implementation costs, maintenance costs), relative prices, labour cost, cultural factors, expectations about economic growth and labour demand, among others. Some of these factors can contribute to increasing substitution while others can slow it down, so the result will depend on the particular configuration of each economy and each productive sector in these aspects (Weller, 2002; Bensusán et al., 2017).

It is clear, therefore, that public policies play a prominent role in shaping the pace and form of technological advances and their impacts on the labour market, labour relations, income and inequality. As mentioned in the previous section, in addition to macroeconomic policies promoting both a path of growth with stability and an investment in technology, other policies such as those on improvements in infrastructure and investment that guarantee universal access to technological devices required in

It is clear, therefore, that public policies play a prominent role in shaping the pace and form of technological advances and their impacts on the labour market, labour relations, income and inequality.

the digital transformation, education and vocational training policies, those that facilitate the digital transformation in smaller companies, institutions and labour relations, and universal social protection policies become more important in this context. To this end, joint action by the states, workers and companies is required.

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Annex

► **Table A.1.1.** Routine index of tasks by occupation (ISCO-08)

ISCO-08 Code	Description	Chile	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru
11	Executive directors, public administration managers and members of the executive and legislative bodies	-0.253	0.160	0.346	-0.626
12	Administrator and marketing directors	-0.375	-0.161	-0.335	-0.502
13	Production and operation directors and managers	-0.391	-0.235	-0.640	-0.561
14	Managers of hotels, restaurants, businesses and other services	0.331	-0.673	-0.469	0.045
21	Science and engineering professionals	-0.825	0.074	-0.967	-0.917
22	Health professionals	0.140	0.019	-0.394	-0.509
23	Education professionals	-1.186	-0.335	-0.969	-1.012
24	Specialists in public and business administration organization	-0.647	-0.302	-0.860	-0.588
25	Information technology and communications professionals	-0.962	-1.069	-0.901	-1.834
26	Law, social sciences and cultural sciences professionals	-0.762	-0.545	-0.702	-0.739
31	Medium level science and engineering professionals	-0.865	0.233	-0.089	-0.477
32	Medium level health professionals	0.131	0.340	-0.116	-0.353
33	Medium level financial and administrative operation professionals	-0.339	-0.076	0.017	-0.344
34	Medium level professionals in legal, social, cultural and associated services	0.250	0.410	0.122	-0.343

► Continues...

ISCO-08 Code	Description	Chile	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru
35	Information technology and communications technicians	-0.223	-0.162	-0.773	-0.629
41	Office workers	-0.336	0.371	-0.557	-0.527
42	Employees with direct consumer contact	-0.066	0.027	0.224	-0.171
43	Accounting employees and material registry officers	0.002	0.086	-0.009	-0.399
44	Other administrative support staff	-0.280	0.339	0.756	-0.435
51	Personal service workers	0.603	1.102	0.753	0.731
52	Retailers	0.646	0.824	0.744	0.580
53	Personal service workers	0.341	2.240	0.362	0.109
54	Protection service workers	0.080	0.904	0.280	-0.120
61	Farmers and qualified workers in farming exports for the market	1.595	1.677	1.592	1.256
62	Qualified forestry workers, fishermen and hunters	1.412	1.465	1.030	0.874
63	Farming, fishing, hunting and foraging workers	3.068	1.735	1.914	3.318
71	Construction officers and operators excluding electricians	0.621	1.091	0.952	0.455
72	Metallurgy mechanical construction and related work officers and operators	0.205	1.003	0.790	0.564
73	Graphic arts artisans and operators	0.439	1.031	0.655	0.614
74	Specialized electricity and electrotechnology workers	0.333	0.582	0.489	0.706
75	Food processing, confection, woodworking and other artisans and related work operators and officials	1.247	1.539	0.951	0.681
81	Fixed installation and machinery operators	0.715	1.215	0.860	0.459
82	Assemblers	1.082	-3.260	0.941	-
83	Vehicle drivers and heavy mobile equipment operators	1.146	1.647	0.968	0.669
91	Cleaners and assistants	2.183	2.544	1.789	1.436
92	Farm, fishing and forestry workers	0.982	1.608	3.148	1.326
93	Mining, construction, manufacturing industry and transportation labourers	1.267	2.354	1.149	0.998
94	Food preparation assistants	0.996	1.720	0.985	0.998
95	Street vendors of services or related services	1.386	1.288	0.855	0.759
96	Waste collectors and other elementary occupations	1.382	1.458	1.673	0.896

Source: ILO, based on PIAAC data.

► **Box 1. Identification of tasks and construction of a routine indicator of occupations in Latin America**

Data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), promoted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was used to analyse the composition of tasks performed in the different occupations in the region. The survey was designed to assess cognitive skills necessary for work, with the aim of providing information for the design of educational and labour policies. Databases contain information on numeracy and literacy; reading comprehension and problem-solving skills and technology-rich environments. Likewise, the survey provides information about the occupations in which workers (people between 16 and 65 years old)⁴¹ work and the type of tasks they perform, as well as the use of technologies and tools required to carry out their work.

This source of information covers 32 OECD member countries and some additional countries. One of its advantages is that it provides country-specific information. However, this is not a periodic survey, but provides timely information: a first round of surveys was carried out between 2011 and 2012, a second round between 2014 and 2015 and a third in 2017. In Latin America, Chile (2014), Ecuador, Mexico and Peru (2017) present available information.

From this source of information, progress has been made in building indicators comparable to those resulting from other widely used global source of information, O*NET.⁴² Author, Levy and Murnane (2003), and previously Acemoglu (1999), among others, relied on this source to classify tasks according to their cognitive or manual, routine or non-routine nature. Subsequently, other authors (Hardy et al., 2018; De la Rica et al., 2020) have used a similar classification using the information available in PIAAC and STEP⁴³. They have then validated their results with data from O*NET.

Following this literature, but based on the information available in PIAAC for the region's countries, the following four broad categories of tasks were considered in this report, as detailed below:

Scope	Tasks	Frequency
Non-Routine - Analytic cognitive (nranalytic)	use spreadsheets	every day
	use word processors	every day
	write letters, email or memos	every day
	create tables and figures	at least once a week
	use simple algebra	at least once a week
	use complex algebra	at least once a week
Non-Routine - Personal cognitive (nrpersonal)	negotiate	at least once a week
	plan other's activities	at least once a week
	teach or train	at least once a week
	give presentations	at least once a week

► **Continues...**

41 For Chile, the survey included people aged 15 years and over.

42 O*NET (Occupational Information Network) is the most detailed source of information on characteristics of occupations, referring to the United States. It collects information on occupational demand and is organized in a database that is updated annually, consolidating information contained in 400 variables about more than 1000 occupations defined according to the official classifier of said country.

43 STEP refers to the World Bank's "Skills Measurement Program" data source that also relays country-specific data.

Scope	Tasks	Frequency
Routine cognitive (rcog)	read or issue invoices	at least once a week
	calculate costs	at least once a week
	make sales	at least once a week
Manual	physical work	every day

The relative content index of routine tasks was created at the occupation level by adding individual responses on the frequency with which they perform each of them. For each category, the sum of the averages of each task indicator at the occupation level, normalized so that they have a mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1, was used per country.

Then, from their logarithms, the routine index was calculated following the previous literature (Author and Dorn 2013; Goos et al. 2014, Lewandowski et al., 2019) so that the indicator will be lower, the greater the weight of non-routine tasks in relation to routine or manual tasks and the greater the weight of routine or manual tasks compared to non-routine ones. In particular, the Routine Index (IRT) by occupation was calculated as:

$$IRT = \ln((\text{manual} + \text{cogr})/2) - \ln((\text{cognr} + \text{personalnr})/2)$$

Where

manual = manual tasks

cogr = routine cognitive tasks

cognr = non-routine cognitive tasks

personalnr = non-routine non-manual tasks that require personal interaction

From a technological point of view, aspects such as connectivity and cybersecurity acquired great importance in the spread of this work arrangement. These advances can be an important asset in terms of digitization in the region.

► 3. Digital acceleration and teleworking in Latin America

3.1 Promoting an arrangement of work in response to the health crisis

As mentioned in Section I of the special topic, the lockdown measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic created the need to quickly adapt the organization of the production and work process, which led to significant increases in work performed from home. Undoubtedly, teleworking allowed a group of enterprises to continue with their operations and certain workers to maintain their employment relationship. This, in turn, prevented an even greater impact of the crisis on labour indicators in the region. The transition from face-to-face work to remote work, however, was not without challenges for enterprises and workers, who had to quickly implement this work arrangement.

From a technological point of view, aspects such as connectivity and cybersecurity acquired great importance in the spread of this work arrangement. These advances can be an important asset in terms of digitization in the region.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the trend in work from home since 2019 for a group of countries in the region, both for total employed workers and for employees.⁴⁴ Only workers who reported having been effectively employed in an activity during the reference period are included here, thus excluding employees who were absent from their jobs.

As the figure shows, the percentage of employed people working from home has risen sharply since the outbreak of the pandemic in the region. This trend was even more pronounced among employees.

In particular, the incidence of this arrangement of work in 2019 was between 5 per cent and 8 per cent among all workers. Among employees, it was even lower, below 3 per cent. In fact, prior to the pandemic, 80 per cent or more of the total employed people performing work from their homes were self-employed.


This situation changed radically in the context of lockdown measures implemented in the world and in the region. For example, in the second/third quarter of 2020 in Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica approximately 20/25 per cent of employees were working from home. Given that, as mentioned, dependent workers accounted for the largest share of this increase, the incidence gap of this work arrangement with respect to self-employed workers declined sharply.

In Costa Rica, both working from home and, specifically, teleworking are identified (see Annex 1). As Figure 1 shows, both show a similar evolution trend. Likewise, as expected, teleworking explained the

44 Annex 1 details the different ways of detecting these phenomena in the countries analysed. For a comprehensive analysis of the definition of teleworking, telework, work from home and home-based work, see ILO (2021a).

increase in work from home. In fact, during the first half of 2020, the increase in teleworking was, in absolute values, greater than the increase in work from home, indicating that other forms of work from home decreased during that period. In the second quarter of 2020, telework accounted for 74 per cent of the total work from home. Additionally, this type of work is observed almost exclusively among employees. In 2020, dependent workers represented around 95 per cent of total teleworkers in that country.

► **Figure 3.1.** Trends in work from home and teleworking.
Selected countries in Latin America. 2019-2021



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

As detailed in Annex 1, Brazil has information from the Continuous PNAD Survey (PNADC) and the PNAD COVID Survey. The latter was implemented between May and November 2020. The picture that emerges from these two sources with respect to working from home offers a sharp contrast. While the proportion of homeworkers surveyed in the first survey remained relatively constant throughout the year, at around 5/7 per cent for all employed persons, the incidence of this phenomenon in the second survey is much higher, at around 13 per cent in the second quarter of 2020, and is even higher, at 16 per cent,

among employees. Furthermore, unlike the first source, the PNAD COVID found that the percentage of employees working remotely exceeds that recorded among other non-employees. The difference between the results is explained by the fact that while the Continuous PNAD inquiries about the location where tasks are *usually* performed, PNAD COVID asked if the person was (*effectively*) working remotely during the week before the survey.

In Uruguay, the scenario is also different in response to the selected question of the Continuous Household Survey selected (see Annex 1). As expected, the share of employees who usually telework remained constant at around 4/6 per cent. In contrast, workers who *effectively* teleworked during the week prior to the interview in April 2020 accounted for about 20 per cent of the total of those who had worked for at least one hour during that week. Among employees, the figure was 23 per cent.

As in Brazil, in Uruguay, the incidence of work from home during 2020 was higher among employees than among self-employed workers. This may be associated with the fact that the teleworking arrangement is directly addressed rather than other modalities of work from home (more common among non-employees) that do not involve the use of technologies. In fact, that is the case of Costa Rica regarding teleworking.

In Peru, for its part, the 2020 ENAHO (National Household Survey) included the measurement of this arrangement, only for dependent workers (see Annex 1). In the second quarter of said year, about a third of them were teleworking.

In summary, in the countries of the region considered here, between 20 and 30 per cent of employees who were currently working did so from their homes during the first half of 2020. About 23 million people teleworked in the region during that period.⁴⁵

After the maximum values recorded in the second and third quarters of 2020, a decreasing trend is observed, most likely associated with the partial relaxation of lockdown measures and, therefore, with increased possibilities for returning to face-to-face work.

However, in the second quarter of 2021 there was a rebound in the incidence of this arrangement⁴⁶, reflecting the new waves of contagion in the region and the measures taken to contain them. By mid-2021, the share of workers and, in particular, employees, working from home continued to be significantly higher than that observed in the months prior to the pandemic in the region.

Countries with available information for the third quarter of 2021 at the time of writing this report - Chile and Costa Rica - showed, however, a reduction in the incidence of this arrangement, again due to the relaxation of lockdown measures. This is strongly observed in the first country. In any case, especially in employees, the share of teleworking continued to be significantly higher than the values recorded prior to the outbreak of the pandemic in the region.

3.2 Different incidence of telework among workers

Before the pandemic, work from home was an arrangement strongly dominated by own-account employment. Much of this group did so on a permanent basis. The lockdown measures led to a significant influx of dependent workers in that group, significantly modifying the traditional attributes of this type of work. For this reason, the following analysis will focus exclusively on employees.

By educational level

The increase in work from home was mainly observed among the most highly educated workers. In fact, the incidence of this arrangement among employees who did not complete primary school remained relatively constant, with negligible values. The bias towards higher educational levels is observed even


45 These estimates take as a reference the data on the number of homeworkers presented in ILO (2021b) for the countries of the region included therein. Then a series of assumptions were made to obtain this data for the rest of the countries. Additionally, in countries with available information, different analyses of the composition and characteristics of people working remotely were carried out in order to estimate the incidence of this phenomenon at the regional level. It is therefore important to bear in mind that they are estimates based on a set of assumptions, and that, therefore, they may undergo modifications to the extent that new information is available.

46 In Uruguay, the increase was verified a few months earlier, in February 2021.


more clearly when telework is specifically studied. In the second and third quarters of 2020, between 40 and 60 per cent of dependent workers with university education were working from home (Figure 3.2).

The varying intensity of these flows also significantly modified the composition of work from home by educational level. While in 2019 between 20 and 50 per cent of all employees working from home had low educational levels, this percentage fell to less than 10 percent, and to even below 2 per cent in some cases, after the beginning of the pandemic. By contrast, employees with a university education accounted for the largest share of workers in this work arrangement during the pandemic. Since the beginning of the pandemic, between 60 and 80 per cent of work was performed by workers with a university education.

► **Figure 3.2.** Incidence of wage employment from home and teleworking by educational level. Selected countries in Latin America, 2019-2021*



► Continues...



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys

*HSI: up to incomplete high school

*SC/UI: complete high school / incomplete tertiary

*UC: full tertiary


This scenario somewhat reflects the greater impact of the crisis, both in terms of job losses and reduced work hours, on employees with less education. The results presented here demonstrate that among this group, the possibilities of continuing to work in their usual places of work or, alternatively, from home, were more limited than for other employees.

Several factors influence this result. On the one hand, the differential impact on sectors of the crisis and lockdown measures affected groups of workers differently, depending on their educational level. On the other, labour informality was more prevalent among less educated workers in a context where informal employment suffered the greatest negative impact of the crisis, especially during the first half of 2020. Additionally, the potential to continue activities from home was influenced by the tasks performed in each occupation, which also differ according to educational level. Finally, the possibility of working from home was conditional based on internet access and the digital devices needed.

By occupation

As mentioned, the type of occupation and the tasks carried are also key determinants of the ability to work remotely. As Figure 3.3 shows, professional, technical and managerial occupations recorded the sharpest increases in work from home. To a lesser extent, this increase is observed among administrative occupations. By contrast, other occupations – primary sector, operational, domestic service, construction – did not record changes, with a much lower incidence of this work arrangement among those professions.

► **Figure 3.3.** Share of employees who work from home and telework by occupation. Selected countries in Latin America. 2019–2021



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

While in 2019, up to a third of workers working from home in Argentina and Costa Rica, and half in Chile, worked in managerial, professional or technical occupations, in the second quarter of 2020, they accounted for between 70 and 80 per cent of this arrangement of work.

As expected, this trend increases among people who telework, as can be seen in the case of Costa Rica. Furthermore, when this dimension is combined with type of activity, workers in financial services, public administration and education, as well as professionals, technicians, managers and administrative personnel in all activities, accounted for almost all telework and about 70 per cent of the total work from home in the second quarter of 2021. This group of workers represented a similar share of work from home in Argentina.

Although in some countries the incidence of work from home increased among informal employees, the second quarter of 2020 presented that at least 80 per cent of this arrangement of work was carried out by formal employees.

Overall, these results are in line with those recorded worldwide. They confirm that the increase in working from home is mainly explained by occupations whose tasks are ICT-intensive, or with some demand, as previously analysed. On the contrary, as expected, in occupations of personal services, which require physical proximity, or that require machinery and/or equipment, this arrangement of work is less feasible.

By level of formality/informality


As previously analysed, informal workers were more vulnerable to the negative impacts of the crisis during the first half of 2020. The information presented in Figure 3.4 shows, to a certain extent, the other side of the teleworking situation. In particular, it shows that formal workers were more likely to continue their activities from home.

Although in some countries the incidence of work from home increased among informal employees, the second quarter of 2020 presented that at least 80 per cent of this arrangement of work was carried out by formal employees.

Different actors explain the work-from-home gap between formal and informal employees. On the one hand, the former group has greater structural job security which, in this unusual context, led to a greater likelihood of continuing to carry out work on the employer's premises or from home. As already mentioned, this was reinforced by policies to sustain the formal employment relationship implemented in some countries of the region.⁴⁷

On the other hand, the average educational level among formal workers is higher than among informal workers and, therefore, the tasks carried out by the former are usually more "teleworkable" than those carried out by the latter. As previously mentioned, workers with a university education who perform professional, technical and administrative tasks are more likely to continue working from home.

► **Figure 3.4.** Share of employees who work from home and telework, by level of formality/informality. Selected countries in Latin America. 2019-2021



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

47 For more information on the policies implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean, see ILO (2020a, 2020b) and ECLAC / ILO (2021).

In this regard, it is worth noting that the downward trend and the subsequent rebound of this arrangement in the second quarter of 2021 was mostly observed among formal workers. Moreover, given that this has not been an arrangement to which informal workers have been able to access intensely, the partial recovery of employment since mid-2020 led by this type of position has not changed the very low incidence of this arrangement in this group of workers.

As shown above, the most frequent transitions that informal workers have experienced since the beginning of the pandemic have been, initially, from these occupations to outside the labour force. Subsequently, the direction of these flows was reversed, as these workers returned to perform tasks in person.

By gender

Gender is another key dimension in the analysis of the incidence and characteristics of working from home. A potential benefit of this arrangement of work, especially for women, is the flexible hours and the possibility of achieving a better work-life balance. However, at the same time, if working hours are not respected, there is a risk of task overload and excessive hours of paid and unpaid work. This situation may have been aggravated by the closure of schools and care facilities when lockdown measures were in effect.


Additionally, remote work may expand the range of employment opportunities and occupations for women, not only because of greater flexibility but also because it allows them to accept jobs that, due to the distance from their homes, would not be possible to do in person.⁴⁸ However, isolation, limited interaction with other workers and the potential loss of a sense of belonging to the enterprise could imply setbacks in the advances made in women's increased participation and permanence in the labour market. At the same time, this work arrangement could accentuate discrimination against women and gender labour gaps. Finally, the greater confinement of women in their homes and the loss of personal contact through face-to-face work could intensify incidents of gender-based violence, especially domestic violence.

As shown in Figure 3.5, prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, the incidence of this arrangement was higher among women. In the context of the pandemic, there were increases in this work arrangement in both groups. Although rates vary by country, all recorded a higher incidence of work from home among women, in some cases accounting for a third of women employees. During this period, women represented more than half of employees who worked from home.

Gender is another key dimension in the analysis of the incidence and characteristics of working from home. A potential benefit of this arrangement of work, especially for women, is the flexible hours and the possibility of achieving a better work-life balance.

48 Work from home could also imply greater job opportunities for people with disabilities who face mobility difficulties.

► **Figure 3.5.** Share of employees who work from home and telework, by gender. Selected countries in Latin America. 2019-2021



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

Women show a clear trend of decreasing work from home since mid-2020 and increasing it again in the second quarter of 2021. In the second quarter of 2021, about 20 per cent of female employees continued to work from home.


Consequently, the gender perspective is especially relevant in this work arrangement. This implies considering the risks and disadvantages that women may face, not only in the regulations and legislation on working from home, especially teleworking, but also in relation to oversight mechanisms and labour policies to promote good practices and prevent this form of work from becoming a source of gender discrimination.⁴⁹

By age

Age is another characteristic associated with different possibilities to continue working from home. In particular, young people have fewer opportunities to work from home than other age groups.


As shown in Figure 3.6, between 50 and 60 per cent of homeworker are middle-aged employees (25-44 years). This group is followed by people aged 45 and over, while young people account for a much smaller share of this arrangement of work. However, the limited participation of young people in total work from home is not only associated with their lower participation in total employment but also with the lower specific incidence of this work arrangement in this age group (except in recent quarters shown in Costa Rica).

► **Figure 3.6.** Share of employees who work from home and telework by age. Selected countries in Latin America. 2019-2021



► Continues...

49 The region has shown progress in identifying good practices and guidance on teleworking through guidelines and manuals emerging from social dialogue. Some examples where ILO has participated are: "Teleworking manual: legal framework and good practices (Fundación ChileMujeres, ILO, Human Rights Subsecretariat, 2021)" and "Manual of good practices in teleworking (ILO, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Unión Industrial Argentina, 2011).



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

Again, these findings are relatively consistent with the fact that youth experienced the greatest loss of employment and hours worked because of the COVID-19 crisis, especially in the first half of 2020. The high incidence of informality and the limited engagement in tasks that are more likely to be carried out from home in this age group may help explain these results.

In the future, teleworking may create significant challenges for workers in certain age groups who are not familiar with the use of new technologies. This highlights the importance of vocational training providing workers with the digital skills that jobs demand.

By labour income


Finally, labour income distribution is a way to illustrate the unequal possibilities employed persons with different attributes have for continuing to work from home.

Figure 3.7 presents for Argentina and Costa Rica the distribution of these employees in the quintiles of labour income of the first quarter of 2020, that is, prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.

As it is shown, in both countries, those who transited to work from home between that quarter and the next were mostly in the highest labour income segments. In particular, about 45 per cent in Argentina and almost 60 per cent in Costa Rica of those who continued to work in the second quarter of 2020 under this arrangement were in the top 20 per cent of labour income in the previous quarter. In contrast, less than 10 per cent of these employees belonged to the lowest income quintile.

► In the future, teleworking may create significant challenges for workers in certain age groups who are not familiar with the use of new technologies.

► **Figure 3.7.** Distribution of wage employment from home and teleworking by quintiles of labour income. Argentina and Costa Rica



Source: ILO, based on labour force surveys.

Therefore, both countries show that, employed persons who were able to continue with their activities from their homes earned higher average labour income prior to the pandemic (first quarter of 2020) than the other two groups.

This is consistent with the results previously analysed in relation to the higher incidence of this work arrangement among formal employees and those with higher educational levels. The opposite is observed among employees who lost their jobs. These workers were –on average– nearer to the bottom of the wage distribution.

3.3 Progress and challenges in the regulation of telework in the region⁵⁰

Some countries in the region already had legislation on teleworking prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in 2008 Colombia established trade union and social security guarantees for workers in this work arrangement. Peru enacted legislation on this issue in 2013. In 2017, Brazil modified the Consolidation of Labour Legislation (CLT), incorporating a chapter on telework. Costa Rica regulated telework in 2019. In 2020, other countries made progress in this regard: Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Chile and Argentina. In Uruguay, a teleworking bill was submitted to the Senate in April 2020, which received preliminary approval in October of that year. In May 2021, Colombia passed the Work at Home Law. Finally, Paraguay passed the telework law in June 2021.

Additionally, in some cases where telework regulations existed prior to the pandemic, modifications were made to address the specific circumstances under which this work arrangement was implemented, or special provisions were established. Examples of this are Honduras, Bolivia and Ecuador, where teleworking was permitted in the public sector and, except for Ecuador, in the private sector.

Some aspects and contents of these laws are common among these countries. In all cases the legislation provides a legal definition of telework/teleworker. In nearly all countries, certain conditions of this arrangement are established, such as: the duration of teleworking and return to the workplace. The costs that the parties shall borne are detailed and an explicit reference is included on the voluntary nature of telework. Regulations on occupational health and safety are also included in many of these laws⁵¹. Finally, in several of these countries, regulations on work organization are included. Among the dimensions considered are the definition of regular and overtime hours, teleworking frequency, workload, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation.

50 For further analysis of these aspects, see ILO (2020a, 2021a), Eurofound ILO (2019) and Messenger (2019).

51 For a more detailed analysis on occupational safety and health in this arrangement, see Bueno (2020, 2021).

Other aspects of teleworking, however, are less frequent in these laws. For example, the conditions in relation to privacy and data protection are only detailed in the laws of a few countries in the region. Even less frequent is the regulation on the right to disconnect or on the effective implementation of teleworking and enforcement procedures.

3.4 Final comments

In the context of the pandemic, teleworking increased significantly in the world and in the region. This arrangement of work guarantee the continuity of certain economic activities and, with it, of the employment relationship. However, not all workers were able to engage in this arrangement. This possibility of working from home has depended, among other factors, on the type and nature of occupation and tasks, as well as on effective access to the technologies necessary to perform work remotely. In a region characterized by labour structures with low overall use of ICTs and high technology gaps, it was not surprising that the increase in the incidence of working from home and especially telework varied among the different groups of workers.

■ ■ In a region characterized by labour structures with low overall use of ICTs and high technology gaps, it was not surprising that the increase in the incidence of working from home and especially telework varied among the different groups of workers.

That is why it is essential to consider the lessons learned during the pandemic, as well as the potential benefits and risks of this work arrangement, which were observed in the world prior to the pandemic. Drawing on dialogue among governments, employers and workers, it is possible to identify good practices that protect the rights, health and well-being of workers, while generating an organizational culture that allows enterprises to efficiently take advantage of the possibilities offered by the new technologies and that lead to productivity gains.

All these dimensions become more relevant considering that, together with the acceleration of digitization processes and the use of information technologies, it seems reasonable to expect that telework will become increasingly feasible and prevalent in the world and in the region.

Annex › Measuring work from home, home-based work and telework in Latin America⁵²

The labour force surveys in the region can be used to identify some of the phenomena previously described. Some of these surveys ask about the main location where workers perform their tasks while others ask more generally about the physical location of the workplace (without identifying whether it is the main place). In both alternatives, the home appears as a possible answer. In general, questions directly related to the frequency with which the worker performs tasks from home are not included, thus making it difficult to differentiate between work from home and home-based work. Additionally, in a more limited set of countries, a direct survey is conducted on teleworking.

Specifically, Argentina (Permanent Household Survey), Brazil (Continuous PNAD), Chile (National Employment Survey), Colombia (Large Integrated Household Survey) and Costa Rica (Continuous

⁵² For a detailed analysis of the definition and measurement of remote work, telework, work at home and home-based work, see ILO (2020c).

Employment Survey) collect information on the place where workers *mainly, effectively or usually* perform their tasks, and includes options that include the dwelling or home. In turn, within this group there are three alternatives. Questions include: “*Where do you mainly perform your tasks?*” (Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica); “*Where do you normally perform your tasks?*” (Brazil); and, “*In the week ending last Sunday, where did you mainly perform your work?*” (Chile). In the last case, the reference period is made explicit.

In Bolivia (Household Survey and Continuous Employment Survey), Ecuador (National Survey of Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment) and Panama (Labour Market Survey), questions are more general and do not inquire about whether the identified place of work is the main / default one. In these countries, questions include “*Where do you work / carry out your work / activities of this business?*” (Bolivia, Mexico, Panama), and “*In which of the following places or locations do you work?*” (Ecuador).

In all these countries, this dimension is studied for the total number of employed, both dependent and independent. In Mexico (National Employment Survey / Telephone Employment Survey) only workers whose business/activity does not have a premises, office or facilities respond to this question. In Peru (National Household Survey / ENAHO), this dimension is explored for employees. This question was incorporated owing to the pandemic, for which reason Peru has only had information since 2020.

As mentioned, some countries in the region also have information on teleworking. In Brazil, in addition to the quarterly survey of Continuous PNAD, another survey known as PNAD COVID was carried out. The latter was surveyed during the months between May and November 2020 and contains information, among other dimensions, about how workers adapted their work patterns in the face of the pandemic, including teleworking (Were you working remotely last week (home office or teleworking)?). That is, the question refers, on the one hand, directly to what actually happened in the previous week and, on the other, to remote work and/or telework.

In Uruguay, the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) questionnaire was modified to more accurately identify these dimensions. In particular, in 2020 two specific questions about telework were incorporated: “Do you usually do telework in your work?” and “... last week did you do telework?”

Finally, in Costa Rica and Peru, among the response options, it is investigated whether work within the home is specifically telework.

Therefore, although from these surveys it is possible to have an overview of the incidence of these phenomena in the region, it is necessary to have more information that allows to identify and accurately characterize each of them. In particular, as mentioned, it is not always possible to clearly differentiate home-based work from home-based work, to identify in which situations it corresponds to remote work and in which it does not, nor if it refers exclusively to teleworking or other forms of work from home.

In the context of the pandemic, however, it is possible to assume that the observed increase in work from home corresponds largely to home-based teleworking. In fact, several countries use it as a *proxy* indicator for teleworking.

Likewise, in some cases where, according to the questionnaire, the default place of work should be surveyed, the increase in the work arrangement is probably reflecting that the place where the work was actually carried out was in fact captured. Although prior to the pandemic, the differentiation between default and effective place of work was less important, in the context of the lockdown, this became a crucial aspect in the measurement of these phenomena. The Uruguayan case is interesting since the inclusion of both questions – default place and effective place – in the same survey provides valuable information regarding the different strategies of inquiry and capture of this work arrangement.

Considering that remote work and telework will undoubtedly become increasingly prevalent forms of work, it is necessary to advance in developing conceptual definitions based on consensus and in including more questions in labour force surveys to adequately measure and characterize these phenomena. The experience gained in this exceptional context – where statistical offices around the world had to rapidly adapt their schemes and ways of working – makes it possible to identify good practices and pending statistical challenges on increasingly relevant issues.

Having more accurate statistics on this phenomenon, in turn, will not only improve the description and characterization of labour markets in the region; it will also contribute to promoting regulatory changes that protect the rights of workers who work from home.

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► 4. Digital labour platforms and the future of work: opportunities and challenges for recovery with decent employment

As mentioned in the previous sections, another manifestation of the changes in the organization of work processes induced by technological advances, mainly in the digital technology field and the Internet, refers to the so-called “*Gig Economy*.” It encompasses both collective work platforms and on-demand work based on the use of Apps.

The former, also known as *crowd work*, refers to online work performed through online platforms that connect several companies, customers, and workers globally. In this way, a worker can perform specific activities commissioned by companies remotely (generally from home). The type of jobs carried out through these platforms is, for example, image recognition, data replication, audio transcription, database research, surveys, or logo design. On-demand jobs based on Apps (geolocation platforms) have developed mainly in transportation, commerce (*delivery*), or providing services (repairs) to homes.

Similar to the case of teleworking, these trends have ramped up in the context of the pandemic and the containment measures against the spread of the virus. For example, delivery activities were considered “essential”, workers continued working due to an increasing demand for their services.

All these changes bring with them many opportunities but at the same time significant challenges that we can already see today. Technological innovation, for example, offers new opportunities to work remotely and online. In the case of online web platforms, there is an open call for services to outsource many people geographically dispersed or individuals working on freelance platforms. Workers have multiple short-term jobs or online contracts with many employers, rather than a more traditional, permanent employer-employee employment relationship with work performed in an establishment, typically on a daytime schedule with approximately 40 hours per work week, depending on the legislation of each country.

This type of work performed on the web requires digital skills to connect to the site and execute tasks remotely while also requiring specialized skills (such as programmer, translator, web developer, among others) (ECLAC-ILO, 2021). As previously mentioned, Baldwin and Forslid (2020) call “telemigration” the hiring of *freelance* workers to provide professional, creative services to companies in the advanced world,

While some of the jobs offered on digital labour platforms involve a transition to the online economy of tasks formerly performed in the traditional economy, there are other cases where there are new tasks. The amount of work carried out through these platforms is still low, but there is an expectation that these types of employment will continue to grow.

Digital labour platforms offer workers, including women, people with disabilities, young people, and migrant workers, the opportunity to work from anywhere and at any time, and such platforms are particularly attractive in countries where jobs are scarce, especially for these workers (ILO, 2021a). Flexible hours and the possibility of working from home could be associated with a better work-life balance. Carrying out activities at home may also be advantageous for people with restricted mobility.

Many low-income countries, attracted by the promising job opportunities offered by these platforms, are investing in digital infrastructure and skills. Digital labour platforms also provide companies with access to a global and local workforce, potentially leading to greater efficiency and productivity. They also offer income and learning opportunities for certain types of workers.

However, as previously discussed, “telemigration” may be associated with higher risks of labour casualization. moreover, if the “offshoring” of these services involves relationships between companies in the advanced world and workers in emerging countries (instead of business-to-business relationships). As a result, it may be hard to scale up value chains in the service sectors and transform the lessons learned into more systemic and lasting organizational capabilities.

Also, traditional companies may face difficult and sometimes unfair competition from digital platforms, which are often not subject to the same obligations vis-à-vis governments (for example, tax or transparency) or labour regulations.

Concerning geolocation-based platforms, the most common activities performed by workers physically present in a specific geographic area include transportation and delivery services and certain home services. Unlike the previous group, these jobs do not require the performance of technologically complex tasks.

During the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and with especial preponderance during periods of lockdown, many of these platforms allowed people to access a great diversity of products without the need to have personal contact with large numbers of individuals (ECLAC-ILO, 2021) and their workers, as mentioned, were considered as “essential.” Additionally, this type of work was an alternative to unemployment and the consequent loss of income in the context of the pandemic.

However, these digital platforms pose numerous challenges. These platforms can create difficulties for workers concerning their employment status, job and income security, working conditions - largely regulated by standard contracts or service agreements that have provisions determined unilaterally by the platforms - and social protection and other benefits since most activities take place outside the scope of labour legislation. These shortcomings got intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic, where the vast majority of platform workers, especially those in geolocation platforms, stated that they continued to work out of the need for income, despite the risk of contracting the disease (Montt et al., 2020).

It is also complicated for platform workers to exercise their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining because the platforms and their clients may be in jurisdictions other than those of the workers (ILO, 2021a).

Latin America has not been exempt from these global challenges, and several countries have already begun to make progress in regulating this modality. For example, in Uruguay and Argentina, since 2015, they have been incorporating specific provisions in their legislation on this new type of work.

In addition, several Latin American countries have introduced simplified taxation mechanisms and access to social security (such as the “regime for small taxpayers”) to extend insurance coverage to self-employed and micro and small businesses, promoting their transition to the formal economy. For example, in Argentina and Uruguay, “small taxpayers” pay a fixed cost, covering taxes and social security contributions.

In the case of Uruguay, the government has also introduced specific measures to extend coverage to platform cab workers. Drivers using cab apps must be registered with social security to obtain their license to operate. The apps allow drivers to sign up and automatically add a social security contribution to the price of each trip and transfer it to the Uruguayan social security institution.

Brazil is currently adopting a similar approach, where the government plans to extend the coverage of its simplified tax and contribution mechanism to drivers working on digital platforms, granting them access in case of illness, maternity and disability benefits, as well as retirement benefits (La Salle and Cartoceti, 2019).

In Colombia, recent regulations explicitly state that occupational health and safety management systems “apply to and have coverage over individuals who provide a service under any modality or form of linkage.” Thus, the regulation details a series of measures to protect individuals working in these areas and prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Peru has developed a specific protocol for independent delivery workers, including them in health and safety management on the platforms. This protocol obliges employers to have occupational health surveillance, prevention, and control plans, including self-employed workers. This provision is relatively novel because it obliges companies to use their technologies to limit the number of available delivery drivers to avoid overcrowding.

Platform workers are considered self-employed in Chile, so they are not covered by Chilean labour regulations. Despite this, several legislative debates have been proposed in this regard to regularize and make visible the conditions of platform workers: among the most prominent are the “Uber Law,” which

suggests that workers be obliged to contribute independently to the social security system; the adaptation of regulations similar to those found in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, where an occupational category called “economically dependent independent worker” was created; or, a final approach proposes that labour regulation be updated to adapt to the new forms of hierarchy and authority brought about by the introduction of these new technologies (Asenjo Cruz et al., 2021).

The COVID-19 crisis highlighted the importance and the high vulnerability in which many of these workers find themselves. However, this crisis can also be an opportunity to advance in regulating their activities, recognizing, for example, the relationship of dependency or another legal form that facilitates proper access to their labour rights and progress in monitoring compliance with labour rights and public health dimensions. Also, promote the development of occupational health and safety protocols and their implementation through training and monitoring.

One aspect of particular relevance in the region is that employment growth associated with the Apss may not necessarily have the same characteristics as those observed in other more developed countries, given the different structures of the workforce in each case, mainly due to the high presence of self-employed workers and informal wage earners in the first group.

This characteristic could lead to some effects of introducing certain technologies differing between the two sets of countries. Thus, Apps in transportation, for example, replace -in some cases- precarious jobs since many countries in the region have individual transportation providers with a high degree of labour informality. A similar situation would arise with other services (repair or *delivery*); for example, it is common for private establishments to hire people to deliver their products exclusively on their behalf. Such individuals usually have no formal relationship with the business owners, they have limited working hours, and their remuneration is flexible (they may even work only for tips).

In these cases, the advancement of these modalities and the technology involved could potentially make the workers more visible while facilitating the tracking of the economic transactions involved. At the same time, this would allow for better control of these activities.

The ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work raises the need to “...and respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by the digital transformation of work, including platform work, in the world of work” (ILO, 2021b).

This path requires social dialogue between all participating parties (digital labour platforms, platform workers and their representatives, and the government) to ensure that national laws are in place to guarantee the rights and obligations of digital platform workers, as well as other key resolutions on wages, working hours, job security and social security, among others (ILO, 2021a).

This issue is of great relevance to society as a whole. It is not feasible to advance in the construction of decent work for all in the future if both old and new labour modalities do not respect fundamental rights at work.

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► 5. The role of technologies in the people-centred recovery

As noted above, new technologies, digital transformation, and automation are transforming the way in which it is produced, exchanged, consumed, while strongly changing the world of work. This is not only in terms of the speed with which employments are created and destroyed, but also in terms of the quality of employments and industrial relations. In addition, technological advances can be a very valuable instrument in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the different strategies and policies to advance in a recovery based on decent work.

In this section of the special topic, first, the economic and policy environment requirements are identified to reverse the low innovation and high heterogeneity outlook that structurally characterises the region, and to move towards a pattern of technological change that is both accelerated and inclusive. The public policy agenda for making digital transformation the basis for productive development in the region is challenging. Decades of relative backwardness must be reversed and work must be done simultaneously in areas as diverse as infrastructure, skills and financing, among others.

Additionally, one of the major structural challenges facing the region's labour markets is to achieve a sustained process of increasing decent work. This not only requires recovering from the significant setbacks caused in these countries by the current crisis, but also making progress on the meagre results that the region had already been experiencing in the quinquennium prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, both in terms of the volume of employment created and the quality of the employments generated. In this context, it is important to identify and strengthen how new technologies make it possible to advance along this path, favouring transitions from informality to formality, both for companies and workers. Therefore, second, this section details some initiatives in this sense promoted in the region in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that can contribute to economic recovery with increasing formality and greater coverage of social protection in the region.

5.1 Macroeconomic environment and policies required to support the digital transformation


Stable macroeconomic environment

The macroeconomic instability shapes a complex environment for companies intending to promote technological change as, to a great extent, digital transformation is a long term bet. In an uncertain and unstable context, business behaviour will be biased towards less expensive and more flexible options, that is, with lower losses in negative scenarios and with rapid departures or reversals in cases of sudden changes in conditions. A shortening of the time horizon rewards short-term investment projects over long-term ones, and the expected profits from riskier projects are discounted at an excessively high rate. Thus, entrepreneurial behaviour becomes defensive and short-sighted (Katz, 2000). These behaviours become even more relevant in this uncertain context in the world and the region. Moreover, strong macroeconomic instability also makes the transition to formalise, as formal labour relations involve medium- to long-term contracts. Policies that contribute, therefore, to reducing macroeconomic fluctuations at the aggregate and sectoral level and to making economies more resilient are essential preconditions for supporting a path of technological

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It is essential to facilitate

the readjustment of abilities of people in the labour market



to sustainably spread the acquisition of labour skills for the use and mastery of digital technologies, as well as, in a broader perspective, those needed for digital economy.

innovation with decent work. As noted in the macroeconomic analysis section of this report, the policy agenda is challenging and requires a wide array of coordinated and far-reaching actions.

Ambitious policies to accelerate technological change

In addition to the above, the region requires policies with ambitious goals and targets that identify and overcome the multiple sources of difficulties on the road to digital transformation. Different sources are acknowledged on the heterogeneity of the regional productive system, so the productive policies to be implemented must be inclusive by design and, at the same time, differentiated to promote the adoption of new digital technologies in the productive system of LAC, in accordance with the technological adoption progress and capacities for local companies. For the most dynamic companies integrated into global supply chains that are already addressing digital transformation, whether, in manufacturing, natural resources, or services, the key is to improve the provision of enabling public goods, such as connectivity and an innovative ecosystem. In the case of companies with intermediate progress in the digital transformation, these policies should aim to accelerate processes and make ongoing transformations - many of them accelerated during the pandemic - much deeper and more sustainable, with a greater focus on productivity and less weight on the urgencies of the disruptive episode. In addition to the requirement for a better digital infrastructure is the difficulty of resorting to markets where complementary factors are in demand: talent, financing and technological solutions. Finally, there are smaller-scale companies and establishments, which are far from the digital transformation and are not very dynamic. In addition to the obstacles already mentioned, there is a bias towards the status quo within the company. In this case, policies should promote the development of technological adoption skills as a prior condition for modernising their production systems or renewing their products. The challenge in the last segment is greater since many companies operate in paradigms that are still far from digitalisation, and operate informally and/or in markets where there are few requirements for modernisation. Integrated and

comprehensive interventions conducted to the micro and small companies segment contribute to improving their stability, resilience, productivity, and competitiveness, which can lead to greater creation and stability of decent work (ILO, 2021a).

Promoting 21st-century skills

This policy axis refers to human capital formation. It is essential to facilitate the readjustment of abilities of people in the labour market to sustainably spread the acquisition of labour skills for the use and mastery of digital technologies, as well as, in a broader perspective, those needed for digital economy. We are facing an oversupply of specific digital skills training that do not develop comprehensive competencies and which, moreover, due to their specificity and lack of accompanying more complex skills, will require more training in ever shorter periods. At the same time, the region shows deficits in the development of competencies that provide workers with the ability to adapt to new scenarios and learn continuously; skills such as those related to communication, collaboration, creativity at work, critical analysis for work, problem-solving, among others. An effective development of these skills creates better opportunities for future workers to avoid having to lead into lengthy reskilling and upskilling processes.

In addition, conditions for the comprehensive development of these skills should be created from early stages and sustained throughout the entire educational trajectory. Generally, the education policy must be strengthened and update its emphasis throughout the educational cycle, including generalising education policy for early childhood, substantially improving the quality of basic education to incorporate more advanced general skills and knowledge, many of which are of a digital nature (Busso et al. 2017). In tertiary and university education, it is essential to aim for greater flexibility and agility in modifying study plans, creating new degree programmes, offering specialisations of shorter duration than traditional alternatives, initiatives that, at the end of the day, aim to mitigate the risks of educational supply lagging in the face of the speed of technological change and its consequences in terms of demands for new skills.

Finally, in this context, learning throughout the life regains particular importance. Dynamic companies of a certain size allow themselves to design in-house mechanisms to retrain skills, but such a practice is rare outside this select group. Technical and vocational education must therefore be encouraged, in addition to the fact that these instances have to be redesigned to make them more inclusive.

There is a wide range of policy interventions aimed at fostering digital skills that can serve as inspiration for countries in the region. A case in point is the *Finishing School* program, first implemented in India and emulated in many other countries. It aims to remedy the shortage of human resources in the offshore services sectors. It is a training program whose curriculum content is designed by representatives from the public sector, private sector, and academia. By definition, it is a program that provides non-formal, short-term training. This program has its chapter in the Region: *Uruguay XXI Finishing School* is a national initiative launched in 2012 within the program Global Services of Uruguay XXI (the national export and investment promotion agency) with technical assistance and co-financing provided by the IDB. It is a training program whose content is “tailored” to the needs of the services sector, which seeks to promote and develop both technical capabilities and complimentary soft skills, to improve the capacity to adapt and respond to changes (García and Bafundo, 2014; Couto, 2019).

Promoting smart integration

Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the digital transformation can improve the insertion of the region's economies into the global economy. As the aforementioned conditions listed progress, there will be more companies which can participate and scale functions in the value chains, whether as direct exporters or through the provision of supplies, equipment and services to exporting companies. At the same time, that closer contact with global markets will help companies to improve their productivity and facilitate their knowledge, access and use of the new innovation waves associated with digital transformation.

The digital transformation has also created opportunities for the countries in the region to begin exporting new goods and services related to that transformation, thus helping to diversify and increase the sophistication of their export baskets. In several cases, these opportunities build on natural resource platforms (agricultural and livestock or extractive), but the market potential captured is broader. This axis is intensive in science and technology policies, both by helping to resolve market and coordination

failures that may hinder the development of business innovation activities and by strengthening linkages between different actors within national innovation systems.

Social dialogue mechanisms and strategic agreements for productive development and digital transformation

The new types of contracting that include, but are not limited to, digital platforms, collaborative economy, teleworking, freelancing, require labour regulations and strategic agreements that guarantee workers' rights and protections, as well as allow underpinning productive development with the adoption of technologies and accelerated increases in productivity.

As mentioned by Salazar-Xirinachs (2017), regarding the future of work, *"New pacts that express this renewed and more integrated vision of the productive development-technology-innovation-education-skills-employment and employability nexus and institutional reforms that translate them into concrete actions are required. That means strengthening spaces for policy dialogue, but at the same time revising the logic and institutions for collective action."*

►► The ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work (2019) recognizes that technological innovations, together with demographic and climate changes and globalization, are the major forces significantly changing the world of labour.

5.2 The role of technology in the transition to formality and increased social protection coverage

ILO Recommendation No. 204 (2015) on the transition from the informal to the formal economy highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach that acts on the multiple dimensions affecting informality to (1) facilitate the transition of workers and economic units from the informal to the formal economy; (2) promote the creation, preservation, and sustainability of enterprises and decent jobs in the formal economy; and (3) prevent the informality of jobs in the formal economy.

Achieving these objectives requires multiple comprehensive actions based on macroeconomic policies that ensure a stable growth path and foster job creation. Favourable macroeconomic environments must be complemented by trade, industrial, tax, sectoral, apprenticeship and vocational training, and infrastructure policies that promote employment, raise productivity and facilitate structural transformation processes. This policy mix becomes even more relevant and necessary in accelerating the digital transformation.

In this regard, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work (2019) recognizes that technological innovations, together with demographic and climate changes and globalization, are the major forces significantly changing the world of labour. For this reason, a people-centred program for the future of work is proposed based on three main axes: (1) increasing investment in people's capabilities; (2) increasing investment in the institutions of work; (3) increasing investment in decent and sustainable work.

Finally, in the context of the pandemic, the ILO has issued a Global Call to Action (ILO, 2021b) for a human-centred recovery from the COVID-19 crisis that is inclusive, sustainable, and resilient. To this end, governments, employers' and workers' organizations are committed to advancing the full and accelerated implementation of the ILO Centenary Declaration. The commitment is to work on a path of inclusive

economic growth and employment, providing protection for all workers, moving towards universal social protection, improving the capacity of labour administrations, all this through the strengthening of social dialogue. Here again, the role of strategies that stimulate productivity through diversification, innovation, and digitalization to create decent jobs and sustainable enterprises is emphasized.

In addition to the above, technological advances can be a very valuable instrument in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the different strategies and policies to advance along this path. Some experiences in this regard in the region and in the context of pandemics are identified below.

Technology as a tool to increase the reach of social protection policies

As previously analysed in detail, the economic crisis resulting from COVID-19 severely affected informal workers and their families. This produced a very intense reduction in labour income in the region and resulted in the challenge of rapidly implementing income support measures for these groups of people (ILO, 2020a).

Because social protection information systems in most countries are limited or not updated for all households or included only specific groups at higher risk of vulnerability, cash transfer strategies initially failed to reach all households in need broadly and quickly.

It was possible to overcome this limitation by using administrative databases to identify other potential beneficiaries (from tax records and income tax returns, for example, in Chile) or through calls to update records, join household social records, or register as a household with informal income (for example, Argentina, Barbados, Paraguay, and St. Lucia). The combined use of these sources of information and the technology to exploit them made it possible in many cases to implement or extend transfer programs in just weeks, demonstrating that there is a capacity to design and implement programs of this type quickly in the region.

At the same time, some countries were able to take advantage of the high level of banking penetration of their populations to deliver aid more quickly while minimizing health risks. Security institutes and other public agencies created web portals to be a kind of one-stop-shop for social assistance, paying some of the non-contributory benefits established and offering a single portal to verify eligibility and track benefits. In addition, some countries even integrated the different sources of household income (labour, unemployment insurance) and linked non-contributory transfers to the difference between that income and a minimum.

All of these have represented significant advances towards building a social protection floor for all people. However, given the recurrent economic crises, the countries in the region should continue to expand and strengthen their social protection information systems and incorporate a larger number of households into existing systems. It is also advantageous to link these household records with various administrative data (pensions, health, taxes, unemployment insurance, etc.) to keep administrative information updated as much as possible. The potential of this information to shape a social protection system that can react quickly to crisis and even link income security programs to active labour market policies is far-reaching.

These comprehensive sources of information with technologies that allow more efficient use of them not only result in a better state capacity to reach the population in need quickly but also provide tools for efficient and effective monitoring and evaluation of the measures implemented.

Technology for skills demands anticipation and the role of vocational training

As mentioned above, a dimension of growing relevance in digital transformation is human capital formation. Since the pandemic broke out, a process of flexibilization of the educational and training offer began, both from the productive sector and education and vocational training centres, ensuring the continuity of learning and promoting access to learning platforms and tools, using various technologies (IDB, 2020).

In the case of vocational training centres, the response to give continuity to training proposals was immediate, although it did not fail to pose challenges for all those involved. In this regard, the pandemic has also brought to the table their capacity to respond quickly to the new demands for competencies and skills required by the changing labour market and for employment in the digital economy, as well as

their capacity to implement training programs to train, retrain and reintegrate workers in jobs requiring the performance of new tasks and the development of new skills (ILO, 2021c).

During the pandemic, about 85 percent of participants in vocational training programs and courses had to continue their training via distance learning, suddenly moving from a classroom-based to a virtual modality. This affected the young participants in training processes, the teachers, the management of the programs and courses, and various actors involved in facilitating access to internet connections, digital tools, and equipment (ILO, 2020b). Not all young participants were able to continue their training processes satisfactorily due to lack of access to internet connections, adequate computer equipment, or having an appropriate learning space in their homes; both because of the economic impacts of the pandemic and pre-existing vulnerabilities. Some were forced to abandon their education and training activities, with likely long-term negative consequences.

In this highly changing context, the challenge for vocational training is to respond to the new needs of the labour market and the demands of the productive sector in coordination with the productive development and digital transformation policies (ILO, 2020b). Below is a set of recommendations to advance along this path with a special approach on the labour market insertion of young people.

Modernizing vocational training programs. Vocational training centres should be oriented towards training in skills and competencies that are required by current occupations and those that will continue to emerge. It is necessary to modernize vocational training programs to make them geared to the development of transversal skills, including digital skills, as well as vocational training systems aimed at encouraging young people to continue training in skills relevant to the labour market and that provide flexible and diverse modalities and tools to fill gaps in education, break down barriers to access to training and respond to the reality of diverse populations of young people. Fast-track learning programs, with short and easy modules in basic care, digital and social-emotional skills, provide workers with skills and facilitate their reinsertion into the labour market. On the other hand, vocational training centres must train and reassess young people in the skills required by “green jobs.”

Designing inclusive vocational training proposals. During the pandemic, many countries provided education through television and radio channels, created national online learning portals, invested in educational technology, online and remote education (digital learning platforms, e-learning, or online learning platforms) to ensure continuity of learning from home. These initiatives should be strengthened. In particular, the offer of on-site, distance, and/or blended learning programs. It is also necessary to design and use specific digital education tools for contexts of low connectivity and the use of basic mobile devices. It is also important to consider the possibility of providing subsidies for transportation and support for those in the most disadvantaged situations, as well as guaranteeing free access to broadband and training for these population groups.

Guaranteeing access to digital media and devices, as well as connectivity. A significant number of young people in the region, apart from not having access to digital skills and requiring training in this regard, do not have access to the basic tools to benefit from the digital economy, such as internet, broadband, smartphones, and computers (IDB, 2020). It is necessary to implement actions to ensure that connectivity does not constitute an obstacle to the progress of digitalization and imply a higher risk of exclusion for young people, insofar as they may see their real possibilities of access and continuity to new types of training, as well as access to teleworking jobs, (ILO, 2020b), and thus also reduce disparities in access to digital technology.

Strengthening the training of vocational training instructors and teachers. The accelerated digitalization precipitated by COVID-19 has implied and will imply the development of new competencies and skills by the teachers and trainers, making it essential to increase their digital skills. In this sense, it is necessary to expand teacher training in the use of digital tools, learning platforms, course design through the use of technologies, and the facilitation of distance learning. Likewise, it is necessary to reinforce the training spaces that provide guidelines for teaching practice and remote facilitation, so that they can use and take advantage of learning management platforms, create digital content and provide adequate remote/online training. It is advisable to develop teaching practice guides for distance learning, training programs for teachers and trainers, etc.

Incorporating new technologies into information management in order to anticipate the demand for required competencies and skills. Vocational training centres must improve their mechanisms for managing information and anticipating training demands, taking into account the reconfiguration of labour markets. Thus, it is relevant to generate or strengthen observatories or areas dedicated to the collection, analysis, and follow-up of labour market data, with tools for massive data analysis, within vocational training centres, both for the identification and anticipation of demands, as well as for the follow-up of labour market trends. Likewise, data and information collected by public employment services on the gaps between jobs and the skills and qualifications of young job seekers are tremendously helpful input for training programs.

Providing mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating policies. Understanding and reporting on the impact of policies on young people require the development and monitoring of a broad set of indicators, including those related to vocational training policies and programs to the digitalization of vocational training centres, digital literacy, closing digital gaps, and the digital and transversal skills development. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor and evaluate vocational training policies and training actions and their results to have inputs for improvement and decision-making.

Protecting and strengthening the funding for vocational training. Some countries have increased funding and resource allocation for the implementation of active labour market policies, while others have reduced it due to the need to support emergency public health measures, as well as to pay for increased unemployment benefits. It becomes relevant to underline the importance of strengthening the scope of action of vocational training because it is essential for the reclassification and retraining of young workers, as well as for the development of transversal and digital skills that seem crucial in times of recovery and productive transformation and are increasingly in demand.

For youth employment policies aimed at recovering from the health crisis to be comprehensive and inclusive, to have greater relevance and effectiveness in addressing the problems, needs, and challenges faced by young people, including the various government agencies responsible for managing public policies in their formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, labour and social actors and partners and other organizations of interest must also be included. Young people must be included and represented in the tripartite dialogue on current and future policies of various kinds aimed at improving their employability and access to decent jobs, not only through their participation and voice but also by integrating decision-making spaces.

Finally, it is crucial to consider the specificities of different youth populations. Policies aimed at generating and providing access to decent jobs and training in digital and transversal skills must consider gender inequalities to respond to the challenges faced by young women in particular. The pandemic has further highlighted the central role that young women play in the supply of unpaid care; however, policies in response to the pandemic have not considered the specific challenges they faced and continue to face. Therefore, the vocational training policymaking with a gender perspective is essential, as well as their articulation with other active labour market and social protection policies that also incorporate this perspective.

The use of digital technologies in improving work management systems

As mentioned in the conclusions of the ILO Commission on the Future of Work, “*Technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and sensors hold innumerable possibilities for improving work: the extraction of information through data mining techniques can help labour administrations identify high-risk sectors and improve labour inspection systems; digital technologies such as apps and sensors can make it easier for companies and social partners to monitor working conditions and labour law compliance in supply chains*” (ILO, 2019)

The response to the pandemic by labour institutions in countries of the region has also required the adoption of innovative measures that allow them, within the framework of health restrictions, to ensure the continuity of their functions, processes, and activities. Within this framework, labour inspections have also had to review and adapt their forms of interaction with users, their operational processes, and their priorities to continue guaranteeing compliance with labour regulations in an adverse context. Few countries in the region expressly declared labour inspection as an essential activity, leading to a fairly widespread use of teleworking or remote working by inspectors and allowing on-site mode in strictly

necessary cases This may have meant a great opportunity for modernization of labour inspections if it implies a qualitative and sustainable leap in their institutional strengthening processes.

The pandemic has shown that the most agile and efficient inspection procedures allowing inspection activities differing from visits through electronic means have been able to adapt more quickly to the circumstances and provide a more timely and agile response. A possible future impulse to these new modalities of inspective action different from the visit may represent a clear advance in an institutional framework in which, in general, staffing is always limited and where its performance is measured, in some cases, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

Another aspect linked to the above refers to the use of ICTs and digital development, which contribute to better coverage of inspection services in an increasingly heterogeneous and changing labour world, and with new employment modalities with their specificities and challenges. As noted, teleworking and work based on digital platforms present significant challenges for this purpose. This is in addition to the structural challenge of the high level of labour informality in the region. It will be essential to continue devoting significant efforts to progress on these fronts.

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2021 LABOUR OVERVIEW

Latin America
and the Caribbean



Explanatory Note

Explanatory Note

The ILO prepares the statistical information published in the *Labour Overview* using data from different official sources of statistics of Latin America and the Caribbean. In the first edition of the *Labour Overview* published in 1994, household surveys in most countries of the region were limited to urban areas, many of which were restricted to the countries' leading cities or urban centres. Thus, to cover the most countries, the *Labour Overview* opted to generate a statistical series limited to urban areas.

For the first time, in the 2015 edition, the *Labour Overview* incorporated a series with national data to complement the urban series. Additionally, while all key indicators contained in the Statistical Annexes have always considered a gender perspective, they are now disaggregated by sex. In the 2016 edition, the ILO carefully revised and updated the national and urban coverage series (see the Explanatory Note in the 2016 *Labour Overview*).

Since the 2018 edition, when *Labour Overview* commemorated 25 years of uninterrupted publication, the ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean convened a work team to conduct a methodological review of the statistical process. The goal was to improve the statistical quality and consistency of the indicators on which this publication is based, as well as to harmonize these indicators with other indicators of ILO publications. This was especially relevant given that national statistical institutes of the region had been very proactive in updating their survey systems, adapting them both to recent resolutions adopted by international standards and to changing national realities.

This meeting resulted in significant adjustments in the Statistical Annex in terms of both content and form. These changes include: the definition and adoption of a new set of weighting factors to estimate regional averages, the strengthening of the series of national indicators, the review of wage indicators, and the introduction of a new series of indicators to complement the national series, among others.

► I. Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the generation of statistical data in the countries of the region and in the statistical annex of the 2020 *Labour Overview*

In 2021, many of the countries in the region relaxed the measures aimed at containing the COVID-19 pandemic and reducing the spread of the virus adopted in 2020, allowing a return to face-to-face surveys. In other countries, the mixed modality was used, thus allowing for the return to face-to-face interviews were conducted in person and also telephone interviews. This made it possible to improve the availability of indicators with disaggregations such as: geographic coverage; population structure (sex and age); education; and relevant labor market variables such as hours worked, income, and informality, which were limited during the year 2020.

In spite of this, for the year 2021 the consequences of the pandemic still persist in the obtaining some of the following labour indicators:

1. Availability of indicators. Of the 26 countries in the region that Panorama Laboral reports statistical information, 19 have managed to produce statistical information, 19 have managed to produce labor market data at some point during the first three quarters of 2021.

2. Breaks in the statistical series. NSOs have made efforts to maintain the delivery of official statistics, striving for quality and comparability of the series. However, changes in the survey collection methods and sample designs, mean that In spite of this, data for 2020 and 2021 cannot be considered strictly comparable with the existing series up to 2019. Therefore, the indicators presented should be treated with caution and with a referential character mainly those that refer to year-on-year variations. In addition, the

comparability of the series of regional averages may be affected by the fact that, as mentioned above, only 19 of the 26 countries included in the statistical annex provided data at some point during the period from January to September 2021. However, it is important to note that about 87% of the regional labor force is contained contained in these 19 countries with available information.

3. Effects on the quality and precision of the estimates. These effects are related, among other aspects, to the increase in non-response, largely influenced by the application of mixed operations (face-to-face and telephone), interview refusals, as well as variations in the geographic distribution of the sample, in those cases where this has occurred. In order to minimize the potential bias generated, and to guarantee the maximum quality and technical accuracy of the indicators, most NSOs are working hard to develop statistical models, calibration techniques, and adjustment of expansion factors to achieve this objective.

NSOs continue to make significant efforts in the dissemination of the techniques performed. This contributes to the confidence of users in official statistics.

A relevant note is that NSOs during the pandemic have not altered the conceptual and methodological framework, as well as the operational definitions of the main indicators of their labor force surveys. It should be noted that the NSOs in the region have had the joint support of the ILO -with respect to conceptual and methodological aspects- and ECLAC -with respect to sample design-.

► II. Concepts and definitions

The national definitions of several statistical concepts applied in the *Labour Overview* are generally based on the standards of the International Conferences of Labour Statisticians (ICLS). However, some are defined according to the standards developed for this publication to the extent that the processes following national criteria imply a partial adherence to international recommendations. It is worth noting that in 2013, the 19th ICLS adopted the “Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization,” through which it revised and expanded on the “Resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, employment, unemployment and underemployment” adopted by the 13th ICLS (1983). Given that the countries of the region have not yet fully incorporated the provisions of the new resolution in effect into the conceptual framework of their surveys, the concepts and definitions detailed below largely maintain the conceptual framework of the 13th ICLS, although they do include elements of the new provisions.

Employed persons are those individuals above a certain specified age and who, during the brief reference period of the survey (which can be a week, a month or a quarter) were employed for at least one hour: (i) wage or salaried employment – in other words, they worked during the reference period for a wage or salary, or who were employed but without working due to a temporary absence during the reference period during which they maintained a formal tie with their job; or (ii) own-account employment, working for profit or family income (includes contributing family workers), or not working independently due to a temporary absence during the reference period. It should be noted that not all countries require verification of formal ties with the establishments that employ those temporarily absent, nor do they necessarily follow the same criteria. Furthermore, some countries do not explicitly include the hour criterion but rather establish it as an instruction in the interviewers’ handbook. In the case of contributing family workers, countries may establish a minimum number of hours to classify them as employed.

Unemployed persons include those individuals over a specified age that, during the reference period: (i) are not employed; (ii) are actively searching for a job; and (iii) are currently available for a job. It should be noted that not all countries of the region apply these three criteria to estimate the number of unemployed persons. Some countries include in the unemployed population individuals who did not actively seek employment during the established job-search period.

Economically active population (PEA) or labour force includes all individuals who, being of at least a specified minimum age, fulfil the requirements to be included in the category of employed or unemployed individuals. In other words, it is the sum of the categories of employed and unemployed individuals.

The employment-to-population ratio is the number of employed individuals divided by the working-age population multiplied by 100 and denotes the level of exploitation of the working-age population.

The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons divided by the labour force multiplied by 100 and represents the proportion of the labour force that does not have work.

The labour force participation rate labour force divided by the working-age population and multiplied by 100 and represents the proportion of the working-age population or labour force that actively participates in the labour market.

Wages and salaries refer to payment in cash and/or in kind (for example foodstuffs or other articles) that employees receive, usually at regular intervals, for the hours worked or the work performed, along with pay for periods not worked, such as annual vacations or holidays.

Average monthly real wage considers the monthly wage in cash or in kind, including overtime hours and bonuses, earned by urban employees aged 15 and over in their main occupation, which is deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at the national level (the same one used for the deflation of the minimum wage series). Coverage of the average monthly real wage includes employees of the private, public and domestic sectors, disaggregated by sex and youth aged 15 to 24. It includes all employees who in the reference period of the survey declared that they received a monetary and/or in-kind payment, and with few exceptions, corresponds to the gross wage, in other words, before deductions. The average monthly real wage index is constructed using 2012 as the base year.

Real minimum wages are defined as the value of the monthly nominal minimum wage deflated using the CPI on a national scale. Most of the countries have a single minimum wage. Nonetheless, in some countries, the minimum wage is differentiated by industry and/or occupation, in which case the minimum-minimum wage of the industry is used as the reference. The real minimum wage index was constructed using 2012 as the base year.

► **III. International comparability**

Progress towards harmonizing concepts and methodologies of statistical data that facilitate international comparison is directly related to the situation and development of the statistical system in each country of the region. This largely depends on institutional efforts and commitments for implementing resolutions adopted in the International Conferences of Labour Statisticians or regional integration agreements on statistical issues. Efforts should focus on information needs infrastructure and the level of development of the data collection system (based primarily on labour force sample surveys), as well as on guaranteeing the availability of human and financial resources to this area. In general terms, the comparability of labour market statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean is mainly hampered by the lack of conceptual and methodological standardization of key labour indicators. This is also true of related variables, since countries may have different concepts for geographic coverage, minimum working-age thresholds and different reference periods, the different reference periods. They use different versions of international classification manuals, among others. Nevertheless, in recent years, statistics institutes of the countries of the region have made significant efforts to adjust the conceptual framework of employment surveys to comply with international standards, which has led to advances in standardization and comparability at the regional level.

► IV. Information sources

Most of the information on employment indicators, real wages, productivity and GDP growth (expressed in constant monetary units) for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean presented in the *Labour Overview* originate from household surveys, establishment surveys or administrative records. These are available on the websites of the following institutions:

Argentina

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos –INDEC– (www.indec.mecon.ar) and Ministerio de Producción y Trabajo (www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion).

Bahamas

Department of Statistical (www.statistics.bahamas.gov.bs).

Barbados

Ministry of Labour (<https://labour.gov.bb>), Barbados Statistical Service (<http://www.barstats.gov.bb/>) and The Central Bank of Barbados (www.centralbank.org.bb).

Belize

Statistical Institute of Belize (www.sib.org.bz).

Bolivia

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas –INE– (www.ine.gov.bo).

Brazil

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia y Estadísticas –IBGE– (www.ibge.gov.br) and Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego (www.mte.gov.br).

Chile

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas –INE– (www.ine.cl), Banco Central de Chile (www.bcentral.cl), Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl), Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social (www.mintrab.gob.cl) and Dirección de Trabajo del Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social (www.dt.gob.cl).

Colombia

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas –DANE– (www.dane.gov.co), Banco de la República de Colombia (www.banrep.gov.co) and Ministerio de Trabajo (www.mintrabajo.gov.co).

Costa Rica

Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos –INEC– (www.inec.go.cr), Banco Central de Costa Rica (www.bccr.fi.cr), Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (www.mtss.go.cr) and Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social (<http://www.ccss.sa.cr/>).

Ecuador

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo –INEC– (www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec) and Ministerio de Relaciones Laborales (www.relacioneslaborales.gov.ec).

El Salvador

Ministerio de Economía –MINEC– (www.minec.gob.sv), Dirección General de Estadística y Censo (www.digestyc.gob.sv) and Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social (www.mtps.gob.sv).

Granada

Central Statistics Office (www.finance.gd/index.php/central-statistics-office).

Guatemala

Instituto Nacional de Estadística –INE– (www.ine.gob.gt) and Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social (www.mintrabajo.gob.gt).

Honduras

Instituto Nacional de Estadística –INE– (www.ine.gob.hn), Banco Central (www.bch.hn) and Secretaría de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (www.trabajo.gob.hn).

Jamaica

Statistical Institute of Jamaica (www.statinja.gov.jm) and Bank of Jamaica (www.boj.org.jm).

Mexico

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía –INEGI– (www.inegi.org.mx) and Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (www.stps.gob.mx).

Nicaragua

Instituto Nacional de Información de Desarrollo –INIDE– (www.inide.gob.ni), Ministerio de Trabajo (www.mitrab.gob.ni) and Banco Central de Nicaragua (<http://www.bcn.gob.ni/>).

Panama

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo –INEC– (www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec) and Ministerio de Trabajo y Desarrollo Laboral (www.mitradel.gob.pa).

Paraguay

Dirección General de Estadística, Encuesta y Censo –DGEEC– (www.dgeec.gov.py) and Banco Central del Paraguay –BCP– (www.bcp.gov.py).

Peru

Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática –INEI– (www.inei.gob.pe), Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (www.bcrp.gob.pe) and Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo (www.mintra.gob.pe).

Dominican Republic

Banco Central de la República Dominicana (www.bancentral.gov.do) and Ministerio de Trabajo (www.ministeriodetrabajo.gov.do).

Saint Lucia

The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia (www.stats.gov.lc).

Trinidad and Tobago

Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (www.central-bank.org.tt) and Central Statistical Office (www.cso.planning.gov.tt).

Uruguay

Instituto Nacional de Estadística –INE– (www.ine.gub.uy).

Venezuela

Instituto Nacional de Estadística –INE– (www.ine.gov.ve) and Banco Central de Venezuela (www.bcv.gov.ve).

► V. General considerations

The information on labour indicators and data on the employment structure indicators for Latin America and Caribbean countries presented in the *Labour Overview* are obtained from national household surveys and administrative records. These sources are processed by the SIALC/ILO team (Labour Information and Analysis System for Latin America and the Caribbean).

It is worth mentioning that several of the household surveys have undergone methodological changes or have made adjustments to the sampling frame and to the weighting factors, for which reason the contents of the series changed household surveys, which may affect the comparability of information across years. In particular, the most significant changes occurred in Mexico (2005, 2010, 2014); Argentina (2003); Bolivia (Plur. State of) (2016); Brazil (2002, 2012); Colombia (2007); Nicaragua (2009); Costa Rica and Chile (2010); Guatemala (2010-2011); Paraguay (2010-2017); Ecuador, El Salvador and Uruguay (2014); and the Dominican Republic (2015). These breaks in the statistical series are indicated in the tables with a double red line to facilitate reading. A methodological change during 2021 occurred in Brazil, which represents close to 40 per cent of the Regional Labour Force. The IBGE in charge of implementing the PNAD survey continued to publish a new series reweighted since 2012. The new weighting method mitigates the nonresponse and coverage bias caused by the health emergency. The footnotes of the tables of the Statistical Annex provide clarifying details.

Moreover, while the *Labour Overview* uses official unemployment rates and labour force participation rates of Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama to calculate the respective regional series of averages, hidden unemployment was excluded given that official information of those countries considers hidden unemployment within the labour force. This is how the harmonized series is obtained, considering the criterion of open unemployment applied by most countries.

Following recommendations of the National Statistics and Census Institute of Argentina, given the “statistical emergency” declared in 2016, beginning with that year’s edition of the *Labour Overview*, statistics on labour market indicators of Argentina for the period 2007-2015 have not been included.⁵³

► VI. Reliability of estimates

The data in the Statistical Annexes originating from household or establishment surveys of the countries are subject to sampling and non-sampling errors. Sampling errors occur because samples are used rather than censuses and vary depending on the sample selected but are within certain reliability margins. Estimates of the key labour market indicators in most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean presented in the *Labour Overview* are obtained through a probability sample considering a pre-determined sampling error and a 95 per cent confidence interval.

Non-sampling errors may also affect estimates derived from household or establishment surveys. These may occur for a variety of reasons, including incomplete geographic coverage, errors in the questionnaires, the inability to obtain information for all people in the sample, the lack of cooperation on the part of some respondents to provide accurate, timely information, errors in the responses of survey respondents (respondent errors) and errors occurring during data collection and processing.

53 See: INDEC “Anexo Informe de Prensa.” (Annex Press Report). Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 23, 2016. (http://www.indec.gov.ar/ftp/cuadros/sociedad/anexo_informe_eph_23_08_16.pdf).



International
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**2021 LABOUR
OVERVIEW**

Latin America
and the Caribbean

**Statistical
Annex
National**

► **Table 1. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND SEX, 2011 - 2021 (Average annual rates)**

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^v
Latin America																			
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	8.5	8.4	9.2	9.8	11.5	10.4	10.2	13.1	9.6	11.7	8.2	11.7	9.3	
Men	...	...	...	...	...	7.8	7.5	8.2	9.2	10.8	9.7	8.5	12.8	9.0	10.6	7.7	11.0	8.4	
Women	...	...	...	...	...	9.4	9.5	10.5	10.7	12.4	11.2	12.3	13.5	10.4	13.1	9.0	12.6	10.6	
Bolivia (Pluri- State of) ^{b/}	2.7	2.3	2.9	2.3	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.7	8.3	5.8	8.7	8.4	7.6	10.8	6.3	8.3	7.5	
Men	2.2	1.6	2.3	1.7	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.4	7.9	5.6	8.1	8.8	6.9	10.4	5.6	8.2	6.8	
Women	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.1	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.0	8.7	6.1	9.4	7.9	8.5	11.3	7.1	8.4	8.3	
Brazil ^{c/}	6.7	7.4	7.2	6.9	8.6	11.6	12.8	12.4	12.0	13.8	12.4	14.9	13.6	14.2	14.9	12.6	13.6	13.9	
Men	4.9	6.0	5.8	5.8	7.3	10.1	11.2	10.8	10.1	11.8	10.4	12.2	12.2	11.6	12.9	10.1	11.8	11.3	
Women	9.1	9.4	9.1	8.5	10.4	13.7	14.9	14.5	14.4	16.3	14.9	18.5	15.5	17.7	17.5	15.9	16.0	17.4	
Chile ^{d/}	7.3	6.6	6.1	6.5	6.3	6.7	7.0	7.4	7.2	10.7	8.2	10.4	12.2	9.5	12.3	8.4	10.9	9.4	
Men	6.2	5.6	5.4	6.1	5.8	6.3	6.5	6.7	6.7	10.5	7.1	9.9	12.6	9.3	12.8	8.3	10.9	9.2	
Women	8.9	8.1	7.1	7.1	7.0	7.2	7.5	8.3	8.0	10.9	9.7	11.0	11.7	9.7	11.6	8.6	11.0	9.8	
Colombia ^{e/}	10.8	10.4	9.6	9.1	8.9	9.2	9.4	9.7	10.5	16.1	12.6	15.8	20.3	15.0	17.5	12.9	16.8	14.6	
Men	8.2	7.8	7.4	7.0	6.7	7.1	7.2	7.4	8.2	12.8	9.8	12.0	17.4	12.1	13.9	9.8	13.7	11.3	
Women	14.4	13.7	12.7	11.9	11.8	12.0	12.3	12.7	13.6	20.6	16.4	21.0	24.6	19.2	22.8	17.2	21.2	19.1	
Costa Rica	10.3	10.2	9.4	9.6	9.6	9.5	9.1	10.3	11.8	19.5	12.5	18.7	24.0	18.1	22.0	15.3	19.5	17.4	
Men	8.7	8.9	8.3	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.5	8.4	9.3	15.5	8.6	13.7	20.0	13.7	17.4	12.2	15.3	13.2	
Women	13.0	12.2	11.1	11.9	12.2	12.1	11.6	13.2	15.3	25.4	18.0	26.1	30.4	24.6	29.0	19.8	25.8	23.5	

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
											1st Quarter ^{v/}	2nd Quarter ^{v/}	3rd Quarter ^{v/}				
Ecuador ^{iv}	4.6	4.1	4.0	4.3	4.3	5.4	4.4	4.1	4.4	8.1	...	4.9	13.3	5.1	6.2	4.9	5.0
Men	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.5	4.3	3.5	3.4	3.7	6.8	...	3.9	11.6	4.0	5.2	3.9	3.9
Women	5.8	4.9	4.9	5.2	5.5	6.8	5.7	5.0	5.5	10.0	...	6.4	15.7	6.7	7.5	6.2	6.4
El Salvador	6.6	6.1	5.9	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.0	6.3	6.3	6.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	8.2	7.3	6.8	8.6	8.4	8.1	8.3	7.3	7.0	7.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	4.4	4.3	4.7	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.2	4.9	5.4	6.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala ^{g/}	4.1	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	2.9	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	6.6	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	2.9	3.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras ^{iv}	4.3	3.6	3.9	5.3	7.3	7.4	6.7	5.7	5.7	10.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	3.3	2.9	3.3	4.5	4.4	5.1	4.0	4.5	4.2	8.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	6.1	5.0	4.9	6.7	11.8	10.7	10.8	7.4	8.1	13.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mexico ^{iv}	5.2	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.3	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.5	4.5	3.4	4.4	4.8	4.2	5.1	4.2	4.3
Men	5.2	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.3	3.8	3.3	3.2	3.5	4.7	3.5	4.4	5.4	4.2	5.3	4.1	4.3
Women	5.2	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.5	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.5	4.1	3.4	4.2	3.9	4.2	4.9	4.4	4.3
Nicaragua	6.0	5.9	5.8	6.6	5.9	4.5	3.7	5.5	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.1	4.8	4.3	4.8
Men	5.5	5.4	5.6	6.2	5.6	4.2	3.5	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.7	5.2	4.9	4.3	4.9
Women	6.6	6.6	6.0	7.0	6.3	4.8	3.8	5.5	5.5	4.7	4.2	4.6	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.6
Panama ^{iv}	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.8	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.0	7.1	18.5	...	...	...	...	18.5	11.3	11.3
Men	4.2	3.5	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.7	5.0	4.8	5.8	13.6	...	...	...	...	13.6	11.0	11.0
Women	4.9	4.9	5.3	6.0	6.2	6.7	7.7	7.6	8.8	24.7	...	...	...	...	24.7	11.8	11.8

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	1st Quarter ^{v/}			2nd Quarter ^{v/}			3rd Quarter ^{v/}			Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}	
											2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	
Paraguay ^{iv/}	5.5	4.6	5.0	6.0	5.4	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.6	7.7	7.9	8.1	7.6	8.6	8.2	6.5	7.9	7.7			
Men	4.3	3.7	4.5	4.6	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.4	5.5	5.9	6.3	6.7	6.7	6.6	5.8	5.5	6.3	6.3			
Women	7.3	5.8	5.7	8.1	6.1	7.5	7.6	7.4	8.0	10.2	10.1	10.2	8.8	11.2	11.5	7.9	10.2	9.8			
Peru ^{v/}	4.0	3.7	4.0	3.7	3.5	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.9	7.4	5.2	7.5	9.3	5.5	9.5	5.3	8.0	6.1			
Men	3.7	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9	3.8	3.5	3.5	7.2	4.7	6.8	10.2	4.6	10.0	4.7	8.3	5.4			
Women	4.4	4.4	4.7	4.0	3.6	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.5	7.7	5.9	8.4	8.0	6.6	8.8	6.0	7.6	7.0			
Uruguay ^{mi/}	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.6	7.5	7.8	7.9	8.3	8.9	10.4	9.7	10.5	10.0	9.8	10.8	9.8	10.2	10.0			
Men	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.1	6.4	6.5	6.6	6.9	7.3	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.8	8.3	8.6	8.7	8.7	8.6			
Women	8.1	8.3	8.2	8.3	8.9	9.4	9.5	10.1	10.7	12.4	10.9	12.6	11.4	11.4	13.4	10.9	11.9	11.6			
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	8.3	8.1	7.8	7.2	7.1	7.3	7.3	7.3	6.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Men	7.7	7.4	7.1	6.7	6.7	7.0	6.4	6.4	6.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Women	9.2	9.0	8.8	8.1	7.8	7.7	8.6	8.6	7.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																					
Cuba	3.2	3.5	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.2	1.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Men	3.0	3.4	3.1	2.4	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Women	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.1	2.6	2.2	1.6	1.8	1.2	1.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...			
Dominican Republic ^{vi/}	6.1	6.7	7.4	6.7	7.3	7.1	5.5	5.7	6.2	5.9	5.7	8.0	3.2	7.6	7.1	6.8	5.3	7.5			
Men	4.7	5.1	5.3	4.8	5.2	4.8	4.0	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.5	4.6	2.4	4.1	4.8	3.5	3.6	4.1			
Women	8.3	9.2	10.5	9.7	10.5	10.5	7.8	8.8	9.3	8.7	8.6	12.9	4.3	12.4	10.5	11.2	7.8	12.2			

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
English-speaking Caribbean																
Bahamas ^{o/}	15.9	14.4	15.8	14.6	13.4	12.2	10.0	10.3	9.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	...	15.0	15.6	13.5	11.8	10.3	9.0	10.1	9.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	...	13.7	16.0	15.8	15.0	14.2	11.0	10.6	9.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{p/}	11.2	11.6	11.6	12.3	11.3	9.7	10.0	10.1	9.6	15.6	17.2	...	15.9	17.9	...	16.6
Men	9.8	10.9	11.7	11.8	12.3	9.3	9.8	9.9	11.0	15.6	16.9	...	14.1	18.2	...	15.5
Women	12.6	12.3	11.6	12.8	10.3	10.1	10.1	10.3	8.1	15.7	17.6	...	17.8	17.5	...	17.7
Belize ^{q/}	...	15.3	14.3	11.6	10.1	9.5	9.3	9.4	9.1	13.7	...	...	11.2	13.7	9.2	9.2
Men	...	10.5	10.6	6.3	6.8	5.6	5.9	5.6	5.9	11.6	...	...	7.0	11.6	6.7	6.7
Women	...	22.3	20.0	19.9	15.4	15.6	14.6	14.9	13.5	17.0	...	...	17.4	17.0	13.0	13.0
Granada ^{r/}	26.2	...	32.2	29.3	29.0	28.2	23.6	19.0	15.4	22.5	19.5	28.4	15.7	21.4	...	28.4
Men	24.8	...	27.0	28.0	26.0	25.6	20.6	15.8	13.6	18.4	...	...	12.0	14.7	...	12.0
Women	27.9	...	38.1	30.9	32.3	31.2	26.8	22.5	17.5	27.0	...	...	20.0	29.1	...	20.0
Jamaica ^{s/}	12.7	13.9	15.2	13.7	13.5	13.2	11.7	9.1	7.7	10.2	8.9	...	9.0	12.6	8.5	8.8
Men	9.3	10.5	11.2	10.1	9.9	9.6	8.4	6.7	5.8	8.7	5.9	...	7.5	11.5	6.3	7.1
Women	16.7	18.1	20.1	18.1	17.9	17.4	15.4	11.9	9.9	12.0	10.4	...	10.8	13.9	11.1	10.8
Saint Lucia	...	21.2	23.3	24.5	24.1	21.3	20.2	20.2	16.8	21.7	17.6	23.1	23.1	24.1	...	19.4
Men	...	19.1	21.3	21.1	21.3	19.4	18.1	18.5	14.9	18.5	14.0	21.8	20.9	21.8	...	16.1
Women	...	23.5	25.5	28.4	27.4	23.5	22.4	22.1	18.9	25.0	22.0	24.5	24.2	26.1	...	23.1
Trinidad and Tobago ^{v/}	5.0	4.9	3.7	3.3	3.4	4.0	4.8	3.9	4.3	4.7	4.2	...	5.1	...	...	...
Men	3.9	4.1	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.9	4.2	3.2	3.7	4.6	4.0	...	5.1	...	...	...
Women	6.3	6.2	4.6	4.0	4.2	4.0	5.6	4.9	5.1	4.8	4.4	...	5.2	...	...	...

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
											1st Quarter ^{v/}			2nd Quarter ^{v/}		3rd Quarter ^{v/}		Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{u/}	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.7	7.9	8.2	8.0	8.0	10.6	9.0	10.8	11.3	10.2	11.6	9.1	10.7	10.0
Latin America and the Caribbean - Men ^{u/}	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.7	6.8	7.0	6.9	6.8	9.2	7.6	9.0	10.5	8.5	10.2	7.5	9.5	8.3
Latin America and the Caribbean - Women ^{u/}	8.0	7.9	7.7	7.3	8.0	9.4	9.8	9.6	9.7	12.5	10.8	13.4	12.5	12.5	13.5	11.3	12.4	12.4

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

- a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.
- b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage.
- c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.
- d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.
- e/ Includes hidden unemployment.
- f/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.
- g/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.
- h/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.
- i/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.
- j/ Includes hidden unemployment. The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.
- k/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continúa (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.
- l/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.
- m/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity.
- n/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.
- o/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.
- p/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.
- q/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.
- r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.
- s/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.
- t/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.
- u/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.
- v/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► Table 2. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND AGE GROUP. 2011 - 2021
(Average annual rates)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	1st Quarter ^v			2nd Quarter ^v			3rd Quarter ^v			2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^v
											2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2021	2021
Latin America																						
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	8.5	8.4	9.2	9.8	11.5	10.4	10.2	13.1	9.6	11.7	8.2	11.7	...	...	11.7	9.3	9.3
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	23.9	22.6	23.7	25.9	30.2	27.5	26.1	34.0	23.8	30.1	...	30.7	...	...	30.7	25.0	25.0
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	5.9	6.0	6.9	7.4	8.8	7.7	7.8	10.5	7.5	9.4	...	9.1	...	...	9.1	7.6	7.6
Bolivia (Pluri-State of) ^{b/}	2.7	2.3	2.9	2.3	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.7	8.3	5.8	8.7	8.4	7.6	10.8	6.3	8.3	...	...	8.3	7.5	7.5
15 - 24	6.6	4.3	6.9	5.5	8.0	7.3	8.3	8.7	10.2	14.5	11.2	14.4	14.5	12.1	18.0	...	12.8	...	...	12.8	13.2	13.2
25 and over	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.9	3.0	7.0	4.6	7.3	7.3	6.6	9.3	...	6.0	...	...	6.0	6.9	6.9
Brazil ^{c/}	6.7	7.4	7.2	6.9	8.6	11.6	12.8	12.4	12.0	13.8	12.4	14.9	13.6	14.2	14.9	12.6	13.6	...	...	13.6	13.9	13.9
15 - 24	15.3	16.0	15.8	15.6	19.5	26.5	28.4	27.8	27.0	30.2	28.3	31.7	30.3	30.0	32.0	27.3	30.2	...	...	30.2	29.7	29.7
25 and over	4.6	5.2	5.1	4.8	6.1	8.2	9.3	8.9	8.7	10.4	8.9	11.5	10.3	11.0	11.5	9.6	10.2	...	...	10.2	10.7	10.7
Chile ^{d/}	7.3	6.6	6.1	6.5	6.3	6.7	7.0	7.4	7.2	10.7	8.2	10.4	12.2	9.5	12.3	8.4	10.9	...	...	10.9	9.4	9.4
15 - 24	17.6	16.4	16.0	16.4	15.3	15.5	17.4	17.7	18.5	24.1	19.7	23.5	28.2	22.7	27.1	17.0	25.0	...	...	25.0	21.1	21.1
25 and over	5.7	5.1	4.7	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.8	6.2	6.1	9.5	7.0	9.2	11.0	8.4	11.2	7.7	9.7	...	...	9.7	8.4	8.4
Colombia ^{e/}	10.8	10.4	9.6	9.1	8.9	9.2	9.4	9.7	10.5	16.1	12.6	15.8	20.3	15.0	17.5	12.9	16.8	...	...	16.8	14.6	14.6
15 - 24	21.9	20.5	19.1	18.7	17.7	18.4	18.6	19.7	20.8	27.1	23.8	27.1	32.9	27.0	28.5	24.1	28.4	...	...	28.4	26.1	26.1
25 and over	8.1	7.9	7.4	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.6	8.4	13.8	10.4	13.5	18.1	12.7	15.4	10.7	14.6	...	...	14.6	12.3	12.3
Costa Rica	10.3	10.2	9.4	9.6	9.6	9.5	9.1	10.3	11.8	19.5	12.5	18.7	24.0	18.1	22.0	15.3	19.5	...	...	19.5	17.4	17.4
15 - 24	22.4	23.1	22.5	25.1	23.0	23.1	22.6	26.8	32.0	41.9	30.9	43.8	48.0	39.4	47.4	38.1	42.1	...	...	42.1	40.4	40.4
25 and over	7.7	7.3	6.5	6.3	6.8	6.8	6.5	7.2	8.3	15.7	9.1	13.9	20.1	14.3	17.9	11.5	15.7	...	...	15.7	13.3	13.3

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}			
											1st Quarter ^{v/}			2nd Quarter ^{v/}				3rd Quarter ^{v/}		
Ecuador ^{iv}	4.6	4.1	4.0	4.3	4.3	5.4	4.4	4.1	4.4	8.1	...	4.9	13.3	5.1	6.2	4.9	9.7	5.0		
15 - 24	11.9	10.7	10.9	11.3	10.4	11.9	9.7	9.4	10.1	14.7	...	8.8	24.3	10.2	10.3	11.1	17.3	10.1		
25 and over	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.1	4.0	3.3	3.0	3.3	6.8	...	4.0	11.2	4.0	5.3	3.5	8.2	3.8		
El Salvador	6.6	6.1	5.9	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.0	6.3	6.3	6.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
15 - 24	12.2	12.4	12.4	15.0	14.0	14.2	14.4	13.6	13.4	14.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
25 and over	5.0	4.4	4.2	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.2	4.6	4.7	5.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Guatemala ^{g/}	4.1	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
15 - 24	7.5	4.9	5.7	6.1	5.7	5.8	5.1	5.0	4.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
25 and over	2.7	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Honduras ^{iv}	4.3	3.6	3.9	5.3	7.3	7.4	6.7	5.7	5.7	10.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
15 - 24	8.0	6.9	7.1	9.4	14.2	15.9	13.5	11.0	11.3	17.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
25 and over	3.0	2.5	2.9	4.0	4.6	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.1	8.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Mexico ^{iv}	5.2	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.3	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.5	4.5	3.4	4.4	4.8	4.2	5.1	4.2	4.5	4.3		
15 - 24	9.8	9.4	9.5	9.5	8.6	7.7	6.9	6.9	7.2	8.0	6.9	8.5	8.6	8.3	9.1	7.7	8.2	8.2		
25 and over	4.0	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.7	3.7	2.8	3.6	4.2	3.4	4.4	3.5	3.8	3.5		
Nicaragua	6.0	5.9	5.8	6.6	5.9	4.5	3.7	5.5	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.1	4.8	4.3	5.0	4.8		
15 - 24	7.8	9.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
25 and over	4.4	4.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Panama ^{iv}	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.8	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.0	7.1	18.5	...	...	...	...	18.5	11.3	18.5	11.3		
15 - 24	12.4	10.3	10.8	12.6	13.1	13.7	16.5	15.7	18.1	40.1	...	...	...	...	40.1	23.9	40.1	23.9		
25 and over	3.0	2.8	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.9	14.1	...	...	...	...	14.1	9.0	14.1	9.0		

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
Paraguay ^{v/}	5.5	4.6	5.0	6.0	5.4	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.6	7.7	8.1	7.6	8.6	8.2	6.5	7.7
15 - 24	12.6	10.4	10.4	12.3	11.8	12.9	13.7	14.2	14.8	17.1	18.0	17.0	18.5	17.7	12.8	16.8
25 and over	3.0	2.6	3.3	4.0	3.3	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.3	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.9	5.7	4.9	5.3
Peru ^{v/}	4.0	3.7	4.0	3.7	3.5	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.9	7.4	5.2	9.3	5.5	9.5	5.3	6.1
15 - 24	9.5	9.1	9.0	9.9	8.4	10.7	10.5	10.6	10.2	14.7	11.2	14.1	11.3	18.9	10.8	12.7
25 and over	2.4	2.1	2.7	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.5	5.8	3.7	8.0	4.3	7.9	4.1	4.6
Uruguay ^{m/}	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.6	7.5	7.8	7.9	8.3	8.9	10.4	9.7	10.5	9.8	10.8	9.8	10.0
15 - 24	18.1	18.5	19.2	19.4	22.5	23.8	24.7	25.9	27.7	33.1	30.2	32.0	35.1	34.8	...	34.5
25 and over	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.7	5.0	4.9	5.3	5.6	6.8	6.3	6.7	6.0	7.0	...	6.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	8.3	8.1	7.8	7.2	7.1	7.3	7.3	7.3	6.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	17.4	17.2	16.4	15.0	15.2	15.6	16.3	17.1	15.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	6.4	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.7	5.9	5.7	5.5	2.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																
Cuba	3.2	3.5	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.2	1.4	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic ^{n/}	6.1	6.7	7.4	6.7	7.3	7.1	5.5	5.7	6.2	5.9	8.0	3.2	7.6	7.1	6.8	7.5
15 - 24	13.9	14.9	17.4	13.4	16.0	16.4	12.8	14.5	15.7	14.4	14.0	8.5	16.8	16.9	...	17.8
25 and over	4.2	4.8	5.0	5.2	5.4	4.9	3.9	3.8	4.2	4.3	4.0	2.3	5.8	5.4	...	5.9

▶ Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
English-speaking Caribbean															
Bahamas ^{v/}	15.9	14.4	15.8	14.6	13.4	12.2	10.0	10.3	9.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{v/}	11.2	11.6	11.6	12.3	11.3	9.7	10.0	10.1	9.6	15.6	...	17.2	...	15.9	16.6
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize ^{v/}	...	15.3	14.3	11.6	10.1	9.5	9.3	9.4	9.1	13.7	...	...	...	11.2	9.2
15 - 24	...	27.7	21.8	22.9	21.2	21.3	19.4	21.3	19.0	23.0	...	...	...	20.6	18.6
25 and over	...	11.2	11.9	7.9	6.7	5.9	6.2	5.7	5.8	11.0	...	...	...	8.4	6.4
Granada ^{v/}	26.2	...	32.2	29.3	29.0	28.2	23.6	19.0	15.4	22.5	...	19.5	28.4	15.7	15.7
15 - 24	...	...	52.5	45.1	41.7	50.4	39.9	33.5	30.0	38.3	...	42.9	29.0	29.9	29.9
25 and over	...	...	27.5	25.6	26.3	23.5	20.3	16.2	12.8	19.9	...	23.0	28.3	13.2	13.2
Jamaica ^{v/}	12.7	13.9	15.2	13.7	13.5	13.2	11.7	9.1	7.7	10.2	7.3	8.9	...	9.0	8.8
15 - 24	...	33.5	37.8	34.3	32.8	31.8	28.2	24.2	20.6	25.7	19.0	22.8	...	24.0	23.6
25 and over	...	10.4	11.1	10.1	10.1	9.7	8.6	6.4	5.4	7.4	5.2	6.4	...	6.4	6.1
Saint Lucia	...	21.2	23.3	24.5	24.1	21.3	20.2	20.2	16.8	21.7	17.6	23.1	21.2	23.1	23.1
15 - 24	...	40.6	44.4	51.2	49.6	46.2	48.0	38.6	32.4	46.0	46.3	49.2	37.2	...	49.2
25 and over	...	16.5	17.2	18.4	18.6	16.3	13.9	16.0	13.7	17.1	11.9	19.5	18.2	...	19.5
Trinidad and Tobago ^{v/}	5.0	4.9	3.7	3.3	3.4	4.0	4.8	3.9	4.3	4.7	4.2	...	5.1	...	...
15 - 24	12.0	11.4	8.9	8.0	8.5	10.6	10.1	10.2	9.0	11.6	13.5	...	9.6	...	...
25 and over	3.7	3.9	2.9	2.6	2.7	3.1	4.2	3.1	3.7	3.9	3.1	...	4.7	...	...

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}	
											1st Quarter ^{v/}		2nd Quarter ^{v/}		3rd Quarter ^{v/}			
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{u/}	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.7	7.9	8.2	8.0	8.0	10.6	9.0	10.8	11.3	10.2	11.6	9.1	10.7	10.0
Latin America and the Caribbean - 15 - 24 ^{u/}	14.0	13.8	13.8	13.7	15.0	18.1	18.5	18.5	18.5	22.6	20.5	22.9	24.5	21.5	23.9	19.6	23.0	21.4
Latin America and the Caribbean - 25 and over ^{u/}	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.6	5.0	5.9	6.2	6.1	6.0	8.5	6.9	8.7	9.5	8.2	9.5	7.4	8.6	8.1

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

- a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.
- b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage.
- c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domicílios Contínua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.
- d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.
- e/ Includes hidden unemployment.
- f/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.
- g/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.
- h/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.
- i/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.
- j/ Includes hidden unemployment. The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.
- k/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Contínua (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.
- l/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.
- m/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity.
- n/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.
- o/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.
- p/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.
- q/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.
- r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.
- s/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.
- t/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.
- u/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.
- v/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 3. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND SEX. 2011 - 2021**
(Average annual rates)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	1st Quarter ^v			2nd Quarter ^v			3rd Quarter ^v			2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^v
											2020	2021	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2021
Latin America																						
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	57.5	57.8	58.5	59.1	54.9	58.6	58.9	49.2	58.4	54.4	59.3	54.1	58.9				
Men	...	...	...	...	...	69.4	69.7	69.6	69.9	64.9	68.7	69.7	58.0	69.1	64.5	69.0	63.7	69.3				
Women	...	...	...	...	...	46.9	47.6	48.7	49.4	45.9	49.5	49.0	41.2	48.4	45.4	50.4	45.4	49.3				
Bolivia (Pluri- State of) ^{b/}	65.9	61.1	63.4	65.8	61.0	66.0	67.4	70.9	73.0	65.8	69.0	70.9	60.9	71.7	64.2	73.6	64.7	72.1				
Men	74.7	70.4	72.6	75.0	72.1	76.4	76.8	79.1	80.7	74.4	77.0	78.2	69.2	79.2	73.6	80.3	73.3	79.2				
Women	57.5	52.6	54.8	57.1	50.4	56.1	58.3	63.0	65.5	57.6	61.3	63.8	52.8	64.6	55.2	67.2	56.4	65.2				
Brazil ^{c/}	60.0	62.7	62.6	62.4	62.7	62.8	63.1	63.2	63.6	59.3	62.7	59.8	57.3	60.8	57.6	61.9	59.2	60.8				
Men	70.8	74.5	74.4	74.0	74.0	73.8	73.6	73.4	73.5	69.8	72.7	70.3	67.8	71.3	68.6	72.2	69.7	71.3				
Women	50.1	51.6	51.6	51.5	52.2	52.4	53.3	53.6	54.3	49.5	53.4	50.0	47.5	50.9	47.3	52.3	49.4	51.1				
Chile ^{d/}	61.5	61.5	61.6	61.9	62.0	62.1	62.7	63.0	62.8	56.1	62.5	57.3	51.9	55.9	53.4	57.1	55.9	56.8				
Men	74.8	74.5	74.2	74.1	74.4	74.1	74.3	74.2	73.6	67.3	73.3	69.0	63.1	67.1	64.5	68.5	67.0	68.2				
Women	48.8	49.1	49.6	50.2	50.3	50.7	51.6	52.3	52.5	45.3	52.1	46.1	41.2	45.0	42.7	46.2	45.3	45.8				
Colombia ^{e/}	63.7	64.5	64.2	64.2	64.7	64.5	64.4	64.0	63.3	59.2	61.6	60.7	54.8	59.9	58.6	60.9	58.4	60.5				
Men	75.1	75.4	74.9	74.9	75.2	74.9	74.8	74.6	73.9	70.8	72.7	72.1	66.2	71.9	71.0	72.7	70.0	72.2				
Women	52.8	54.1	53.9	54.0	54.8	54.5	54.5	53.8	53.1	48.1	50.9	49.7	43.9	48.5	46.8	49.6	47.2	49.3				
Costa Rica	59.0	62.8	62.3	62.5	61.2	58.4	58.8	60.7	62.5	60.2	63.4	60.8	57.6	59.5	59.1	61.0	60.0	60.4				
Men	73.6	75.9	75.1	75.9	74.3	72.4	73.0	74.3	74.4	72.2	74.7	72.3	70.5	71.2	71.5	72.0	72.2	71.8				
Women	44.2	49.5	49.3	49.0	48.1	44.3	44.5	46.9	50.6	48.1	52.1	49.3	44.6	47.6	46.7	49.8	47.8	48.9				

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
											1st Quarter ^{v/}			2nd Quarter ^{v/}		3rd Quarter ^{v/}		Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
											2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	
Ecuador ^{i/}	62.5	63.0	62.9	63.1	66.2	68.2	68.6	67.0	66.6	63.0	...	63.8	60.9	65.8	63.8	66.7	62.3	65.5
Men	77.9	78.1	77.6	78.8	80.5	81.0	81.0	79.7	78.7	75.9	...	77.5	73.8	78.5	76.9	78.8	75.4	78.3
Women	48.1	48.8	48.9	48.5	52.7	56.2	56.9	55.0	55.0	50.6	...	50.8	48.5	53.7	51.2	55.2	49.9	53.2
El Salvador	62.7	63.2	63.6	62.8	62.1	62.2	61.9	61.3	62.2	61.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	81.2	81.4	80.7	80.7	80.2	80.1	80.6	79.5	80.5	79.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	47.0	47.9	49.3	47.8	46.7	47.3	46.3	46.1	46.8	46.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala ^{g/}	61.8	65.4	60.6	60.9	60.7	60.8	61.0	60.6	59.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	84.6	87.6	83.4	83.8	84.7	84.0	85.3	85.0	83.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	40.4	45.7	40.6	40.6	38.9	40.1	39.2	39.1	37.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras ^{h/}	51.9	50.8	53.7	56.1	58.1	57.5	59.0	60.4	57.3	59.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	70.4	69.2	72.1	73.6	74.0	74.0	76.0	76.3	75.1	73.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	34.9	33.8	37.2	40.5	43.9	43.0	43.8	46.0	41.4	47.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mexico ^{i/}	59.8	60.4	60.3	59.8	59.8	59.7	59.3	59.6	60.1	55.6	59.9	57.1	49.4	59.0	55.5	59.4	54.9	58.5
Men	78.5	78.8	78.5	78.3	78.0	77.7	77.6	77.4	77.2	71.7	76.4	74.2	63.5	75.9	72.6	76.3	70.8	75.5
Women	42.8	43.9	43.9	43.1	43.4	43.4	43.0	43.5	44.7	41.0	44.9	41.7	36.7	43.9	39.9	44.2	40.5	43.3
Nicaragua	75.6	76.8	75.8	74.0	72.4	73.6	73.5	71.6	71.1	69.1	70.9	69.5	66.5	66.5	68.3	66.6	68.6	67.5
Men	87.9	87.7	87.2	85.8	84.6	84.9	84.7	82.6	82.3	80.5	82.0	80.7	78.5	79.1	80.5	79.1	80.3	79.6
Women	64.0	66.6	65.1	63.0	60.9	63.1	63.2	61.6	61.0	58.7	61.0	59.4	55.7	55.0	57.1	55.2	57.9	56.5
Panama ^{j/}	61.9	63.5	64.1	64.0	64.2	64.4	64.0	65.4	66.5	63.0	...	...	...	...	63.0	60.4	63.0	60.4
Men	79.2	80.1	79.7	79.4	78.4	78.6	77.6	78.8	78.8	74.0	...	...	...	...	74.0	74.4	74.0	74.4
Women	45.8	48.2	49.4	49.8	50.8	51.1	51.2	52.8	55.0	53.2	...	...	...	...	53.2	47.3	53.2	47.3

▶ Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
Paraguay ^{iv/}	61.1	64.4	62.4	62.3	62.1	62.6	71.0	71.9	72.4	70.3	71.2	72.9	66.7	72.0	70.7	71.4	69.5	72.1	
Men	73.2	75.1	74.0	74.6	74.1	74.5	84.4	84.6	84.8	83.5	83.8	85.2	81.3	84.2	84.3	84.0	83.1	84.5	
Women	49.0	53.7	52.7	50.1	50.2	50.8	57.8	59.4	60.2	57.4	59.1	60.8	52.6	60.1	57.5	59.1	56.4	60.0	
Peru ^{v/}	73.9	73.6	73.2	72.2	71.6	72.2	72.4	72.3	72.7	64.4	70.5	70.0	49.0	70.7	64.3	70.7	61.3	70.5	
Men	82.7	82.4	82.0	81.3	81.0	81.2	81.0	80.7	81.1	74.7	78.5	79.0	59.1	79.2	75.9	79.2	71.2	79.1	
Women	65.2	64.8	64.5	63.2	62.3	63.3	64.0	64.0	64.5	54.3	62.6	61.1	39.0	62.2	52.8	62.4	51.5	61.9	
Uruguay ^{vi/}	64.8	64.0	63.6	64.7	63.8	63.4	62.9	62.4	62.2	60.5	61.6	61.5	58.8	60.9	60.3	61.5	60.2	61.3	
Men	74.7	73.5	73.9	74.3	73.0	72.2	71.6	70.7	70.1	67.9	68.4	68.4	66.5	67.9	68.2	68.7	67.7	68.3	
Women	55.8	55.6	54.4	55.9	55.4	55.4	55.0	54.9	54.9	53.8	55.4	55.0	51.7	54.6	53.1	54.8	53.4	54.8	
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	64.4	63.9	64.3	65.1	63.7	63.9	66.2	66.8	65.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Men	78.6	77.8	78.1	79.1	77.8	77.9	79.9	80.1	79.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Women	50.3	50.1	50.6	51.3	49.9	50.2	52.7	53.7	50.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																			
Cuba	76.1	74.2	72.9	71.9	67.1	65.2	63.4	63.8	65.2	66.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Men	90.0	89.5	87.1	86.2	80.4	78.2	76.2	76.9	76.0	76.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Women	60.5	57.4	57.3	56.3	52.6	50.9	49.4	49.5	53.3	54.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Dominican Republic ^{vi/}	58.2	59.4	59.3	59.5	61.8	62.3	62.2	63.6	65.1	60.2	63.4	61.7	56.6	62.8	59.7	63.1	59.9	62.5	
Men	73.1	74.1	73.9	74.2	76.3	76.6	76.1	77.8	78.4	74.0	76.3	75.3	70.5	75.3	74.1	75.7	73.6	75.5	
Women	43.7	45.3	45.1	45.4	48.1	48.9	49.0	50.4	52.6	47.6	51.5	49.2	43.9	51.1	46.4	51.5	47.3	50.6	

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
English-speaking Caribbean																	
Bahamas ^{o/}	72.1	72.5	73.2	73.7	74.3	77.1	80.5	82.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	...	75.8	76.9	77.8	79.5	81.7	83.6	85.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	...	69.5	70.1	70.1	71.7	73.1	75.1	76.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{p/}	67.6	66.2	66.7	63.9	65.1	66.5	65.4	64.8	63.7	60.6	...	58.7	...	62.6	58.6	...	60.7
Men	72.7	71.9	72.0	67.7	68.7	70.4	69.7	69.4	68.0	64.8	...	62.2	...	67.5	62.3	...	64.9
Women	63.0	61.0	62.0	60.4	61.7	62.8	61.5	60.6	59.7	56.7	...	55.6	...	58.1	55.3	...	56.9
Belize ^{q/}	...	65.8	64.2	63.6	63.2	64.0	64.1	65.5	68.1	55.1	...	...	...	59.7	55.1	61.9	61.9
Men	...	79.2	78.4	78.2	77.8	78.0	78.2	78.3	80.5	68.7	...	...	...	72.9	68.7	76.1	76.1
Women	...	52.6	50.1	49.2	48.8	50.2	50.2	52.9	55.9	42.4	...	...	...	47.0	42.4	48.2	48.2
Granada ^{r/}	69.5	...	66.7	67.8	68.8	68.2	65.8	67.6	68.4	65.1	...	67.4	60.9	67.5	66.2	...	67.5
Men	75.0	...	70.9	71.5	74.5	73.3	71.3	73.1	74.6	71.8	...	72.0	64.2	71.2	75.7	...	71.2
Women	63.9	...	62.6	64.1	63.4	63.1	60.6	62.5	62.6	59.0	...	62.8	58.0	63.5	57.9	...	63.5
Jamaica ^{s/}	62.1	61.9	63.0	62.8	63.1	64.8	65.1	64.0	64.6	63.0	65.6	62.8	...	63.3	61.3	63.4	63.2
Men	70.1	69.2	70.0	70.0	70.3	71.2	71.3	70.4	71.0	69.5	71.6	69.3	...	69.6	68.4	70.3	69.7
Women	55.0	54.9	56.3	55.9	56.3	58.6	59.1	57.9	58.5	56.7	59.9	56.6	...	57.2	54.5	56.7	56.8
Saint Lucia	...	70.6	71.0	72.2	72.2	72.8	71.4	71.4	71.0	68.8	69.9	69.6	67.7	70.2	69.9	...	69.9
Men	...	75.3	76.2	77.1	78.3	78.3	76.5	77.8	75.7	74.1	78.0	71.7	72.9	75.3	73.1	...	75.0
Women	...	66.1	66.0	67.4	66.0	67.4	66.8	65.2	66.5	64.3	62.2	67.5	63.3	65.8	67.2	...	65.5
Trinidad and Tobago ^{v/}	61.3	61.9	61.4	61.9	60.6	59.7	59.2	59.1	57.4	56.6	57.2	...	55.9	...	...	...	...
Men	72.3	72.1	71.6	72.2	71.2	69.5	68.9	68.4	66.1	65.4	66.1	...	64.6	...	...	...	...
Women	49.4	51.7	51.1	51.8	50.0	50.1	49.5	49.9	48.7	47.8	48.4	...	47.1	...	...	...	...

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
											1st Quarter ^{v/}		2nd Quarter ^{v/}		3rd Quarter ^{v/}		Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}	
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{w/}	61.8	62.9	62.7	62.5	62.5	62.6	62.9	63.1	63.3	58.7	62.4	60.3	54.3	61.1	57.9	61.9	58.2	61.1
Latin America and the Caribbean - Men ^{w/}	75.2	76.5	76.2	76.1	75.8	75.7	75.8	75.7	75.6	70.7	74.1	72.5	65.8	73.2	70.5	73.9	70.1	73.2
Latin America and the Caribbean - Women ^{w/}	49.2	50.2	50.1	49.9	50.0	50.4	50.9	51.3	51.8	47.5	51.5	48.9	43.5	49.7	46.0	50.7	47.0	49.7

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

- a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.
- b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage.
- c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.
- d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.
- e/ Includes hidden unemployment.
- f/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.
- g/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.
- h/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.
- i/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.
- j/ Includes hidden unemployment. The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.
- k/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continúa (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.
- l/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.
- m/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity.
- n/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.
- o/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.
- p/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.
- q/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.
- r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.
- s/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.
- t/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.
- u/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.
- v/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 4. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND AGE GROUP, 2011 - 2021**
(Average annual rates)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w
Latin America																			
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	57.5	57.8	58.5	59.1	54.9	58.6	58.9	49.2	58.4	54.4	59.3	54.1	58.9	58.9
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	38.3	39.0	39.5	39.1	33.2	38.7	38.0	26.1	37.1	31.2	...	32.4	37.6	37.6
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	64.4	64.4	65.1	65.9	62.3	65.2	66.0	56.8	65.6	61.4	...	61.0	65.8	65.8
Bolivia (Pluri- State of) ^{b/}	65.9	61.1	63.4	65.8	61.0	66.0	67.4	70.9	73.0	65.8	69.0	70.9	60.9	71.7	64.2	73.6	64.7	72.1	72.1
15 - 24	52.2	45.3	46.8	51.8	44.6	51.2	42.7	41.5	49.9	44.2	48.9	53.8	35.3	55.2	42.1	...	42.1	54.5	54.5
25 and over	79.8	78.1	77.9	79.1	75.9	78.1	77.1	76.7	78.1	75.6	78.1	79.0	72.2	79.5	74.3	...	75.2	79.3	79.3
Brazil ^{c/}	60.0	62.7	62.6	62.4	62.7	62.8	63.1	63.2	63.6	59.3	62.7	59.8	57.3	60.8	57.6	61.9	59.2	60.8	60.8
15 - 24	59.1	57.2	56.1	55.2	55.0	55.2	56.0	56.1	57.0	51.4	56.2	52.1	48.3	54.2	49.3	56.1	51.3	54.1	54.1
25 and over	68.1	65.9	66.1	66.0	66.3	66.3	66.4	66.3	66.6	62.5	65.7	62.9	60.7	63.6	60.8	64.5	62.4	63.7	63.7
Chile ^{d/}	61.5	61.5	61.6	61.9	62.0	62.1	62.7	63.0	62.8	56.1	62.5	57.3	51.9	55.9	53.4	57.1	55.9	56.8	56.8
15 - 24	38.5	37.3	36.4	36.7	36.0	35.1	35.1	34.3	32.5	26.4	35.6	27.3	22.0	25.3	22.1	25.8	26.6	26.1	26.1
25 and over	67.8	68.0	68.2	68.3	68.4	68.5	69.0	69.3	69.3	62.3	68.1	63.4	58.2	62.0	59.8	63.4	62.0	62.9	62.9
Colombia ^{e/}	63.7	64.5	64.2	64.2	64.7	64.5	64.4	64.0	63.3	59.2	61.6	60.7	54.8	59.9	58.6	60.9	58.4	60.5	60.5
15 - 24	54.4	55.8	54.6	54.6	54.7	53.7	53.2	52.6	51.4	46.9	48.8	49.1	41.2	48.0	46.5	48.2	45.5	48.4	48.4
25 and over	73.8	74.4	74.2	74.2	74.5	74.3	74.0	73.5	72.8	68.2	71.0	69.4	64.0	68.8	67.5	69.9	67.5	69.4	69.4
Costa Rica	59.0	62.8	62.3	62.5	61.2	58.4	58.8	60.7	62.5	60.2	63.4	60.8	57.6	59.5	59.1	61.0	60.0	60.4	60.4
15 - 24	43.4	48.3	48.0	48.2	45.9	43.2	43.4	46.1	45.3	44.5	48.6	48.3	41.7	45.5	43.8	44.8	44.7	46.2	46.2
25 and over	64.0	67.2	66.7	66.8	65.8	62.8	63.1	64.5	66.8	64.0	67.2	64.0	61.4	62.8	62.7	64.8	63.7	63.9	63.9

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
											1st Quarter ^{v/}		2nd Quarter ^{v/}		3rd Quarter ^{v/}				
Ecuador ^{v/}	62.5	63.0	62.9	63.1	66.2	68.2	68.6	67.0	66.6	63.0	...	63.8	60.9	65.8	63.8	66.7	62.3	65.5	
15 - 24	43.1	43.9	42.2	41.1	43.5	45.6	45.9	44.7	44.6	42.3	...	43.6	39.8	44.9	44.6	47.3	42.2	45.3	
25 and over	69.2	69.3	69.9	71.0	74.1	76.1	76.4	74.6	73.8	69.3	...	70.9	67.7	73.1	70.3	73.3	69.0	72.5	
El Salvador	62.7	63.2	63.6	62.8	62.1	62.2	61.9	61.3	62.2	61.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
15 - 24	46.3	50.3	49.6	49.1	45.8	48.5	49.0	48.5	49.2	50.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25 and over	67.5	68.0	68.8	67.7	66.9	67.0	66.3	65.5	66.2	64.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Guatemala ^{g/}	61.8	65.4	60.6	60.9	60.7	60.8	61.0	60.6	59.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
15 - 24	53.5	58.3	50.3	51.8	52.4	52.6	52.5	52.5	51.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25 and over	66.1	68.8	65.7	65.3	64.8	64.7	64.9	64.3	62.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Honduras ^{h/}	51.9	50.8	53.7	56.1	58.1	57.5	59.0	60.4	57.3	59.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
15 - 24	49.9	48.1	51.6	52.3	56.6	55.5	56.7	57.8	54.0	54.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25 and over	65.2	63.7	66.4	68.3	69.0	67.7	68.9	70.4	67.2	61.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Mexico ^{i/}	59.8	60.4	60.3	59.8	59.8	59.7	59.3	59.6	60.1	55.6	59.9	57.1	49.4	59.0	55.5	59.4	54.9	58.5	
15 - 24	46.9	47.3	46.4	45.6	44.8	44.2	43.8	43.8	44.8	42.3	43.7	41.6	32.9	44.6	40.7	45.9	39.1	44.0	
25 and over	64.3	65.0	65.0	64.4	64.6	64.6	64.2	64.4	64.7	62.0	64.6	61.5	53.6	63.1	59.6	63.3	59.3	62.6	
Nicaragua	75.6	76.8	75.8	74.0	72.4	73.6	73.5	71.6	71.1	69.1	70.9	69.5	66.5	66.5	68.3	66.6	68.6	67.5	
15 - 24	69.8	71.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
25 and over	79.6	80.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Panama ^{j/}	61.9	63.5	64.1	64.0	64.2	64.4	64.0	65.4	66.5	63.0	...	...	...	...	63.0	60.4	63.0	60.4	
15 - 24	44.1	46.3	46.9	45.2	43.9	44.2	44.5	46.5	47.0	50.0	...	...	...	...	50.0	41.4	50.0	41.4	
25 and over	66.8	68.6	69.5	69.8	70.4	70.8	69.9	71.2	72.4	66.6	...	...	...	...	66.6	65.7	66.6	65.7	

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}	
Paraguay ^{k/}	61.1	64.4	62.4	62.3	62.1	62.6	71.0	71.9	72.4	70.3	71.2	72.9	66.7	72.0	70.7	71.4	69.5	72.1
15 - 24	58.2	60.1	59.6	58.1	55.1	58.6	58.0	58.3	58.9	56.1	57.2	61.3	51.3	60.0	56.0	57.8	54.9	59.7
25 and over	74.0	77.8	76.2	74.6	75.4	75.2	75.8	76.8	77.1	75.2	76.1	76.9	72.0	76.0	75.7	76.0	74.6	76.3
Peru ^v	73.9	73.6	73.2	72.2	71.6	72.2	72.4	72.3	72.7	64.4	70.5	70.0	49.0	70.7	64.3	70.7	61.3	70.5
15 - 24	59.6	58.9	57.9	56.1	53.7	53.7	53.9	53.2	54.1	49.3	53.2	55.9	29.1	52.7	46.0	52.2	42.8	53.6
25 and over	80.9	80.4	80.3	79.4	79.4	80.1	80.1	80.0	80.2	70.7	76.9	75.5	51.3	77.6	70.3	77.7	66.1	76.9
Uruguay ^{m/}	64.8	64.0	63.6	64.7	63.8	63.4	62.9	62.4	62.2	60.5	61.6	61.5	58.8	60.9	60.3	61.5	60.2	61.3
15 - 24	49.8	48.9	48.7	48.6	46.5	45.2	43.8	43.4	43.2	43.1	45.7	44.4	40.4	42.2	42.8	...	43.0	43.3
25 and over	68.8	68.1	67.7	68.9	68.5	68.4	68.1	67.6	67.3	66.1	66.8	66.8	64.6	66.9	65.9	...	65.7	66.8
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	64.4	63.9	64.3	65.1	63.7	63.9	66.2	66.8	65.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	41.8	40.7	40.9	41.6	39.0	38.4	42.5	43.8	43.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	72.2	71.8	72.0	72.6	71.4	71.8	73.4	73.7	70.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																		
Cuba	76.1	74.2	72.9	71.9	67.1	65.2	63.4	63.8	65.2	66.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic ^{n/}	58.2	59.4	59.3	59.5	61.8	62.3	62.2	63.6	65.1	60.2	63.4	61.7	56.6	62.8	59.7	63.1	59.9	62.5
15 - 24	40.5	41.2	41.0	40.9	43.8	44.6	43.3	44.4	45.3	39.0	43.2	42.8	33.5	45.4	38.7	...	38.3	44.1
25 and over	65.1	66.2	66.1	66.2	68.2	68.6	68.6	69.9	71.4	66.8	69.8	67.5	63.9	68.1	66.0	...	66.9	67.8

▶ Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{v/}
English-speaking Caribbean																	
Bahamas ^{o/}	72.1	72.5	73.2	73.7	74.3	77.1	80.5	82.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{p/}	67.6	66.2	66.7	63.9	65.1	66.5	65.4	64.8	63.7	60.6	...	58.7	...	62.6	58.6	...	60.7
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize ^{q/}	...	65.8	64.2	63.6	63.2	64.0	64.1	65.5	68.1	55.1	...	...	...	59.7	55.1	61.9	61.9
15 - 24	...	49.5	46.3	46.6	44.7	44.9	45.6	45.4	50.1	42.2	...	...	...	45.5	42.2	48.7	48.7
25 and over	...	73.9	73.4	73.0	73.0	73.8	73.5	75.8	77.2	60.5	...	...	...	65.6	60.5	67.4	67.4
Granada ^{r/}	69.5	...	66.7	67.8	68.8	68.2	65.8	67.6	68.4	65.1	...	67.4	60.9	67.5	66.2	...	67.5
15 - 24	...	...	53.4	55.2	56.6	52.9	52.5	56.6	55.1	45.8	...	50.5	39.2	51.4	48.4	39.2	51.4
25 and over	...	...	70.9	71.6	72.1	72.6	69.3	70.3	71.6	69.8	...	71.5	66.1	71.3	70.7	66.1	71.3
Jamaica ^{s/}	62.1	61.9	63.0	62.8	63.1	64.8	65.1	64.0	64.6	63.0	65.6	62.8	...	63.3	61.3	63.4	63.2
15 - 24	...	33.6	34.7	33.3	34.0	36.7	36.5	34.2	34.9	33.9	35.8	33.7	...	33.6	32.9	34.3	33.9
25 and over	...	73.0	74.1	74.4	74.5	75.8	76.3	75.7	76.3	74.4	77.3	74.3	...	74.9	72.5	74.7	74.7
Saint Lucia	...	70.6	71.0	72.2	72.2	72.8	71.4	71.4	71.0	68.8	69.9	69.6	67.7	70.2	69.9	...	68.8
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad and Tobago ^{v/}	61.3	61.9	61.4	61.9	60.6	59.7	59.2	59.1	57.4	56.6	57.2	...	55.9	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	46.6	46.7	46.5	45.3	44.9	42.4	42.0	68.1	39.5	35.5	37.7	...	33.3	...	...	...	...
25 and over	64.1	65.2	64.4	65.4	63.7	63.1	62.4	49.3	60.6	60.3	60.7	...	59.9	...	...	...	...

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{w/}		
											1st Quarter ^{w/}			2nd Quarter ^{w/}				3rd Quarter ^{w/}	
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{w/}	61.8	62.9	62.7	62.5	62.5	62.6	62.9	63.1	63.3	58.7	62.4	60.3	54.3	61.1	57.9	61.9	58.2	61.1	
Latin America and the Caribbean - 15 - 24 ^{w/}	51.8	51.3	50.1	49.6	49.0	49.1	49.4	49.5	49.9	46.0	49.3	47.4	39.6	48.5	44.3	50.3	44.4	48.5	
Latin America and the Caribbean - 25 and over ^{w/}	68.7	68.1	68.0	67.9	68.1	68.1	68.1	68.2	68.2	64.1	67.2	64.9	59.1	65.7	62.6	66.1	63.0	65.6	

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

- a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters. The participation rates by age group correspond to the average for the I and II quarters.
- b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage.
- c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domicílios Contínua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.
- d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.
- e/ Includes hidden unemployment.
- f/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.
- g/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.
- h/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.
- i/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.
- j/ Includes hidden unemployment. The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.
- k/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Contínua (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.
- l/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.
- m/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity.
- n/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.
- o/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.
- p/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.
- q/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.
- r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.
- s/ Includes hidden unemployment. The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.
- t/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.
- u/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.
- v/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 5. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO, BY COUNTRY AND SEX, 2011 - 2021**
(Average annual rates)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w
Latin America																			
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	52.6	52.9	53.1	53.3	48.6	52.5	53.0	42.8	52.8	48.1	54.4	47.8	53.4	53.4
Men	...	...	...	...	...	64.0	64.4	63.9	63.5	57.9	62.0	63.8	50.6	62.9	57.7	63.7	56.8	63.5	63.5
Women	...	...	...	...	...	42.5	42.7	43.6	44.1	40.2	43.9	43.0	35.6	43.4	39.4	45.9	39.6	44.1	44.1
Bolivia (Pluri- State of) ^{b/}	63.7	59.7	61.5	64.3	58.9	63.8	64.9	68.4	70.3	60.4	65.0	64.7	55.8	66.3	57.3	69.0	59.4	66.6	66.6
Men	73.1	69.2	71.0	73.7	70.0	74.0	74.3	76.4	78.0	68.5	72.7	71.9	63.1	73.8	66.0	75.8	67.3	73.8	73.8
Women	55.7	50.9	52.8	55.3	48.2	53.9	56.0	60.8	62.9	52.6	57.5	57.8	48.7	59.1	49.0	62.4	51.7	59.8	59.8
Brazil ^{c/}	56.0	58.0	58.1	58.0	57.3	55.5	55.0	55.3	56.0	51.1	55.0	50.9	49.5	52.1	49.0	54.1	51.1	52.4	52.4
Men	67.3	70.1	70.0	69.7	68.5	66.4	65.3	65.5	66.1	61.5	65.2	61.8	59.5	63.0	59.7	64.9	61.5	63.2	63.2
Women	45.5	46.7	46.9	47.1	46.7	45.3	45.3	45.8	46.5	41.4	45.4	40.7	40.1	41.9	39.0	44.0	41.5	42.2	42.2
Chile ^{d/}	57.0	57.4	57.8	57.9	58.1	58.0	58.3	58.3	58.3	50.1	57.3	51.4	45.6	50.6	46.8	52.3	49.9	51.4	51.4
Men	70.2	70.3	70.2	69.6	70.0	69.4	69.4	69.2	68.7	60.3	68.1	62.2	55.1	60.9	56.2	62.8	59.8	61.9	61.9
Women	44.5	45.1	46.1	46.7	46.7	47.0	47.7	48.0	48.4	40.3	47.0	41.1	36.4	40.7	37.7	42.2	40.4	41.3	41.3
Colombia	56.8	57.8	58.0	58.4	59.0	58.5	58.4	57.8	56.6	49.8	53.8	51.1	43.7	50.9	48.4	53.0	48.6	51.7	51.7
Men	69.0	69.5	69.4	69.7	70.1	69.6	69.4	69.1	67.9	61.8	65.6	63.5	54.7	63.2	61.1	65.6	60.5	64.1	64.1
Women	45.2	46.7	47.1	47.6	48.3	48.0	47.8	47.0	45.9	38.3	42.6	39.3	33.1	39.2	36.2	41.1	37.3	39.8	39.8
Costa Rica	52.9	56.2	56.4	56.5	55.4	52.8	53.5	54.4	55.2	48.5	55.5	49.4	43.7	48.7	46.1	51.6	48.5	49.9	49.9
Men	67.2	69.2	68.9	69.7	68.3	66.6	67.5	68.0	67.4	61.0	68.2	62.4	56.4	61.4	59.0	63.3	61.2	62.4	62.4
Women	38.5	43.5	43.8	43.2	42.2	38.9	39.4	40.7	42.8	35.9	42.8	36.4	31.0	35.9	33.1	39.9	35.6	37.4	37.4

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020		2021		3rd Quarter ^w	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w
											1st Quarter ^w	2nd Quarter ^w	2020	2021				
Ecuador ^{e/}	59.6	60.4	60.3	60.4	63.3	64.6	65.5	64.3	63.7	57.9	...	60.7	52.8	62.4	59.9	63.4	56.3	62.2
Men	75.0	75.3	74.9	75.9	77.6	77.5	78.2	77.0	75.8	70.8	...	74.5	65.2	75.4	72.9	75.7	69.1	75.2
Women	45.3	46.5	46.6	46.0	49.8	52.4	53.6	52.2	52.0	45.6	...	47.5	40.9	50.1	47.4	51.7	44.1	49.8
El Salvador	58.6	59.4	59.9	58.4	57.8	57.9	57.6	57.4	58.2	57.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	74.6	75.4	75.1	73.7	73.5	73.6	73.9	73.6	74.9	73.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	45.0	45.8	47.0	45.5	44.4	44.7	43.9	43.8	44.3	43.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala ^{f/}	59.2	63.5	58.7	59.1	59.2	59.2	59.4	59.1	57.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	82.2	85.5	81.1	81.6	83.0	82.2	83.6	83.2	82.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	37.7	44.1	39.1	39.2	37.5	38.7	37.8	38.0	36.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras ^{g/}	49.7	48.9	51.6	53.1	53.8	53.2	55.1	57.0	54.1	53.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	68.1	67.2	69.7	70.3	70.8	70.2	73.0	72.8	71.9	67.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	32.8	32.2	35.3	37.8	38.8	38.4	39.1	42.6	38.0	41.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mexico ^{h/}	56.7	57.5	57.3	56.9	57.2	57.4	57.3	57.6	58.0	53.1	57.8	54.6	47.0	56.6	52.6	56.9	52.5	56.0
Men	74.4	74.9	74.6	74.4	74.7	74.7	75.0	74.9	74.5	68.3	73.8	70.9	60.1	72.7	68.7	73.2	67.5	72.3
Women	40.6	41.7	41.7	41.0	41.4	41.7	41.4	42.0	43.1	39.3	43.4	39.9	35.2	42.1	38.0	42.3	38.9	41.4
Nicaragua	71.1	72.3	71.4	69.1	68.1	70.2	70.8	67.7	67.2	65.6	67.5	66.0	62.9	63.1	64.9	63.7	65.1	64.3
Men	83.1	83.0	82.3	80.5	79.9	81.3	81.7	78.1	77.8	76.4	77.6	76.5	74.1	75.0	76.6	75.7	76.1	75.7
Women	59.8	62.2	61.2	58.5	57.1	60.1	60.8	58.2	57.7	55.9	58.4	56.7	52.9	52.3	54.4	52.8	55.2	53.9
Panama ^{i/}	59.1	61.0	61.5	60.9	60.9	60.8	60.1	61.5	61.8	51.3	...	...	...	...	51.3	53.5	51.3	53.5
Men	75.8	77.4	77.1	76.2	75.0	74.9	73.7	75.0	74.2	64.0	...	...	...	...	64.0	66.2	64.0	66.2
Women	43.5	45.8	46.8	46.8	47.6	47.7	47.2	48.8	50.2	40.1	...	...	...	...	40.1	41.8	40.1	41.8

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w
Paraguay ^y	57.7	61.5	59.3	58.6	58.7	58.9	66.7	67.4	67.6	64.8	65.6	67.0	61.6	65.8	64.9	66.7	66.5
Men	70.0	72.4	70.7	71.1	70.5	70.8	80.1	80.0	80.2	78.6	78.5	79.5	75.8	78.6	79.4	79.4	79.2
Women	45.4	50.6	49.7	46.0	47.2	47.0	53.4	55.0	55.3	51.6	53.1	54.6	47.9	53.4	50.9	54.4	54.1
Peru ^w	70.9	70.8	70.3	69.6	69.1	69.2	69.5	69.4	69.8	59.7	66.8	64.7	44.4	66.8	58.2	67.0	66.2
Men	79.6	79.8	79.2	78.5	78.2	78.1	77.8	77.7	78.1	69.3	74.8	73.6	53.1	75.6	68.3	75.5	74.9
Women	62.4	61.9	61.5	60.7	60.1	60.4	61.1	61.1	61.5	50.1	58.9	55.9	35.9	58.1	48.1	58.7	57.6
Uruguay ^y	60.7	59.9	59.5	60.4	59.0	58.4	57.9	57.2	56.7	54.3	55.6	55.0	52.9	55.0	53.8	55.5	55.1
Men	71.0	69.8	70.2	70.5	68.4	67.5	66.9	65.8	64.9	62.1	62.5	62.6	60.6	62.2	62.4	62.7	62.5
Women	51.3	51.1	50.0	51.3	50.5	50.1	49.8	49.4	49.0	47.1	49.3	48.1	45.8	48.4	45.9	48.9	48.5
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	59.0	58.7	59.3	60.4	59.1	59.2	61.3	61.9	60.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Men	72.6	72.1	72.6	73.8	72.6	72.4	74.8	74.9	74.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Women	45.6	45.6	46.1	47.1	45.9	46.3	48.1	49.1	47.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																	
Cuba	73.6	71.6	70.5	70.0	65.4	63.8	62.4	62.7	64.4	65.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Men	87.3	86.4	84.4	84.2	78.5	76.7	75.0	75.7	75.1	75.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Women	58.4	55.3	55.3	54.6	51.2	49.8	48.6	48.6	52.7	54.0	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Dominican Republic ^{m/}	54.6	55.4	54.9	55.5	57.3	57.9	58.7	60.0	61.0	56.7	59.8	56.8	54.8	58.0	55.4	58.9	57.9
Men	69.7	70.3	69.9	70.6	72.3	72.9	73.1	75.1	75.3	71.0	73.6	71.9	68.8	72.2	70.6	73.1	72.4
Women	40.1	41.1	40.4	41.0	43.1	43.8	45.2	45.9	47.8	43.4	47.1	42.9	42.0	44.8	41.5	45.7	44.5

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w
English-speaking Caribbean																	
Bahamas ^{n/}	60.6	62.0	61.6	62.9	64.4	67.7	72.5	74.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Men	...	64.4	64.9	67.2	70.1	73.3	76.0	76.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Women	...	59.9	58.8	59.0	61.0	62.7	66.8	68.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{o/}	60.1	58.5	58.9	56.0	57.7	60.0	58.9	58.3	57.6	51.1	...	48.6	...	52.6	48.2	...	50.6
Men	65.6	64.1	63.6	59.7	60.2	63.9	62.9	62.5	60.6	54.7	...	51.6	...	58.1	51.0	...	54.8
Women	55.1	53.5	54.8	52.6	55.3	56.5	55.3	54.4	54.9	47.8	...	45.8	...	47.8	45.7	...	46.8
Belize ^{p/}	...	55.7	56.7	56.3	56.8	57.9	58.1	59.4	62.0	47.6	...	...	...	53.0	47.6	56.2	56.2
Men	...	70.9	72.3	73.3	72.5	73.6	73.6	73.9	75.7	60.7	...	...	...	67.8	60.7	71.0	71.0
Women	...	40.9	39.6	39.4	41.2	42.4	42.9	45.1	48.3	35.2	...	...	...	38.8	35.2	41.9	41.9
Granada ^{q/}	51.3	...	45.3	47.9	48.9	49.0	50.3	54.8	57.9	50.5	...	54.2	43.6	56.9	52.1	...	56.9
Men	56.4	...	51.8	51.5	55.2	54.5	56.6	61.6	64.4	58.5	...	59.5	47.4	62.6	64.5	...	62.6
Women	46.1	...	38.7	44.3	42.9	43.4	44.3	48.4	54.0	43.1	...	49.0	40.2	50.8	41.1	...	50.8
Jamaica ^{r/}	54.3	53.3	53.4	54.2	54.6	56.2	57.5	58.2	59.7	56.6	60.9	57.3	...	57.6	53.6	58.0	57.6
Men	63.6	61.9	62.1	62.9	63.3	64.3	65.2	65.6	66.9	63.5	67.4	64.1	...	64.4	60.5	65.9	64.8
Women	45.8	45.0	45.0	45.8	46.2	48.4	50.0	51.0	52.7	49.9	54.5	50.7	...	51.0	46.9	50.4	50.7
Saint Lucia	...	55.6	54.4	54.5	54.8	57.4	57.0	57.0	59.0	53.9	57.6	53.5	53.3	54.0	53.1	...	53.7
Men	...	60.9	60.0	60.9	61.6	63.1	62.9	63.4	63.3	60.4	65.9	58.4	59.6	59.5	57.2	...	59.0
Women	...	50.6	49.1	48.3	47.9	51.6	51.4	50.8	55.5	48.2	49.4	49.5	48.0	49.3	49.9	...	49.4
Trinidad and Tobago ^{s/}	58.2	58.8	59.1	59.9	58.5	57.4	56.3	56.8	54.9	53.9	54.9	...	53.0	...	...	...	...
Men	69.5	69.2	69.5	70.1	69.2	66.8	66.0	66.2	63.6	62.4	63.5	...	61.3	...	...	...	...
Women	46.3	48.5	48.8	49.7	47.9	48.0	46.7	47.4	46.2	45.5	46.3	...	44.6	...	...	...	...

 Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021
											1st Quarter ^w		2nd Quarter ^w		3rd Quarter ^w		Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w	
Latin America and the Caribbean ^v	57.8	58.8	58.7	58.7	58.3	57.7	57.8	58.1	58.3	52.6	56.8	53.8	48.1	54.8	51.2	56.2	52.0	54.9
Latin America and the Caribbean - Men ^v	71.2	72.4	72.1	72.0	71.5	70.5	70.5	70.5	70.5	64.3	68.5	66.0	58.9	67.0	63.4	68.3	63.6	67.1
Latin America and the Caribbean - Women ^v	45.3	46.2	46.3	46.2	46.1	45.7	46.0	46.4	46.9	41.7	45.9	42.3	38.1	43.5	39.8	44.9	41.2	43.6

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

- a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.
- b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage.
- c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.
- d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.
- e/ The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.
- f/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.
- g/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.
- h/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.
- i/ The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.
- j/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.
- k/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.
- l/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity.
- m/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.
- n/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.
- o/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.
- p/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.
- q/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.
- r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.
- s/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.
- t/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.
- u/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 6. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND AGE GROUP. 2011 - 2021**
(Average annual rates)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	1st Quarter ^u			2nd Quarter ^u			3rd Quarter ^u			2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^u
											2020	2021	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2021
Latin America																						
Argentina ^{a/}	...	...	...	...	...	52.6	52.9	53.1	53.3	48.6	52.5	53.0	42.8	52.8	48.1	54.4	47.8	53.4				
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	29.2	30.2	30.2	29.0	23.2	28.1	28.1	17.2	28.3	21.8	...	22.7	28.2				
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	60.5	60.6	60.7	61.0	56.8	60.2	60.9	50.8	60.7	55.6	...	55.5	60.8				
Bolivia (Pluri-State of) ^{b/}	63.7	59.7	61.5	64.3	58.9	63.8	64.9	68.4	70.3	60.4	65.0	64.7	55.8	66.3	57.3	69.0	59.4	66.6				
15 - 24	48.8	43.3	43.5	49.0	41.0	47.4	39.2	37.9	44.7	37.8	43.5	46.0	30.2	48.5	34.6	...	43.5	47.3				
25 and over	78.4	76.7	76.3	77.8	73.9	76.0	75.2	74.5	75.7	70.3	74.5	73.3	66.9	74.3	67.3	...	74.5	73.8				
Brazil ^{c/}	56.0	58.0	58.1	58.0	57.3	55.5	55.0	55.3	56.0	51.1	55.0	50.9	49.5	52.1	49.0	54.1	51.1	52.4				
15 - 24	50.1	48.1	47.2	46.6	44.3	40.6	40.1	40.5	41.6	35.9	40.2	35.6	33.6	37.9	33.6	40.8	35.8	38.1				
25 and over	65.0	62.5	62.7	62.8	62.3	60.8	60.2	60.4	60.8	56.0	59.8	55.7	54.5	56.6	53.9	58.4	56.0	56.9				
Chile ^{d/}	57.0	57.4	57.8	57.9	58.1	58.0	58.3	58.3	58.3	50.1	57.3	51.4	45.6	50.6	46.8	52.3	49.9	51.4				
15 - 24	31.8	31.2	30.6	30.6	30.5	29.7	29.0	28.2	26.5	20.0	28.6	20.9	15.8	19.5	16.2	21.4	20.2	20.6				
25 and over	63.9	64.5	65.0	64.8	64.9	64.7	65.0	65.0	65.1	56.4	63.4	57.6	51.8	56.8	53.1	58.5	56.1	57.6				
Colombia	56.8	57.8	58.0	58.4	59.0	58.5	58.4	57.8	56.6	49.8	53.8	51.1	43.7	50.9	48.4	53.0	48.6	51.7				
15 - 24	42.5	44.3	44.2	44.4	45.0	43.8	43.3	42.3	40.7	34.2	37.2	35.8	27.6	35.0	33.3	36.6	32.7	35.8				
25 and over	67.8	68.5	68.7	69.0	69.3	68.9	68.5	67.9	66.6	58.8	63.6	60.0	52.4	60.1	57.1	62.4	57.7	60.8				
Costa Rica	52.9	56.2	56.4	56.5	55.4	52.8	53.5	54.4	55.2	48.5	55.5	49.4	43.7	48.7	46.1	51.6	48.5	49.9				
15 - 24	33.7	37.1	37.2	36.1	35.3	33.2	33.6	33.7	30.8	25.9	33.6	27.1	21.6	27.6	23.0	27.7	26.2	27.5				
25 and over	59.1	62.2	62.4	62.6	61.3	58.6	59.0	59.8	61.2	53.9	61.0	55.1	49.0	53.8	51.5	57.4	53.8	55.4				

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w	
											1st Quarter ^w		2nd Quarter ^w		3rd Quarter ^w			
											2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021		
Ecuador ^{e/}	59.6	60.4	60.3	60.4	63.3	64.6	65.5	64.3	63.7	57.9	...	60.7	52.8	62.4	59.9	63.4	56.3	62.2
15 - 24	37.9	39.2	37.6	36.5	39.0	40.2	41.4	40.5	40.1	36.0	...	41.8	30.1	42.6	40.0	42.0	35.2	40.7
25 and over	67.1	67.4	68.1	69.0	71.9	73.1	73.9	72.3	71.3	64.5	...	66.9	60.1	68.9	66.6	70.8	63.3	69.7
El Salvador	58.6	59.4	59.9	58.4	57.8	57.9	57.6	57.4	58.2	57.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	40.7	44.0	43.4	41.7	39.4	41.7	41.9	41.9	42.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	64.1	65.0	66.0	64.4	63.4	63.5	62.9	62.5	63.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Guatemala ^{f/}	59.2	63.5	58.7	59.1	59.2	59.2	59.4	59.1	57.9	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	49.4	55.4	47.4	48.6	49.4	49.6	49.8	49.9	49.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	64.3	67.4	64.3	64.2	64.0	63.8	63.9	63.4	61.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Honduras ^{g/}	49.7	48.9	51.6	53.1	53.8	53.2	55.1	57.0	54.1	53.3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	45.9	44.8	47.9	47.4	48.6	46.7	49.0	51.4	47.9	44.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	63.2	62.1	64.5	65.5	65.8	64.9	66.2	67.6	64.5	56.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Mexico ^{h/}	56.7	57.5	57.3	56.9	57.2	57.4	57.3	57.6	58.0	53.1	57.8	54.6	47.0	56.6	52.6	56.9	52.5	56.0
15 - 24	42.3	42.8	42.0	41.2	41.0	40.8	40.8	40.7	41.6	38.9	40.7	38.1	30.1	40.9	37.0	42.4	35.9	40.4
25 and over	61.7	62.5	62.4	62.0	62.4	62.6	62.4	62.7	62.9	59.7	62.8	59.3	51.4	61.0	57.0	61.0	57.1	60.4
Nicaragua	71.1	72.3	71.4	69.1	68.1	70.2	70.8	67.7	67.2	65.6	67.5	66.0	62.9	63.1	64.9	63.7	65.1	64.3
15 - 24	64.4	64.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	76.1	76.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Panama ^{i/}	59.1	61.0	61.5	60.9	60.9	60.8	60.1	61.5	61.8	51.3	...	...	...	...	51.3	53.5	51.3	53.5
15 - 24	38.7	41.5	41.8	39.5	38.2	38.2	37.2	39.2	38.5	29.9	...	...	...	...	29.9	31.5	29.9	31.5
25 and over	64.8	66.7	67.7	67.5	67.9	68.0	67.0	68.4	68.8	57.2	...	...	...	...	57.2	59.8	57.2	59.8

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	1st Quarter ^w		2nd Quarter ^w		3rd Quarter ^w		2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^w	
Paraguay ^v	57.7	61.5	59.3	58.6	58.7	58.9	66.7	67.4	67.6	64.8	65.6	67.0	61.6	65.8	64.9	66.7	64.0	66.5	64.0	66.5	64.0	66.5
15 - 24	50.9	53.9	53.4	50.9	48.6	51.0	50.0	50.0	50.2	46.6	46.9	49.5	42.6	49.0	46.1	50.4	45.2	49.6	45.2	49.6	45.2	49.6
25 and over	71.7	75.7	73.7	71.7	72.9	72.3	72.9	73.7	73.8	71.2	72.1	72.9	68.3	71.5	71.4	72.3	70.6	72.2	70.6	72.2	70.6	72.2
Peru ^w	70.9	70.8	70.3	69.6	69.1	69.2	69.5	69.4	69.8	59.7	66.8	64.7	44.4	66.8	58.2	67.0	56.5	66.2	56.5	66.2	56.5	66.2
15 - 24	53.9	53.5	52.6	50.6	49.2	48.0	48.2	47.5	48.6	42.1	47.3	46.8	25.0	46.8	37.4	46.6	36.5	46.7	36.5	46.7	36.5	46.7
25 and over	79.0	78.7	78.2	77.8	77.6	78.0	78.1	78.0	78.2	66.6	74.0	71.3	47.2	74.3	64.8	74.5	62.0	73.4	62.0	73.4	62.0	73.4
Uruguay ^v	60.7	59.9	59.5	60.4	59.0	58.4	57.9	57.2	56.7	54.3	55.6	55.0	52.9	55.0	53.8	55.5	54.1	55.1	54.1	55.1	54.1	55.1
15 - 24	40.8	39.9	39.3	39.1	36.1	34.5	33.0	32.2	31.2	28.8	31.9	29.4	27.5	27.3	27.9	...	29.7	28.4	29.7	28.4	29.7	28.4
25 and over	66.0	65.3	65.0	66.1	65.3	65.0	64.7	64.1	63.5	61.6	62.6	62.2	60.2	62.8	61.3	...	61.4	62.5	61.4	62.5	61.4	62.5
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)	59.0	58.7	59.3	60.4	59.1	59.2	61.3	61.9	60.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	34.5	33.7	34.2	35.4	33.1	32.4	35.6	36.3	36.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	67.6	67.3	67.6	68.4	67.3	67.5	69.2	69.6	66.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Spanish-speaking Caribbean																						
Cuba	73.6	71.6	70.5	70.0	65.4	63.8	62.4	62.7	64.4	65.4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dominican Republic ^{m/}	54.6	55.4	54.9	55.5	57.3	57.9	58.7	60.0	61.0	56.7	59.8	56.8	54.8	58.0	55.4	58.9	56.7	57.9	56.7	57.9	56.7	57.9
15 - 24	34.9	35.0	33.9	35.4	36.8	37.2	37.7	38.0	38.2	33.3	37.1	34.8	30.6	37.7	32.1	...	33.9	36.2	33.9	36.2	33.9	36.2
25 and over	62.4	63.0	62.8	62.7	64.5	65.2	65.9	67.2	68.3	63.9	67.0	63.5	62.4	64.1	62.5	...	64.7	63.8	64.7	63.8	64.7	63.8

▶ Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^{w/}
English-speaking Caribbean																	
Bahamas ^{n/}	60.6	62.0	61.6	62.9	64.4	67.7	72.5	74.2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Barbados ^{o/}	60.1	58.5	58.9	56.0	57.7	60.0	58.9	58.3	57.6	51.1	...	48.6	...	52.6	48.2	...	50.6
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belize ^{p/}	...	55.7	56.7	56.3	56.8	57.9	58.1	59.4	62.0	47.6	...	...	...	53.0	47.6	56.2	56.2
15 - 24	...	35.7	35.3	35.9	35.2	35.3	36.7	35.7	40.6	32.5	...	...	...	36.1	32.5	39.7	39.7
25 and over	...	65.7	66.5	67.2	68.1	69.4	69.0	71.4	72.8	53.9	...	...	...	60.1	53.9	63.1	63.1
Granada ^{q/}	51.3	...	45.3	47.9	48.9	49.0	50.3	54.8	57.9	50.5	...	54.2	43.6	56.9	52.1	...	56.9
15 - 24	...	...	25.4	30.3	33.0	26.2	31.6	37.6	38.6	28.2	...	28.8	27.9	36.0	27.0	...	36.0
25 and over	...	...	51.4	53.3	53.1	55.5	55.3	58.9	62.4	55.9	...	60.4	47.4	61.9	58.4	...	61.9
Jamaica ^{r/}	54.3	53.3	53.4	54.2	54.6	56.2	57.5	58.2	59.7	56.6	60.9	57.3	...	57.6	53.6	58.0	57.6
15 - 24	...	22.4	21.6	21.9	22.8	25.0	26.2	25.9	27.7	25.3	29.0	26.0	...	25.5	22.9	26.2	25.9
25 and over	...	65.4	65.9	66.9	67.0	68.5	69.8	70.9	72.2	68.9	73.3	69.5	...	70.2	65.6	70.5	70.1
Saint Lucia	...	55.6	54.4	54.5	54.8	57.4	57.0	57.0	59.0	53.9	57.6	53.5	53.3	54.0	53.1	...	53.7
15 - 24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 and over	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Trinidad and Tobago ^{s/}	58.2	58.8	59.1	59.9	58.5	57.4	56.3	56.8	54.9	53.9	54.9	...	53.0	...	...	...	...
15 - 24	41.0	41.3	42.4	41.7	41.0	37.9	37.8	65.9	...	...	32.6	...	30.1	...	...	...	...
25 and over	61.7	62.6	62.6	63.7	62.0	61.1	59.8	47.1	...	...	58.8	...	57.0	...	...	...	...

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021		2020	2021	Average 1st - 3rd Quarter ^u
											1st Quarter ^u	2nd Quarter ^u	3rd Quarter ^u		
Latin America and the Caribbean ^v	57.8	58.8	58.7	58.7	58.3	57.7	57.8	58.1	58.3	52.6	56.8	53.8	48.1	51.2	54.9
Latin America and the Caribbean - 15 - 24 ^v	44.5	44.2	43.1	42.8	41.6	40.3	40.2	40.3	40.7	35.7	39.2	36.5	29.8	33.7	38.1
Latin America and the Caribbean - 25 and over ^v	65.5	64.9	64.8	64.8	64.7	64.1	64.0	64.0	64.0	58.6	62.6	59.3	53.5	56.6	60.3

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

a/ 31 urban areas. The INDEC, within the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters. Employment to population ratio by age group correspond to the average of the I and II quarters.

b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The annual data for 2020 is for urban coverage. For comparability the quarterly data presented in the table for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are for urban coverage. Employment to population ratio by age group correspond to the average of the I and II quarters.

c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.

d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.

e/ The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020, the average data for the II quarter of 2020 corresponds to the months of May and June.

f/ Since 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data.

g/ Data for 2020 are preliminary and correspond to a telephone survey conducted in November and December.

h/ Data up to the I quarter of 2020 come from the ENOE, data for the second quarter of 2020 come from the ETOE and from the third quarter of 2020 onwards the information corresponds to the new edition of the ENOE.

i/ The 2020 data corresponds to the telephone survey conducted between September and October and the 2021 survey corresponds to October.

j/ Data from 2017 correspond to the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continúa (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.

k/ Data for 2020 and 2021 are preliminary.

l/ Annual data for 2020 is preliminary. The data for the first quarter of 2020 comes from the ECH for January and February, from March 2020 to June 2021 they come from the ECH-Telefónica. From July 2021 onwards, it corresponds to the ECH 2021, which includes a methodological change, becoming a rotating panel survey also with monthly periodicity. Employment to population ratio by age group correspond to the average of the I and II quarters.

m/ Series 2011 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labour Force Survey (ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years. Employment to population ratio by age group correspond to the average of the I and II quarters.

n/ 2019 data are preliminary and correspond to May.

o/ 2020 data correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters. The survey was not conducted in the I and II quarters of 2020.

p/ Data for 2018 corresponds to April, for 2019 to the average of April and September and for 2020 to September.

q/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter of 2020.

r/ The survey was not conducted in the II quarter (April) of 2020; the 2020 annual average corresponds to data from the I, III and IV quarters.

s/ The annual average for 2019 corresponds to the I, II and IV quarters; the survey was not conducted in the III quarter of 2019.

t/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Panama.

u/ Data for 2020 and 2021, may present comparability problems with 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes that the Institutes of Statistics and Census have implemented due to the COVID - 19 situation. Preliminary data.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the Survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 7. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO BY STATUS IN EMPLOYMENT AND YEARS OF EDUCATION^{a/}. 2012- 2020**
(percentages)

Year	Years of education ^{b/}	TOTAL	Status in employment									
			Employee			Non-employee			Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
			Total	Public	Private	Total	Employer	Own-account				
2012	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	None	4.2	2.2	0.8	2.5	7.3	2.4	8.1	5.9	7.4	2.4	
	1 to 6	25.0	16.9	6.0	19.4	35.8	22.2	38.0	40.5	37.5	35.3	
	7 to 12	49.4	53.0	36.6	56.7	42.4	44.1	42.2	51.1	47.4	49.6	
	13 and over	21.4	27.9	56.6	21.4	14.5	31.3	11.8	2.5	7.6	12.7	
2015	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	None	3.7	1.9	0.6	2.1	6.5	2.0	7.2	5.0	6.9	1.2	
	1 to 6	22.9	15.5	5.1	17.7	33.0	19.7	35.1	37.9	34.3	31.8	
	7 to 12	50.5	53.3	34.4	57.4	44.5	44.2	44.5	54.2	49.9	55.6	
	13 and over	22.9	29.3	59.9	22.7	16.0	34.1	13.3	2.9	8.8	11.4	
2016	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	None	3.7	2.0	0.6	2.3	6.3	2.2	6.9	5.0	6.6	2.2	
	1 to 6	22.2	15.0	4.9	17.1	31.9	19.3	33.8	36.4	33.2	30.6	
	7 to 12	50.3	52.6	33.9	56.7	45.2	44.1	45.4	55.1	50.6	52.3	
	13 and over	23.8	30.4	60.6	23.9	16.7	34.4	14.0	3.5	9.6	14.9	
2017	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	None	3.5	1.8	0.6	2.1	5.9	2.0	6.5	4.6	6.8	0.8	
	1 to 6	21.5	14.3	4.5	16.5	30.9	19.3	32.7	35.1	32.5	27.3	
	7 to 12	50.4	52.6	33.7	56.7	45.6	43.7	45.9	56.5	50.4	46.9	
	13 and over	24.5	31.2	61.2	24.7	17.5	35.0	14.9	3.9	10.3	25.0	

► Continues...

Year	Years of education ^{b/}	TOTAL	Status in employment							
			Employee			Non-employee				Others
			Total	Public	Private	Total	Employer	Own-account	Domestic worker	
2018	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	3.3	1.7	0.5	2.0	5.5	1.9	6.1	4.5	2.1
	1 to 6	21.0	13.9	4.4	16.0	30.1	18.7	31.8	34.2	36.7
	7 to 12	50.4	52.3	32.6	56.6	46.0	43.5	46.4	57.0	43.6
	13 and over	25.3	32.1	62.5	25.5	18.5	35.9	15.7	4.2	17.6
2019	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	3.1	1.7	0.5	1.9	5.2	1.8	5.7	4.4	2.0
	1 to 6	19.8	13.1	4.0	15.0	28.4	17.6	30.1	33.2	25.5
	7 to 12	50.7	52.2	31.8	56.6	46.8	44.0	47.2	57.6	55.2
	13 and over	26.3	33.0	63.7	26.4	19.6	36.5	17.0	4.8	17.2
2020 ^{c/}	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	2.4	1.3	0.4	1.5	4.0	1.7	4.3	3.2	1.4
	1 to 6	18.0	11.6	3.6	13.5	26.5	17.2	27.8	32.9	15.7
	7 to 12	50.7	51.3	30.0	56.6	48.3	42.6	49.2	58.2	40.2
	13 and over	28.8	35.9	66.0	28.4	21.2	38.5	18.7	5.7	42.7

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

a/ Selected countries: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil (new reweighted series), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The data correspond to the age of the official Working Age Population of each country.

b/ Excludes those who do not declare years of study.

c/ Excludes Guatemala and Honduras. Ecuador corresponds to the III and IV quarters, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) I quarter, Colombia excludes March and April.

► **Table 8. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO BY STATUS IN EMPLOYMENT, SUB-REGION AND YEARS OF EDUCATION.**
2020 (percentages)

Subregion	Years of education ^{a/}	TOTAL	Status in employment								
			Employee			Non-employee			Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
			Total	Public	Private	Total	Employer	Own-account			
Latin America ^{b/}	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	4.2	2.2	0.8	2.5	7.3	2.4	8.1	5.9	7.4	2.4
	1 to 6	25.0	16.9	6.0	19.4	35.8	22.2	38.0	40.5	37.5	35.3
	7 to 12	49.4	53.0	36.6	56.7	42.4	44.1	42.2	51.1	47.4	49.6
	13 and over	21.4	27.9	56.6	21.4	14.5	31.3	11.8	2.5	7.6	12.7
Central America ^{c/}	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	3.2	1.9	0.6	2.2	5.8	3.5	6.2	4.9	4.5	0.0
	1 to 6	20.7	14.4	4.3	16.7	31.1	27.8	31.7	41.6	23.9	0.0
	7 to 12	52.4	54.4	33.7	58.9	47.4	43.4	48.2	49.6	59.3	100.0
	13 and over	23.7	29.3	61.4	22.3	15.7	25.2	13.9	3.9	12.3	0.0
Andean Countries ^{d/}	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	None	3.9	1.6	0.2	1.8	5.3	1.7	5.6	4.0	7.3	1.5
	1 to 6	26.3	16.8	4.2	19.1	34.2	24.1	34.9	35.4	29.8	15.6
	7 to 12	42.6	42.4	18.4	46.7	41.7	40.0	41.8	48.8	46.3	39.8
	13 and over	27.2	39.2	77.2	32.4	18.8	34.2	17.7	11.7	16.6	43.1

► Continues...

► **Table 9. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYED POPULATION BY STATUS IN EMPLOYMENT, COUNTRY, YEAR AND SEX. 2012 - 2020 (percentages)**

Country, year, sex		TOTAL	Status in employment											
			Employee			Non-employee					Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
			Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer		Own-account				
Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers			Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative		Non-professional, technical or administrative						
Latin America ^{a/}														
2012	Total	100.0	58.0	10.8	13.0	34.1	30.7	3.2	1.1	2.6	23.8	5.1	5.3	0.9
	Men	100.0	61.6	8.8	15.5	37.3	33.2	4.0	1.4	2.7	25.0	0.6	3.6	1.0
	Women	100.0	52.7	13.9	9.4	29.5	27.0	2.0	0.6	2.3	22.1	11.8	7.8	0.6
2015	Total	100.0	58.3	10.6	13.0	34.6	30.8	3.0	1.1	2.7	24.1	5.0	4.9	1.1
	Men	100.0	61.3	8.5	15.4	37.4	33.7	3.8	1.4	2.8	25.6	0.6	3.2	1.3
	Women	100.0	53.9	13.7	9.6	30.6	26.7	1.9	0.6	2.4	21.8	11.4	7.3	0.8
2018	Total	100.0	57.0	10.4	13.3	33.4	32.3	3.2	1.2	2.9	25.1	4.9	4.5	1.2
	Men	100.0	60.0	8.3	15.8	35.9	35.0	4.0	1.5	2.9	26.5	0.6	2.9	1.4
	Women	100.0	52.8	13.2	9.7	29.8	28.5	2.1	0.7	2.7	23.0	11.1	6.7	0.9
2019	Total	100.0	57.1	10.3	13.5	33.4	32.3	3.1	1.1	3.0	25.0	4.9	4.4	1.2
	Men	100.0	60.3	8.3	16.0	36.0	34.7	3.9	1.4	3.0	26.4	0.6	2.9	1.5
	Women	100.0	52.7	13.2	9.9	29.7	28.9	2.1	0.7	2.9	23.1	11.0	6.5	0.8
2020	Total	100.0	56.8	11.6	13.1	32.1	32.6	3.0	1.1	3.1	25.4	4.4	4.4	1.8
	Men	100.0	59.1	9.2	15.7	34.3	35.4	3.7	1.4	3.2	27.1	0.6	2.9	2.0
	Women	100.0	53.5	15.0	9.5	29.0	28.5	1.9	0.6	3.1	23.0	9.9	6.6	1.4

► Continues...

► Continues...

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment											Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
		Employee				Non-employee				Total					
						Employer		Own-account							
TOTAL	Total	Public	Private		Establishments with six or more workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers											
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{e/}															
2012	Total	100.0	36.8	9.9	11.9	15.0	42.8	5.5	1.0	2.1	34.3	2.4	17.6	0.4	
	Men	100.0	42.9	9.5	14.4	19.0	45.9	7.2	1.4	2.5	34.8	0.1	10.7	0.5	
	Women	100.0	29.1	10.3	8.7	10.1	39.0	3.4	0.4	1.5	33.7	5.2	26.4	0.3	
2015	Total	100.0	36.0	8.7	12.8	14.5	45.0	3.5	0.9	2.5	38.2	1.5	17.1	0.3	
	Men	100.0	41.3	8.2	15.3	17.8	48.7	4.4	1.3	2.9	40.1	0.2	9.7	0.1	
	Women	100.0	28.6	9.3	9.2	10.0	39.9	2.1	0.3	1.9	35.5	3.3	27.6	0.6	
2018	Total	100.0	29.0	8.0	9.7	11.3	49.3	4.3	0.6	2.6	41.9	1.8	19.5	0.4	
	Men	100.0	33.2	7.6	11.5	14.1	56.0	5.9	1.0	3.0	46.1	0.2	9.9	0.7	
	Women	100.0	24.0	8.6	7.4	8.0	41.4	2.3	0.2	2.1	36.8	3.6	30.9	0.0	
2019	Total	100.0	31.0	8.3	11.3	11.4	48.5	3.7	0.5	2.7	41.6	1.9	18.3	0.3	
	Men	100.0	36.3	7.6	14.0	14.7	52.7	5.1	0.7	3.1	43.7	0.2	10.3	0.5	
	Women	100.0	24.7	9.2	7.9	7.5	43.6	2.1	0.2	2.3	39.1	3.9	27.8	0.0	
2020	Total	100.0	27.2	7.1	9.8	10.3	47.7	2.9	0.3	2.8	41.7	1.8	19.4	3.9	
	Men	100.0	32.0	6.7	12.2	13.0	52.4	3.9	0.4	3.2	44.9	0.2	11.1	4.3	
	Women	100.0	21.5	7.5	6.9	7.1	42.2	1.7	0.1	2.3	38.0	3.7	29.1	3.4	
Brazil d/															
2012	Total	100.0	64.1	12.3	10.5	41.3	26.3	2.5	1.5	3.1	19.3	6.7	2.9	0.0	
	Men	100.0	66.3	9.1	12.0	45.1	31.1	3.1	1.8	3.3	22.9	0.8	1.8	0.0	
	Women	100.0	60.9	16.7	8.4	35.9	19.6	1.6	1.0	2.9	14.2	14.9	4.5	0.0	

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												Domestic worker	Contrib- uting family worker	Others			
		Employee					Non-employee					Total	Establish- ments with a maxi- mum of five workers				Establish- ments with six or more workers	Profes- sional, technical or admin- istrative	Non-pro- fessional, technical or admin- istrative
Total	100.0	63.3	12.1	10.3	40.8	27.7	2.7	1.6	3.2	20.1	6.3	2.7	2.7	0.0					
2015	Men	100.0	64.6	9.1	11.7	43.8	33.1	3.3	2.1	3.5	24.2	0.7	1.6	0.0					
	Women	100.0	61.5	16.3	8.4	36.8	20.3	1.8	1.0	2.9	14.6	14.0	4.3	0.0					
	Total	100.0	61.5	12.3	11.3	38.0	29.7	2.9	1.8	3.4	21.5	6.6	2.2	0.0					
2018	Men	100.0	63.2	9.3	13.2	40.6	34.5	3.5	2.3	3.5	25.2	0.9	1.4	0.0					
	Women	100.0	59.3	16.1	8.7	34.5	23.2	2.0	1.3	3.3	16.6	14.1	3.4	0.0					
	Total	100.0	61.3	12.1	11.3	38.0	30.1	2.8	1.8	3.6	21.9	6.4	2.2	0.0					
2019	Men	100.0	62.9	9.2	13.1	40.6	34.8	3.4	2.2	3.6	25.6	0.9	1.4	0.0					
	Women	100.0	59.2	15.9	8.8	34.6	23.8	2.1	1.2	3.6	16.9	13.8	3.2	0.0					
	Total	100.0	61.9	13.4	10.9	37.6	30.4	2.8	1.8	3.9	21.9	5.6	2.1	0.0					
2020	Men	100.0	62.7	10.1	12.7	39.9	35.0	3.4	2.3	3.9	25.5	0.8	1.4	0.0					
	Women	100.0	60.8	17.9	8.4	34.5	23.9	1.9	1.2	3.9	16.9	12.2	3.1	0.0					
	Chile																		
2012	Total	100.0	71.6	10.8	6.7	54.1	22.7	2.5	1.6	2.3	16.2	4.5	1.2	0.0					
	Men	100.0	75.8	8.4	7.5	59.8	23.2	3.1	2.3	2.4	15.3	0.3	0.7	0.0					
	Women	100.0	65.5	14.3	5.5	45.7	21.9	1.6	0.6	2.2	17.5	10.7	1.9	0.0					
2015	Total	100.0	71.5	11.3	7.1	53.1	23.5	2.6	1.5	2.8	16.5	3.8	1.2	0.0					
	Men	100.0	74.9	8.8	7.9	58.3	24.1	3.2	2.1	3.0	15.8	0.3	0.7	0.0					
	Women	100.0	66.7	15.0	5.8	45.8	22.5	1.8	0.7	2.5	17.5	9.0	1.9	0.0					

▶ Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment																		
		TOTAL							Employee					Non-employee				Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
									Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer		Own-account				
											Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative			
2018	Total	100.0	70.6	11.8	6.8	51.9	24.6	2.7	1.5	3.1	17.4	3.7	1.1	0.0						
	Men	100.0	73.2	8.8	7.8	56.7	25.9	3.3	2.0	3.1	17.5	0.1	0.7	0.0						
	Women	100.0	66.9	16.1	5.5	45.3	22.8	1.8	0.7	3.0	17.3	8.5	1.8	0.0						
2019	Total	100.0	70.6	12.2	6.9	51.5	24.9	2.6	1.5	3.3	17.5	3.6	1.0	0.0						
	Men	100.0	73.2	9.3	7.9	55.9	26.1	3.3	2.0	3.4	17.4	0.2	0.6	0.0						
	Women	100.0	67.1	16.2	5.5	45.4	23.2	1.7	0.7	3.2	17.5	8.2	1.5	0.0						
2020	Total	100.0	70.1	14.2	7.3	48.5	22.1	2.3	1.0	2.8	16.0	2.6	0.9	4.3						
	Men	100.0	71.0	11.0	8.0	52.0	22.9	2.9	1.4	2.7	16.0	0.2	0.7	5.2						
	Women	100.0	68.7	18.8	6.3	43.6	21.0	1.6	0.5	2.9	16.1	6.2	1.1	3.0						
Colombia																				
2012	Total	100.0	43.0	4.0	12.5	26.5	47.8	4.2	0.7	3.6	39.3	3.5	5.5	0.1						
	Men	100.0	46.3	3.6	14.8	27.8	49.7	5.4	0.9	3.8	39.6	0.3	3.7	0.1						
	Women	100.0	38.4	4.6	9.3	24.5	45.2	2.6	0.4	3.3	38.9	8.1	8.1	0.2						
2015	Total	100.0	45.4	3.9	12.2	29.4	46.6	3.5	0.7	3.8	38.7	3.3	4.6	0.1						
	Men	100.0	47.4	3.4	13.9	30.1	49.2	4.3	0.9	4.0	40.0	0.3	3.0	0.1						
	Women	100.0	42.6	4.5	9.8	28.3	42.9	2.2	0.4	3.5	36.9	7.4	6.9	0.2						
2018	Total	100.0	45.3	3.8	11.6	30.0	47.7	3.4	0.6	4.0	39.6	2.9	4.0	0.1						
	Men	100.0	46.4	3.3	13.0	30.1	50.8	4.3	0.8	4.1	41.5	0.3	2.5	0.0						
	Women	100.0	43.8	4.4	9.6	29.8	43.3	2.2	0.4	3.8	36.9	6.7	6.1	0.1						

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
		Employee					Non-employee									
Total	Public	Private		Total	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Own-account		Non-professional, technical or administrative					
		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers						Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative						
2019	Total	100.0	47.1	3.7	12.5	30.8	46.0	3.0	0.6	4.0	38.4	3.1	3.7	0.1		
	Men	100.0	49.1	3.3	14.3	31.5	48.2	3.7	0.9	4.1	39.6	0.3	2.3	0.0		
	Women	100.0	44.2	4.3	10.1	29.9	42.9	2.0	0.4	4.0	36.5	7.0	5.7	0.1		
2020	Total	100.0	44.1	4.1	11.6	28.4	47.1	2.6	0.6	4.3	39.7	2.7	3.5	2.6		
	Men	100.0	45.4	3.5	13.7	28.2	49.4	3.1	0.8	4.4	41.0	0.3	2.4	2.5		
	Women	100.0	42.0	5.1	8.4	28.5	43.7	1.8	0.3	4.1	37.6	6.2	5.2	2.8		
Costa Rica																
2012	Total	100.0	72.9	15.6	18.3	39.1	20.9	2.1	0.8	3.1	15.0	4.3	1.8	0.0		
	Men	100.0	75.1	12.9	17.8	44.4	23.9	2.8	1.0	3.4	16.7	0.1	0.9	0.1		
	Women	100.0	69.5	19.8	19.1	30.5	16.2	0.9	0.5	2.5	12.3	11.0	3.3	0.0		
2015	Total	100.0	70.1	13.3	18.6	38.3	21.8	2.3	0.8	2.6	16.0	4.9	2.5	0.6		
	Men	100.0	72.8	10.9	18.3	43.6	24.7	2.9	1.1	2.9	17.8	0.2	1.6	0.7		
	Women	100.0	65.9	17.1	19.2	29.6	17.0	1.4	0.4	2.2	13.0	12.7	4.0	0.4		
2018	Total	100.0	70.4	12.7	17.0	40.7	23.4	3.0	1.1	2.2	17.1	4.1	1.7	0.3		
	Men	100.0	73.2	10.4	16.3	46.4	25.3	3.9	1.4	2.0	18.0	0.1	1.1	0.4		
	Women	100.0	65.8	16.5	18.3	31.0	20.2	1.4	0.6	2.7	15.4	11.0	2.8	0.3		
2019	Total	100.0	68.4	13.9	16.5	38.0	24.7	2.8	0.6	3.3	18.0	4.6	2.0	0.4		
	Men	100.0	71.0	11.2	16.0	43.9	27.2	3.3	0.8	3.3	19.7	0.1	1.3	0.4		
	Women	100.0	64.3	18.2	17.4	28.7	20.6	1.9	0.2	3.2	15.3	11.7	3.0	0.3		

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												
		Employee				Non-employee								
						Employer			Own-account		Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
Total	Public	Private		Total	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative						
		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers											
2020	Total	100.0	68.6	14.9	16.1	37.6	25.2	2.5	0.7	2.6	19.5	3.7	2.0	0.5
	Men	100.0	69.9	11.2	17.0	41.7	28.2	3.0	1.0	2.4	21.9	0.0	1.3	0.6
	Women	100.0	66.5	21.2	14.7	30.5	20.2	1.7	0.2	2.9	15.4	10.0	3.2	0.2
Ecuador ^{e/}														
2012	Total	100.0	50.7	8.7	16.5	25.5	36.7	3.5	0.5	1.5	31.2	2.6	10.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	57.3	7.8	20.7	28.8	37.1	4.4	0.7	1.7	30.3	0.3	5.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	40.6	10.1	10.1	20.4	36.1	2.1	0.2	1.3	32.5	6.1	17.1	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	52.3	9.4	17.4	25.5	34.8	2.8	0.5	1.4	30.2	2.6	10.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	60.5	8.8	21.9	29.8	33.9	3.5	0.7	1.6	28.2	0.3	5.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	40.3	10.2	10.7	19.3	36.1	1.7	0.2	1.1	33.1	6.1	17.5	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	47.1	8.0	16.7	22.4	37.3	2.6	0.4	2.1	32.2	2.7	13.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	55.8	7.7	21.5	26.6	37.0	3.1	0.6	2.2	31.0	0.3	7.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	34.8	8.4	9.8	16.5	37.7	1.8	0.2	1.8	33.9	6.1	21.4	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	45.8	7.7	16.3	21.8	38.1	2.5	0.4	2.2	33.1	2.8	13.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	54.5	7.3	21.2	26.0	37.8	3.1	0.5	2.4	31.8	0.2	7.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	33.5	8.2	9.4	15.9	38.6	1.6	0.2	2.0	34.8	6.2	21.6	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	42.7	7.8	15.5	19.4	39.6	2.0	0.3	2.6	34.7	2.2	15.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	50.9	7.0	20.8	23.1	39.0	2.6	0.4	2.5	33.6	0.5	9.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	31.1	8.9	7.9	14.2	40.4	1.3	0.1	2.7	36.3	4.7	23.9	0.0

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												
		Employee					Non-employee					Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
		Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account				
Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative						
El Salvador														
2012	Total	100.0	53.8	8.1	17.2	28.5	34.0	3.8	0.5	1.0	28.8	4.4	7.7	0.1
	Men	100.0	62.2	7.8	22.3	32.1	29.5	4.4	0.6	1.3	23.2	0.6	7.6	0.1
	Women	100.0	42.0	8.6	10.1	23.3	40.3	2.9	0.2	0.6	36.6	9.6	8.0	0.1
2015	Total	100.0	55.0	7.6	17.4	29.9	33.5	4.0	0.4	1.2	27.9	4.5	6.9	0.2
	Men	100.0	63.7	7.4	22.6	33.7	29.3	4.8	0.5	1.5	22.5	0.6	6.1	0.2
	Women	100.0	42.6	7.9	10.0	24.6	39.3	2.9	0.2	0.7	35.5	9.9	7.9	0.2
2018	Total	100.0	56.6	7.7	18.5	30.4	32.9	4.1	0.4	1.4	27.0	4.4	5.9	0.2
	Men	100.0	65.3	7.3	23.4	34.5	28.7	5.1	0.5	1.5	21.5	0.8	5.0	0.2
	Women	100.0	44.3	8.3	11.7	24.4	38.7	2.5	0.2	1.2	34.8	9.6	7.2	0.1
2019	Total	100.0	55.9	7.6	19.1	29.2	33.3	4.1	0.3	1.4	27.5	4.7	5.7	0.4
	Men	100.0	65.8	7.4	24.5	34.0	28.6	4.4	0.5	1.6	22.1	0.6	4.6	0.4
	Women	100.0	41.9	8.0	11.4	22.5	40.1	3.7	0.1	1.0	35.3	10.4	7.3	0.4
2020	Total	100.0	56.9	7.9	24.7	24.3	33.6	3.6	0.3	1.3	28.4	4.4	5.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	67.2	8.1	31.2	27.9	27.8	4.1	0.4	1.6	21.8	0.7	4.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	42.2	7.7	15.4	19.1	41.8	3.0	0.2	0.8	37.8	9.7	6.3	0.0
Guatemala ^{1/}														
2012	Total	100.0	49.3	5.3	20.8	23.1	33.6	2.5	0.3	1.2	29.6	3.5	13.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	59.0	4.3	27.1	27.6	29.4	2.4	0.5	1.1	25.4	0.3	11.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	32.5	7.0	10.0	15.4	40.9	2.6	0.1	1.3	36.9	9.1	17.6	0.0

 Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												
		Employee							Non-employee					
		Total	Public		Private		Total	Employer			Own-account			
			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
2015	Total	100.0	57.4	6.2	21.1	30.1	30.0	2.5	0.2	0.8	26.5	2.9	9.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	64.5	4.5	25.4	34.5	26.9	2.5	0.3	0.8	23.3	0.1	8.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	43.1	9.5	12.3	21.3	36.1	2.5	0.1	0.7	32.8	8.6	12.3	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	55.0	6.2	21.4	27.4	30.9	2.4	0.3	0.7	27.5	4.4	9.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	63.2	5.1	26.3	31.7	28.3	2.6	0.4	0.7	24.6	0.1	8.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	39.3	8.2	12.0	19.0	35.9	2.0	0.1	0.6	33.2	12.8	12.1	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	59.3	6.7	23.9	28.8	28.2	2.5	0.3	0.8	24.6	4.1	8.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	66.9	5.5	28.7	32.6	26.0	2.8	0.4	0.8	22.0	0.2	7.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	44.5	8.9	14.4	21.2	32.5	1.8	0.1	1.0	29.6	11.8	11.1	0.0
Honduras ^{g/}														
2012	Total	100.0	39.8	6.6	15.1	18.0	44.7	2.7	0.5	1.4	40.1	2.1	13.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	41.8	4.6	18.8	18.3	43.7	2.9	0.6	1.2	38.9	0.2	14.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	35.9	10.3	8.1	17.5	46.7	2.3	0.3	1.6	42.5	5.8	11.5	0.1
2015	Total	100.0	44.0	6.4	16.6	21.0	40.3	2.2	0.4	1.6	36.1	2.7	12.9	0.1
	Men	100.0	49.1	4.8	22.5	21.8	38.3	2.5	0.5	1.6	33.7	0.3	12.2	0.1
	Women	100.0	35.7	9.0	7.1	19.6	43.6	1.8	0.2	1.5	40.1	6.6	14.0	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	43.4	5.8	17.9	19.7	40.3	2.9	0.4	1.8	35.2	3.3	13.0	0.1
	Men	100.0	50.2	4.2	24.5	21.6	37.3	2.9	0.6	1.8	31.9	0.7	11.7	0.1
	Women	100.0	32.8	8.3	7.8	16.7	45.0	2.9	0.1	1.8	40.2	7.3	14.9	0.1

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment													
		Employee						Non-employee							
		Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account		Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative							
2019	Total	100.0	45.4	6.3	17.9	21.2	39.4	2.6	0.4	1.7	34.8	2.7	12.3	0.1	
	Men	100.0	50.2	4.2	23.6	22.3	37.4	2.6	0.5	1.5	32.8	0.3	11.9	0.2	
	Women	100.0	37.3	9.9	8.1	19.3	42.9	2.7	0.2	1.9	38.2	6.7	13.0	0.0	
2020	Total	100.0	44.3	6.0	16.9	21.4	45.0	3.0	0.4	2.3	39.3	2.4	6.7	1.6	
	Men	100.0	52.5	4.3	22.3	25.9	40.5	3.5	0.6	2.6	33.9	0.2	5.2	1.5	
	Women	100.0	33.0	8.3	9.4	15.3	51.2	2.3	0.2	1.9	46.8	5.4	8.6	1.7	
Mexico															
2012	Total	100.0	59.9	11.2	17.9	30.9	26.8	3.8	0.7	1.6	20.6	4.5	6.1	2.6	
	Men	100.0	64.3	9.5	21.7	33.1	27.6	4.8	1.0	1.9	19.9	0.6	4.4	3.0	
	Women	100.0	52.9	13.8	11.7	27.4	25.5	2.1	0.3	1.3	21.8	10.9	8.9	1.8	
2015	Total	100.0	59.9	10.3	17.4	32.2	26.7	3.7	0.6	1.8	20.7	4.7	5.3	3.3	
	Men	100.0	63.9	8.5	21.0	34.4	27.7	4.7	0.8	2.0	20.1	0.7	3.9	3.8	
	Women	100.0	53.4	13.1	11.6	28.7	25.2	2.0	0.3	1.4	21.5	11.3	7.7	2.4	
2018	Total	100.0	60.1	9.6	17.0	33.6	27.1	4.0	0.7	1.9	20.4	4.3	4.5	4.0	
	Men	100.0	63.3	7.9	20.2	35.2	28.3	5.1	1.0	2.1	20.1	0.6	3.1	4.6	
	Women	100.0	54.9	12.3	11.7	30.9	25.1	2.2	0.3	1.6	20.9	10.2	6.7	3.1	
2019	Total	100.0	59.7	9.4	17.1	33.2	27.4	4.1	0.7	2.0	20.6	4.4	4.6	4.0	
	Men	100.0	63.3	7.6	20.5	35.1	28.2	5.3	0.9	2.1	19.9	0.7	3.2	4.6	
	Women	100.0	54.2	12.2	11.9	30.2	26.0	2.2	0.3	1.7	21.8	10.1	6.7	3.0	

▶ Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												
		Employee					Non-employee					Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
TOTAL	Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account		Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
2020	Total	100.0	60.9	11.1	17.6	32.2	26.5	4.0	0.7	1.9	19.9	4.4	4.0	4.2
	Men	100.0	63.5	9.0	20.9	33.6	28.2	5.1	0.9	2.0	20.1	0.7	2.8	4.9
	Women	100.0	56.8	14.3	12.4	30.1	23.8	2.3	0.2	1.7	19.5	10.3	5.8	3.3
Panama														
2012	Total	100.0	63.3	15.3	8.6	39.4	27.2	1.9	0.9	1.6	22.8	4.7	4.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	65.1	11.8	10.9	42.4	30.8	2.3	1.1	1.8	25.6	0.8	3.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	60.6	20.8	5.1	34.8	21.5	1.3	0.5	1.3	18.4	10.7	7.2	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	62.0	15.8	8.3	37.9	29.4	2.2	0.9	1.8	24.5	4.3	4.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	63.1	12.6	10.5	40.0	32.6	2.7	1.3	1.6	27.1	1.0	3.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	60.2	20.4	5.0	34.8	24.5	1.4	0.4	2.2	20.5	9.2	6.1	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	58.5	15.7	7.7	35.1	32.7	1.9	1.2	2.0	27.5	4.0	4.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	60.4	12.7	9.8	37.9	35.3	2.3	1.6	2.0	29.3	0.8	3.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	55.7	20.0	4.6	31.1	28.9	1.3	0.7	2.1	24.9	8.7	6.6	0.1
2019	Total	100.0	56.2	15.3	7.0	33.9	33.7	1.8	1.1	2.2	28.7	4.6	5.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	58.2	12.6	9.4	36.2	37.1	2.1	1.4	2.3	31.3	0.9	3.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	53.3	19.0	3.7	30.6	29.1	1.4	0.7	2.0	25.0	9.9	7.7	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	51.1	19.3	7.1	24.6	39.0	1.6	0.6	1.8	35.0	4.4	5.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	50.8	14.2	10.1	26.5	43.9	2.2	0.8	2.0	38.9	1.2	4.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	51.4	26.5	2.9	21.9	32.0	0.8	0.2	1.5	29.5	8.8	7.7	0.0

► Continues...

Country, year, sex	TOTAL	Status in employment														
		Employee				Non-employee				Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others				
		Total	Public	Private	Total	Employer	Own-account	Non-professional, technical or administrative								
Paraguay																
2012	Total	100.0	43.5	9.2	14.0	20.2	40.3	4.3	1.3	1.4	33.5	6.3	8.4	1.6		
	Men	100.0	50.2	8.1	17.9	24.2	37.9	5.3	1.6	1.6	29.4	0.8	8.8	2.2		
	Women	100.0	33.8	10.8	8.3	14.6	43.8	2.8	0.7	1.0	39.2	14.1	7.7	0.7		
2015	Total	100.0	45.0	11.0	13.6	20.4	35.3	4.0	0.8	2.0	28.6	7.1	8.7	3.8		
	Men	100.0	51.2	9.0	17.2	25.0	37.3	5.6	0.9	1.7	29.2	0.7	6.5	4.3		
	Women	100.0	36.3	13.7	8.6	14.0	32.5	1.7	0.7	2.4	27.7	16.1	12.0	3.2		
2018	Total	100.0	46.6	10.1	13.4	23.1	35.4	4.4	0.9	1.9	28.1	7.6	8.2	2.3		
	Men	100.0	52.8	8.2	17.2	27.5	37.1	5.8	1.3	1.8	28.2	1.0	6.0	3.0		
	Women	100.0	37.4	12.9	7.8	16.6	32.8	2.2	0.4	2.2	28.0	17.2	11.3	1.3		
2019	Total	100.0	45.4	10.0	13.1	22.3	35.5	4.4	0.8	2.2	28.1	7.6	8.1	3.4		
	Men	100.0	52.0	8.5	17.1	26.5	36.6	5.6	1.1	2.0	27.9	0.9	6.0	4.5		
	Women	100.0	36.1	12.2	7.4	16.6	34.0	2.7	0.4	2.5	28.4	17.0	11.0	1.9		
2020	Total	100.0	44.8	9.7	16.1	19.0	37.1	4.0	0.7	2.3	30.2	6.9	8.6	2.7		
	Men	100.0	52.1	8.3	21.5	22.3	37.3	5.4	0.9	1.8	29.2	0.8	6.8	3.0		
	Women	100.0	34.2	11.7	8.2	14.3	36.7	1.9	0.3	2.9	31.5	15.7	11.3	2.2		
Peru																
2012	Total	100.0	45.3	9.4	12.0	23.9	40.2	4.3	1.1	1.7	33.0	2.6	11.6	0.3		
	Men	100.0	51.3	9.5	13.8	28.0	41.6	5.5	1.7	2.2	32.1	0.3	6.5	0.3		
	Women	100.0	37.6	9.3	9.6	18.7	38.3	2.7	0.4	1.1	34.2	5.6	18.1	0.3		

 Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
		Employee					Non-employee									
Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer		Own-account		Non-professional, technical or administrative							
		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative									
2015	Total	100.0	47.2	9.1	13.6	24.6	39.2	3.5	0.7	1.6	33.5	2.5	11.1	0.1		
	Men	100.0	53.1	8.7	15.8	28.6	40.7	4.4	1.0	2.0	33.3	0.3	5.9	0.1		
	Women	100.0	39.5	9.5	10.7	19.3	37.3	2.3	0.3	1.1	33.7	5.3	17.8	0.0		
2018	Total	100.0	46.4	8.7	13.9	23.8	41.4	3.4	0.6	2.0	35.4	2.3	9.8	0.0		
	Men	100.0	51.8	8.2	15.9	27.7	42.5	4.3	0.9	2.4	34.9	0.2	5.5	0.0		
	Women	100.0	39.7	9.3	11.5	18.9	40.1	2.3	0.3	1.4	36.1	4.9	15.3	0.0		
2019	Total	100.0	46.4	8.7	14.1	23.6	40.9	3.3	0.6	2.2	34.8	2.5	10.1	0.1		
	Men	100.0	52.3	8.3	16.4	27.6	41.7	4.0	0.9	2.7	34.2	0.2	5.8	0.1		
	Women	100.0	39.0	9.2	11.2	18.7	40.0	2.5	0.3	1.6	35.7	5.3	15.6	0.0		
2020	Total	100.0	43.8	8.9	14.8	20.2	41.0	2.4	0.4	1.6	36.6	1.6	13.4	0.1		
	Men	100.0	49.1	8.0	17.7	23.3	42.5	3.0	0.6	1.9	37.0	0.1	8.2	0.1		
	Women	100.0	36.7	10.0	10.7	15.9	39.0	1.5	0.2	1.2	36.0	3.7	20.6	0.1		
Dominican Republic ^{iv}																
2012	Total	100.0	46.7	13.2	6.4	27.1	45.9	2.5	0.9	2.0	40.5	5.6	1.8	0.0		
	Men	100.0	43.1	10.3	6.3	26.5	54.7	2.9	1.3	2.1	48.4	0.8	1.4	0.0		
	Women	100.0	53.0	18.4	6.4	28.1	30.5	1.8	0.4	1.8	26.5	14.1	2.4	0.0		
2015	Total	100.0	49.2	13.3	8.4	27.5	42.2	2.4	0.9	1.8	37.2	5.8	2.2	0.6		
	Men	100.0	46.5	10.2	8.0	28.3	50.6	2.9	1.2	1.9	44.8	0.7	1.5	0.6		
	Women	100.0	53.5	18.3	9.0	26.2	28.7	1.5	0.4	1.6	25.1	13.8	3.4	0.6		

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment											Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
		Employee						Non-employee							
		Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account					
				Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
2018	Total	100.0	50.0	14.1	8.0	27.9	41.6	2.3	0.9	1.8	36.4	5.7	1.8	1.0	1.0
	Men	100.0	46.6	11.0	7.0	28.7	50.7	3.1	1.2	2.1	44.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Women	100.0	55.1	18.9	9.5	26.6	27.6	1.2	0.5	1.5	24.5	13.3	3.0	1.0	1.0
2019	Total	100.0	51.7	13.6	8.5	29.5	40.2	2.2	1.0	1.8	35.2	5.6	1.6	0.9	0.9
	Men	100.0	48.2	10.4	7.1	30.7	49.1	2.7	1.4	2.1	42.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0
	Women	100.0	56.9	18.4	10.7	27.8	27.1	1.6	0.3	1.4	23.9	12.7	2.5	0.7	0.7
2020	Total	100.0	50.5	14.5	9.3	26.7	41.7	2.3	0.7	1.4	37.3	5.0	1.4	1.4	1.4
	Men	100.0	46.7	10.9	7.8	28.0	50.6	3.0	0.9	1.5	45.2	0.4	0.7	1.7	1.7
	Women	100.0	56.2	19.8	11.6	24.9	28.4	1.3	0.3	1.3	25.5	11.9	2.5	1.0	1.0
Uruguay															
2012	Total	100.0	68.2	14.8	11.1	42.4	25.9	3.1	1.6	3.9	17.3	4.4	1.3	0.2	0.2
	Men	100.0	70.4	12.9	11.6	45.9	28.6	4.0	2.2	3.8	18.6	0.0	0.7	0.2	0.2
	Women	100.0	65.6	17.0	10.4	38.1	22.6	2.0	0.9	4.1	15.6	9.7	1.9	0.3	0.3
2015	Total	100.0	68.5	14.7	10.9	42.9	26.4	2.6	1.5	4.0	18.3	3.8	0.9	0.3	0.3
	Men	100.0	69.8	12.5	11.2	46.1	29.4	3.3	2.0	3.9	20.2	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3
	Women	100.0	67.0	17.3	10.6	39.0	22.8	1.8	0.9	4.1	16.0	8.5	1.4	0.3	0.3
2018	Total	100.0	67.6	15.0	10.5	42.1	27.4	2.3	1.5	4.5	19.2	3.9	0.8	0.4	0.4
	Men	100.0	68.3	12.7	10.9	44.7	31.0	2.9	1.9	4.4	21.7	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.3
	Women	100.0	66.7	17.7	10.1	38.9	23.1	1.5	0.9	4.5	16.2	8.6	1.2	0.4	0.4

▶ Continues...

Country, year, sex		Status in employment												
		Employee				Non-employee								
		Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account		Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers			Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative						
2019	Total	100.0	67.9	15.4	10.6	41.9	27.4	2.3	1.4	4.4	19.3	3.6	0.8	0.4
	Men	100.0	68.6	13.2	10.9	44.5	30.5	3.1	1.7	4.4	21.3	0.0	0.5	0.3
	Women	100.0	67.0	18.1	10.3	38.6	23.6	1.4	0.9	4.4	16.8	7.8	1.1	0.4
2020	Total	100.0	68.6	17.0	10.0	41.6	27.3	2.1	1.3	4.6	19.4	3.0	0.9	0.3
	Men	100.0	68.5	14.2	10.3	43.9	30.8	2.8	1.7	4.7	21.7	0.0	0.5	0.2
	Women	100.0	68.7	20.3	9.7	38.8	23.0	1.3	0.8	4.5	16.5	6.5	1.4	0.4

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ Weighted average.

b/ 31 urban agglomerates. INDEC in the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic.

c/ The years 2012 and 2015 based on the Household Survey for the November-December period of each year. The years 2018 to 2020 correspond to the Encuesta Continua de Empleo (Continuous Employment Survey) with annual period. The year 2020 corresponds to the I quarter.

d/ New reweighted series.

e/ Data for 2020 correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters.

f/ The survey was not conducted in 2020.

g/ Data for 2020 based on the Telephone Household Survey to measure employment, not comparable with previous years.

h/ Data for 2012 based on the reweighted National Labour Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo, ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 based on the Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

Years where in a country there is a revision of the survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 10. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYED POPULATION BY STATUS IN EMPLOYMENT, SUBREGION, YEAR AND SEX. 2012 - 2020 (percentages)**

Country, year, sex		TOTAL		Status in employment											Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others
				Employee				Non-employee									
				Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account					
						Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
Latin America ^{a/}																	
2012	Total	100.0	58.0	10.8	13.0	34.1	30.7	3.2	1.1	2.6	23.8	5.1	5.3	0.9			
	Men	100.0	61.6	8.8	15.5	37.3	33.2	4.0	1.4	2.7	25.0	0.6	3.6	1.0			
	Women	100.0	52.7	13.9	9.4	29.5	27.0	2.0	0.6	2.3	22.1	11.8	7.8	0.6			
2015	Total	100.0	58.3	10.6	13.0	34.6	30.8	3.0	1.1	2.7	24.1	5.0	4.9	1.1			
	Men	100.0	61.3	8.5	15.4	37.4	33.7	3.8	1.4	2.8	25.6	0.6	3.2	1.3			
	Women	100.0	53.9	13.7	9.6	30.6	26.7	1.9	0.6	2.4	21.8	11.4	7.3	0.8			
2018	Total	100.0	57.0	10.4	13.3	33.4	32.3	3.2	1.2	2.9	25.1	4.9	4.5	1.2			
	Men	100.0	60.0	8.3	15.8	35.9	35.0	4.0	1.5	2.9	26.5	0.6	2.9	1.4			
	Women	100.0	52.8	13.2	9.7	29.8	28.5	2.1	0.7	2.7	23.0	11.1	6.7	0.9			
2019	Total	100.0	57.1	10.3	13.5	33.4	32.3	3.1	1.1	3.0	25.0	4.9	4.4	1.2			
	Men	100.0	60.3	8.3	16.0	36.0	34.7	3.9	1.4	3.0	26.4	0.6	2.9	1.5			
	Women	100.0	52.7	13.2	9.9	29.7	28.9	2.1	0.7	2.9	23.1	11.0	6.5	0.8			
2020	Total	100.0	56.8	11.6	13.1	32.1	32.6	3.0	1.1	3.1	25.4	4.4	4.4	1.8			
	Men	100.0	59.1	9.2	15.7	34.3	35.4	3.7	1.4	3.2	27.1	0.6	2.9	2.0			
	Women	100.0	53.5	15.0	9.5	29.0	28.5	1.9	0.6	3.1	23.0	9.9	6.6	1.4			

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		TOTAL		Status in employment										Contributing family worker	Domestic worker	Others	
				Employee			Non-employee										
				Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account					
						Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers		Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative					
Central America and Mexico ^{a/ b/}																	
2012	Total	100.0	57.5	10.7	17.1	29.7	29.5	3.5	0.7	1.6	23.7	4.4	6.8	1.9			
	Men	100.0	61.7	9.0	20.8	32.0	30.2	4.3	1.0	1.8	23.2	0.6	5.4	2.2			
	Women	100.0	50.6	13.4	11.1	26.1	28.3	2.1	0.3	1.3	24.5	10.6	9.1	1.3			
2015	Total	100.0	58.4	10.0	17.0	31.4	28.8	3.4	0.6	1.7	23.2	4.5	5.9	2.4			
	Men	100.0	62.5	8.2	20.5	33.8	29.6	4.2	0.8	1.9	22.7	0.6	4.6	2.8			
	Women	100.0	51.8	13.0	11.2	27.5	27.5	2.0	0.3	1.3	23.9	10.9	8.0	1.8			
2018	Total	100.0	58.3	9.5	16.7	32.0	29.3	3.6	0.7	1.8	23.1	4.3	5.2	2.9			
	Men	100.0	61.9	7.8	20.0	34.1	30.2	4.6	0.9	1.9	22.8	0.6	4.0	3.3			
	Women	100.0	52.3	12.3	11.4	28.7	27.8	2.2	0.3	1.6	23.7	10.4	7.3	2.2			
2019	Total	100.0	58.5	9.5	17.1	32.0	29.1	3.7	0.6	1.9	23.0	4.3	5.1	2.9			
	Men	100.0	62.3	7.6	20.5	34.2	29.9	4.6	0.9	2.0	22.5	0.6	3.9	3.4			
	Women	100.0	52.5	12.4	11.7	28.4	27.9	2.2	0.3	1.7	23.8	10.3	7.1	2.2			
2020	Total	100.0	59.1	11.2	17.0	30.9	29.1	3.7	0.6	1.9	22.8	4.3	4.0	3.5			
	Men	100.0	61.8	9.0	20.1	32.7	30.7	4.7	0.9	2.0	23.1	0.6	2.8	4.0			
	Women	100.0	54.8	14.5	12.1	28.1	26.7	2.2	0.2	1.7	22.5	10.1	5.8	2.7			
Andean Countries ^{a/ c/}																	
2012	Total	100.0	44.2	7.0	12.8	24.3	43.3	4.3	0.8	2.6	35.6	3.0	9.3	0.2			
	Men	100.0	49.1	6.7	15.3	27.1	45.0	5.4	1.2	2.9	35.4	0.3	5.5	0.2			
	Women	100.0	37.4	7.5	9.4	20.4	41.0	2.6	0.3	2.1	35.9	6.7	14.6	0.2			

► Continues...

Country, year, sex		TOTAL	Status in employment											
			Employee				Non-employee				Domestic worker	Contributing family worker	Others	
			Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer						Own-account
				Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Total	Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative	Non-professional, technical or administrative				
2015	Total	100.0	46.0	6.8	13.4	25.8	42.4	3.4	0.7	2.6	35.8	2.8	8.7	0.1
	Men	100.0	50.5	6.3	15.8	28.3	44.3	4.3	0.9	2.9	36.2	0.3	4.9	0.1
	Women	100.0	39.9	7.4	10.2	22.3	39.9	2.2	0.3	2.2	35.2	6.1	14.0	0.2
2018	Total	100.0	44.2	6.4	12.9	24.9	44.3	3.4	0.6	2.9	37.4	2.6	8.8	0.1
	Men	100.0	48.2	5.9	15.0	27.2	46.6	4.3	0.8	3.2	38.3	0.2	4.8	0.1
	Women	100.0	39.0	7.0	10.0	21.9	41.2	2.2	0.3	2.6	36.2	5.7	14.1	0.1
2019	Total	100.0	44.9	6.4	13.5	25.1	43.5	3.1	0.6	3.0	36.8	2.7	8.8	0.1
	Men	100.0	49.6	5.9	16.0	27.7	45.0	3.8	0.8	3.3	37.2	0.3	5.0	0.1
	Women	100.0	38.7	7.0	10.1	21.6	41.4	2.1	0.3	2.7	36.3	6.0	13.9	0.1
2020	Total	100.0	41.8	6.5	13.0	22.3	44.1	2.5	0.5	3.0	38.2	2.2	10.3	1.6
	Men	100.0	45.9	5.8	15.9	24.2	46.0	3.1	0.6	3.2	39.1	0.3	6.3	1.6
	Women	100.0	35.9	7.6	8.9	19.4	41.5	1.6	0.2	2.7	36.9	4.9	16.2	1.6
Southern Cone ^{a/d/}														
2012	Total	100.0	64.1	12.5	10.7	40.9	26.1	2.6	1.4	3.2	18.9	6.5	2.7	0.5
	Men	100.0	66.7	9.5	12.2	44.9	30.2	3.2	1.8	3.3	21.9	0.7	1.8	0.7
	Women	100.0	60.5	16.8	8.4	35.3	20.3	1.7	0.9	3.0	14.8	14.7	4.1	0.4
2015	Total	100.0	63.4	12.6	10.4	40.4	27.1	2.7	1.5	3.3	19.6	6.2	2.6	0.7
	Men	100.0	65.2	9.6	11.9	43.7	31.8	3.4	1.9	3.5	23.0	0.6	1.6	0.8
	Women	100.0	61.1	16.7	8.4	35.9	20.6	1.8	0.9	3.1	14.8	13.9	3.9	0.5

▶ Continues...

Country, year, sex		TOTAL	Status in employment											
			Employee				Non-employee							
			Total	Public	Private		Total	Employer			Own-account		Domestic worker	Contributing family worker
Establishments with a maximum of five workers	Establishments with six or more workers	Establishments with a maximum of five workers			Establishments with six or more workers	Professional, technical or administrative		Non-professional, technical or administrative						
2018	Total	100.0	61.9	12.7	11.2	38.1	28.9	2.9	1.7	3.5	20.8	6.4	2.1	0.6
	Men	100.0	64.0	9.8	13.1	41.1	33.2	3.6	2.2	3.5	23.9	0.8	1.4	0.7
	Women	100.0	59.2	16.6	8.6	34.0	23.3	2.0	1.1	3.5	16.7	14.0	3.2	0.4
2019	Total	100.0	61.7	12.6	11.1	38.0	29.4	2.8	1.7	3.7	21.2	6.3	2.1	0.6
	Men	100.0	63.7	9.7	13.0	40.9	33.5	3.4	2.1	3.7	24.3	0.8	1.3	0.7
	Women	100.0	59.0	16.3	8.6	34.0	23.9	2.0	1.1	3.8	17.0	13.7	3.0	0.4
2020	Total	100.0	62.1	14.0	10.9	37.2	29.6	2.7	1.6	3.9	21.4	5.5	2.1	0.8
	Men	100.0	63.3	10.7	12.8	39.8	33.6	3.3	2.0	3.8	24.4	0.7	1.4	1.0
	Women	100.0	60.4	18.4	8.3	33.6	24.0	1.8	1.0	3.9	17.2	12.0	3.0	0.6

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ Weighted average.

b/ The countries included are: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama. In Guatemala, the survey was not conducted in 2020; in Honduras, data for 2020 based on the Telephone Household Survey to measure employment, not comparable with previous years. In Dominican Republic data from 2012 based on the reweighted National Labor Force Survey (ENFT), new measurement from 2015 through the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

c/ The countries included are: Bolivia (Plurin. State of), Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In Bolivia (Plurin. State of) the years 2012 and 2015 based on the Household Survey for the November-December period of each year; the years 2018 to 2020 correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey with annual period and the year 2020 corresponds to the 1 quarter. In Ecuador, data for 2020 correspond to the average of III and IV quarters.

d/ The countries included are: Argentina, Brazil (new reweighted series), Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

► **Table 11. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYED POPULATION BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, COUNTRY, YEAR AND SEX. 2012 - 2020 (percentages)**

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
Latin America ^{a/}											
2012	Total	100.0	15.6	0.5	13.3	7.6	24.6	6.1	5.3	26.7	0.2
	Men	100.0	20.8	0.7	14.2	12.2	20.7	8.9	5.3	17.1	0.2
	Women	100.0	8.1	0.2	12.1	0.7	30.2	2.2	5.4	40.9	0.2
2015	Total	100.0	14.6	0.5	13.2	7.8	24.9	6.3	5.5	27.2	0.2
	Men	100.0	19.5	0.7	14.2	12.6	20.9	9.1	5.3	17.4	0.2
	Women	100.0	7.4	0.2	11.7	0.7	30.7	2.1	5.6	41.3	0.1
2018	Total	100.0	14.3	0.5	12.7	7.4	25.4	6.5	5.6	27.4	0.3
	Men	100.0	19.2	0.7	13.5	12.2	21.5	9.5	5.5	17.7	0.3
	Women	100.0	7.3	0.2	11.5	0.7	30.9	2.1	5.8	41.3	0.2
2019	Total	100.0	13.8	0.5	12.6	7.4	25.7	6.5	5.6	27.7	0.2
	Men	100.0	18.7	0.7	13.5	12.1	21.8	9.6	5.5	17.9	0.2
	Women	100.0	7.1	0.2	11.2	0.7	31.3	2.1	5.8	41.4	0.2
2020	Total	100.0	14.1	0.6	12.6	7.2	24.6	6.7	5.6	28.4	0.2
	Men	100.0	18.5	0.8	13.6	11.7	20.9	9.8	5.5	18.9	0.3
	Women	100.0	7.8	0.3	11.1	0.7	29.9	2.1	5.8	42.1	0.2
Argentina ^{b/}											
2012	Total	100.0	1.1	0.9	13.1	9.0	22.2	8.2	10.1	34.8	0.6
	Men	100.0	1.5	1.3	16.6	15.0	23.1	12.0	10.1	19.9	0.7
	Women	100.0	0.5	0.4	8.3	0.7	21.0	2.7	10.2	55.7	0.5

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2015	Total	100.0	0.9	1.3	13.2	9.1	20.7	8.3	9.6	36.1	0.8
	Men	100.0	1.4	1.9	16.8	15.0	20.9	12.3	9.6	21.1	0.9
	Women	100.0	0.3	0.4	8.1	0.6	20.3	2.7	9.7	57.3	0.6
2018	Total	100.0	0.9	0.9	11.2	9.1	22.2	7.2	10.4	35.9	2.2
	Men	100.0	1.3	1.3	13.9	15.6	22.7	11.0	10.5	21.0	2.7
	Women	100.0	0.3	0.4	7.8	0.7	21.6	2.2	10.2	55.1	1.6
2019	Total	100.0	1.0	0.8	11.4	9.0	22.2	7.4	10.8	36.2	1.1
	Men	100.0	1.5	1.2	14.1	15.4	22.7	11.4	11.2	21.3	1.3
	Women	100.0	0.3	0.3	7.9	0.8	21.7	2.3	10.3	55.5	0.9
2020	Total	100.0	1.0	0.9	12.1	8.6	21.1	7.2	10.8	37.2	1.1
	Men	100.0	1.3	1.4	14.6	14.8	22.1	11.2	11.2	22.1	1.4
	Women	100.0	0.4	0.3	8.9	0.7	19.8	2.0	10.4	56.7	0.8
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{c/}											
2012	Total	100.0	31.9	0.6	9.9	7.3	22.4	7.2	1.0	19.6	0.2
	Men	100.0	33.3	0.7	10.7	12.5	14.3	11.5	0.9	15.9	0.2
	Women	100.0	30.1	0.3	9.0	0.7	32.7	1.7	1.0	24.3	0.2
2015	Total	100.0	31.4	0.4	10.3	9.3	22.0	7.3	1.1	18.1	0.1
	Men	100.0	32.3	0.5	10.8	15.4	13.4	11.3	1.1	15.2	0.1
	Women	100.0	30.2	0.2	9.5	0.8	34.1	1.6	1.3	22.1	0.2
2018	Total	100.0	33.1	0.3	10.0	7.5	23.6	7.2	1.3	17.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	34.2	0.5	10.5	13.3	14.1	12.1	1.1	14.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	31.8	0.1	9.4	0.5	35.0	1.3	1.4	20.5	0.0

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2019	Total	100.0	29.0	0.3	11.2	7.8	24.6	7.8	1.1	18.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	29.7	0.5	11.5	13.8	15.2	13.4	1.1	14.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	28.2	0.1	10.8	0.5	35.8	1.1	1.2	22.2	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	30.1	0.3	11.3	7.3	24.2	7.8	1.3	17.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	30.3	0.4	11.9	13.2	15.0	13.6	1.1	14.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	30.0	0.2	10.7	0.4	35.1	1.0	1.6	21.0	0.0
Brazil ^{d/}											
2012	Total	100.0	12.0	0.5	13.7	8.5	23.0	6.0	6.2	30.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	16.1	0.7	15.3	14.0	21.9	8.7	6.3	17.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	6.1	0.2	11.6	0.9	24.5	2.3	6.1	48.4	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	10.6	0.5	13.3	8.3	24.0	6.1	6.4	30.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.5	0.6	15.0	13.9	22.6	9.0	6.5	17.8	0.0
	Women	100.0	5.2	0.2	10.8	0.6	26.0	2.2	6.3	48.6	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	9.6	0.4	12.1	7.4	25.1	6.5	6.4	32.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	13.5	0.6	13.8	12.5	24.2	9.7	6.7	19.0	0.1
	Women	100.0	4.3	0.2	10.0	0.6	26.4	2.2	6.0	50.3	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	9.4	0.5	12.1	7.3	25.1	6.7	6.5	32.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	13.3	0.7	13.8	12.4	24.0	9.9	6.8	19.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.2	0.2	9.8	0.6	26.5	2.3	6.1	50.2	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	9.9	0.5	12.1	7.0	23.9	6.8	6.6	33.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	13.7	0.7	13.9	11.6	22.7	10.1	6.9	20.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.6	0.3	9.6	0.7	25.6	2.3	6.1	50.8	0.0

 Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
Chile											
2012	Total	100.0	12.5	0.7	11.6	8.2	23.4	7.2	8.7	27.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	17.4	1.0	13.5	12.9	19.6	10.2	8.6	16.7	0.0
	Women	100.0	5.3	0.3	8.7	1.2	29.0	2.8	8.7	43.9	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	11.2	0.8	11.2	8.7	24.0	7.3	8.8	28.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	15.7	1.1	12.9	13.7	20.8	10.1	8.8	17.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.7	0.3	8.7	1.5	28.7	3.3	8.8	43.9	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	10.4	1.0	10.3	8.5	23.9	8.7	8.8	28.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.2	1.5	12.2	13.7	21.2	12.0	8.3	17.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	5.2	0.4	7.8	1.3	27.6	4.2	9.6	44.1	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	10.3	1.1	9.8	8.6	24.1	8.1	8.8	29.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.3	1.6	11.6	13.8	21.4	11.3	8.3	17.7	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.9	0.5	7.3	1.6	27.9	3.8	9.6	44.5	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	9.5	1.4	10.1	7.8	22.6	8.1	10.1	29.9	0.4
	Men	100.0	13.2	2.0	11.7	12.3	20.3	11.2	9.7	19.2	0.4
	Women	100.0	4.3	0.6	7.8	1.4	25.8	3.8	10.8	45.2	0.3
Colombia											
2012	Total	100.0	18.6	0.5	12.8	6.0	26.7	8.3	8.0	19.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	26.2	0.7	11.7	9.8	22.3	11.7	7.1	10.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	7.9	0.3	14.4	0.6	33.0	3.5	9.2	31.1	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	17.0	0.5	11.8	6.2	27.4	8.2	9.0	19.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.0	0.7	11.5	10.3	22.6	11.8	7.9	11.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	7.3	0.3	12.3	0.7	34.2	3.2	10.4	31.6	0.0

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2018	Total	100.0	17.7	0.6	12.0	6.2	26.8	8.0	9.2	19.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.6	0.7	11.3	10.1	22.5	11.6	7.8	11.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	7.9	0.3	13.1	0.8	32.8	2.9	11.1	31.1	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	16.9	0.6	11.8	6.8	27.2	7.9	8.9	19.9	0.0
	Men	100.0	23.8	0.8	11.1	11.0	22.8	11.6	7.3	11.7	0.0
	Women	100.0	7.0	0.3	12.8	1.0	33.4	2.6	11.2	31.7	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	17.8	1.2	11.0	6.8	26.0	8.6	8.9	19.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.5	1.4	11.1	10.5	20.9	12.2	7.2	12.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	7.5	0.8	10.9	1.1	34.0	3.0	11.6	31.1	0.0
Costa Rica											
2012	Total	100.0	10.4	1.8	9.9	6.3	25.3	7.1	3.0	35.9	0.3
	Men	100.0	15.0	2.6	11.0	9.8	23.1	10.1	2.6	25.6	0.3
	Women	100.0	2.9	0.6	8.3	0.5	28.8	2.3	3.6	52.6	0.3
2015	Total	100.0	12.4	1.5	10.9	6.7	24.0	5.6	2.9	36.0	0.2
	Men	100.0	17.4	2.1	12.4	10.4	21.8	7.6	2.9	25.3	0.1
	Women	100.0	4.2	0.5	8.4	0.6	27.6	2.3	2.8	53.4	0.2
2018	Total	100.0	12.4	1.3	10.8	6.9	23.7	7.2	3.0	34.1	0.6
	Men	100.0	17.2	1.8	11.6	10.8	21.5	9.8	3.2	23.6	0.5
	Women	100.0	4.3	0.4	9.5	0.4	27.3	2.8	2.8	51.7	0.7
2019	Total	100.0	12.0	1.2	10.4	6.9	22.5	7.5	3.1	36.1	0.4
	Men	100.0	17.0	1.6	11.5	10.7	19.9	10.5	2.7	25.8	0.4
	Women	100.0	4.1	0.5	8.6	0.8	26.6	2.9	3.7	52.4	0.3

 Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2020	Total	100.0	12.9	1.3	10.4	6.6	21.6	7.3	3.0	36.4	0.4
	Men	100.0	17.7	1.8	11.4	10.0	19.5	9.8	2.7	26.5	0.5
	Women	100.0	4.6	0.5	8.6	0.7	25.2	2.8	3.7	53.5	0.3
Ecuador ^{e/}											
2012	Total	100.0	28.5	0.4	10.4	6.2	25.6	5.9	6.0	16.9	0.0
	Men	100.0	33.2	0.5	10.9	9.8	19.5	8.7	6.4	10.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	21.3	0.2	9.7	0.7	34.9	1.8	5.4	26.0	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	26.9	0.5	11.0	7.4	24.2	7.0	4.4	18.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	29.6	0.7	11.6	12.0	18.4	10.1	4.5	13.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	22.9	0.3	10.1	0.6	32.6	2.5	4.2	26.8	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	29.3	0.4	10.9	6.5	24.3	6.6	5.6	16.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	31.5	0.5	11.7	10.8	18.9	9.8	5.6	11.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	26.3	0.2	9.9	0.6	31.9	2.1	5.7	23.3	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	30.2	0.4	10.3	5.9	24.4	6.6	5.8	16.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	32.3	0.5	11.2	9.9	19.2	9.9	5.8	11.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	27.4	0.2	9.0	0.4	31.8	1.9	5.7	23.5	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	31.9	0.4	9.6	5.5	24.9	6.3	4.4	17.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	34.5	0.6	10.4	8.9	19.9	9.3	3.9	12.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	28.1	0.2	8.3	0.4	32.1	2.0	5.0	23.8	0.0
El Salvador											
2012	Total	100.0	21.0	0.4	15.5	5.1	28.7	4.3	5.4	19.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	32.5	0.6	13.7	8.5	19.5	6.5	6.2	12.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	5.0	0.2	18.0	0.2	41.5	1.3	4.3	29.4	0.0

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2015	Total	100.0	18.2	0.6	16.1	5.4	30.4	4.7	5.6	18.9	0.0
	Men	100.0	28.3	0.8	14.2	9.1	21.0	7.1	6.9	12.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.8	0.3	18.9	0.4	43.6	1.3	3.9	27.8	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	16.7	0.9	15.1	6.3	31.5	4.6	6.3	18.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	26.2	1.1	13.9	10.4	22.1	6.9	7.3	12.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.4	0.5	16.8	0.5	44.7	1.4	4.9	27.7	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	16.4	0.8	14.9	6.8	31.0	4.7	6.2	19.2	0.0
	Men	100.0	25.5	0.9	13.6	11.4	21.5	7.1	7.1	12.8	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.4	0.5	16.7	0.4	44.4	1.5	4.9	28.2	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	15.9	0.5	16.2	6.5	31.2	4.9	6.0	18.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.4	0.7	14.6	10.8	21.9	7.2	7.5	12.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.7	0.3	18.4	0.4	44.5	1.5	4.0	27.2	0.0
Guatemala ^{iv}											
2012	Total	100.0	32.3	0.3	13.4	5.8	26.4	3.3	3.3	15.2	0.0
	Men	100.0	43.8	0.4	12.4	9.0	17.5	4.7	3.6	8.8	0.0
	Women	100.0	12.6	0.1	15.1	0.2	41.8	0.8	2.8	26.4	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	32.0	0.3	12.8	5.6	25.3	3.8	4.0	16.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	43.0	0.5	10.6	8.3	19.6	5.3	4.1	8.8	0.0
	Women	100.0	10.0	0.1	17.3	0.2	36.8	0.9	3.7	30.8	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	33.1	0.4	12.8	5.7	23.5	3.9	5.1	15.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	44.2	0.6	10.3	8.6	17.0	5.4	5.0	8.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	11.9	0.2	17.4	0.1	36.1	0.8	5.2	28.2	0.0

 Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2019	Total	100.0	31.2	0.5	11.6	6.8	24.0	3.8	4.9	17.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	41.3	0.6	9.6	10.1	18.0	5.3	5.0	10.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	11.5	0.2	15.6	0.4	35.8	0.9	4.7	30.9	0.0
Honduras ^{9/}											
2012	Total	100.0	38.6	0.4	13.4	5.4	21.9	3.3	2.9	14.1	0.1
	Men	100.0	52.6	0.5	9.8	8.0	14.4	4.5	2.9	7.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	11.6	0.2	20.3	0.4	36.3	1.0	2.9	27.1	0.2
2015	Total	100.0	30.1	0.9	14.8	5.6	23.6	3.5	4.5	16.9	0.1
	Men	100.0	43.7	1.1	11.4	9.0	16.1	5.2	4.4	9.1	0.1
	Women	100.0	8.1	0.5	20.5	0.2	35.9	0.7	4.5	29.6	0.1
2018	Total	100.0	31.8	0.6	13.4	5.6	23.5	3.9	3.8	17.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	44.9	0.7	10.8	9.0	15.2	5.8	3.8	9.7	0.0
	Women	100.0	11.4	0.4	17.6	0.3	36.3	1.0	3.8	29.3	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	30.8	1.0	13.5	6.2	23.8	3.7	3.9	17.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	43.9	1.3	10.9	9.5	15.7	5.2	3.7	9.7	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.5	0.4	17.9	0.6	37.6	1.1	4.1	29.8	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	23.9	0.8	16.2	5.9	24.9	3.5	4.9	18.7	1.2
	Men	100.0	34.9	1.0	14.2	9.8	17.3	5.8	5.4	10.0	1.6
	Women	100.0	8.8	0.4	18.9	0.6	35.4	0.4	4.2	30.6	0.6
Mexico											
2012	Total	100.0	14.1	0.4	15.3	7.5	26.5	4.8	1.7	29.1	0.7
	Men	100.0	20.1	0.5	15.6	11.6	19.9	6.8	1.5	23.2	0.7
	Women	100.0	4.3	0.2	14.7	0.7	37.3	1.5	1.9	38.8	0.6

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2015	Total	100.0	13.8	0.4	16.0	7.8	26.4	4.9	1.6	28.4	0.6
	Men	100.0	19.9	0.5	16.4	12.2	19.8	7.0	1.5	22.1	0.6
	Women	100.0	3.9	0.2	15.5	0.7	37.2	1.5	1.8	38.8	0.5
2018	Total	100.0	13.1	0.4	16.6	8.2	26.2	5.2	1.6	28.1	0.6
	Men	100.0	18.9	0.5	16.8	12.8	19.7	7.4	1.4	21.8	0.7
	Women	100.0	3.7	0.2	16.4	0.8	36.7	1.7	1.8	38.2	0.5
2019	Total	100.0	12.7	0.4	16.6	7.8	27.4	5.1	1.6	27.8	0.6
	Men	100.0	18.5	0.5	17.0	12.3	20.6	7.4	1.4	21.6	0.6
	Women	100.0	3.8	0.2	15.8	0.8	38.0	1.6	1.9	37.5	0.5
2020	Total	100.0	12.9	0.4	16.4	7.7	26.0	5.3	1.8	29.1	0.5
	Men	100.0	18.6	0.5	16.6	12.1	19.7	7.5	1.6	22.8	0.6
	Women	100.0	3.9	0.2	16.2	0.8	35.8	1.7	2.1	38.9	0.4
Panama											
2012	Total	100.0	16.9	0.8	6.9	10.4	23.2	8.3	9.1	24.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	22.3	1.0	7.0	16.0	19.6	11.5	8.4	14.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.6	0.5	6.6	1.6	28.7	3.5	10.1	40.4	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	14.8	0.8	7.7	10.0	23.6	8.6	9.3	25.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	19.4	1.1	7.6	15.9	20.2	11.8	8.5	15.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.0	0.5	7.8	1.3	28.6	4.0	10.4	39.3	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	14.6	0.6	7.6	10.2	23.7	8.9	8.7	25.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	19.0	1.0	7.3	16.1	19.8	12.6	8.5	15.8	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.2	0.2	8.0	1.7	29.4	3.5	9.0	40.1	0.0

 Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2019	Total	100.0	14.8	0.8	7.5	9.0	23.5	9.0	9.2	26.2	0.0
	Men	100.0	19.3	1.0	7.4	14.5	19.4	13.0	9.1	16.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.5	0.5	7.7	1.3	29.2	3.3	9.5	40.0	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	14.6	0.7	9.1	8.5	21.2	8.6	9.7	27.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	18.9	0.9	8.1	14.0	17.4	12.5	10.7	17.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	8.3	0.4	10.5	0.6	26.5	3.0	8.2	42.5	0.0
Paraguay											
2012	Total	100.0	27.2	0.6	10.5	5.5	25.5	4.2	4.8	21.7	0.0
	Men	100.0	30.1	0.8	12.3	9.3	23.3	6.3	4.8	12.9	0.0
	Women	100.0	23.0	0.2	8.0	0.1	28.6	1.2	4.8	34.2	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	20.1	0.5	12.3	6.7	26.6	3.9	5.4	24.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.1	0.7	14.5	11.3	24.3	5.8	5.4	14.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	14.5	0.4	9.2	0.2	29.8	1.2	5.3	39.5	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	20.5	0.5	11.4	7.1	26.0	3.3	6.3	24.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	24.2	0.7	14.1	11.7	23.3	4.7	6.2	15.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	15.0	0.2	7.6	0.3	30.1	1.2	6.5	39.2	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	20.1	0.4	10.9	7.7	26.5	3.0	5.9	25.3	0.1
	Men	100.0	24.2	0.6	12.8	13.0	23.7	4.5	5.5	15.5	0.1
	Women	100.0	14.5	0.1	8.3	0.2	30.5	0.8	6.5	39.1	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	21.2	0.5	10.0	8.8	26.7	3.1	5.2	24.4	0.1
	Men	100.0	24.7	0.6	11.5	14.5	24.2	4.5	5.1	14.7	0.1
	Women	100.0	16.2	0.2	7.8	0.5	30.5	1.1	5.3	38.3	0.1

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
Peru											
2012	Total	100.0	26.0	0.2	10.7	5.9	25.9	7.4	5.4	18.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	29.6	0.2	11.4	10.0	16.5	11.8	6.1	14.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	21.5	0.1	9.7	0.6	38.0	1.8	4.5	23.8	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	26.9	0.2	9.5	6.6	25.4	8.0	5.5	17.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	30.2	0.3	10.2	11.2	16.0	12.9	6.0	13.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	22.7	0.1	8.7	0.6	37.6	1.8	4.9	23.6	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	25.9	0.2	9.1	6.0	27.2	8.1	6.1	17.4	0.0
	Men	100.0	29.7	0.3	9.6	10.3	17.3	13.2	6.3	13.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	21.2	0.1	8.4	0.5	39.8	1.7	5.8	22.6	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	25.4	0.2	9.0	6.2	27.0	8.1	6.2	18.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	28.5	0.3	9.7	10.6	17.4	13.2	6.6	13.6	0.0
	Women	100.0	21.5	0.1	8.0	0.6	38.9	1.8	5.7	23.4	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	33.1	0.2	8.6	6.3	23.8	7.5	5.2	15.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	35.9	0.4	8.7	10.6	15.6	11.9	5.5	11.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	29.3	0.1	8.3	0.4	35.0	1.4	4.9	20.6	0.0
Dominican Republic ^{iv}											
2012	Total	100.0	14.6	1.1	10.4	6.3	27.4	7.6	5.7	26.9	0.0
	Men	100.0	21.6	1.2	11.1	9.6	26.0	11.0	5.4	14.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	2.4	1.0	9.1	0.4	30.0	1.5	6.3	49.2	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	10.0	1.4	9.9	6.9	27.9	7.6	2.4	34.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	15.3	1.6	11.5	10.9	26.1	11.2	2.1	21.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	1.6	1.0	7.3	0.6	30.7	1.9	3.0	54.0	0.0

▶ Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2018	Total	100.0	9.5	1.5	9.9	8.1	27.1	7.4	2.6	34.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.6	1.7	11.3	13.0	25.3	11.3	2.3	20.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	1.6	1.1	7.7	0.7	29.7	1.5	3.0	54.7	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	8.9	1.2	10.1	7.4	27.8	7.0	2.8	34.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.0	1.3	11.6	12.2	26.1	10.8	2.5	21.6	0.0
	Women	100.0	1.5	1.1	7.9	0.4	30.4	1.4	3.2	54.2	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	9.1	1.4	10.5	7.4	27.3	7.8	2.5	34.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	14.3	1.6	12.0	12.2	25.0	12.1	2.3	20.4	0.0
	Women	100.0	1.4	1.1	8.2	0.3	30.6	1.4	2.7	54.3	0.0
Uruguay											
2012	Total	100.0	8.8	1.0	11.9	7.8	21.8	6.7	8.7	33.3	0.0
	Men	100.0	12.6	1.3	14.2	13.7	21.3	9.7	8.3	19.0	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.1	0.6	9.1	0.7	22.5	3.1	9.1	50.7	0.0
2015	Total	100.0	9.0	0.8	11.1	8.1	21.8	7.3	9.8	32.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	12.7	1.1	13.4	13.8	21.2	10.4	9.1	18.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	4.5	0.5	8.3	0.9	22.6	3.5	10.7	49.1	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	8.5	0.9	10.4	7.4	21.7	7.1	10.5	33.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	12.4	1.2	12.8	13.0	21.3	10.2	9.7	19.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.8	0.5	7.4	0.6	22.2	3.3	11.4	50.8	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	8.4	0.8	10.3	7.3	21.4	7.2	10.5	34.0	0.0
	Men	100.0	12.3	1.1	12.7	12.8	20.8	10.4	9.8	20.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.8	0.4	7.5	0.6	22.1	3.2	11.5	51.0	0.0

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2020	Total	100.0	8.1	0.8	10.3	6.7	20.6	7.6	11.4	34.5	0.0
	Men	100.0	11.7	1.1	12.7	11.8	20.2	11.0	10.4	21.1	0.0
	Women	100.0	3.8	0.5	7.3	0.6	21.1	3.6	12.5	50.6	0.0

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ Weighted average.

b/ 31 urban agglomerates. INDEC in the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labour market in the Argentine Republic.

c/ The years 2012 and 2015 based on the Household Survey for the November-December period of each year. The years 2018 to 2020 correspond to the Encuesta Continua de Empleo (Continuous Employment Survey) with annual period. The year 2020 corresponds to the I quarter.

d/ New reweighted series.

e/ Data for 2020 correspond to the average of the III and IV quarters.

f/ The survey was not conducted in 2020.

g/ Data for 2020 based on the Telephone Household Survey to measure employment, not comparable with previous years.

h/ Data for 2012 based on the reweighted National Labour Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo, ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

|| Years where in a country there is a revision of the survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in the comparability of the data.

► **Table 12. LATIN AMERICA: NATIONAL EMPLOYED POPULATION BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, SUB-REGION, YEAR AND SEX. 2012 - 2020 (percentages)**

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
Latin America ^{a/}											
2012	Total	100.0	15.6	0.5	13.3	7.6	24.6	6.1	5.3	26.7	0.2
	Men	100.0	20.8	0.7	14.2	12.2	20.7	8.9	5.3	17.1	0.2
	Women	100.0	8.1	0.2	12.1	0.7	30.2	2.2	5.4	40.9	0.2
2015	Total	100.0	14.6	0.5	13.2	7.8	24.9	6.3	5.5	27.2	0.2
	Men	100.0	19.5	0.7	14.2	12.6	20.9	9.1	5.3	17.4	0.2
	Women	100.0	7.4	0.2	11.7	0.7	30.7	2.1	5.6	41.3	0.1
2018	Total	100.0	14.3	0.5	12.7	7.4	25.4	6.5	5.6	27.4	0.3
	Men	100.0	19.2	0.7	13.5	12.2	21.5	9.5	5.5	17.7	0.3
	Women	100.0	7.3	0.2	11.5	0.7	30.9	2.1	5.8	41.3	0.2
2019	Total	100.0	13.8	0.5	12.6	7.4	25.7	6.5	5.6	27.7	0.2
	Men	100.0	18.7	0.7	13.5	12.1	21.8	9.6	5.5	17.9	0.2
	Women	100.0	7.1	0.2	11.2	0.7	31.3	2.1	5.8	41.4	0.2
2020	Total	100.0	14.1	0.6	12.6	7.2	24.6	6.7	5.6	28.4	0.2
	Men	100.0	18.5	0.8	13.6	11.7	20.9	9.8	5.5	18.9	0.3
	Women	100.0	7.8	0.3	11.1	0.7	29.9	2.1	5.8	42.1	0.2

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
Central America and Mexico ^{a/ b/}											
2012	Total	100.0	17.1	0.5	14.4	7.1	26.3	4.9	2.5	26.8	0.5
	Men	100.0	24.3	0.6	14.4	11.0	19.8	7.0	2.4	20.0	0.5
	Women	100.0	5.3	0.3	14.4	0.6	36.9	1.5	2.6	37.9	0.5
2015	Total	100.0	16.1	0.5	15.0	7.4	26.3	5.0	2.4	26.9	0.4
	Men	100.0	23.2	0.7	14.9	11.5	20.1	7.2	2.3	19.7	0.5
	Women	100.0	4.5	0.3	15.2	0.6	36.5	1.5	2.5	38.6	0.3
2018	Total	100.0	15.9	0.5	15.3	7.8	25.9	5.3	2.5	26.5	0.4
	Men	100.0	22.7	0.7	15.1	12.1	19.7	7.5	2.4	19.4	0.5
	Women	100.0	4.8	0.3	15.6	0.7	36.1	1.7	2.6	37.9	0.4
2019	Total	100.0	15.3	0.5	15.1	7.6	26.8	5.2	2.5	26.6	0.4
	Men	100.0	22.1	0.6	15.2	11.9	20.4	7.5	2.4	19.5	0.5
	Women	100.0	4.6	0.3	15.0	0.7	37.0	1.6	2.7	37.7	0.3
2020	Total	100.0	13.4	0.5	15.6	7.5	26.0	5.5	2.4	28.6	0.5
	Men	100.0	19.4	0.7	15.7	11.9	20.0	7.9	2.4	21.5	0.6
	Women	100.0	4.1	0.3	15.5	0.7	35.2	1.7	2.6	39.5	0.3
Andean Countries ^{a/ c/}											
2012	Total	100.0	23.8	0.4	11.5	6.1	25.9	7.6	6.1	18.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	29.0	0.5	11.4	10.1	19.3	11.3	6.1	12.3	0.0
	Women	100.0	16.6	0.2	11.6	0.6	34.9	2.5	6.2	27.2	0.0

 Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2015	Total	100.0	23.0	0.4	10.8	6.8	25.8	7.9	6.4	18.8	0.0
	Men	100.0	27.6	0.6	11.0	11.3	19.0	11.8	6.1	12.6	0.0
	Women	100.0	16.8	0.2	10.5	0.6	35.1	2.5	6.8	27.4	0.0
2018	Total	100.0	23.7	0.4	10.7	6.3	26.3	7.7	6.8	18.1	0.0
	Men	100.0	28.2	0.6	10.7	10.6	19.5	11.9	6.4	12.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	17.6	0.2	10.7	0.6	35.2	2.2	7.5	26.0	0.0
2019	Total	100.0	22.9	0.4	10.6	6.6	26.4	7.8	6.8	18.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	27.2	0.5	10.7	11.0	19.8	12.0	6.2	12.5	0.0
	Women	100.0	17.2	0.2	10.4	0.7	35.3	2.1	7.4	26.7	0.0
2020	Total	100.0	26.2	0.7	10.1	6.5	24.9	7.8	6.2	17.6	0.0
	Men	100.0	30.1	0.9	10.4	10.6	18.5	11.8	5.5	12.2	0.0
	Women	100.0	20.6	0.4	9.7	0.7	34.2	2.1	7.1	25.3	0.0
Southern Cone ^{a/d/}											
2012	Total	100.0	11.3	0.5	13.4	8.5	23.0	6.3	6.7	30.1	0.1
	Men	100.0	15.2	0.8	15.2	13.8	21.9	9.1	6.8	17.2	0.1
	Women	100.0	5.9	0.2	10.9	0.9	24.6	2.4	6.7	48.4	0.1
2015	Total	100.0	9.9	0.6	13.1	8.4	23.8	6.4	6.9	30.9	0.1
	Men	100.0	13.5	0.8	15.0	13.9	22.4	9.3	7.0	18.0	0.1
	Women	100.0	4.9	0.2	10.3	0.7	25.7	2.4	6.8	48.8	0.1

► Continues...

Year	Sex	Total	Agriculture, fishing and mining	Electricity, gas and waterworks	Manufacturing	Construction	Trade	Transportation, storage and communications	Financial establishments	Community, social and personal services	Unspecified activities
2018	Total	100.0	9.1	0.5	11.9	7.7	24.7	6.6	7.0	32.2	0.3
	Men	100.0	12.7	0.8	13.6	12.9	23.7	9.8	7.2	18.9	0.3
	Women	100.0	4.2	0.2	9.5	0.7	26.1	2.3	6.8	50.0	0.2
2019	Total	100.0	8.9	0.5	11.8	7.6	24.7	6.7	7.2	32.4	0.1
	Men	100.0	12.5	0.8	13.6	12.8	23.6	10.0	7.4	19.1	0.2
	Women	100.0	4.1	0.2	9.4	0.7	26.2	2.4	6.9	50.0	0.1
2020	Total	100.0	9.4	0.6	11.9	7.3	23.6	6.9	7.3	33.0	0.2
	Men	100.0	12.8	0.9	13.7	12.1	22.5	10.1	7.5	20.2	0.2
	Women	100.0	4.5	0.3	9.3	0.7	25.1	2.3	7.0	50.6	0.1

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ Weighted average.

b/ The countries included are: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. In Guatemala, the survey was not conducted in 2020; in Honduras, data for 2020 based on the Telephone Household Survey to measure employment, not comparable with previous years. In Dominican Republic data from 2012 based on the reweighted National Labor Force Survey (ENFT), new measurement from 2015 through the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

c/ The countries included are: Bolivia (Plurin. State of), Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In Bolivia (Plurin. State of) the years 2012 and 2015 based on the Household Survey with November-December period of each year; the years 2018 to 2020 correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey with annual period and the year 2020 corresponds to the I quarter. In Ecuador, data for 2020 correspond to the average of III and IV quarters.

d/ The countries included are: Argentina, Brazil (new reweighted series), Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

► **Table 13. LATIN AMERICA: CHANGE IN THE REAL AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGE BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND WAGE INDICATORS. Years 2012 - 2020**
(percentages)

Country / Wage indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Latin America (simple average)									
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)	100.0	102.5	103.7	104.0	104.8	105.5	106.5	108.9	110.9
Men	100.0	102.2	103.7	102.9	104.0	104.2	104.6	107.4	106.8
Women	100.0	103.2	104.0	106.2	106.2	107.7	109.9	111.9	118.0
Real average monthly wage index public sector	100.0	102.0	104.4	106.1	107.9	110.2	112.7	115.2	117.6
Real average monthly wage index private sector	100.0	102.6	103.6	103.3	104.2	104.3	104.6	107.2	105.9
Real average monthly wage index domestic work	100.0	104.5	105.7	113.8	111.9	112.5	114.5	116.3	113.2
Real average wage Women / Men	83.5	84.4	83.7	86.1	85.1	86.0	87.6	86.8	90.1
Latin America (weighted average) ^{a/}									
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)	100.0	101.9	102.7	102.9	104.8	105.2	106.5	107.8	110.8
Men	100.0	101.7	102.6	102.4	104.0	104.4	105.6	106.6	107.8
Women	100.0	102.3	103.0	104.2	106.6	107.3	108.8	110.7	116.2
Real average monthly wage index public sector	100.0	101.7	102.6	103.7	107.0	108.0	110.6	112.4	113.3
Real average monthly wage index private sector	100.0	102.0	102.8	102.9	104.5	104.7	105.4	106.6	107.4
Real average monthly wage index domestic work	100.0	103.3	106.1	108.4	109.8	111.0	111.7	112.0	107.1
Real average wage Women / Men	78.5	78.9	78.6	79.7	80.2	80.3	80.5	81.1	82.1
Bolivia (Pluri. State of)									
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)	100.0	98.7	106.5	108.4	108.2	107.5	109.6	110.6	111.2
Men	100.0	98.4	104.6	103.1	106.6	104.3	104.7	107.9	103.6
Women	100.0	98.8	109.7	117.3	112.1	114.3	119.5	117.2	126.5
Real average monthly wage index public sector	100.0	95.0	102.9	110.0	118.8	112.4	113.3	127.1	124.8
Real average monthly wage index private sector	100.0	97.6	106.4	105.4	103.3	105.5	105.5	104.4	99.9

► Continues...

Country / Wage indicators		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	113.9	109.4	128.2	112.5	106.8	121.7	113.0	128.2
Real average wage Women / Men		71.9	72.2	75.3	81.9	75.6	78.7	82.1	78.0	87.8
Brazil										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	102.1	104.5	105.2	108.4	110.5	112.4	112.8	117.7
Men		100.0	101.9	104.8	105.0	107.2	109.8	112.0	111.7	115.4
Women		100.0	102.4	104.6	106.3	111.0	112.6	114.2	116.0	122.4
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	101.3	103.4	103.9	109.4	111.2	114.2	116.2	116.8
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	102.2	104.5	105.2	107.6	109.6	110.5	110.4	113.2
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	103.6	108.8	109.1	111.4	112.2	113.2	111.9	106.6
Real average wage Women / Men		74.3	74.7	74.2	75.2	77.0	76.2	75.8	77.2	78.8
Chile										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	103.5	102.7	104.7	104.2	107.4	110.3	111.0	115.4
Men		100.0	102.6	101.1	103.5	103.8	105.8	108.8	109.5	110.2
Women		100.0	105.9	106.7	107.9	106.4	112.5	115.6	115.9	125.7
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	109.6	107.3	112.5	105.1	111.6	111.1	115.1	114.3
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	101.2	100.4	101.6	103.2	104.5	107.9	107.3	110.6
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	116.2	111.9	125.2	128.0	133.7	134.7	134.9	131.7
Real average wage Women / Men		70.9	73.2	74.8	73.9	72.8	75.4	75.4	75.1	80.9
Colombia										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	103.9	107.6	103.2	100.7	100.7	102.1	107.2	104.2
Men		100.0	103.2	108.9	103.2	100.2	99.6	99.8	105.5	100.3
Women		100.0	105.1	106.2	103.6	101.8	102.7	105.6	109.5	109.4
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	101.0	105.9	101.9	105.2	104.1	109.2	117.8	109.9
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	104.6	108.8	104.2	100.8	101.7	102.2	106.0	101.3

► Continues...

Country / Wage indicators		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	103.7	105.1	107.0	101.5	104.8	106.8	109.9	98.7
Real average wage Women / Men		84.9	86.4	82.8	85.2	86.3	87.6	89.9	88.1	92.6
Costa Rica										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	102.6	103.7	109.3	113.3	109.3	106.1	111.3	118.6
Men		100.0	101.1	103.0	106.3	110.1	104.7	101.9	108.1	109.8
Women		100.0	105.0	104.6	113.6	117.8	115.8	112.2	116.1	132.3
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	105.7	104.9	114.9	116.0	110.3	112.6	118.4	124.6
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	98.6	105.1	110.6	115.5	109.7	109.3	110.4	113.4
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	97.2	95.0	120.6	112.2	107.2	101.2	89.9	96.1
Real average wage Women / Men		83.9	87.1	85.2	89.7	89.8	92.7	92.4	90.1	101.2
Ecuador^{b/}										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	108.6	110.8	110.0	110.3	109.0	111.8	120.9	104.4
Men		100.0	109.0	110.5	110.0	110.7	109.3	111.9	121.1	98.7
Women		100.0	107.7	111.1	109.9	109.5	108.5	111.7	120.5	114.5
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	103.5	107.9	108.9	108.1	110.3	111.3	121.8	104.5
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	110.8	111.4	109.5	109.4	107.5	112.8	122.5	101.6
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	97.7	108.5	107.0	104.4	104.7	108.7	108.5	95.6
Real average wage Women / Men		96.7	95.5	97.2	96.6	95.6	95.9	96.5	96.2	112.2
El Salvador										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	107.4	104.4	106.5	102.7	109.8	113.0	116.9	117.7
Men		100.0	102.1	103.3	105.0	102.3	109.2	112.3	114.7	115.7
Women		100.0	115.7	106.4	108.7	103.1	110.5	114.2	120.0	120.5
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	106.0	111.6	108.8	113.7	119.1	116.4	123.6	124.5
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	107.9	102.0	107.0	102.5	109.8	113.3	116.0	117.2

► Continues...

Country / Wage indicators		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	111.2	106.4	104.0	113.1	110.4	115.3	129.3	131.5
Real average wage Women / Men		90.7	102.8	93.4	93.8	91.3	91.7	92.2	94.8	94.4
Guatemala ^{c/}										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	98.9	104.0	97.7	96.6	93.4	94.1	89.0	...
Men		100.0	98.1	105.0	94.2	95.3	91.9	92.7	86.4	...
Women		100.0	101.6	103.3	105.8	100.0	97.2	97.8	95.0	...
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	96.5	107.4	104.3	100.8	100.9	102.9	102.8	...
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	98.4	100.4	95.2	94.9	90.3	92.0	86.7	...
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	106.1	100.6	109.8	100.1	100.2	95.1	91.7	...
Real average wage Women / Men		86.2	89.3	84.8	96.8	90.5	91.2	91.0	94.7	...
Honduras										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	94.5	96.5	90.9	93.5	89.8	87.2	91.7	...
Men		100.0	93.9	94.7	91.4	93.5	92.8	87.2	93.3	...
Women		100.0	95.4	99.0	90.2	93.4	85.3	87.2	89.5	...
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	96.5	99.9	95.5	100.5	98.1	92.7	89.6	...
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	98.9	99.8	92.2	96.1	94.2	91.2	97.2	...
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	98.1	100.6	103.6	97.5	96.9	101.6	104.1	...
Real average wage Women / Men		99.4	100.9	103.9	98.1	99.2	91.3	99.3	95.4	...
Mexico										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	100.2	95.9	97.0	98.9	96.6	96.4	97.3	100.5
Men		100.0	100.3	95.9	97.1	99.4	97.1	97.0	98.0	99.7
Women		100.0	100.1	95.8	96.7	98.1	96.0	95.8	96.6	103.0
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	101.3	96.4	98.4	98.9	95.8	95.0	93.7	97.8
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	100.3	97.0	98.1	101.0	99.1	99.3	101.0	102.6

▶ Continues...

Country / Wage indicators		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	100.5	98.8	101.0	102.4	104.3	103.4	104.6	103.7
Real average wage Women / Men		83.2	83.0	83.1	82.8	82.2	82.3	82.2	81.9	86.0
Panama ^{d/}										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	102.1	101.3	108.3	114.3	121.4	120.5	124.5	...
Men		100.0	104.7	102.3	109.1	113.5	116.8	117.3	124.8	...
Women		100.0	98.4	100.0	107.3	115.3	127.8	125.1	124.6	...
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	100.6	98.4	106.6	113.3	129.9	129.6	132.4	...
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	102.2	101.8	107.1	112.5	114.1	113.2	118.6	...
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	110.6	118.4	127.4	125.6	126.4	131.1	143.0	...
Real average wage Women / Men		89.8	84.4	87.8	88.3	91.2	98.2	95.8	89.7	...
Paraguay										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	110.8	108.8	111.2	107.1	107.3	108.7	108.7	102.5
Men		100.0	111.3	110.6	109.0	105.6	106.2	105.1	105.6	98.1
Women		100.0	111.3	105.7	114.9	109.1	108.1	114.3	113.8	109.5
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	111.5	110.9	108.7	105.8	113.5	117.4	112.8	109.9
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	110.0	108.8	111.3	107.8	108.1	106.3	108.0	99.8
Real average monthly wage index domestic work		100.0	101.1	106.9	106.0	105.6	104.9	108.8	108.6	106.1
Real average wage Women / Men		79.4	79.3	75.8	83.7	82.1	80.8	86.4	85.6	88.6
Peru										
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)		100.0	102.0	104.3	103.9	107.3	105.2	106.9	108.9	100.9
Men		100.0	102.3	104.0	103.4	106.9	104.6	106.7	106.8	96.0
Women		100.0	100.8	104.7	104.4	108.2	106.7	108.0	113.0	109.0
Real average monthly wage index public sector		100.0	104.4	110.3	109.4	117.5	117.5	126.5	129.9	124.3
Real average monthly wage index private sector		100.0	101.7	102.4	102.5	104.1	101.5	100.9	102.5	91.4

► Continues...

Country / Wage indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Real average monthly wage index domestic work	100.0	99.6	99.9	101.8	106.8	108.8	112.1	115.9	105.4
Real average wage Women / Men	76.6	75.4	77.1	77.3	77.5	78.1	77.5	81.0	86.9
Dominican Republic									
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)	100.0	97.6	95.7	94.1	97.0	100.5	106.2	111.0	129.8
Men	100.0	98.3	96.8	91.9	95.6	98.3	100.8	107.0	129.5
Women	100.0	96.4	94.5	96.8	98.7	103.6	112.8	116.1	130.8
Real average monthly wage index public sector	100.0	96.7	95.1	103.5	99.6	110.9	130.6	119.6	155.2
Real average monthly wage index private sector	100.0	99.2	95.5	87.8	93.6	94.1	92.1	104.8	114.4
Real average monthly wage index domestic work	100.0	104.3	106.7	144.2	149.5	149.5	145.9	164.7	146.4
Real average wage Women / Men	88.0	86.3	85.9	92.8	90.9	92.8	98.5	95.5	...
Uruguay									
Real average monthly wage index (SPMR)	100.0	104.5	108.8	110.1	109.1	113.5	112.0	112.2	108.0
Men	100.0	105.2	109.7	110.5	110.0	113.1	110.5	110.8	104.9
Women	100.0	103.4	107.3	109.3	108.4	114.6	114.8	114.6	112.8
Real average monthly wage index public sector	100.0	100.6	103.5	104.7	105.2	107.6	107.7	107.6	105.1
Real average monthly wage index private sector	100.0	105.9	110.3	111.5	110.9	115.0	112.8	112.4	105.6
Real average monthly wage index domestic work	100.0	102.9	109.0	111.8	108.6	116.9	118.3	114.5	108.8
Real average wage Women / Men	76.0	74.8	74.4	75.2	75.0	77.0	79.0	78.6	81.8

Source: ILO, based on information from the household surveys of the countries.

a/ The weighting used to estimate the weighted average is: Urban Wage Earners, disaggregated by sex and institutional sector.

b/ The survey was not conducted in the I quarter (March) of 2020.

c/ The survey was not conducted in 2020.

d/ The 2020 survey does not allow disaggregation by urban area.

|| Break in series.

► **Table 14. LATIN AMERICA: REAL MINIMUM WAGE INDEX AND RATIO OF THE NOMINAL MINIMUM WAGE AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE NOMINAL WAGE OF THE URBAN PRIVATE SECTOR, BY YEAR AND COUNTRY. 2012 - 2021 (Year 2012 = 100)**

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Latin America									
Bolivia ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	113.5	128.8	142.3	149.7	161.3	162.4	164.3	162.8	-1.0
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	46.6	48.9	54.9	58.8	62.1	63.0	64.1	67.1	
Brazil ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	102.6	103.1	102.9	105.7	108.7	106.8	107.7	109.2	1.5
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	45.9	45.7	44.8	45.4	45.4	44.2	44.7	44.2	-2.5
Chile ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	104.8	108.8	111.7	117.1	120.7	123.6	128.6	133.3	3.5
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	42.2	43.2	43.9	44.8	45.6	45.8	46.9	47.9	
Colombia ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	102.0	103.6	103.2	102.7	105.3	108.0	110.6	114.4	3.3
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	53.9	52.7	54.8	56.4	57.3	58.5	57.7	62.5	
Costa Rica ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	101.1	103.8	107.7	109.2	109.0	109.2	110.1	112.1	1.8
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	71.1	68.5	67.5	65.5	68.8	69.2	69.1	73.4	
Ecuador ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	106.0	109.4	109.6	111.4	113.6	117.2	119.3	121.6	1.8
									0.0

► Continues...

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
								Year-over-year change in the minimum wage Average Jan-Nov	
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	64.9	66.7	68.0	69.3	72.1	70.7	66.4	81.1	
El Salvador ^{b/}									
Real minimum wage index	101.2	106.0	111.2	110.5	133.1	131.6	131.5	132.0	0.4
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	71.0	78.8	78.7	81.7	91.8	88.0	85.9	85.3	
Guatemala ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	100.1	101.1	103.2	102.4	103.6	103.2	99.5	99.1	-0.3
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	88.3	87.5	93.9	93.7	99.8	97.2	99.9	...	
Honduras ^{b/}									
Real minimum wage index	100.4	99.3	101.4	104.1	103.5	103.9	104.3	105.8	1.5
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	93.8	91.4	100.6	99.4	100.9	104.3	93.8	...	
Mexico ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	100.5	100.4	103.1	105.8	110.3	115.1	129.0	149.8	16.0
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	30.8	31.8	32.3	32.2	34.2	35.6	39.3	44.9	
Nicaragua ^{b/}									
Real minimum wage index	105.2	110.4	117.8	125.3	131.2	137.2	135.8	133.8	-1.6
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Panama ^{b/}									
Real minimum wage index	96.1	106.4	106.3	111.3	110.3	114.2	114.6	117.4	2.5
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	49.5	55.3	52.3	52.3	51.3	53.2	51.1	...	

 Continues...

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
								Year-over-year change in the minimum wage Average Jan-Nov	
Paraguay ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	97.4	100.4	98.9	95.6	100.7	100.4	101.3	101.4	0.3
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	77.5	80.8	77.8	77.7	81.6	82.7	82.2	89.0	
Peru ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	101.5	98.3	95.0	99.8	101.1	106.8	106.9	104.9	-1.8
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	59.0	56.8	54.8	56.7	58.9	62.6	61.6	67.9	
Dominican Republic ^{b/}									
Real minimum wage index	103.1	105.6	113.2	117.5	129.8	131.8	136.9	142.3	4.8
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	43.5	46.3	54.0	52.5	57.7	59.9	54.7	70.7	
Uruguay ^{a/}									
Real minimum wage index	101.3	105.3	108.1	109.9	113.8	115.9	122.5	118.8	-2.9
Nom. min. wage as a % of the nom. wage of the priv. sec.	39.4	39.3	46.3	40.8	40.8	42.3	44.9	46.3	
Simple average of the real min. wage index	102.3	105.7	108.5	111.1	116.0	118.0	120.2	122.4	1.9
Weighted average of the real min. wage index ^{c/}	102.1	103.0	104.1	106.7	110.3	111.7	116.3	123.1	5.4

Source: ILO, based on official national data.

a/ Index based on national minimum wage.

b/ Index based on the lowest minimum wage in the industrial sector.

c/ The weighting used to estimate the weighted regional average corresponds to the total number of private sector employees in each year by country.

▶ **2021 LABOUR
OVERVIEW**

Latin America
and the Caribbean

▶ **Statistical
Annex
Urban/Rural**

► **Table 1. LATIN AMERICA: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA. 2011 - 2020 (annual average rates)**

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{n/}
Argentina ^{a/}										
Urban	...	...	...	...	...	8.5	8.4	9.2	9.8	11.5
Rural	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{b/}										
Urban	3.8	3.2	4.0	3.5	4.4	4.7	5.1	4.9	5.0	8.3
Rural	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.4	2.0	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.1	...
Brazil ^{c/}										
Urban	7.5	7.7	7.5	7.2	9.0	12.1	13.2	12.7	12.3	14.2
Rural	2.5	5.3	5.2	5.0	6.1	8.6	10.2	9.9	9.7	10.4
Chile ^{d/}										
Urban	7.6	6.8	6.3	6.7	6.6	7.0	7.2	7.6	7.5	11.0
Rural	5.2	4.7	4.5	4.8	4.9	4.6	5.2	5.3	5.2	8.2
Colombia ^{e/}										
Urban	11.8	11.4	10.7	10.0	9.8	10.3	10.5	10.9	11.5	17.8
Rural	7.3	6.5	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.1	6.5	8.7
Costa Rica ^{f/}										
Urban	10.1	10.0	9.2	9.6	9.7	9.6	9.0	10.3	12.0	20.1
Rural	10.9	10.8	9.9	9.8	9.3	9.4	9.4	10.2	11.1	17.5
Ecuador ^{g/}										
Urban	6.0	4.9	4.7	5.1	5.4	6.8	5.7	5.2	5.6	10.2
Rural	2.4	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.4	1.9	1.8	2.2	3.6
El Salvador										
Urban	6.6	6.2	5.6	6.7	6.5	6.9	6.8	6.1	6.1	6.9
Rural	6.6	5.8	6.6	7.5	7.9	7.2	7.4	6.9	6.8	6.9
Guatemala ^{h/}										
Urban	3.1	4.0	3.8	4.0	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.1	...
Rural	...	1.6	2.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.3	...
Honduras ^{i/}										
Urban	6.8	5.6	6.0	7.5	8.8	9.0	8.2	8.0	7.8	11.2
Rural	2.0	1.7	2.0	2.7	5.6	5.4	4.9	2.7	3.0	10.5
Mexico										
Urban	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.8	3.6	3.9	4.9
Rural	3.4	3.1	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.9

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{n/}
Nicaragua										
Urban	8.1	8.7	7.7	8.5	7.7	6.3	5.2	7.5	7.7	7.1
Rural	3.7	3.8	3.1	4.0	3.7	2.5	1.8	3.0	2.7	2.6
Panama ^{g/}										
Urban	5.4	4.8	4.7	5.4	5.8	6.4	6.9	7.1	8.3	...
Rural	2.4	2.4	2.7	3.4	3.2	3.2	4.1	3.2	4.0	...
Paraguay ^{j/}										
Urban	6.4	5.7	5.9	7.3	6.4	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.2	9.2
Rural	4.3	2.9	3.6	4.0	3.6	3.9	4.7	4.7	5.4	5.0
Peru										
Urban	5.1	4.7	4.8	4.5	4.4	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.7	9.4
Rural	0.9	0.8	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.1
Dominican Republic ^{k/}										
Urban	6.6	7.3	7.8	7.1	7.9	7.9	6.1	6.1	6.4	6.1
Rural	4.3	4.9	5.9	5.4	5.0	4.0	3.1	3.9	4.9	4.6
Uruguay ^{l/}										
Urban	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.9	7.8	8.2	8.3	8.6	9.2	10.6
Rural	4.4	4.5	4.9	4.8	5.6	6.0	6.0	6.8	6.8	9.2
Latin America ^{m/}										
Urban	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.7	7.2	8.7	9.0	8.9	8.8	11.3
Rural	3.2	3.8	3.8	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.0	4.8	4.9	6.4

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ 31 urban agglomerates. INDEC, in the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labor market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.

b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The 2020 survey does not allow obtaining the annual data for the rural area.

c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.

d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.

e/ Includes hidden unemployment. The urban area includes municipal capitals and the rural area includes population centres and dispersed rural areas.

f/ The 2010 data is the average of the III and IV quarters.

g/ Includes hidden unemployment.

h/ As of 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data. The survey was not conducted in 2020.

i/ The 2020 survey considers the PET from 15 years and older, not comparable with previous years.

j/ Data from 2017 onwards correspond to the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.

k/ Series 2009 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labor Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo, ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

l/ The rural area refers to localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants.

m/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama. The weighted average for urban areas, including Argentina, covers 17 countries and the weighted average for rural areas covers 16 countries (excluding Argentina).

n/ The 2020 data may present comparability problems with the 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes implemented by the Statistical and Census Institutes due to the health emergency situation. In addition, 2020 regional data are not comparable with previous years since information is not available for Guatemala and Panama and also for rural Bolivia. Preliminary data.

|| Years in which a country is undergoing a revision of the survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in data comparability.

► **Table 2. LATIN AMERICA: LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND**

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{n/}
Argentina ^{a/}										
Urban	...	...	...	...	...	57.5	57.8	58.5	59.1	54.9
Rural	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{b/}										
Urban	59.6	57.0	58.5	59.4	56.2	61.6	62.2	65.6	68.6	65.8
Rural	79.7	70.1	74.0	80.2	72.0	76.3	79.4	83.4	83.7	...
Brazil ^{c/}										
Urban	59.6	63.7	63.7	63.3	63.7	64.0	64.6	64.8	65.3	60.7
Rural	62.3	56.8	56.3	56.6	56.7	54.9	53.6	52.8	52.8	50.1
Chile ^{d/}										
Urban	62.0	61.8	61.8	62.1	62.3	62.3	63.0	63.3	63.3	56.8
Rural	58.0	58.9	60.0	60.4	60.2	60.6	60.7	60.5	59.3	50.7
Colombia ^{e/}										
Urban	65.2	66.0	65.8	66.0	66.3	65.9	65.6	65.3	64.7	60.4
Rural	58.8	59.5	58.8	58.1	59.4	59.5	60.1	59.5	58.2	55.1
Costa Rica ^{f/}										
Urban	60.3	64.1	63.0	63.9	62.7	59.3	59.5	61.4	63.6	61.6
Rural	55.4	59.2	60.1	58.6	57.2	55.9	56.9	58.7	59.6	56.4
Ecuador ^{g/}										
Urban	62.2	62.8	61.8	62.2	64.1	65.7	65.8	64.2	63.3	60.2
Rural	63.6	64.1	65.4	65.3	70.8	73.9	74.9	73.6	74.1	69.4
El Salvador										
Urban	63.7	64.6	65.1	64.6	62.2	63.8	63.3	62.9	63.9	62.7
Rural	60.9	60.7	61.0	59.4	59.7	59.5	59.6	58.6	59.1	59.1
Guatemala ^{h/}										
Urban	61.0	65.5	61.9	62.7	62.9	62.3	62.8	63.2	60.5	...
Rural	62.6	65.4	59.2	58.9	58.3	59.1	58.9	58.2	57.9	...
Honduras ^{i/}										
Urban	52.5	51.2	54.3	55.7	56.9	57.4	58.1	60.5	57.5	61.0
Rural	51.4	50.4	53.1	56.4	59.4	57.6	60.1	60.3	57.2	58.3
Mexico										
Urban	61.0	61.6	61.6	60.9	60.8	60.8	60.5	60.8	61.1	55.8
Rural	55.4	56.2	55.7	55.8	56.3	55.6	55.3	55.2	56.4	54.5

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{n/}
Nicaragua										
Urban	73.7	74.7	74.5	73.2	71.6	72.0	72.0	69.7	69.0	66.2
Rural	77.4	78.7	77.1	75.3	73.5	75.2	75.7	74.2	73.6	72.1
Panama ^{g/}										
Urban	63.2	63.6	64.1	64.3	64.5	64.6	64.2	65.1	65.9	...
Rural	58.8	62.8	64.2	63.3	63.4	63.9	63.4	66.0	68.1	...
Paraguay ^{j/}										
Urban	60.5	64.1	63.0	62.7	62.3	63.9	71.3	71.9	72.6	70.1
Rural	61.9	64.9	61.5	61.8	61.6	60.6	70.5	71.8	72.0	70.4
Peru										
Urban	71.6	71.5	71.2	70.0	69.4	70.5	70.7	70.6	71.0	61.1
Rural	81.6	80.7	80.2	80.3	79.9	78.8	79.0	79.1	79.7	79.7
Dominican Republic ^{k/}										
Urban	58.3	60.2	59.4	59.8	62.2	62.8	62.6	64.0	65.5	60.1
Rural	55.6	55.3	57.0	55.9	60.6	60.4	60.2	62.3	63.2	60.4
Uruguay ^{l/}										
Urban	65.0	64.0	63.8	64.9	64.0	63.8	63.4	62.8	62.8	61.0
Rural	63.3	64.4	62.7	63.6	62.6	61.2	60.2	60.4	59.0	57.7
Latin America ^{m/}										
Urban	61.2	63.2	63.0	62.7	62.8	63.1	63.4	63.7	64.0	59.1
Rural	61.4	60.1	59.7	59.9	60.3	59.9	59.9	59.7	59.9	56.8

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ 31 urban agglomerates. INDEC, in the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labor market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.

b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The 2020 survey does not allow obtaining the annual data for the rural area.

c/ Data from 2012 onwards correspond to the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua (PNADC), not comparable with previous years. New reweighted series published by IBGE.

d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.

e/ Includes hidden unemployment. The urban area includes municipal capitals and the rural area includes population centres and dispersed rural areas.

f/ The 2010 data is the average of the III and IV quarters.

g/ Includes hidden unemployment.

h/ As of 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data. The survey was not conducted in 2020.

i/ The 2020 survey considers the PET from 15 years and older, not comparable with previous years.

j/ Data from 2017 onwards correspond to the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.

k/ Series 2009 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labor Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo, ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

l/ The rural area refers to localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants.

m/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama. The weighted average for urban areas, including Argentina, covers 17 countries and the weighted average for rural areas covers 16 countries (excluding Argentina).

n/ The 2020 data may present comparability problems with the 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes implemented by the Statistical and Census Institutes due to the health emergency situation. In addition, 2020 regional data are not comparable with previous years since information is not available for Guatemala and Panama and also for rural Bolivia. Preliminary data.

|| Years in which a country is undergoing a revision of the survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in data comparability.

► **Table 3. LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO BY YEAR, COUNTRY AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA. 2011 - 2020 (average annual rates)**

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{1/}
Argentina ^{a/}										
Urban	...	...	...	...	...	52.6	52.9	53.1	53.3	48.6
Rural	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Bolivia (Pluri. State of) ^{b/}										
Urban	57.3	55.2	56.1	57.3	53.8	58.7	59.1	62.4	65.1	60.4
Rural	79.1	69.7	73.4	79.9	70.5	75.4	78.6	82.7	82.8	...
Brazil ^{c/}										
Urban	55.2	58.7	58.9	58.7	58.0	56.3	56.1	56.6	57.3	52.1
Rural	60.7	53.8	53.4	53.8	53.2	50.2	48.1	47.6	47.7	44.9
Chile ^{d/}										
Urban	57.3	57.6	57.9	57.9	58.2	58.0	58.4	58.5	58.6	50.6
Rural	55.0	56.1	57.3	57.5	57.2	57.8	57.6	57.3	56.2	46.6
Colombia ^{e/}										
Urban	57.5	58.5	58.8	59.4	59.8	59.2	58.8	58.2	57.3	49.6
Rural	54.5	55.7	55.3	54.8	56.0	56.4	57.0	56.5	54.4	50.3
Costa Rica ^{f/}										
Urban	54.2	57.7	57.2	57.8	56.6	53.6	54.2	55.1	55.9	49.2
Rural	49.4	52.8	54.2	52.8	51.9	50.7	51.5	52.7	52.9	46.5
Ecuador										
Urban	58.5	59.7	58.9	59.0	60.7	61.2	62.1	60.8	59.8	54.1
Rural	62.1	62.7	63.9	63.7	69.2	72.1	73.5	72.3	72.5	66.8
El Salvador										
Urban	59.5	60.6	61.5	60.3	58.1	59.4	59.0	59.1	60.0	58.4
Rural	56.9	57.2	56.9	55.0	54.9	55.2	55.2	54.5	55.1	55.0
Guatemala ^{g/}										
Urban	59.0	62.8	59.6	60.2	60.9	60.2	60.8	61.1	58.6	...
Rural	59.4	64.3	57.9	57.9	57.2	58.0	57.9	57.4	57.1	...
Honduras										
Urban	48.9	48.3	51.1	51.5	51.9	52.3	53.4	55.7	53.0	54.2
Rural	50.3	49.5	52.0	54.9	56.1	54.5	57.2	58.6	55.5	52.1
Mexico										
Urban	57.5	58.3	58.3	57.6	57.9	58.2	58.2	58.6	58.8	53.1
Rural	53.5	54.5	53.9	54.2	54.8	54.3	54.2	54.1	55.2	52.9

► Continues...

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ^{i/}
Nicaragua										
Urban	67.8	68.2	68.8	66.9	66.1	67.5	68.3	64.5	63.7	61.5
Rural	74.6	75.8	74.7	72.3	70.7	73.3	74.3	72.0	71.6	70.2
Panama										
Urban	59.8	60.6	61.1	60.9	60.7	60.4	59.8	60.6	60.5	...
Rural	57.5	61.3	62.4	61.1	61.3	61.9	60.7	63.9	65.4	...
Paraguay ^{h/}										
Urban	56.7	60.5	59.3	58.1	58.3	59.3	66.4	66.8	67.3	63.7
Rural	59.2	63.1	59.3	59.3	59.4	58.2	67.2	68.4	68.1	66.9
Peru										
Urban	67.9	68.1	67.8	66.8	66.4	66.9	67.2	67.3	67.7	55.4
Rural	80.9	80.0	79.2	79.5	79.2	78.2	78.4	78.4	79.1	78.8
Dominican Republic ^{i/}										
Urban	54.4	55.8	54.8	55.6	57.2	57.9	58.8	60.1	61.3	56.5
Rural	53.2	52.6	53.6	52.9	57.5	58.0	58.4	59.9	60.1	57.7
Uruguay ^{i/}										
Urban	60.7	59.6	59.5	60.4	59.0	58.6	58.1	57.4	57.0	54.6
Rural	60.5	61.6	59.7	60.5	59.1	57.5	56.6	56.3	54.9	52.4
Latin America and the Caribbean ^{k/}										
Urban	56.9	58.7	58.7	58.5	58.3	57.6	57.7	58.0	58.3	52.4
Rural	59.4	57.9	57.4	57.8	57.9	57.2	57.2	57.1	57.2	53.4

Source: ILO, based on information from household surveys of the countries.

a/ 31 urban agglomerates. INDEC, in the framework of the statistical emergency declared in 2016, recommends disregarding the series published between 2007 and 2015 for purposes of comparison and analysis of the labor market in the Argentine Republic. The 2016 annual data is the average of the II, III and IV quarters.

b/ Data from 2016 onwards correspond to the Continuous Employment Survey (ECE), not comparable with previous years. The 2020 survey does not allow obtaining the annual data for the rural area.

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d/ Series based on 2017 census projections.

e/ The urban area includes municipal capitals and the rural area includes population centres and dispersed rural areas.

f/ The 2010 data is the average of the III and IV quarters.

g/ As of 2011, the age of the PET has changed from 10 to 15 years, which may affect the comparability of the data. The survey was not conducted in 2020.

h/ Data from 2017 onwards correspond to the Continuous Permanent Household Survey (EPHC), not comparable with previous years.

i/ Series 2009 - 2014 based on reweighted National Labor Force Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo, ENFT). New measurement as of 2015 using the Continuous National Labor Force Survey (ENCFT), data not comparable with previous years.

j/ The rural area refers to localities with less than 5,000 inhabitants.

k/ Weighted average. Excludes hidden unemployment in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama. The weighted average for urban areas, including Argentina, covers 17 countries and the weighted average for rural areas covers 16 countries (excluding Argentina).

l/ The 2020 data may present comparability problems with the 2019 data due to adjustments in the statistical processes implemented by the Statistical and Census Institutes due to the health emergency situation. In addition, 2020 regional data are not comparable with previous years since information is not available for Guatemala and Panama and also for rural Bolivia. Preliminary data.

Years in which a country is undergoing a revision of the survey or of important variables that may lead to a possible break in data comparability.

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