



Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges

A SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS FROM SEVEN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS



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Peacebuilding and statebuilding are reinforcing processes that support the building of effective, legitimate, accountable and responsive states. These overlapping but distinct processes are essential elements for guiding national and international efforts in addressing state fragility and promoting peace and stability in situations of conflict and fragility.

The Synthesis Report was prepared to inform discussions at the first meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding on 9-10 April 2010 in Dili, Timor-Leste. “The Dialogue” is an ongoing discussion process that engages representatives of national and regional governments, bilateral and multilateral development partners and civil society in an open and frank conversation about improving peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

This report identifies seven peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities as stepping stones to reach the Millennium Development Goals in conflict-affected and fragile states. These priorities were later defined as goals in the *Dili Declaration – A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. The report also identifies bottlenecks and emerging good practices, drawing on findings of seven multi-stakeholder consultations that were carried out as part of the Dialogue in Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and Timor-Leste.

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Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
(the) Dialogue	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
IfS	European Instrument for Stability
MDTFs	Multi Donor Trust Funds
Monitoring Survey	Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBC	UN Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peace Building Fund
PBSO	Peace Building Support Office
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSF	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Fund
SG	UN Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC
SWAPs	Sector Wide Approaches
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
JAM	Sudan Joint Assessment Mission

Dili Declaration

A NEW VISION FOR PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

PREAMBLE

We, the representatives of developing countries and regions, bilateral and multi-lateral partners and civil society, met in Dili on 9-10 April 2010. We welcome the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding as an innovation in the international system, where countries and regions experiencing conflict and fragility and development partners can jointly shape and guide international assistance to support peacebuilding and statebuilding.

This Declaration builds on the g7+ statement agreed in Dili on 8 April 2010 (see Annex). We reaffirm our commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).

Conflict and fragility are major obstacles for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We recognise that it will be extremely difficult to achieve the MDGs in most fragile and conflict-affected states by 2015. We urgently need to address conflict and fragility by supporting country-led peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. To improve the impact of our efforts, we will take immediate actions and develop an International Action Plan on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING GOALS

Our collective vision is to end and prevent conflict and to contribute to the development of capable, accountable states that respond to the expectations and needs of their population, in particular the needs of vulnerable and excluded groups, women, youth and children. We recognise the centrality of state-society relations in supporting the development of capable, accountable and responsive states. This will require sustained efforts by all stakeholders to improve governance, strengthen economic and social development, and promote peace and security as outlined in the statement by the g7+.

In order to translate this vision into reality and guide our collective engagement, we identify the following peacebuilding and statebuilding goals as stepping stones to achieve progress on development:

- Foster inclusive political settlements and processes, and inclusive political dialogue.
- Establish and strengthen basic safety and security.
- Achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts and access to justice.
- Develop effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate service delivery.
- Create the foundations for inclusive economic development, including sustainable livelihoods, employment and effective management of natural resources.
- Develop social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
- Foster regional stability and co-operation.

We recognise that priorities to achieve these goals will be different in each country. These priorities should be set at country-level through a process that engages all stakeholders, especially women and civil society.

CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING GOALS

Among the challenges identified through national consultations, we are particularly concerned about:

- Lack of a shared vision for change among key stakeholders that is based on consultations with citizens and civil society. Lack of context and conflict analysis.
- Lack of trust between developing countries and development partners.
- Too many overlapping plans, and weak alignment of donors behind a unified national plan. Lack of agreement on the need to address shifting short-term and long-term priorities at the same time.
- Approaches which focus on a country's capital city and certain regions, creating pockets of exclusion and engaging only a few central state actors in the executive.
- Insufficient attention to the protection of women and children from armed conflict and to the participation of women in peacebuilding and statebuilding.
- Insufficient attention to economic growth and job creation, particularly for youth.
- Unrealistic timeframes for reform, weak capacity to implement plans and limited effectiveness of capacity development approaches.

- The need to strengthen linkages between development, security, justice and good governance.
- Lack of data and reliable statistics to inform planning for peacebuilding and statebuilding.
- Insufficient flexibility, speed and predictability of transition financing, and limited effectiveness of existing instruments.

ACTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

The following actions can help accelerate progress on peacebuilding and statebuilding, and deepen the implementation of the Paris Declaration, the AAA and the Principles for Good International Engagement if implemented today. Beginning now, we commit ourselves to:

1. Set up a mechanism to enable the g7+ meetings to continue.
2. Formulate international peacebuilding and statebuilding goals based on this Declaration.
3. Develop a long-term vision at country-level to guide the development transformation.
4. Ensure that national development plans integrate peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, and set clear priorities that can adapt to evolving circumstances.
5. Map the allocation of in-country government and international resources across regions and social groups to ensure equity and prevent exclusion.
6. Initiate in-country joint reviews of the impact of development partners' hiring and procurement procedures on the local economy and labour market, as well as on local capacity.
7. Initiate discussion with expert institutions on the development of national statistical capacities.
8. Where the United Nations (UN) do not have a lead co-ordination mandate, agree on a lead development partner co-ordination arrangement at country-level to drive co-operation and policy dialogue with governments on development priorities. Establish clear terms of reference to deliver on this arrangement, in line with the Paris Declaration and AAA.

We will report back on the status of delivering these actions at the next meeting of the International Dialogue in early 2011.

AN INTERNATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

Delivering more effective support to peacebuilding and statebuilding will require a change in approach. To this end, we commit to developing an International Action Plan between now and the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF 4). This plan will respond to the goals and challenges identified in the national consultations. We also agree that the International Action Plan will give special attention to four areas and focus specifically on the relevance to fragile and conflict-affected states:

1. **Capacity development:** Develop recommendations for improving and harmonising support to capacity development, recognising the critical contribution of South-South co-operation. Recommendations will also address how to avoid policies that undermine the capacity of developing countries, and how to support statebuilding.
2. **Aid instruments:** Improve the way aid is delivered to ensure rapid and flexible delivery and transition towards government-led delivery through country systems.
3. **Planning processes:** Improve the process that ensures that developing countries' peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and constraints are identified, that feasible plans are prepared, and that development partners align to them.
4. **Political dialogue:** Improve how peacebuilding and statebuilding are part of the political dialogue between developing countries and development partners, and how in-country political dialogue can ensure better state-society relations and the building of trust between state and citizens. This could address the role of media and communications at the national, sub-national and global levels.

Particular attention will be given to the issue of gender equality and the role of women, and the potential of youth in all of the areas above. We will deliver this work programme through a range of mechanisms to be further defined. Participation in these mechanisms will include developing countries, development partners and civil society.

We will work through the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding to deliver this International Action Plan at HLF 4 in the Republic of Korea in November 2011.

INFORMING OTHER PROCESSES AND INCREASING PARTICIPATION

We will feed the results from the International Dialogue country consultations and this meeting into other on-going processes to improve the impact on peacebuilding and statebuilding. This will include the Peacebuilding Commission Review, the implementation of the UN Secretary General's Report on Peacebuilding, the MDG Review Summit and the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).

We commit to continue this dialogue and to expand participation to other countries and stakeholders.

DILI, TIMOR-LESTE

10 APRIL 2010

Statement by the g7+

9 APRIL, 2010 · DILI, TIMOR-LESTE

We, the representatives from Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste, assembled for the g7+ Partners Meeting, gathered to signify the will of fragile states and regions to reduce poverty, deter conflict and provide better conditions for our people.

We thank the international community for giving us the space to conduct this dialogue, share our experiences and learn from our lessons. This gives us a stronger voice to speak to the international community about our needs and circumstances.

Therefore, we recognise that to assist the development partners in designing their assistance to fragile states and situations, we must take leadership and express a **strong, long-term vision. This vision** should be reflected in our national plans, which must guide donor intervention in our countries. We should also recognise that this transformation is a long process that takes time and requires flexible approaches that are sensitive to the stages of fragility and political context. The long-term vision will be set out in our development plans, frameworks and strategies. These plans will prioritise the following areas:

1. GOVERNANCE

- **Political**
- **Public administration and decentralisation**
- **Economic, financial**

We recognise the need for good governance that empowers the people through open and transparent public administration and financial management, political representation and leadership. It is through the principles of good governance that effective and efficient public administration can be achieved. Leadership and effective systems of political empowerment are also essential to ensure development and social inclusion. There is recognition that democracy must be implemented in accordance with local circumstances.

It was agreed that in some fragile nations the needs of good governance require the implementation of a programme of decentralisation to bring service delivery and representation closer to citizens.

2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

- **Infrastructure development (highlighting roads, telecommunications, transport, energy)**
- **Natural resource management**
- **Land issues and agriculture**
- **Poverty reduction**
- **Environment and climate change**
- **Job creation**

With widespread poverty experienced by our nations and as a root cause of our conflicts, we agree that economic development is central to our stable futures. To achieve economic development, the importance of infrastructure development is a priority. Among infrastructure needs, connectivity through telecommunications, quality roads, water and sanitation, and electricity and energy are basic requirements for our development.

Greater emphasis must be focused on aid effectiveness, which can contribute to these core infrastructure needs that will deliver immediate relief and economic development.

3. HUMAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

- **Health**
- **Education**
- **Human resources, capacity**
- **Vulnerable citizens**
- **Gender equality**

Our societies cannot develop without basic conditions that allow our citizens a good quality of life that sustains the human and collective spirit. Education, health, water and sanitation, gender equality and job creation are fundamental to human and social development. Effective programmes that protect and strengthen the most vulnerable and reach the most remote and inaccessible areas are critical to both sustainability and stability.

Aid must be distributed fairly across the country to reduce the risk of conflict, and ensure social inclusion and a common national identity that is respected by international partners.

4. SECURITY

- **Conflict resolution and prevention**
- **Reconciliation**
- **Social inclusion**
- **Peacebuilding, dialogue**
- **Rule of law**

There was a shared recognition that without security there can be no development. We acknowledge that we have a responsibility to address and resolve our internal conflicts. Common to the experiences of fragile states and situations is the occurrence of conflict and the existence of latent tensions and disagreement.

We have all dealt with what have often seemed intractable problems and social division. We acknowledged these problems and agreed on the approaches that are necessary to bring peace and security. This includes the need for reconciliation, social inclusion, dialogue, the institution of the rule of law, and for an honest examination of the root causes of conflict and our national mentality. There must be recognition that a change of national mentality is a long process that takes time. As we have all experienced conflict, there was agreement that we can learn from our individual and collective experiences and discuss together how we addressed our problems.

Resolution of conflict takes time due to the internal dynamic and complexities of our circumstances. Security and stability require the integration of all groups in society which should engage in a process of self-examination leading to a common purpose. International partners must integrate their intervention accordingly.

Action must be taken to operationalise these priorities. **There is a strong spirit of solidarity between our countries and a strong desire to continue to work together in the g7+ group** to share experiences, challenges, failures and successes, to make a rapid transition to sustainable peace and development, and to bring tangible results for the people of all our nations.

We believe this dialogue has provided clarity in our shared challenges in nation building. We recognise our collective responsibility given the urgency of the situation, and given the effect of conflict. We are the furthest away from reaching the MDGs and we recognise we will not achieve them within the current time frame.

In order to work effectively with donors, fragile nations must develop and communicate their own planning, programmes, models and strategies of development through strong leadership. The fragile nations acknowledge that each country must take ownership by developing these frameworks to address individual

circumstances and within the national context. We recognise that ownership comes with a responsibility to define our needs and be accountable for delivery. We want donors to adhere to this principle and align accordingly.

When considering these circumstances, we agree there are common themes through shared characteristics and challenges amongst fragile states. All must be addressed with action and aid assistance that is effective.

We recognise fragile states are in a transitional stage – in order to further explore the above themes and to discuss our common and collective issues, **it is necessary for the g7+ Partner Meetings to continue**. It is through this dialogue and institutional grouping that we can discuss our priorities and our approaches, and in doing so, allow for empowered and effective communication with the donor communities.

We believe fragile states are characterised and classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing; and that in order to make long-lasting change and implement the principles of good engagement; the national context must guide each distinctive path to sustainable development, and donors must first harmonise to this concept and then implement without undue process. Although we all accept international standards, the donor community must be aware of our conditions and needs. That is why we must give ourselves a transitional period to reinforce our capabilities and systems and not have complex and slow procedural requirements and conditions imposed upon us.

Fragile nations, above all states, understand the meaning of urgent action, that a government's responsibility to address the needs of the people is a priority which often requires swift, immediate, and decisive responses to avoid potential or escalating threats to national stability. International partnerships are critical at this time. **A two-pronged approach is necessary, requiring flexibility in systems and untying restraints** that could prevent aid delivery while establishing medium- to long-term planning.

We realise the need to have a collective voice as members of a formal forum, supported and accepted by the international community.

Executive Summary

This report was prepared to inform discussions at the first meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (“the Dialogue”) on 9-10 April 2010 in Dili, Timor-Leste. The report synthesises the findings of seven multi-stakeholder consultations which were carried out between November 2009 and March 2010. Consultations were held in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan* and Timor-Leste. The main objectives of the consultations were to help generate a consensus around fundamental peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, and to identify key bottlenecks and good practices in national and international support to these areas.

The analysis presented in this report also draws on the findings of the Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey (“Monitoring Survey”); on a review of strategic planning frameworks in selected fragile and conflict-affected countries; and on recent policy-oriented research on peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The report is based on an understanding of peacebuilding and statebuilding as two mutually reinforcing processes aimed at supporting the building of effective, legitimate, accountable and responsive states characterised by a healthy state-society relationship and by peaceful relations among communities and with external neighbours.

The findings from the seven consultations confirmed the relevance of these concepts and helped to articulate the various dimensions and dynamics of the two processes, recognising that different contexts will present different peacebuilding and statebuilding scenarios. They also suggested that there is an emerging consensus around a set of common peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities that national and international partners should consider in their work in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

* “Southern Sudan” refers to a region of Sudan. The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements in 2005. Consultations were organised by GOSS in February 2010 to take stock of Southern Sudan’s peacebuilding and statebuilding experience since 2005.

Key priorities identified include first and foremost the promotion of successful political settlement and political processes and the halt of violent conflict through an increased focus on basic safety and security. Additional priorities identified by the majority of the country consultations relate to the rule of law, the promotion of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the strengthening of the state's capacity to raise revenues and to provide services according to people's expectations. Effective management of natural resources, inclusive growth and economic development are also seen as critical components of peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies, particularly in more stable post-conflict situations. Strategies to build a positive relationship between the state and citizens and the need to support capacities and opportunities for social reconciliation within and across the communities and for participation were identified as gaps in current national and international peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. Finally, the regional dimension of those efforts was also highlighted.

The country consultations identified a set of challenges in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and in the engagement of national and international partners with such processes. These include the difficulty of operating in sensitive and fast-changing environments without a clear vision for change; weak planning and low implementation of agreed priorities; the difficulty of balancing short- and long-term objectives; financing modalities and other specific donor practices that are not fully aligned with peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities; capital-centric approaches to statebuilding; a narrow view of capacity development, often confined to human resource development and management rather than including deeper behavioural and institutional issues such as motivation and styles of management; and lack of mutual accountability between national and international partners.

The findings of the seven consultations, however, suggested that some good practices are emerging both in regard to how peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities are being addressed in-country, and in regard to the response of national and international partners to the challenges outlined above. Good practices were reported, for example, on ways national and international partners support political processes and critical sectors like security sector reform (SSR). Some good practices were also identified in relation to planning and accountability frameworks, more specifically in regard to donor efforts to increase alignment with and provide more effective support to national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

In conclusion, the findings summarised in this report reconfirmed the usefulness of a peacebuilding and statebuilding approach and called for stronger and more coherent national and international engagement to support peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities in the short, medium and long term.

1. Introduction

This report synthesises evidence on peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and challenges, and provides examples of good practices in national and international support to peacebuilding and statebuilding. It has been developed as input to structure discussion during the first meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (“the Dialogue”), which took place in Dili, Timor-Leste, on 8-10 April 2010.

The findings in this report have been collected through a series of multi-stakeholder consultations that were carried out in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste between November 2009 and March 2010. Participants in these consultations included officials from different parts of governments, members of parliament, civil society and the private sector, and international community representatives. The national and regional governments involved are all members of the Dialogue, and volunteered to organise consultations on peacebuilding and statebuilding and to share this experience with other members of the Dialogue.

In addition to findings from the multi-stakeholder consultations, the findings in this report draw on:

- The 2010 Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey.¹
- An analysis of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and activities in strategic planning frameworks.²
- Relevant international reference material on peacebuilding and statebuilding.³
- Material from existing national policy dialogue forums and other national processes.

Notes

1. The monitoring exercise took place in Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.
2. Strategic planning frameworks were reviewed for Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Togo.
3. See bibliography for detailed references.

2. Key concepts and definitions of peacebuilding and statebuilding

Concepts and definitions

The concepts of peacebuilding and statebuilding have emerged in response to the growing concern that traditional development approaches might not be adequate or appropriate in situations characterised by insecurity, heightened risks of conflict and weak state capacity and legitimacy.

In general terms, *peacebuilding* is about ending or preventing violent conflict and supporting sustainable peace, while *statebuilding* is about establishing capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states. The two concepts are defined in Box 2.1.

Box 2.1 Defining peacebuilding and statebuilding

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.”

Source: Conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the UN system adopted by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in May 2007.

“Statebuilding is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. Positive statebuilding processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state.”

Source: OECD, 2008.

Key peacebuilding objectives include *inter alia*: preventing countries from lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict; establishing structures and incentives for peaceful mitigation of conflicts; incentivising elite commitment to peace processes, while laying the groundwork for those processes to be made more inclusive over time; establishing a framework for political, security and economic transition; jump-starting recovery; demonstrating peace dividends by meeting the urgent needs of the population.

Key statebuilding objectives include developing capacity and legitimacy of the state and promoting a constructive relationship between the state and society. This necessitates building inclusive political processes to facilitate a continuous exchange between state and society, while developing state capacity to perform its functions in ways that meet people's expectations. Key state functions include (i) delivery of security and justice, (ii) revenue and expenditure management, (iii) basic service delivery and (iv) economic management.

Distinct but overlapping processes

The two concepts are related and sometimes overlapping, but distinct. They address a basic common purpose and objective: support to the building of capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states characterised by peaceful relations among communities and with external neighbours, in which power is contested non-violently, and in which the government is accountable and responsive to the wishes and needs of its population, as well as capable of properly managing processes of political inclusion (DFID 2009). Both processes take place in extraordinarily complex environments, in which every activity (whether labelled statebuilding or peacebuilding) will potentially impact peace, stability and the relationship between the state and society. Both are essentially long-term, non-linear and internal processes, the outcomes of which will be little influenced by external actors. Peacebuilding and statebuilding both seek to build capacities for managing national political and economic processes, and to foster local ownership. Yet they both rely on external assistance to achieve these aims.

However, peacebuilding and statebuilding contribute to overcoming conflict and fragility through different perspectives and approaches. Their practice and that of the main actors involved,* over the short to medium term, can differ significantly. Peacebuilding emphasises helping states and societies move from situations of great peril to relatively greater safety. The emphasis within statebuilding is on helping in the transition from lawlessness

* The differences among agencies, mandates, funding channels, timelines, mindsets, and organisational cultures among international actors engaged in peacebuilding and statebuilding reflect and exacerbate some of these tensions.

or arbitrary authoritarian rule to government based on law about which there is general consent.

In conclusion, emerging lessons from international experience suggest that bringing the two perspectives together adds value to analysis, strategy development and programming, and can enhance the effectiveness of national and international responses in situations of fragility and conflict. If peacebuilding and statebuilding are to be successfully integrated, however, peacebuilding approaches must be more sensitive to longer-term concerns of state legitimacy and capacity. Complementing this should be efforts to ensure that the longer-term enterprise of statebuilding addresses drivers of conflict as well as other sources of fragility.

3. Understanding the dynamics of peacebuilding and statebuilding

Peacebuilding and statebuilding are dynamic processes. The features of these processes and dynamics of how they unfold and interact at country level are different and depend to a great extent on the specific country context. Even within the same country, perceptions of what is a priority may change according to the region or the actors concerned, as the consultations in CAR, DRC and Timor-Leste showed. This makes decisions on how to best prioritise and sequence support to country-level peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts particularly difficult for both national and for international actors. Identifying the most critical risks of instability and the most likely drivers of peace can be a useful way to address this challenge, and indeed appear to have guided the peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies in some of the countries examined.

Uppermost among the many priorities, the findings of the seven country consultations suggest, were reaching a political settlement that provides a stable foundation for peace and for dialogue between the state and society, the absence of open conflict, and the provision of basic safety and security for the population. Those priorities were moreover found to underpin progress in other critical peacebuilding and statebuilding areas. Several country consultations suggested that these considerations have informed approaches to prioritising and sequencing.

The priority accorded to other important issues (*e.g.* justice, service delivery and economic development) varied from context to context. The majority of the country consultations suggested, for example, that service delivery can be a critical dimension of state legitimacy and of responding to public expectations. Decisions on service delivery (*e.g.* what, how, where and to whom) may impact on the broader peacebuilding and statebuilding context. Inclusive growth is fundamental to job creation and to strengthening the legitimacy of the state, and may be prioritised over other interventions that address issues of justice and impunity. Growth, however, requires transparent systems of public financial management, effective management of resources, and peace. Without these conditions in place, growth might contribute to inequality and

undermine peacebuilding. The seven country consultations showed that these dynamics are, in several instances, well understood, but that identifying the right responses is often difficult.

In **Sierra Leone**, for example, priority was initially given to peace and security. Once significant progress was achieved in these areas, the focus shifted to economic transformation, with every other element treated as an enabler or driver of growth (second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PRSP, 2008). In **DRC**, where violent conflict still affects part of the population, strengthening the political process and supporting core capacities of the state to provide security and protection for affected populations remain priorities and core factors to re-establish citizens' trust in the state. In **CAR**, peace and security are seen as top priorities; several mechanisms were set in place to support a political settlement and renewed focus was placed on security sector reform. Views on the priority of security versus political governance and development are, however, not unanimous in CAR, which goes to show the difficulty of managing these complex dynamics.

In **Southern Sudan** and **Timor-Leste** the consolidation and capacitation of the young institutions of the state are seen as the critical priority of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. Interestingly, the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission had attempted prioritisation and sequencing by focusing the first two years after the signature of the peace agreement on peace consolidation, and the second phase on socio-economic development. Building the core state institutions and their core capacities was considered an overarching priority and a necessary condition to underpin both phases. In **Timor-Leste** the emphasis shifted over time from building the core state institutions to consolidating them, ensuring the involvement of citizens, and expanding the reach of the state beyond the capital. The country consultation in **Burundi** showed how, in the complex post-conflict dynamic, consolidation of peace was prioritised without sufficient attention to statebuilding aspects. This has contributed to delays in addressing core causes of conflict, and to a more fragile peace process.

The seven consultations highlighted that managing peacebuilding and statebuilding dynamics requires continuous analysis and monitoring of the context and a regular reassessment of priorities and fine-tuning of responses. Both in **Southern Sudan** and **Timor-Leste**, for example, national and international actors appear to have missed opportunities to consolidate the peacebuilding and statebuilding process early on because of their lack of understanding of the underlying and changing dynamics and priorities on the ground.

One important conclusion is that national and international actors need to agree on, and reconcile, critical peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities as a starting point for engagement. The following chapter identifies these priorities, as they have emerged from the seven country consultations.

4. Peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities

Peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives in national plans

Most national plans and strategies reviewed have some articulation of associated objectives.¹ **Liberia's** Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), for example, has a full annex on peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue and the **CAR** PRSP (2008-10) and the *Plan Prioritaire du Fonds de la Consolidation de la Paix* (2008, revised in 2009) articulate critical peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives.

Specific strategic frameworks (e.g. compacts, integrated peacebuilding strategies, or peacebuilding frameworks) have been developed in some countries to complement national plans with a more specific focus on peacebuilding objectives.² In **Burundi**, for instance, although the PRSP includes reference to the most urgent peacebuilding and statebuilding issues as part of the overall development strategy (e.g. ceasefire, transitional justice, land issues, and the need to combat impunity), a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding has been developed to facilitate a more holistic approach to the broader peacebuilding challenges. Similarly, in **Sierra Leone**, a Peacebuilding Strategy was developed and integrated into the most recent PRSP.

Despite such frequent references to peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges in national strategies and plans, however, the consultations suggest that most countries lack a more holistic and shared national vision that can guide national and international efforts. As a result, strategies are not necessarily shared across the country, and broad peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives included in national plans are rarely translated into specific priorities and tasks.

These findings suggest the importance – but at the same time, the challenges – of setting broad high-level goals for peacebuilding and statebuilding, and the usefulness of facilitating discussions about common priorities and interventions. To help such efforts, the consultations have highlighted a series of critical areas that should be prioritised within the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. These priority areas are: (i) inclusive political settlements

and processes; *(ii)* basic safety and security; *(iii)* justice and peaceful resolution of conflict; *(iv)* capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery; *(v)* effective management of resources and sustainable economic development; *(vi)* societal capacities for reconciliation and peace; and *(vii)* capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region. Each of these priority areas is discussed in further detail below.

The interaction between state and citizens was unanimously recognised as being at the centre of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process.

Political processes and settlements

Political processes are the mechanisms by which relations between state and society are mediated and bargains are struck and institutionalised. Political settlement and processes shape the rules of political, social and economic exchange. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- A vision for the implementation of a peace agreement and longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives (CAR, Southern Sudan).
- An inclusive political settlement, reached through power sharing, elite bargaining, political reconciliation and dialogue (Southern Sudan), and also including attention to the centre-periphery balance and need for local political settlement (Burundi, DRC, Timor-Leste).
- The involvement of institutions that are capable of providing checks and balances within the political system, in particular the parliament (DRC) and the judiciary (Sierra Leone).
- A strategy for social and political inclusion, and space for negotiation of state-society relations, for example through institutionalised dialogue (Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Regular organisation of elections, referendums, and constitutional processes (CAR, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).

All consultations agreed that support to inclusive political settlements and processes is critical to the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. However, the theme was understood and prioritised differently in different countries, *e.g.* the need to broker a new social contract and the need to bring new actors into existing settlements (**Timor-Leste, Liberia**); a call for broadening the political process (**Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Timor-Leste**); the need to ensure broader representation and accountability in the political process through support to electoral and constitutional processes and/or parliaments (**Burundi, DRC, Southern Sudan**). Regardless of the understanding applied,

most consultations recognised the limited scope and capacities of international actors to influence processes that are mainly endogenous and non-technical in nature, and that interrelate to complex dynamics of legitimacy and accountability.

The **Southern Sudan** consultations stressed the need to support “inclusive peace processes” to end conflict and create the basis for a sustainable political settlement and “an inclusive political settlement that facilitates constructive state-society relations” as critical peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is founded on an understanding that inclusive politics and participation are at the core of efforts to address the root causes of the conflict. Current budget priorities reflect the importance of creating a sufficient level of security to ensure that elections and the referendum take place.

In **CAR**, the *Accord Politique Inclusif*³ and the *Forum de Dialogue National* are considered cornerstones of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. By bringing together representatives of the government, the opposition, and civil society, these processes have created hope for the re-establishment of peace and for a stable social and political environment in the country. Similarly, in **Burundi**, the *Forum Permanent de Dialogue de Parties Politiques* was established to support national dialogue around the political process, to promote a climate of respect among political parties, and to create a positive environment conducive to elections. Both countries stress transparent elections as a critical priority to consolidate the political process and strengthen citizens’ confidence in the state. **Burundi** identifies adoption of the electoral law and the establishment of the Electoral Commission as “priorities amongst priorities”, to be accompanied by mechanisms to enable citizens’ effective participation.

The consultation in **Timor-Leste** suggested that the peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in the country required more than a technical “fix”, and highlighted that the political process needs to create a platform for inclusive political dialogue that can generate broader consensus on where the country is heading. The **Liberian** PRSP recognises the lack of an inclusive political process as a core cause of conflict in the past. Reducing political polarisation, reaching political consensus on the rules of the game, supporting reconciliation, and de-linking political and economic power are seen as essential for ensuring that the political system is a vehicle for peaceful political competition.

Opportunities for the renegotiation of the state-citizens’ relationship, and the need for political settlement to channel social expectations are recognised as being at the core of the political process in the majority of the consultation processes. None of the sources examined, however, articulates what this would mean in practical terms, and most references to citizens’ involvement in the political process are largely limited to suggestions to broaden consultation with civil society.

Basic safety and security

The provision of basic safety and security for the population is a core capacity of the state. The security function of the state refers to its capability to manage the legitimate use of force in order to protect the population and territorial integrity from international or external threat. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- Formal reforms to enhance the governance and functions of the security sector institutions, in particular the army and the police (CAR, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Support to DDR processes (CAR, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan).
- Strengthening of mechanisms and/or the role of bodies that can provide oversight of security sector institutions, *e.g.* parliaments (Burundi, DRC, Liberia).
- Support of the outreach of security institutions to the local level and support of the positive role of local bodies and actors in promoting security (Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Promoting community security through local-level mechanisms (DRC, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).

Reducing violence and improving security feature as key priorities and preconditions for peacebuilding and statebuilding in all consultations and strategies. Strategic frameworks in **Burundi**, **CAR** and **Liberia** have specific pillars on security, while documents in **DRC**, **Southern Sudan** and **Timor-Leste** make reference to security as integral to the broader peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. Priorities under security that are highlighted by the country consultations include formal reforms of the security sector (*e.g.* DDR, reform of the army, building the capacity of the police); increased legitimacy and capacity of the security sector institutions; and interventions to improve human security at the local level, in particular the protection of women and vulnerable groups (**DRC**, **Liberia**, **Timor-Leste**). The setting up of an oversight mechanism for key security institutions was seen as a key complement to such reforms.

In **Liberia** for example, the country consultation highlighted the “maintenance of territorial and human security” as an overarching peacebuilding and statebuilding priority. The government acknowledges the need for a broader view of security that recognises the importance of human rights, good governance, protection of livelihood, education, and healthcare. Citizens regard

security as a major goal, and the key question highlighted by the consultations revolves around how to reconfigure the security apparatus of the state to ensure it protects citizens, rather than just supporting those in power.

In **Southern Sudan** the focus is on building people's confidence in the police and the army, and on bringing security to the local level by improving the outreach of legitimate security institutions; by helping to negotiate local peace agreements to incorporate the militias into the army; and by strengthening the capability of local-level bodies. It was recognised in the findings of the consultation that this requires processes that involve negotiating agreements with local leaders and non-state actors, significant capacities and outreach, and availability of resources – all of which are scarce in conflict-affected contexts like Sudan.

In **Timor-Leste** critical challenges identified include balancing the strong role of non-state organisations and traditional norms in maintaining order beyond the capital with promoting the role and legitimacy of the police to take control of security at the community level. This is a difficult task given the low trust of citizens in the police, many of whom served during the previous regime. It is nonetheless seen as necessary to consolidate peace and strengthen the state.

In **DRC** the Monitoring Survey highlights reform and professionalisation of the army and police as one of the six main peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. These issues were also raised as key priorities in the *Contrat de Gouvernance* (2007), which sets out key governance reforms and serves as an implementation plan for the PRSP. The consultations also identified the need to expand security to the conflict-affected eastern regions of the country, and to focus resources on human security.

In **Burundi**, improvement in the security sector is a strategic pillar of the PRSP and the development and implementation of a National Strategy for the Reform of the Security Sector is considered a top priority. Similarly, in **CAR**, the PRSP and the *Plan de Consolidation de la Paix* also explicitly identify security sector reform as a priority.

Most consultations recognised that security system reforms take time. However, they highlighted the importance of quick improvements that would help in preventing and containing violent conflict (**Southern Sudan**), enable other processes to take place (e.g. elections in **CAR** and **Southern Sudan**, socio-economic development in every country), and enhance state legitimacy and accountability in fragile transitions. Country consultations also highlighted the inconsistent support to this sector, which is also confirmed in the Monitoring Survey in **CAR** and **DRC**.

Justice and peaceful resolution of conflict

This area relates to the state's capacity to rule "through" the law, to contain and resolve conflict, to adjudicate through the independent, impartial, consistent, predictable and equal application of the law for all citizens, and to hold wrong-doers to account. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- Strengthening legal and judicial frameworks and institutions (all countries/regions).
- Expanding access to justice, especially to the poor, marginalised and conflict-affected groups, including by supporting the use of traditional systems (DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Supporting mechanisms, including non-formal and traditional systems, for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, at the central and local level (DRC, CAR, Liberia, Timor-Leste).
- Developing and implementing strategies and mechanisms to address issues of impunity and to fight corruption (Burundi, DRC, Liberia).

Rule of law and access to justice featured highly on the agenda in all of the consultations and national plans examined. Weak rule of law – in particular, corruption – and lack of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict at national and local levels were widely recognised by the consultations as key causes of conflict, and thus as threats to the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. Not surprisingly, several national strategic frameworks have dedicated pillars to address specific rule of law priorities.

The formal justice system, considered a key component of the accountability dimension of state-society relations, is at the centre of most suggested interventions under the justice umbrella. The consultations, however, highlighted the need to reach beyond the formal institutions and the central level, and stressed the importance of understanding and working with existing informal rules and mechanisms of justice and conflict resolution. These might be rooted, for example, in community justice, which in some instances is seen as legitimate by the local population, particularly where the state has limited reach (**CAR, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan**). The issues of impunity, human rights, and corruption were also frequently mentioned as critical priorities, particularly in contexts where the political leadership shows variable commitment to reform (**DRC, Liberia**).

In **Burundi**, objectives for strengthening the justice sector (including the fight against impunity and corruption) are included in the PRSP and the

Plan d'Actions Prioritaires, which guides its implementation. Both recognise the importance of justice improvements in general and of managing disputes related to the past as critical dimensions of peacebuilding. Suggested interventions include promoting reconciliation through the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a special court, and settling land disputes related to the crisis. Attempting to address these issues through the PRSP reflects recognition of the need to prevent conflict relapse and to build capacities and systems for conflict management as integral to the country's overall development plan.

The **Timor-Leste** consultations highlighted the sensitive and political nature of interventions and reforms in the justice sector. These include tensions related to the establishment of mixed systems of justice that combine formal and informal mechanisms and the need to manage political influences over decisions related to the justice sector. For example, the political decision to establish a Lusophone legal system, which is little understood by lawmakers and the public alike, might have contributed to limiting access to justice for the population at large.

The consultations in **Southern Sudan** highlighted the government's efforts to better understand the nature of local conflict through the slow establishment of local government structures. In **Liberia** and **DRC** the country consultations reported that, given the weakness of judicial institutions, the use of non-formal dispute resolution mechanisms is actively promoted as a means to settle disputes, in particular related to land tenure and access to natural resources. In **DRC**, consultations also highlighted the need to urgently strengthen an independent judicial system and the fight against impunity and human right violations, particularly gender-based violence.

Besides the long-term objective of promoting broader reforms of the formal legal and judicial frameworks, the consultations also highlighted specific initiatives aimed at improving access to justice and enhancing capacities for peaceful settlement of disputes. Such initiatives include the establishment of governance and anti-corruption commissions, land commissions, and truth and reconciliation commissions. In **Sierra Leone** the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's recommendations have been articulated in a government white paper, while in **CAR** the *Haut Conseil de Mediation* has been created to support the management of conflict between the state and citizens.

Few country consultations identified interaction between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state as mechanisms for conflict resolution (e.g. the Parliament in **DRC**, local bodies in **Southern Sudan**).

Capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery

This section relates to the abilities or capacity of the state to meet the expectations of the population for basic services, which is at the heart of the state-citizens' relationship, and to be able to raise revenues to do so sustainably. Key priorities and the consultations that identified them include:

- Establishment of an effective system of public financial management (all countries/regions).
- The ability of the state to raise revenues (Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Effective and equitable management of natural resources (DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste).
- Development of minimum administrative capacity, at central and local levels (all countries/regions).
- The existence of mechanisms through which citizens can articulate demands and participate in decisions that affect their access to services (CAR, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).

Unequal access to services and opportunities is often considered a core cause of conflict and continued instability. The government's capacity to meet longer-term statebuilding objectives, such as raising revenue and ensuring delivery of services in a way that meets people's expectations, is central to the existence of the state. It strengthens the state's legitimacy, effectiveness and responsiveness, in part because it reduces dependency on foreign aid and technical assistance. Most national planning documents identified specific related objectives such as building a sustainable system of public finance, the establishment of state control over taxation, the existence of minimum administrative capacity, the equitable management of natural resources, and sharing of the benefits of economic growth across the population. Key trade-offs were also identified, in particular between the need to rapidly deliver critical services and the long-term process of strengthening the organisations needed to manage and deliver.

The consultations in **Southern Sudan** and **Timor-Leste**, for example, highlighted how these countries are confronted with the need to build a whole range of basic capabilities from scratch and to establish new institutions capable of managing government resources and service delivery. In **Southern Sudan**, this has included the creation of the central government in Juba, ten state governments, and critical public administration functions.

Five years into the peacebuilding and statebuilding process, basic planning, budgeting and financial management systems are now in place. As a result of this and increased security, provision of basic services has sharply increased, albeit from an extremely low base. A key priority now is to consolidate these achievements and to decrease reliance on natural resource revenues through the development of a modern taxation system. However, the consultations stressed that effective management of natural resources remains a critical component of these efforts, and is essential to facilitate further improvements.

On the other hand, **Liberia** and **DRC** struggle to strengthen already existing state institutions and to establish “different capacities” that would deliver more equitable and inclusive services, including to vulnerable and marginalised groups (or regions), strengthen the accountability of the state, and contribute to building trust between the state and citizens.

The country consultation in **Sierra Leone** suggested that the government understands that it will need to build the necessary capabilities to deliver expected services through long-term measures such as reform of the civil service, if it is to reach the poverty reduction objectives stated in the second PRSP. At the same time the government is focusing on aligning national resources and international aid to support a level of service delivery that satisfies minimal standards. The development of an aid policy is expected to contribute to this goal.

The importance of centre-periphery relations was identified as critical for peacebuilding and statebuilding in several country consultations. This includes building core administrative capacities at the local level, ensuring that central revenues are fairly managed and equally distributed across the country, and creating local systems for raising and managing taxes and to deliver services. In **Timor-Leste**, the consultation stressed the need for the government to administer the national wealth through the Petroleum Fund and direct it to expanding development opportunities across the country, in particular to rural populations. The “Referendum Package” was also identified as an interesting initiative by the government, intended to stimulate local service delivery through partnership with the private sector.

The consultations recognised the need to empower citizens to articulate demands for services, in particular the most vulnerable and marginalised groups, but provided little insight on how to encourage this. Support to civil society participation and decentralisation are, in most cases, seen as the key means to incorporate citizens more closely in governance and decision making and to enable them to participate in determining their expectations in regard to service delivery.

Effective management of resources and sustainable economic development

This area relates to the state's capacity to create an enabling framework for economic growth, for the management of natural resources, and for employment. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- Construction of basic infrastructure for investment and enabling the development of the private sector (CAR, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan).
- Employment generation (all countries/regions).
- Provision of a regulatory framework for economic growth (including property rights and land registration, enabling frameworks for trade and investment) (CAR, Liberia, Timor-Leste).
- Mechanisms for the transparent use and management of natural resources and for the sharing of benefits across the country and the population (DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone).

At the root of state fragility and conflict often lie low levels of economic production and high levels of poverty. The extent to which states can promote growth in key sectors of the economy can become critical in the eyes of national stakeholders, and is a key factor influencing state legitimacy and its ability to collect revenues. The extent to which the state is perceived as extracting and managing resources (including the environment) for the benefit of all its citizens is thus a critical factor in the peacebuilding and statebuilding process.

Most consultations identified poverty, exclusion from economic opportunities, mismanagement of natural resources, and the lack of economic and financial governance as causes of conflict and potential factors of instability in the medium and long term (**Burundi, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan**). Consequently, promoting economic growth and poverty reduction were recognised as key priorities for the peacebuilding and statebuilding process in most countries. These issues are also core building blocks of most national development strategies.⁴

The degree of attention and the elaboration of specific objectives under this goal depend on the country context. **Sierra Leone**, for instance, identified economic growth as one of its top priorities to consolidate peace and decrease aid dependency. Similarly, the consultations in **Burundi, Southern Sudan** and **Timor-Leste** all highlighted socio-economic development and economic growth as critical to providing peace dividends and to consolidating the legitimacy of the emerging state institutions. The consultations suggested that in order to do so, economic development must focus on

employment creation, on the modernisation of agriculture, and on the development of the private sector among others, and must ensure it reaches the poorest and most conflict-affected communities, particularly in rural areas, as well as returnees and demobilised combatants.

Strengthening the management of natural resources was recognised as an important priority in several consultations. Natural resources can be an important source of conflict, but some consultations also highlighted how proper management and use of these resources can contribute to stabilising peace through raising needed revenue for investment in socio-economic development (**DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste**). Other areas that were identified include the need to integrate the informal economy and to address the challenging issue of illicit trade and financial flows. Both of these areas are critical to enable sustainable growth but extremely sensitive because of the impact on peoples' livelihoods and the involvement of powerful interest groups (**DRC, CAR, Liberia, Sierra Leone**). In **CAR**, for example, the decision by the government to regulate the diamond sector has had a negative impact on the local economy and increased people's food insecurity. This highlights how important it is to understand the overall impacts and trade-offs involved in reform initiatives, and to ensure that attempts to integrate other sectors of the informal economy do not have negative effects on the population.

The tension between short- and longer-term objectives is obvious when looking at economic growth. States emerging from conflict, oftentimes with scarce resources, find themselves under pressure to provide quick results and immediate benefits for people – for example in the agriculture sector (**Burundi, Timor-Leste**) and employment for former combatants (**DRC, Liberia**) – while supporting sustainable economic reform and development in the long term. The development of regulatory frameworks in general, and in particular the adoption of stricter regulations perhaps necessary to build an enabling environment for investment and growth in the long term, may negatively affect economic activities that provide income for parts of the population.

Reference to mechanisms for involving citizens in setting economic development priorities and for increasing their capacity to benefit from improved economic opportunities is nearly absent in the findings of the country consultations.

Social capacities for reconciliation and peace

This area relates to the need for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to take account of existing divides within and among communities and to support processes of social reconciliation. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- Support initiatives for social reconciliation and for strengthening communities' capacities for conflict management (DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste).
- Strengthening social cohesion and social capital (DRC, Timor-Leste).
- Increasing opportunities for citizens' participation and involvement in key steps of a peacebuilding and statebuilding process (all countries).

As mentioned earlier, peacebuilding and statebuilding approaches highlight the centrality, across various dimensions, of state-society relations and of citizens' active involvement in shaping such relations. Communities that are strong, peaceful and cohesive are necessary to enable effective participation, to actively contribute to promoting peace and stability, and to engage with longer-term statebuilding efforts. Effective community networks and social capital are also important enablers of economic development.

The consultations confirmed the primacy of state-society interaction; the importance of citizens' involvement in influencing how peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities are framed and delivered; and the need to support citizens' capacity to benefit from the gains of peace, security and improved socio-economic opportunities. In most of the countries that participated in the consultations, however, communities have undergone processes that have had a devastating impact on the social fabric, have created divisions, and have undermined people's and communities' social capital. This has clearly reduced the capacity of citizens to become involved in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes derive benefits from newly available opportunities. This suggests the need for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to explicitly address social tensions that predate and result from the conflict, to rebuild the social fabric through dialogue and reconciliation, and to provide mechanisms for the representation of all citizens, in particular those who have been excluded and marginalised (**Burundi, DRC, Liberia**).

The **Sierra Leone** PRSP and the **Timor-Leste** consultations, for example, identify issues of societal divide as affecting peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, and therefore suggest the need for greater attention to social reconciliation. A culture of impunity and its consequences for social cohesion remain an issue in **CAR, DRC and Liberia**. This is linked to the issue of human rights, and to the importance of local-level conflict resolution mechanisms. The **DRC**

country consultation also identified a clear need to rebuild the social fabric through dialogue and reconciliation, and to address the strong social tension that predates and results from the conflict.

Interestingly, a sub-section on “attitudinal change” in Sierra Leone’s second PRSP draws on concepts of state-society relations and the social contract and, more specifically, spells out the citizens’ side of the social contract. The PRSP notes the main goal of the Attitudinal Change Campaign as being to get Sierra Leoneans to change their attitude and so enable them to transform their country from a failed state to a peaceful, progressive, united nation. The document does not acknowledge, however, that for citizens and communities to engage positively with the state and a “nation-building” exercise, fundamental problems of mistrust within and across community and *vis-à-vis* the state will have to be addressed.

In **Burundi** the PRSP includes a section on “strengthening the community dynamic”. This section acknowledges that during over a decade of war, local communities became the primary locus of survival, and that their social fabric has been severely affected. Few solutions, however, appear to be offered and these relate more to citizens’ participation than community reconciliation and cohesion. They include a statement on the need for a decentralisation policy that will build on community mechanisms and allow communities to participate in the nation’s social and economic development through the planning and management of local development plans.

None of the consultations or documents examined articulates what should be key objectives or priorities in this area. This suggests that overall, this area – although certainly important – is receiving scarce attention within national or international policy and decision-making circles.

Regional stability and co-operation

This area discusses the capacity of the state to maintain constructive relations with its neighbours and the wider region, and to contribute to regional stability and co-operation. Key priorities identified and the consultations that identified them include:

- Territorial integrity and management and protection of natural resources (Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan).
- Cross-border infrastructure developments to support trade (Burundi, Southern Sudan).
- Co-operation agreements to manage peaceful bilateral relations (Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan).
- Sub-regional integration (CAR, Sierra Leone).

Regional instability and conflict are recognised by most country consultations as threats to national peacebuilding and statebuilding processes (**Burundi, CAR, DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan**). Regional co-operation, in particular on economic and security issues, is therefore considered an important objective for the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda.

The **CAR** PRSP identifies sub-regional integration and international co-operation as one of the eight strategic pillars. In **DRC**, dialogue and political solutions with neighbours and engaging in common projects are seen as integral components of the statebuilding effort. In **Liberia**, building and maintaining regional peace and security is an objective under the PRSP pillar on peace and security; the overall objective is to establish bilateral and multilateral security co-operation (*e.g.* with the Mano River Union, ECOWAS, and the African Union). In **Southern Sudan** improving connectivity within that region and among neighbouring regions is one of the five areas requiring immediate attention. The **Burundi** consultations stressed the need for better regional integration and the development of co-operation agreements with neighbouring countries.

Regional co-operation is also clearly a priority of the international community and regional organisations, and therefore should be seen as a priority within the context of international and regional assistance in support of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Notes

1. Reference to peacebuilding and statebuilding in national development plans is, however, dwarfed by the overall focus on growth and poverty reduction and by the fact that these documents are oriented towards capital flows.
2. Compacts exist in: Afghanistan, Iraq, DRC, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste; peacebuilding frameworks have been developed through engagement with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and CAR.
3. An agreement signed in 2008 that involves government representatives, political leaders and parties, local authorities and armed movements.
4. Research shows a general positive correlation between economic growth and the reduction of conflict. Economic revitalisation is also recognised as a priority to assist countries in the immediate aftermath of a conflict (see UN General Assembly, 2009).

5. Challenges for peacebuilding and statebuilding support

The Dialogue consultations, the Monitoring Survey, and other documents consulted while preparing this report have highlighted a number of common challenges in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and in national and international support to peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives. These include: the lack of a shared vision for peace and long-term development; the difficult balance between short- and long-term objectives; weak strategic planning and priority setting and low implementation rates; inefficient financing practices; poor institutional arrangements; centralised approaches; lack of citizen participation poor strategic communication; weak accountability between national and international partners; and ineffective donor support. Each of these challenges is further explained below.

Shared vision for change

While developing a coherent national vision for peacebuilding and statebuilding was highlighted at some of the consultations as a priority and a key outcome of the political process, it should be expected that in countries emerging from conflict – often over the basic directions of the country – arriving at a broad consensus will not be a simple or fast process. It is thus not surprising that according to country consultations, in most instances such a vision either does not exist or is not shared within the country or region (**DRC, Southern Sudan**). Some consultations also highlighted the lack of a shared vision for peace and development between national and international partners (**Liberia**).

An exception is **Sierra Leone**, where the second PRSP has a broad vision that is accorded a high degree of priority. Most national and international partners have committed to align with its four areas of well-defined focus and time-bound benchmarks.

In **DRC**, on the contrary, several strategic documents – including the PRSP, a *Plan d'Actions Prioritaires*, the *Programme du Gouvernement* and the five *Chantiers de la Republique* (i.e. the priorities of the President) – articulate various aspects of a peacebuilding and statebuilding “vision”. It is

unclear to what extent this vision is shared broadly or whether it is supported by sufficient political leadership. In **Timor-Leste**, while there is a high degree of prioritisation resulting from continued dialogue between government and international partners (*e.g.* the Annual Priorities process) and regular development partners' meetings, dialogue on the medium-term vision is just starting. In **Southern Sudan** the consultations suggested that the failure to arrive at an agreed single "peacebuilding framework" was an error in the immediate post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement period, and a factor that may be affecting government capacity to promote the "statebuilding project" and the potential support of international partners.

The following factors were identified by the consultations as limiting the development of a shared vision for peacebuilding and statebuilding: (i) the lack of a shared understanding of the context (**CAR, DRC, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste**);* (ii) the absence of an agreed theory of change over the long term (**CAR, DRC, Southern Sudan**);** (iii) the difficulty of integrating different country realities into one vision; and (iv) the tendency to focus on immediate priorities and interventions unsuited to address the multiple dimensions of the peacebuilding and statebuilding challenge (**DRC**).

Managing trade-offs between short- and long-term objectives

The consultations recognised the existence of trade-offs between short- and longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives, and the difficulty of making choices that risk undermining some aspects of statebuilding while supporting immediate peacebuilding priorities, and vice versa.

In **Liberia**, difficult choices were made between aligning support to the long-term political settlement versus short-term deals brokered between elites and power-sharing arrangements that secured peace initially. The result was a decision to support a compromised and inefficient governance system (*e.g.* Liberia's Transitional Government from 2003 to 2006). Tensions also

* Shared analysis of the context results from negotiation between stakeholders, which requires leadership. In CAR, for example, there is disagreement among stakeholders as to whether to describe the country as a post-conflict state, a situation of ongoing crisis, or somewhere in between. In Sierra Leone there appear to be two contrasting views: some highlight "the impressive array of government and donor documents and strategies"; others believe that "the progress made in drafting strategy papers has not yet generated a feeling of progress on the ground".

** Consultation in CAR, DRC and Southern Sudan suggested that a theory of change should help articulate the critical questions concerning the kind of state that is desirable, and what needs to happen to get there.

emerged from the impetus to deliver services quickly to meet urgent needs and maintain stability, and longer-term objectives to build state capacity.

The Monitoring Survey in **Timor-Leste** found that there were mixed views on the concept of “buying peace” (*i.e.* government provision of cash transfers to help internally displaced people reintegrate into the community following the crisis). While there was general agreement that this was a successful short-term intervention and a likely long-term investment in peace, participants also highlighted the importance of respect for inclusion in order to build lasting peace. There was general agreement that the transition to more equal and sustainable distribution of economic growth and service delivery programmes will help support these efforts.

Strategies, planning and priority setting

The lack of a shared vision for change and the difficult choices that need to be made between short- and long-term objectives impact on the strength of strategic planning processes and on the identification and articulation of specific peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives and priorities. The Monitoring Survey and the review of national strategic frameworks highlighted the limitations of PRSPs as strategic planning documents. Strategic peacebuilding frameworks, compacts and exercises like the Post-Conflict Needs Assessments also appear to struggle to provide a realistic and prioritised framework for peacebuilding and statebuilding. Common problems highlighted include the following.

Proliferation of plans and strategic frameworks. The existence of several planning documents – often developed at the request of donors – and the absence of one single strategic framework that addresses and prioritises peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives often result in what the consultation in **Southern Sudan** described as “disjointed incrementalism”. The fragmentation of donor-funded activities, which occurs and persists to a great extent because of the absence of government leadership and because of a continued tendency of donors to seek to implement their own programmes, is both a cause and a symptom of this challenge.

In **Southern Sudan** the Joint Assessment Mission prepared after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements, was followed by the “Expenditure Priorities and Funding Needs 2008-2011”, the current planning document of the government, and by the Juba Compact, endorsed by the Government of **Southern Sudan** and its Development Partners (2009). None of these plans serves as an explicit guide for peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, and the JAM in particular has been widely criticised for being an unprioritised wish list that largely overestimated the implementation capacity in post-war Sudan.

In **DRC** the strategic planning context is even more fragmented. The PRSP (2006-08), the *Contrat de Gouvernance* (2007), and the *Programme d'Actions Prioritaires* (2009-10) were all developed to guide prioritisation and implementation. In addition, the *Cinq Chantiers* (2006) and *Le Pacte de Performance* both address different peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. While the different plans in theory are supposed to address different part of the agenda to avoid overlap and duplication, the reality of multiple planning frameworks complicates co-ordination and harmonisation of activities and increases the risk of competition.

In regard to donor practices, the Monitoring Survey suggests that increasingly, international actors are promoting and supporting partner country-led processes to develop national strategies (PRSP in **Sierra Leone** and **CAR**; Annual Priorities in Timor-Leste; PRSP and *Plan d'Actions Prioritaires* in **DRC**). However, as indicated by the **DRC** example above, there are signs that these efforts have in fact contributed to increased fragmentation of plans and strategies. This is further complicated by the fact that different donors have different plans and strategies guiding their funding and implementation decisions – e.g. the UN has its UNDAF; the World Bank has its Country Assistance Strategy; and bilateral donors have different types of strategy papers.

Challenges to operational alignment. Most consultations touched on the difficulties associated with the transition between various phases of assistance (e.g. humanitarian, peacebuilding and statebuilding, development), and the inherent trade-off between being flexible enough to adapt to quick changes on the ground and identifying and aligning with sub-national priorities and plans. In **Timor-Leste**, for example, the consultations noted that international actors have found it difficult to quickly adapt their plans and strategies, to shift gears between longer-term development and emergency response, and to fully align their programmes on national priorities and systems in an environment where national plans and priorities have been annually adjusted to meet what have often been rapidly changing contexts.

Low rates of implementation

The low rate of implementation of national strategic plans, even when good plans are in place, was identified as a challenge by the majority of the consultations and other documents examined. Weak managerial and leadership capacity or commitment, and/or the lack of realistic assessment of capacity and of politics – in particular by donors – are seen as some of the causes for poor performance in this area.

The **Liberia** consultation identified the lack of consensus on what constitutes “successful implementation” and the absence of conflict-sensitive approaches to the design of policies and programmes as challenges to the

peacebuilding and statebuilding process. Consultations in **Southern Sudan** highlighted that strategic planning should have mechanisms for regular revision, and that implementation modalities should have built-in flexibility to shift funding between budget lines based on shifting needs. The PRSP and the *Plan de Consolidation de la Paix* in **CAR** remain key reference documents, but their provisions are scarcely implemented. The main reasons mentioned during the country consultations related to the lack of alignment of the budget to priorities and the overall weak prioritisation in the two documents.

In **DRC**, an external evaluation of the *Contrat de Gouvernance* and of the *Programme d'Actions Prioritaires* (2006-08) has confirmed the lack of progress with security sector, justice and public administration reform, as well as with the strengthening of oversight institutions, as key gaps in the implementation of plans and threats to the consolidation of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process.

Lack of prioritisation, unrealistic timelines, weak government absorptive capacity at central and local level, inappropriate funding mechanisms and lack of co-ordination within the government and with international partners were all identified as causes of poor progress with implementation in the majority of the country consultations.

Financing practices

Poor and inefficient donor financing practices were identified as a fundamental challenge to peacebuilding and statebuilding, in all consultations as well as in the Monitoring Survey. Common problems appear to be: (i) the short-term horizon and the lack of flexibility of donor funding; (ii) the weak alignment of funding to nationally owned planning processes and priorities; and (iii) specific aid modalities. These practices may affect state legitimacy, capacity and responsiveness, as funds cannot be committed to long-term reforms critical for statebuilding; sectors vital to peacebuilding and statebuilding remain underfunded; and the way funds are delivered may not respond to the needs and expectations of national partners (**CAR, Liberia, Southern Sudan, Timor-Leste**). A recent report on transition financing (OECD 2010j) suggests that the proliferation of funding arrangements – despite efforts to increase harmonisation and co-ordination through such mechanisms as Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) – and the low operational effectiveness of existing pooled funding instruments remain important bottlenecks that prevent governments from fully benefiting from the assistance of development partners. The same report finds that when donors distribute aid in disaggregated ways to individual departments, they risk distorting political processes and developing tensions within national partners. It also expresses concerns about the persistently high levels of earmarking in situations of conflict and fragility, which largely limits the flexibility of donor funding.

The **Liberia** country consultation, for example, cited the inability of donors to commit support to long-term priorities and a drop in aid at a critical phase of the peacebuilding process as threats to peace. On the other hand, large funding envelopes, as was delivered to **Burundi** as the Peacebuilding Fund became operational, risk overwhelming local absorptive capacities. This suggests that the assumptions behind funding modalities that are promoted are not always sufficiently articulated. At the same time, **Burundi** shows how the prevalence of projects over direct budget support (which constitutes only 35% of the foreign aid budget), can further affect government capacity and undermine the relationship between the state and international partners.

The security sector is marked by specific financing challenges, and several consultations stressed the fact that most external support to SSR is in the form of technical assistance, with only limited funding available for the actual implementation of key reforms. This remains a challenge, despite renewed international commitment to supporting security and the broadening of the ODA criteria to cover aspects of security sector work.

Finally, the consultations noted that aid allocations in many cases do not correspond to the identified need. Lack of data on country-wide poverty levels and aid volatility make it difficult for the government to sustain service delivery, which can easily contribute to undermining citizens' trust. In **CAR**, for example, 80% of aid goes to the capital, despite widespread recognition that the biggest and most urgent needs exist outside the capital.

Institutional arrangements

The seven consultations and the Monitoring Survey highlighted that weak institutional arrangements within and between national government departments, which affect strategic planning processes and implementation, may lead to compartmentalised approaches to addressing peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges. The donor practice of dealing with single institutions (e.g. ministries) on a bilateral basis, instead of supporting cross-departmental capacities, contributes to this problem. The proliferation of institutional structures, also promoted by donors, is another factor affecting the building of state capacity.

In **DRC**, evaluation of the *Contrat de Gouvernance* and of the *Plan d'Actions Prioritaires* has identified a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities among government actors and the donor practice of engaging with individual ministries as reasons for the weak implementation of agreed priorities and for disjointed interventions. In **Liberia**, weak institutional arrangements between government agencies are a major impediment to effective peacebuilding and statebuilding. The country consultation highlighted that if left unaddressed, this issue will constrain effective implementation of current policy, and undermine the foundations of the long-term statebuilding process.

In **Burundi** the creation of multiple institutional structures is seen as affecting the already weak capacity of the state to support its basic functions or to take real charge of its portfolio.

Executive and capital-centric approaches

The focus of national and international attention on the capital and on a few central state actors (*e.g.* the executive) was generally seen as characteristic of, yet challenging to, peacebuilding and statebuilding. To address historical marginalisation and reduce centre-periphery tensions, the consultations in **Burundi, DRC, CAR, Liberia** and **Timor-Leste** recommended “decentralising” peacebuilding and statebuilding to ensure activities takes account of local priorities. They also suggested broadening support to state institutions beyond the executive (*e.g.* parliaments), such as local-level bodies and other political and social actors.

The risks of rural-urban divide in aid and too narrow a focus on central institutions and on the executive were quoted at the **Timor-Leste** country consultations as contributing to the creation of “islands of capability” within a generally dysfunctional system, leaving aside more inclusive approaches to development and seriously affecting overall state capacities and legitimacy. The country consultation also found that the over-centralisation of development, politics and services in Dili has exacerbated regional frictions, because district administrations in rural areas, where the majority of the population lives, remain weak and service delivery low. There is also a risk of developing central government capacities beyond sustainable means.

In **CAR**, where the presence of the state is very limited outside the capital and lawlessness still reigns in parts of the country, the need for peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts and benefits to reach beyond Bangui was highlighted as a priority. At the same time, limited capacities and resources affect any effort to move on with decentralisation, which is currently on the government agenda. In **Liberia** the PRS recognises the need to shift from the urban-oriented policies of successive administrations; these policies have contributed to excluding the majority of the population from institutions and processes of governance, and denied access to economic and social assets and opportunities. In **DRC**, local elections, decentralisation, reaching consensus on the roles and responsibilities of central and provincial authorities, and local development initiatives are seen as priorities for governance reforms.

These issues can become particularly damaging where international actors fail to analyse the nature of the social contract, or grasp the complexity and fragility of a political settlement in a country. External actors can upset the balance of power between interest groups, as happened in the early stages of their interventions in **Timor-Leste**.

Citizen participation

Enhancing citizens' participation and ensuring that they gain ownership of government policy formulation and implementation are recognised in all consultations as important components of a renewed governance system and of the social contract underpinning it. Examples of effective involvement of civil society in key decision-making and planning contexts are, however, rare.

In **Liberia**, a broad-based national consultation informed the development of the PRS. Its implementation, however, did not follow the same inclusive process. Civil society, community-based organisations and ordinary Liberians were not fully involved in PRS implementation, which created a situation where the government was seen as going it alone. Ensuring citizens' participation at all stages of the design and implementation of interventions in support of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and broader development objectives was seen as a challenging yet key area for long-term stability.

The consultations in **CAR** recognised that statebuilding cannot happen merely through technocratic reforms of the public administration or of the legal and institutional frameworks. The findings suggested the need for civil society participation, to enable the government to understand and respond to people's expectations and consequently to rebuild the trust between the state and citizens. Meaningful participation is, however, difficult in a context where a culture of participation has never developed and where the presence of the state is still very feeble. State-centric and capital-centric approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding promoted by national and international partners do not help create space for civil society actors.

Poor strategic communication

Unsurprisingly, strategic communication in fragile and conflict-affected countries is seldom a priority, despite being a critical element for change and for efforts to increase the legitimacy and accountability of the state. Communicating government decisions in regard to critical peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and interventions contributes to aligning interest and getting support for difficult reforms. Most of the consultations identified the lack of communication as a real challenge to the advancement of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda.

In **Timor-Leste**, lack of understanding of the term "democratisation" risks putting the political process in jeopardy. Strong political divides have resulted in a weak culture of political dialogue: weak communication between political parties and their constituents, and the limited information available on government policies and direction, contribute to this lack of understanding. Participants at the country consultation highlighted that good communication

is especially important when the population has no previous experience of living in an independent democracy and is faced with new systems and new languages. These participants suggested that improved communication to citizens must be a priority for the government, so that it can increase transparency and maintain the support of the population in the democratic system.

The consultations in **Southern Sudan** identified the lack of strategic communications from the centre, associated with the weaknesses of a still-nascent leadership, as an important factor affecting the consolidation and advancement of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process.

Limited accountability of international partners

While mutual accountability features highly in the aid effectiveness agenda, poor accountability on the donor side has been a key feature of the relationship between national and international partners engaged in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This concern, well articulated by several consultations and by the Monitoring Survey, is becoming even more important as donors become increasingly engaged in supporting highly complex peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Even when mutual accountability is an objective of a peacebuilding and statebuilding framework for collaboration between national and international partners (e.g. peacebuilding strategic frameworks and international compacts), often the actual commitments of international actors are not spelled out clearly enough, and efforts to review actions against international commitments have been weak.

In **Burundi**, for example, pledges at the 2007 donor roundtable exceeded the initial appeal, but a year later only 30% of these pledges was disbursed. Although the gap between pledges and disbursement was noted in a resource-mapping document prepared by the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) in 2008, the Peace Building Commission (PBC) did not examine it further as part of the review process.

The **Liberia** consultations note that the significant reduction in the country's aid was inconsistent with the commitments made at the pledging conference in Berlin (2008), and that dependable levels of aid from international partners are necessary to consolidate peace and deliver the PRS objectives behind which donors have aligned. **DRC** consultations noted the lack of effective co-operation among donors and their different approaches to problems, even in the same sector.

The Monitoring Survey for **CAR** questions the accountability of the international community in supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and their fulfilment of international commitments on a number of grounds. These include the impact on the state's capacity to make longer-term

plans of significant lapses of time between the commitment of aid and its disbursement, and concerns about long-term promises to support the transition from humanitarian aid to development as the peacebuilding and statebuilding process consolidates.

Limited effectiveness of capacity development approaches

Donor approaches to capacity development continue to be piecemeal, and they fail to address cross-government and systemic challenges. Reliance on foreign technical assistance and the poor rate of transfer of skills and knowledge were found to undermine the capacity, accountability and legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens (*e.g.* **DRC, Burundi, Timor-Leste**). In **Burundi** capacity development programmes, heavily dependent on short-term training and workshops, were seen as ineffective in strengthening core state institutions and the administration at central level, and even less effective at the local level.

In **Sierra Leone** consultations noted a narrow perspective on capacity development, with a focus on human resources management and development but little discussion about the changes required to address deeper behavioural and institutional issues such as motivation and styles of management. These same consultations called for a more comprehensive capacity development approach to support statebuilding, with attention to both institutional and human capacity. Similarly, the **Liberia** consultations called for developing capacities beyond the technical to include less tangible skills such as conflict sensitivity.

In **Timor-Leste** technical assistance is becoming contentious, both in terms of its relative cost to other aid mechanisms and in terms of its quality. Weak transfer of skills and technical capacity, quick turnover of “advisers”, significant levels of “brain-drain” (government officials leaving their jobs to work for donor agencies), and the lack of coherent, long-term capacity development programmes are seen as affecting significant progress in this area. These concerns were shared by the majority of the country consultations. At the same time, the Timor-Leste consultations suggested that “while the emphasis needs to be on building capability and skills rather than on job substitution, an assessment of the need for some continued in-line support would enable a more realistic and prioritized approach to capacity building.”

Related to the problem of ineffective donor support to capacity development is the use of parallel systems. The reluctance of donors to take risks and to use country systems for implementing donor-supported activities often leads to the use and multiplication of parallel project implementation units. One of the reasons for such units is the difficulty faced by partner countries in putting in place adequate management and reporting systems. The **Sierra**

Leone consultations complained, however, that “the complexity and volume of donor documents and associated activities overwhelms the government and creates an artificially high standard”.

The consultations in **CAR** and **Timor-Leste**, for example, highlighted that the tendency to multiply institutional structures within weak states, without ensuring that these institutions and structures have the resources and capacity to sustain themselves and perform their functions, risks further reducing the legitimacy and effectiveness of a state already perceived as ineffective. The same concerns were expressed in regard to the use of parallel project implementation units to deliver the majority of aid in **DRC**.

6. Emerging good practices in peacebuilding and statebuilding

Good practices that are emerging from peacebuilding and statebuilding experiences and that were reported in the seven consultations, in the Monitoring Survey and in other documents reviewed include: successful interventions in support to key peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities (e.g. political process, security, justice, services, economic development, social reconciliation, and regional co-operation); and responses to identified challenges to peacebuilding and statebuilding (e.g. strategic planning; improved systems for financing; measures to increase mutual accountability). These practices are identified in order to stimulate thinking about possible activities, but should not be seen as templates to be duplicated without careful consideration. Each context is different, and what works in one country may not work in another.

Good practices to support peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities

The consultations and the Monitoring Survey present a number of good practices related to some of the key peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities identified earlier. The following are some examples.

In **Burundi**, strong commitment by some national actors and international partners to support the political settlement and process has brought results and created new ground for a sustainable peace process, after years of failed attempts. The new power-sharing agreement outlined by the Arusha Accords and the new Constitution has contributed to reducing ethnic tensions. These documents, which were strongly supported by the international community, included provisions to address issues that were identified as critical for peace consolidation, including decentralised land management and public financing of, and ethnic quota in, political parties.

In **Liberia**, reform of the security sector, a top national priority, has made significant progress, thanks *inter alia* to a strong commitment of the government and development partners, and to a clear strategic direction provided by the PRS and the National Security Strategy. The government has also thought strategically about the challenge posed by the withdrawal of

the UN peacekeeping operation (UNMIL) and has proposed a joint planning process with UNMIL and the rest of the UN to prepare for the withdrawal. Continuing in **Liberia**, the issues of economic revitalisation, of fiscal responsibility of the government, and of protecting natural resources have been high on the government and international actors' agenda. A combination of key reforms has enabled the government to curb corruption and increase internal revenues collection to as much as 300%. Key measures include the ongoing Financial Sector Reform and the Public Financial Management processes. A new Public Financial Management law that provides the basis for improved management and addresses weaknesses in budget preparation has been passed by the legislature and is being implemented to help with budget execution and cash planning.

Southern Sudan provides a good example of efforts to balance various objectives (*e.g.* security and setting up basic state institutions). While the government and its sub-units have little capacity to engage directly in the full range of service delivery, efforts were directed, with some success to developing key institutional capabilities in order to gradually take on this responsibility. The quick set-up of basic organs of government has been vital to establish confidence that results can be achieved. The development of a taxation policy (2009 Taxation Act) and plans to develop non-oil sources of revenue, among other reforms, also show a clear understanding of critical steps to consolidate nascent institutions.

Timor-Leste presents some good practices in conflict resolution and reconciliation at the local level, one of the current government's key priorities after the 2006 crisis. The government financed cash payments, pensions to validated combatants and casualties' families, as well as scholarships for their children, and the resettlement of refugees. The use of traditional and modern reconciliation processes has also contributed to reducing tensions in rural areas. The process was seen as being comprehensive and able to accommodate regional differences and a variety of needs, and as an important contribution to stability in the absence of a functioning court system in large parts of the country.

Efforts to manage conflict through dialogue and mediation, and through the use of traditional systems, were also mentioned in the **CAR** consultations. Positive changes in the behaviour of the authorities, especially in the conflict-affected regions, are contributing to strengthening the presence of the state through its administrative and security outreach, rather than through armed confrontation. The state itself, with the support of BONUCA, has also started engaging with local leaders to support inter-community dialogue.

In **Sierra Leone** the second PRSP (2008-12) offers a model of clear prioritisation and articulation of government commitment to socio-economic development. Identified priorities clearly address blockages to growth and each main strategic priority fits within a coherent overall logic that balances

both peacebuilding and statebuilding imperatives; each presents a set of specific activities needed to support success. The plan also articulates a number of strategies and policies designed to improve the government's capacity to deliver essential services to its people while stimulating economic growth in the private sector. Overall, the document indicates a clear understanding of the interlinked imperatives of economic development, essential for wealth generation, and public sector management. This is critical to creating and sustaining a publicly acceptable degree of economic and social equity.

Good practices in addressing key challenges to statebuilding and peacebuilding

Good practices are also emerging that address some of the challenges identified in the previous chapter. These relate *inter alia* to improved planning mechanisms, addressing short- and long-term objectives, improved financing and mutual accountability frameworks.

Strategic planning

Weak strategic planning and prioritisation, the proliferation of strategic frameworks, and the fragmentation of donor-funded activities were all identified as challenges to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Good practices by national and international partners to address these challenges include improved PRSP and implementation matrixes, and the increasing use of joint planning frameworks and sector-wide approaches.

In **DRC**, efforts to improve planning processes and to strengthen collaboration between the government and international partners and among international partners are contributing to a better alignment of resources and programmatic responses. The 2008 *Programme d'Actions Prioritaires* was considered significantly improved from the previous version, and the monitoring and evaluation system set in place by the Ministry of Planning is considered a model to be shared with other countries. Multi-sectoral strategies developed by the government include programmes that address the highest peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, *e.g.* security (*Programme d'Action Prioritaire* 2008), youth employment (*Chantiers du Gouvernement*), a stabilisation plan for the conflict-affected regions of the East (STAREC), the creation of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes, are all good examples of good practices to promote political, security, and development co-operation at the regional level. In **CAR**, the African Development Bank and the World Bank have adopted a joint country strategy and donor co-ordination mechanisms have been strengthened. This is creating a new momentum for pushing some of the critical peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives forward.

Sierra Leone presents a number of good practices related to planning, prioritisation and phasing of interventions in support of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. In line with the new focus on the consolidation of state capacity and growth, and on reducing aid dependence (the focus of a new aid policy), key priorities are raising revenues and good management of natural resources. Improved national planning is accompanied by an increased harmonisation of donor strategies (World Bank-African Development Bank, DFID-European Union, and Joint UN Vision) and their better alignment to national priorities. These, besides being good practices as such, also show a clear understanding by national and international partners of the peacebuilding and statebuilding dynamics in the country and of the importance of national ownership to enhance state legitimacy, effectiveness and responsiveness.

Another positive example of efforts to improve planning processes and prioritisation is **Liberia's** PRS. The plan, which benefited from a broad national consultation, articulates the government's vision, the overarching framework, and specific objectives and principles for post-crisis peacebuilding and statebuilding. The broad consultations and decentralisation of the development planning process were considered good practices. The PRS also includes a strong framework for monitoring and evaluation. The co-ordination structure that is set up for the implementation of the PRS also demonstrates careful attention to issues of balance and representation. A key challenge, as mentioned earlier, remains the implementation of the plan.

Burundi, CAR and Sierra Leone are all focus countries for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. As part of this initiative, specific Peacebuilding Strategies have been elaborated, highlighting a narrower agenda focusing on prioritising specific peacebuilding areas within the broader development agenda. In all three countries, good practice can be found in efforts to integrate the strategies into the overall framework of the PRSP, although the actual impact of these efforts will still need to be reviewed.

In regard to the fragmentation of donor-funded activities, some donor practices help counter fragmentation at the country or sector level. These most commonly take the form of joint planning frameworks, joint country strategies, budget support donor groups (Sierra Leone), sector-wide approaches (SWAPs in DRC), multi-donor trust funds (DRC), and delegated co-operation arrangements.

Financing

Good practices promoted by donors line with the Paris Principles and the Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations include: greater use of pooled financing modalities, in particular global and country-focused Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs); better co-ordinated

responses across government agencies (ODA and non-ODA pools); the establishment of specific budget lines for transitional activities by some donors; recognition of the important role of non-ODA in post-conflict contexts; and the broadening of ODA criteria to include sectors related to political processes and security. An increased share of assistance is also being channelled through programme-based as opposed to project-based approaches, and the use of direct budget support, including to local entities, is being timidly explored, although the associated high fiduciary risks limit the spread of such mechanisms. Global instruments such as the Peace Building Fund (PBF), the World Bank-managed Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Fund (PSF), and the European Instrument for Stability (IfS), which are operational in most of the countries that participated in the consultations, can contribute to filling some of the current funding shortfalls, facilitate more targeted and timely flow of funds to kick-start critical priorities, and support more coherent international support across a range of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

An example of a good donor practice is the Dutch Stability Fund. The fund, which combines ODA and non-ODA funds, was assessed as having contributed to providing more flexible and rapid funding for activities to promote peace, security and development in situations of conflict and fragility, regardless of whether these activities were ODA-eligible or not (see OECD 2010j).

Mutual accountability

Recent years have seen the development of an increasing number of instruments (e.g. compacts, integrated peacebuilding strategies, peacebuilding frameworks) aimed, *inter alia*, at creating a relationship of collaboration between a donor and a host country that goes beyond donorship, and at enhancing the accountability of donor countries. A review of Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks conducted by the PBSO (2007) defines these frameworks as “mutually accountable and time-bound agreements, between a government and international partners, for directing scarce foreign and public technical, financial, and political resources towards building national capacities to address the root causes of violent conflict.” Compacts and other forms of agreement are increasingly articulated around the implementation of an existing national plan or strategy, and can have an important role to play as the conduit for translating a domestically generated strategy into a mutual framework that secures its implementation. Some of the Peacebuilding Frameworks prepared through the PBC’s engagement clearly articulate international commitments.

Recent experiences with compacts in **DRC** and **Southern Sudan** provide evidence of how governance can be improved through better interaction and coherence among different modalities and actors. There are early indications that such planning and co-ordination tools have encouraged better

prioritisation of activities and improved modalities for how government and international partners should interact. This is helping increase the accountability of the government to citizens on the one hand, the accountability of donors to the government and to citizens of the host country on the other, and helping strengthen mutual accountability between the two parties.

Also, national development strategies, *e.g.* PRSPs, can contribute to enhancing mutual accountability between national and international partners. In **Liberia** for example, the priority action matrices and the indicator matrix attached to the PRS included the responsibilities of a lead ministry/agency, thus creating the accountability of a government entity for progress on each indicator. Yet the PRS did not include information on donors' or any other stakeholders' commitments. The first annual progress report (April 2008-April 2009), however, includes information on donor commitments and disbursement by pillar. It also compares donor commitments to the government of Liberia's contributions for each pillar. This represents an important input for mutual accountability. However, it is not clear whether the progress report will actually be used to hold donors accountable for their commitments.

In **CAR**, the *Plan de Consolidation de la Paix* is seen as a framework document for dialogue and co-operation with international partners. It clearly establishes the responsibilities of the different national and international partners, thus facilitating mutual accountability. In **Burundi**, despite the challenges highlighted earlier, the country consultations mentioned the Consultative Groups between the government and international partners, Including a Political Forum, as useful mechanisms to address sensitive political questions and improve alignment around peacebuilding priorities.

7. Conclusions

This report has highlighted and evidenced the critical importance of peacebuilding and statebuilding for aid and development effectiveness in conflict-affected and fragile situations. It has made the case that progress towards peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives is needed if fragile and conflict-affected countries are to meet the MDGs.

The report has been based on findings from different countries' experiences with peacebuilding and statebuilding. While clearly highlighting that context matters and that countries find themselves at different stages in their peacebuilding and statebuilding process, the findings suggest a set of recurring goals that can serve as signposts for achieving peace and development in the long term. These goals are:

1. Inclusive political settlements and processes
2. Basic safety and security
3. Justice and peaceful resolution of conflict
4. Capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery
5. Inclusive and sustainable economic development and the management of natural resources
6. Social capacities for reconciliation and peace
7. Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region

The report suggests that these goals need to be at the forefront as national and international partners design strategies and programmes and decide on the appropriate aid modalities for implementation.

The report also highlights a series of challenges and bottlenecks that impede national and international aspirations to deliver on these goals. These include: the lack of a shared vision for peace and long-term development; the difficult balance between short- and long-term objectives; weak strategic planning and priority setting and poor implementation rates; financing practices; poor institutional arrangements; centralised approaches; lack of citizen

participation, poor strategic communication; weak accountability between national and international partners; and limited effectiveness of capacity development approaches. These challenges will need to be addressed to promote peace and security, and to support capable and legitimate states that can take the lead in the national development process.

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Annex A

Indicative list of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities

The following matrix highlights a sample of specific peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and challenges that emerged during multi-stakeholder consultations in Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste. The list is not exhaustive, nor is it fully representative of the breadth of discussions that took place during these consultations.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities

1. Political Processes and Settlements <i>(Political processes are the mechanisms by which relations between state and society are mediated and bargains are struck and institutionalised. Political settlements and processes shape the rules of political, social and economic exchange).</i>	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
A vision for the implementation of a peace agreement and longer term peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives		✓				✓	✓
An inclusive political settlement, reached through power sharing, elite bargaining, political reconciliation and dialogue and also including attention to the centre-periphery balance and need for local political settlement	✓		✓			✓	✓
Involvement of institutions capable of providing checks and balances within the overall political system, mainly parliament and the judiciary and support representational democracy			✓		✓		
A strategy for social and political inclusion and space for negotiation of state-society relations, for example through institutionalized dialogue						✓	✓
Regular organisation of elections, referendums and constitutional strengthening		✓		✓		✓	✓
2. Basic safety and security <i>(The provision of basic safety and security for the population is a core capacity of the state. The security function of the state refers to the capacity of the state to manage the legitimate use of force in order to protect the population and territorial integrity from international or external threat).</i>	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
Formal reforms to enhance the governance and capacities of the security sector institutions, in particular the army and the police		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Support to DDR processes (a priority also reflected in national strategies)		✓	✓	✓		✓	
Strengthening of mechanisms and/or the role of bodies that can provide an oversight of security sector institutions (e.g. Parliament)	✓		✓	✓			
Support the outreach of security institutions to the local level and support the positive role of local bodies and actors in promoting security						✓	
Promoting community security through local level mechanisms			✓			✓	✓

3. Justice and peaceful resolution of conflict (State's capacity to rule "through" the law, to contain and resolve conflict, to adjudicate through the independent, impartial, consistent, predictable and equal application of the law for all citizens and to hold wrong-doers to account).	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
Strengthening legal and judicial frameworks and institutions	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Expanding access to justice, especially to the poor, marginalised and conflict-affected groups, including by supporting the use of traditional systems			✓	✓		✓	✓
Supporting mechanisms, including non-formal and traditional systems, for peaceful resolution of conflicts, at the central and local level		✓	✓	✓			✓
Developing and implementing strategies and mechanisms to address issues of impunity and to fight corruption	✓		✓	✓			✓
4. Capacities to raise revenues and to meet expectations through service delivery (Re-establishment of core state functions and capacities at the central and local level, in particular the capacity of the state to raise revenue. The state provision of (or its guarantee that others provide) basic services is at the heart of social expectations of the state.	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
Establishment of effective system of public financial management	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Development of minimum administrative capacity, at central and at local level	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ability of the state to raise revenues					✓	✓	✓
Effective and equitable management of natural resources			✓	✓		✓	✓
The existence of mechanisms through which citizens can articulate demands and participate in decisions that affect their access to services		✓		✓	✓		✓

5. Effective management of resources and sustainable economic development (<i>State capacity to create an enabling framework for economic growth, for the management of natural resources and for employment.</i>)	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓			✓	✓	✓
		✓		✓			✓
6. Social capacities for reconciliation and peace (<i>Need for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to take account of existing divides within and among communities and to support processes of social reconciliation.</i>)	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
			✓	✓	✓		✓
			✓				✓
7. Regional stability and cooperation (<i>Capacity of the state to maintain constructive relations with its neighbours and the wider region and contribute to regional stability and cooperation.</i>)	Burundi	Central Af. Republic	DRC	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Southern Sudan	Timor Leste
					✓	✓	
	✓					✓	
	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
8. Sub-regional integration		✓			✓		
			✓	✓		✓	✓
					✓		