

Somalia Human Development Report 2012



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*

Empowering Youth for Peace and Development





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The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme.

Note: First name only used for interviewees quoted in this Report to protect the individuals' privacy.

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
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“Dhalinyaradu waa qorax so baxeyso”



“Youth are the rising sun”



Foreword

Since its first *Somalia Human Development Report* in 1998, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has published two subsequent editions. The 1998 report examined Somalia's long-running political and humanitarian crises, and the impacts on education and governance, bringing forward the plight of two generations deprived of schooling since the education system collapsed in the mid-1980s. The 2001 report assessed socioeconomic trends since 1998 and examined three forces affecting human development—globalization, the private sector and human rights. Since then, the crisis in Somalia has deepened and become more complex. A third generation of youth has missed the opportunity for an education. It has no memory of a functioning state.

This *2012 Somalia Human Development Report* is dedicated to Somalia's young women and men. Placing youth at the centre of analysis, it explores how development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding can become more responsive by mobilizing and empowering youth as positive agents of change. It argues that a failure to invest in youth as an asset for the broader economy and society will continue to incur formidable costs, including the perpetration of intergenerational poverty and conflict.

The report examines key drivers of youth exclusion, working from a conflict-sensitive perspective, and investigates holistic options to engage youth in peacebuilding and development. It advocates that policy makers and other stakeholders move away from a traditional, state-centric conception of security to one that concentrates equally on the security of individuals, especially youth. The plight of youth in Somalia should inspire a broad national debate on their future. This report calls on administrations, civil society and the international community to integrate youth in all human development and peacebuilding strategies as an urgent priority. It underscores the imperative of placing empowerment at the centre of any youth development agenda. A reform action agenda takes into account the voices of youth from a comprehensive survey of more than 3,300 men and women aged 14 to 29.


We extend our deep appreciation to all contributors to this report. Youth advisory groups, comprising representatives of most of the active youth organizations and groups in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia, and focus groups that included representatives from a wide sector of the Somali society provided crucial input. Government representatives from Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia contributed to the selection of the theme and extended their support during the preparation of this document. A number of development agencies assisted with key information to strengthen the analysis presented.

To ensure local ownership, develop national capacity, and address the diverse contexts and challenges of Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia, teams from three research institutions were used to conduct surveys, interviews and focus group discussions, and prepare background papers. They included the Center for Research and Dialogue in south central Somalia, Admas University in Somaliland and a consortium headed by Puntland State University, and comprising Kaalo Relief and Development and Somali Family Services in Puntland.

We are hopeful that the Somali Youth Charter, which emanated from discussions related to this report and was developed by young Somalis, will serve as a clarion call to empower the youth as catalytic agents of change. The Charter should be seen as a starting point for the exchange of views, reaching consensus among policy makers and others on how to recognize and act on lessons. This HDR comes at an opportune time, when the world is seeking urgent and innovative solutions to the crises in Somalia. The future of Somalia is in the hands of youth. They are tomorrow's social, political and technological leaders. It is the task and responsibility of policy makers to listen to them now, to trust what they hear and to explore with young people how best to respond.



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Somalia HDR Production Process

Survey of youth conducted and background papers compiled by:

- Centre for Research and Dialogue in South Central Somalia; a consortium of Puntland State University, KAALO Relief and Development and Somali Family Services in Puntland; and Admas University, with technical expertise of national consultants.
- Focus groups comprising youth, women's groups, elders, government and civil society members contributed to content of the report.
- Youth advisory groups formed in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia.
- Stakeholder consultations involved representatives from the government, private sector, academia, local and international NGOs in the validation of the report's findings.
- Internal and external reader's groups read through the report to strengthen where possible, highlight errors or omissions, ensure information presented is correct, culturally and politically sensitive and addresses crucial cross-cutting issues. Peer review conducted by local and international experts on Somalia, the UNDP HDR Office, Bureau of Development Policy (BDP) and UN agencies working in Somalia.
- Youth advisory groups and staff from local and international NGOs, such as International Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP), held discussions on and disseminated the Somali Youth Charter among youth in their respective locations throughout Somalia.

Abbreviations

ABC	Attitudes plus behaviour plus contradiction
AFLC	Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis
ALMP	Active Labour Market Policy
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APD	Academy for Peace and Development
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu Suna Wal-Jama'a
ATRB	African Traditional Responsive Banking
AVR	Armed Violence Reduction
CARE	International relief and development non-governmental organization
CBA	Community-based approaches
CBO	Community-based organization
CCTs	Conditional Cash Transfers
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEMED	Centre for Employment and Micro-economic Development
CISP	International Committee for the Development of Peoples (Italian NGO)
COI	Country of information
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRD	Center for Research and Development
CSOs	Civil society organizations
CYCI	Commonwealth Youth Credit Initiative
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DOH	Doses of Hope
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC	District Safety Committee
DSP	District Safety Plan
ECD	Early Child Development
EDC	Education Development Center, Inc
EGER	Employment Generation for Early Recovery
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGC	Female Genital Cutting
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FGM	Female genital mutilation
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCC	Global Citizen Corps

GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GECPD	Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNI	Gross National Income
GPI	Global Peace Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HE	Humanitarian Emergency
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HPI	Human Poverty Index
IBBL	Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHDI	Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JFFLS	Junior Farmer Fields and Life Schools
KII	Key Informant Interviews
K-MFI	Kaaba Micro Finance Institution
LMIS	Labour Management Information Service
LSBE	Life Skills-Based Education
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MUDAN	Network of youth organizations in Nugal
NAPA	National Adaptation Plan of Action
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NFE	Non-formal education
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NYP	National Youth Policy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSAA	Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
PDRC	Puntland Development Research Center
PMT	Population Movement Tracking
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships

PYD	Positive youth development
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RDS	Rural Development Scheme
RICH	Responsibility, Identity, Creativity and Hope
SCIC	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SIMAD	Somali Institute of Management and Administration
SMEs	small and medium enterprises
SNM	Somali National Movement
SONYO	Somaliland National Youth Organization
SOYDEN	Somali Youth Development Network
SSC	Sool, Sanaag and Ceyn
SY4E	Somali Youth for Employment website
SYLP	Somali Youth Livelihood programme
TB	Tuberculosis
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TGS	Traditional governance system
TNG	Transitional National Government
TOT	Training of trainers
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCIR	United States Commission on Immigration Reform
WB	World Bank
WCRWC	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WDR	World Development Report
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
YAG	Youth Advisory Group
YDI	Youth Development Index
YEDP	Youth Education, Development and Participation Programme
YEI	Youth Empowerment Index
YEN	Youth Employment Network
YFAs	Youth Farmers' Associations
YTF	Youth Transformation Framework

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
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Overview

Somalia is at a crossroads where decades of one of the world's most complex and protracted conflicts have shaped a country of stark contrasts. The south central region has experienced years of fighting and lawlessness, while the north-east and north-west have achieved a fragile semblance of peace and stability. The divide shows both what is possible in Somalia, and how much must be done so that all Somalis can walk on the path of development and peace. A powerful new vision for Somalia is required, one oriented around building an inclusive society, where all people feel empowered, and have the capabilities and opportunities to improve their lives.

Towards this end, new dynamism and hope could come from recognizing and harnessing the full potential of Somalia's youth. Young people have been one of the worst-afflicted groups to suffer inter-generational historical exclusion. At the same time, in recent years, they have become the largest population cohort. This presents both tremendous possibilities and dire threats. Opportunities could come through providing quality education and decent jobs, for example, by channeling the 'demographic dividend' into economic gains and social transformation. Threats emerge when educational institutions and labour markets fail to respond to the needs of youth, and some end up pursuing violent alternatives.

Given Somalia's now long history of development and peacebuilding strategies that have had limited success, it is clear that the way forward depends on a much more ambitious agenda that aims for transformation. An essential aspect is placing positive youth empowerment at the centre of all peacebuilding and development goals, and advancing it through shifts in policies, priorities and institutional reforms. This calls for actions at both the central and local levels. Given the large numbers of marginalized youth and other citizens, a solid foundation of democracy must be built, including through mechanisms institutionalizing transparency and accountability to check corruption, eliminate discrimination and ensure that people's voices are heard and responded to at all levels. Community-led poverty reduction and peacebuilding strategies at the same time need to reduce disparities in social, economic and political empowerment that breed resentment and heighten the potential for conflict.

The international community has made several efforts to join hands with Somali stakeholders in bringing peace and stability to Somalia. Fifteen well-intentioned peace and reconciliation efforts have faltered, however. Along the way, Somaliland seceded from Somalia and declared independence in 1991, while Puntland became an autonomous state within the Somalia federal structure in 1998. These two regions have established some stability through bottom-up conflict transformation with a sustained focus on resolving issues at the community level.

But conflict has continued to be intractable in south central Somalia. One explanation for the failure of reconciliation there is that peace processes have been preoccupied with the top-down task of state-building and power-sharing. This approach has not yet succeeded because it has not been sufficiently broad-based, engaging the population at large. Fundamental questions about the form of the Somali government and how to equitably manage the distribution of political power and resources have remained unaddressed, as have the root causes of conflict. These encompass historical and political factors such as governance failure and the legacy of past violence; underdevelopment, economic stagnation and chronic poverty; inequalities across different social groups and levels; the demographic youth bulge; and growing environmental stresses.

State-building is important, but it cannot take hold in an environment of distrust and wide-spread exclusion, and without dealing with the drivers of conflict. An analysis of Somalia suggests that the political landscape is dominated by distinct but overlapping regional (border security) and international (piracy and counter-terrorism) security agendas. The security and stability of the Somali people themselves—the targets of so much of the violence—frequently gets overlooked. A focus on conflict management—which by nature focuses on short-term gains—has resulted in the sidelining of development that would reach a broader spectrum of Somalis. As a result, inequities grow and fuel conflict.

The preference for short-term management over long-term transformation also appears in the overshadowing of development assistance by humanitarian aid, although the latter also has room for improvement, particularly in relation to early warning systems and distribution mechanisms. One impact has been the neglect of the agricultural sector and the environmental resources upon which food security and many livelihoods depend. This has then increased the risk of humanitarian emergencies, with the most recent example being the unprecedented famine that Somalia faced during the second half of 2011.

Understanding Somalia's nexus between conflict and development is far from straightforward, given the complex interplay of the causes of conflict. But this 2012 *Human Development Report* for Somalia argues that conflict, poverty and underdevelopment do sustain and reinforce each other. Future interventions need to be informed by a better understanding of the political economy and the interactions of social and clan dynamics. This is important to improve the status of human development.

Slow Pace of Human Development


Human development equips people with the capabilities and opportunities they need to make choices to improve their lives. Across all dimensions of human development, Somalia has suffered severe consequences from conflict, as reflected in the indices developed by the global Human Development Report. The Somali people currently have some of the lowest development and humanitarian indicators in the world, and inequalities across different social groups, a major driver of conflict, have been widening. The famine in 2011 signifies an increasingly dismal future, if approaches to both conflict and development do not significantly change.

Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI) value is strikingly low at 0.285 (Annex 2). If internationally comparable data were available, Somalia would probably rank among the lowest in the world, at 165 out of the 170 countries in the 2010 global *Human Development Report*. Further, if one accounts for the level of inequality in the distribution of income, education and health—the three components of the HDI—then Somalia's HDI is even worse, with the average loss at 42 percent, as measured by the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI).

Gender inequality is alarmingly high at 0.776 out of a value of 1 (complete inequality), with Somalia at the fourth lowest position globally on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) if internationally comparable data were available. Women suffer severe exclusion and inequality in all dimensions of the index—health, employment and labour market participation. Somali girls are given away in marriage very young, and violence against girls and women is widespread. Traditional laws, used in lieu of a state judiciary, are highly discriminatory against women. Female genital mutilation (FGM) afflicts an estimated 98 percent of Somali women. Despite national gender equality policies and provisions, for example, gender-based violence and discrimination against Somali women continue to brutally suppress human rights and often go unpunished. Traditional Somali society is conditioned not to openly discuss issues such as domestic violence and rape, which further hampers women's access to justice. Many courageous efforts of Somali women to rise above patriarchy have been isolated and short lived, and they have yet to achieve the critical mass in decision-making required to effect wider change. Young women end up greatly disadvantaged in all spheres of life, a reality that hinders their rights and development, and perpetuates intergenerational cycles of gender inequality and the feminization of poverty.

In terms of measuring deprivations related to poverty, Somalia's Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of 0.47 out of 1 would place it at 94 out of 104 countries in 2010 if comparisons were made to the ranking in the global HDR. An estimated 82 percent of Somalis, are considered poor across multiple dimensions (Figure 1). The divide between urban and rural populations is

Figure 0.1: Incidence of Poverty & Average Intensity of Deprivation by Region



significant—61 percent and 94 percent, respectively. In south central Somalia, 89 percent of people are poor across several dimensions, compared to 75 percent in Puntland and 72 percent in Somaliland.

A Large and Excluded Generation

The youth population in Somalia will not experience a peak in the foreseeable future due to high fertility rates, estimated at 6.2 births per woman between 2010 and 2015. Over 70 percent of Somalis are under the age of 30; most face blocked transitions to adulthood due to multiple social, economic and political exclusions. These are related to clan and cultural affiliations, gender, age, illiteracy and poverty, among other factors. They have been reinforced by dominant social attitudes and prejudicial cultural practices, and perpetuated by violence. Exclusion limits capabilities and opportunities, and constricts the contributions of youth to peacebuilding and development. It also dampens the natural energy and enthusiasm of youth, and systematically hinders their potential for positive advancement.


According to a survey conducted to prepare this 2012 *Somalia Human Development Report*, overall unemployment among people aged 15 to 64 is estimated at 54 percent in Somalia, up from 47 percent in 2002. The unemployment rate for youth aged 14 to 29 is 67 percent—one of the highest rates in the world. Females experienced higher unemployment at 74 percent than males at 61 percent. The majority of unpaid family workers were young women who were mostly forced to take traditional occupations due to entrenched traditional gender roles. A higher labour force participation rate for youth, estimated at 66 percent, further reflects lost opportunities for many who might otherwise attend school and acquire skills and education that could raise their future productivity and potential earnings.

The survey unveiled how Somali youth aged 14 to 29 face challenges deterring their transition from school to the labour market. About 21 percent of youth respondents were neither working nor in school. The proportion of youth neither working nor in school increased with age, although 40 percent of those surveyed who were in this category were actively seeking work. This jobless or discouraged group is the most disadvantaged and most vulnerable to risky and criminal behaviours. The proportion of youth who were neither working nor in school was more pronounced among young women at 27 percent than young men at 15 percent (Figure 2). When school-age children and youth are taken together, a large proportion of the population is idle, neither working nor in school. Strategies for youth in this group need to promote labour market integration before they become involved in criminal activity or other high-risk behaviours.

For the most part, the potential gains from a different path—one of youth empowerment and ‘inclusion’—have been overlooked. The potential of youth should be harnessed for positive transformation in Somalia, as otherwise this large generation has the potential to threaten peace, stability and sustainable development. Already, youth are major actors in the conflict, constituting the bulk of the participants in militias and criminal gangs, including Al-Shabaab. Lost opportunities, unclear identity and a growing sense of marginalization among youth in an environment of state collapse, violent conflict and economic decline provide fertile ground for youth radicalization. The same reasons that have pushed young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab have also drawn them to join street gangs. Building on the opportunities offered by youth—and reducing the threats that stem from them—calls for bold and rapid action, starting with an empowerment agenda that brings youth to the centre of peacebuilding and development.

The recent uprisings in the Arab world have demonstrated just how potent youth can be in driving political transformation, especially when fueled by frustrations over a lack of livelihoods or voice in decisions affecting them. In Somalia, poor quality education and the lack of jobs are major sources of tension for thousands of youth. Those aspiring to leadership or political

Figure 0.2: Youth Not Working and Not in School by Gender



positions are further confronted by discrimination based on age, including legal barriers. Frustrated by the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities, some pursue constructive coping strategies such as migration while others end up in piracy and terrorism. If this reality continues to be neglected, the fallout will be disastrous both for Somalia and, through the continued mushrooming of terrorist groups, the world.


The youth survey conducted as part of preparing this report was used to gauge levels of youth frustration. The Youth Frustration Index was calculated as a measure of youth disempowerment. Respondents were asked to rate their opinion on reasons for frustrations on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with mean scores for the three regions presented in Figure 3. The overall frustration index score in Somalia worked out at 3.96 out of 5, with the highest frustration being observed in south central Somalia at 4.3, compared to the northern zones at 3.7. Across the regions, south central Somalia scored the highest in all predisposing factors for youth restiveness. Youth ranked feelings of humiliation lowest and the lack of employment opportunities highest. A similar ranking was discernible in both Somaliland and Puntland.

It is not surprising that the lack of employment opportunities ranks at the top of youth frustrations—given the 67 percent youth unemployment rate. A majority of youth are willing to leave the country in search of alternative livelihood opportunities. Imbalances between available education and training, and the skills actually required for jobs persist against a backdrop of the multiple shocks that have devastated the Somali economy, including conflict and environmental degradation.

Success in reversing the high levels of youth unemployment, along with underemployment and poverty, will depend on stimulating a diversified and growing economy through policies and programmes that address both demand and supply side considerations. Shifting perceptions and attitudes towards employment must form an integral part of the response, including the perspective that view youth as second-class citizens who must gain in years long before they can grow in responsibility. The recognition that youth unemployment cannot be tackled by single actors working alone should be backed by coordinated responses that are well integrated into strategies confronting the wider crisis of the Somali economy.

On the Youth Frustration Index, relatively low scores on feelings of humiliation and lack of self-esteem reflected that youth still have hopes for the future, despite formidable challenges. This notion was confirmed across all three regions—even in south central Somalia, about 80 percent of respondents in the survey were either very optimistic or fairly optimistic. Both domestic and international peacebuilding and development efforts could do much more to galvanize these high aspirations for change—for youth, and Somalis at large.

Figure 0.3: Youth Frustration and Underlying Causes (mean score)



Holistic Policies and Programmes—in Practice

Unleashing the full potential of Somali youth in development and peacebuilding requires holistic policies and programmes geared towards poverty reduction, economic growth, and social and political inclusion. While there has been a growing emphasis on ‘holistic’ and ‘integrated’ approaches to youth, a significant gap exists between rhetoric and practice. There is not yet a systematic framework for understanding and dealing with the full complexities of youth in relation to violent conflict.

International organizations support a variety of youth programmes in Somalia, but they remain thinly scattered and poorly coordinated. There are very few innovative and proven youth-focused projects with potential for wider replication and upscaling. Rights-based programmes dominate, focused on protection, basic education, psycho-social work and advocacy. These are followed by socio-political interventions, such as peace education and support for youth organizations, and economic initiatives,

including for vocational training and short-term job creation. Existing job creation programmes are mostly supply-driven, offering training and skills development, with less attention paid to tackling the demand side, such as through public works programmes and sustainable microfinance, self-employment or entrepreneurship schemes. There is little evidence of which strategies work best, information that is critical for wider replication and upscaling, and for choosing the most effective entry points.

Recent encouraging signs include the newly ratified national youth policies in Somaliland and Puntland, and the TFG's efforts to develop a national youth policy. These offer more comprehensive frameworks. But their impact will very much depend on how well they are anchored in national development strategies and sectoral policies for coordinated action, the resources allocated, and the extent to which youth are engaged in future planning, implementation and monitoring.

To help inform these and other emerging efforts taken by and for youth, the *Somalia Human Development Report 2012* presents a holistic policy and programme framework centred on youth as positive agents of change. It harmonizes the three common strategies—rights-based, economic and socio-political—around common goals. These include empowering youth to develop their full potential, to freely express themselves and have their views respected, and to live free of poverty, discrimination and violence.

Empowerment implies recognizing that youth have diverse needs, interests and unexplored potentials, even those young people at risk of becoming engaged in conflict. Various strategic partners—adults, the private sector, civil society and government—need to come together to collectively offer youth, in a well-integrated manner, the full range and depth of services needed to expand their social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities, at the individual and community levels.

The report presents guiding principles and strategic directions for designing holistic youth programming, focusing on core dimensions of empowerment: the promotion of employability by building assets and capabilities; and sustainable job creation through employment-led growth strategies and the promotion of youth entrepreneurship. Cross-cutting interventions, such as employment and recruitment services, organizational capacity building, youth representation and voice, and environmental sustainability and equity, should be incorporated into youth programming as they facilitate empowerment. These arenas offer a wide range of possible activities and interventions and key elements that constitute a best practice in youth development and empowerment. They are not intended to be a panacea for all the challenges and problems of youth development, but can provide entry points for transformational strategies that shift away from the current, mostly ad hoc, welfare approaches.

Creating and supporting youth organizations, social mobilization and organizational capacity building should be basic building blocks of such programmes. Providing group-based activities, including through sports, community services, education, skills and local entrepreneurship-led employment, could cultivate positive identities, group empowerment, teamwork and leadership skills. Community-led development is one particularly valuable strategy that empowers communities through direct control over investment decisions, and project planning and implementation; it could offer a broad-based space for fostering many innovative youth-led development and peacebuilding programmes.

Given the close links between peace and development, a holistic framework for youth demands concerted collaboration between actors working in development and peacebuilding. Development work needs to proactively incorporate peacebuilding, while the latter needs to integrate measures, including economic ones, to achieve sustainable development and durable peace. Both should strive for empowerment, and through that for transformation.

A Reform Agenda for Dynamic Transformation

Towards making the power and potential of youth central to development and peacebuilding, the *Somalia Human Development Report 2012* presents a nine-point agenda for dynamic transformation. Based on the need for moving from isolated to holistic programming, and from conflict management to conflict transformation, it draws on the lessons learned from the slow progress in Somalia over the past 20 years. It is also in the spirit of international and regional youth response strategies, particularly the World Youth Program of Action, the African Youth Decade 2009-2018 Plan of Action and the United Nations Development Group's (UNDG) strategic framework and priority programme areas for joint action that has been developed in response to the key development challenges underlying the political movements in the Arab World.

Underpinning the implementation of this reform agenda is the guiding principle that youth empowerment is a shared responsibility, which can be accelerated meaningfully if all key stakeholders, including government, UN institutions, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and the diaspora, and youth organizations partner with each other and synergize their efforts to empower young people, so they can align their programmes with the national youth policy framework and plan of action, and mainstream youth perspectives into their programmes and interventions.

The agenda calls for:

Putting empowerment at the centre of the national development agenda: This requires removing policy and institutional barriers that have perpetuated the multiple exclusions and marginalization of youth, and creating and supporting conditions under which young people gain ability, authority, agency and opportunities to make choices for themselves and other people. A coherent national youth policy framework needs to be well integrated in the national development strategy and translated into action. All international aid agencies should agree on a joint youth programme of action geared towards a common youth agenda as a vehicle for transformation.

Strengthening democratic governance: This is essential to guaranteeing political rights, protecting economic freedoms, making institutions accountable and fostering an enabling environment where peace and development can flourish. A number of reforms are necessary, starting with a review of the clan-based so-called power-sharing 4.5 formula (Chapter 2, Box 2.4), which should be made more democratic as part of an inclusive state-building and reconciliation process. To ensure the voice and representation of youth in political life, constitutional amendments and reform measures could remove existing age limits for youth to contest elections, at all levels of government.

The decentralization of power and resources at the regional and district levels, and the development of capacities to provide well-managed, inclusive public services and administration would help provide an environment in which individuals feel protected, civil society and community-based organizations are able to flourish, and state institutions can be held more closely accountable. Upholding respect for human rights and the rule of law may require amending legislation, strengthening judicial institutions, promoting human rights training, and establishing credible, independent and impartial national human rights institutions reinforced by local non-governmental human rights organizations.

Enhancing youth voice and representation: Youth empowerment is not possible without guaranteeing their rights to participate in government decision-making at all levels. Any conventional ‘tokenism’ should be avoided, and youth should be accepted as partners in decision-making so that they can express their views and make specific contributions to youth-related issues and beyond. Since appropriate institutional mechanisms can ensure youth representation, these should be clearly articulated in the national youth policy framework.

Strong and interconnected youth organizations at the grassroots are essential to involving a broad spectrum of youth. At the national level, participation in decision-making bodies could come through the creation of a permanent national youth council, and by ensuring the adequate presence of youth representatives in national youth policy coordination and monitoring body comprising government and other stakeholders. Strong links across all levels of governance, from the local to the national, should be promoted, and extended to the international level where warranted, with an emphasis on regular networking and the exchange of knowledge and experiences.

Enhancing employability of young people: Making skills training and employment services available, affordable, relevant and high in quality should be essential elements of a comprehensive policy to enhance the employability of young people, given the strong links between youth unemployment and frustration. Other policies should provide access to universal, free, quality public primary and secondary education, with a focus on extending access to excluded groups, and with greater attention to quality early childhood development programmes.

Comprehensive vocational training programmes should include life skills, basic education and technical skills to cater to the diverse needs of young people—and respond to current market needs. Critical additional sources of support can come from job search and placement assistance, self-employment services and opportunities for on-the-job experience. A National Youth Empowerment Development Fund could be set up and managed by a national youth council to mobilize additional resources for youth from the government, the donor/aid community, the private sector, the diaspora and international philanthropic foundations.

Part of this funding could be channelled directly to community-based organizations as seed capital or to a revolving fund for microfinancing schemes for innovative youth enterprises.

Promoting employment-led inclusive growth: Widespread youth unemployment cannot be tackled in isolation from the wider crisis confronting the Somali economy. Sustainable employment creation and youth employment promotion should be essential aspects of any overarching economic growth strategy addressing the dual challenges of providing decent work and strengthening capacities for public and private sector development. Economic policies should be centred on promoting empowerment to attain inclusive pro-poor growth, and avoid growth that is jobless, voiceless and/or futureless. They should focus on unleashing potential in sectors most likely to produce employment and reduce poverty, especially those suited to the skills, interests and experiences of young people.

Appropriate national legislation based on international labour standards and good governance of the labour market should support growth and uphold rights and the quality of employment. Active labour market policies and programmes should target youth, drawing from careful analysis of demand and supply in local employment. Governments, in consultation with employers' and workers' organizations, need to establish labour market information and monitoring mechanisms to ensure a regular flow of information on employment for young people. Given the limited capacity of the formal labour market to meet the growing demand for youth employment, a critical alternative is self-employment, but at the same time, demand-driven training may help youth eventually access formal employment.

Localizing MDG-based development and peacebuilding: The limits of top-down approaches to consolidating peace and economic recovery in Somalia point to a new bottom-up agenda that localizes peace and development by engaging youth as active partner and positive agent of change. This means mainstreaming peace within the national development strategy, guided by the localization of the MDGs that is youth-centered. Because of its relevance for youth livelihood and empowerment, an integrated community-based approach to development and peacebuilding can yield significant dividends by empowering local communities, leading to increased civil society participation. At the same time, community involvement cannot solve structural issues without the devolution of power and resources.

In peacebuilding, conventional top-down conflict management needs to yield to a new, dynamic vision of peace that is locally empowered, with youth-led community organizations in the driver's seat. It calls for bringing together various strategic partners, including the government, private sector and civil society, to collectively offer all youth a full and well-integrated array of products and services they need to expand their social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities.

'Engendering' development and peacebuilding: Development and peacebuilding, if not engendered, are endangered. Women, especially young women, need to be at the centre of the national policy agenda, with gender equality measures integrated across all dimensions of all initiatives. Given the prevalence of gender-based violence and discrimination in Somali society, engendering development and peacebuilding will call for confronting existing barriers through policy and planning. This is both a technical and a political process, requiring substantial shifts in organizational cultures and ways of thinking, as well as in the goals, structures and resource allocations of international agencies, governments and NGOs.

Where appropriate, gender programmes should be targeted separately to men and women before a more inclusive approach is devised. While some gender-neutral programmes already attract more girls than boys, even well-intended policies can be gender blind. The evidence of existing women organizations marginalizing young females is a case in point. Gender-targeted programmes with their explicit focus on young women are thus critical to dealing with the different transition to adulthood that girls face. Enhancing youth capabilities should be carried out in a manner that is empowering for young women, focusing on their practical survival needs (such as interventions to reduce domestic workloads) as an entry point to addressing their productive livelihood and strategic (empowerment) needs. All interventions should aim for gender transformation through strategic actions that end unequal power relations between men and women. Empowerment through bottom-up mobilization, in particular, can lead to a natural emancipation that can be sustained.

Ensuring environmentally sustainable human development: Successive humanitarian responses in Somalia have not addressed the environmental costs, even though these are now emerging as a significant source of conflict escalation. Climate change is making the environment and the human beings who live in it more vulnerable, threatening livelihoods and ecological

security. Moving forward, the country must have a long-term plan of action for natural resource management as an integral component of the national development strategy. Because youth often have a stronger awareness of environmental issues and a greater stake in long-term sustainability, they could have a lead role, including in driving community-led movements for greening human development.

Any framework plan should include the development of a decentralized system of sustainable energy, since a looming energy crisis is becoming a barrier to breaking the cycle of poverty and conflict. This could be community-based, and oriented around both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing adaptive responses to climate change. Somalia also needs to urgently design and implement a National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) that gives a central role to community-based adaptation programmes in taking measures such as harvesting rainwater and managing forests and natural resources. Community-based property rights or lease-hold systems for rangeland management would help address land rights and tenure conflicts, and instill greater motivation for sustainably managing land.

Strengthening the knowledge base: A growing body of research and practice on peacebuilding and development has informed policy makers and development practitioners around the world. Customizing this to Somalia, including informing policy debates, require a rich agenda of research, and improvements in national data and evidence-based analysis.

Towards a systematic and comprehensive study of youth and the dynamics of the conflict-development nexus, an in-depth national mapping and analysis of at-risk youth is required. Other priorities should be comprehensive national living standards measurement and labour force surveys to better understand the varied dimensions of youth empowerment, equity and sustainability. Regionally disaggregated data could increase understanding of inequalities that drive conflict and poverty. Defining an accepted measure of multiple exclusions, and delineating the interactions between inclusion and exclusion are important, as is a measure of empowerment that factors in social, economic and political exclusions, and captures their impacts on development and conflict.

Empowerment at the Core

As a cornerstone of human development, empowerment is at the core of the agenda outlined here. It has revolutionary potential in bringing together both the top-down removal of exclusionary policy and institutional barriers, and bottom-up community-led initiatives that empower people socially, politically and economically. In the process, democracy deepens and the causes of conflict—including inequities in society—diminish. Each individual can find new opportunities to develop and use capabilities to lead the lives they choose, and contribute to a more prosperous, peaceful future.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction

UNDP has published two prior national human development reports for Somalia. A 1998 report provided a historical background to the long-running political and humanitarian crisis, and examined education and governance. It brought forward the plight of two generations deprived of education since the school system collapsed in the mid-1980s. In 2001, a second report assessed the main socioeconomic trends since 1998 and examined three forces that impact human development: globalization, the private sector and human rights.

Since the publication of these two reports, the crisis in Somalia has deepened and become more complex. A third generation of youth has missed the opportunity for an education and has no memory of a functioning state as Somalia has been without a central government since the collapse of its 22-year military dictatorship in 1991. Twenty years of efforts to unite the country under a viable national government have not yet succeeded, alienating large parts of the population and polarizing the population into ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ camps. During this time, hundreds of thousands of Somalis have starved to death, countless others have been killed and displaced, and thousands of children and youth have been forced to join militias.

The human development consequences of the conflict have been devastating, culminating most recently in the 2011 famine, which has only underscored the need to build resilience and promote long-term development to avoid a recurrence.

Caught between the dual traps of conflict and poverty, Somalia, not surprisingly, remains at the bottom of the list of the world’s failed states, showing no improvement since 2005.¹ Since a failed state provides fertile ground for terrorism, and a host of other ills that threaten to spill beyond its borders, the situation in Somalia is not only

a problem for Somalis, but also for the world. It has become a reminder of the inadequacy of conflict management strategies that do not address the root causes of violence, among them the persistent lack of political consensus about the form that a national government should take, and about how to equitably manage the distribution of political power and resources among the country’s fractious clans, and across different social groups, including youth, the focus of this report.

Despite its bleak outlook, Somalia is not an entirely lawless and ungoverned land. It is a country of stark contrasts—between resilience and vulnerability, and between the troubled south central region and the relatively stable and peaceful north. Age-old kinship systems, traditional coping mechanisms and remittances from the sprawling Somali diaspora coexist with severe poverty and environmental degradation. Two regions of northern Somalia spared by most of the conflict during the 1990s, Somaliland and Puntland, have been able to achieve greater internal social and political coherence, and have established separate administrations. In 1991, Somaliland declared independence from Somalia, although it has not yet gained international recognition. In 1998, the north-east region of Somalia proclaimed itself the semi-autonomous State of Puntland.

A longstanding focus on the security of the state over the security and empowerment of the people remains. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed in 2004 to lay the foundation of a national government over a five-year period, has not garnered widespread local support and has yet to reach a power-sharing accord for inclusive governance. Continued difficulty in finding concordance between the Somalis’ traditional culture and a modern government, and the repeated application of

... many younger people are trapped in an environment of violence, fear, unemployment and poverty. This both erodes their hopes for human development and makes them more likely to become part of conflict.

faulty approaches to peace conferences have contributed to the Somalis' lack of enthusiasm about the restoration of a viable state.

Against this backdrop, Al-Shabaab youth militias are waging a war against the Government, committing flagrant human rights abuses, and disrupting the distribution of humanitarian aid. Despite the recent focus on conflict analysis and development assistance, the imbalance in aid flows continues with more resources being channelled toward humanitarian assistance and security sectors resulting in skewed development assistance.

Given that youth have consistently borne the brunt of the protracted conflict for the third generation now, this has resulted in the selection of the theme 'Empowering Youth for Peace and Development' for this report, following wide consultations with stakeholders. This report attempts to present the experiences and perceptions of young Somalis while addressing some critical questions: What is the situation of youth and how does it differ for young women and men? How do they see their role in the future? How has the preference for conventional conflict management strategies over the conflict transformation approach based on local empowerment and mutual recognition blocked opportunities for human development and escalated the conflict? Under what conditions can youth be empowered to engage effectively in peace and development?

The report places youth at the centre of its analysis. It argues that investing in them is the surest way to empower them to participate in peace and development, and cut the intergenerational cycle of poverty and conflict. It calls on policymakers and other stakeholders to move away from a traditional, state-centric conception of security to one that concentrates equally on the security and empowerment of individuals, especially youth.

History has repeatedly confirmed that chronic poverty and serious human development problems descend into violent conflicts unless they are actively redressed. Fostering human development is a path towards peace. It is about

creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives according to their needs and interests. It entails understanding that people are the real wealth of nations, and that investing in them is the best way to achieve sustainable, stable economic growth and human security.

Youth: The Missing Link

Youth is a critical stage of a person's development (Box 1.1). But in Somalia, which at 73 percent now has the largest portion of people below age 30 in its history,² many younger people are trapped in an environment of violence, fear, unemployment and poverty. This both erodes their hopes for human development and makes them more likely to become part of conflict. Experiences from Somalia and elsewhere show that when large numbers of young people are jobless and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they become a ready pool of recruits for violent extremists.

Typically, young people in conflict zones are viewed either as victims and/or perpetrators. Although the potential of youth as agents of change is evident from the revolutions emanating from the Arab Spring, they still often appear in public debates primarily as accomplices in crime, suicide bombing and rebellions.³ This leads to a common approach to policies and programmes for youth based on a concern with deficits, where youth concerns are addressed primarily to prevent them from becoming tomorrow's armed groups, criminals and terrorists.⁴ The risk with this thinking, and its emphasis on keeping disaffected youth content and occupied mainly in the short or medium term, is that it produces results that may be unsustainable, and it overlooks longer-term negative impacts on youth and development more generally. In this context, recommendations made by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children remain relevant (Box 1.2).

Viewing youth as key actors in peace and development is a vastly different perspective that challenges traditional thinking. This report maintains that this shift in thinking needs to occur in Somalia, where stability is

Box 1.1: Definitions of Youth

While the United Nations (UN) defines youth as those persons between the age of 15 and 24, there is no universally accepted definition of the term. The lower bound ranges from around 12 years (Jordan) to around 18 years (Bangladesh). The upper bound ranges from around 24 (Jamaica) to even 35 or 40 (Kenya and Pakistan). The World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) use the terms 'adolescent' for those 10 to 19 years old, 'youth' for those 15 to 24, and 'young people' for those 10 to 24. Some reference points use biological markers and suggest youth as the period between puberty and parenthood, while others use cultural markers to define youth as a distinct social status with accompanying roles, rituals and relationships.

This report broadly considers youth as a transitional category between childhood and adulthood, and uses the terms 'youth' and 'young people' interchangeably. In order to conduct a representative sample survey of the Somali youth for this report, however, youth were defined as those falling within the age bracket 14 to 29. The national youth policy in Somaliland defines youth as persons between the ages of 14 to 35, while in the Puntland national youth policy, the age bracket falls between 15 and 30.

As a transitional period of semi-autonomy, youth is a time when people experiment with adult roles, but do not fully commit to them. There are three distinct transitional phases that vary by age and country: early phase (learning), middle phase (learning and work) and late phase (work and family). Amongst the critical factors considered important for affecting these three phases are learning and staying healthy, going to work, starting a family and exercising citizenship.

Various circumstances determine the transition to adulthood, which can be prolonged or cut short by several factors. Armed conflict exacerbates the problem of finding a common definition because it forces children to assume adult roles and functions. Since there is no legal framework for youth combatants in protracted armed conflict, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes have largely neglected them in practice.

A further injustice comes from the common use of the term 'youth' to mean young men, not women, so that the latter are often left out of youth-focused development programmes. Proper understanding and recognition of the disproportionate burdens and inequality of opportunities faced by young women are important steps in devising successful gender strategies for youth empowerment.

The transition from childhood to adulthood has a crucial gender dimension. During this stage, societal expectations and personal aspirations of young men and women begin to diverge. Young males are likely to gain much more autonomy and mobility, while girls begin to experience new restrictions and attitudes, behaviour and conduct. Traditional cultural norms in Somalia dictate that females are sheltered during the stage of puberty for reasons such as purity and marriageability, stigma or family reputation. In many societies, it is also socially and culturally acceptable for youth to be longer for young males than for young females. In cases of violent conflict, young women and girls suffer disproportionately from rape and sexual violence as a targeted strategy to weaken families and break down the social fabric.

Source: UNDP 2006b; World Bank 2007b; National youth policies of Puntland 2008 and Somaliland 2010.

Box 1.2: Youth on the International Agenda

In 2000, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children published a report based on a review of international programmes and policies on health, education, livelihood and protection needs for young people affected by armed conflicts. The report made the following recommendations: ensure that youth affected by armed conflict remain squarely on the international agenda for action; conduct field-based research that accounts for youths' specific and distinct experiences in armed conflict; identify 'good practices' in youth programming and increase appropriate programming interventions on their behalf; increase funding for adolescent-specific programming; promote gender equality; and empower young people.

Source: Women's Committee for Refugee Women and Children 2000.

None of the building blocks of poverty reduction—inclusive economic growth, human capital, empowerment and social protection—are possible without harnessing the potential of youth.

essential for social reconstruction, and where conventional approaches now have a long record of ineffectiveness. The report calls for understanding youth as assets, not threats. From this perspective, youth should be engaged as partners in peace and development. Investments should be made to empower them to overcome the barriers they face, and to nurture peaceful behaviours and attitudes. Giving young people both skills and livelihood opportunities, for example, could help to break the cycle of poverty and conflict. Building their capacities and making public services more appropriate for youth could significantly accelerate progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and promote human development at large.

Investing in youth as peace builders and socioeconomic actors has unique advantages because of their distinctive capabilities, including openness to new experiences, desire for change, and idealism and innovation. Public policy could empower them by opening new opportunities to exercise these capabilities, in the service of peace and development, so that youth can fully exercise their citizenship and human rights. A continued failure to invest in young people will only lead to increases in crime, violence and conflict.

A Valuable Investment

There is growing evidence of how strategic investments in young people's education, health and employment can have some of the most long-term and cost-effective human development impacts, as they enable countries to build a strong economic base. According to the World Bank, "to produce surging economic growth and sharply curb poverty, developing countries need to invest in better education, healthcare, and job training for their young people between the ages of 12 and 24." Estimates indicate that halving the current global youth unemployment rate could substantially boost growth in developing economies. Further, research on 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 showed that economic growth is directly related to achievements in secondary schooling.⁵

None of the building blocks of poverty reduction—inclusive economic growth, human capital, empowerment and social protection—are possible without harnessing the potential of youth. Youth are a development issue, because any country is affected by their situation. Development is equally a youth issue, because youth are affected by all aspects of it. They are essential in achieving all of the MDGs⁶—a strong argument for fully integrating youth programmes of action in MDG-based national development processes. Without the involvement of young people as the largest population cohort, the goals will remain elusive and their long-term sustainability will be compromised.

Many aspects of human capital development for youth are not covered by the MDGs. Specific indicators that are targeted for youth, defined as people between 15 and 24 years old, have shown some of the weakest progress.⁷ Given the rapidly approaching deadline for attaining the MDGs in 2015, these gaps require urgent attention. In general, making youth-focused target indicators more explicit should be a priority in global and national development agendas after 2015. Just as gender equality is an MDG, so should youth empowerment be a goal.

A Holistic Approach Towards Youth

The phenomenon of high numbers of youth in conflict, including in Somalia has been explained through the lens of multiple exclusions and deprivations.⁸ While some theories focus solely on demographic 'youth bulges' (young people fight because there are too many of them without alternative opportunities) or coercion (young people fight because they are forced to), available evidence suggests that youth engage in violence for diverse and context-specific reasons. In some cases, youth avoid violence and adopt non-violent measures, such as migration, in response to their frustrations.

An international focus on youth and peace-building has emerged relatively recently, and mechanisms for working with youth are still in early stages of experimentation. One approach

emphasizes removing obvious sources of political and economic discontent among young people, such as by offering economic incentives like employment. A second approach aims to mobilize youth to imagine a peaceful future by providing more opportunities to engage in social and public life. It sheds light on youth identities and roles in society. A third approach emphasizes rights, and stresses prevention and raising awareness at the community, national and international levels.

In Somalia, the harmonization of these three approaches is an urgent priority, because building on the synergies among them can have the greatest impact on Somali youth, their future and human development at large. This report advocates converging all three to create an empowering environment, where youth are strategic social and economic actors as well as peace builders, as demonstrated in Figure 1.1. Area A represents the place where the potential of youth can be most fully harnessed by protecting them from forced recruitment, furthering their personal development, giving them employment options, and asking for their opinions and action.


A Nexus Between Conflict and Development

Understanding and addressing the situation faced by Somali youth today benefits from the growing body of research analysing the complex and synergistic links across conflict, peace, security and development. Poverty does not in itself create violent conflict, but poverty, inequality and multiple exclusions, especially of a large youth cohort, increase its likelihood. Somalia raises numerous questions about how conflict creates and exacerbates underdevelopment and poverty, and how peacebuilding can worsen conflict or aid sustainable peace. Economic development cannot promote sustainable peace without actions to promote effective governance and security, and vice versa. The key factors underlying the conflict-development nexus in Somalia are highlighted in Figure 1.2.

Major root causes of violence include historical and political factors, such as state collapse, governance failure and a legacy of past violence; underdevelopment, economic stagnation and chronic poverty; inequalities at different levels of society and across groups; a


Poverty does not in itself create violent conflict, but poverty, inequality and multiple exclusions, especially of a large youth cohort, increase its likelihood.

Figure 1.1: Holistic Approach Towards Youth



Source: Adapted from Kemper 2005

Figure 1.2: Conflict Development Nexus: Root Causes and Drivers



Source: Adapted from Steward 2002 and Østby 2003.

demographic youth bulge; unemployment; and environmental pressures.⁹ Another problem has been the concentration of development activities in accessible areas, which fosters regional imbalances and lopsided development, in the process perpetuating exclusion and inequalities. In Somalia both grievances over multiple exclusions, and greed generated by war and state collapse are perpetuating the struggle, especially among youth. “Greed and grievance” are in fact the two dominant explanations for why youth seem to have a higher propensity than other groups to engage in violence.¹⁰ This concept, first coined by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, refers to causes of war.

Exclusion¹¹ is a dynamic, process driven by unequal power relations operating along three dimensions—socio-cultural, economic and political—and at different levels, including individuals, groups, households, communities, countries and around the globe.¹² It is the process through which certain individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from the society in which they live on the basis of their ethnicity, gender, age, religion, disability, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) status

or migrant status.¹³ It involves the systematic denial of entitlements to resources and services, and to participate on equal terms in economic, social, cultural or political arenas.¹⁴

While relative deprivation of the individual leads to grievances, frustration and aggressive behaviour, the relative deprivation of groups, particularly a lost generation of youth, provides opportunities for skilful leaders to mobilize collective action to achieve political or economic goals, including through violent means.

An Agenda for Empowerment

A more holistic approach to youth in Somalia’s conflict would draw on empowering them to develop capabilities,¹⁵ the conceptual foundation of human development. Empowerment can meet the challenges of conflict transformation, human security, peace building and inclusive development. Empowering youth can be seen as an entry point for empowering all people.

Despite much rhetoric, empowerment as the centrepiece of development and peacebuilding has not been much practised.¹⁶ This shortfall has undercut human development in many countries,

including Somalia. But empowerment is now being recognized as one of the key elements in redefining the concept of human development.¹⁷ In contrast to top-down, curative and preventive public policies, empowerment policies have the potential to drive an agenda for transformation from the bottom up.

In the broadest sense, empowerment entails the expansion of freedom of choice and action for increasing one's authority and control over the resources and decisions that affect one's life. It is about transforming existing power relations in favour of those groups—such as women, disadvantaged people and generally the poor—who, through historical exclusion, face severe limitations in exercising power and making choices.¹⁸ Conceptualized as an emancipation process, empowerment allows people facing disadvantages to nonetheless claim their rights, obtain access to resources and participate actively in shaping society and making decisions (Box 1.3 and Chapter 4). It is thus an important counterpoint to exclusion.

Since youth's choices are extremely constrained in conflict environments because of their lack of assets and powerlessness to negotiate better

terms for themselves, either with formal or informal institutions, youth empowerment is defined as the expansion of their assets and capabilities so they can participate in, negotiate with and hold accountable the institutions that affect them.¹⁹ This definition encompasses two crucial aspects. First, youth must be equipped with capabilities to make purposeful choices and take action in line with these. Second, they must have opportunities to achieve a desired outcome. While the first depends on specific individual or collective attributes,²⁰ the second is linked to social, economic and political structures.

Interactions between capability and opportunity determine the degree of youth empowerment. Can youth think critically and envisage alternative options to make effective choices? Which factors influence them to transform their choices into desired actions/results? How can conditions be fostered that enable young people to gain abilities, authority and opportunities to translate their choices into actions that benefit their lives and those of other people?²¹ The proper assessment of capabilities and opportunities provides the basis for judging different dimensions of empowerment and associated obstacles.²²

... youth empowerment is defined as the expansion of their assets and capabilities so they can participate in, negotiate with and hold accountable the institutions that affect them ...

Box 1.3: Key Concepts of Empowerment

Empowerment is a multidimensional concept occurring in three broad dimensions—social, economic and political. Empowerment in one dimension can play a catalytic role in bringing about change in other dimensions, depending on the context and stage of development. Empowerment within a particular dimension does not necessarily lead to empowerment in other dimensions, however.²³ This means that a holistic, integrated approach is required to harmoniously address and sustain all aspects of empowerment. Policies promoting all three components of empowerment can be a powerful force for reducing horizontal inequalities, a key driver of conflict and youth exclusion.

Empowerment is a cumulative dynamic process and outcome operating at different levels. Empowerment is not just a process; it is also about reaching desirable outcomes—substantive empowerment, which encompasses both inter-personal empowerment (individual capacities, self-esteem and self-efficacy) and instrumental empowerment (capabilities such as knowledge and skills) to achieve collective socio-political goals.²⁴ As a process, it involves building people's capacities by mobilizing and organizing them to channel their collective skills, resources and energies to understand and combat the causes of poverty. As an outcome, it involves people coming together to bring about structural transformations of political, economic, social and cultural conditions required to address the causes of their poverty.

Empowerment operates at different levels: At the individual level, people may experience psychological empowerment, such as increases in self-respect, esteem or confidence, which often evolve from collective action.²⁵ At the community level, empowerment allows individuals and groups to organize and mobilize themselves to achieve commonly defined goals.

In Somalia, an empowerment framework may be the most holistic and effective option for addressing interrelated youth and societal crises.

Empowerment and inclusion are closely related but separate concepts: Empowerment is about the enhancement of assets and capabilities of diverse individuals and groups so they can engage in influence and hold accountable the institutions that affect them. Social inclusion involves the removal of oppressive rules, and exclusionary policy and institutional barriers, along with the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of diverse individuals and groups to assets and development opportunities.²⁶ While the empowerment process operates from below and involves agency, as exercised by individuals and groups, social inclusion requires systemic change initiated from above to sustain empowerment over time.²⁷

Social mobilization as an important dimension of capacity building is primarily a mechanism for empowerment: While capacity building refers to knowledge transfers to individuals or groups in order to enable or empower them to carry out certain activities, empowerment increases the relative power and ability of people. Empowerment in this sense is an outcome of both the capacity building of disadvantaged people and a reform of oppressing rules and practices.

Empowerment for transforming conflict into a constructive outcome: Empowerment in this sense means that a person or group is empowered by gaining new awareness and understanding of goals, options, skills, resources and decision-making, which makes it possible for them to use these new insights in mediation and negotiations.²⁸ Conflicts can be better transformed into constructive outcomes when people are empowered socially, economically and politically. Empowerment can also be a negative force for transforming the dispute into violent conflict, especially if different groups experience mismatches in social, economic and political empowerment.

Empowerment as a crucial component of human security: Human security requires addressing both freedom from fear and want. Attempts to implement this agenda have identified two crucial complementary components—protection from threats and empowerment in responding to these threats.²⁹ The protection of the individual from fear and want will only be sustainable if people are empowered to have a voice in shaping choices and opportunities to lead dignified lives.

Source: Adapted from UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2004*.

Mobilizing Individuals and Institutions

Empowerment is a multidimensional concept. It can be broadly broken down into social, economic and political empowerment (Box 1.4). Not just a process, it is also about reaching desirable outcomes³⁰—the kind of substantive empowerment encompassing the interpersonal (individual capacities, self-esteem and self-efficacy) and the instrumental (capabilities such as knowledge and skills) to achieve collective socio-political goals.³¹

Operating at different levels, empowerment requires changes in both individuals and institutions. At the individual level, people may experience increases in confidence that often evolve from collective action.³² At the community level, empowerment allows individuals and groups to organize and mobilize themselves to achieve common goals. Social inclusion is integral to sustaining these processes, and may require systemic changes, often initiated from above.³³ Empowerment

thus entails both developing capacities among disadvantaged people, and reforming oppressive rules and practices.

Empowerment cannot exist without individual and social responsibility and collaboration. In this sense, youth empowerment entails transactional partnering between adults and youth, among other elements. The adult provides space to enable the youth to become empowered, while the youth becomes empowered by making full use of available opportunities as a collaborator in society, rather than simply as a victim or perpetrator of conflict.

The conceptual framework presented in Figure 1.3 demonstrates how empowerment simultaneously associated with social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities is critical for conflict transformation, human security and sustainable human development. Areas B, C and D all show a mismatch between the different dimensions of empowerment and hence are unsustainable. Area A represents

Box 1.4: Dimensions of Empowerment


Social empowerment is described as the process by which people, organizations or groups who are socially and culturally powerless become aware of the dynamics at work in their lives, and develop skills and capabilities for exercising control over aspects they value. The blending of individual human capabilities (education, skills, health, information and communication) with social capabilities such as trust and common values enables collective strength. This makes it possible for people to solve problems by themselves and to start claiming their rights from different governmental and other institutions.

Economic empowerment is about expanding economic capabilities to improve access to productive resources—physical and financial—and ensuring equal access to economic opportunities (employment, markets and technology). The resources owned or available for use as well as conditions of exchange (relative prices and the workings of markets) are crucial. Empowerment strategies that support overcoming barriers to access can help enhance the assets and economic capabilities critical for economic empowerment.

Political empowerment is about the expansion of political capabilities associated with democratic governance. Democratic governance ensures that people's human rights and freedoms are respected, that people have influence in decisions that affect their lives, and that they can hold decision-makers accountable. Political empowerment also encompasses legal empowerment, which is defined as the process of acquiring critical awareness about rights and the law, the ability to assert rights, and the capacity to mobilize for change. Political empowerment addresses political entitlements associated with democracies, encompassing opportunities for political dialogue, dissent and critique, as well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives.

Source: UNDP Nepal Human Development Report 2004.

Figure 1.3: Conceptual Framework



Source: Adapted from UNDP Nepal Human Development Report 2004.

... empowerment
for conflict
transformation
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structures ...

sustainable empowerment by integrating all dimensions. While empowerment in one dimension can play a catalytic role in others,³⁴ this is not automatic.³⁵ A high level of social and political empowerment amid very low economic empowerment makes empowerment unsustainable, leading to disenchantment and conflict, for example.

In Somalia, an empowerment framework may be the most holistic and effective option for addressing interrelated youth and societal crises. As one of the four pillars of human development, empowerment reinforces the other three: equity, productivity and sustainability.³⁶ Since these three cannot always be pursued in mutually reinforcing ways,³⁷ this report advocates for the centrality of empowerment as the only overarching framework to bring about positive synergies across all four pillars. Empowerment is also one of the two pillars of human security.³⁸

Human security rests on both freedom from fear and want.³⁹ Attempts to implement this agenda have led to two approaches, with one stressing protection from threats, and the other emphasizing empowerment and appropriate mechanisms to respond to these threats.⁴⁰ Both can be linked to an overarching empowerment framework, because the protection of the individual from fear and want will only be sustainable if people are empowered to shape choices and opportunities. This moves the security reform agenda away from state security, putting people's security at the centre.

In Somalia and elsewhere, empowerment for conflict transformation has the potential to promote substantial shifts in existing unequal power structures, where each individual has opportunities to develop and use his or her capabilities. Equally important, however, is the recognition that empowerment can fuel violent conflict, especially if there are mismatches in the degrees of empowerment across different groups.⁴¹ Human security and development strategies need to become more sensitive to these dynamics, and more effective in addressing underlying causes of conflict, including those that stem from the political economy, and

sources of inequality and discrimination across different groups and levels of society.

Moving Towards Transformation

An agenda for empowerment in Somalia would potentially involve both support for inclusive policy reform and bottom-up measures. It would rest on four critical elements: access to information, inclusion and participation, accountability and local capacity building. Informed citizens are better equipped to take advantage of opportunities, access services, exercise their rights, and hold state and non-state actors accountable. Creating space for people and excluded youth to participate in decision-making is critical for debating issues, setting local and national priorities and delivering basic services. Citizen action or social accountability through access to timely information and impartial justice can reinforce political and administrative accountability mechanisms, and build pressure for improved governance and accountability. Organized communities are more likely to have their voices heard and their demands met.

Support for inclusive policy reform encompasses the removal of exclusionary policy and institutional barriers through state reform measures linked to governance, the rule of law, incentives, social inclusion and accountability.⁴² Critical elements comprise making state institutions more responsive to people by reforming public administrations, reforming the legal system for removal of discriminatory and exclusionary practices, decentralizing power and resources, creating opportunities and an investment climate for inclusive growth, and promoting democratic politics and efficient governance practices. It is also critical to remove social barriers and discrimination on the basis of region, ethnicity, race, gender, religion and socioeconomic status.

Support for bottom-up measures encompasses investing in youth assets and capabilities, and in creating and broadening opportunities to use these. It also entails strengthening the capacities of local organizations and social capital, especially through social mobilization

and community-based programmes. In Somalia, where state institutions and governance systems are weak, community-led initiatives can be a particularly effective means to strengthen local governance and promote development and peace.

Report Preparation and Organization

The theme for the Somalia Human Development Report 2012 was selected in consultation with Somali stakeholders, including from government, civil society and research organizations. In order to ensure broad national ownership from the very beginning, three national institutions were selected to conduct a national youth survey and prepare background papers for Somaliland (Admas University), Puntland (a consortium headed by Puntland State University) and south central Somalia (the Centre for Research and Dialogue).

The report is based on primary data collected through the survey, which reached 3,352 households and an almost equal number of youth, comprising 1,798 young men and 1,540 women, aged 14 to 29 (see Annex 4 for the survey methodology and sample distribution by zone). The survey was supplemented by focus group discussions, key informant interviews, secondary sources of data, and international and national expertise.

A questionnaire was developed for both household and youth interviews. One youth respondent from each randomly selected household was chosen for the latter. Household level information covered mainly socio-demographic profiles and livelihood assets, while the interviews with youth captured information on youth assets and opportunities, and opinions on livelihood challenges and priorities.

A pool of enumerators and supervisors, mostly young men and women, were trained to undertake the survey. The training was useful to clarify the questions and the various codes in order to minimize non-sampling errors. Field supervisors were especially trained to administer checklists for focus group

discussions held separately for men and women, and key informant interviews with government officials, religious leaders, community elders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions and the business community. Following the training, the survey instruments and checklists were pre-tested in the field. Based on pre-testing of results, the questionnaires were finalized.

The survey was conducted successfully in Somaliland and Puntland, but in south central Somalia, due to the security situation, the sample was biased in favour of urban areas. Data entry operations were completed by the partner institutions, while the data processing, cleaning and generation of tables for analysis took place centrally at UNDP.

To ensure the meaningful involvement of youth in the report preparation process, youth advisory groups comprising knowledgeable members from the most active and representative youth organizations were formed in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia. Consultative youth advisory group workshops in the three administrative zones discussed preliminary findings, carried out rapid mappings of youth groups and programmes, and agreed on priorities for holistic youth empowerment strategies, to be presented in the form of recommendations in the report.

A final two-day workshop brought together 17 representatives of regional youth advisory groups to validate the report's findings and recommendations, and develop an initial draft of a Youth Charter (Annex 1) for young Somalis. To ensure it is widely representative and to gather relevant feedback on the content, the Charter was circulated through individuals and youth organizations in Somaliland, Puntland as well as through International Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP) in accessible areas in south central Somalia. To access the diaspora, the Charter was circulated using an online survey tool known as Survey Monkey and posted on the UNDP website.⁴³ It was shared through individual correspondence following online searches for Somali youth

groups in various countries. Feedback received on the content of the Charter and a potential dissemination strategy has been incorporated in the best way possible.

The Youth Charter will be used as a set of guiding principles for state and non-state actors to engage with young Somalis, thereby helping to ensure that youth voices are heard and taken into account while planning and implementing development policies and programmes. The Charter, which also guides young Somali men and women with a common set of values, will serve as an effective tool to engage young Somalis from within Somalia and the diaspora in constructive dialogues among themselves and with other stakeholders.

The final report presented here benefitted from a series of consultative and validation workshops in the three regions that brought together key stakeholders—comprising governmental, private sector and non-governmental representatives. It is organized in six chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines Somalia's political, economic and socio-cultural context. It considers the human development consequences of conflict, the drivers of conflict, and gaps in efforts to broker peace. All these elements have a profound impact on the existing reality and future prospects for Somali youth.

Chapter 3 assesses the situation of youth in Somalia, based on the survey for this report. It highlights their perceptions of multiple

exclusions, joblessness, frustration, survival strategies and priority needs, including hindrances to and opportunities for empowering them in peacebuilding and development.

Chapter 4 explores existing support mechanisms for youth, and looks at how these could be made more effective through an empowerment approach. Good practice examples and success stories from Somalia and other conflict-affected countries demonstrate the roles youth can play. The chapter presents a comprehensive framework for better enabling youth to overcome barriers and pursue opportunities.

Chapter 5 explores the imperative of localizing the peace and development agenda, drawing upon a Somali-led peace process rooted in a conflict transformation approach. It investigates the existing and potential role of youth as peacebuilders, examining how and under what conditions they can play a catalytic role in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Promising good practices and lessons learned, and recommendations for sustained involvement are highlighted.

Chapter 6 provides major policy recommendations to reduce poverty and promote human development through youth empowerment. It calls for engaging and empowering youth as a strategic entry point for interventions to address larger challenges and opportunities, and offers specific recommendations for a future youth agenda.

Chapter 2

Dual Traps: Poverty and Violence

Dual Traps: Poverty and Violence

Human development is about expanding choices and advancing rights, while violent conflict is one of the most brutal suppressions of these. Conflict is both a cause and a consequence of state collapse and development reversals, perpetuating the dual traps of poverty and violence.

A failure to understand and address the root causes of conflict has hindered peace initiatives in many conflict-affected countries; Somalia is no exception. It now presents the longest running case of state collapse in post-colonial Africa. Nearly 20 years of diplomatic, military and state-building efforts to unite Somalia under a viable national government have achieved little more than the alienation of large sections of the population. In a situation where governance and security are provided by a mix of traditional institutions, modern governmental authorities, religious bodies, private militia, and transnational enterprises supported by international organizations, the conventional state-centric model of peacemaking between a government and opposition parties has limited applicability.

Somalia continues to face one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with half the population in urgent need of aid. The 2011 famine that has affected large parts of the south has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.⁴⁴ Another challenge is the emergence of Al-Shabaab, the Islamic radical group waging a war against any future secular Somali state by mobilizing a lost generation of Somali youth. Widespread youth unemployment, poverty, and the desire for law and order by the Somali people have contributed to the movement's appeal.⁴⁵

Traditionally, studies of violent conflicts relied on historical and political factors to explain why wars emerge, persist, recur and end. In

response to the increasing concentration of civil wars in poor countries, however, there has been growing emphasis on socioeconomic conditions associated with frequent conflicts. Development without peace is not sustainable, and peace without development is not durable. Youth are critical in connecting the two, as they are both a major cause of crisis and one of the groups that suffers the greatest consequences. When youth are socially, economically and politically excluded to the degree that has occurred in Somalia, they present an enormous challenge. Solving it depends on concerted efforts to harness their energies and empower them with capabilities and opportunities to help transform conflict and sustain development and peace.

In general, a deeper understanding of peace and development dynamics is needed to address the conflict in Somalia, especially in the absence of the state, and to ground reconciliation efforts in social relations and local communities. What are the fundamental causes of the Somali conflict? What explains the perpetuation of the civil war and the failure of past peace efforts? What are the development consequences and their implications in exacerbating the conflict? These are some of the fundamental questions on which there is no consensus and limited knowledge.

Providing a backdrop for the rest of the report, this Chapter presents an overview of Somalia's political, economic and socio-cultural attributes. Considering the links between conflict and development, it examines some of the human development consequences, underlying socioeconomic and human security trends, and international responses to the Somali crisis. All of these elements have a profound impact on the present reality and future hopes of Somali youth, as will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

Providing a backdrop for the rest of the report, this Chapter presents an overview of Somalia's political, economic and socio-cultural attributes.

Somalia's clan-based political dynamics have consistently worked against the re-establishment of a central Government ...

Somalia's Complex Context

The Political Landscape

Somalia's clan-based political dynamics have consistently worked against the re-establishment of a central Government (Box 2.1). While Somaliland in the north-west and Puntland in the north-east established their own administrations, which to some extent fulfil basic functions of government, south central Somalia remains deeply divided (Box 2.2) as political differences among its clans have led to entrenched factionalism. Over

the past two decades, the nature of the Somali crisis and the international context within which it is occurring have changed, from civil war in the 1980s; to state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s; to a globalized ideological conflict in the first decade of the new millennium. The Somali state failed as a result of internal and external factors,⁴⁶ including the legacy of colonialism, which divided the Somali territory into five states; the nature of Cold War politics; and the cumulative effect of wars with neighbouring countries.

Box 2.1: Background on the Somali Conflict

The seeds of the Somali conflict were planted in 1897 when the country was divided among the British, French and Italian colonial powers,⁴⁷ and again in 1948 with the British transfer of the Ogaden region to Ethiopia.⁴⁸ Since 1960, political developments have gone through three distinct phases. That year, the British Somaliland protectorate and the Italian-administered Somalia simultaneously gained independence and merged under the United Republic of Somalia. During the first decade after independence, Somalia's liberal democratic Constitution built the foundation for successful political integration of territories with distinct colonial traditions and a clan-driven multi-party political system, which became the basis for building and governing cross-clan coalitions. This system was abolished in a military coup in 1969, however. For the next two decades, the country went through oppressive and autocratic rule under a military regime led by Major-General Mohammed Siad Barre,⁴⁹ who initiated clan based politics as a means of control. The regime's repressive policies weakened the effectiveness of government institutions and corrupted the unifying features of Somali society. Greed and grievance politics set in motion a decade-long civil war and ultimately the collapse of the regime.

The overthrow of the military government in January 1991 triggered violent upheavals followed by a prolonged period of anarchy and warfare. In south central Somalia, clan-based militia competing for control of resources and engaging in looting and other forms of criminal activities led to a catastrophic famine from 1992 to 1993. This prompted the UN Security Council to establish the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) in 1992, and the US-supported Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993. The UN withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 after peacekeepers were repeatedly attacked by Somali militia, killing 18 American troops and hundreds of Somalis.

After the failure of UN-led peacekeeping interventions, several externally sponsored national reconciliation conferences on state-building were initiated. In August 2000, the Arta National Peace Conference formed a Transitional National Government (TNG) by adopting the so-called '4.5 power-sharing formula' for proportional representation of Somali clans in government. The TNG failed to produce a national unity government, however. In 2002, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) revived the peace initiatives, which led to the formation of the TFG in late 2004. It was slated to lay the foundation of a national government over a five-year period. But an umbrella organization of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), comprising Mogadishu's seven Islamic courts, took control of Mogadishu on 5 June 2006, and then extended their control over most of south central Somalia.

A more violent phase in the Somali conflict began in December 2006, when Ethiopia invaded Somalia and defeated the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), killing hundreds of Somali youth. The presence of Ethiopian troops to protect the TFG led to the emergence of Al-Shabaab as a radical youth resistance movement supported by foreign jihadists, including Al-Qaeda. This is in part due to the ongoing exclusion of youth from political channels. Ethiopia withdrew from Mogadishu in January 2009, and the security vacuum was filled by a regional force called the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with the mandate of supporting the transitional government.

Source: Solomon 2009; Lewis 1994; Bruton 2010.

Box 2.2: Towards Autonomy: The Creation of Somaliland and Puntland

The north-western region of Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991 as a result of a home-grown, clan-based reconciliation process, culminating in the Boroma Conference of 1993, which elected Mahamed Haji Ibrahim Egal as President. The declaration of independence and the formation of an interim Government marked the end of a 10-year war by the Somali National Movement against the Government of Siad Barre. Somaliland is dominated by the Isaaq clan and comprises 5 of the 18 administrative regions of Somalia.

Though internationally unrecognized, the Somaliland Government comprises an Executive President, a Cabinet and a bicameral Parliament composed of the House of Elders and the House of Representatives. A Constitution, adopted in 2001 through a public referendum, began the transformation of a 'clan democracy' system into a multi-party democracy. It establishes the judiciary as an independent branch of the Government, and stipulates the formation of regional and local governments. Somaliland has held a series of national democratic elections.

The north-eastern region of Puntland followed Somaliland's example with the creation of the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia in August 1998. This was the outcome of a nearly three-month-long consultative conference, involving both political and clan leaders. Constitutionally, Puntland is part of Somalia, and its Government is working towards rebuilding a unified Somali state. It has a Parliament; major political decisions are taken by clan representatives who are either members of Parliament or convene as traditional authorities. Home to the Darood/Majerteyn clan, Puntland comprises 3 of the 18 regions of Somalia, and contests control of two disputed regions, Sool and Sanaag, with neighbouring Somaliland.

Unlike Somaliland, Puntland advocates for a federal Somalia and formally endorsed the transitional federal process; but has its own Constitution and armed forces, and conducts its own foreign and trade policies.

Note: All references to regions within administrative zones are made in line with internationally used pre-war boundaries.

Source: UNDP Somalia 2011a and 2011b.

The TFG, formed in 2004, still has to accomplish many of the transitional tasks set out in the Transitional Federal Charter during its five-year tenure (Box 2.3). Following the so-called power-sharing 4.5 formula (Box 2.4) with the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in early 2009, known as the Djibouti Agreement, the TFG was reconstituted, and the Parliament expanded with the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members. This new agreement⁵⁰ prolonged the life of the TFG by extending its term, which was due to end in January 2009, for a further two-year period.

With the rise of Al-Shabaab, which controls most of southern Somalia (Box 2.5), the reach of the TFG became more limited, being confined to a few districts in Mogadishu. Formed from the merger of four Somali groups, Al-Shabaab has been supported by foreign Islamists, including those linked to Al-Qaeda⁵¹ (Box 2.5). Starting as a nationalist,

fundamentalist Islamic group, Al-Shabaab originally focused on driving Ethiopian forces out of Somalia following their invasion in 2006 in response to the takeover of large parts of Somalia by the hard-line ICU. The movement has now changed its focus and is looking to promote global jihad, rather than just creating an Islamic caliphate in Somalia. Over the past three years, Al-Shabaab has instituted many of the same harsh practices as the Afghan Taliban in the territories under its control. It enforces its rules by administrative methods and intimidation.

In early 2008, the United States designated Al-Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization, meaning that it is believed to be involved in the planning and/or execution of acts of terrorism against US nationals or national security.⁵² Today, Al-Shabaab's ideological commitment to global jihadism; its connections to Al-Qaeda; its military capabilities⁵³ through the operation of terrorist

Box 2.3: Principles to Guide the Transitional Federal Charter

The Transitional Federal Charter, approved in February 2004 at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi, provides a temporary legal underpinning of the Somali state. It will be operational until a federal Constitution is adopted through a popular referendum during the final year of the transitional period. The 1960 Somali Constitution and other national laws apply to all matters not covered by and not inconsistent with the Charter. Key guiding principles are as follows:

Inclusive governance: The Charter upholds democracy as the guiding principle of a future governance structure. Sovereign authority of the Somali state is invested in the people of Somalia, who might either directly or indirectly exercise their democratic rights.

Decentralization: Article 11 of the Charter provides for a decentralized system of administration based on federalism. The Somali Republic is envisioned to comprise four levels of governance: The federal Government; state governments (two or more, based on free will); regional administrations and district administrations. The TFG shall ensure that the process of federating Somalia will take place within a period of two-and-a-half years from the date that the Federal Constitutional Commission is established.

Resource sharing: The Charter stipulates the fair and equitable appropriation and allocation of resources as the task of the TFG. Land should be used and managed in a manner that is equitable, efficient, productive and sustainable. Natural resources such as minerals, water, flora and fauna should be public property.

Power sharing: According to Article 13 of the Charter, the TFG shall ensure that all appointments in the service of the Government are based on qualifications and fair distribution among the citizens. The 4.5 formula applies for power-sharing among major clans: 61 seats go to each of the four major clans and 31 seats go to the 'minority' groups.

Gender balance: According to Article 29, at least 12 percent of all members of the Transitional Federal Parliament should be women. According to Article 26 of the Charter, the Government promises to promote participation of women in all aspects of society.

Free market economy: The Charter stipulates that free enterprise should form the basis of the economic system. The Government shall encourage and provide full protections for foreign investment, private property under law and intellectual property.

Respect for human rights: The Somali Republic recognizes all international human rights conventions and treaties. It guarantees equality of citizens before the law, providing for rights guaranteed under the Charter, including the rights to: legal proceedings in a competent court, personal liberty, security, protection of family, freedom of information and media, assemble and strike, establish political parties and social organizations, properly remunerated labour, and political asylum and education.

Social welfare: The Charter pledges the Government will be responsible for providing public health care, support for safe motherhood, childcare and control of communicable diseases, and protecting the welfare of aged persons, persons with disabilities, orphans, widows, students and heroes who fought in defence of the country. The Government shall encourage the establishment of civil society and public social development institutions. The Charter further stipulates that the law shall regulate the establishment of private health centres and clinics. The Government shall safeguard the public morality of society, and promote the social welfare of rural populations.

Source: United Nations and World Bank. 2008.

training camps, with an exodus of young Somali men from Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Europe;⁵⁴ and its ability to capture and control territory suggest that it will continue to pose a strategic challenge to Somalia and neighbouring countries. Al-Shabaab does face certain challenges from within Somalia, given its clash with another Islamist group,

Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah.⁵⁵ But the main factors underlying the movement's resilience have been highly debatable: Western and regional policies that helped it to appear as the best defender of Somali nationalism; the illegitimacy of its contenders in southern Somalia; and its ability to use economic and ideological resources in an innovative and efficient manner.⁵⁶

Box 2.4: Equal Parts: The '4.5 Formula'

The 4.5 formula allots an equal number of places in the legislature to each of the four major Somali clans (Rahanweyn, Dir, Hawiye and Darood), with a half place allotted to minorities.

It was first adopted at the 1996 Sodere conference, where broad agreement was reached on relative clan size and territorial rights. It was also used for discussions on representation at both the Arta and Mbagathi talks. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) formed in 2004 had originally 275 members, with each of Somalia's four major clans getting 61 seats, while an alliance of minority clans was awarded 31 seats. According to Article 29 of the Transitional Federal Charter, at least 12 percent of the members of Parliament shall be women. Following the creation of a unity government in 2008-2009 between the TFG and moderate members of the ARS, the TFP's seats were increased to 550. Of those, 475 Members of Parliament are appointed following the 4.5 formula: 1 apportionment goes to each of the four major Somali clans, while a coalition of minority clans receives a quota of 0.5.

The 4.5 formula has been seen by some as being unfair, undemocratic and ineffective by both the intellectual and religious Somali communities. Defenders argue that 4.5 is a stop-gap measure designed only for the transitional phase, but this does not explain why a system that produces often poor quality leaders should be considered even a temporary remedy. Clan representation is a legitimate and emotional issue, and debate over a fair system is necessary. But in general, moving towards a policy-based politics, in which leaders are freely chosen on merit rather than clan affiliation, could accelerate progress on all fronts.

Source: Mukhtar 2007; Interpeace and Centre for Research and Dialogue 2009.

The strength of Al-Shabaab also lies in its ability to address the needs of certain groups, especially youth, who have been marginalized by both political processes and resource conflicts. Lost opportunities, unclear identity and a growing sense of marginalization among youth in an environment of state collapse, violent conflict and economic decline provide fertile ground for youth radicalization. The same reasons that have pushed young Somalis to join Al-Shabaab have also drawn them to join street gangs. Socioeconomic problems are not only the factors used by Al-Shabaab for recruitment, however; it also uses intimidation and force, along with jihadist indoctrination, as discussed in Chapter 5.

In June 2011, Al-Shabaab moved out of Mogadishu, thus providing the TFG with an opportunity to consolidate its position there. This has opened space for recovery and development. The TFG received a further extension for a year,⁵⁷ and is working with the international community to implement the Mogadishu Stabilization Plan for the ravaged capital. Another positive development has been a consultative meeting on ending the transition in Somalia held in May 2011 and the adoption

of a roadmap on 6 September 2011 for the remaining part of the TFG's tenure, including the completion of a draft Constitution by 20 June 2012.

The TFG has limited public support⁵⁸ and has made limited progress in establishing itself as an authority. Like its predecessors, it has had many opponents.⁵⁹ Based on previous experiences, many Somalis fear that a central Government will dominate and marginalize them. This underscores the limits of the TFG as a genuinely representative and inclusive government,⁶⁰ which explains the recurrent tensions between it and self-governing enclaves.⁶¹ Some local and foreign observers have also expressed concern about transparency in the current Government.⁶² Its strength compared to previous governments may lie not in its legitimacy and support within Somalia, but in its recognition by the international community.

An analysis of Somalia suggests that the political landscape is dominated by distinct but overlapping regional (border security) and international (piracy and counter-terrorism) security agendas.⁶³ The security and stability of the Somali people themselves—the targets

An analysis of Somalia suggests that the political landscape is dominated by distinct but overlapping regional (border security) and international (piracy and counter-terrorism) security agendas.

Box 2.5: The Emergence of Terror: Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab (which means youth in Arabic) came to prominence as the military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006. It posed the greatest threat to the TFG, with the ultimate goal of turning Somalia into an Islamic state; building a greater Somalia by incorporating regional areas with large ethnic Somali populations such as Djibouti, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya; and spreading its strict version of Islam throughout the region. Moreover, Al-Shabaab purports to be committed to global jihadism and has self-professed connections to al-Qaeda. The movement is opposed to democracy, and faces broad but fragmented opposition from secular groups in south central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, and from Somalia's neighbours. It is the target of international counter-terrorism efforts.

A large number of Al-Shabaab militia members are either unemployed youth forcefully recruited or bribed into joining the militia, mercenaries or individuals recruited from mosque study circles. The militia also cooperates with clan militias and various business leaders and their militias. Despite having a central decision-making council, or shura, Al-Shabaab is fractured along ideological and clan lines, with several leadership changes during the past year. Some leaders employ a more hard-line interpretation of sharia or Islamic law, implementing their agenda by violent means, while other more 'moderate' Al-Shabaab leaders favour engaging in talks with rivals and the local community to maintain popular support.

Since Al-Shabaab is a mobile group, the magnitude of its recruitment and deployment of troops varies in order to balance forces in Mogadishu and the countryside. Early recruitment concentrated on youth, and the group mostly used religious discourses to convince them to join its jihad movement. The status of war and the Ethiopian/US/African Union Mission in Somalia presence facilitated the recruitment especially of disenfranchised and unemployed youth, who could easily be indoctrinated. Al-Shabaab has imposed a strict, Taliban-style version of sharia in the areas it has captured.

Women are required to wear the veil and socks. Men are forbidden to shave their beards or wear their pants below their ankles; those deemed as having 'inappropriate hairstyles' have had their heads forcibly shaved. The militia forcibly removed gold and silver teeth. It closed cinemas, set fire to markets selling the mild stimulant *khat*, forbade cell phone ringtones unless they were verses from the Koran, forbade all forms of smoking, banned videogames, dancing at weddings, watching, and in some places, playing soccer, and listening to non-Islamic music. Radio stations nationwide were ordered to close or play only the call for prayer. Businesses are ordered to close during prayer times, when all residents are required to be praying. Public transporters in Mogadishu and Kismayo must segregate passengers by sex, with male passengers sitting in the front and female passengers in the rear seats.

Source: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). 2010

of so much of the violence—frequently gets overlooked.⁶⁴

A Clan-based Society

Unlike many African nations, which comprise multi-ethnic societies, Somalia has a single, homogeneous ethnic group with a common culture.⁶⁵ The Somali clan system is an important feature of social, political and economic life, and key to understanding many aspects of contemporary Somali society.⁶⁶

The clan structure is divided into four major groups: the Hawiye, Darood and Dir/Isaaq, which are overwhelmingly nomadic pastoralist clans that speak the Mahaatiri language; and the

Digil and Mirifle, also known as the Rahanweyn, which practice agro-pastoralism in the southern part of Somalia and speak the Maay language. Several smaller ethnic communities, including the Bantus and groups estranged based on traditional occupations, have been largely neglected by the state.⁶⁷ These minority groups do not get any clan protection, with some even being victims of sexual abuse and gang attacks. The Bantus and estranged groups are faced with the greatest inequalities and social exclusion and the international community has not done much either to address these asymmetries.

All clan families and sub-clans maintain armed militias that mobilize youth, and that look to

their traditional home territories as a power base, manpower pool and place of refuge. Warlords of various factions make and break alliances based on clan relations, the demand for resources, the need to counterbalance the strength of a rival, revenge and the advancement of their own fortunes.

Clan identity is not static but is shaped and manipulated according to changing situations.⁶⁸ During the last decade of the Siad Barre regime, clan was used by the political elite as a mechanism to access state resources and other assets, and to distribute political patronage. Most of Somalia's armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of clans, often as a result of political leaders manipulating them for their own purposes.

Historically, Somali society employed a centuries-old traditional governance system under traditional customary laws known as *xeer*.⁶⁹ Over time, this system was shaped and influenced by the advent of Islam and the colonial governance system. Most traditional customary laws that were not compatible with Islamic sharia were discarded.⁷⁰ A merger of the three systems has persisted until today. With the collapse of formal judicial institutions, *xeer* and sharia laws have regained significance, and now play critical roles in post-war governance and state-building.⁷¹

Violence and Exclusion of Women

Somalia ranks second to Afghanistan as the worst country worldwide for women.⁷² Violence against women cuts across all social and economic strata, and is deeply embedded in Somali culture. The Somali customary system is based on clear gender divisions of labour. Women are generally confined to the household, while men have jurisdiction over decisions outside the home.⁷³ Nonetheless, women have been the backbone of Somali society, providing much of the labour required for the survival of the family in a harsh environment. They fetch water and wood, milk the animals, process the milk, feed the family, and take care of the children and livestock. There are many women-headed households in Somalia where women

are the breadwinners, engaging in small-scale enterprises, especially in urban areas.⁷⁴

Since 1991, the re-emergence of customary law, the extended use of sharia law and the resort to clan-based forms of political representation have meant women have been virtually excluded from all political and judicial structures in different parts of the country. The *xeer* recognizes the rights of men but limits the rights of women, meaning their lives are of unequal value to those of men. Sharia law offers women greater justice than the *xeer*, but can only be administered by men; in practice it is often misapplied in the interests of the latter. Although Somalia's Family Law states that females and males have equal inheritance rights, both sharia law and customary practices often prevent women from getting equal shares or any share at all.⁷⁵

Since Somali women and men have had different access to resources, power and decision-making before, during and after conflict, they experience different impacts and inequalities in terms of burdens and opportunities. As in most contemporary conflicts, many Somali women have been killed, raped, displaced and abandoned. Women and children comprise 70 to 80 percent of all refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).⁷⁶ Many women have lost husbands and other able-bodied family members to violence, leaving them to provide for and protect the children, the elderly and the sick. Polygamy and divorce have further contributed to the increasing number of female breadwinners.⁷⁷ Among other consequences, these situations reduce education opportunities for girls.

Gender-based violence has been a significant feature of Somalia's conflict, in which customary conventions to protect women and children and preserve human dignity have been violated.⁷⁸ Rape and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups, are targeted strategies to weaken families and break down the social fabric of communities and societies. Even in some parts of Somalia where there is relative peace, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence persist, creating long-term threats to security and to women's health.

With the collapse of formal judicial institutions, *xeer* and sharia laws have regained significance, and now play critical roles in post-war governance and state-building.

Despite the marginalized status of women, there are many examples of them engaging in efforts to stop fighting and bring different factions together.

Perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence are rarely prosecuted, given the weakness of the judiciary system and the lack of recognition of these as crimes. Even as rape continues to be used as a tool of war, survivors have no recourse.⁷⁹ Women in IDP camps are particularly vulnerable, having lost their clan protection, and are common victims of murder, rape and kidnappings. Traditional Somali society is conditioned not to openly discuss issues such as domestic violence and rape, which further hampers women's access to justice. Most surveys confirm under-reporting of violence.

Despite the marginalized status of women, there are many examples of them engaging in efforts to stop the fighting and bring different factions together. They usually sustain both maternal and paternal clan networks,⁸⁰ and have used this cross-cutting clan identity to play crucial roles in promoting reconciliation across clan lines. For instance, women persuaded the leaders of the five main clans in southern Somalia to attend peace negotiations in Arta, Djibouti, in 2000, and challenged delegates to think beyond clan boundaries in drafting a peace agreement (Box 2.6).⁸¹ Women have not gained membership in

clan institutions involved in political decision-making, however. Many courageous efforts of Somali women to rise above patriarchy have been isolated and short lived, and they have yet to achieve the critical mass in decision-making required to effect wider change.

The status of Somali women differs widely across social groups and to a certain extent across geographic areas, but this richness and diversity is poorly understood. Development agencies' activities focus mostly on women as beneficiaries rather than partners of projects. As women generally lack power and authority, continued and increased support needs to be provided for greater equity in all aspects of decision-making and in society.

Efforts to promote the status of Somali women need to begin not simply within women's organizations, but become part of larger societal efforts to address the inherent causes of gender inequalities.⁸² One step would be to encourage Somalia to become a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). While both Somaliland and Puntland have developed gender policy papers⁸³ recognizing

Box 2.6: Somali Women Create the Sixth Clan

In the Arta conference of July 2000, 100 women from the five main clans were nominated by the clan elders to serve as their representatives in the conference. These women realized that peace based strictly on the traditional clan structure would exclude women's voices from decision-making.

A group of 92 women delegates gathered outside a large military tent in Arta and agreed to break out of their clan-based allegiances to vote as a single bloc. When the conference opened, in an effort to gain formal admittance to the talks, they formed their own clan and lobbied successfully to be recognized as the so-called Sixth Clan.

Delegates from every clan at Arta, including the newly formed Sixth Clan coalition, came to an agreement to secure 25 assembly seats for women, or 10 percent of the total, with each of the five main clans allotted five seats.

Thirty-four Somali women were active in the 2004 Intergovernmental Authority on Development-led Mbagathi Peace and Reconciliation Negotiations as delegates for Somalia, and as observers and activists. Their involvement secured commitments to some women's rights, gender and family issues, and an affirmative action clause, as well as gender related institutional mechanisms provided in the Somalia Transitional Charter.

Political leaders have reneged on the allocated number of seats, however; when a woman vacates her seat, her clan fills it with a male candidate. Consequently, the number of women members of the current assembly has declined—women today make up only three percent of parliamentarians.

Source: Timmons 2004 and Jama 2010.

the need for women's empowerment at all levels of clans, communities and society, it is not yet clear how these policies will look in terms of actual implementation.

A Weak and Distorted Economy

Somalia has long been one of the world's poorest and least developed countries, bearing relatively few natural resources. Somalia's GDP per capita of US \$284 is the fourth worst in the world.⁸⁴ Using a poverty line of US \$2 per day (purchasing power parity (PPP)), the incidence of poverty is 61 percent in urban areas, 80 percent for rural people and 73 percent overall.⁸⁵ The economy has been in recession since the outbreak of the civil war.

Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock accounting for about 40 percent of gross domestic product and more than 50 percent of export earnings.⁸⁶ Despite livestock exports having grown by 56 percent since 2008, remittances and aid fund Somalia's growing negative trade balance.⁸⁷ Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, *khat*,⁸⁸ petroleum products, and manufactured goods are the principal imports. The scale of livestock exports and the trade economy is critical in terms of the food security of the Somali people.

Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy, largely based on remittances. Conflict-driven mass migration started some 20 years ago, and at least one million Somalis, 14 percent of the population, now live outside the country, creating one of the world's largest diaspora groups.⁸⁹ On per capita basis, Somalia is also one of the world's largest recipients of remittances. Estimates indicate that remittance accounts for 35% of GDP and is amongst the highest in the world.⁹⁰ Flows have been estimated at up to US \$1 billion in 2004, but could be as high as US \$2.3 billion, representing some 23 percent of household income and 80 percent of the start-up capital for small and medium enterprises.⁹¹ Without this external support network, the economy would have imploded long ago.

Government revenue, currently estimated at 3 percent of GDP, is one of the lowest in the world, which is insufficient to deliver basic services. Even this meagre revenue base is poorly managed and there are allegations of corruption and a lack of financial transparency.⁹²

The protracted collapse of the central Government in south central Somalia and comparatively low levels of international rehabilitation and development assistance mean that Somali households must procure social welfare services from the private sector. However, with Al Shabaab's departure from Mogadishu and AMISOM's success in driving them from some of the major cities, there has been greater engagement between the government and the people in these areas. The Mogadishu Stabilization Plan is a good example of partnership between the Government and the international community to provide development and humanitarian assistance to the people. During the 2011 famine, the government engaged more closely with the people affected by it in Mogadishu.

The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Telecommunication firms provide wireless access in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the African continent. The main growth in commercial activity has been in transit trade, with Somalia acting as a transfer point for goods travelling to markets in the Horn and East Africa.

The main natural resources in the country are livestock, cash crops, charcoal, marine resources, frankincense, and potential oil and mineral reserves. Minerals, including uranium and likely deposits of petroleum and natural gas, are found throughout Somalia, but have not been exploited commercially. Although arid lands have demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to regenerate, climate change and population pressure on natural resources are accelerating the destruction of environmental resources. The main environmental challenges in Somalia are the degradation of the rangelands, over-exploitation of forests for charcoal production,

On per capita basis, Somalia is also one of the world's largest recipients of remittances.

Since education, health and a decent standard of living are major determinants of human development, improving people's access to these fundamental needs is important to promote human development.

depletion of wildlife resources, desertification, marine pollution, and damage to the marine ecosystems through overfishing, illicit fishing and the unrestricted dumping of waste.

Human Development in Reverse

Civil wars have been called 'development in reverse'. They divert resources from productive economic activities and social goods that advance development. They incur direct human and longer-term developmental costs through the loss of household assets, destruction of infrastructure essential for human well-being, and reduced confidence in institutions that leads to lawlessness and capital flight.⁹³ Since education, health and a decent standard of living are major determinants of human development, improving people's access to these fundamental needs is important to promote human development. When youth have limited access, there can be far-reaching intergenerational consequences. The youth challenge is therefore the ultimate human development challenge. A failure to respond to it will stall and reverse efforts to advance human development. From this perspective, a proper understanding of Somalia's human development situation is critical before devising successful youth development strategies.

Somalia has suffered many consequences from conflict. Between 450,000 and 1.5 million people have died in Somalia's conflict or directly due to hunger since 1991.⁹⁴ Millions have been affected by disability, rape and sexual violence, and the spread of disease and famine. Conflict has disrupted and destroyed family structures and the social fabric of societies through human rights abuses, forced recruitment of children and youth into rebel groups, massive displacements, and losses of life and property.

The psychological and social tolls are high. Many war-affected persons have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which contributes to poor mental and physical health, reduced quality of life, and, in some cases, increased violent behaviour. Women who have endured sexual violence experience the agony of rejection in their own families and

communities. Many youth and children who are victims of violence at an early age are prone to becoming perpetrators later on.

The 2010 global *Human Development Report* introduced updated versions of its human development indices. The following section examines human development in Somalia by using the updated Human Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the newly introduced Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The detailed methodology for computing the human development indices is provided in Annex 3. Also included is a Community Well-being Index that uses nine indicators to measure local level infrastructure and resilience.

Human Development Index

The HDI combines indicators of health, education and income. Somalia's decline in all of these areas is reflected in its low HDI ranks. In 1990, the value of the index was 0.200, with Somalia ranking 123 out of 130 countries.⁹⁵ The 1998 *Somalia Human Development Report* calculated the HDI for 1995-1997 as between 0.159 and 0.184. The observed worsening human development situation over this period should, however, be treated with caution as they are not directly comparable due to methodological differences.⁹⁶ The 2001 *Somalia Human Development Report* gave an HDI value of 0.284, and placed Somalia at 161 out of 163 countries.⁹⁷ Although Somalia has prepared two human development reports since 1998, there has been no systematic approach to generating HDR specific data, which has resulted in Somalia's omission from the global Human Development Index. It is worth-emphasizing here that the 2010 global *Human Development Report* does not present an updated version of human development index for Somalia in the absence of some of the indicators especially Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP US\$) and mean years of schooling. Since these two indicators for Somalia have been estimated using the information obtained from the 2010 household survey conducted for this report, the calculated HDI and other indices such as IHDI and GII

for Somalia in this report pertains to the same reference year (2010) as those for countries in the 2010 global HDR. Hence, Somalia's position in relation to other countries being compared below should be treated accordingly to understand how Somalia would rank globally if internationally comparable data were available in the 2010 global HDR.

Using the new method and data for calculating the HDI (Annex 3), Somalia has a value of 0.285. If internationally comparable data were available, Somalia would probably rank at 165 out of the 170 countries in the 2010 global *Human Development Report*, just above Mozambique⁹⁸ (Figure 2.1). This is a clear manifestation of continued extremely low levels of human development.


While the concept of human development is much beyond what the HDI captures, especially in conflict-affected countries like Somalia, the index does provide an indication of the depth of Somalia's human development crisis. Among the three dimensions of the HDI, the education

index is the lowest at 0.118, followed by the income index at 0.253 and the health index at 0.486. The education index draws on both mean years of adult education (aged 25 and older) and expected years of schooling for children. While these education indicators encapsulate the concept of education better than the previous indicators, they do not assess the quality of education, a critical factor.

Lack of data limits the estimation of regionally and socioeconomically disaggregated HDI values. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which human development progress in the relatively peaceful and stable northern regions is offset by the worsening situation in south central Somalia. While the security environment is relatively more conducive to human development in Somaliland and Puntland, rural-urban inequalities are corroborated by the IHDI discussed below.

Poor health and education standards have continued. Low life expectancy in Somalia is linked to high rates of infant mortality, one of the

Figure 2.1: Human Development Index



Source: UNDP Global Human Development Report 2010; Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

highest rates of maternal mortality in the world,⁹⁹ which is exacerbated by the widespread practice of FGM, and the spread of preventable diseases such as tuberculosis (TB), malaria and measles. High levels of mortality and low life expectancy stem from inadequate curative and preventative health services, the collapse of sanitation and water systems, erratic food security and pockets of chronic malnutrition, all of which increase susceptibility to fatal diseases. In the early to mid-1990s, plummeting life expectancy was attributed to high levels of mortality due to war, starvation, and disease. Since then, life expectancy has slightly increased from 47 in 2001 to 50 in 2010.¹⁰⁰ There is a possibility of this trend being reversed due to the recent famine. Other human development indicators are equally sobering.

While the protracted conflict and political crisis are the most significant factors explaining the blockages to human development in Somalia, in the mid- to late-1980s, when Somalia was a recipient of high levels of foreign aid, its development indicators were still among the worst in the world. This suggests that explanations for Somalia's current human


development crisis must look not only at the turmoil of the past two decades.

Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index

The IHDI adjusts the HDI for inequality in health, education and income. It is equal to the HDI if there is no inequality among people, but is less than the HDI as inequality increases. The difference between HDI and IHDI measures the loss in potential human development due to inequality. In this sense, the IHDI is the actual level of human development, while the HDI can be viewed as potential human development, or the maximum level that could be achieved if there was no inequality.¹⁰¹ The IHDI for Somalia has been calculated at 0.166, which is 41.8 percent lower than the HDI value of 0.285. Ranked globally, this would place Somalia just above Mozambique, Congo and Zimbabwe (Figure 2.2).


Somalia ranks as the third worst country, just above Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, in terms of human development lost due to inequality across all three dimensions of the index (Figure 2.3). The highest loss is in education (46 percent)

Figure 2.2: Inequality-adjusted HDI



Source: UNDP Global Human Development Report 2010; Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 2.3: HDI Losses Due to Inequality (%)



Source: UNDP Global Human Development Report 2010; Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

followed by health (43 percent) and income (36 percent), indicating that non-income inequality is higher than income inequality. Any overall gains in human development are largely offset by these wide gaps. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has increased from 0.39 in 2001 to 0.48 in 2010.¹⁰²

According to the 2010 global *Human Development Report*, countries with low HDI experience greater losses in human development due to higher multidimensional inequality. Globally, the average loss in HDI was 22 percent, ranging from 6 percent (Czechoslovakia) to 45 percent (Mozambique). Reducing these losses means correcting multidimensional inequalities by creating equality of opportunities in the three critical dimensions of human development—education, health and standard of living.

Gender Inequality Index

The GII reflects women's disadvantages in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates;


empowerment by the share of parliamentary seats and attainment of secondary and higher education; and economic activity by the labour market participation rate.

The GII shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It ranges from zero (complete gender equality), to one (extreme gender inequality).¹⁰³ Using the data reported in Annex 2, the GII value for Somalia is 0.773, indicating a very high level of inequality. Ranked globally, this places Somalia at the fourth lowest position, just above Yemen, Mali, Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea (Figure 2.4). Women suffer more exclusion and inequality than men in the health dimension, followed by empowerment and labour market participation. The loss in human development due to gender inequality is alarming and calls for concerted attention.

Multidimensional Poverty Index

Knowing not just who is poor, but how and why they are poor is essential for effective human development programmes and policies. In

Figure 2.4: Gender Inequality Index



Source: UNDP Global Human Development Report 2010; Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.


contrast to the traditional headcount measure of poverty, the MPI captures both the incidence of poverty and the average intensity of deprivation. It identifies those with multiple deprivations as the poorest of the poor—a person who is deprived in 100 percent of the indicators has a greater intensity of poverty than someone deprived in 40 percent. Using the data from the 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by UNICEF for Somalia, the report calculated a disaggregated MPI for the three regions, and rural and urban areas.

The MPI for Somalia is 0.47,¹⁰⁴ ranking it 94 out of 104 countries considered in the 2010 global *Human Development Report*.¹⁰⁵ Among Arab states, Somalia has the highest MPI value. The value is strikingly high in nomadic areas (0.62) followed by rural areas (0.52). It is lowest in urban areas (0.30), indicating a rural concentration of poverty (Figure 2.5). Likewise, it is consistently worse in south central Somalia (0.54) compared to Puntland (0.41) and Somaliland (0.38). This reflects the impact of conflict on poverty and under-development.

Figure 2.6 shows the regional variations in both the proportion of people who are multidimensionally poor and the intensity of poverty. The multidimensional head count poverty for Somalia is estimated at 81.8 percent. While poverty is widespread and persistent across all zones, 99 percent of people in nomadic areas and 94 percent in rural areas are multidimensionally poor. The average intensity of deprivation in nomadic areas is 63 percent and 60 percent in rural areas. Even in urban areas, three out of five people live in poor households, with an average intensity of deprivation of 50 percent. The proportion of people suffering multidimensional poverty is highest in south central Somalia at 89 percent, followed by Puntland at 75 percent and Somaliland at 72 percent. Regions with higher multidimensional headcount poverty also have consistently more deprivation; the average intensity of deprivation among the poor is higher in south central Somalia than in other areas.


At 58 percent, the intensity of deprivation in Somalia is higher than the world average of

Figure 2.5: Multidimensional Poverty Index by Areas



Source: UNICEF 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data for Somalia.

Figure 2.6: Incidence of Poverty & Average Intensity of Deprivation by Region



Source: UNICEF 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data for Somalia.

53.2 percent and similar to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the three dimensions, standard of living accounts for the highest deprivation at 86.7 percent, followed by education at 74.5 percent and health at 47.6 percent.


The contribution of standard of living to the overall MPI in Somalia is the highest at 50 percent, followed by education at 32 percent and health at 19 percent. A similar pattern is visible in all regions, except that the relative

contribution of health is much stronger in south central (Figure 2.7). This provides useful information for policy makers to devise targeted poverty reduction programmes.

Community Well-being Index

UNDP conducted a participatory community survey from 2005 to 2007 that covered 5,800 out of 7,400 settlements covering the three administrative zones of Somalia– Somaliland,

Figure 2.7: Contribution of Different Dimensions to the MPI



Source: UNICEF 2006 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data for Somalia.

Puntland and south central Somalia. It was designed to capture information on the overall characteristics of settlements, and the spatial distribution of livelihood systems, infrastructure, administrative structures, governance and vulnerability.

Using this information, a composite community well-being index has been computed to assess the relative position of the three zones of Somalia. The index captures 36 indicators organized into nine dimensions of community well-being, of which five dimensions are related to infrastructure (education, health, transport and communication, electricity and water) and four relate to resilience (social capital, personal security, economic security and environment security). The detailed conceptual underpinnings, including indicators and underlying methodology for calculating the index, are presented in Annex 2.

The value of the index for Somalia is 0.29 out of a maximum score of 1, indicating a dismally low level of infrastructure and livelihood security at the community level (Figure 2.8). South central Somalia is ranked lowest, but the results were similar for Somaliland and Puntland. The detailed results are presented in Annex 3.

Insecurity and Vulnerability

High levels of food insecurity, famine and increasing population displacements have all blocked progress in human development in


Somalia. About 27 percent of the total population or an estimated 2 million people faced acute food and livelihood crises in 2010,¹⁰⁶ a trend that has risen since 2007 (Figure 2.9). If refugees outside Somalia are added to this number, the situation becomes even worse.

Fleeing From Home

About 1.5 million people are internally displaced, over 570,000 are refugees dispersed in the surrounding region, and nearly 3 million people are dependent on humanitarian aid. As of July 2010, Mogadishu alone had an estimated population of over 372,000 IDPs.¹⁰⁷ Among IDPs, the most vulnerable groups are women and children.¹⁰⁸


Somaliland and Puntland host tens of thousands of people from south central Somalia, which has put a strain on their resources. IDPs in Somaliland and Puntland have limited access to health services and education, and are threatened by evictions; women are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse and minority groups to discrimination. In the absence of a formal national asylum framework, the prospects for overall protection remain weak. This is highlighted by the arbitrary detention of IDPs, as well as hostility and discrimination towards ‘foreigners’ that impede access to already limited socioeconomic opportunities. Refugees do not have legal rights to work, and access to protection through law enforcement and justice mechanisms is limited.

Figure 2.8: Composite Community Well-Being Index



Source: UNDP Somalia 2006. Participatory community survey in Somalia, 2005/6.

Figure 2.9: Estimated Population in Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis



Source: FSNAU, FEWSNET and partners, post-GU 2010 seasonal data.

Somalia is the largest source of refugees in the world today after Afghanistan and Iraq.

Insecurity is the major cause of population displacement at 86.2 percent, followed by drought at 7.8 percent and lack of livelihood opportunities at 4.7 percent.¹⁰⁹ The majority of IDPs are from minority clans often displaced because of persecution by dominant clans. Minority groups are outside the Somali social lineage divisions; therefore, they have no clan protection, rendering them vulnerable to attacks from clan militias.

Somalia is the largest source of refugees in the world today after Afghanistan and Iraq. As of the end of 2010, there were over 600,000 Somali refugees, mainly spread over Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. Every year, tens of thousands of refugees make the hazardous journey from their places of origin in south central Somalia and Ethiopia through Puntland, and onwards across the Gulf of Aden.

Per capita humanitarian assistance for Somalia was four times the per capita aid for development ...

In 2010, over 53,000 people tried to cross the gulf. Many die during the journey, while others are subjected to abuse and injury at the hands of unscrupulous smugglers.

Food Security

During the second half of 2011, the United Nations has described the situation in Somalia as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.¹¹⁰ Drought and conflict left 4 million people at risk of starvation in Somalia, 2.34 million of whom are still facing food insecurity, with the majority suffering in the south. In the course of the year, the number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance doubled to 4 million, and at the peak of the crisis, 750,000 people were facing famine. A combination of the massive scale-up in humanitarian assistance and a good harvest towards the end of the year, helped to improve the humanitarian situation in Somalia and half a million people were lifted out of famine by November. Despite the famine in the south being declared over in December 2011, inhabitants of the affected areas are still grappling with its effects, with nearly a third of the population remaining in crisis, unable to meet essential food and non-food needs. A continued, large-scale and multi-sectoral response is critical to prevent further deterioration of the situation and a reversal of recent gains.¹¹¹ Food insecurity relates to the decreasing productivity of agriculture in Somalia over the last 20 years. In the early 1980s, an International Monetary Fund-World Bank structural adjustment programme helped set this trend in motion,¹¹² including by reinforcing Somalia's dependency on imported grain. Large-scale farms were wiped out during the civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, and only small-scale farming is currently practised. Farmers lack knowledge of modern agricultural techniques, and the small size of their businesses hinders efficient economies of scale. The ability of communities in arid lands to adapt to drought has collapsed, while deforestation has devastated traditional ecosystems, eliminating trees, grazing land and water.

The international community has pursued some long-term development and resilience-building efforts to correct these problems, such as through

investments in agriculture and environmental conservation. However, there has been a strong focus on short-term emergency relief and humanitarian measures. Somalia has had many severe droughts in the past, but why this recent drought turned into a famine and how long the crisis will be managed through emergency aid should receive urgent attention.

International Aid

Almost all expenditures for peace and development in Somalia have come from foreign aid, and the country faces a serious deficit in financing. There is a huge gap between planned investment, commitment and disbursement.¹¹³ Overall per capita humanitarian and development aid for Somalia was US \$100.60 in 2008.¹¹⁴ Aid totals were 3.35 times higher in Iraq and 1.83 times higher in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵

Per capita development aid in Somaliland stands at US \$32.20; Puntland is close behind at US \$31.30. In south central Somalia, where the majority of the population is concentrated, development aid per capita is a mere US \$13.80. Per capita humanitarian assistance for Somalia was US \$80.10 in 2008, four times the per capita aid for development of US \$20.60.¹¹⁶ Development has not received adequate attention and resources. Evidence from past crises suggests that the longer the crisis lasts, the more significant the negative implications for development assistance. This creates new risks of vulnerability and instability.

Aid delivery in large parts of Somalia has been shut down in territory controlled by Al-Shabaab, and hindered by restrictive US counter-terror laws that seek to prevent aid from falling into Al-Shabaab's hands.

The Financial Cost of State Failure

According to a study in 2011, the international community, including the Somali diaspora, has collectively spent just over \$55 billion in responding to Somalia's conflict since 1991.¹¹⁷ Piracy (ransom, rescue) accounts for the largest chunk of this cost, followed by humanitarian and development aid; remittances; peacekeeping and military responses, counter-terror initiatives

and diplomacy; and costs associated with international crime and illicit financial flows (Figure 2.10). While these estimates are conservative, they are assuredly on the low side. The price of lost opportunity and growth would likely dwarf all others. A surprisingly large number of actors bear these costs, while arms traders, smugglers, local warlords and others benefit from Somalia's continuing misery and statelessness.

Despite shortcomings in available data, it is clear that vast sums are being spent on some areas, such as dealing with piracy, while less goes towards addressing root development problems. Often, the international response to the situation on the ground has been to address the more urgent needs rather than addressing these root problems.

Fragile states are the countries furthest away from meeting the internationally agreed MDGs by 2015, representing 75 percent of the MDG deficit. Among those, Somalia is one of the most off-track (Annex 4). Major new investments need to be made, especially in youth-focussed

poverty reduction and human development, for Somalia to come out of conflict and civil war in the foreseeable future.


Conflict has many Drivers

Identifying and understanding the causes, dimensions and dynamics of conflict is essential in determining appropriate methods for conflict prevention, resolution and transformation. Causes can be broadly grouped into systemic, proximate or immediate, and can be internal or external. All of these types overlap and interrelate; they are not mutually exclusive.

As stated in Chapter 1, the Somali conflict is a result of the interplay of multiple historical, socioeconomic and political processes that have shaped the political and socio-economic structure of society. Research has identified 'clannism', poor governance, resource competition, militarization, regional disputes and international involvement as key drivers.¹¹⁸ As a measurement tool, the Failed State Index, on which Somalia consistently ranks first, uses a composite of 12 sub-indicators (Figure 2.11).¹¹⁹


According to a study in 2011, the international community, including the Somali diaspora, has collectively spent just over \$55 billion in responding to Somalia's conflict since 1991.

Figure 2.10: Breaking Down the Costs of State Failure in Somalia Since 1991



Source: Norris and Bruton 2011.

Figure 2.11: The Failed State Index for Somalia



Source: *The Fund for Peace*. 2010.

Vast sums are being spent on some areas, such as dealing with piracy, while less goes towards addressing root development problems ...

The following section examines only the major systemic and proximate factors in Somalia, with an emphasis on the former as the root of all other sources. Systemic drivers relate to governance, economic factors, a demographic youth bulge and environmental pressure. Proximate causes include militarization, external influences and piracy.

Uneven Power, Weak Institutions

Somalia's colonial experience led to the emergence of a nationalist Government with a centralized state system to control political power and economic resources. This produced an uneven distribution of political and economic power across the various clans, and fuelled the inter-clan hostility that has fed the Somali crisis (Box 2.7). State failure has since destroyed any guarantees of group protection through political participation, and has resulted in the exclusion of youth, women and minority clans.

Somalia's legacy of corrupt and abusive political leadership has prevented agreement on an inclusive government. Past experiences with the misuse of government and public resources, the political manipulation of clan identity, and the dependence of most Somali political and faction leaders on external support have upheld the belief that the Government only serves

the interest of a select few, while remaining indifferent to the welfare of the majority of the people. The inability to provide basic services, including justice and security, to all its citizens further reduces state legitimacy and trust in state institutions, weakening or breaking the social contract. Violence is seen in part as a means to correct these grievances.

Under-development and Poverty

Under-development and chronic poverty are major structural risk conditions for conflict, especially when linked to oppression. Somalia's economy collapsed even before the civil war; it became one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world during the Barre regime. Further devastation came from the reduction of international aid during the 1980s,¹²⁰ followed by the collapse of the state in 1991. The famine that gripped Somalia in 2011 has the potential for driving the country further into conflict if structural weaknesses are not addressed through long-term investments in food security and human development at large. Youth should be an urgent priority, because when their successful transition to adulthood is blocked by the lack of human development, one result is the intergenerational transmission of poverty and risky behaviours as potential drivers of conflict.

Box 2.7: Military Excesses

“The military regime, led by the armed forces of Somalia, has experienced a devastating fall from grace; they took over a country with all institutions in place and left 22 years later with no institutions and the country in shambles. Personalities took the place of institutions and when the time came for the personalities to leave the scene, everything crumbled. During the reign of the armed forces, the meagre resources of the country were diverted to them. Cronyism, nepotism and chronic corruption were the order of the day. Certain clans were made dear and near whereas others were perceived to be hostile to the regime and ostracized. The officer corps were divided into those who were to be trusted and those who were not. Those who were not considered to be loyal to the regime were harassed, transferred, sent abroad or dismissed without a shred of evidence to support the perception - no matter how competent or professional they were. By the time the implosion occurred, the armed forces existed in name only, due to mismanagement, abuse of power and lack of accountability. Instead of being of a nation governed by laws and institutions we became a nation of men on ‘I say so basis’. The situation in the country was tailor made for disaster.”

Source: Interview with former member of the Somali National Police Force, south central Somalia

Grievances Between Groups

Inequalities between groups spur grievances that mobilize people to act, including through violence (Box 2.8).¹²¹ In Somalia, this kind of inequality is widespread, with historical roots in both colonial and military regimes that patronized some clans over others. This is clearly manifested by the Failed State Index discussed above, on which Somalia scores very high on horizontal inequality as measured by uneven economic development along group lines, the level of political mobilization based on group disparities, a legacy of vengeance-seeking based on group grievances and the rise of factionalized elites. Addressing inter-group inequality is vital to both development goals and conflict transformation.

Competition for Resources

Inter-group inequalities provoke competition over natural resources, including land, forests, water, energy and marine resources. Evidence from semi-arid countries in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that resource poor countries are more conflict prone.¹²² Even once they end, conflicts that have been associated with resource and environmental scarcities are twice as likely to relapse into violence.¹²³ Climate change threatens to further compound these issues.¹²⁴

In Somalia, competition for natural resources has been a persistent factor in igniting and sustaining clashes among clans and militia groups, including

in the face of rapid environmental degradation¹²⁵ (Box 2.9). Other resources that have provoked conflict comprise key cities (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa), ports and airstrips, important checkpoints and foreign aid.¹²⁶ In the face of rising environmental scarcity and weakened social institutions, warlords are able to seize control of key resources by mobilizing alienated, unemployed youth.

Historically, traditional leaders settled conflicts over resources using the widely accepted Somali traditional legal system. These settlement mechanisms have weakened, however, as political leaders realized that whoever controlled the state would control the nation's resources. Lawlessness and the unregulated war economy have created new economic incentives to profit from resources.

Much of the conflict in contemporary Somalia is centred on the issue of landownership and land disputes. Various clans were marginalized first by an inappropriate land registration law, and later by a dictatorial regime that used their land to buy political loyalty (Box 2.10). The civil war and state collapse accelerated this trend of appropriating land from weaker groups. Unravelling the thousands of land and property disputes emanating from the collapse of the state is a major challenge in reconciliation efforts and has been at the centre of nearly every peace process since 1991.¹²⁷

Unravelling the thousands of land and property disputes emanating from the collapse of the state is a major challenge in reconciliation efforts and has been at the centre of nearly every peace process since 1991.

Box 2.8: Horizontal Inequality Provides Powerful Incentives—in the Wrong Directions

Horizontal inequalities are multidimensional—with political, economic and social elements. Economic inequalities provide fertile ground for conflict, socio-cultural inequalities bind groups together, and political inequalities provide incentives for leaders to mobilize people for rebellion (Stewart et al. 2008).

Horizontal inequalities are more likely to be a source of conflict when: they are consistent and increasing over time; they are consistent across different dimensions; group boundaries are relatively impermeable; there are fairly large numbers of people in the different groups; there is little or no improvement in the absolute economic and social position of the deprived; groups are sufficiently cohesive, enabling collective action to emerge; leaders emerge and are not incorporated into the ruling system (or through the political exclusion of some groups); and government is irresponsible or, worse, proactively and violently repressive, and consequently there is no redress for problems through peaceful means (Fukuda-Par et al. 2008).

A study on the causes of wars in 32 countries identified horizontal inequality or group exclusion as a driver of conflict (ibid.). Another study classified 233 politicized communal groups in 93 countries according to political, economic and ecological differences, and found that most groups suffering horizontal inequalities had taken some action to assert group interests, ranging from non-violent protest to rebellion (Gurr 1993). Nepal is a case where multiple exclusions, disempowerment and mismatches between social and economic empowerment among groups in backward regions became the trigger for violent conflict (UNDP Nepal 2004).

Source: Stewart et al 2008; Fukuda-Par et al. 2008; UNDP 2004; Gurr 1993; McCoy 2008.

Box 2.9: The End of Environmental Regulation

The collapse of the central government authority meant the end of all environmental regulations in Somalia. This has led to the degradation of physical infrastructure as well as wanton destruction and overexploitation of natural resources. Almost all the water wells in pastoral areas ceased operating after the collapse of the Government, for example, as water pumps were either looted or broke down after years of neglect. Access to water has, therefore, become a source of conflict in these regions.

Pastoralists are also fighting over grazing land, due to environmental degradation from over-grazing and development of new village settlements. Similar conflicts flare over access to irrigation canals.

The unregulated exploitation and destruction of the environment is likely to add to rural impoverishment and future conflicts as resources continue to dwindle.

Source: Focus group discussions for the “Somalia Human Development Report” 2012 south central Somalia

A looming energy crisis in large parts of Somalia is emerging as another driver of resource conflict. In the absence of alternatives, the vast majority of Somalis continue to rely heavily on traditional solid fuels, particularly charcoal and fuel wood. But supplies are shrinking rapidly due to overexploitation for both domestic consumption and export. High demand for charcoal in the Gulf States, due to strict laws preventing local deforestation, has created opportunities for traders to accumulate large profits. Excessive harvesting of acacia trees for charcoal production is rapidly leading to reduced

biodiversity, deforestation and desertification.

Large Numbers of Youth—Without Jobs

Somalia’s demographic profile shows a pronounced ‘youth bulge’ (Chapter 3). This portion is unlikely to decline in the near future due to a high fertility rate. It has been and probably will continue to be a major source of conflict in Somalia, where two-thirds of youth are unemployed—one of the highest rates of joblessness in the world. This is among the factors fuelling Al-Shabaab’s appeal.

Box 2.10: Land as a Source of Conflict

Traditionally, pastoral land has been communal property under the control of clans and sub-clans, and not individuals, while agricultural land was allocated to households by village elders without clearly defined property rights. The clans and sub-clans have often fought over the use of these resources; traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were used to settle disputes.

But this traditional system of conflict resolution came under stress during Siad Barre's regime, after he introduced a new land registration law in 1975. Instead of legalizing the claims of local clans and peasants, all unregistered land became state property. Most local farmers did not have the financial means to register their claims with the authorities.

After its defeat in the Ogaden War, the regime used land resources to win political loyalty. This policy led to the economic marginalization of clans residing in the fertile riverine areas of the Lower Shabelle and Juba valleys.

Source: Adapted from Dehèrez 2009.

A disproportionately large youth cohort can be a potent driver of conflict.¹²⁸ The top 10 countries on the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index all have proportions of young people higher than the 47 percent average for developing countries. Countries in which young adults comprise more than 40 percent of the adult population are more than twice as likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict as countries with lower proportions. In Somalia, young adults make up 57 percent of the adult population.

While the presence of a demographic bulge is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for violence, youth bulges have been statistically linked to conflict when they are reinforced by factors such as poor governance, economic stagnation, poverty, unemployment and inequality. When a large pool of young people are uprooted, intolerant, jobless, and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for ethnic, religious, and political extremists seeking to mobilize violence. While both greed and grievance are voluntary reasons for joining violent groups, there are also involuntary reasons, including forced recruitment through physical abduction and indoctrination. A further discussion about the motivations for youth to engage in violence appears in Chapter 5.

The major structural drivers underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of

livelihood opportunities; insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills; poor governance and weak political participation; and a legacy of past violence. Other factors comprise forcing youth to join violent groups, often due to a lack of alternatives for survival. Immediate triggers include political events, abuses by security forces, sudden economic crisis, and personal loss and trauma.¹²⁹

Militarization

Somalia is believed to be one of the most heavily armed countries in the world. Weapons proliferated during the Cold War, and supplies continued to grow after 1991, with Somalia situated at the heart of the regional arms trafficking networks of East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. This market relies on traditional trade routes, military supply lines and corrupt government actors to provide support to clansmen, warlords and militants who purchase or barter for small arms.¹³⁰ Trans-shipment points from Somaliland to Kismayo are believed to be popular destinations for arms entering from the peninsula.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have provided additional arms through their proxies on either side of the Somali conflict.¹³¹ The weaponry provides opportunities for spoilers seeking to undermine peace and state-building, including through the militarization of unemployed youth and children, who use guns to loot, murder, and

... two-thirds
of youth are
unemployed—
one of the
highest rates of
joblessness in the
world.

inflict horrific crimes. Arms are associated not only with the pursuit of political power, but also with international terrorism, protection and the furtherance of economic objectives.

In 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 733, calling for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being sent to Somalia. Since its adoption, it has become one of the most violated UN resolutions. Given the lack of regional policing capacity, and the arms market's maturity and continued strong demand, the prospect for containment or elimination is unlikely without addressing the root causes of conflict.

Piracy

Piracy¹³² is a consequence of the civil war that has contributed to overall insecurity in Somalia as well as to international terrorism and environmental degradation. State collapse, domestic insecurity, extreme poverty and unemployment, and easy access to weapons provide the perfect environment for piracy to thrive and increase. Since the beginning of 2008, Puntland has been the epicentre of the problem.

Illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Somali territorial waters contributed to a rise in piracy.¹³³ Somalia's fishing industry has collapsed in the last 15 years, and its waters are being heavily exploited by African, Asian and European ships.¹³⁴ This has led to armed resistance by Somali fishermen, and the escalation of pirate attacks against commercial vessels and innocent seafarers. Pirates are mostly young unemployed men (Box 2.11) and those who aspire to make quick profits; creating

employment opportunities could be an incentive for them to move out of piracy (Box 2.12).

Estimates indicate that incidents off the coast of Somalia account for more than half of reported piracy cases worldwide.¹³⁵ A total of 217 attacks were attributed to Somali pirates in 2009, compared to 111 attacks in 2008 and 44 in 2007.¹³⁶ In 2010, 4,185 seafarers were attacked with firearms and rocket propelled grenades, 1,090 were taken hostage, and 516 were used as human shields. In spite of the violent nature of these crimes, the human cost of piracy is still underreported.¹³⁷

Most companies pay ransom for the safe return of their ships and crews, making this type of crime very profitable. The most recent estimate is that pirates took in US \$60 million in ransom payments in 2009. Since the rise of piracy results from a failure to resolve one of the world's most protracted conflicts, the solution lies inside Somalia and not just in increasing maritime patrols off the coast, as has been mainly done to date.

External Involvement

External actors and states have played important roles in Somalia's ongoing conflict by allying with clans sympathetic to their aspirations and strategic interests. Incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying national reconciliation and a political resolution. Involvement by external states is further complicated by cross-boundary clan relations.¹³⁸

Three major reasons for the involvement of external actors in Somalia's conflict are security

Box 2.11: No One Dares Speak

Huge amounts of money generated by the Somali militia from piracy have prevented communities in the central regions from establishing local administrations. Mohamed, a long-term resident of Haradhere district, which is a pirate town, indicated that "no one dares to speak about the formation of local administration. Piracy groups do not want to see any authorities in the areas they operate. We live in a state of fear and violence. The presence of pirates seems to prolong the Somali conflict." Since the organizers of piracy are now among the wealthiest and most powerful people in the central regions, attempts by local communities to arrest and imprison the leaders are likely to be very difficult.

Source: Focus group discussions for the Somalia HDR 2012, south central Somalia.

Box 2.12: Job Creation is the Answer for a Former Pirate

“After completing secondary education, I was unable to continue due to poverty. I had to look for a job, but could not find one. Because of this frustration, I was lured into piracy in August 2009. I saw some of my friends leading luxurious lives with money from piracy and that was another attraction. They initially refused to accept me in their team, but later I was able to join the pirates at the age of 20. There were 10 in my group. When I joined the pirates, I did not have any money and had to rent weapons—seven Bazookas (US \$6,000), BKM (US \$4,000) and AK-47 (US \$400)—from a money lender who normally charged very high rates because of the high risk involved. Once we were successful in holding a ship to ransom and collecting the ransom money, the first thing we did was to pay the money lender double the money we borrowed. These money lenders were all in their early thirties.

“Although we made many attempts to hold a ship to ransom, we were successful only once. Avoiding the maritime patrols in the seas is very difficult and fraught with danger. But once we were able to overcome this hurdle, there were many ships we could target. When we captured the ship far from the Somali waters in the Indian Ocean, we had to take care of the food and health of the crew for about four months until the ransom was paid by the owner. We received total ransom money of US \$4 million, from which I received US \$70,000.

“I squandered the money on alcohol, *khat*, commercial sex workers and a new car. I also tried to migrate to Sweden by paying the cost for a Swedish Somali woman to come to Garowe and offering her US \$20,000. But I was not successful. When I had spent all the money, I went again to capture another ship, but was caught by the international coastal guards who confiscated all my weapons.

“I left piracy in July 2010 to join a vocational school. Thereafter, I was employed by the Government of Puntland. I then gave up my bad habits, married and am now leading a respectable life. Now I am happy and believe that job creation for the youth is the answer to stopping young people from joining piracy.”

Source: Interview with an ex-pirate for the Somalia HDR 2012, Puntland.

concerns among some of Somalia’s neighbours, particularly Ethiopia; the power struggle among various countries for dominance in the Horn of Africa; and the war against terrorism.¹³⁹

Ethiopia and Somalia have a longstanding history of conflict over the Ogaden territory.¹⁴⁰ Since the 1977 war over it, the relationship between the two countries has been very sensitive. Another danger stems from the longstanding border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.¹⁴¹ Until this is resolved, efforts to disrupt the flow of arms to radical groups in Somalia will be stalemated.

Somalia is a member of the African Union and the League of Arab States, which have their own interests in the political arrangement in Somalia. Arab states have remained largely outside the discussion and efforts to coordinate policy in Nairobi, and yet remain active in Somali politics.¹⁴² They have consistently supported a more central state vision for Somalia and may be resistant to expanded support for sub-national regional administrations.

In conflict and peacebuilding, the Somali diaspora is a double-edged sword, contributing significantly to both. Financial obligations to assist the clan in times of conflict have endured. Yet diaspora support for local reconciliation and state-building has also been a key ingredient for success, notably in Somaliland and Puntland. Since 2000, the diaspora has been highly visible in the state institutions of Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland, occupying top leadership positions in the state, political parties, cabinet, parliament and civil service.

Recent US concern in Somalia has stemmed from the war on terrorism. US policy has focused on alienating and delegitimizing Al-Shabaab, and not involving it in the ongoing peace initiatives.¹⁴³ Given that the fight against terrorism continues to occupy an important place in US foreign policy, US support for peace in Somalia will likely depend upon the commitment of the unity Government to contain extremism, and of Al-Shabaab to renounce violence and cooperate with efforts to apprehend suspected terrorists.

Shortfalls in International Mediation

The primary goal of international engagement in Somalia since 1991 has been to end the civil war, to contain and resolve the political crisis, and to re-establish a sovereign government. Since 1991, 15 national reconciliation conferences have been convened, of which six were full-fledged national peace conferences. The Addis Ababa, Arta and Mbagathi peace processes are considered central among them (Box 2.13). Although several were termed ‘reconciliation’ conferences, their primary focus has always been on securing power-sharing agreements rather than true reconciliation. Youth have been

side-lined in these processes, with no political outlets to express their need and aspirations.

More recently, the London Conference on Somalia held on 23 February 2012 has underscored the centrality of Somali ownership of the peace process and the need for coordinated and scaled up international support.¹⁴⁴ Unlike past initiatives that concentrated on foreign methods, operations, and interventions, this conference stressed the importance of indigenous approaches and decisions and included the various Somali regions, particularly the more stable northern regions of Puntland and Galmudug and the autonomous region of Somaliland, if not Al-Shabaab.¹⁴⁵ It has urged the TFG to be prepared to relinquish its authority and power

Box 2.13: Peace Conferences

The Djibouti Talks, June-July 1991, brought six factions together to form an interim government. It exacerbated political tensions, culminating in armed conflict that destroyed much of Mogadishu in late 1991.

The United Nations convened the Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Talks, January-March 1993, to provide a blueprint for the creation of a two-year interim government. Fifteen clan-based factions attended. The talks produced an accord that sparked tensions between the United Nations and some armed factions over whether the creation of district and regional councils was to be a bottom-up process or controlled by clans. Armed conflict broke out between General Aideed’s faction and UN peacekeepers, which derailed the mission and blocked implementation of the accord.

The Sodere Conference, 1996-1997, convened by neighbouring Ethiopia, sought to revive a decentralized, federal Somali state at the expense of factions that opposed Ethiopia. The talks introduced the principle of fixed proportional representation by clan, the 4.5 formula.

The Cairo Conference, 1997, was convened by Egypt to promote a centralized Somali state and elevate the power of those factions that boycotted the Sodere talks. The two broad coalitions that emerged from Sodere and Cairo were responsible for the main political divisions in Somalia in subsequent years.

Djibouti convened the Arta Peace Conference, 2000. It brought civic rather than faction leaders to the talks, and produced the three-year TNG by adopting the 4.5 formula. This process empowered a Mogadishu-based coalition at the expense of a pro-Ethiopian alliance.

The Mbagathi Conference, 2002-2004, was sponsored by IGAD in Kenya to produce a successor to the failed TNG. With heavy Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement, the delegates, consisting mainly of militia and political leaders, agreed on the creation of a federalist state. There was a phase in the talks dedicated to the resolution of conflict, which never gained traction. The Mbagathi talks culminated in the creation of the TFG in late 2004 and the controversial election of President Abdullahi Yusuf. The TFG was deeply divided at the outset, with many Somalis raising objections about the legitimacy of representation at the talks.

The Djibouti Agreement, 2008, saw a number of principles of power sharing being agreed upon, following which, on 26 January 2009, the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) voted on the expansion of Parliament with 200 seats reserved for the ARS, and 75 seats for civil society and opposition members that were not part of the ARS. Accordingly, a new Government of national unity, comprising both TFG and ARS members was formed and a new president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected by the expanded parliament on 31 January 2009.

Source: Interpeace and Center for Research and Dialogue 2009.

in order to allow the emergence of a true central government. This means that TFG's mandate ends in August 2012, by which time it is expected to have enacted a new constitution and to have held a general election for a constituent assembly, the implementation of a new constitution, and the installation of a new president, executive, and legislature—a real pressure that had been largely absent from past conferences. It is yet to be seen how it will withstand the test of time to translate these decisions into concrete action.

Clearly, the Somali process can only be successful if all Somalis are included, or at least invited to be included, in order to become stakeholders in the country's future. However, international mediation encounters a number of constraints in a situation where there is no state. Ensuring the real representation of all Somali people was a problem in all conferences. The multiplication of factions contributed to a persistent dilemma of how to determine legitimate and authoritative representation.¹⁴⁶ Other obstacles have come from the regional politics in Somaliland and Puntland, and the lack of consensus on the nature of a future Somali state, with debates swayed by Somali clan agendas, foreign security agendas and religious ideological agendas. Peace agreements have also fallen short in lacking implementation plans, necessary resources, and arbitration and monitoring mechanisms to ensure they were fully implemented.

Despite these constraints, the lack of success of the peace processes can be attributed to the reliance on political mediation alone and top-down, uniform application of conventional conflict management. This is based on a zero-sum game, where win/lose power-sharing agreements and the revival of the state have dominated the agenda, while fundamental causes such as disputes over land and compensation for stolen property have been side-lined.

The consistent focus on state-building strategies has continued despite the reality that the average Somali would benefit more immediately from a state of peace than the revival of the central Government.¹⁴⁷ The state-building imperative assumes that achieving nominal agreement on power-sharing, the revival of government

institutions, and the establishment of security and law enforcement services are real measures of success, rather than reconciliation, good governance and welfare provisions. It also assumes that public support exists for a revived state,¹⁴⁸ but many Somalis perceive a state over which they have no control as a potential threat. State-building and peacebuilding are not synonymous. The former requires the consolidation of governmental authority; the latter involves reconciliation and consensus. In Somalia, neither process will be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

This unresolved dispute over the nature of the state has continued to be a stumbling block in the creation of a unified state in Somalia. UNOSOM II, the UN-led humanitarian intervention, attempted to introduce regional autonomy through district councils and decentralized governance. In contrast, the Arta process sought to re-establish the unitary centralized state on the basis of clan-based power sharing. Neither initiative succeeded in establishing a consensus on a territorial or clan-based framework for governance. The IGAD-led process aimed to incorporate the clan-based power sharing of the Arta process and the territorial councils of the UNOSOM II, but the failure of the TFG to become an even minimally functional administration points to a larger problem in the state-building agenda.

The national clan-based 4.5 formula for the TNG and TFG has institutionalized chronic factional competition for political offices—the presidency, premiership and speaker of Parliament—and appointments to the Cabinet and senior management positions.¹⁴⁹ These disputes have undermined past processes, and prevent sustainable reconciliation and peaceful political transition. The challenge will be in part to limit clan-based domination through an inclusive democratic process and the rule of law. So far, the failure to engage in bottom-up peacemaking has allowed warlords to use localized clan structures as a resource base for their own political survival.

Tackling some of the issues plaguing the Horn of Africa would go a long way in creating a more conducive regional environment for

... the London Conference on Somalia in 2012 has underscored the centrality of Somali ownership of the peace process and the need for coordinated and scaled up international support ...

resolving the Somali crisis. The engagement of external actors through the peace processes has in particular become a rallying point inside Somalia for an incipient Islamist movement. The reconstitution of the TFG with the inclusion of a wing of the Islamists (ARS) has ignited new sectarian strife, while leading to the fragmentation of the Islamist-led resistance and the emergence of Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Party in opposition to all external interventions.

Conclusion

During the last 20 years, the international community's many efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia have included 15 reconciliation and peace efforts that were well intentioned, but nonetheless unsuccessful. Somaliland seceded from Somalia and declared independence, while Puntland became a semi-autonomous state. These two areas have established a semblance of stability primarily through traditional bottom-up reconciliation and peace processes. But conflict has continued to be intractable in the south central part of the country.

Why have reconciliation efforts failed in the south? The top-down and exclusionary approach that was adopted has some serious flaws. The preoccupation with state-building efforts in a country without a state has only contributed to the escalation of the conflict, due to their exclusionary nature and people's suspicion of the state as a predator and oppressor. State-building is important, but it cannot take root

in an environment of distrust and wide-spread exclusion. It will continue to be futile unless the causes of conflict are tackled. The same can be said of the stark imbalances between short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term development assistance.

Understanding the nexus between conflict and development in Somalia is far from straightforward, given the complex dynamics and interactions across the diverse causes of violent conflict. Future interventions need to be informed by a better understanding of the political economy and the interactions of social and clan dynamics. This is important to improve the status of human development. Somalia's HDI ranking is among the lowest in the world, and the erosion in the index due to inequality is extremely high at 42 percent. Gender inequality is extreme, and most of the Somali population struggles with multidimensional poverty.

The combination of conflict and negative development consequences has hit youth hard, with immediate consequences for them now and over the longer term through the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Unless their multiple exclusions are addressed and potentials for positive contributions harnessed—such as through opportunities to participate in reconciliation and peacebuilding, in state-building and in development—they will increasingly be drawn into the conflict and become an important element in perpetuating and sustaining Somalia's long drawn out conflict.

Chapter 3

Youth: Caught in Crisis

Youth: Caught in Crisis

The transition from childhood to adulthood is a critical stage of human development. The extent to which youth succeed depends on the opportunities available to them, the assets and capabilities they have accumulated, and the spaces in which they are encouraged to function. Missed opportunities to invest in youth development limit their future prospects, along with hopes for addressing the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

The survey conducted for this report is the first of its kind to unveil the reality of the youth crisis in Somalia. With two decades of endless civil war and unrest, Somali youth face harsh realities. Many are poor, uneducated and unemployed, or have left the country as migrants or refugees. Others have joined the armed militia, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and use violence to earn quick money through robbery, ransacking or piracy. With few choices or outlets to express their anger, they are ready recruits for engaging in risky behaviour. A ‘lost’ generation poses significant challenges not only to youth themselves, but also imposes formidable economic, political and social costs, a real threat to national stability.

As in many war-torn countries, youth in Somalia have suffered a societal breakdown that has left them feeling victimized. At the same time, they are a source of conflict that affects society at large.¹⁵⁰ These two dimensions combine in a ‘youth crisis’ that has become a fundamental barrier to breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and conflict, and promoting sustainable development and peace.

If youth have been both the victims and perpetrators of violence in Somalia, they are also a source of hope for the future. A new strategic direction is required, based on harnessing the full potential of the next generation. Just as the Somali Youth League (SYL) led the struggle for

the liberation of the Somali Republic in 1960 (Box 3.1), youth are critical for building an inclusive society in which all Somalis would feel valued and empowered, and have opportunities to participate fully in decisions that affect them. There is currently a proliferation of youth groups in Somalia today but they have not been able to form a strong network with a common vision on their role in development and peace building. *The Youth Charter* (Annex 1) provides an opportunity for young Somali women and men to collectively present their aspirations to the state and non-state actors and to partner with them to realize the objectives outlined.

Sustainably empowering youth depends on building social inclusion, and overcoming economic and political exclusion. The empowerment process—defined as the “expansion of assets and capabilities of young people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable the institutions that affect their lives”¹⁵¹—involves individuals and groups taking action from below. Social inclusion is initiated from the top, and entails overcoming exclusion through the removal of policy and institutional barriers. Both processes start with the identification of inter-related dimensions of exclusion.¹⁵²

Chapter 3 looks at the three exclusions faced by Somali youth—social, economic and political—and argues for empowerment strategies to simultaneously tackle each area. First, socio-cultural exclusion includes a lack of access to social services such as education and health, and discrimination based on gender, ethnicity and age, among other factors. Second, economic exclusion comprises lack of access to labour markets, land, credit and other assets and opportunities. Third, political exclusion encompasses the denial of citizenship rights, such as political participation and the right to

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Box 3.1: Somali Youth League

In 1943, the first modern Somali political party, the Somali Youth Club, was formed in Mogadishu to unite all Somali clans under its flag. At its foundation, the party had 13 members. Better-educated police and civil servants were permitted to join the party in 1948, and it was renamed the Somali Youth League. The League had an aspiration for independence, and began to open offices not only in Italian and British Somaliland, but also in the Ogaden and in the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Its main objectives were to lead the country to independence and to unify all Somali territories, including the NFD and the Ogaden. Other goals were to create opportunities for universal modern education; to develop the Somali language by a standard national orthography; to safeguard Somali interests; and to oppose the restoration of Italian rule.

A League policy banned clannism, so that the 13 founding members, although representing four of Somalia's five major clans, refused to disclose their clan affiliations. In the first national elections after independence, held on 30 March 1964, the League won an absolute majority of 69 of the 123 parliamentary seats.

Five years from then, in general elections held in March 1969, the ruling SYL, led by Mohammed Ibrahim Egal returned to power. However, in the same year, then President of Somalia Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated. A military coup quickly ensued, with Siad Barre assuming leadership. Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) subsequently renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic, arrested members of the former government, banned political parties, dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution. This success of the SYL clearly indicates how important a role youth can play in rebuilding a modern, democratic Somalia. Youth could play a similar role in Somalia today if the space for political participation opened up.

Source: Barnes 2007

Somalia's demographic profile shows 73 percent of the population are below the age of 30.

organize. It further entails the lack of personal security, rule of law and freedom of expression.

To reverse these forms of exclusion, actions in each will need to reduce both absolute deprivations, such as the number of people below the poverty line, and the relative deprivations festering through increasing inequalities in Somalia. Social empowerment should provide all youth and citizens with equal access to social assets and opportunities essential to well-being. Economic empowerment should foster equitable opportunities for business development and access to employment, and promote pro-poor economic policies. Political empowerment should protect rights and freedoms, expand social and political participation, and foster democratic decision-making.

The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on primary data collected through a nationally representative sample survey (Chapter 1 and Annex 4). Questions that have been considered include: What assets, capabilities and opportunity structures do Somali youth have to transition from childhood to adulthood? What are the main

barriers that prevent young men and women from accessing assets and opportunities for social, economic and political empowerment?


The proper investigation of these issues, based on youth perceptions of multiple exclusions, will lay a solid foundation for considering youth engagement in development and peacebuilding.

The Youth Bulge: Dividend or Threat?

Somalia's demographic profile shows 73 percent of the population below the age of 30, based on a sample household survey¹⁵³ (Figure 3.1). The potential implications of this kind of 'youth bulge' have gained wider recognition recently, especially after the youth movements that led the Arab Spring with protests against their lack of economic and political rights.¹⁵⁴ Developing countries with weak or highly exclusionary political institutions are most vulnerable to potential youth unrest, culminating in violence in the worst cases.¹⁵⁵

For Somalia as a whole, youth between the ages of 14 and 29 represent around 42 percent of the population.¹⁵⁶ If the bracket is expanded to ages

Figure 3.1: Somalia Demographic Profile by Sex



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

10 to 34, the composition represents roughly 60 percent. In contrast to East Asia, where the youth bulge has peaked, the youth population in Somalia will not peak in the foreseeable future.¹⁵⁷ This is due to high fertility rates, estimated at 6.2 births per women between 2010 and 2015, and high death rates, reflected in low life expectancy, currently estimated at 50 years.

This demographic youth bulge presents both challenges and opportunities. Threats come from the failure of educational institutions and labour markets to absorb youth, resulting in their social and economic marginalization. Employment shortfalls are reflected in the high dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the dependent population—children below the age of 14 plus older people aged 65 and above—to the working age population, ages 15 to 64. Somalia's ratio is estimated at 0.55, indicating there are 55 dependents per 100 working-age people. While this figure estimated from the 2010 survey data for this report is lower than the World Bank's estimate for Somalia (91) in 2010, it compares fairly well with its estimates for Egypt (58), South Africa (53) and Libya (53).¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, a level this high results in fewer resources for investments in children and youth that would boost economic growth over the long

term. Evidence shows that a one percent decline in the dependency ratio and youth cohort could pay for a 33 percent increase in spending per dependent.¹⁵⁹ But this figure is skewed by the limited availability of income opportunities for the working age population, underscoring the need for employment-led economic growth.

Another critical challenge comes from the fact that under-employed young people are more likely to breed unrest than those that are productively occupied.¹⁶⁰ In this respect, the UN Youth Employment Network, in collaboration with the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO), has recommended four critical areas for national action: employability, equal opportunities, entrepreneurship and employment creation.¹⁶¹ While these are important criteria for devising youth empowerment programmes, this report argues for taking much broader actions. These include bold investments in youth capabilities, options for decent and productive jobs, and institutional space for youth to express their desires for social, economic and political change. If these avenues are blocked, young people's frustrations may continue to spin into crime, conflict and a never-ending spiral of poverty.

... this report argues for taking much broader actions. These include bold investments in youth capabilities, options for decent and productive jobs, and institutional space for youth to express their desires for social, economic and political change.

The demographic youth bulge could present enormous opportunities if the right macroeconomic, social and labour market policies and institutions were designed to support youth ...

The demographic youth bulge could present enormous opportunities if the right macroeconomic, social and labour market policies and institutions were designed to support youth in learning, going to work, avoiding health risks, becoming good citizens and exercising citizenship. The youth-adult transition period, if well guided, could produce human capital as a significant factor in the growth and development of the country as a whole.¹⁶² The 'economic miracle' of East Asia presents a good example of how a large generation of youth can be harnessed for economic gains and social transformation.

What do Youth Value?


Socio-cultural values and beliefs play an important role in shaping youths' lives and behaviours. To capture these aspects, the survey for this report asked youth how much they value the importance of family, religion, work, education and politics. The family assumes great significance, with 98 percent of respondents indicating it as very important. Religion ranked second to family, followed by work, education, friends and service to others (Figure 3.2). There were no significant gender differences in the rankings, nor were there noticeable differences across regions, except for politics. The interest of youth in politics was higher in relatively stable Somaliland and

Puntland than in south central Somalia.

The centrality of family in youth life has clear implications for the transition from childhood to adulthood. Until the completion of basic education, young people generally are under the complete care, protection and guidance of their parents or guardians. Upon completing some basic education, until the age of 15 or 20, young people face major decisions about continuing education, entering the labour market and/or starting a family. Depending on the family and other pre-determined circumstances beyond their control, youth may be forced to choose one or more of these options.

Given the close ties of Somali youth to their families, much of their decision-making is influenced and guided by families and parents, even though their families hardly allow the youth to make even basic household decisions (Figure 3.9). The roles of kinship and family structure in bonding, social networking and trust are crucial. At the same time, the weaknesses in family structures, coupled by or by virtue of traditional customs may lead to an erosion of social capital and constrain social development, thereby perpetuating patriarchal values that dominate young women and men.

Figure 3.2: Importance of Crucial Aspects of Youth Life



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Households in Somalia are traditionally large, averaging 6.7 members. Across the regions, the average household size ranges from six members in Somaliland to seven in south central Somalia. Most families are headed by a man, although female-headed households represented 24 percent of the survey sample, reflecting large-scale migration and deaths among male spouses. Although several factors affect the feminization of poverty, there are good reasons to believe that female-headed households are most susceptible to poverty because they have fewer income earners to provide financial support within the household.¹⁶³

As with family, religious values can have both positive and negative outcomes in the life of the youth. Religiosity was higher among educated youth, which suggested that education in the Koranic system has a fundamental role in spreading religious values.¹⁶⁴ The relatively low importance of politics to youth perhaps reflected their lack of faith and trust in the political process, and loss of confidence in its ability to initiate change.

Gender Trajectories

Variations in the trajectories for young women and men clearly manifest in the very high Gender Inequality Index score for Somalia, as discussed in Chapter 2. Youth is the stage where patriarchal traditions and cultural norms become entrenched, and girls begin to experience multiple discriminations due to new restrictions and attitudes. Young males by contrast are likely to gain much more autonomy and mobility. Traditional cultural norms in Somalia dictate that females are sheltered during puberty for reasons such as purity and marriage prospects, stigma or family reputation.¹⁶⁵

Early and forced marriages (Box 3.2) and teenage pregnancies are common, with an estimated 45 percent of women aged 20-24 being married by the age of 18.¹⁶⁶ According to the findings of the focus group studies conducted for this report, girls who get married or give birth at a young age are more vulnerable to violence and health risks. In addition, females suffer higher rates of accidental death, suicide, victimization by violent crime, sexually transmitted diseases and

mental disorders, posing huge individual and societal costs.

Female infanticide, inadequate provision of food and medical care, physical abuse and forced sex threaten the lives of many girls. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is performed on Somali girls between the ages of 8 and 10 to control women's sexuality.¹⁶⁷ It leaves many women with lifelong medical problems and sometimes results in early deaths.¹⁶⁸ Although this harmful practice was declared illegal in 1991, it is an unpunished crime that remains widespread—in Somaliland, 62 percent of the respondents in a youth survey conducted by the Somaliland National Youth Organization (SONYO) in 2011 stated that FGM was still practised.¹⁶⁹

In short, young women end up greatly disadvantaged in all spheres of life, for example more young women than young men were required to work at home than attend school, literacy rates were found to be higher amongst young men than young women and consequentially higher numbers of women were found to lack formal employment than men. This reality hinders women's rights and development, and perpetuates intergenerational cycles of gender inequality and the feminization of poverty. The following pages shed some light by presenting gender-disaggregated information from the national survey for this report, although in most cases the results show no significant gender difference in youth perceptions, given the stark challenges common to both women and men.

Youth Empowerment: What Stands in the Way

As a group, youth are more vulnerable to social, economic and political exclusion than older age cohorts relatively better protected by the economy, social policy and customs. Somali youth face multiple structural barriers built into the family, organizations, local government and society at large. At the family and community level, barriers are shaped by gender, identity, class, sexual orientation, age, family, community, education and ability. Powerlessness comes from institutions, such as through disempowering laws, and from a lack of

The roles of kinship and family structure in bonding, social networking and trust are crucial. At the same time, the weaknesses in family structures, coupled by—or by virtue of—traditional customs may lead to an erosion of social capital and constrain social development ...

Box 3.2: Robbing Girls of Childhood

Many Somali girls are given away in marriage at an early age, after which they must start producing children. It is seen as normal for a Somali elder to marry a teenage girl. The main reasons for this practice are the girls' virginity and the bride price. Young girls are less likely to have had sexual contact and thus are believed to be virgins upon marriage; this condition raises the family status as well as the dowry paid by the husband.

Child marriage robs a girl of her childhood, necessary to develop physically, emotionally and psychologically. In fact, early marriage inflicts great emotional stress as the young woman is removed from her parents' home to that of her husband and in-laws. Her husband, who is often many years her senior, may have little in common with a young teenager. Girls who are victims of early marriages are often also victims of son preference, and may be malnourished and have stunted physical growth. Early pregnancy can have some harmful consequences for both young mothers and their babies.

Source: Interviews conducted for the "Somalia Human Development Report" 2012.

individual and collective resources. The majority of youth in Somalia are not equipped with the knowledge necessary to be fully involved as active participants in their communities. And they are silenced and tokenized because they are young. Other forms of oppression, such as gender discrimination, may operate alongside ageism, making it a struggle for youth to simply survive, much less assert their identity.

While youth in south central Somalia face steeper obstacles than youth in the post-conflict northern areas, both confront similar challenges relating to the different dimensions of exclusion, including poor education, a lack of access to livelihoods and no outlet for political participation.

In the survey for this report, almost 80 percent of the youth respondents in south central Somalia strongly believed that youth suffer more exclusion than other groups,¹⁷⁰ compared to less than 50 percent in Somaliland and Puntland (Figure 3.3). This underlined links between exclusion and grievances, and engagement in aggressive behaviours. For youth to be empowered, they need support for developing assets and capabilities,¹⁷¹ along with equal access to opportunities to use these.

Social Barriers

Somali youth face multifaceted socio-cultural exclusions that deprive them of social assets, capabilities and opportunities, including in education. Barriers to schooling comprise the lack of quality facilities, affordability


and acceptability in terms of the content of education. The formal school system, with its rigid timetable and set calendar, does not meet local needs and circumstances, especially for the large nomadic population. A proper understanding of mobility trends and patterns of the nomadic population is required to devise innovative strategies to reach these groups.

Culturally, youth are considered immature and in need of guidance.¹⁷² They are not trusted to make sound decisions for themselves and others.¹⁷³ 'Youth' is often a relative concept with no fixed boundaries that is used to sideline or humiliate a competitor of lesser age, perpetuating a culture of gerontocracy. The influence of the clan, in which the role of elders and the traditional leadership is prominent, further entrenches exclusion. A skewed social structure keeps these groups in power.

Rights and Information

Information is a critical element of youth empowerment. Informed youth are better equipped to take advantage of opportunities to reduce poverty, access services, exercise rights, and hold state and non-state actors accountable, including on critical issues such as education, decent work, political participation and gender equality. Disclosure of information about youth rights and the performance of institutions promote transparency in government, public services and the private sector, while laws on the rights to information and freedom of press enable

Figure 3.3: Youth Suffer More Exclusion Than Other Groups (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

informed citizen action. The role of representative youth organizations is critical in this regard.

The survey revealed a fairly high level of awareness among youth respondents about their rights because of their exposure to both traditional and modern information technologies. Youth awareness of the right to education was highest at 82 percent, followed by the right to decent work at 71.4 percent, the right to freedom of expression at 68 percent, and the right to political participation and to equal gender rights at 57 percent (Figure 3.4).

More male than female youth were aware of their rights. Urban respondents were more likely to be aware than their rural counterparts, across all regions. A low level of awareness of the equal rights of young men and women was particularly glaring in Somaliland at 36 percent. The overall awareness level of youth respondents was highest in south central Somalia, followed by Puntland and Somaliland.


Radio was by far the most important source of information, used by over 80 percent of youth respondents, followed by television at 38 percent, newspapers at 31 percent and the

Internet at 24 percent. The survey data revealed no gender difference in access to information. Radio was the most regularly used media at over 71 percent, followed by informal sources at 51 percent and television at 48 percent. Among those who have Internet access, only 35 percent used it regularly, while newspapers were used regularly by just a quarter of the respondents. Across the three regions, media, especially television, newspaper and the Internet, were used most routinely in Somaliland.

While greater awareness of youth rights indicates high aspirations and expectations, the lack of opportunities to realize these means there is a mismatch that leads to disenchantment. Most rights are not accessible to Somali youth. Women in the focus group discussions observed that in their communities, youth had very few rights, irrespective of gender. The youth advisory groups pointed to the failure of the Government and armed groups to recognize the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which results in the recruitment of children by the militias in violation of their rights. The advisory groups also said that excluding youth from political leadership infringes on their rights.¹⁷⁴

Youth awareness of the right to education was highest at 82 percent, followed by the right to decent work at 71.4 percent, the right to freedom of expression at 68 percent, and the right to political participation and to equal gender rights at 57 percent ...

Figure 3.4: Youth Know Their Rights (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Education and Training

Education is a vital prerequisite for empowering youth, achieving the MDGs and advancing sustainable human development, but the majority of school-age children in Somalia have never been to school. Following the collapse of the state in 1991, many schools ceased to exist for all practical purposes, and many Somali children and young people lost the chance to access formal education.¹⁷⁵ While there has been gradual improvement, with a substantial increase in the number of operational primary and secondary schools, opportunities for formal education are still unavailable to a majority of children, especially in rural and nomadic areas. Schooling is packed with academic learning, leaving little space for personal development, practical skills and professional career guidance. As aptly expressed by participants in the Somaliland focus group discussions: “The quality of education is very low and the teaching is poor. School availability is difficult and expensive.” Education receives less than 7 percent of the annual budget.¹⁷⁶

The survey revealed that the youth literacy rate, which does not include data from the Koranic


schools, is about 48 percent in the age group 14 to 29. The rate was higher among males at 53 percent than females at 43 percent, and there are more literate youth in urban than rural areas—55 percent compared to 33 percent.

According to the 2006 Somalia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), among women aged 15 to 24, 24.7 percent were literate. Based on the survey for this report, the literacy rate among school children aged 6 to 13 was 42 percent (Figure 3.5). The adult literacy rate of the sample population (aged 15 years and above) was estimated at 31 percent for Somalia as a whole—26 percent for females against 36 percent for males.¹⁷⁷ This compares to 19 percent in 2001—13 percent among females and 25 percent among males—based on a UNDP/World Bank survey.¹⁷⁸ Among the literate population, the majority has a primary level education, with only a small proportion attaining secondary level or above.

Despite progress in literacy rates, school dropout, particularly between primary and secondary levels, often reflects poor quality education and lack of availability and affordability. About

... the youth literacy rate, which does not include data from the Koranic schools, is about 48 percent in the age group 14 to 29.

Figure 3.5: Literacy by Age Group (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

50 percent of the sample population aged 6 to 29 was not attending school, with females surpassing males. The major reasons cited for not attending school were inability to afford it at 36 percent, household work at 22 percent and not relevant for getting jobs at 17 percent (Figure 3.6). The reasons varied by gender, with no regional differences. For instance, about 33 percent of females compared to 21 percent of males had to work at home instead of attending school (Box 3.3). Youth perceptions of the quality of education diverged by the levels of education and region, but for the majority, the quality of education offered at all levels was either very poor or poor (Figure 3.7).

The scale and outreach of existing vocational training programmes, especially for youth, is fairly low in relation to the problem of acquiring employable skills. Only a small percentage of youth respondents reported receiving vocational training, with marked gender inequality in opportunities—10 percent male against 5 percent female—and no significant regional difference. Clearly, engendering programmes to provide high-quality employable skills to both young men and women assumes great importance for expanding outreach.

Overall, the number of school age children and youth will continue to grow in Somalia,


putting pressure on existing education facilities. A major concern is not only to expand equal educational opportunities—including for many disadvantaged groups such as migrants, displaced persons, street children, indigenous and nomadic youth in rural areas, and young people with disabilities—but also to ensure quality, and relevance to employment and the transition to full adulthood. Also critical is the lack of affordability as the major barrier for many parents, due to widespread poverty and the dearth of livelihood opportunities.

Health and Risky Behaviour

Health is a critical factor in accessing opportunities—including to education, work, the formation of families and civic participation—and empowerment. According to the survey, 73 percent of youth rated the quality of health facilities as poor.


Four percent of respondents aged 14 to 29 years were living with disabilities. Among them, 47 percent had physical disabilities and the rest mental disabilities. Youth with chronic health conditions, such as diabetes, heart problems, and respiratory and kidney related diseases, constituted 1.5 percent. Rural areas show the highest incidence; there were no gender differences in the prevalence of chronic diseases.

Figure 3.6: Reasons for Not Attending School Aged 6-29 Years (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 3.7: Youth Perception of Educational Quality (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

According to a Youth Behavioural Survey conducted in 2011 by IOM in collaboration with Somaliland, Puntland and South Central AIDS Commissions, despite approximately 90 per cent of youth having heard about HIV and AIDS only 11.1% of young women and men aged between 15-24 could correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual transmission of

HIV and reject major misconceptions about HIV transmission (8.7% of men and 13.4% of young women).

Indeed a sizeable proportion of youth hold beliefs that are potentially dangerous, the most common being that female circumcision can reduce the risk of HIV transmission. Other

Box 3.3: Why do Girls Drop Out of School in Somaliland?

"I was nearly completing high school... my father did not encourage me to continue my education; one day he suddenly informed me that he was giving me away in marriage. I married a person I had never met before.... I was just 18 and that is why I dropped out from school."

Fadima, 21, a young mother who lives in Hargeisa.

"I am a mother of four children; three boys and one girl. When all go to school, I need someone to help with household chores; so I told the girl to stay at home to help with the housework, because tomorrow she may marry and go to another house, so what is the use of educating her; she must help me and her brothers, cook food, clean house and wash clothes."

Maryama, 47, a mother in Erigavo, Sanaag Region.

"The mother cannot do the housework alone... If 30 boys and 30 girls are enrolled in a school, the 30 boys are very likely to complete their course of work, while only 10 girls may successfully complete education."

Female respondent, Burao.

Source: Abdi et al. 2009 and interview conducted for the "Somalia Human Development Report" 2012.

major misconceptions include: HIV can be transmitted through mosquito bites or by sharing cutlery or food, and can be cured by traditional healers. In addition the IOM study found that in Somaliland in particular, the average age of female sex workers – interviewed by respondent-driven sampling method – was 29 years, with 28.6% being under 25 years of age. Fifty-seven percent of female sex workers interviewed in Somaliland were of Ethiopian of origin, indicating trans-border activities.

There is therefore a need to expand socio-culturally acceptable HIV sensitization and awareness raising campaigns on HIV, focusing on the various modes of transmission and misconceptions about HIV in order to address stigma and discrimination which is extremely high in Somalia and continues to fuel the spread of the disease. Breaking the negative attitudes and misconceptions about condom use among the most vulnerable youth and women can be a powerful entry point, given strong socio-cultural and religious values against pre-marital and extra-marital sex. In addition the IOM study (2011) found that 4.2 per cent of young men aged between 15-24 had sexual intercourse before the age of 15. Therefore Somalis should be encouraged to check their HIV status and go for Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) particularly if they engage in pre- or extra-marital sex or have multiple partners.

The survey found that 8 percent of youth respondents chewed *khat*, a narcotic; 11 percent smoked; and less than 2 percent used illicit drugs, although under-reporting is common in most surveys on these issues.¹⁷⁹ A relatively higher proportion of youth in Somaliland chewed *khat*, at 12 percent, than in the other regions. According to the 2011 SONYO youth survey in Somaliland, 24 percent of youth chewed *khat*, and of those, 48.7 percent chewed every day. When asked about what induces them to chew, 60.6 percent attributed their chewing to peer pressure, while 16.6 percent said they chewed as a matter of curiosity. Asked how they spend most of their spare time, 15 percent said they chew *khat*.¹⁸⁰

The survey for this report found that among those who chewed *khat*, the frequency of use was on average about three times a week, with an average expenditure of US \$8 per day in Somalia (Figure 3.8). The average daily expenditure on *khat* ranged from US \$6 in south central to as high as US \$11 in Puntland. Consumption has contributed significantly to psychosocial problems, and causes loss of motivation for people to work or go to school. It has become a major driver of poverty and conflict through clan feuds, and fuels criminal behaviour.¹⁸¹

Risky health behaviours are highly gendered. There is a very low rate of drug use among female

youth but, given the social stigma associated with female smoking and chewing, this can also be taken as a sign of under-reporting (Box 3.4). And while male youth are at high risk of chewing *khat*, smoking and substance abuse, females are at high risk from other serious health-related social practices, such as female genital mutilation.

Household Decision-making

Youth are traditionally excluded from decision-making in households, where male heads normally make decisions on social, economic and political matters. The role of female heads in household decision-making was less than 15 percent, according to survey respondents in all regions, with no differences in young men and women's perception of the role of female heads. This was further corroborated by focus group discussions with traditional leaders and women.

To capture the extent to which youth make decisions at the household level, responses were rated on a four-point scale, with 4 for a very high degree and 1 for not at all, to arrive at the mean score. The results showed that the role of youth in household decision-making was negligible, with an average score of around 2 out of 4


(Figure 3.9). For the majority of the respondents, their role in influencing household decisions was either very small or not at all. More female youth than males felt marginalized in terms of household decision-making processes.

About 37 percent of youth respondents reported disagreements with parents, most prominently in Puntland at 54 percent, and with no gender differences.

Economic Marginalization

The world is facing serious youth unemployment challenges. Globally, the youth labour force participation rate decreased from 54.7 percent to 50.8 percent between 1998 and 2008, while the share of youth employment in the total fell from 47.9 percent to 44.7 percent. With the youth population growing faster than employment opportunities, youth are almost three times as likely as adults to be unemployed.¹⁸² In Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty rates are among the highest in the world, an average of 2.2 million young people are expected to enter the labour force every year between 2010 and 2015, adding pressure to already saturated job markets.¹⁸³ The chances for many young people in low-income countries of ever transitioning

Figure 3.8: *Khat* Consumption Patterns



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Box 3.4: Going Against the Norm: Why Young Somali Women Chew *Khat*

Khat chewing is traditionally associated with men, often as a pastime of mostly young, jobless men. Instances of young Somali women chewing *khat* are virtually unheard of or go unreported due to social pressure. There are examples of young women going against societal norms, however, for reasons including poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and depression.

Chewing *khat* has become a lifestyle for Bilan, a 28-year-old mother of five. She was born into a family of seven, four girls and three boys, and married at a very young age. Later she divorced and went back to her family, leaving the children with their father.

Young women in Somalia are largely unemployed and do not belong to any youth groups. Most, like Bilan, lack skills or training. For two years she has been selling *khat* and using the proceeds to maintain her children and herself. She feels isolated since she does not participate in family decision-making, and does not receive any remittances from her relatives abroad or any support from her parents, who own a small shop. There are no clear future plans.

“It is difficult and I’m emotionally stressed,” says Bilan. So, like young men, deprived of any recreational facilities or enterprise or education, she has taken to *khat* chewing.


Ayan, 22 and a mother of one, also chews *khat*. Her situation is similar to Bilan’s. She has only a class three elementary education and is unemployed. She is the firstborn in her family, and has already been married twice. She was first married at the age of 14 and divorced three months later due to her unemployment and heavy dependence on her mother. The second marriage only lasted for 18 months and led to divorce after her husband turned abusive. She does not know where her child is. To forget her accumulating problems, Ayan started chewing *khat* two years ago.

“We chew as a group of young women. Women sellers bring it to us. After selling, they use the money to tend to their expenses. Chewing brings a happy feeling,” she says. Her family doesn’t know about her habit.

Hibaq is a divorced mother of two for whom chewing has become an addiction. After a first marriage collapsed, she followed the counsel of her peers and family and married the village herbalist as his fourth wife. She then divorced him and now leads a stressed and depressing life.

Source: Interviews conducted for the “Somalia Human Development Report” 2012.

Figure 3.9: Who Makes Household Decisions?



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Each year, thousands of young people enter the labour market in search of employment, but no measures are in place to stimulate it, such as through public works programmes to motivate employers to hire young people.

from unpaid contributing family workers to paid employment in the formal sector are slim. These problems are particularly acute in Somalia, where they pose one of the most urgent development challenges.

Somali youth, especially young women, face difficulties in securing livelihoods due to the lack of jobs, poorly developed skills, and limited access to credit and capital assets. In a shattered economy, many youth have no options but to remain idle or search for alternatives such as migration or illegal activities. Some extend their education and delay marriage and raising families. A huge cost stems from youth's economic exclusion. Evidence from other countries reveals that the aggregate economic costs of youth exclusion due to unemployment, school dropouts, adolescent pregnancy and youth migration has been as high as US \$53 billion in Egypt (17 percent of GDP) and US \$1.5 billion in Jordan (7 percent of GDP). The cost of not investing in youth in Kosovo was estimated to be 204 million euros, or one-third of the national budget.¹⁸⁴

Rising youth unemployment and poverty as critical obstacles to the economic empowerment of Somali youth result from a combination of demand and supply side factors. On the supply side, a major obstacle to the employability of young people is inadequate education, which leaves a growing number of entrants to the labour market poorly equipped with relevant skills. On the demand side, inappropriate school curricula and lack of employable skills mean that job seekers do not meet the needs of employers, especially in the tertiary sector.¹⁸⁵ Young people often accept lower wages and lower-quality jobs that do not really match their learned skills. Added to that, few jobs are available, because economic stagnation has depressed overall demand for labour. Each year, thousands of young people enter the labour market in search of employment, but no measures are in place to stimulate it, such as through public works programmes to motivate employers to hire young people. The lack of a coherent national youth policy and youth council means that young people have no outlets to ensure representation in labour market decision-making bodies. Beside unemployed youth, there

are also jobless or discouraged youth who are neither in school nor looking for a job.


In the search for employment, youth face numerous hindrances due to their age and lack of work experience. Employment service agencies operate in an ad hoc and uncoordinated manner where youth have no representation, while older people occupy most government jobs. Available employment opportunities, especially in Somaliland, are mostly occupied by people coming from outside,¹⁸⁶ a source of growing discontent among the young and educated. For example, menial and manual jobs are taken by poorly educated migrants from Ethiopia and those displaced from Somalia. There are skilled workers from Somalia who are employed in the construction industry. Technicians and engineers for electronic and small manufacturing industries are brought in from Asia. "Clannism" also plays a role in exclusion, especially when people who belong to other clans have moved to another area as in the case of internally displaced youth. Long term, the solution to youth unemployment will depend on macroeconomic and labour market policies that promote broad-based economic growth and viable employment opportunities in both the formal and informal sectors.

Broken Transitions

The natural transition after completing school is to enter the labour force. For the majority of young people in Somalia, however, that transition has been broken. The focus group discussions confirmed that young people are more vulnerable to unemployment compared with prime age adults, mainly due to a lack of skills, work experience, job search expertise and resources to enable them either to start their own businesses, find jobs or migrate.

The survey unveiled how Somali youth aged 14 to 29 face unhealthy patterns of transition from school to the labour market. About 21 percent of youth respondents were neither at work nor in school, another 58 percent were only in school, 14 percent were only working and the rest were doing part-time jobs along with attending school (Figure 3.10). At the age of 14, most youth are in school, but they start dropping out shortly thereafter, and most are out of school by age 24. As expected,

Figure 3.10: Distribution of Youth Aged 14-29 in School and at Work



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

the proportion of youth working with/or without going to school increased with age.

The proportion of youth who were neither working nor in school also increased with age, although 40 percent of those surveyed in this category were actively seeking work. The proportion was more pronounced among young women at 27 percent than young men at 15 percent (Figure 3.11). Across the three regions, the proportion was highest in south central Somalia at 24 percent, followed by Puntland at 19 percent (Figure 3.12). Among children aged 6 to 13, about 28 percent were out of school and not working, 4.2 percent were working and 3 percent were working and studying, while the remaining two-thirds were attending school.

When school-age children and youth are taken together, a large proportion of the population is idle, neither working nor in school. This group is the most disadvantaged and vulnerable to risky and criminal behaviours, warranting special second-chance programmes. Strategies need to promote labour market integration before these youth become involved in criminal activity or other high-risk behaviours. This will require developing literacy and numeracy classes, job-related skills and basic life skills, and on-the-job learning opportunities driven by the needs of the labour market.

An equally unhealthy transition pattern is that of entering the labour market at an early age to survive, a pattern that perpetuates intergenerational poverty. Today's school age children and youth who join the job market without schooling are tomorrow's illiterate young adults, who face a bleak future in terms of employment prospects, health, and ability to influence, let alone actively contribute to, decision-making.


Employment

According to the survey, overall unemployment among people aged 15 to 64 was estimated at 54 percent in Somalia, as compared to the 47 percent calculated in 2002.¹⁸⁷ The survey found the unemployment rate¹⁸⁸ among youth aged 14 to 29 was 67 percent—one of the highest rates in the world.

Females experienced higher unemployment rates at 74 percent than males at 61 percent. Youth unemployment was highest in Somaliland at 84 percent, followed by south central Somalia and Puntland (Figure 3.13). The high unemployment rate in Somaliland is corroborated by the 2011 youth survey conducted by youth umbrella organisation SONYO, which estimated that 75 percent of youth were unemployed.


Females experienced higher unemployment rates at 74 percent than males at 61 percent.

Figure 3.11: Youth Not Working and Not in School by Gender (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 3.12: Percentage of Youth by Working Status




Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Unemployment rates estimated in this report using the standard and strict ILO definition. Unemployment is a measure of who is available for work and actively seeking employment. If a person is not available and looking for work, they are considered outside the labour market and hence are not unemployed under the strict ILO definition (Box 3.5). Reasons for not being in the labour force give an equally important measure of the situation of youth, however. When asked why they are not in the labour force,

a significant percentage of young men gave no reason, underscoring their lack of hope. This is a critical factor that points in the direction of disenfranchisement and alienation.

The survey revealed that about 66 percent of youth aged 14 to 29 were economically active or participating in the labour force.¹⁸⁹ The rest were inactive mainly because they were students, with a relatively higher percentage among young men than young women. The high labour force

Figure 3.13: Unemployment Rate by Region (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

participation rates amid high unemployment reflect limited jobs for youth, who are forced to look for any job because they live in poverty. It also reflects lost opportunities for many young men and women who might otherwise attend school and acquire skills and education that could raise their future productivity and potential earnings.

The labour force participation rate was highest in Puntland at 77 percent, followed by Somaliland at 63 percent. Among those in the labour market, about 19 percent described themselves as paid

workers, 50 percent were unpaid family workers and self-employed, and the remaining 31 percent were unemployed (Figure 3.14). Among employed female youth, only 15 percent had a paid job, and the majority of the rest described themselves as self-employed or engaged in unpaid family labour.¹⁹⁰

This breakdown suggests that most young people have little say in their choice of jobs, mostly ending up in traditional unpaid family occupations and self-employment.¹⁹¹ The dominance of self-employment means limited opportunities


The survey revealed that about 66 percent of youth aged 14 to 29 were economically active or participating in the labour force.

Box 3.5: A Problem of Joblessness, Not Just Unemployment

The strict ILO unemployment rate is based on three criteria. It defines as unemployed people those who are without work, available for work, and have been seeking work for the preceding four weeks. The 'relaxed' ILO unemployment rate includes unemployed people, who are not searching for work because they are discouraged, i.e., they have lost all hope of finding a job. Jobless youth are defined as the ratio of those who are neither employed nor in the labour force. This includes all youth who are not in school and not looking for a job. Another measure of joblessness is the ratio of youth who are not in school and do not hold jobs, whether or not they are looking for jobs. This ratio includes the ILO unemployed as well as discouraged workers who are not in the education system.

Source: ILO 2010.

Figure 3.14: Employment Status of Youth Respondents (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

... the main reasons for youth being unemployed were lack of job opportunities at 42 percent, followed by lack of employable skills at 18 percent.

in the formal sector. Considering traditional occupations as 'forced' employment, 80 percent of the youth surveyed were unemployed, with this rate higher among female youth.

Among those who were unemployed, the average duration of unemployment was one year, a period that extended to 19 months in south central Somalia. The SONYO study in Somaliland indicates that 69.1 percent of unemployed youth have been unemployed for more than three years.¹⁹²

According to the survey for this report, the main reasons for youth being unemployed were lack of job opportunities at 42 percent, followed by lack of employable skills at 18 percent. Lack of access to credit was cited as a barrier to starting up a business by 9 percent of the respondents. More female youth than males said they faced discrimination in the labour market (Box 3.6), mainly due to inherent cultural biases, and more so in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab. The majority of unpaid family workers were females who are mostly forced to take traditional occupations by virtue of their entrenched traditional gender roles. Somaliland does have a provision for equal opportunity in its labour laws, but it remains unenforced.

For many youth respondents, existing education and skills did not match the types of jobs demanded in the labour market (Figure 3.15). University-educated youth are experiencing high unemployment rates because they do not meet formal labour market needs. Technical and vocational training institutions do not have clear standards for curriculum development and training based on job market demand.

These barriers also explain why large numbers of young people end up in the low-paying informal sector, as unpaid family workers or self-employed. From the survey for this report, about 70 percent of youth in both paid and unpaid work were seeking different jobs, with this proportion higher in south central Somalia and among women. Among those looking for a different job, low pay in the present job was cited as the main reason, followed by the need for a full-time job, a lack of job satisfaction and low returns from self-employment.

During the focus group discussions, participants repeatedly raised the issue of how youth unemployment has created various social ills, resulting in marginalization, impoverishment and the wasting of enormous human resources.


Box 3.6: Women Don't Need to Apply for Jobs Here

A 70-year-old clan Chief from Balad/Mogadishu has a family that includes himself, his wife and their eight children. His daughter Fatima is the youngest of his children and was educated in private schools through college. After graduating from SIMAD Institute of Business Administration and Management, she applied for a vacancy in a telecommunications company in Mogadishu.

Although at the time of the interview no one from the company had informed her that she would not be hired because she is a woman, she found out later that the company 'prefers' men over women. The position was given to a male. Fatima and her father later realized that this company recruits women only as cleaners. The Chief thinks that business owners have not yet accepted that women have the same rights as men.

Source: Interview with clan Chief, Balad/Mogadishu for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 3.15: Mismatch Between Education and Labour Demand (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Forced Migration

Usually forced migration applies only to people who flee from conflict or natural disaster, while economic migration is considered voluntary. However, the economic situation in Somalia is so severe that economic migration as a coping strategy can also be considered, by some, forced. Frustrated by the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities, a very high percentage of youth would leave the country if they could, despite difficulties in migration (Box 3.7).

About two-thirds of youth respondents said they intend to leave the country. The proportion was

highest in south central Somalia at 87 percent, with no significant difference between male and female respondents (Figure 3.16). For 64 percent, getting a well-paid job was the main incentive to leave the country. Better educational opportunities and escaping from conflict were cited by about 17 percent of respondents. The proportion of those willing to leave the country to escape from conflict was highest in south central Somalia at about 31 percent.

Political Exclusion

The participation of youth in political decision-making processes, from the grassroots to

The participation of youth in political decision-making processes, from the grassroots to the national level, is a necessary prerequisite for political empowerment.


Box 3.7: Our Dream Was to Flee the Country

“I was very jealous of young diaspora guys who visited to the country and got married to young beautiful women in the locality. As local boys, we cannot marry because we do not have jobs and good education. Then I and six other friends (four boys and two girls) decided to migrate to Europe through Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya to Italy. We were arrested in South Sudan by rebels of John Garang who harassed us and took everything, and raped the girls. After two days we started our journey to Khartoum where again the Sudanese army imprisoned us for 19 months, after which we came back to Mogadishu.

“However, we did not stop pursuing our dream to flee from the country. This time we went through the Kenya border but again were imprisoned in Garissa, Kenya, for two months and brutally beaten in the prison where they asked us for ransom before being released. This time we experienced poor health. Now I feel so lucky because I am still alive while many of my peers died in the high seas, in prisons in Africa or from attacks by wild animals on their way to Europe, the Arab States or Southern Africa.”

Source: Interview with Jamac Said, Mogadishu, for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 3.16: Respondents Willing to Migrate (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

the national level, is a necessary prerequisite for political empowerment, and for making governments more responsive and effective in reducing poverty. Young people need the opportunity and the capacity to express their views without fear of retribution. National youth councils, youth parliaments and regional youth-based advocacy groups are some forms of representation mechanisms for young people.

In Somalia, the political and cultural exclusion of the young from decision-making has taken root in the political culture. Youth are often engaged

in civil society, but are very absent from other realms. Those aspiring to leadership or political positions are confronted by discrimination based on age, including legal barriers. The Somaliland Constitution, for example, requires candidates running for the House of Representatives to be at least 35 years old, and those contesting for the House of Elders to be at least 45.¹⁹³ Recently, the Government there has adopted a constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum age limit for contesting local council elections from 35 to 25. SONYO spearheaded the campaign to change the age limit. Political parties, while getting

the largest number of votes from youth, do not accommodate them at the executive and central committee levels.

Youth are also excluded in candidate selection processes through the clan system, which is biased against them. In south central Somalia, some youth are not comfortable with traditional leaders because they do not adapt to social change, which leads to clashes.

Voluntary Organizations

When youth organize themselves collectively, they are more likely to have their voices heard and their demands met, with the community level being one important entry point. To better judge the existence of different community organizations, the organizational outreach index has been computed using the 2005/2006 community survey data for Somalia.¹⁹⁴ The method used to calculate this index is similar to the community well-being index described in Chapter 2 (Annex 2). The overall organizational outreach index for Somalia is estimated at 0.33 out of 1 (Figure 3.17). The outreach of youth organizations is among the lowest categories (0.14 out of 1), followed by women's groups.


This finding was supported by the report's survey, which found that less than 20 percent of youth respondents (22 percent male compared to 15 percent female) were members of youth organizations, followed by 13 percent in recreational and sports groups, and 10 percent in women's groups.

Youth participation in other voluntary organizations was marginal at less than 8 percent (Figure 3.18). This perhaps reflected either the very limited presence of youth organizations or limited priority accorded to enlisting youth members. Gender gaps in participation were more pronounced in youth organizations and recreational groups, where male youth outnumbered the female youth. Even in women's groups, outreach to female youth was low at 15 percent. This was attributed mainly to resistance from women's groups, which normally prefer older women in their organizations. The issue of how discrimination against female youth persists even within women's organizations came out during the focus group discussions.

Among those who were members of youth organizations, the degree of youth participation in organizational decision-making was fairly


When youth organize themselves collectively, they are more likely to have their voices heard and their demands met, with the community level being one important entry point.

Figure 3.17: Community Organisational Outreach Index



Source: UNDP/World Bank. *Participatory Community Survey in Somalia 2005/6*.

Figure 3.18: Youth Participation in Local Organisations (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

good, with one-third of respondents stating their participation was high, compared to 38 percent reporting a moderate level, and the rest a low or negligible level. The overall degree of the youth participation rate measured by the mean score was 3.1 out of 5, or 62 percent, indicating a reasonably fair degree of participation.¹⁹⁵ The gender difference in the participation rate was marginal—2.95 for female youth compared to 3.13 for male youth. The degree of participation was lowest in Puntland.

A number of barriers limited youth from participating in voluntary organizations, with marked gender and regional variations. The lack of education and gender discrimination featured prominently and consistently as critical barriers in all regions, as reported by 29 percent and 27 percent of youth respondents, respectively (Figure 3.19). Illiterate youth and young women were often excluded from youth organizations. Discrimination on the basis of political and clan/cultural affiliations, age, occupation and poverty were other barriers. Obstacles were more pronounced in south central Somalia, where about two-thirds of the respondents said they had experienced discrimination on the basis of clan and cultural and political affiliation. Gender discrimination was more acute in south central Somalia, experienced by 52 percent of young women compared to just 15 percent of young men.

Entering Politics


The survey revealed a sharp contrast in political affiliations between youth in south central Somalia and those in Somaliland and Puntland, with about 32 percent of youth in south central Somalia reporting involvement in political parties compared to virtually insignificant proportions in the northern zones. Less than 20 percent of youth respondents expressed a desire to be more involved in the political process, with south central Somalia recording the lowest response at 9 percent, followed by a slightly higher proportion in Puntland and a much higher proportion in Somaliland at 34 percent (Figure 3.20).

Based on the consultative discussions with the youth, the low level of interest in politics reflects a lack of faith and trust in the political process, and loss of confidence in its ability to initiate change. It also indicates fear of the consequences of taking part in political activity due to protracted conflict and social turmoil.

Perceptions of Peace and Conflict


Youth respondents identified competition for political power, followed by the struggle for resources and inter-clan/family conflict as the major sources of violence in Somalia. These perceptions varied greatly by region, but with no noticeable gender differences. In contrast

Figure 3.19: Barriers to Youth Participation (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 3.20: Youth's Desire to be Involved in Politics (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.


to south central Somalia, where 91 percent of youth experienced conflict, only 10 percent of youth have experienced conflict in Somaliland; Puntland lies between these extremes at 31 percent. Resource conflict was by far the most important source of conflict in Puntland, with sexual violence against women being reportedly insignificant (Figure 3.21).

Among those who reported different types of conflict, a vast majority of respondents in

south central Somalia noted a general increase in all types of conflicts, compared to about 25 percent in Puntland and a virtually insignificant proportion in Somaliland. The majority of youth in both Somaliland and Puntland reported consistent or declining levels of conflicts over resources, sexual violence against women and inter-family conflicts.

For the majority of youth, poor governance was the root cause of conflicts in all regions; in south

Figure 3.21: Presence of Conflict in the Community (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Youth respondents identified competition for political power, followed by the struggle for resources and inter-clan/family conflict as the major sources of violence in Somalia.

central Somalia, radicalism or fundamentalism was the most frequently cited cause. In Somaliland, 40 percent of youth respondents cited unemployment as a major cause or risk factor for the outbreak of conflict.

When asked about the level of peace in their community, a strong majority of survey respondents in south central Somalia reported a very violent situation, compared to a general perception of peace among youth in Somaliland. In Puntland, a quarter reported unstable or violent situations, another quarter was indifferent and the remaining 50 percent said their situation was peaceful. The overall peace mean score rated on a 1 (very violent) to 5 (very peaceful) scale works out to be 3.5 out of 5 in Somalia, with the lowest peace score in south central Somalia at 2.1 and the highest in Somaliland at 4.6 (Figure 3.22).

Violence and Justice


Violence and crime occur in numerous ways in Somalia (Box 3.8). Besides factional militias fighting for political power and control of territory and resources, there are criminal activities and banditry; private disputes over property and marriage; and vendettas related to rapes, family disagreements and abductions. Weak governance and corruption are also closely linked with violence and crime, especially

organized crime. Legal frameworks designed to protect youth in crisis situations have largely proven ineffective, while development efforts have allowed other priorities to take precedence.

As with illicit drug and substance abuse, under-reporting is a common problem in most surveys of crimes. The abuse of children and adolescents is a particularly hidden problem; studies regularly show that much goes undisclosed, for many reasons.¹⁹⁶ Children and adolescents are easily intimidated by offenders and fear retaliation. And families, children and adolescents often wish to deal with crime and victimization informally. They sometimes fear the consequences of disclosure to authorities, and police and court involvement.

Youth survey respondents were asked to share their experiences of different forms of violence and crimes in the last year, along with their perceptions of the justice system. About a quarter said that they had been victims of a physical attack at least twice in the last year, compared to less than 10 percent who said they had experienced property crimes, sexual violence, forced detention or kidnapping (Figure 3.23). There were no significant gender differences in whether or not men and women had experienced different types of violence, although women experienced violence more frequently than men.

Figure 3.22: Youth Perceptions of Peace



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Box 3.8: Flagrant Violations of Human Rights

Punishments such as amputations and stoning illustrate the extent to which violence still substitutes for the rule of law in many areas of Somalia. UN human rights staff has received credible reports that, in areas controlled by insurgent groups, ad hoc tribunals are judging and sentencing civilians without due process, including death sentences by stoning or decapitation, amputation of limbs and other forms of corporal punishment. The lack of accountability, especially with regard to serious violation and abuse of human rights and international humanitarian law, has contributed to a culture of impunity. With the exception of Somaliland and Puntland, rule of law is virtually non-existent in Somalia, in particular in the south central region.

A more worrisome development is the extreme interpretations of sharia law by hard-line Islamists in areas under their control. They have led to severe corporal punishment, including the amputation of hands of alleged criminals. According to one report, in an incident on 3 July, Islamist forces in the Marka district of Shabelle Hoose (Lower Shabelle) amputated the right hand of a man accused of stealing cattle in Gandabe. The sentence was carried out publicly in front of hundreds of residents. After the amputation, the man was reportedly taken to the hospital for treatment while his hand was paraded around town to serve as a lesson to other residents.


Source: United Nations 2009.

Youth in Somaliland experience the lowest incidence of violence. Puntland surpasses the other areas in all forms of violence except forced detention, which is more pronounced in south central Somalia. About 38 percent of youth respondents in Puntland compared to 26 percent in south central were victims of a physical attack in the last year. A low rate of sexual violence and rape was common in all areas, ranging from 2 percent to 13 percent, possibly because female youth, the main victims, were less likely to

disclose such cases in the face of deep cultural and social stigmas.

Among those who reported a crime to authorities, a physical attack was the most commonly cited case at 50 percent, followed by property crimes at 32 percent. A little over a quarter admitted to having reported sexual violence, kidnapping and forced detention. Male youth were more likely to report crimes to authorities than female youth, especially in cases of sexual violence or rape, abduction and forced detention. Less than

Figure 3.23: Experience of Violence Within the Previous Year



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Usually, issues of violence against individuals or members of the household are dealt with by customary law and not through official channels.

5 percent of female youth reported these crimes to authorities, compared to over 43 percent of male youth.¹⁹⁷

The low reporting to authority is influenced by other factors, with significant variations in accessing justice across the regions. Usually, issues of violence against individuals or members of the household are dealt with by customary law and not through official channels. Victims report their grievances to their elders and traditional leaders, friends or other trusted advisors for resolving the problem without the help of authorities. When survey respondents were asked how easy it was to seek justice from the existing mechanisms—namely, community elders, religious leaders, councils of elders, judicial courts and police—their most frequently cited recourse involved the community elders, followed by religious leaders. About 54 percent of respondents reported having very easy access to community elders for seeking justice. In contrast, for almost 50 percent of the respondents, access to judicial courts and police was difficult.

During the focus group discussions, community-based justice systems carried out by clan/

community elders were also reported to be the major sources for justice, followed by councils of elders and judicial courts. The groups, particularly members from non-urban households, perceived traditional systems of justice as more accessible.

The survey further revealed to what extent youth trust the existing justice systems. The level of trust in the court system was low in most cases, especially in south central Somalia. Overall, community elders and religious leaders ranked first in terms of trust, followed by judicial courts and police. A recent victimization survey conducted by UNDP Somalia in Galkayo¹⁹⁸ found that trust in the police increases among individuals who have actually been exposed to crime, and superseded trust in elders among those who have experienced homicide in their household.

Asked about discrimination in accessing justice, over two-thirds of youth in the survey believed that discrimination on the basis of caste, clan and economic status has remained either unchanged or become worse. Young women were more likely to experience discrimination in accessing justice than young men. This may

be why 70 percent of young women reported discrimination as either unchanged or worse, compared to 53 percent of young men.

Youth said they are often subject to arbitrary imprisonment or temporary arrest by the police on the order of a parent, traditional leader or group of sub-clan elders, without any legal process. In general, they complained that violations of their rights and enforcements of their claims were not taken seriously in the law enforcement system.¹⁹⁹

While women are often targeted for violence, most victims and perpetrators of violent crime are young men. Successful social and economic integration of disaffected young men, ex-combatants, refugees and IDPs, including by stimulating youth-centred employment generation strategies, should be a critical development goal in conflict-affected countries like Somalia.


How Serious are Different Problems?

Youth perceptions of the seriousness of various problems in Somalia were rated on a scale of 1 (not a problem) to 5 (extremely serious) and depicted in Figure 3.24. The result showed wide regional variations in the seriousness of

different social, political and environmental concerns, with the overall situation, as measured by a mean score, being the worst in south central Somalia at 4.2, followed by Puntland at 3.7 and Somaliland at 3.4. As expected, south central surpassed the other zones in terms of the severity of the problems of human insecurity, lawlessness, sexual violence against women, presence of armed groups and IDPs, human trafficking, crime and theft. Environmental damage and fuel shortages were rated as more serious in Somaliland than in other regions. Youth unemployment was perceived as a universal problem, ranking first with a mean score of 4.3 out of 5, and affirming that this is the biggest challenge to youth empowerment in Somalia. This was followed by human and environmental insecurity at 3.9.

There were significant gender differences in opinions, especially on domestic and sexual violence against women, fuel shortages and environmental crisis. Female youth respondents saw these as more serious problems than their male counterparts in all regions, because women bear the brunt of the impacts, including through their struggle to stay safe while fulfilling their

Figure 3.24: Rating of Youth Opinions on Seriousness of Problems (mean score)



Youth unemployment was perceived as a universal problem, ... affirming that this is the biggest challenge to youth empowerment in Somalia.

Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

The disconnect between education and employment opportunities was the biggest hurdle youth face in getting jobs, and perhaps the key obstacle to their social and economic empowerment.

traditional gender role of gathering fuels from a declining resource base.

Voices and Choices

Youth rated their opinions on statements concerning youth issues using a five-point ordinal scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This exercise was designed to capture perceptions of relative deprivations and associated survival strategies, along with perspectives on family support and gender equality.

Youth is a category cutting across all culturally defined identity groups, but it is also a generational identity group in its own right. When youth suffer more deprivation and exclusion than other identity groups, this may lead to risky survival strategies. A close examination of the mean score (Figure 3.25) revealed some distinct commonalities and differences in youth opinions across the three regions. The most notable common pattern was that south central Somalia fares worst on almost all issues, reflected by mean scores consistently exceeding four out of five.


On issues related to youth exclusions and grievances, scores varied by issue and region,

ranging from 3.3 for youths as victim and perpetrators of conflict in Somaliland to 4.7 for youth exclusion and grievances in south central Somalia. There were no noticeable gender differences. Almost four-fifths of youth respondents in south central Somalia, compared to less than half in Somaliland and Puntland, strongly agreed that youth suffer more exclusion than other groups.

The disconnect between education and employment opportunities was the biggest hurdle youth face in getting jobs, and perhaps the key obstacle to their social and economic empowerment. Youth voices were very strong and consistent on this issue, with a mean score of 4 across Somalia. A majority of youth respondents said that they had no outlet for participation to express their needs and aspirations, with scores ranging from 3.8 in Puntland to 4.3 in south central Somalia.

On coping with multiple crises, youth were asked to rate their opinion on violent and non-violent strategies. As motives for youth engagement in violence, both financial and non-material gains, such as physical protection, ranked high in south central Somalia with a mean score of 4.4. On

Figure 3.25: Youth Perception of Exclusion and Coping Strategies (mean score)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

the issue of youth as victims (including forced recruitment) and perpetrators of conflict, south central Somalia again ranks the worst, followed by Puntland. A statement about youth forced to leave the country for better opportunities as a non-violent coping strategy was strongly supported by the vast majority of respondents in all regions, especially in south central Somalia.

A Youth Frustration Index

Caught between deep-rooted conflict and poverty, and being jobless and voiceless, Somali youth are becoming increasingly frustrated. Their energy and enthusiasm, and inbuilt desire for change are systematically thwarted through exclusion and deprivation.

Basic issues like the lack of proper parental care and guidance, lack of quality education and employable skills, unemployment, the high cost of living, lack of self-esteem and feelings of humiliation, limited space to participate in decision-making, inadequate recreational facilities, poor governance and weak economic support systems are all fomenting youth restiveness. To capture the prominence of these factors, and develop an index gauging levels of


frustration, youth respondents were asked to rate their opinion on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with mean scores for the three regions presented in Figure 3.26.

The overall frustration index score in Somalia worked out at 3.96 out of 5, with the highest frustration being observed in south central Somalia at 4.3, compared to the northern zones at 3.7. Across the regions, south central Somalia scored the highest in all predisposing factors for youth restiveness, ranging from the lowest score on feelings of humiliation to the highest on lack of employment opportunities. A similar ranking was discernible in both Somaliland and Puntland.

The relatively low scores on feelings of humiliation and lack of self-esteem reflected the chance that youth have not yet lost hope for a bright future, despite the formidable challenges. This notion was confirmed across all three zones (Figure 3.27). Even in south central Somalia, about 80 percent of respondents were either very optimistic or fairly optimistic, with no gender difference in optimism. This is a clear manifestation of the aspiration of Somali youth to harness their potential as active agents of change.

Caught between deep-rooted conflict and poverty, and being jobless and voiceless, Somali youth are becoming increasingly frustrated.


Figure 3.26: Youth Frustration and Underlying Causes (mean score)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

... youth have not yet lost hope for a bright future, despite the formidable challenges.

Figure 3.27: Youth Optimism About Future Prospects (%)



Source: Survey conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Conclusion

A large youth cohort in Somalia presents both opportunities and threats. Much depends on how quickly youth empowerment actions for peace and development are put in place. Bold actions will be costly, but delay in taking them could be devastating, posing a further threat to the hard-won socio-economic resilience of turbulent Somalia. In particular, if the task of providing education and jobs for youth continues to be neglected, the fallout could be disastrous for Somalia and the world.

Youth unemployment in Somalia is possibly the worst in the world. Fed by multiple shocks, it is the source of multiple ills—greater marginalization, poverty and wasted potential. Success in tackling this challenge will depend on a diversified and growing economy that expands employment opportunities, and on appropriate policy interventions, especially macroeconomic

and labour market policies designed to draw benefits from the huge numbers of youth entering the workforce. These interventions must address both demand and supply considerations, and should encompass both policies and programmes specifically targeted to youth. Addressing perceptions and attitudes around youth employment should form an integral part of the response. And there should be broad recognition that no single player or action can solve the challenge of addressing the obstacles faced by youth in their transition from childhood to adulthood and coping with the frustrations of those who cannot find a place. Failure to address this group will cause further discontent which, because of the factors of history, will create further cycles of conflict and violence at all levels, from individual perpetration of crime against the disadvantaged and disenfranchised to recruitment in international criminality and terrorism.

... there should be broad recognition that no single player or action can solve the challenge of addressing the obstacles faced by youth in their transition from childhood to adulthood.

Chapter 4

Empowering Youth for Inclusive Development

Empowering Youth for Inclusive Development

Chapter 3 explored obstacles faced by youth in Somalia, and how multiple exclusions and disempowerment have blocked their transition to adulthood. Increased poverty, social inequalities, low-quality education, gender discrimination, widespread unemployment, weak health systems and a marginalized position amid rapid globalization are the bitter realities within which young Somalis live. The link between youth unemployment and exclusion is clearly established; an inability to find a job creates vulnerability and social alienation, and heightens the attraction of illegal activities, conflict and violence, with grave implications for the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Youth exclusion is a classic example of structural violence²⁰⁰ and a serious violation of human rights and freedoms—a brutal suppression of human development.

With Somalia's youth affected by conflict as soldiers, civilians, family members and students, engaging them as strategic actors in development requires a holistic approach. This should be based on empowerment, and seek to unleash the positive potentials of youth. So far, support for youth development has largely been based on solving problems rather than fostering empowerment, and implemented in a mostly ad hoc and fragmented manner. Much has been narrowly defined in terms of interventions in single sectors, particularly education, vocational training and employment generation.

What are the most effective means to address the multitude of challenges facing youth in Somalia today? What are the lessons from national and international experiences in engaging youth as strategic development actors and peacebuilders in conflict-affected areas? What conditions and strategic actions can empower youth to engage as catalytic agents of change in an inclusive development process? These are some of the questions that need to be answered.

This chapter will assess existing youth policies and programmes in Somalia, highlight some gaps and consider how an empowerment framework could fill these. It concludes with a strategic plan for action that illustrates how governments and other actors can fully harness the potential of youth as agents of change and peace.

Youth Policies and Programmes

The many issues faced by youth—learning, working, staying healthy, forming families and exercising citizenship—call for a coherent national youth policy well integrated into national development strategies, and reflected in sectoral policies and programmes. Young people should participate in the design and implementation of all plans that affect them.


In the survey for this report, the majority of youth in Somalia expressed their willingness to play a role as socioeconomic actors, with no significant gender difference (Figure 4.1). Across the three regions, willingness was highest in south central Somalia (58 percent), followed by Puntland and Somaliland. Interestingly, youth from all areas attached more importance to their roles as peacebuilders than as social and economic actors (Chapter 5). Youth agreed that peacebuilding activities cannot be sustained unless backed by tangible economic programmes, and stressed peacebuilding as an integral component of youth development and empowerment.

National Policies

In general, Somalia has suffered from a vacuum in national youth policies. This along with low enforcement of existing laws and the governance failure in managing the conflict reflect and exacerbate the exclusion of youth. Recently, both Somaliland and Puntland formulated national youth policies with UNICEF support

With Somalia's youth affected by conflict as soldiers, civilians, family members and students, engaging them as strategic actors in development requires a holistic approach. This should be based on empowerment, and seek to unleash the positive potentials of youth.

Figure 4.1: Willingness to be a Socioeconomic Actor (%)



Source: Data gathered for the Somalia HDR 2012.

The many issues faced by youth—learning, working, staying healthy, forming families and exercising citizenship—call for a coherent national youth policy ...

through broad consultations with all key stakeholders, including young people.²⁰¹ These milestones have recently been ratified (August–September 2011), and provide the basis for devising well-integrated and coordinated implementation mechanisms. They are similar in goals, priority strategies and underlying actions, including by targeting special at-risk youth groups²⁰² (Table 4.1). Both recommend the formulation of national youth action plans, youth empowerment/development funds²⁰³ and national youth policy monitoring task groups comprising youth representatives.

Implementation will depend very much on political will, and how well these policies are anchored in mainstream development strategies backed by appropriate resources, and the extent to which they engage youth. Youth policies typically encounter some common limits, such as poor coordination across policies and sectors that affect youth, limited accountability for youth outcomes, and a weak voice for young people in monitoring and providing feedback on the quality of service delivery. A key obstacle to addressing youth development in a comprehensive manner has been the lack of specific policy benchmarks that reflect the poverty and development challenges of youth. To date, the development data on youth have been fragmented, and there has been very little

systematic data collection to assess the social and economic conditions of youth.

Donor-supported Programmes

Various youth service organizations have undertaken a number of donor-supported youth programmes in Somalia over the past decades (Box 4.1). During the consultations with youth groups for this report, it became clear that these programmes are scattered and poorly coordinated, with little documented evidence of success and failure. Even in relatively peaceful and stable Somaliland and Puntland, the nature and scale of the interventions do not match the pressing problems faced by youth. In many cases, efforts are short-term, haphazard and duplicated, with no emphasis on sustainability. A rapid mapping of existing youth-focused programmes during the youth consultative workshops for this report revealed a number of insights highlighted here.

Donor-supported youth programmes are mostly concentrated in Somaliland and Puntland, since insecurity in south central Somalia has severely limited the scope of operations for the international community.²⁰⁴ Most interventions target youth in more formal settings, such as schools and urban areas, leaving out a larger number of the most vulnerable youth. A lack of regionally disaggregated baseline data on

Table 4.1: National Youth Policies for Puntland and Somaliland

Puntland	Somaliland
1 Education skills and training • Building quality education. • Enhance the educational opportunities for all youth at all levels of the education system. • Ensure gender equity in educational participation. • Review and revise the school curriculum to reflect the values and economic needs and opportunities of Puntland. 2 Youth participation and leadership development • Strengthen the awareness of young people and the wider community regarding active and responsible citizenship. • Provide support for young people to actively participate in community life. • Recognize the importance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the fulfilment of its obligations. 3 Disarmament, security and peacebuilding • Implement a national disarmament programme. • Develop a campaign to discourage piracy and ransom. • Develop awareness of peacebuilding through campaigns. 4 Sustainable livelihoods and youth employment • Design and implement a National Youth Employment Action Plan. 5 Recreation, sports, youth centres, arts and culture • Design and implement a multipurpose Youth and Sports Centre Programme • Enhance the knowledge, understanding and appreciation of young people regarding Somali culture, history and the Islamic faith. 6 Healthy lifestyles • Enable all young people to be able to access information, education and counselling services in the areas of youth health priorities. • Campaign to reduce <i>khat</i> chewing and smoking dependency. • Prevent and control the spread of HIV and AIDS and mitigate negative social impacts. 7 Sustainable development and the environment • Enhance environmental knowledge and awareness among young Puntlanders.	1 Education and training • Increase accessibility and student participation by making education more appealing and readily available to all. • Devise strategies for improving gender balance in school attendance and retention, and teacher recruitment. • Expand opportunities for technical vocational education and training (TVET). • Empower non-formal education and expand it in all regions 2 Employment creation, economic participation and poverty reduction • Design and implement a national youth employment strategy. • Promote youth self-employment as a job option. • Create linkages between education and training institutions and the local labour markets. • Promote awareness of labour laws. 3 Healthy and quality lifestyles • Enable all young people to be able to access information, education, counselling and support services in youth health. • Campaign to reduce <i>khat</i> chewing and smoking dependency and other substance abuse. • Prevent and control the spread of HIV and AIDS and mitigate against their social impacts. 4 Youth participation and citizenship • Strengthen the awareness of young people and the wider community regarding active and responsible citizenship. • Provide practical support for young people to actively participate in community and national life. 5 Gender equity and empowerment of young women • Identify and focus on specific actions to empower young women to enjoy their rights to health, recreation, education and employment opportunities. • Create specific structures and services to provide young men and women with greater participation in community life. 6 Security and peace • Create opportunities for young people to contribute to peacebuilding and stability. 7 Justice and juvenile delinquency • Implement appropriate legislation and rehabilitation measures for juvenile delinquents.

Youth agreed that peacebuilding activities cannot be sustained unless backed by tangible economic programmes, and stressed peacebuilding as an integral component of youth development and empowerment.

Puntland	Somaliland
- Encourage the active involvement and leadership of young people in environmental initiatives. 8 Gender and human rights - Identify and focus on specific actions that deny young women enjoying their rights to health, recreation, education and employment opportunities. - Support young Puntlanders to become aware of their rights and obligations, and to experience such rights and obligations. 9 Civic education - Develop appropriate school and community-based civic education curriculum, resource materials and awareness activities. 10 Immigration and the diaspora - Focus on alternative options for would-be illegal migrants. - Mobilize the resource capacity of the diaspora. 11 ICT and globalization - Develop ICT as a key focus in school curriculum reform. - Focus on ICT as a key youth job creation area. - Strengthen initiatives related to youth and media.	8 Environment - Enhance environmental knowledge/awareness among youth. - Encourage the active involvement and leadership of young people in environmental initiatives. 9 Sports and recreation - Design and implement a youth sports and recreation strategy that enhances access, equity and opportunity for youth. 10 ICT and globalization - Develop ICT as a key focus in school curriculum reform. - Focus on ICT as a key youth job creation area. 11 Arts and culture - Enhance the knowledge, understanding and appreciation of young people regarding Somaliland culture. 12 Immigration and diaspora - Focus on alternative options for immigrants. - Mobilize the resource capacity of the diaspora.

Without a coherent national policy framework, youth programmes still operate mainly in discrete sectors.

different categories of youth has limited the scope for realistic programming in response to the actual needs of young people in different environments.

A rights-based orientation dominates (protection, basic education, psycho-social work and advocacy), followed by socio-political (peace education and support for youth organizations) and economic programmes (vocational training, short-term job-creation).²⁰⁵ Without a coherent national policy framework, youth programmes still operate mainly in discrete sectors. There is limited evidence of the integration of youth programmes into broader national policies and their links to regional policies on employment, poverty reduction and MDG acceleration.

While empowerment is the cornerstone of holistic youth programming, it is seen as the means but not the end goal in many youth programmes. Few programmes seek to ensure inclusiveness through top-level policy reforms and empowerment through bottom-up, community-based youth

development strategies. Despite a growing emphasis on holistic and integrated approaches, a gap exists between donor rhetoric and practice. Little attention is being paid to identifying youth by their motivation for engaging in conflict—whether financial gains, historical grievances or coercion—even though this is key to designing appropriately targeted programmes.

Participants in the survey for this report felt that youth programmes were isolated, and that many agencies still engaged in discrete projects rather than longer-term, more ambitious programmes. They felt this led to a duplication of efforts. For example, in Somaliland, out of 55 organizations listed for mapping, 83 percent are running education programmes with a high degree of duplication within the same region. In the Maroodijeex region, 16 out of 24 organizations are involved in education.

Youth pointed out that the short-term nature of donor-funded projects based on lengthy

Box 4.1: Donor-supported Programmes for Youth

Through UNDP's community security programme, women, youth and marginalized groups are empowered to contribute meaningfully to public life, particularly safety and security decision-making. At least 4,000 youth have been provided with life skills education, vocational training and psycho-social care, and mobilized around community security. Though not directly youth targeted, the UNDP Employment Generation for Early Recovery (EGER) project has supported a number of activities to improve living conditions through the provision of short- and long-term employment opportunities, rehabilitation of infrastructure, skills training and capacity development and innovative income generation options.

The ILO provides policy advice to strengthen labour market policies and programmes for youth employment and capacity building for governments, employers and workers' organizations, and technical assistance in formulating and implementing national youth employment programmes focusing on employment-intensive investment, skills development, youth entrepreneurship, access to finance and other targeted labour market measures. It also supports advocacy and awareness-raising activities to promote decent work for youth, with a focus on employability, employment creation, and worker's rights and advisory services. This takes place through the Centre for Employment and Micro-economic Development, the Somali Youth for Employment website and grant schemes for youth-led initiatives.

UNICEF has been supporting programmes comprising life skills-based education (interpersonal skills, problem-solving, conflict resolution and decision-making) and business skills (business ideas and business plan techniques, and provision of grants to successful business plans). Girls' leadership initiatives, programmes on citizenship, youth broadcasting ventures, youth multipurpose centres and youth-led community-based programmes are other initiatives.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assists with youth-friendly health services, such as through the integration of adolescent sexual and reproductive health issues into health policies in Somaliland and Puntland; a mapping of outlets providing youth-friendly health services; and peer education initiatives, including those using theatre. Youth peer networks have been established in Somaliland and Puntland.

Under Jobs for Peace and Stability through Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has developed the Junior Farmer Fields and Life Schools programme to allow young people to take part in agricultural production in their communities. It combines support for vocational education with employment promotion. Graduates are encouraged to organize Youth Farmers' Associations to help access resources and market their products.

Source: Extracted from UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA and FAO programmes in Somalia.

project documents meant that many initiatives were terminated before their components were fully understood, and had little scope for social mobilization and partnership building. They stated that many youth programmes are implemented by non-youth organizations with marginal youth participation. High expectations raised by programmes through awareness and capacity building are not backed by tangible and sustainable economic assistance, creating a mismatch between social and economic empowerment, and leading to disenchantment and frustration.

Existing job creation programmes are mostly supply-driven, offering training and skills development and job counselling, with no attention paid to tackling the demand side,

such as through public works programmes and sustainable microfinance, self-employment or entrepreneurship schemes. These initiatives are typically short-term relief measures based on the general assumption that mass youth unemployment can drive violent conflict, rather than on a specific analysis of the economic, social and political factors underlying conflict in a particular region.

Given the emerging consensus on the critical role of youth in the national development process, documentation of best practices and lessons learnt becomes an important contribution to improving the quality and scope of programming for youth development. Key elements that constitute a best practice in youth development and empowerment include:²⁰⁶ 1) participation

Youth policies are more likely to be successful if youth issues are well integrated across national policy, planning and implementation mechanisms, with traditional line ministries implementing most aspects.

(as full partners in multidimensional initiatives and not just token participation); 2) innovation (by introducing innovative ways of reaching out to youth); 3) strategic capacity enhancement (integral to all youth development programmes, and linked to employable skills); 4) knowledge and rights-based approaches (developing a knowledge base to be of practical use in policy formulation and programming, and taking a holistic perspective on youth development issues, rather than a narrow or sectoral response to the needs of youth); 5) community engagement and commitment; 6) strategic partnerships (multiple partnerships for a multi-sectoral approach to respond to the diverse needs of youth); and 7) the potential for scaling up.

From this perspective, there are very few innovative and proven youth-focused projects with potential for wider replication and upscaling. Evaluation of donor interventions has been limited, so evidence of success is also limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with less focus given to measuring the impacts on conflict or the sustainability of employment. Where replication would be warranted, it is limited by the absence of linkages and coordination with government policies and programmes.

Other weaknesses include limited partnerships between youth and government agencies; limited funds and slow delivery of resources; a lack of information and shared experiences; and the absence of participatory monitoring and evaluation systems.

The youth consultative workshops for this report also shed light on the problems faced by existing youth organizations, chief among them being the lack of inclusive participation and representation of both young men and women, the limited role of members in decision-making, funding scarcity, and weak organizational capacity and networking. Participants rated youth organizations as moderate in their degree of participation, with little transparency and low accountability. They considered them at a medium level in terms of leadership quality, poor in trust and solidarity, and negligible in organizational strength for conflict management.

Considerations for Stronger Policies

Youth in the survey for this report affirmed the importance of integrating national youth policies into national development strategies, coupled with creating youth-led institutional mechanisms to implement and monitor a community-driven development programme for youth empowerment. More effective youth policies could be guided by the following considerations.

Integration is effective: Youth policies are more likely to be successful if youth issues are well integrated across national policy, planning and implementation mechanisms, with traditional line ministries implementing most aspects. One potential opportunity for establishing a coherent national framework lies in integrating a youth policy into national development strategies recently formulated by the government in Somaliland.²⁰⁷ Equally important are sound implementation modalities with clear roles for youth and other sectoral ministries, as well as for youth councils, the private sector and civil society organizations. Considering that youth issues are not prominently featured in the MDGs, national development strategies and action plans should take an integrated view of the needs of young people.

Coordination must cross sectors: Since issues and outcomes in one sector are influenced by policies in another, there must be effective coordination between youth and other sectoral ministries, with clear lines of accountability. Currently, ministries or departments of youth in Puntland and Somaliland have little or no influence over other sectoral ministries responsible for the bulk of policies that affect youth. A clear implementation modality needs to be defined, along with benchmarks for monitoring desired youth outcomes and how effectively youth are involved in implementation and monitoring.

Youth need space to speak: The formation of a national youth council and national youth policy monitoring task force comprising youth representatives are important steps. Fully realizing their potential will require an

empowering space for youth to fully participate in, influence and hold accountable all institutions that affect their lives.

Setting priorities based on proven success:

Too many policies directed at young people are promising but unproven, a serious impediment to wider replication and upscaling.²⁰⁸ This also complicates the right choice of entry points for priority interventions because they have not been tested on the ground, a critical step for devising successful national youth action plans, particularly in fragile countries like Somalia. The Somaliland and Puntland national youth policies make no references to proven success, either from inside or outside Somalia. Part of the problem lies in supply-driven policy formulation and implementation. Through demand-driven community-based youth programmes, many innovative strategies for empowering youth could be tested, and demonstrated successes anchored in national policy for rolling out across the country.

Implementing a coherent and integrated national framework for youth requires strong capacities, including for analysis, policy development, implementation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. These have traditionally been weak in Somalia. As in many developing countries, the Ministry of Youth and its departments are under-resourced in monetary and human resources, although their work can be enhanced through inputs from organizations that represent the interests of young people.

Towards Better Programmes

There are some youth programmes currently operating in Somalia that show promise, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded Somali youth livelihood programme called Shaqodoon (Box 4.2) and the UNICEF life skills programme (Box 4.3). Education Development Centre, Inc. (EDC), in partnership with the business community, local authorities, and local and international organizations, implemented Shaqodoon in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia, which worked “to establish systems that bridge supply and demand

with necessary support to young people and employers” and reached thousands of Somali youth to provide them with greater opportunities to work, learn and develop self-employment prospects. Youth, parents, business owners, and government authorities considered the training effective and the placement opportunities beneficial for youth’s long-term employment prospects.

Although the programme concluded in December 2011, an NGO in Hargeisa known by the same name and inspired by the Shaqodoon programme, is currently implementing key elements of the programme.

UNDP’s EGER project is another promising example. Started in mid-2008, it seeks to generate employment opportunities and income for vulnerable populations in Somalia, particularly women, marginalized groups and youth. By March 2012, 67,840 beneficiaries were employed through labour-intensive physical and social infrastructure rehabilitation initiatives. Of those beneficiaries, 30 percent of them women. A total of 500,000 workdays were generated. EGER is rooted in communities: it seeks to build permanent capacities and increased skill levels, empowering local communities and contributing to improved living conditions. It is implemented through community-based partner NGOs in a participatory manner, with a view to supporting livelihoods, contributing to political and social stability, and promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Young people themselves have led campaigns in Somalia against harmful cultural practices such as FGM, using dialogue and drama to challenge communities to think critically about their practices, and advocating through wider community media initiatives (Box 4.4). The few innovative interventions are thinly scattered and yet to be holistic.

Building on the experience and lessons learned from a UNDP peacebuilding infrastructure project,²⁰⁹ UNICEF’s comprehensive Life Skills-Based Education programme and the ILO programme on youth employment initiatives²¹⁰ in Somalia, a new Armed Violence Reduction

Through demand-driven community-based youth programmes, many innovative strategies for empowering youth could be tested, and demonstrated successes anchored in national policy for rolling out across the country.

Box 4.2: Innovation in Providing Livelihoods

The Somali Youth Livelihood Programme (SYLP), also known as Shaqodoon, is an innovative USAID-funded programme that was designed to provide Somali youth with greater opportunities to access work, training, internships and self-employment. The programme made links with the local business community and other employers to define skills needed; assisted education and trained providers to develop programmes focused on meeting labour market demands; and helped youth successfully pursue livelihood and work opportunities.

Somaliland was the first location to successfully pilot the programme in 2009. By partnering with 50 training and education institutes, businesses and government counterparts in Puntland, Galmudug and south central Somalia, the training and placement programme placed over 4,622 youth (78%) in livelihood opportunities (internships, apprenticeships and paid jobs). An additional 1,868 youth were supported in small business development through the provision of micro grants and/or toolkits. The programme is accessible to a wide variety of youth, from those with low literacy levels to university graduates.

The skills training areas comprised carpentry, beekeeping, masonry, information technology (IT), junior laboratory technicians training and journalism. In addition to face-to-face education, the programme produced interactive Somali language audio programmes on financial literacy and entrepreneurship, and piloted innovative cell phone and web-based technologies to communicate with organizations offering career opportunities and youth looking for work.

Source: Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC) 2010, 2011 and 2012; USAID 2012; SYLP Final Evaluation Report.

(AVR) project, ‘Community Security through engaging with Youth at Risk’ has begun. A partnership between UNDP, UNICEF and ILO, this holistic joint initiative is designed to change the mind-set of at-risk youth by providing them with alternative avenues for livelihoods and the space to become positive members of their communities. The programme is rooted in six guiding principles: context sensitivity; community empowerment; gender mainstreaming; flexibility based on iterative learning; advocating for a common approach towards youth; and an integrated approach. Although this new and innovative effort has yet to be proven, it provides valuable insights into designing a holistic youth programme with high potential for success in the future.

Youth respondents to the survey for this report prioritized some key areas for programmes, based on mean score results (Figure 4.2). Those addressing youth exclusion, training linked to employment, employment creation and youth organizations top the list. During the consultative workshops, youth representatives from all regions strongly expressed the need for a more holistic, multidimensional approach to

youth empowerment for peace and development, emphasizing the role of youth as agents of positive change and as peacebuilders.

The youth groups proposed a number of priority programmes associated with social, economic and political empowerment. These included community-based approaches to youth development, where many youth-related programmes, including those targeting special groups, can be pursued and combined to unleash synergies.

Youth employability should be developed through life skills training that promotes responsible citizenship and life-long learning (including decision-making, leadership, and social entrepreneurship skills for conflict transformation and peacebuilding) and livelihood skills training (securing employment, job-searching skills, leadership skills and entrepreneurial skills). Creating employment opportunities could come through youth entrepreneurship (self-employment and business start-up schemes, micro-finance, and youth enterprise agencies/cooperatives), investment in employment-intensive sectors (public works and infrastructure) and apprenticeships.

Box 4.3: Reaching Young People Out of School

UNICEF Somalia's Youth Education, Development and Participation Programme reaches out-of-school young people between 14 and 18 years of age to promote learning and participation. It began in 1998. Lacking any organized youth groups and networks to collaborate with, initially the programme used sports and recreational activities as a key entry point. It has since expanded to focus primarily on non-formal learning and community development. The strategy is to strengthen the country's loosely organized youth groups and civil society organizations by providing young people with training and capacity-building, and helping them identify their needs and plan activities that will advance their future. The overall aim is to empower Somali adolescents through participation in community development activities.

Nearly 700 youth leaders from more than 200 youth groups and civil society organizations across Somalia have been trained through the programme, and learned to transform their groups into active community-based organizations. They are learning how to apply conflict resolution skills to situations that arise in their daily lives—an aspect the programme heavily emphasizes. In addition to sports, they use music and art to communicate ideas and advocacy messages, and encourage participation in the programme.

This programme provides valuable lessons and insights for adopting an integrated and multi-sector programming approach for addressing the needs of vulnerable segment of youth as highlighted below.

Community participation and mobilization was made possible through sports events that mobilized not only the youth, but also their families and the community at large. Sports thus became an effective channel for delivering messages on the development and peacebuilding potential of youth. The sports forums also enhanced public awareness on health issues such as HIV/AIDS. Youth were enabled to engage with local leaders to communicate their ideas and plan for development activities that directly affected the quality of life, such as environmental cleaning projects.

Strategic capacity building focused on training-of-trainers to build the leadership and organizational skills of local youth groups. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution skills were heavily emphasized in the training. These skills became an asset to the youth, who used them to resolve conflicts among themselves and in the larger community. The trainees became 'youth mentors' to other youth groups, transforming them into active community-based organizations, and contributing to the improvement of their own lives and life in general in their communities.

The multi-sector approach provided the youth with a chance to acquire basic educational skills by developing a non-formal education (NFE) curriculum to impart literacy, numeracy and life skills. An essential part of this component was creating a link between the NFE training and the school-based curriculum. This feature gave youth a choice to either earn a certificate that allowed them to enter the formal system or to pursue a vocation.

Innovative dimensions of the programme included the establishment of a modality for creating youth-friendly community spaces that could be scaled up for greater impact. The youth activities generated through the programme were mainstreamed into the 2004 to 2008 UNICEF country programme. One concrete proposal was the setting up of multi-purpose development centres designed to function as hubs for delivering a wide range of youth focused services.

Source: UNICEF 2003 and UNFPA undated.

The youth groups highlighted the importance of youth organizational capacity development and representation at different levels, and called for the creation of youth empowerment funds managed by youth councils in close partnership with relevant stakeholders.

Factoring in Youth at Risk

Identifying the specific needs of disadvantaged young people is a basic prerequisite for devising


successful policies and programmes. Youth at risk, generally defined as those between the ages of 12 and 24 who face conditions hindering their personal development and successful social integration, have a greater propensity than their peers to engage in behaviours such as school absenteeism, dangerous sexual behaviour, delinquency, violence, and substance use and abuse. Factors that put young people at risk include youth unemployment,

Box 4.4: Speaking Out Through the Media

While elders remain the traditional voice of Somali leadership, Somali youth are fast becoming leaders in society, using youth groups to voice the concerns of their generation. Youth groups, especially at the local level, are promoting greater community awareness about FGM, disarmament, and HIV and AIDS. Since Somalia retains a strong oral culture where the importance of mass media as a conduit of the spoken word is fundamental, UNICEF supports youth broadcasting initiatives. UNICEF works with 20 youth groups around the country, providing training to young people in radio and video production. The programme focuses on key issues of concern to young people, such as access to basic health services, the threat of malaria, preserving and properly using limited water resources, and the risk of HIV and AIDS. Youth groups conduct ongoing training and day-to-day management of production with the support of producers from local media. Once produced, video and radio programmes are broadcast and distributed at regular intervals.

Source: Data gathered for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Figure 4.2: Priority Interventions for Youth Empowerment (Mean Score)



Source: Data gathered for the Somalia HDR 2012.

underemployment, and lack of formal sector employment; early school dropout; risky sexual behaviour leading to early childbearing and HIV transmission; crime and violence; and substance abuse. The consequences are extremely costly to young people in terms of their ability to make a successful transition to adulthood.

Radicalization among youth has increased with the growing influence of Al-Shabaab. To mitigate this, it is important to understand the motivations of different categories of at-risk youth and contributing factors that attract them

to radical groups. DDR programmes as a bottom-up approach with community-based ownership could be a possible avenue for mitigation by targeting push factors at different levels, and aiming towards prevention, demobilization and reintegration. DDR initiatives to decrease the number of participants in various armed groups took place in Mogadishu between 2001 and 2007, but were discontinued due to lack of funding.

Some groups of at-risk youth identified during the youth consultative workshops for this report were internally displaced youth; nomadic youth;

Identifying the specific needs of disadvantaged young people is a basic prerequisite for devising successful policies and programmes.

returnee refugee youth; survivors of physical, sexual, or psychological abuse; youths with disabilities: youth abusing *khat* or other drugs; youth living with HIV and AIDS; and jobless youth who are neither in school nor employed.

Three types of youths can be distinguished in terms of their level of risk:

- Young people who face risk factors in their lives, but who have not yet engaged in risky behaviour;²¹¹
- Young people who engage in risky behaviour, but have not yet suffered severe negative consequences; and²¹²
- Young people who are experiencing severe negative consequences as a result of risky behaviour.²¹³

An in-depth study is needed to understand the relative size of these categories, and learn more about the causes and consequences of risky behaviour. This would include the following groups:

Internally displaced youth: A large section of the Somali population, currently estimated at 1.55 million,²¹⁴ is internally displaced due to conflict, insecurity, economic marginalization, forced evictions, and lack of social support and opportunity to return to areas of origin. Although precise estimates are not available, a substantial number of IDP families are women-headed households with sizeable numbers of children and youth.²¹⁵ IDPs that traditionally belong to minority clans, once forced outside their traditional clan boundaries, often have little recourse to systems of justice when violations against them take place. Most young men and women suffer multiple displacements, lose their assets and means of livelihood, and face human rights violations such as rape, arbitrary arrests, forced recruitment, exploitation and physical violence, both en route to and at their final destination. This group needs special care and attention and a workable strategy needs to be put in place for the successful integration and rehabilitation of IDPs.

Nomadic youth: Many nomadic youth in Somalia are forced to abandon pastoralist lifestyles after loss of their livestock due

to drought, and migrate in search of better employment opportunities. Many are lured into conflict, or end up engaging in piracy as a means of survival. There are no programmes directed at these disfranchised nomadic youth as most initiatives are concentrated in urban areas.

Youth with disabilities: War in Somalia has probably increased the number of people with disabilities. Estimates put the figure at over half million, a substantial proportion of whom are youth. Exclusion of young people with disabilities can leave them socially disempowered, and render them unemployable due to a lack of skills. There are no viable programmes for addressing the needs of youth with disabilities.

Youth engaged in substance abuse: The growing trend in the consumption of *khat* has been one of the major risk behaviours among youth in Somalia, with one-third currently affected by it. It comes with serious health implications, and has been a major driver of poverty, conflict, unemployment and criminality. There is no easy solution to overcome this problem without peace and economic prosperity.

Young women: Overall, young women in Somalia are more vulnerable than their male counterparts due to gender discrimination. Cultural factors undermine their role in the broader public sphere, while the difficulty of finding a job that pays a fair wage may encourage them to abandon the idea of participating in the labour market altogether. Institutions need to be in place to challenge mind-sets and encourage young women, through tailor-made training programmes for employment and to support young mothers to work outside the house if they wish to.

Moving Empowerment to the Centre

Experiences, research and the perspectives of youth themselves all lead to the conclusion that a new approach is needed for policies and programmes for Somali youth. The multifaceted challenges youth are facing has spurred growing consensus that this implies taking a holistic, multi-sectoral approach to youth development.

Institutions need to be in place to challenge mind-sets and encourage young women ... to work outside the house if they wish to.

This report calls for putting measures to empower youth at the centre of all actions to assist them, through a framework rooted in developing capabilities and opportunities, as the foundation of human development.

Internationally, despite growing awareness and commitment, a comprehensive framework for analysing the complex situation youth face in conflict has yet to emerge. Since youth development and empowerment are not well-integrated concepts, they are still peripheral to mainstream development policy-making and programming. Some serious consequences have come from blurring lines between youth and children—mainly, the neglect of youth.²¹⁶

Three distinct policy frameworks are generally applied.²¹⁷ The ways in which they touch on the relationships between youth and conflict, as well as the ways they omit it, are indicative of the problems in framing this issue.²¹⁸ First, the conflict prevention agenda views young people as potential agents of violence rather than as actors or partners in development programmes. It is based on the premise that young people with limited education and few employment opportunities provide a fertile recruiting ground for parties in a conflict, and that addressing the needs and aspirations of

adolescence is an important aspect of long-term prevention. Second, the youth agenda focuses on youth as a discrete group and highlights the importance of engaging with them as partners and beneficiaries. It outlines the impacts of conflict on youth and highlights the roles youth should play in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, but generally fails to explain the context of violent conflict. Third, the development agenda, currently driven by the MDGs, treats youth as a single identity group, and emphasizes mainly employment as a solution to the perceived youth crisis.

Under these frameworks, programmes and practices for youth in conflict contexts typically follow one of three approaches—the rights-based approach, the economic approach or the socio-political approach. Each has strengths and weaknesses (Table 4.2).²¹⁹ The value of the rights-based approach lies in prevention. It views youth as victims of a violent environment. Although the ultimate aim is to enable them to move from being victims to being social actors, aided by legal and institutional frameworks, the approach does not factor in young people's differing experiences and changing self-perceptions. It neglects the significant roles youth have played in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Table 4.2: Three Perspectives on Support for Youth in Conflict

	Rights-based Approach	Economic Approach	Socio-political Approach
Optimal period	Prevention	Short-term	Long-term
Objective	Human security	Stability	Reconciliation
Target group	Children (less than 18 years of age)	Youth (15 to 24 years)	Flexible, responsive to self-perception and socio-cultural concepts
Roles of youth (characteristics)	Victim (vulnerable, innocent) Social actor (adaptable, resilient)	Exploitable resource (aggressive, greedy) Economic actor (resourceful, rational)	Spoiler (frustrated, excluded) Peacebuilder (transformable, active)
Instruments	Legal norms and Conventions	Economic policies at Micro-/macro-level	Participatory approaches
Typical programmes	Reintegration into families; human rights advocacy; psychosocial work; basic education	Socioeconomic reintegration; vocational training; income-generation activities; catch-up education	Participatory surveys; support of youth activities, organizations and networks; peace education

Source: Kemper 2005.

The economic approach is most effective in the short-term by delivering immediate results to young beneficiaries, including by luring them away from armed forces. It sees youth as rational economic actors/decision-makers in the market place. A lack of alternatives can result in them engaging in armed conflict. Short-term interventions offering income and employment options are offered as counter-incentives to fighting. This approach does not ask how war affects youth—it is grounded in how youth deprivation affects war.

The socio-political approach fosters long-term reconciliation by countering the marginalization of young people through integration into societal structures and decision-making. It stresses the active potential of youth as agents for change or peacebuilders, and considers how their inability to make decisions can turn them into spoilers of peacebuilding. Given its vision of changing inter-societal relations towards reconciliation, this approach is most effective in the long run.

These approaches are evident in different development programmes. The Youth Employment Network—created by the UN Secretary-General, the ILO and the World Bank, for example, supports countries with activities such as school-to-work transition surveys, the development of vocational training policy guidelines, support schemes for young workers in the informal sector, and entrepreneurship education programmes in high schools. The Bank's 2007 *World Development Report* did pioneering work on youth transitions from school to work. USAID has outlined programme guidelines for youth: identify, but do not isolate, youth at risk; build community-based programmes; ensure youth ownership and leadership; engage female youth; programme holistically; and plan transitions to adult roles.²²⁰ The Department for International Development (DFID) has developed programming options to address youth exclusion and violence.²²¹ These are all important exercises, but more could be done to build synergies across approaches and issues, for the benefit of youth and human development at large.

Taking a Broader View

An empowerment framework for youth development entails recognizing that all youth have diverse needs, interests, unexplored powers and potential assets. It involves bringing together various strategic partners—adults, the private sector, civil society and government—to collectively offer youth a full and integrated range of services to expand their social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities, which generate empowerment at the individual and community level. It builds on bottom-up and participatory processes, and endorses the notion that investing in youth capabilities and empowering them to exercise choices is valuable in itself, and one of the surest paths to inclusive economic growth and sustainable human development. It recognizes that youth development needs to be undertaken with and by youth.

Understanding young people's potential calls for moving away from instrumental participation, aimed at achieving a particular outcome, to transformative participation, where youth are empowered to assume greater control over their lives and contribute to structural changes in society.²²² As conceptualised in Chapter 1, a greater emphasis on the relationship between development and peacebuilding can in part be gained by combining rights-based, socio-political and economic approaches.²²³

Positive youth development has emerged as a perspective that directs policy and programme interventions from problem-solving, prevention and deterrence towards youth preparation and development.²²⁴ It treats youth as development assets, and is about providing people, programmes, institutions and systems so that all youth—'troubled' or not—obtain the support and opportunities they need to empower themselves.

Positive youth development stresses developmental assets such as relationships, opportunities and personal qualities that young people need to avoid risks and achieve their full

Internationally, despite growing awareness and commitment, a comprehensive framework for analysing the complex situation youth face in conflict has yet to emerge.

Empowering youth means creating and supporting conditions under which young people gain abilities, authority, agency and opportunities to translate their choices into their own lives and the lives of other people.

potential as independent and functional adults. Recognizing different transition phases, from an early age beginning in families, extending to schools and finally to a point where youth are fully involved in society, requires different interventions, guidance and skills at each stage.

While this approach has a lot of merit, and much of youth empowerment is linked to positive youth development, not all positive youth development programmes explicitly stress the participation of young people in decision-making and policy and programme design.²²⁵ Youth empowerment explicitly calls for involving young people in decision-making linked to programme goals, planning and/or implementation, because participation has no meaning when young people are tokenized.

A youth empowerment approach considers youth from a strengths-based perspective with a primary focus on recognizing and enhancing youths' multiple assets, capabilities and opportunities, across the social, economic and political arenas. It incorporates multidimensional interventions at the individual, community and larger levels that collectively are crucial to breaking negative cycles of disempowerment and exclusion. Aside from its other benefits, such an approach can be as effective in addressing the anti-social, high-risk behaviours of youth in conflict and post-conflict setting as a more direct emphasis on curtailing these tendencies.²²⁶

Forging social support and positive connections between youth and their peers, and families and communities, and strengthening civic engagement constitute central pillars of youth empowerment models.²²⁷ Communities support youth, and youth support communities. This entails providing youth with the necessary opportunities to acquire a broad range of competencies and demonstrate a full complement of positive connections to self, others and the larger community.²²⁸ Connecting youth across sectors of communities can advance not only individual development, but also community and economic development.

On many occasions, however, unclear distinctions between types of power and limited

clarity on appropriate strategies to address power imbalances have led to the failure of empowerment-focused interventions. Power in empowerment strategies should not refer to power over, but rather to alternative forms—power to, power with and power from within.²²⁹ These forms of power unleash individual and collective strengths to work towards common goals without coercion or domination.

Empowering youth means creating and supporting conditions under which young people gain abilities, authority, agency and opportunities to translate their choices into their own lives and the lives of other people.²³⁰ As stated in Chapter 1, this report envisages this process occurring along three broad dimensions—social, economic and political—and operating at the individual, community and broader levels. Two strategies need to be in place: first to help youth build assets and capabilities (the demand for skills and behaviours), and then to create opportunities to use these effectively and productively (the supply of accessible opportunities and the creation of an enabling environment to use these effectively and productively).²³¹ How well youth capabilities are then blended with opportunities determines different degrees of social, economic and political empowerment, as well as associated obstacles (Box 4.5).²³²

Going Beyond Protection

So far, initiatives to serve young people in conflict situations have been mainly driven by preventive and/or curative strategies,²³³ with little or no attention paid to empowerment. Empowerment has a strong element of prevention, but also incorporates dimensions of youth participation, citizenship and cultural identity, which are not typically part of preventive or curative approaches. While building capabilities and expanding social, economic and political opportunities, empowerment programmes and policies at the same time devise strong social protection measures for youth who may need special second-chance programmes to reintegrate into society after they return from being part of the conflict. Going beyond the confines of a focus on

Box 4.5: A Pioneering Framework in International Youth Development

At Mercy Corps, youth development programming is based on a Youth Transformation Framework. It was built from research across disciplines and 25 years of field experience with positive youth development strategies in complex and fragile transitional environments. Mercy Corps helps young people develop capabilities and access opportunities to secure incomes, and build a sense of responsibility, identity, creativity and hope. Its goal is to see young people transition into global citizens who are responsible for and capable of building secure, productive and just communities at home and around the world.

The organization provides education and training relevant to social and market conditions, and helps local actors create spaces where young people can evolve and contribute meaningfully. It optimizes engagement with governments, the private sector and civil society to establish solid institutional foundations. The Youth Transformation Framework guides support for building six transformational assets: knowledge and resilience, civic and social development, career development, protection, institutional support, business and financial services. Seventy-five programme outcomes that represent youth needs help practitioners better identify the most important drivers of peace, productivity and justice, and develop cross-sectoral programming. Because context differs, certain youth programmes target 10-year-olds, while others focus on young adults up to age 30.

In 2009, Mercy Corps was operating 36 youth development projects in 18 countries worth approximately \$55 million. The USAID and Mercy Corps Southern Somalia Livelihoods Recovery Programme which started in April 2007 to improve the ability of households and communities to cope with and recover from natural and man-made shocks has demonstrated significant achievements. Currently, Mercy Corps is working to provide aid to displaced families in the Somali capital of Mogadishu.

Source: Mercy Corps 2009.

protection allows the development of strategies recognizing and responding to the complexity of young people's engagement with conflict and their roles in peacebuilding.

Youth empowerment programmes in a conflict context like Somalia's should be rooted in community-based approaches to development and peacebuilding (Box 4.6). The success of these is well known²³⁴ including through community-led initiatives that strengthen local governance in the face of otherwise weak institutions.²³⁵ There are many examples, including community-based policing, community-based radio stations, traditional mechanisms for conflict management, and community user groups for socioeconomic recovery. These seek to empower local groups and institutions through direct control over investment decisions, and project planning, execution and monitoring, using a process that emphasizes inclusive participation and management.

The underlying presumption is that local communities are better placed to identify their shared needs and the actions necessary to meet them, which can contribute to a

sense of community ownership and the sustainability of interventions. At the core of the community-based approach is a representative community institution that can serve as a forum for discussion, decision-making and implementation.

Towards a Comprehensive Framework for Youth

A review of existing support for youth underscores the importance of a common, comprehensive framework that harnesses the full potential of youth as positive agents of change. Under an empowerment framework, rights-based, economic and socio-political approaches can be harmonized to help youth grasp all opportunities to develop their full potential, to freely express themselves and have their views respected, and to live free of poverty, discrimination and violence. Operating on a multidimensional concept of empowerment, this framework can address diverse needs in setting priorities, and designing, implementing and monitoring policies and programmes related to young people. It entails two strategies at different levels: first,

Two strategies need to be in place: first to help youth build assets and capabilities (the demand for skills and behaviours), and then to create opportunities to use these effectively and productively ...

Youth empowerment programmes in a conflict context like Somalia's should be rooted in community-based approaches to development and peacebuilding ...

Box 4.6: Successes in Communities

Community mobilization or social mobilization is an essential first step for building community capacities to identify their priorities, resources, needs and solutions in such a way as to promote representative participation, good governance, accountability, and peaceful change.²³⁶ In community mobilization, every community and all citizens have the right to know the procedures, decision-making processes and financial flows of development programmes. Successful community-based approaches support social mobilization and capacity-building needs of community members, and in many cases, local and national government officials, by providing both technical skills (such as financial and project cycle management) and soft skills (leadership, relationship-building, empowerment strategies to manage power dynamics, resource mobilization and advocacy).

Inclusive participation and representation: Community-based approaches aim to foster and institutionalize all elements of good local governance—inclusive participation and representation, transparency and accountability. They do so not simply as a means to fulfil immediate needs but also as ends in themselves. Experience shows that traditional leaders and government authorities excluded from community-based interventions may become obstacles to successful implementation.²³⁷ While inclusive processes have the potential to build trust, community solidarity and social capital, there are also potential risks of elite capture and government interference that undermines community empowerment.²³⁸ Traditionally dominant groups, such as clan/religious leaders in Somalia, have controlled community institutions, resulting in continued marginalization of excluded groups. Strong mechanisms for transparency—public meetings, publication of decisions, etc.—can help to counter some of these tendencies.²³⁹ Efforts need to be made to ensure that government involvement does not end up compromising ownership at the local level. The creation of separate advisory boards or ad hoc consultations to involve elites can be effective in drawing on their skills while preventing the risk of elite capture.²⁴⁰

Existing versus new institutional structures: At the core of community-based approaches is a representative community institution.²⁴¹ It is generally far more cost effective to capitalize on existing local institutions and make them more participatory and representative of the concerns of the marginalized than to create new structures, provided existing local institutions and traditional authorities are receptive to the inclusion of all local groups, including all categories of youth. It is equally important to capitalize on already existing youth organizations and make them more inclusive, such as through representation of traditional elders. Among other benefits, this can help reduce the potential for societal tension.²⁴²

Horizontal and vertical linkages: For community-based approaches to be effective and sustainable, it becomes important to build horizontal linkages and social capital across communities. This can be achieved by sharing knowledge and resources to build collective strength and create bottom-up demand pressures. Establishing strong horizontal linkage lays a solid foundation for community organizations to federate vertically, linking community-based activities to government line ministries (micro-macro links). Partnerships between government institutions and local communities are important for the renewal of state-society relations and sustainability of community-based approaches. Connections to government may be beneficial for donors to fund communities via the state. Rwanda, for example, has created a structure that brings together communities at multiple levels in order to support micro-to-macro needs and links.²⁴³

Empowerment of local communities: The empowerment of local communities is a common aim in community-based approaches. Empowerment is promoted through the provision of information, inclusive participation and decision-making, capacity building and funds that allow them to define and prioritize their needs, and manage their own projects to address these. For the community-based approach to be sustainable, balancing social and economic empowerment is essential. Expectations raised by social mobilization, awareness building and skills development should be backed by economic programmes, for example. Peacebuilding activities should contain strong economic empowerment components that provide tangible benefits that motivate people to be involved.

Source: Adapted from Haider 2009a.

building capabilities such as relevant knowledge, assets, skills, attitudes and behaviours, and second, creating access to equal opportunities to use these capabilities. Empowerment is also about social and civic responsibilities that must be fulfilled by young people.

Considering that empowering youth means multiple efforts to involve them in the design, implementation and monitoring of community-based programmes, and to foster their participation in decision-making at the national level through representative youth councils, this report does not address the operational details of programming. It does provide a broad framework for action that describes enabling conditions, guiding principles and strategic programming directions based on discussions with the report's youth advisory groups.

Necessary Conditions

Empowering youth requires substantial shifts in sector and macro-policies and priorities to support conditions for young people to gain abilities, authority, agency and opportunities. An appropriate reform agenda would entail three essential pillars: making state institutions more responsive to young people; removing multiple exclusions and discriminations on the basis of region, ethnicity, gender, religion and socioeconomic status; and strengthening local organizational capacity-building through community mobilization.

A coherent national youth policy framework needs to be in place, and this should be well integrated in the national development strategy currently being formulated by the governments in Somalia. This is an important prerequisite to pursue the right macroeconomic and sectoral policies, and create institutions conducive to inclusive growth; to ensure strong integration with the sectoral policies and programmes of line ministries for coordinated action; and to remove policy and institutional barriers that have perpetuated the multiple exclusions faced by youth.

The government in Somalia should create and support mechanisms to allow youth to participate

in national planning and policy setting through the formation of a national youth council. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua provide good examples of how youth departments (or ministries) have been successful in listening to youth and capturing their opinions, information then used to shape national plans, define priorities and align sector policies to youth livelihood needs. Sweden has a coherent national framework for youth incorporated into national policy planning as well as implementation mechanisms.²⁴⁴ At a minimum, governments should solicit feedback from youth on policies and legislation that will affect them prior to implementation.

In Somalia, where public institutions and governance systems are require strengthening, community-led initiatives can be a particularly effective means to strengthen local governance and promote development and peacebuilding. They help ensure ownership of the development process and the effectiveness of interventions targeting youth. They establish conditions by which youth have choices and opportunities to improve their own lives, as well as those of people in their families, communities and country.

Guiding Principles

A close review of both international and national experience in youth programming together with the best practice elements and other considerations emerging from the forgoing analysis provides a solid conceptual foundation for the formulation of some guiding principles in the Somali context. A framework that addresses young Somalis' needs and aspirations should abide by the following principles:

Context sensitivity: There is no one-size-fits-all approach to youth. Causes of and actors in conflict and development vary greatly across Somalia. Contextual understanding is essential to working with cultural values, practices and beliefs that greatly influence acceptance of new ideas and change. There are particular cultural constraints that need to be taken into account when addressing the reproductive rights of young people, including in gender-sensitive, life-skills-based sexual and reproductive health education.

Under an empowerment framework, rights-based, economic and socio-political approaches can be harmonized to help youth grasp all opportunities to develop their full potential, to freely express themselves and have their views respected, and to live free of poverty, discrimination and violence.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to youth. Causes of and actors in conflict and development vary greatly across Somalia. Contextual understanding is essential to working with cultural values, practices and beliefs that greatly influence acceptance of new ideas and change.

Putting children and youth together in a single life-cycle framework: Since children and youth are the most susceptible to increased vulnerability and risky behaviour, considering them under a single framework is essential for promoting human development. If investments are not made in the early years, the costs and consequences become particularly evident in youth and early adulthood, perpetuating the intergenerational cycle of poverty. The life-cycle framework is a potentially powerful tool for overcoming intergenerational poverty.²⁴⁵ Used in designing and evaluating programmes, it provides the basis for assessing the scale of child and youth issues, and prioritizing interventions accordingly.

A holistic, bottom-up perspective: A holistic perspective to youth development requires integrated community-based strategies that create a protective and empowering environment for all children and youth to harness their full potential, regardless of their level of risk. Holistic community-based programmes offer a broad platform for innovation and pilot demonstration of good practice model that is replicable, scalable and sustainable. They recognize that communities are in the best position to identify priority needs, and strategize and develop action plans for inclusive development and sustainable peacebuilding. Inclusive participation and representation, trust-building, accountability and transparency, community solidarity, and nurturing social capital are guiding principles.

Foster adult-youth partnerships: Building alliances with adults is critical for the success of youth empowerment programmes, because culturally rooted attitudes view youth as objects and recipients rather than capable partners. Youth-adult partnerships should emphasize equitable working relationships that can catalyse youth empowerment. For adults, this will help change attitudes towards youth, and develop better understanding of their capabilities, needs and priorities. Youth will gain life and leadership skills for decision-making at the community level.

Forging multi-stakeholder partnerships and collaboration: The multidimensional nature of youth empowerment programmes and the

support needed at different levels requires identifying relevant stakeholders and building strategic partnerships, such as with government ministries, civil society organizations, international development agencies, and the private sector and youth organizations. These partnerships unleash synergies and maximum positive outcomes for young men and women.

Gender mainstreaming: A gender-sensitive approach must be adopted when planning, implementing, and evaluating policies and programmes, recognizing that in conflict and post-conflict situations, the needs, interests and experiences of young men and women vary significantly. Women are subjected to various forms of sexual and gender-based violence, for example, but can also contribute to violence by encouraging and supporting men to fight. Gender mainstreaming entails the full inclusion and engagement of young men as well as women in policy, programmes and actions. Since gender equality is not possible unless men change their attitudes and behaviour, more advocacy efforts should target men. Some actions require working only with women and girls, or primarily involving women's organizations active at local levels before scaling up to broader strategies.

Environmental sustainability: This should be the touchstone of all interventions to ensure both intra- and intergenerational equity and sustainability. It requires the application of clean, green and climate-resilient technologies and practices, and institutional and policy innovations, including to mobilize youth as energy entrepreneurs and environmental activists.

Youth Empowerment Programmes: An Illustration

Taking into account the principles listed above, the following pages elaborate on strategic directions for designing a holistic youth programme around employment, identified by Somali youth as one of the most critical issues they face. Core areas of intervention are broadly grouped into three components: promotion of employability; sustainable employment creation; and cross-cutting interventions,

such as job-matching services, organizational capacity building, youth representation and voice, and environmental sustainability and equity, as shown in Figure 4.3.

Promoting Employability


Preparing youth for employment entails improving their employment readiness,²⁴⁶ building skills and linking them to employment opportunities. Employability can be defined as “the capacity to move self-sufficiently into and within labour markets, to fulfil potential through sustainable formal employment or self-employment (or entrepreneurship).”²⁴⁷ Comprehensive, multiservice training programmes for youth should respond to a wide range of developmental needs. Basic education, technical and vocational education and training, and social empowerment

through life skills are the main components to enhance the employability of Somali youth.

Considering that the lack of quality and efficiency in primary education has led to a high proportion of pupils dropping out of school, basic education should do more to prepare young people for life-long learning. It should offer life skills (communication, decision-making and leadership skills, critical and creative thinking and the ability to cope with emotions, stress and conflict) that enhance political and social empowerment, and can contribute to preventing conflicts, reducing social exclusion and supporting peaceful development.²⁴⁸ Peer education can be an effective way of providing young people with information, motivation and life skills related to both employment and sensitive issues such as sexuality and drug abuse.²⁴⁹

Holistic community-based programmes offer a broad platform for innovation and pilot demonstration of a good practice model that is replicable, scalable and sustainable.

Figure 4.3: Three Components of a Holistic Youth Programme



Source: Data gathered for the Somalia HDR 2012.

Market-oriented technical and vocational training in both life skills and livelihood skills could be developed through coordination and cooperation among governmental institutions, training providers and the private sector, making it more attractive and relevant to young people. There are already promising examples of connection programmes—Shaqodoon is a case in point. The integration of systematic learning into real-life working environments helps trainees develop technical competencies and social skills. Entrepreneurship skills development can increase self-employment prospects for young people in the formal and informal economy.

Another priority is early child development, as one of the basic building blocks of the life-cycle approach to positive youth development, and also one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce risky behaviours among young people. These programmes offer long-term human development benefits,²⁵⁰ including in stemming the intergenerational transmission of inequality and poverty. Quality initiatives increase primary school completion rates, and raise the likelihood of children enrolling in and completing secondary school, a critical protective factor for young people. Other benefits can be lower risks of early pregnancy, criminal and violent activity, and substance abuse during adolescence and young adulthood.²⁵¹ Conversely, children who do not receive proper care, nutrition and attention in their first five years of life are threatened by lifelong negative consequences in educational achievement, employment and earnings.²⁵² Some critical success factors for support and implementation of early childhood development programmes include involving parents and the community to foster local ownership and connections between parents and children, and establishing coordination with government line ministries and agencies that provide different services.

Many young people in Somalia discontinue their education before acquiring basic skills to succeed in work and life because of both demand and supply side constraints. Second-chance education programmes or education equivalency programmes are promising options

to address these barriers. They offer education and training on a mix of essential skills.²⁵³ The positive impacts can be direct, such as by providing youth with schooling that was cut short when they dropped out, which increases their chances of acquiring employment and receiving higher wages. Benefits can also be indirect, such as by giving youth information and skills to make good decisions, increasing their prospects for a successful life. UNICEF is partnering with the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPD) to support 12,000 primary school girls and women in vulnerable communities. Over 3,300 girls are receiving free education at GECPD schools, of which 2,070 girls are in second-chance non-formal education (including literacy, numeracy and life-skills education).²⁵⁴ Some key issues for consideration in designing and implementing second-chance programmes include the importance of partnerships among NGOs, private providers and the formal education system; flexible class schedules; integrated curricula, with life skills and vocational training; and high-quality programmes comparable to formal education.

Another promising intervention can be conditional cash transfer programmes. They work by giving youth cash grants on the condition that they attend school on a regular basis. The cash is provided on a per-student basis and generally covers direct costs (such as school fees, supplies and transportation costs), and/or the opportunity costs incurred by families when they lose income as a result of sending their children to school. The success of such programmes depends on how well they are targeted and backed by complementary services such as schools and health centres.²⁵⁵

Multiservice Training Programmes

In general, comprehensive multiservice training programmes for youth employability should bring together two broad skills sets—those for life and those for livelihoods. This holistic approach is likely to be more efficient in terms of time and cost, and more effective at building a thorough understanding of concepts, than preparing and delivering life skills and technical skills development programmes as separate

components. Some additional guiding principles that have emerged from training programmes for disadvantaged youth are listed in Box 4.7.

Life skills development has had a positive impact on the employability and educational outcomes of youth, and reduces the likelihood of risky behaviour.²⁵⁶ It is a vital prerequisite for a healthy transition into adulthood, including in helping connect youth with their communities, which makes them more likely to continue their education and enter the economic mainstream. Life skills comprise psycho-social and interpersonal skills aimed at promoting responsible citizenship and life-long learning that can help youth make informed decisions, communicate effectively, and cultivate healthy coping and self-management skills. It can be important to link schools with NGOs in providing life skills training so that young people can learn in a community setting.

Livelihood skills development prepares young people for employment by offering them skills

related to finding jobs, interviewing, leadership, entrepreneurship, basic business functions and other needs appropriate to the local economy. Many youth livelihood programmers develop leadership skills in youth by empowering them to take lead roles as trainers and/or mentors to support their peers' development. Some critical success factors include partnerships with the private sector to ensure the provision of demand-driven skills, internships to provide on-the-job training, job search assistance and on-the-job experience.

Sustainable Microfinancing Schemes

Somali youth have very limited access to market opportunities, due to factors including weak social networks, negative stereotypes, discrimination, a lack of skills and limited work experience. Barriers to credit come from and compound these obstacles. Constraints to accessing formal finance comprise a lack of credit history and business experience, as well as the perception that youth pose higher risks.

... comprehensive multiservice training programmes for youth employability should bring together two broad skills sets—those for life and those for livelihoods.

Box 4.7: What Makes 'Good' Training for Disadvantaged Youth?

Innovative: It has unique characteristics that address the weaknesses in other training practices by reaching disadvantaged youth; appeals to the interests of all stakeholders.

Feasible: It can realistically be implemented; there is sufficient support, funding and capacity.

Gender sensitive: Young women as well as young men are given a voice in all aspects of development, implementation and follow-up to ensure that their interests are taken into account.

Responsive: The practice is consistent with the needs identified by young women and men; it involves a consensus-building approach; it is responsive to the interests and desires of the participants.

Relevant: The practice contributes, directly or indirectly, to demands of the market and the needs of the participants.

Ethical: It is consistent with principles of social and professional conduct; it operates in accordance with international labour standards.

Effective: The practice actually makes a difference in addressing youth employability; the impact has been measured either formally or otherwise; the impact evaluation has been documented and made available to interested parties.

Efficient: Resources (human, financial and material) are used in ways that maximize impact.

Sustainable: The practice can continue after its initial piloting; its benefits to the individual, community, economy and/or society are likely to continue over the medium to long term.

Replicable: The practice can be replicated in other situations or settings; some elements of the practice are useful for other programmes.

Upscaleable: The practice can be expanded to operate on a wider level (e.g., from community level to national level).

Source: ILO 2002.

Widespread youth unemployment cannot be dealt with apart from the wider economic crisis facing the Somali economy.

Nonetheless, a global survey of 81 microfinance institutions and youth service organizations showed that those institutions that did lend to youth did not find that they were higher risk or administratively more costly to serve than non-youth.²⁵⁷ Properly designed microfinancing programmes can in fact play a significant role in linking youth to market opportunities from which they are currently excluded. They have the potential for formalizing the informal sector, and empowering micro-entrepreneurs to participate in and benefit from the formal economy. This potential, however, is contingent upon a supportive environment at all levels and among all actors.

Sustainable micro-financing schemes are characterized by non-subsidized interest rates linked to competitive market rates, while offering the flexible, customer-friendly services preferred by low-income groups. While subsidies and grant loans are essential for initial business start-up capital and market penetration, they are not long-term options. In the Somali context, where the interest free loan is the norm based on Islamic principles, more research and pilot action is needed to explore how to introduce sustainable microfinancing schemes. One existing example is the Kaaba Micro Finance Institution in Somaliland, which operates according to Islamic stipulations (Box 4.8). Esusu in Nigeria shows how microfinance rooted in local culture is more sustainable and participatory (Box 4.9).

Creating Opportunities to Work

The success of interventions promoting employability depends on the availability of employment opportunities. Sustainable employment creation should address the dual challenges of providing decent work and green jobs by strengthening the institutional capacities of both the public and private sectors.

A fundamental barrier to tackling youth unemployment and underemployment in Somalia is insufficient economic growth. While short-term, labour-intensive employment programmes are nominally effective emergency responses, they cannot be maintained over the longer term.

Targeted macroeconomic and labour market policies should be in place to reduce youth unemployment, complemented by the specific promotion of youth entrepreneurship and job creation initiatives.

Widespread youth unemployment cannot be dealt with apart from the wider economic crisis facing the Somali economy. Economic growth is one condition for overcoming poverty and unemployment; however, it must be broad-based and inclusive. The recent experience in the Arab region shows that despite relatively high levels of per capita GDP and sustained high growth of around 5 percent, the region continues to suffer from significant levels of income poverty, high youth unemployment and socio-political exclusion.

The cornerstone of inclusive development and empowerment is avoiding economic growth that is jobless (where the overall economy grows but does not expand the opportunities for employment), ruthless (where the fruits of economic growth mostly benefit the rich), voiceless (where growth occurs under political repression and authoritarian control without full participation of the people) and futureless (where present generation squanders resources needed by future generations).²⁵⁸ Broad-based, people-centred, and equitable economic growth and development call for major structural reforms. Sound macroeconomic and labour market policy reforms may be conducive to employment-led growth in the long run; however, they are often weak on creating employment for a large number of young people in the short to medium term, especially in the conflict context of Somalia.

Labour-intensive public works programmes and emergency employment schemes such as those being implemented by the EGER project of UNDP Somalia can be potential areas of intervention to provide short-term jobs, strengthen local skills, and rebuild economic and social infrastructure to stimulate the economy. Small-scale infrastructure investment through labour-intensive works programmes can create jobs and businesses, and have a multiplier effect.²⁵⁹

Investing in socioeconomic infrastructure and local institutions, restoring the natural resource

Box 4.8: Microfinance in Accord with Islam

Kaaba Micro Finance Institution (K-MFI) was set up in Somaliland in 2009 to provide access to credit for low-income earners and the self-employed, especially women. Its targeted customers are micro- and small entrepreneurs, small traders and market vendors, low salaried workers, small-scale farmers, and dairy, poultry and fisheries businesses. So far, 2,755 active clients have received loans; K-MFI has a target of reaching 5,000 beneficiaries by 2012, and aims at being financially self-sustaining.

To work around the Islamic prohibition on charging interest, K-MFI adopted three practices.

Murabaha involves financing working capital and liquidity management. This means buying the requested commodity (thereby taking on the risk) and selling it to the customer at an agreed mark-up price.

Musharaka is a form of partnership used by clients seeking partial financial assistance. The K-MFI invests a certain amount in the income-generating activities. The beneficiaries pay monthly instalments plus agreed mark-ups. If losses are incurred, they are borne by the two parties and apportioned according to the investment made by each partner.

Ijara is a lease-purchase mode of financing mostly used by clients to finance the acquisition of equipment.

Surer's story demonstrates what impact microfinance institutions can have. She wanted to start a domestic bakery in a pit oven, and worked out a business plan that was approved. She received US \$200, minus US \$20 to cover the administrative costs of the loan, which she used to buy ingredients and basic utensils, and rent space. Every morning she baked bread and took it to the market to sell. Her profits have enabled her to repay the loan, build a proper oven and employ two paid employees. She has added two more rooms to her one-room hut for her five children. More importantly, her children have been able to go to school.

Source: Data gathered from Kaaba Micro Finance Institution, Somaliland, for the Somalia HDR, 2012.

Box 4.9: A Nigerian Bank Based on Tradition

In Nigeria, African Traditional Responsive Banking is a unique loan scheme that draws from the best of African traditional microcredit practices, tempered by modern knowledge. At its core are the traditional practices, combined with a community-based institutional structure, training and advisory services, and a 'social banking' model that is traditional and responsive. Informal savings and loan schemes are based on traditional knowledge and values, and microfinance initiatives that build upon them can count on legitimacy, accountability and self-enforcement. In its first five years, savings mobilization has increased by 100 percent and the loan fund portfolio by over 50 percent. Loan repayments remain at 98 percent. The scheme in particular empowers poor and rural women economically, socially and politically, while creating a sense of belonging and ownership.

Source: Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). United Nations 2005.

base and rebuilding local government capacity are critical for community-based livelihood initiatives. For sustainability, however, these should be linked to long-term employment creation and the provision of decent work by nurturing the local private sector and labour markets, inducing foreign investment and strengthening links across different sectors.

Somalia needs a coherent and integrated employment promotion strategy to improve the

competitiveness and growth of its economy, along with an effective human resource development policy. New engines of job creation could come through private sector-led growth—agriculture, livestock and fishery are some promising sectors with immense potential for employment. This requires the proper design and implementation of medium to long-term plans, guided by modernization and export promotion strategies. The livestock sector can be modernized by attracting investments to transform its modes of

Given the current limited capacity of the formal labour market, self-employment is one critical alternative for youth.

production towards value-added commodities (processing, packaging and marketing of milk, meat, hides, and by-products such as bio-gas, fertilizers and fish meal) that meet international standards. Towards the commercialization of fisheries, investments in training; repair of gear and boats; and fish processing, packaging and marketing will help young fishermen exploit growing demand from both export and local markets.²⁶⁰

Entrepreneurship and Self-employment

Given the current limited capacity of the formal labour market, self-employment is one critical alternative for youth. Self-employment programmes—also known as micro-enterprise development or entrepreneurship programmes—commonly provide technical services such as training on business planning, counselling, and financial assistance in the form of credit, allowances or grants.²⁶¹ Youth enterprise agencies are another possibility for promoting young entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurial skills not only increase employability, but also make young people more motivated to be active citizens, and minimize their feelings of social exclusion. Being a successful entrepreneur requires a combination of problem solving and interpersonal skills, as well as self-confidence and leadership attributes. All of these are important as well for becoming a successful employee in the formal sector.

Economic diversification is the key response to the inbuilt vulnerabilities—including limited jobs—from reliance on single commodities, and traditional livestock rearing and livelihoods. Somalia has an abundance of natural resources and potential niches to which value could be added, including animal products (dairy, and hides and skins), fishing, minerals, farming, bee products (honey exports), gums, resins and other natural products (non-timber forest products). Information and communications technology (ICT) is the fastest growing business sector in Somalia, which can be effectively harnessed to allow youth to come together to express their ideas and opinions and link up with the business sector. More emphasis needs

to be given on supporting youth in playing an important role in development by providing them with opportunities to set up ICT-enabled business enterprises.

To be successful, self-employment and enterprise development programmes in Somalia need to link to competitive markets through participatory value chain analysis²⁶² training and complementary services (business counselling and appropriate financial support) so that young entrepreneurs can expand their businesses in line with actual and growing demand. Trainings of trainers can be a powerful tool to create a cadre of local youth entrepreneurs, as those young people who have taken the training can then teach their peers.

Matching Supply and Demand

Providing employment services is an effective way to address gaps in information and skills that can be root causes of unemployment. These services can match jobs with job seekers through search and placement assistance, counselling, job rosters and labour information systems.²⁶³ They need to be reinforced by an active, youth-oriented labour market policy, supported by youth policies and institutions.

One of the challenges in promoting youth employment is to establish or improve and expand consultancy and placement services. Career guidance has to be developed as a flexible tool supporting youth in their transition from school to the labour market. A good—and gender-sensitive—labour management information service needs to be in place. Employment services for youth in general are most successful when they are included in an integrated package that also comprises career guidance, education (formal and non-formal) and skills training, and helps youth access social services such as childcare or transport that make it easier for them to find and keep jobs.

Stronger Youth Organizations

Social capital formation at the local level is a fundamental building block for ensuring the sustainability of all other forms of capital—human, physical, financial and natural—and

better development outcomes.²⁶⁴ This report places great importance on social mobilization to develop organizational capacities at the grassroots, viewing this as a dynamic process by which youth in a community form groups to share and discuss problems, to seek solutions using their own and outside resources, and to become more active participants in the decisions that affect them as individuals, and as members of households and the community. The objective should be to create empowering community organizations that take responsibility for and gain control over decision-making in community-level activities. This is achieved through ensuring ownership via genuine participation, sharing benefits equitably, upholding transparency in decision-making, ensuring accountability, and aiming for productivity and sustainability.

Creating and supporting youth organizations at all levels helps integrate youth voices and choices across public decision-making and development programming. This makes decisions and programmes most appropriate and accountable to youth, and demonstrates how youth can be leaders, trainers and mentors. Since support for these kinds of initiatives needs to consider different sectors, especially where the process and goals involve empowerment, a strong institutional framework should be in place to orchestrate the efforts of actors including the central government, local governments, NGOs, private sector entities, communities and youth councils.

The role of the government should be to place the youth agenda squarely within the country's broader social and economic framework, and specify necessary budgetary resources for the development of mechanisms that encourage youth participation and cultivate related capacities. In this process, district level agencies can serve as important intermediaries between the local and central levels.

Environmental Sustainability and Equity

The promotion of environmental sustainability and equity, in mutually reinforcing ways, should be integrated in all efforts to empower youth for inclusive development. With climate change taking hold, environmental damage is

now strongly emerging as a source of conflict escalation, recurrent drought and famine, and human development shortfalls for both present and future generations.

Rapid deforestation due to the destructive charcoal trade, over-grazing and the mismanagement of land tenure are causing irreparable damage to the environment in Somalia. Most Somalis continue to rely heavily on traditional solid fuels, particularly charcoal and firewood, but these energy resources are shrinking rapidly due to overexploitation for both energy and grazing needs. Growing competition over fast-declining energy sources has already heightened tensions among communities to such an extent that the energy crisis alone is becoming one of the key drivers of resource conflict in Somalia.

Ironically, Somalia's climatic conditions provide some of the world's best conditions for harnessing renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind energy. There are proven successes in introducing technologies, such as improved cook stoves, that can reduce fuel use, inside air pollution and the long hours of drudgery associated with collecting wood and other fuels. Other possibilities include solar cookers, dryers and lamps, and portable solar bio-digesters.

Properly designed, decentralized provision of energy services combined with environmental conservation programmes would provide options to engage youth through community-based actions, setting new patterns of behaviour in place for a new generation. These activities could focus on both mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change, while accelerating progress on MDG targets. Policies for sustainable energy options could help improve the efficiency of solid fuels; promote the sustainable management of biomass resources; facilitate the transition to modern fuels by making them locally available, affordable and acceptable; and introduce technological and institutional innovations.

To generate greater momentum towards the MDGs, renewable energy projects need to evolve from their 'traditional' focus on residential needs towards much broader employment

Creating and supporting youth organizations at all levels helps integrate youth voices and choices across public decision-making and development programming.

The promotion of environmental sustainability and equity, in mutually reinforcing ways, should be integrated in all efforts to empower youth for inclusive development.

generation efforts—with an emphasis on youth. These could include linking renewable energy to income generation and productive uses in agriculture, small industries, commercial services and social services, among others. Since energy and water are closely interlinked, they should be addressed simultaneously.

Finally, the process of extending energy sources should venture beyond providing technology and services to empower local people, especially young men and women, as energy entrepreneurs and environmental conservationists. Individual and organizational capabilities should be developed, along with a support structure for complementary investments.

Tracking Change

Monitoring and evaluating youth development programmes poses challenges because they can extend over a long period of time and touch a range of sectors. It is not always possible to isolate causes of success or failures, or track spill-over effects across populations. Since the transition from youth to adulthood is a complex process, outcomes can be unexpected or even negative, such as increased risk-taking. A better understanding of what youth need to transition through each stage of the lifecycle and to become economically self-sufficient is needed. Evaluations of youth programmes are faced with

addressing these challenges in order to establish a base of knowledge required by policymakers to choose effective strategies.

Table 4.3 provides a list of key MDG-related indicators that can be used to monitor progress towards empowerment; these should be disaggregated by gender.

A Youth Empowerment Index

The indicators in Table 4.3 could further be used to construct a composite Youth Empowerment Index, which could establish a benchmark against which to monitor the impact of programme interventions. Although empowerment as a critical pillar of human development has been recognized since the inception of the global Human Development Report, it has been difficult to quantify true measures of empowerment given differences about what is important and the paucity of internationally comparable measures.²⁶⁵

The Human Empowerment Index produced by the 2004 Nepal Human Development Report, however, has been recognized by the 2010 global *Human Development Report* as an innovative measure that captures social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities.²⁶⁶ While the lack of adequate information prevents applying this index in Somalia, ample scope exists to generate information and customize

Table 4.3: Indicators for Monitoring Youth Empowerment Programmes

Social	Economic	Political
Youth literacy rate (ages 14-29)	Incidence of child labour	Percentage of youth membership in community organizations
Mean years of schooling among youth	Labour force participation rates	Percentage of youth who are aware of their representation in political decision-making bodies
Vocational training rates among youth	Unemployment rates	Percentage of youth engaged in politics
Percentage currently engaged in anti-social behaviour	Percentage of youth not at work and not in school	Percentage of youth working as peacebuilders in the community
Under-five mortality rate by gender	Percentage of youth engaged in entrepreneurship	Percentage of youth who feel politically empowered
Percentage of youth using the internet	Per capita household income	Percentage of youth participating in elections

Source: Adapted from youth advisory group consultative workshops for Somalia HDR 2012; global MDG indicators.

it for youth empowerment in that context. An index would be a potentially powerful tool for identifying the magnitude of multiple exclusions, and mismatches in their social, economic and political dimensions—information crucial for devising successful national policies and strategies.

The Brazil Youth Development Index (YDI) developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is another innovative measure. It draws on six indicators underlying the three dimensions of the HDI—health, education and income. The education-related indicators are youth illiteracy, appropriate schooling and quality of education.²⁶⁷ Health indicators include mortality due to internal causes and mortality due to violent causes.²⁶⁸ Income is measured by per capita family income.²⁶⁹ The YDI closely correlates with the HDI. Some youth-focused national human development reports, especially in Egypt and Kenya, have also produced youth development indexes with indicators based on national needs and priorities.

While the choice of indicators depends on the purpose of the index, national priorities and easy availability of information, it is essential that a future Youth Empowerment Index for Somalia be constructed at two levels. At the national level, an index should be devised using objective indicators to capture and combine the three dimensions of empowerment, in line with the Nepal methodology. It should be regionally disaggregated. At the grassroots, community empowerment should be measured using qualitative indicators underlying different dimensions of local organizational capacity building for community-led youth development programmes.

Measuring Local Capacities

Given the importance of local social capital formation, including through organizational capacity development, several qualitative indicators can be used to assess the perceptions of youth on progress towards this end, using a standard scoring method rated on a five-point ordinal scale between the most desirable (5 points) and least desirable (1 point) outcomes (Box 4.10).

Conclusion

Since youth represent the largest generation in Somalia and one of the nation's greatest assets, recognizing and harnessing their full power and potential as key development actors and peacebuilders through holistic programming would contribute significantly to poverty reduction, economic growth and social inclusion. This requires developing a comprehensive and systematic framework that captures the complexity of the situation of youth in a context of violent conflict.

Despite movement in that direction through a growing rhetorical emphasis on holistic and integrated programmes, progress in practice has been slow. Existing donor-supported youth programmes in Somalia are dominated by rights-based programmes for protection, basic education, psycho-social work and advocacy. Many innovative programmes have yet to be documented through in-depth studies that identify best practices and lessons for adopting holistic youth programme worthy of wider replication and up-scaling. The recently formulated national youth policies in Puntland and Somaliland are encouraging, but their effectiveness will depend very much on how well they are anchored in national and sectoral development strategies for coordinated action, and the extent to which youth are engaged in policy design, implementation and monitoring.

This chapter has offered a multidimensional empowerment framework for youth that harmonizes rights-based, economic and socio-political approaches, towards a goal of youth gaining optimal opportunities to develop their full potential, to freely express themselves and have their views respected, and to live free of poverty, discrimination and violence. The multidimensional nature of empowerment implies recognizing diverse needs, interests and potentials of all youth, regardless of their level of risks. It calls for bringing together various strategic partners, including the government, private sector and civil society, to collectively offer youth a full and well-integrated array of products and services they need to expand their social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities.

Since youth represent the largest generation in Somalia and one of the nation's greatest assets, recognizing and harnessing their full power and potential as key development actors and peacebuilders through holistic programming would contribute significantly to poverty reduction, economic growth and social inclusion.

Box 4.10: Assessing Institutional Capacities

Decision-making process: Proper understanding of how group decisions are made in the formulation of rules and regulations, programme selection and programme implementation becomes important for the sustainability of grassroots institutions. If decisions are not made with the full participation and consensus of group members, other crucial attributes of institutional capacity building are unlikely to emerge and be sustained. The group's decision-making process is assessed by specifying a number of criteria: consensus, persuading members to reach consensus, majority rule and imposition by outsiders.

Degree of participation: Indicators to monitor the degree of participation are influenced by organizational growth, group behaviour and group self-reliance. The participation of group members can be assessed in terms of their degree of participation in the planning, implementation and maintenance of projects, including their participation in making rules and regulations.

Knowledge and transparency: Transparency in project information and the decision-making process means that decisions have to be made in a manner easily understood by all participants, who should be fully aware of and responsible for the outcomes of their decisions. Transparency in the decision-making process can be measured by assessing the group members' degree of knowledge and information about project objectives, group rules and regulations, and group funds, savings and investments.

Accountability: Related to transparency is the degree of two-way accountability of the group to its members and vice-versa. The indicators to capture this critical element of group empowerment include the accountability of members for group decisions and the group's accountability to its members.

Leadership quality: The success or failure of grassroots organizations depends on, among other factors, how honest, devoted, responsible, efficient and skilful leaders are in managing group activities in a sustained way.

Organizational linkages and coordination: Sustainability and capacity for self-help can be judged by the extent to which the local organization has established networking and partnerships with other organizations, both vertically and horizontally.

Trust and solidarity: Mutual trust and cooperation among members of communities is a significant factor in institutional performance. The features of social organizations that enhance trust and cooperation include making institutions more democratic and efficient in delivering public goods and services. The degree to which members of the community trust each other can be measured by three sets of indicators, namely trust and solidarity among group members, trust/unity between group and non-group members, and levels of self-confidence.

Conflict management capacity: Unmanaged conflict is a threat to the survival of any group; at least, it makes the group less effective. Conflict can occur within or among groups, often arising from differences in values, beliefs and attitudes regarding different issues, such as inclusion and participation, control over resources and benefit sharing. Group members' perceptions of the degree of conflict management both within and between groups should be assessed, along with groups' abilities to claim government services and work with other groups for mutual benefit.

Source: Adapted from UNDP Nepal Human Development Report 2004; Sharma and Banskota 2005.

In an illustrative example of a youth empowerment programme designed around employment, three core areas of interventions are promotion of employability by building assets and capabilities; sustainable employment creation through employment-led growth strategies, and support for youth entrepreneurship and self-employment; and cross-cutting interventions, including services to match jobs and job seekers. These entail a wide range of possible activities requiring

backing by multiple government ministries and donors. They are not intended to be a panacea for all the challenges and problems of youth development. But they can provide strategic directions for devising successful policy and programme strategies for empowering youth, and moving from an ad hoc, welfare-based paradigm to transformational community-led youth development where young people are problem solvers, not problems to be solved.

Chapter 5

Youth Empowered for Peace

Youth can play key roles as development actors and peacebuilders in places of conflict; the framework for action presented in Chapter 4 provides scope for harnessing this potential. Chapter 5 turns to a consideration of peacebuilding from a broader development perspective, in view of the long-running failure of top-down peace processes in south central Somalia and the more successful bottom-up peace processes in the northern region. It further elaborates links between youth, conflict and peacebuilding; the need for tackling the root causes of conflict and localizing development; and the roles of youth in conflict and peacebuilding. It presents lessons from experience, and a framework of strategic directions.

An Overlooked Role

The general view of youth in conflicts has been more negative than positive. They are most often depicted in two ways: as helpless victims, unemployed, growing up in hopelessness, and subjected to forced labour and recruitment into militias; or as criminals or child-soldiers who are inherently violent and easily manipulated by others into becoming perpetrators, and are easily recruited by groups prone to violence.²⁷⁰

By contrast, the potential of youth as positive agents of change and key actors in peace and development is barely recognized and rarely cultivated,²⁷¹ even though youth around the world on many occasions have demonstrated their ability to act as peacebuilders and social and economic actors. Further, youth offer unique capabilities in their openness to change and innovation. In their large numbers—the youth bulge—they could be an indispensable part of building a culture of peace within society. Empowering young people to engage as positive agents of change enables them to exercise their citizenship and human rights; helps channel

their inputs into policies and services most appropriate for youth; and reduces the likelihood of youth-led crimes or conflicts.

As Somalia makes clear, young people also have highly destructive potential as violent actors, often due to societal neglect. Those reared in a culture of conflict and especially those who have been direct victims of violence are more likely to resort to violence. A large youth population influenced by historical social, economic and political exclusions faces a limit beyond which is social unrest, be it peaceful movements or violent protests. The ongoing war by Al-Shabaab in south central Somalia is a case in point. More research and analysis is required to better understand the multiple factors that drive youth to take up arms, and that foment youth resentment and grievances to the point of unrest. This could explore how young people perceive conflict and what drives some to become involved in it, while others choose non-violence.

What is already clear from this report is that engaging youth in peacebuilding efforts can help address their feelings of fear, isolation, hopelessness and stigmatization, and in turn, contributes to the overall security of the community. To effectively empower youth, promote their competencies and resilience, and positively affect their social roles requires peacebuilding at multiple levels of society, including the family, school and community. Effective community mobilization and young people's involvement in local associations are avenues to build their social capital and sense of belonging and empowerment, which in turn act as important deterrents to violence.²⁷² There is also a need to bring youth-centred perspectives into conflict analysis. If youth are too often on the frontlines of war as soldiers, victims and violent actors, it is now time to put them on the frontline of the quest for peace.

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If youth are too often on the frontlines of war as soldiers, victims and violent actors, it is now time to put them on the frontline of the quest for peace.

Aiming for Transformation

Peacebuilding is an evolving concept. It involves “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.”²⁷³ A distinction is commonly drawn between negative and positive peace. Negative peace, as defined by Galtung, is the absence of war or direct or physical violence, whereas positive peace is a long-term process aimed at achieving the absence of indirect or structural violence.²⁷⁴ The concept of negative peace is immediately intuitive and empirically measurable, and can be used as a starting point to elaborate its counterpart concept, positive peace. The Global Peace Index (GPI) is a first step in this direction. It is a measurement of peace as the “absence of violence” that seeks to determine which cultural attributes and institutions are associated with states of peace (Box 5.1).

Sustainable peacebuilding focuses on both ending hostilities (negative peace) and tackling the root causes of conflict (positive peace). It can thus be defined as “a process that facilitates the establishment of positive peace, and tries to prevent violence by addressing the causes of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political and economic transformation.”²⁷⁵ Positive peace entails an orientation towards conflict transformation based on empowerment to reduce violence and destructive cycles of interaction, while at the same time promoting justice in human relationships. The Somali political crisis is one example of what happens when these elements are not factored in—the long-running emphasis on state-centric peace negotiations and strategies there has not even managed to achieve the goal of suspending hostilities.

In 1999, the UN General Assembly launched a programme of action to build a “culture of peace” for the world’s children. Based on justice, tolerance and plenty, the culture of peace would endorse values, attitudes and behaviours that reject violence; endeavour to prevent conflicts by addressing root causes; and aim to solve

problems through dialogue and negotiation. The programme of action promoted education for peace and sustainable development based on human rights, gender equality, democratic participation, tolerant solidarity, open communication and international security. Links between peace and the causes of peace were presumed rather than systematically measured, however.

Sustainable peacebuilding requires a more holistic approach, such as that provided by the conflict transformation model known as the ‘ABC triangle’: attitudes plus behaviour plus contradiction.²⁷⁶ When conflict turns violent, each of the ‘ABCs’ converts to violence: ‘attitudes’ to cultural violence (e.g., discrimination, enemy images), ‘behaviour’ to direct physical violence, and ‘contradiction’ (perceived incompatibility or clashing of goals between two or more parties) emerges from structural violence.²⁷⁷ In this model, the core issue is to simultaneously end all three forms of violence: direct physical violence by changing conflict behaviours; structural violence by removing structural injustices/contradictions; and cultural violence by changing attitudes.

Peacebuilding is contingent upon wider justice and fair development. Justice is both a condition for and the foundation of peace, and requires working to end conflict through concerted efforts towards reconciliation and the creation of right and just relationships.²⁷⁸ It is critical to integrate both human rights and peacebuilding into all aspects of development to ensure that reconciliation and justice go hand in hand. But this can happen only when there is a shift of emphasis from conflict management to a conflict transformation approach.

Building more than a State

State-building is not synonymous with peacebuilding, but represents an integral part of it. State-building interventions seek to develop functioning and self-sustaining state structures that re-establish the social contract between the state and citizens, and promote state legitimacy. The Somali experience, however, is one where the state-building exercise has not been grounded in the broader society. State-

Box 5.1: At the Bottom of the Global Peace Index

Somalia was the least peaceful country in 2010, and was second to Iraq in 2009/2010, according to the GPI issued by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The GPI is the world's leading measure of global peace. It gauges ongoing domestic and international conflicts, safety and security in society, and militarization in 153 countries using 23 separate indicators.

The GPI indicator of internal conflict registered the highest possible score, as the violent confrontation between the UN-backed TFG and the Islamist rebel groups Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab continued for the fourth successive year. Outbreaks of fierce fighting frequently engulfed parts of the capital, Mogadishu, and towns across southern Somalia. The ability of the peacekeeping force, AMISOM, to protect government installations and strategic positions against sustained attack has ensured the TFG's survival, but the political scene remained highly unstable. Islamist militia maintained control of most neighbourhoods in Mogadishu, as well as much of the south and centre of the country. A conflict between the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia also simmered on in 2009.

Figures from UNHCR and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre suggest that around 1.9 million Somalis have been uprooted by the ongoing conflicts. This amounts to more than 20 percent of the population, giving Somalia the highest possible score (5) for this indicator, along with Bhutan, Cyprus, Iraq and Sudan. Almost all of Somalia's measures of societal safety and security are accorded very high scores. The exceptions are police numbers per capita and the proportion of the population in jail on account of the country's lack of civil institutions. Although no accurate figures exist for defence spending by the transitional government, it is believed to have increased substantially in 2009 in response to greater threats, and as a result of the international community finding a way around the arms embargo on the country to prop up the ailing regime.

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace 2011.

society relations are dynamic, evolving and non-linear over time—a difficult process that if not well managed can turn violent (Box 5.2). The blueprint for a functioning state cannot be imported from elsewhere, as this would negate the endogenous character of state formation. At the same time, an endogenous process cannot be left to itself where it has already resulted in violent convulsions.²⁷⁹

The challenge for peacebuilding is how to work with society and convince those who hold power to construct a state that is rooted in society. Experience shows that these kinds of internal peacebuilding processes achieve more robust results in the long term than those derived from shorter-term external assistance and cooperation.²⁸⁰

While coming from different angles, peacebuilding and state-building converge in their aim to strengthen the relationship between the state and society, and to promote a representative and inclusive political system. The Somalia experience shows that attempts

at statebuilding that ignore or oppose this convergence will encounter considerable difficulty. Strengthening central state institutions is unquestionably important, but if this becomes the main or only focus, it threatens to further alienate local societies by rendering them passive, thereby weakening a sense of local responsibility for overcoming problems and local ownership of solutions. In Somalia's top-down peace processes, power sharing and revival of the state have always dominated the agenda for peace, while the fundamental causes of conflict have been side-lined. International efforts have emphasized building a national government with little or no attention to the rural majority of the population. The result has been a government that pursues state security without investing in human security, which is a government that achieves neither.

Addressing Root Causes

Currently, there are three principal approaches to conflict intervention—conflict settlement, resolution and transformation. Each is linked to

Conflict transformation involves actively working with the causes of conflicts, as well as norms and values, towards positive peace.

Box 5.2: The Relationship Between State and Society

“State building is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relations. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state. This necessarily requires the existence of inclusive political processes to negotiate state-society relations. State building is intimately connected to the political processes through which social/political relations and power relationships between holders of state power and organized groups in society are negotiated and managed. This process is often violent, but it can provide the basis for developing state capacity and legitimacy if the parties involved can identify common interests and negotiate arrangements to pursue them. Legitimacy aids the process of state building, and is reinforced as state building delivers benefits to the people. The state’s ability to manage state-society expectations and state-building processes is influenced by the degree of legitimacy it has in the eyes of its population. As such, legitimacy is both a means and an end for successful state building.”

Source: OECD/DAC 2008. Addressing root causes

three frames defining conflicts²⁸¹—resources, interests and identity, respectively²⁸²—with different strategies for action²⁸³ (Box 5.3). Both conflict settlement and conflict resolution, which typically fall under conventional conflict management approaches, continue to favour conflict avoidance or reduction—negative peace. Conflict transformation involves actively working with the causes of conflicts as well as norms and values, towards positive peace.²⁸⁴

Conventional wisdom continues to limit the development of more innovative conflict transformation approaches, which would involve a paradigm shift towards empowerment and the mutual recognition of conflicting parties as fully fledged negotiating partners in all peacebuilding efforts. The ultimate aim of conflict transformation is to reach a settlement on substantive issues that fully considers the underlying needs and fears of the conflicting parties.²⁸⁵

Box 5.3: Settlement, Resolution...or Transformation?

Conflict settlement aims to end an armed conflict through an agreement among conflicting parties, but without addressing the underlying causes. It sees conflict as a struggle over claims to scarce status, power and resources, with some sort of win/lose or compromise outcome. It primarily involves the official and formal activities of diplomatic and governmental actors.

Conflict resolution deals with process-oriented activities designed to address underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence. Bargaining is focused on articulating each party’s legitimate interests, and on creative methods of working with opponents to maximize the degree to which these interests can be satisfied. It does not necessarily address the underlying values, norms and fears of each of the parties, however. Non-official, non-governmental parties are typically involved.

Conflict transformation focuses on long-term peacebuilding efforts targeting outcomes, processes and structural changes. It emerged from longstanding efforts to deal with intractable ethnic conflict. The objective is to overcome direct, cultural and structural forms of violence, and transform unjust social relationships through empowerment. Local organizations as well as international development agencies and NGOs engage in grassroots training, capacity building and empowerment, trauma therapy, and human rights and development interventions. This is an open-ended, long-term, multi-track and dynamic process aimed at putting civilians at the centre of peace processes. Its ultimate goal is equal access to resources to address larger structural inequalities for longer-term social reconstruction and reconciliation.

Source: Bigdon and Korf 2004.

Through a conflict transformation lens, the root causes of violent conflicts arise from unsatisfied human needs, as well as from unequal and repressive social and political structures that compound the grievances of marginalized groups. Empowerment is a powerful tool to address unequal power relations through a process of dialogue and active listening. The recognition of an opponent's interests, needs, fears and values does not figure prominently in the current empowerment discourse, however. A sharper focus is needed for conflict transformation, because it is more sensitive to the dynamics of a conflict, compared to conflict management and preventive approaches (Table 5.1).

Applying conflict transformation for youth means addressing the root causes of multiple exclusions, moving beyond protection and preservation of the status quo, and seeking to harness their full potential. Most existing programmes for youth fall somewhere among preservation of the status quo, the integration of youth within social processes and institutions to

forestall efforts to mobilize youth to perpetuate conflict, and the transformation of the status quo by positioning youth as agents of such transformation. While programmes that preserve the status quo stabilize the present, transformative programmes open up a vista of a peaceful future by providing more opportunities for youth to broaden their engagement in social, economic and public life.

Addressing unequal and discriminatory causes of poverty both horizontally (across social, religious and clan/ethnic groups) and vertically (from the grassroots to civil society to the government) is vital to ensuring that both peacebuilding and developmental goals respond effectively to conflict. Vertical peacebuilding develops relationships across all levels of society in peace-related initiatives, while horizontal peacebuilding fosters constructive understanding and dialogue across lines of division.²⁸⁶ The youth empowerment framework presented in Chapter 4 can help make such links through its inclusive perspective and dynamic,

Applying conflict transformation for youth means addressing the root causes of multiple exclusions, moving beyond protection and preservation of the status quo, and seeking to harness their full potential.

Table 5.1: Diverse Strategies, Different Results

Impact on Conflict	Transformation	Conflict Prevention	Conflict Avoidance	Conflict Catalyst
Impacts on other communities	Includes participants' preferences and priorities in project design.	Considers affected communities' priorities and preferences.	Avoids worsening tensions and supports connection between communities.	Increases tension with other communities.
Effects on perceptions and relationships	Increases mutual dependency and communication between communities.	Reduces harmful competition, suspicion and biases.	Avoids creating or worsening harmful competition, suspicion and biases.	Increases harmful competition and suspicion in communities.
Ethical aspects	Models and promotes constructive values.	Reduces ethical problems.	Avoids harmful behaviour, messages and relationships.	Can lead to harmful behaviour, messages or provocations.
Risk of violence	Increases individual and communal capacity to abstain from being involved in and exposed to violence.	Reduces vulnerability of people and communities to violence.	Avoids placing people and communities at (more) risk from violence.	Places people and communities at (greater) risk from violence.

Source: Rogers et al. 2010.

The local peace processes demonstrate both a demand for security and law and order, and a capacity among Somali communities, in the absence of a state, to control and manage conflict.

bottom-up process, which entails community mobilization and strengthening collective voices for peace through vertical and horizontal links.

Lessons from Somali-led Peace Processes

In contrast to the many failed externally driven peace efforts for Somalia, Somalis themselves have led numerous relatively successful local efforts to end violence and re-establish local security and systems of governance. These provide an alternative to tried state-building templates. They suggest that a bottom-up approach may be more effective in resolving Somalia's crisis, albeit in a more gradual way.

The Peace Mapping study by Interpeace has catalogued over 120 indigenous peace processes in Somalia since 1991—more than 90 in south central Somalia, over 30 in Somaliland (1991-1997) and eight in Puntland. The study provides valuable insights and lessons on how Somali-led processes have proved more effective than internationally sponsored national reconciliation initiatives.²⁸⁷ The local peace processes demonstrate both a demand for security and law and order, and a capacity among Somali communities, in the absence of a state, to control and manage conflict. Both Somaliland and Puntland have clearly shown the potential and sustainability of 'home-grown' peacemaking and reconciliation. By choosing independence in Somaliland and semi-autonomy in Puntland, people in these regions have altered the constitutional make-up of the former highly centralized and predatory Somali state, identified as one of the causes of state failure.

Notwithstanding the contested sovereignty over its eastern regions, and that it is not recognized internationally, Somaliland's political evolution from indigenous grassroots organizing in the early 1990s to a democratic governance system since 2002 presents a good example of peacebuilding using the conflict transformation approach.²⁸⁸ Somaliland has rebuilt relations between warring communities; redistributed stolen property, and restored law and order; demobilized militia; and established district,

municipal and national governance structures. These successes are attributed to a sustained focus on resolving issues at the community level before attempting to tackle issues of national governance. For example, national conferences were developed from a series of local meetings in which communities sought to resolve their differences, and actors and customary institutions from traditional clans were fully involved. Indeed, the involvement, strength and resilience of local communities have allowed Somaliland to progress even with very little external assistance.²⁸⁹ The experience suggests that the best hope for state revival in Somalia may lie in the explicit pursuit of a state where a central government with limited power and capacity relies on a diverse range of local authorities to execute core functions of government and mediate relations between local communities and the state.²⁹⁰ Somaliland offers important lessons in this regard.

Puntland is another example of state reconstruction based on a bottom-up approach.²⁹¹ The idea of a decentralized administration originated as far back as 1991, but it took seven years and several peace conferences before the federal state in Puntland was declared in 1998. The Garowe Community Constitutional Conference held in 1998 over a period of three months was a home-grown political process involving numerous meetings that eventually led to the formation of Puntland. The conference articulated that Somalia's future lay in a federated state.²⁹²

Partial Peace through Traditional Means

Local peace initiatives in south central Somalia have emerged under the guidance of clan elders using customary law as a moral and legal framework. They are based on clan traditions of negotiation, mediation and arbitration. The majority involve the resolution of conflicts over shared land, pastoral resources and clan-related revenge killings through reconciliation, and by building cohesion and cross-clan alliances. The number and frequency of peace initiatives is a function of the heterogeneity of the clans and sub-clans, and the relative value of local resources.²⁹³

Reconciliation processes involving people from two or more regions have occurred in several parts of south central Somalia.²⁹⁴ For the region as a whole, however, a combination of local structural inequalities and greater international attention has made conflict more intractable and local reconciliation more difficult. This has prevented the establishment of more durable government structures of the type that have emerged in Puntland and Somaliland. Local peace processes have been effective in managing security in many parts of south central Somalia. But experience shows that hard-won local peace accords reached through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are vulnerable to being undermined by armed factions, business leaders and other powerful stakeholders.²⁹⁵ In the long term, peace needs a viable state authority to sustain it. Further, unlike in Somaliland and Puntland, local peace processes in south central Somalia have not explicitly set out to address underlying causes of state failure and conflict.

Since 1991, throughout the regions, clan elders, titled elders and religious leaders have played pivotal roles in all Somali-led peace processes as mediators, delegates of their clans or overseers

of conflict management and local governance. Customary and sharia law have provided a framework for dialogue, decision-making, settling grievances and the reinstitution of law and order. Unlike an externally driven peace process, local peace processes illustrate the rich traditions of mediation, reconciliation and consensus building that lie at the heart of the Somali approach to peacebuilding (Table 5.2).

Indigenous Somali peace processes are large and lengthy public affairs, in which decision-making through consensus, inclusiveness and restoration of social relations and contracts between communities are key principles. The process of reconciliation involves the parties controlling violence, demonstrating compromise and tolerance, and agreeing to coexist. Economic motivations—the use and control of land and productive assets and real estate to re-establish trade and commerce and restore livelihoods—are important catalysts.

Women have very limited opportunities to participate in formal Somali peace processes. Yet they have organized themselves as strong peace advocates using innovative tactics to mobilize support and pressurize parties to

Table 5.2: Driving Peace from Inside vs. Outside

Somali 'Ownership'	Externally Driven
Locally designed, mediated, managed and financed	Externally designed, mediated, managed and financed
Legitimate leadership and representation (locally selected)	Contested leadership and representation (not locally endorsed)
Sufficient and flexible timeframe	Insufficient timeframe
Located in the Somali region	Located outside the Somali region
Traditional mechanisms of consensus building and conflict resolution	Limited scope for reconciliation
Systems for reparation are fundamental	Conflict resolution mechanisms focused on 'quick fix' power-sharing solutions
Use of sanctions against 'spoilers'	No transitional justice or reparation
Inclusive, involving broad public participation	No sanctions employed
Substantive efforts to disseminate proceedings and outcomes, ensuring popular endorsement	Exclusive, with limited public participation
Transitional mechanisms established to oversee implementation (e.g., joint security committees)	Weak public outreach, and no dissemination or attempts at public ratification
	Emphasis on establishing government rather than transitional entity or the tasks it is mandated to fulfil

Source: *Interpeace and Center for Research and Dialogue 2009.*

stop fighting. They have demonstrated critical leadership in civil society peace initiatives in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia, helping to reduce violence and create conditions for dialogue. Their actions have included demolishing checkpoints, demobilizing militia, monitoring human rights, interceding between belligerents and contributing financially to peace conferences (Box 5.4). They have struggled, however, to find a direct role in formal negotiations or decision-making due to cultural and religious barriers.²⁹⁶ Women's complementary skills and experiences could be better directed towards influencing a positive agenda for peace, and enhancing sustainability, including through their influence over young militia, especially in south central Somalia.

Although largely seen as successful, local peace initiatives driven by clan and religious elders have paid little heed to youth participation, which is generally reduced to a bare minimum or relegated to entertainment and other peripheral activities. Clan affiliation is in fact one of the main barriers to youth participation in peacebuilding in Somalia, with youth mainly expected to obey political and religious community leaders. The clan structure is such that even as the voices of youth are not heard, they are duty bound to defend and protect their clan—this is seen as one of their most important roles.

Political affiliation is another barrier for youth in local peace initiatives. They are not allowed to participate in decision-making, and are more or less used as foot soldiers for violence. In short, politicians and elders want youth only during election campaigns and wars, but not in negotiating peace processes because young people are seen only as part of the problem. Their role as part of the solution is rarely appreciated.

The Youthful Face of Conflict

Despite some successes in peacebuilding in Somalia, non-state armed actors are prevalent in all regions of Somali. They include criminal gangs, freelance militias, political/radical armed groups, clan militias and private/market/neighbourhood security groups.²⁹⁷ Given the current lack of in-depth research, little is known about what drives these groups or how they operate. What is clear is that children are being systematically recruited and used for military and related purposes by all major combatant groups.²⁹⁸ They are mostly recruited from schools or madrasas and from camps for IDPs in Somalia and refugees in neighbouring countries. There are reports of girls being recruited by anti-government elements to 'marry' fighters, provide logistical support and collect intelligence. The majority of children associated with armed forces or armed groups are 14 to 18

Box 5.4: A Peace Caravan from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian Border

During the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, peace accords were reached at the two preliminary mini-conferences at Bandiiradly and El Hur in May and June 2006. The lack of infrastructure and telecommunications in this vast geographical area presented particular challenges for the wide dissemination of the results, however. The accords included the establishment of joint committees in the conflict zones to sustain community interaction, establish local ground rules to manage the sharing of water and grazing resources, address any other issues arising in the local areas, and monitor implementation of the agreement.

To close the information gap, women's groups played an important part in passing news of the settlement at water holes and other meeting places, and two caravans led by elders were organized. Covering over 200 kilometres from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian border, they visited all key villages and settlements to brief the communities and pass peace messages, mobilizing community support for the process. The peace caravans concluded with large gatherings at El Hur on 30 June 2006 for the communities living around Hobyo town on the Indian Ocean, and at Qaydaro town on 4 July 2006 for the population in the border area between the south Mudug and Galgadud regions. These positive developments encouraged the diaspora to visit the region in support of the process.

Source: Interpeace and Center for Research and Dialogue 2009.

years old, although children as young as 9 are being recruited by anti-government elements.²⁹⁹ The most dominant group in enlisting youth is Al-Shabaab, which uses intimidation and forced recruitment, along with economic incentives and jihadist indoctrination (Box 5.5).

Authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, two areas spared the worst violence, are now increasingly concerned about infiltration by Al-Shabaab forces hiding among returning displaced persons. In Puntland, youth engaged in criminal activities are reported to be mainly pirates and illicit drug or charcoal traders. In south central Somalia, the main criminal gangs are pirates, freelance militia and armed clan militia, while the main non-state armed groups consist of Al-Shabaab; Ahlu Suna Wal-Jama'a; (Raaskambooni; Sool, Sanaag and Ceyn; and groups affiliated with the business community or led by former warlords, TFG private militia, Hisbul Islam (outside Al-Shabaab control), international security companies, regional armed militia and private armed security. Clans and families also mobilize youth—as a defence against hostile clans.

The total number of children and youth being used in Somalia's conflict is not known, but available information indicates that thousands are being trained in basic arms techniques as well as on more sophisticated skills such as assassination, intelligence collection and the use of improvised explosive devices.³⁰⁰ This violates international human rights and humanitarian law. The recruitment and use of children by armed forces or armed groups is one of six egregious child rights violations falling within the scope of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005). Recruitment of children under age 15 for direct participation in hostilities is a war crime.

Why Youth Become Violent

Many Somali youth have known nothing but conflict and hardship for most of their lives, especially in south central. Since 1991, a whole generation has known no formal government or gained respect for law and order. It has missed going to school. The few who are being educated today may attend institutions that indoctrinate them into Islamic fundamentalism. Lacking alternative livelihood opportunities,

Many Somali youth have known nothing but conflict and hardship for most of their lives, especially in south central.

Box 5.5: Radicalization of Youth

The Al-Shabaab militia targets youth 12 to 22 years old, depending on the height of the person. But in some instances, children as young as 9 are recruited, trained in combat and taught extreme ideological lessons. For any youth to be promoted to higher ranks, he/she must have at least three to five years of experience on tough battlefronts, such as the Ethiopian interventions in early 2006 or the Mogadishu battles since 2008. They must participate in deadly operations, including assassinating key individuals and planting mines, and be committed to implementing all actions in their areas of specialization.

Al-Shabaab recruitment methods encompass promising phones and money or other incentives; ideological indoctrination in mosques; using children as recruiters practicing more aggressive techniques such as threats to children and relatives; raids on schools and abductions in public areas and from vehicles. The group also fuels animosity between the minority (especially Bantu) clans and the larger clans, and plays on the emotions of youth by alluding to the jihad against foreign AMISOM and TFG forces. Ironically, Al-Shabaab has many foreigners among its ranks.

Young senior commanders in the ranks of Al-Shabaab are often in charge of deadly operations and special assignments like intelligence gathering, arrests, torture, intimidation and murder. They most often target humanitarian aid workers, business people and private sector workers. They also collect money from individuals and communities for the group. Among the general population, the young militias are the most feared members of Al-Shabaab, due to the fact that they take the law in their own hands against individuals they accuse of being against Islamic teachings, without fear of any consequences from senior commanders. In general, armed children and youth are seen as the most problematic group of combatants to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate, and are the highest security risks.

Source: United Nations 2010; Marchal 2011

When young people—particularly young men—have few opportunities for positive economic, social and political engagement, they become a ready pool of recruits for violent groups.

they are forced to engage in risky behaviours or criminal activities for survival. With little voice in clan structures or governance, they turn to violence to vent their frustrations. During focus group discussions with women in south central Somalia, participants indicated that youth would only be able to become involved in political decision-making when violent conflict is over. Young women saw violence as a means to challenge gender norms that traditionally discriminate against women and girls

When young people—particularly young men—have few opportunities for positive economic, social and political engagement, they become a ready pool of recruits for violent groups.³⁰¹ Financial and other rewards, such as protection, can be attractive for uneducated and unemployed youth with few alternatives, in a situation imposing few penalties for violence. Some IDP camps in south central Somalia are particular breeding grounds for street gangs, drug dealers and armed militias (Box 5.6). Where grievances are the motivation for violence, relative deprivation and multiple exclusions are the drivers.³⁰² Involuntary reasons for joining armed groups include forced recruitment.

In south central Somalia, during the youth group consultative workshop for this report, participants revealed that two-thirds of those engaged in armed militia were forced to join violent groups through physical abduction, and processes of indoctrination and socialization into violence (Box 5.7). Those who have joined violent groups voluntarily reported a desire for material and other gains as the main propeller, followed by grievances, in both south central Somalia and Puntland (Box 5.8). Youth survey

findings confirmed that financial and other incentives instigate much of the violence in south central Somalia.

For south central, the youth group consultation noted three main reasons for youth joining violent or criminal activities. In order of importance, they were seeking identity, revenge and status. Thrill seekers—those looking for adventure—are almost non-existent. Identity seekers join an organization/identity group in the absence of other outlets to express their frustrations and grievances. Revenge seekers perceive themselves as victims and choose violent extremism to vent their anger and sense of oppression. Status seekers look for recognition by leaving the country to become foreign fighters and redress unrealized expectations.

Youth violence and extremism are associated with the exclusion and isolation they experience under weak and corrupt law enforcement and security systems, as well as within their families and communities. The focus group discussions highlighted a lack of understanding by parents of youth needs—encompassing a reluctance to communicate with their children, violent behaviour and suppression of children—as a major factor in the youth orientation towards violence. Youth felt that their families and communities do not value and appreciate them, which pushes them to the streets, where they mix with the ‘wrong peers’ and become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. Most youth expressed hopelessness over blocked aspirations and the violation of their rights through unfair treatment by elders and authorities. They reported being torn between social pressures and economic hardships.

Box 5.6: IDP Camps—Cauldrons of Extremism

“Most young people from IDP camps are street children who behave very badly. The IDP camps are breeding grounds for extremism. It is from here street gangs, child soldiers, drug dealers and armed militias are recruited. Parents cannot pay school fees nor find jobs for the youth. Therefore, most of them are illiterate and desperate to follow anyone who offers anything even if it is very risky. I am very concerned about my two teenage sons who are now street children in KM4 are ready to join one of the youth gangs because I cannot provide them with an alternative source of livelihood.”

Source: Interviews conducted in IDP camps, south central Somalia, for Somalia HDR 2012.

Box 5.7: Victimized by Al-Shabaab

A 15-year-old boy from an Al-Shabaab-controlled district of Mogadishu explained, “Al-Shabaab interfered with us and stopped us from playing.” The youth were offered money in dollars to join. Those who joined would in turn persuade others to join. The youth were initially given US \$250. “When you become an expert and can use your weapon, the money can be increased to up to US \$300 or 400. Al-Shabaab would also use religion to recruit boys into their militia. They would preach and convince people that they are engaged in a holy war, a jihad that Al-Shabaab was going to win. Whoever fought in this war would go to heaven and would receive their reward there.”

Al-Shabaab reportedly exploited the anger of the population against the abuses of the TFG and Ethiopian troops between the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2009. A 21-year-old man said in 2009: “I know about 10 persons who were involved in fighting against the Ethiopians, in different groups: Al-Shabaab, the Jabathul Islamiya and the ICU. Many were 17 years old or less. One of them used to sell watermelons on the street. He was captured by government troops and was tortured and left for dead, so when he recovered he joined Al-Shabaab.”

Source: Amnesty International 2011.

Box 5.8: Desperate Youth Join Armed Militias

“My elder brother Ali, 20 years old, was a second year student at the university when he left studies in October 2010 to join the extremist group Al-Shabaab. It was unfortunate for him because many of his young classmates and neighbourhood friends are already members of the group. When parents advised him to give up the membership of that group he resisted because he saw no other option. He said ‘what else can I do; even if I graduate from the university, there are no opportunities for employment. Is there a government that helps us find employment or cares about young people? I can either migrate to a foreign country or join this group. Otherwise, no one cares for us’. There is a wisdom that says ‘the devil finds work for the idle hand.’ He became fully engaged in Al-Shabaab. A few weeks later (end of February 2011) his parents were informed that Ali died in a fight against government forces and AMISOM.”

Source: Interview conducted for the Somalia HDR 2012.


Charismatic clan militia leaders often exploit these struggles, skilfully riding the ever-changing shifts in young people’s desires and grievances. A compounding factor is the easy availability of firearms. A 2009 UNDP survey found that almost 60 percent of respondents in Mogadishu reported that firearms had become far more easily available during the last 12 months—those most commonly used were Kalashnikov-type assault weapons, automatic rifles, pistols and revolvers.

Despite large numbers of youth suffering the same conditions and high levels of exclusion, some youth avoid violence and adopt non-violent measures, such as migration. The survey found large numbers of youth have seized any opportunity to leave Somalia.

Untapped Potential in the Quest for Peace

While youth are an integral part of violence in Somalia, in the survey they also expressed a very high willingness to be involved in peacebuilding—over 75 percent of respondents in south central Somalia wanted to contribute to peace initiatives (Figure 5.1). Even in relatively peaceful and stable Somaliland and Puntland, three out of every five youth indicated their interest in peacebuilding. Youth in all regions in fact attached more importance to their role as peacebuilders than as social and economic actors. There was no gender difference except in Somaliland, where more young women than men wanted to help build peace. These results indicate significant prospects for involving young people in sustainable peacebuilding.

Figure 5.1: Willingness to be a Peacebuilder



Source: Survey data for Somalia HDR 2012.

Ageism was a concern, with adults seen as largely indifferent to engaging in dialogue with young people, even though many also think young people are strong enough to change society. Although youth have been excluded from peace processes due to entrenched cultural norms, particularly the domination by clan elders and religious leaders, they are gradually emerging as effective agents of change through the formation of youth groups and umbrella organizations for collective action. Puntland provides some successes of youth-led initiatives in resolving local and regional conflicts (Box 5.9).³⁰³

Focus group discussions confirmed the view of many youth that politicians and clan leaders mobilize young people in elections and during conflicts, but afterwards leave them further marginalized, without any roles in society. Dialogue with youth further revealed that peace education, conflict resolution skills and leadership training dominate existing peacebuilding initiatives, but tangible economic or alternative livelihood programmes are needed for sustained engagement. In discussing the lack of political space and/or platforms for them to express their views, needs and grievances, youth did draw attention to local youth organizations

where they could come together and solve their problems, but noted these are concentrated in urban centres. This limits scope for wider participation.

A More Hopeful Future: Strategic Directions

Somalia needs a new approach to peacebuilding. Aimed at conflict transformation, it should build on the holistic programme for youth elaborated in Chapter 4, and become integral to all development policies, programmes and actions. Both peacebuilding and development efforts need to be localized, and create space for unleashing the full potentials of youth as peacebuilders and agents of change. Some strategic directions for integrating peace into community-led, inclusive development are presented here.

Linking Development and Peacebuilding

Sustainable peace is not possible unless peacebuilding is integral to long-term development efforts. Peacebuilding initiatives that ignore development are not sustainable; development initiatives that ignore conflict are not effective. Making such links can help optimize limited resources and expertise, while

Box 5.9: Youth-led Peace Initiatives in Puntland

Youth campaign and action in the Nugal region: Youth organizations have managed to settle disputes peacefully through their own initiatives. One such action was taken when four local armed gangs kidnapped and raped a 20-year-old woman during an attack on passengers of a taxi from Bosasso. The youth groups in Garowe organized a strong protest demanding the authorities act swiftly to apprehend the criminals and bring them to justice. The protesters blocked all the main streets and gathered in front of state institutions such as police stations and regional offices. They urged the public to confront such groups and help bring them to justice. Youth members were also instrumental in resolving a land dispute between two clans in the Shimbiraale area in cooperation with the traditional elders of the two parties, local authority and the police force. The MUDAN youth umbrella³⁰⁴ has been engaging in public awareness-raising programmes in Garowe using Radio SBC, Radio Garowe, Radio Nugal and Radio Daljir to deliver their peace messages. MUDAN was recently awarded with a Peace Building and Good Governance project by CARE International as part of its Civil Society and Media in Transition initiative.

Resolving the cycle of revenge killings in the Sool region: The predominantly pastoral Sool region has been traditionally afflicted by revenge killings. Youth organizations have promoted peace and stability, including through awareness-raising initiatives in Las-anod, Qorilay and Yeyle. In the midst of clan fighting, youths worked side by side with the regional authority and traditional leaders to restore stability. They have also helped resolve revenge killings resulting from conflicts over water, pasture and camels.

Peace work plan in the Mudug region: Peacebuilding is very challenging in the Mudug region, where there is greater insecurity than in the other regions of Puntland. The Dud-Mudug youth umbrella³⁰⁵ convened a peace dialogue in Galkayo in which both the northern and southern youth members of the divided town participated. It became the first meeting to arrive at a consensus on a peace work plan for Galkayo, a clear manifestation of youth commitment to peace.

The Voice of Youth, a newsletter in the Ayn region: Youth organizations have contributed to this newsletter, representing the voice of youth. They have presented their views on peace and how to strengthen it in Puntland.

Awareness-raising campaign on peace and community policing in collaboration with government institutions in the Bari region: The awareness-raising campaign covered Bosasso, Puntland's commercial capital, and other places in the region, mainly through local radio broadcasts. Youth organizations emphasized the need for stability, and called upon all actors and government officials to work together to improve security. In close collaboration with government security agencies, youth groups started social policing in the main parts of the city to prevent an escalation of clan conflicts, bringing about significant improvements.

Source: UNDP Somalia 2011a.

... strategies to empower youth and local communities to work towards resolving conflict and increase civil society participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be key areas of work.

at the same time ensuring that aid programmes do not unwittingly exacerbate existing tensions. Development agencies should establish alliances with organizations working for peace and conflict resolution. To address the roots of the problems that cause violent conflict, peacebuilding and development must identify the frustrations and interests of youth, who bear the brunt of many injustices.

Linking peace to development requires viewing development as the empowerment of individuals, groups and peoples, both as a process and outcome, to “participate in, contribute to and enjoy continuous economic, social, cultural, and political development, in which all human

rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”³⁰⁶ In this, strategies to empower youth and local communities to work towards resolving conflict, and that increase civil society participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be key areas of work.

Localizing the Peace Agenda

The difficulties faced by international missions in Somalia raise profound questions about the limits of top-down approaches to peace and reconstruction that ignore indigenous approaches to peacemaking. The situation underlines the need for a new agenda of localizing peace, in which activities to promote

Localizing peace does not necessarily mean excluding external involvement, resources and support. Nor does it imply fully restoring traditional institutions that no longer command broad social consensus.

peace use local materials and resources in a manner that activates latent cultural energies, creates a genuine sense of ownership and empowerment, and heightens prospects for sustainability.

Localizing peace does not necessarily mean excluding external involvement, resources and support. Nor does it imply fully restoring traditional institutions that no longer command broad social consensus. In some cases, local traditions and cultural resources may have to undergo reinvigoration to reflect a changing social milieu.³⁰⁷ In many conflict-affected countries, including Somalia, both the revitalization of culture and the role of the outsider as a facilitator are critical, due to the breakdown of traditional social institutions and networks that were once responsible for conflict management, and because some local traditions may exclude or marginalize voices—for example, those of women and youth—that are vital to a high-quality, sustainable peace.

At the core of localizing peace agendas is activating local cultural resources in response to locally felt needs and aspirations, and seeking to balance top-down conventional interventions with a genuinely participatory and bottom-up process. This requires a shift to empowerment-led conflict transformation approaches, without negating the role of external facilitation.

The Roles of Religion and Culture

Somalia is a majority Muslim country, and Islam provides one of the few identities that unify Somali clans. Peacebuilding efforts therefore could draw upon Islamic teachings, using an appropriate pedagogy to produce positive results.³⁰⁸ Abu-Nimer identified 17 Islamic values that can be used for peace education programmes.³⁰⁹ These include the pursuit of justice; social empowerment by doing good (ihsan); the universality of dignity and humanity; equality; the sacredness of human life; a quest for peace, knowledge and reason; creativity and innovation; forgiveness; importance of deeds and actions; involvement through individual responsibility; patience (sabar); collaborative actions and solidarity; the concept of ummah

(community); inclusivity and participatory processes; and pluralism and diversity.

Some of the most effective peacebuilding measures in Somalia have included artistic, cultural and athletic events such as music, theatre, festivals and sports. Somalis place a high value on literature, particularly poems, and have been called ‘the nation of poets’.³¹⁰ Somali culture and literature can offer useful tools and techniques for attaining and sustaining peace, building on the important role of literature in liberation movements and in bringing people together.

Mass media such as radio and television can widely promote tolerance and dialogue. Inflammatory reporting that ignites violence needs to be replaced with new scripts and images that illustrate how conflict may be channelled constructively. Creative youth programmes similar to Peace-links in Sierra Leone could be an effective means of transmitting positive messages and information (Box 5.10).

Youth Representation and Capacity Building

It is essential to create a space for engaging youth in civic and political institutions for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This could include: forging stronger and more strategic partnerships; training governments on how to engage youth; supporting platforms for youth voices in the media; offering training for young people on good governance, human rights, peacebuilding, political leadership, mediation and conflict transformation; engaging community partners to support youth activities; nurturing active citizenship and peace entrepreneurship; creating and supporting youth organizations; and cultivating an inter-generational partnership with adults.

Support mechanisms are needed to institutionalize peace education at all levels of the school curriculum, and to develop a cadre of youth leaders who can act as trainers of their peers, and participate in designing and implementing community-based peacebuilding programmes. To ensure the national representation of youth, national youth umbrella organizations and networks need to be

Box 5.10: Peace-links in Sierra Leone

Peace-links is a non-governmental youth-led organization founded in 1990 in Sierra Leone with the aim of empowering marginalized young people to step forward for positive change in their communities. Its programmes reach approximately 500 young people per year. Peace-links works to ensure that young people, especially those in extremely difficult circumstances, acquire the skills, knowledge, and confidence they need to contribute to society. Activities include music and dance workshops, peace education, sports, awareness-raising campaigns, vocational skills training, youth leadership training, seminars and camps.

One of the keys to the success of Peace-links is the use of music and dance-drama as vehicles of expression and a means of healing the wounds of war. The lyrics and messages in the songs challenge the culture of violence and propose a culture of peace. Through music, young people can express not only their pain but also their hope for a better future. Songs and group activities help reconcile communities, build trust among participants and boost the personal self-esteem of young people.

Source: Del Felice and Wisler 2007. Youth representation and capacity building

created and empowered to project a strong and integrated youth voice at the central level.

Monitoring Impacts

Unlike many mainstream development interventions, where there are often clear indicators of success, the gains from peace building are frequently intangible and difficult to gauge, especially in a short time frame. Conventional development indicators and assessment tools are usually inadequate. Since changes in perceptions and attitudes are pivotal in breaking cycles of prejudice and animosity inherent in most conflicts, indicators that capture these should be supplemented with case studies as the basis for monitoring peace programmes. While the Global Peace Index provides a framework for monitoring at the national level, youth-focused indicators suggested in Chapter 4 should be expanded to assess progress at the community level.

Peacebuilding indicators should capture both negative and positive peace. While negative peace can be measured using indicators on physical violence and crime, positive peace requires the empowerment indicators suggested in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

The Somali-led peace processes provide critical lessons for the international community and

peacemakers on the importance of focusing more on supporting home-grown peacemaking and political reconstruction, with a sustained focus on resolving concerns at the community level before attempting to tackle issues of national governance. Given the close link between peace and development, there is an urgent need for close collaboration between those working in the two areas. Development workers need to incorporate peacebuilding in their programmes, while peacebuilders can integrate economic perspectives, for example, in their work to achieve a durable peace.

Somalia currently lacks a holistic approach to encouraging youth as peacebuilders. The few youth-focused peace programmes are thinly scattered and oriented towards short-term projects, with limited evidence of success. Somali youth are willing to play a role as active peacebuilders and have already demonstrated their ability to resolve various local disputes. This strength needs to be tapped through comprehensive peace-related training, backed by programmes that provide tangible economic benefits for a sustainable impact.

One challenge is for development agencies to take a proactive approach to peacebuilding. This entails adopting a transformative empowerment framework in all programming, from strategic planning to programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

... national youth umbrella organizations and networks need to be created and empowered to project a strong and integrated youth voice at the central level.

Chapter 6

An Agenda for Youth Empowerment

An Agenda for Youth Empowerment

Amid Somalia's stark contrasts, from famine and vicious fighting in the south central region to a fragile semblance of peace and stability in the north, youth, women, IDPs and minority groups have faced marginalization and exclusion. As the largest population cohort, they represent tremendous opportunities for peace and development, but also grave threats. They are the strongest possible case for Somalia to adopt a new strategic vision for an inclusive society, where all people feel empowered and have the opportunity to participate fully in the life of their community. This will require radical shifts in policies, priorities and institutional reforms, and a far greater recognition of the strength and value that could come from harnessing youth as key development actors and peace builders. But failure to do so will otherwise continue to incur formidable costs—over the short term and across generations.

As a cornerstone of human development, people's empowerment, particularly youth and other marginalized groups, both at the individual and community level, is the most holistic agenda for the kind of dynamic transformation that Somalia needs to free itself from conflict and chaos. A holistic agenda for youth empowerment must include a two-pronged strategy. It should initiate the removal of exclusionary policy and institutional barriers from the top. It should also instigate a bottom-up process of fostering community-led initiatives that empower local people socially, politically and economically. It has a strong potential for deepening democracy, challenging existing inequitable power structures, and addressing root causes of conflict, including social anomalies and asymmetries. It should create a level playing field, where each individual has opportunities to develop and use his/her capabilities. Somalia's inter-related youth and societal crises underscore the urgency of placing

empowerment at the centre of the country's development agenda. The human development paradigm considers people as primary actors in improving their own welfare through economic, social and political empowerment. This objective must drive the policy framework, guided by sound mechanisms to eliminate discrimination, ensure that people's voices are heard at all levels and check corruption.

This report underlines the value and robustness of the empowerment approach in addressing the multifaceted peace and development challenges in Somalia, as it continues struggling with one of the world's most complex and longest conflicts. It outlines a vision for the fulfilment of human development through the full enjoyment of freedom as the cornerstone of good governance, access to quality education and knowledge, empowerment of marginalized groups, human security, and pro-poor and employment-led inclusive growth. It argues for the centrality of empowerment in achieving greater equity and sustainability, including by enhancing the voice and representation of youth³¹¹.

The reform action agenda presented here provides broad strategic directions for formulating appropriate national programmes of action, taking into account the voices of youth as reflected in the consultations and survey for the report, along with key findings emerging from research and analysis. It is also in the spirit of the international and regional youth response strategies particularly the World Youth Program of Action, African Youth Decade 2009-2018 Plan of Action and more importantly the United Nations Development Group's (UNDG) strategic framework and priority programme areas for joint action that has been developed in response to the key development challenges underlying the transformative change championed by youth in the Arab region³¹². Given the common

challenges faced by Somali youth, as evident in the Youth Charter (Annex 1), together with existing barriers to empowerment, it suggests measures common to south central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, while at the same time recognizing the imperative of reform measures specific to different contexts.

Underpinning the implementation of this strategy is the guiding principle stated in Chapter 4: Youth empowerment is a shared responsibility, which can be accelerated meaningfully if all key stakeholders partner with each other and synergize their efforts. They need to play specific critical roles and adopt particular responsibilities in coordinating, facilitating, implementing, and monitoring and reporting on progress towards youth empowerment. As a custodian of overall development, the Government has a responsibility to lead the promotion and advancement of youth participation and empowerment in Somalia. In this regard, the national youth policy and corresponding action plans should also include an implementation and partnership strategy to encourage and guide all stakeholders, including international development agencies, on how to mainstream young men and women in all their core policy and programmes.

All development partners including UN institutions, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and the diaspora, and youth organizations must be guided by a comprehensive national perspective in their efforts to empower young people, so they can align their programmes with the national youth policy framework and plan of action, and mainstream youth perspectives into their programmes and interventions. Donor collaboration and multi-stakeholder partnerships for coordinated action (Box 6) will be important for operationalizing the reform agenda presented in this chapter.

Putting Empowerment at the Centre of the National Development Agenda

Placing empowerment at the centre of any national development strategy is a vital

prerequisite for transformation in Somalia. This requires removing policy and institutional barriers that have perpetuated the multiple exclusions and marginalization of youth, and creating and supporting conditions under which young people gain ability, authority, agency and opportunities to make choices for themselves and other people. A coherent national youth policy framework needs to be well integrated in the national development strategy, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Somaliland prepared a national development strategy in 2011, which allows for revisions at regular intervals, and Puntland is in the process of preparing one. This provides an opportunity to integrate the national youth policy in the development plans as a core priority. While implementation of the recently ratified national youth policies should take precedence in Somaliland and Puntland, the TFG is also developing a youth policy in consultation with youth groups with support from the UN. In this context, the governments should recognize and internalize the common needs and aspirations of Somali youth, as reflected in the Youth Charter. It provides a unified voice for the empowerment of youth and the Somali people and urges the governments—the TFG and those of Somaliland and Puntland—to take bold actions in five priority core areas: policy and institutional reform, empowerment in its three dimensions, peacebuilding and green development.

One important step could be membership in the African Youth Charter³¹³ in order to tap opportunities for national action and regional synergies. The African Youth Decade 2009-2018 Plan of Action provides a strategic framework for engaging all stakeholders in popularizing, ratifying and implementing the Charter by supporting the development of national and regional plans of action.³¹⁴ Efforts are being made in some countries to involve young people in political and decision-making processes, as reflected in the establishment of national youth parliaments and youth appointments in executive positions. Youth networks such as the Pan African Youth Union have been created at the regional and continental level. Many countries, including Somalia, have not

Box 6: The Role of Key Stakeholders in Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development

Government and sector ministries

- Develop a national youth policy and action plan for priority action ensuring that other sectoral policies (education, health, employment, energy, environment, etc.) integrate the national youth policy, and are responsive to the needs and aspirations of youth;
- Promote coordination, collaboration and networking among all stakeholders, including international aid groups, the private sector and the diaspora, through the creation and management of youth empowerment fund for sustained technical and financial support in the design, implementation and evaluation of a national youth programme of action in partnership with a lead agency experienced and involving the Government, local partners and CBOs.
- Establish, strengthen and support youth council at national, district and local levels, ensuring their participation and representation in all structures of leadership, governance and management;
- Institute and support multiservice training and enterprise development centres at the national and district levels for promoting the employability of youth and youth entrepreneurship by engaging the private sector, and support microcredit and financing through the development of youth-led associations/cooperatives for youth enterprises;
- Develop a National Youth Volunteers scheme, placing recent graduates in line Ministries, Embassies, UN offices and private offices providing an opportunity for work experience for students; and
- Promote research and documentation, and serve as a repository for data on the status of youth with appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators, in collaboration with international development partners.

International development partners and inter-governmental agencies

- Adopt a ‘business unusual’ approach to transformation and social change in the spirit of the UNDG response strategy for the Arab world, focusing on strategic core responses (democratic reforms and inclusive growth) rather than interventions that might be marginal or lack value addition;
- Strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of government institutions for the design, implementation and monitoring of the national youth programme of action;
- Promote youth cooperatives and youth led savings and credit organizations and strengthen youth umbrella organizations and their networks at the national level, and integrate them with regional and global youth networks;
- Provide support to establish a scientific knowledge base, through research, technical and institutional innovation, that supports evidence-based policy and programme formulation, and implementation of sustainable livelihood options (environment, renewable energy, microfinance, economic opportunities /labour market surveys, and high value products for youth enterprise development);
- Undertake joint initiatives for designing and implementing a holistic youth empowerment and livelihoods diversification project to establish a convincing demonstration model at the community level with potential for wider replication and upscaling;
- Advocate for mainstreaming of demonstrated good practices and lessons in national policy and programmes;
- Build national capacities to collect and compile socioeconomic data and economic opportunities mapping for the youth cohort in a timely and accurate manner for effective planning, target-setting, monitoring and evaluation.
- Develop livelihood diversification projects focusing on urban youth and vulnerable youth through innovative youth schemes and partnerships with the private sector and the diaspora;
- Organize Youth Job Fairs and exhibitions bringing all the partners (Government, local ministries, development partners, donors, Somali diaspora) to link trainings/skills development with jobs.

Non-governmental and civil society organizations

- Develop and support national policy advocacy programmes to ensure youth voice representation and participation in decision-making bodies and governance process at the national, district and local levels in the spirit of the Youth Charter;

- Strengthen the capacity of youth organizations and their networking with community-based organizations to address the nationwide integration of the most marginalized youth groups, including women, youth with disabilities, and youth living with HIV and AIDS;
- Initiate innovative and sustainable microcredit schemes for youth entrepreneurship development, offering them a wide range of practical demand driven technical skills, and life skills in leadership and conflict resolution;
- Mobilize resources for youth programmes;
- Engage young people in awareness-raising and support community-based programmes on climate change and other pressing environmental issues; and
- Involve communities in identifying educational, social and cultural initiatives to support young people's reintegration taking into account the psychosocial and attitudinal factors related to crisis- and post crisis environments.

Youth councils/forums

- Mobilize, sensitize and organize youth in a unified body that engages in political, economic and socio-cultural activities;
- Act as a voice and bridge to ensure that government and other decision and policy makers are kept informed of the views and aspirations of youth;
- Protect youth against any kind of manipulation and discrimination on the basis of age, gender, clan or experience;
- Advocate for and mobilize resources to support and fund youth council programmes and activities;
- Liaise with development organizations to ensure that youth gain access to resources, services and programmes; and
- Promote relations and networking between youth organizations inside and outside Somalia.

Private sector

- Provide opportunities for promoting youth employment through investments in: entrepreneurship development in high-value niche products, demand-driven curricula to improve skills, training and apprenticeship opportunities, and innovative credit schemes;
- Develop youth volunteer schemes and twinning arrangements providing an opportunity for graduates from TVET centres to get work experience;
- Adopt and implement the core principles of the United Nations Global Compact³¹⁵ for promoting corporate social responsibility at all levels of business activities by developing inclusive business model with a long-term growth perspective that engages youth and other vulnerable groups and recognizes their rights (collective bargaining, elimination of child labour and other worst forms of labour including discrimination in respect of employment and occupation) while taking initiatives to promote environmental sustainability and anti-corruption advocacy.

Parents/care takers of youth

- Increase communication with young men and women in families giving them an empowering space where youth feel valued, respected, encouraged, and supported by parents and other adults in their efforts to develop personal and collective capacities for self determinism and healthy decision-making.

yet ratified the Charter,³¹⁶ however. Ratification is a critical next step towards implementation, and subsequent changes in national laws and policies.

Progress in youth empowerment heavily depends on how international actors, government, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and youth organizations align their activities and mainstream youth

perspectives into targeted programmes and interventions. In this context, the multidimensional concept of empowerment—social, economic and political—provides ample scope for harmonizing the three dominant approaches to youth programming. This will help harness the full potential of youth by ensuring youth become strategic social and economic actors, as well as peacebuilders. The approach should bring together all international

aid agencies for a joint youth programme of action geared towards a common youth agenda as a vehicle for transformation.

Strengthening Democratic Governance and Youth Participation

Weak or dysfunctional governance is one of the fundamental barriers to addressing Somalia's societal and youth crises. Strengthening democratic governance is essential to guaranteeing political rights, protecting economic freedoms, making institutions accountable and fostering an enabling environment where peace and development can flourish. Lasting peace will not be possible unless people feel represented in political life, and have a true stake in society. Sustainable development will not be achieved. A number of reforms are necessary to build confidence and ensure the government works in the interest of its citizens. The approach in support of governance reform must be extended beyond institutional strengthening to working within society to foster inclusive political and economic participation, rebuild resilient state-society relations and prevent conflict.

While recognizing traditional mechanisms of inclusive governance, the existing clan-based 4.5 formula (see Box 2.4 in Chapter 2) should be reviewed, and made more democratic as part of an inclusive state-building and reconciliation process. For this, the TFG should follow through on its commitments to engage all stakeholders in Somali society, including youth, in reconciliation and institution building, as per the spirit of the Transitional Federal Charter. To ensure the voice and representation of youth in political life and governance process, constitutional amendments and reform measures could lower existing age limits for youth to contest elections, at all levels of government. The recent constitutional amendment by the government of Somaliland to reduce the minimum age limit from 35 to 25 for local elections is a welcome step, but similar reforms for national elections are still warranted to guarantee youth representation in parliament, an aspiration reflected in the Youth Charter. Enlisting youth participation in

governance can prove to be effective in fighting against corruption, including by using their ICT competencies and unique capabilities in their openness to change and innovation to contribute to transparency, accountability, performance and efficiency in government transactions and operations.

Deepening democracy requires democratization of centralized forms of government, including through the decentralization of power and resources at the regional and district levels, and the development of capacities to provide well-managed, inclusive public services and administration. This helps provide an environment in which individuals feel protected, civil society and community-based organizations are able to flourish, and state institutions can be held more closely accountable, given adequate institutional mechanisms to uphold transparency and address political corruption, which otherwise de-legitimizes the State through leakages of public resources and sub-optimal development outcomes.

Respect for human rights and the rule of law are cornerstones of good governance, and critical supports for empowerment for peace and development. The mere presence of laws and institutions is inadequate without fair and impartial enforcement, however. Despite national gender equality policies and provisions, for example, gender-based violence and discrimination against women in Somalia continue to brutally suppress human rights and often go unpunished, posing a great loss to progress in human development. Upholding laws and rights may require amending legislation, strengthening judicial institutions, promoting human rights training, and establishing credible, independent and impartial national human rights institutions reinforced by indigenous non-governmental human rights organizations, including youth or juvenile courts.

Enhancing Youth Voice and Representation

This report has documented the political exclusion of youth, and revealed how the lack of outlets to express their needs and aspirations has

... the practice of traditionally excluding youth from decision-making is ingrained at the household level, where male heads normally make decisions on social, economic and political matters according to survey respondents from all regions.

fomented restiveness. Youth empowerment is not possible without guaranteeing their rights to participate in government decision-making and government processes at the national, district and local levels. The low participation of youth in decision-making is attributed mainly to lack of leadership and management skills, regulatory policy barriers and cultural norms reserving leadership roles for older adults. Furthermore, the practice of traditionally excluding youth from decision-making is ingrained at the household level, where male heads normally make decisions on social, economic and political matters according to survey respondents from all regions. For youth to fully participate and have ownership of the process, parents and other adults/caregivers in families need to assume the primary responsibility for ensuring the creation of the physical, social, emotional, and creative spaces where youth feel valued, respected, encouraged, and supported.

Political empowerment is a process and an end in itself. It is an intrinsic right of youth, and paramount for promoting equity and sustainability. For meaningful participation, any conventional 'tokenism' should be avoided, including in existing youth umbrella organizations and the newly envisaged youth council. Youth should be accepted as partners in decision-making so that they can express their views and make specific contributions to youth-related issues and beyond. Since appropriate institutional mechanisms can ensure youth representation at different levels, these should be clearly articulated in the national youth policy framework. The Government needs to include affirmative policy statements in the national youth policy on the representation of youth (both young men and women) in governance bodies at the national, district and local levels.

Strong and interconnected youth organizations at the grassroots are essential to involving a broad spectrum of youth. On the local government level, youth advisory bodies or other institutional forms should be the first outlets for youth to express views on local agendas; their perspectives could then be incorporated in community-based development planning. At the national level, participation in decision-

making bodies could come through the creation of a permanent national youth parliament/council, and by ensuring the adequate presence of youth representatives in national youth policy coordination and monitoring body comprising government and other stakeholders. Similar youth representation should take place at middle levels of government. Strong links across all levels, from the local to the national, should be promoted, and extended to the international level where warranted, with an emphasis on regular networking and the exchange of knowledge and experiences. Youth involvement in international arenas could be facilitated through the organization of special youth events, like world youth forums, congresses and retreats, or through youth-oriented Internet resources. International development partners should play an important role in enhancing the capacity of these youth networks/organizations at different levels. Besides financial and productive skills that yield tangible benefits, youth need training in leadership, peacebuilding, negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution.

Enhancing Employability of Young People

The lack of education and skills training linked to employment has been one of the major obstacles faced by Somali youth, heightening their frustration and disempowerment. The promotion of employability: by building assets and capabilities; supporting sustainable employment creation and offering cross-cutting interventions, such as mediation and matching services, organizational capacity building, and the fostering of youth voice and representation, are core areas for designing programmes to empower youth, as elaborated in Chapter 4.

Making education, skills training and employment services available, affordable, relevant and high in quality should be essential elements of a comprehensive policy to enhance the employability of young people, giving special attention to disadvantaged groups such as young women, youth with disabilities, and IDP and nomadic youth. Quality formal education, as well as effective, relevant and demand driven vocational training, labour market information

and services, and work experience are key factors for successful inclusion in the labour market. In order to address the changing needs of youth and unstable economic environment, economic opportunities mapping /surveys must be conducted on a regular basis in order to address the evolving situation. Such a system could be institutionalised in the key ministries/ department or civil society organization depending on the capacity in the area.

Overcoming barriers to inclusive education:

At 31 percent, Somalia has one of the lowest primary school enrolment rates in the world today.³¹⁷ One of the biggest challenges that children face is the limited availability of educational institutions in rural areas. Those who attend mostly drop out due to poor quality and high costs. Since employability begins with literacy and education, public primary and secondary education should be free and compulsory. It should be high in quality and efficiency, with relevant content to make it more attractive to young people. For this, educational curricula must include components of enterprise, life skills, ICT, conflict resolution, culture, human rights and the environment, as appropriate. The quality of education could be tackled by establishing minimum service and qualification standards, and by making school management more accountable through local assessment bodies.

Inclusive education requires flexible structures to reach all groups. A large part of the nomadic population has been denied access to education, for example, because they move and live in remote regions. Innovative ways of reaching nomadic populations, such as through mobile nomadic schools, distance learning and barefoot teachers³¹⁸—could be explored and introduced.

Investing in quality early childhood development programmes for all populations is essential to increasing primary school completion rates and addressing the intergenerational transmission of poverty. For those young people who discontinue their education before acquiring basic skills, second-chance or education equivalency programmes should be considered, with flexible class schedules, integrated curricula featuring

both life skills and vocational training, and high quality comparable to formal education.

Therefore a thorough review, rethinking and reorientation of education, vocational training and labour market policies is critically important to facilitate the transition to work and to give young people a head start in working life. As elaborated above, the aim is to ensure that young people upon leaving school possess a general education and a balanced range of qualifications and skills.

Comprehensive multiservice training programmes:

Many Somali youth are disadvantaged in terms of core skills required in the labour market, for both wage and self-employment. The failure of conventional supply-oriented vocational training to respond to labour market demands calls for developing a technical and vocational education system that cooperates with the private sector and is geared toward market requirements. Comprehensive training programmes should combine both life skills and livelihood skills development components to cater to the diverse needs of young people. This integrated approach is likely to be more efficient in terms of time and cost, and more effective in helping young people to become well-rounded adults than delivering life skills and livelihood skills development programmes as separate components.

Incorporating a life skills component develops psycho-social and interpersonal skills to promote responsible citizenship and life-long learning. This can help youth make informed decisions, communicate effectively, and cultivate coping and self-management skills. Livelihood skills development should be oriented around preparing young people to secure employment by offering them job-searching, interviewing, leadership and entrepreneurial skills, as well as marketable business skills (budgeting, marketing, accounting, planning and communications) appropriate to the local economy. The Government has an important role to play in instituting such multiservice training centres at the district level. This calls for forging partnerships with the private sector to ensure demand-driven skills, internships to provide

on-the-job training for participants, search and placement assistance and self-employment services to give young people a better chance of finding employment. Coordinated support across sectors and ministries linked to education and employment is also required for long-term impact.

Sustainable microfinancing scheme: Youth face several constraints to accessing financing to acquire assets and create businesses, including a lack of credit history and experience, and the perception that youth pose higher risks. Properly designed micro-financing programmes can help young people overcome these barriers and link them to market opportunities. For this, microcredit schemes should be an integral part of the holistic programme for youth discussed in Chapter 4.

At the community level, microfinance strategies should build on collective and cooperative support in the forms of solidarity groups. With necessary training and the provision of seed capital, or through revolving funds, youth-led community organizations learn to run microcredit schemes. These should be based on non-subsidized interest rates linked to competitive market rates to bolster sustainability, while offering the flexible, customer-friendly services preferred by low-income groups, such as comfortable loan maturity periods. Subsidies should be seen as priming the pump for initial business start-ups, however, not as long-term interventions. Cash or in-kind contributions should come from entrepreneurs, based on affordability.

In Somalia, where interest-free loan is the norm, due to Islamic principles, more research and pilot actions are needed to explore alternative options for address the sustainability of interest free micro finance institutions suited to the Somali context. The Kaaba Micro Finance Institution in Somaliland is an innovative example of how a conventional micro-financing scheme can be customized to suit Islamic norms, while ensuring that the institution can sustain itself. A recently developed interest free microfinance model—Rural Development Scheme (RDS) of Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL)—is another success example.³¹⁹ Successful programmes such

as the Commonwealth Youth Credit Initiative³²⁰ provide pilot experiences that can be replicated.

National Youth Empowerment Development Fund: A national community-led youth empowerment programme and national youth policy would require mobilizing sustained financial resources from the government, international aid groups, the private sector and the diaspora. Its primary purpose is to support the economic empowerment of youth. Towards this purpose, a National Youth Empowerment Development Fund could be set up and managed by a national youth council. It could operate under a national independent governing board comprising major stakeholders and contributors, and the council. For core funding for innovative youth programmes, the government could lead financing through a formal budgetary allocation of 40 percent, and mobilize the rest equally from the donor/aid community and local governments. The council could mobilize additional resources through creative fundraising efforts involving the private sector, the diaspora and international philanthropic foundations. Part of this funding could be channelled directly to community-based organizations as seed capital or to a revolving fund for micro-financing schemes for innovative youth enterprises. International development partners have an important role to play in supporting the establishment of such fund. The Government should come up with an affirmative policy guideline for the creation and management of the fund with a clear resource mobilization strategy and accountability mechanism by strengthening partnership with a number of stakeholders including the diaspora.

Promoting Employment-led Inclusive Growth

In Somalia, two-thirds of youth are unemployed, one of the highest rates in the world. A vast majority is willing to leave the country in search of alternative livelihood opportunities. Widespread youth unemployment is a critical aspect of the crisis facing youth, but cannot be tackled in isolation from the wider crisis confronting the Somali economy. Job creation is paramount, but at the same time, jobs must be productive and sustainable, provide

opportunities for advancement and uphold decent working conditions.

Sustainable employment creation should be an essential aspect of any economic growth strategy addressing the dual challenges of providing decent work and strengthening capacities for public and private sector development. There is an urgent need to develop, implement and monitor integrated national policy frameworks, including national employment strategies with dedicated action plans on youth employment, as well as coherent sectoral policies. Such policies should be based on evidence of demonstrated success and directed at sub-sectors that can act as engines of growth, such as livestock, fisheries and other niche products based small and medium enterprises that generate the highest number of jobs per unit of investment.

The rapid urbanization-youth employment nexus requires government policies for capturing the demographic dividend, and addressing the new needs of young people in cities and towns. Young men and women also represent a disproportionately large part of rural-to-urban migrants, hence, in the face of large youth cohorts, strong urbanization may be expected to lead to an extraordinary crowding of youth in urban centres, potentially fuelling social instability. Urban poverty/employment programmes will be required to address this phenomenon. Another important consideration is the imperative for integrating conflict sensitive development/peace building in youth employment creation. While the aim of youth employment might be livelihoods sustenance and development, the goal should also be to contribute to peace building and accelerated MDG achievements early on in Somalia. In Somalia, it is equally essential to ensure link between livelihoods stabilisation, local economic recovery for employment and inclusive growth. The Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is one such example that can be replicated as an effective strategy for rural employment for the most vulnerable and youth.

An integrated policy approach: This involves engaging different partners, including young

people, in making provisions for the creation of quality jobs for youth and enhanced youth employability. It calls for focusing on labour demand and supply, and addressing both the quantity and quality of employment. A strategy for youth employment promotion could be placed at the heart of the national economic policy framework to help shape an economic environment that fosters employment-led, pro-poor and inclusive growth. This will require structural reforms, since economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for overcoming poverty and youth unemployment. As discussed in Chapter 4, many countries have suffered from high incidences of poverty, unemployment and socio-political exclusion despite rapid economic growth.

Empowerment must drive the policy framework for attaining inclusive pro-poor growth: This is critical in avoiding growth that is jobless, ruthless, voiceless and/or futureless. Making growth pro-poor requires three conditions: a concentration of growth in economic sectors that can directly benefit the poor; an environment that promotes their employment and real incomes; and the enhancement of their basic human capabilities—particularly education, health, skills and social capital to enhance productivity and employability. Decentralization should be another critical strategy to ensure that benefits are equitably shared and growth is not lop-sided.

The economic growth strategy of Somalia must be based on unleashing potential in sectors most likely to produce employment and reduce poverty, and make growth inclusive: Sectoral policies can be highly effective in promoting employment-intensive growth and generating employment opportunities for young people, if the focus is on areas that are suited to the skills, interests and experiences of young people and that carry the greatest potential for growth. In Somalia, agriculture, livestock and fishery are some promising sectors with immense potential, with properly designed and implemented medium- to long-term plans guided by modernization and export promotion strategies. For instance, Somalia has natural resources and potential niches that could be

mapped and research for added value, including animal products (dairy, and hides and skins), fishing, farming, bee products (honey exports), minerals (quality gems and crystals), aromatic gums (frankincense, myrrh and opoponax), resins and other natural products (such as non-timber forest products). Since ICT is the fastest growing business sector in Somalia, youth should be assisted in setting up ICT-enabled business enterprises. New engines of job creation could come through private sector-led growth, supported by a proactive state that improves services and establishes conditions for workers to acquire skills for global competition.

It is therefore important in Somalia to avoid a single sector approach in youth employment. The overriding messaging on youth employment is the integration of youth employment across a number of productive sectors in a conflict or post conflict country early on. While it can be project based, there is an imperative in ensuring that government sectors (where government exists) are prioritizing youth employment in their budgets, recovery and development plans. Targeting youth on employment without embedding the efforts across government and non-governmental sectors will not solve the problems facing youth.

Appropriate national legislation based on international labour standards and good governance of the labour market is central to growth and rights: Labour market laws and regulations should be designed to ensure that employment promotion and enterprise development do not compromise workers' rights. Well-managed investments in labour-intensive development projects and programmes; micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises; and social enterprises and cooperatives could provide sources of quality jobs for young people. Also important is the encouragement of an entrepreneurial culture.

Active labour market policies and programmes: These should be well designed, targeted and organized to meet the specific requirements of youth, drawing from careful analysis of demand and supply in local

employment. A lack of work experience, the absence of labour market information, limited vocational guidance and counselling, poor job placement mechanisms and inadequate demand all exacerbate the difficulties for youth in finding decent jobs. Governments, in consultation with employers' and workers' organizations, need to establish labour market information and monitoring mechanisms to ensure a regular flow of information on employment for young people. Employment services, such as placement assistance and counselling, are among the most successful active labour market interventions supporting youth to access timely and relevant information regarding markets, and linking them with mentors and apprenticeship programmes to further enhance their skills. The USAID-supported Somali youth livelihood programme Shaqodoon is one programme with wide potential for replication. An equally innovative and promising programme is the Youth at Risk project, which, however, is yet to be proven.

Promoting youth entrepreneurship and self-employment: Given the limited capacity of the formal labour market to meet the growing demand for youth employment, self-employment is a critical alternative. While youth entrepreneurship is not a panacea for youth unemployment, it can assist in reducing unemployment and improving the employability of young people. Considering that many young people have the potential to become entrepreneurs, and to create or join an enterprise or cooperative, the development of entrepreneurship among young people should be an important component of employment policies.

Youth entrepreneurs or enterprise development programmes should be linked to competitive markets and value chains to expand businesses in line with growing demand for a product or service. They should stress a combination of problem solving and interpersonal skills, as well as self-confidence and leadership attributes required to be a successful entrepreneur. A broad and dynamic concept of entrepreneurship would stimulate initiatives comprising the

private sector, small and large enterprises, social entrepreneurs, cooperatives, the public sector and youth organizations.

Many young people are actually engaged in self-employment in the informal and agricultural sectors. In this context, an important challenge in Somalia moving forward will be to support graduation from informal to formal decent jobs for young men and women.

Localizing MDG-based Development and Peacebuilding

The limits of top-down approaches to consolidating peace and economic recovery in Somalia point to a new bottom-up agenda that localizes peace and development by engaging youth as active partner and key agent of change, a major conclusion emerging from Chapter 5 of this report. This means mainstreaming peace within the national development strategy, guided by the localization of the MDGs that is youth centred. Because of its relevance for youth livelihood and empowerment, an integrated community-based approach to development and peacebuilding can yield significant dividends by empowering youth and local communities, leading to increased civil society participation.

UNDP's MDG breakthrough strategy should provide the basis for designing and supporting a holistic community driven peace and development programme with a view to establishing a convincing good practice demonstration model that is replicable, scalable and sustainable to ensure faster progress towards the MDGs.³²¹ It should address an integrated and scaled-up set of priority interventions using proven technologies that have large multiplier and spill-over effects to yield maximum impacts. Such priority interventions should build on local potentials relying on participatory community decision-making while addressing the special needs and capacities of youth and youth led community organizations.

There are examples from around the world of how grassroots peace and development strategies have built on local talents and

capacities of youth, such as in establishing peace zones.³²² Grassroots peacebuilders have proven over and over that conflict is not inevitable and that development and peace are complementary, not competitive. From Bosnia to Colombia to Sri Lanka, courageous and unarmed civilians—often children and youth—are subverting the power of the gun simply by talking to their neighbours. From Kosovo to Indonesia to Sierra Leone, ordinary people are building peace by risking their own lives to save others from the curse of conflict. Examples can also be found in interface projects in Belfast, Northern Ireland, that involve engaging ex-combatants and ex-prisoners in inter-community dialogue and development projects, or the Youth Against Crime project in Soweto,³²³ as well as the Bual peace zone project in Mindanao, the southern island of the Philippines that adopts an integrated development and peacebuilding initiative to sustain a peace zone in a protracted and highly divisive Muslim-Christian conflict setting.³²⁴ The various roles played by youth as marshals at demonstrations in South Africa and elsewhere are other examples of youth utilizing and developing their skills in meaningful peace building activity. Clearly, programmes that emphasize youth empowerment and that are focused on community development have more peacebuilding implications, given the benefits in terms of power and self-esteem that are accrued to youth who are engaged and active for benefiting whole communities.

Without a link to youth empowerment, humanitarian aid initiatives may only partially tap into local potential, and in the worst cases inadvertently contribute to conflict. This is not to say that localizing peace means excluding external involvement and resources. Nor does it mean fully restoring traditional institutions that no longer command a broad social consensus based on the needs and aspiration of a large youth cohort. Outsiders have essential roles to play especially where traditional social institutions that were once responsible for conflict management have broken down, and where traditions may exclude or marginalize youth as active partners in sustainable peace.

Community involvement can be effective in reversing exclusionary processes, but at the same time it cannot solve structural issues without the devolution of power and resources. This is possible only if conventional top-down conflict management yields to a new, dynamic vision of peace that is locally empowered, with youth led community organizations in the driver's seat. It calls for bringing together various strategic partners, including international development partners, government, private sector and civil society, to collectively offer all youth a full and well-integrated array of products and services they need to expand their social, economic and political capabilities and opportunities.

Engendering Development and Peacebuilding

Development and peacebuilding, if not engendered, are endangered. Women need to be placed at the centre of the national policy agenda, with gender equality measures integrated across all dimensions of all initiatives. This report has clearly shown that Somalia's record on gender equality is one of the worst in the world. Girls and female youth face a number of barriers³²⁵ that limit their abilities to maximize their potential and participate fully in economic, social and political spheres.

Young women may be the worst affected group in conflicts, yet they are virtually absent in all bodies concerned with conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding as an integral part of development has less of a chance of succeeding if half the population lacks the opportunity for genuine participation. A gender perspective must thus be mainstreamed in conflict analysis, needs assessments, strategic frameworks, planning, implementation, evaluation, conflict prevention, peace negotiations, peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding.

Beyond gender policy—changing the mind-set and institutional culture: Given the deep-rooted gender-based violence and discrimination in Somali society, engendering development and peacebuilding requires confronting existing barriers through policy and planning. This is both a technical and a political process,

requiring substantial shifts in organizational cultures and ways of thinking, as well as in the goals, structures and resource allocations of international agencies, governments and NGOs. Mainstreaming gender requires change at different levels in these institutions, and across different functions. Changing the mind-sets and behaviours of men can offer crucial support to the goal of gender equality through strong and sustained advocacy.

A dual track approach to gender mainstreaming: In the Somali context, gender programmes should be targeted separately to men and women before a more inclusive approach is devised. Sensitization initiatives specific to men can begin altering their attitudes and behaviours in terms of gender roles and relations. Interventions for women need to enhance their capabilities on par with those of men. Men have benefitted more from gender mainstreaming projects than women, which is why the concept of women only projects have gained prominence in developing countries.³²⁶ This is especially a risk in Somalia, given the entrenched cultural norms and male dominance. Enhancing women's needs and interests will benefit both the family and the community and can lead towards the sustainability of the project. Addressing women's capabilities can be carried out in a manner that is empowering for women, focusing on their practical survival needs (such as interventions to reduce domestic workloads) as an entry point to addressing their productive livelihood (income generation) and empowerment needs. These interventions can incubate ideas and strategies that can later be transferred to mainstream programmes.

Choice of right policy and entry point: Governments have a range of policy options to reduce gender disparities by broadening opportunities so that young men and women have better access to services, even without gender-based targeting. Some gender-neutral programmes, such as building more schools in rural areas that reduce distances travelled by children, attract more girls than boys. Distance is a bigger constraint for girls, for whom personal security is a concern for parents. Increased investments in infrastructure for water, energy,

and forest and rangeland management ease household work for girls, otherwise a critical barrier to schooling. Since women are so heavily burdened by virtue of their traditional gender role in collecting water and fuels, time-saving interventions like easy access to water and alternative energy can be powerful steps towards participation in development and peacebuilding programmes.

Experience also shows, however, that even well-intended policies can be gender blind.³²⁷ Focus group discussions with young Somali women revealed how women organizations have even marginalised young females. Gender-targeted programmes focusing on young women are thus critical to deal with the different transition to adulthood that girls face, which often comes with severe limitations on opportunities, voice and exposure to information. Conditional cash transfer programmes that provide larger transfers to families to send and keep girls in schools can be a strategy leading to increased enrolment, for example. Facilitating young women's school-to-work transition requires specific training programmes and labour intermediation services. All interventions should venture beyond being gender-sensitive and gender-responsive, and aim for gender transformation through strategic actions that end unequal power relations between men and women. Empowerment through bottom-up mobilization, in particular, can lead to a natural emancipation that can be sustained.

International development agencies have an important role to play in involving more women in development and peace activities. Working in partnership with youth and women's groups from the grassroots to the national level, they can support peacebuilding by strengthening the capacities of these organizations and helping them to articulate their views on peace and conflict resolution.

Ensuring Environmentally Sustainable Human Development

In the midst of protracted crisis, successive humanitarian responses in Somalia have largely neglected the environmental costs, even though

these are now emerging as a significant source of conflict escalation. Rapid deforestation due to the rapacious charcoal trade, mainly for export to Persian Gulf countries; the over-fishing of selectively targeted marine species by foreign fisheries operating illegally offshore; the dumping in local waters of toxic waste with pesticides used in Europe; and desertification hastened by over-grazing and the mismanagement of land tenure have all taken considerable tolls. Climate change is now making the environment and the human beings who live in it more vulnerable, threatening livelihoods and ecological security. This has perpetuated the vicious cycle of poverty and environmental distress. A vast majority of the youth respondents to the survey for this report said they experienced climate change as a serious threat to their livelihoods, in the absence of adaptation measures such as the introduction of new crops, organic farming and the conservation of renewable resources. Youth can play an important role in reversing these trends through their active participation in environmental initiatives.

Given the close link between the environment and conflict, environmental sustainability should be part of all future development interventions in Somalia where there is significant potential for youth involvement. The country must have a long-term plan of action for natural resource management as an integral component of the national development strategy. This is necessary to ensure environmentally sustainable development, equitable growth and intergenerational equity. Because youth often have a stronger awareness of environmental issues and a greater stake in long-term sustainability, they could have a lead role as key environmental activists and energy entrepreneurs, driving community-led movements for greening human development. International development partners have an important part in supporting the transition to green economies both at the policy and community levels, in the context of their regional experience in climate change resilience interventions.

Given the close link between the environment and conflict, environmental sustainability should be part of all future development interventions in Somalia where there is significant potential for youth involvement.

Developing a decentralized system of sustainable energy: The looming energy crisis is becoming a fundamental barrier to breaking the cycle of poverty and conflict, and promoting sustainable livelihoods and environmental security. In the absence of alternatives, the vast majority of the Somali population continues to rely heavily on traditional solid fuels such as wood. These are not only polluting, but resources are rapidly shrinking due to overexploitation for both domestic consumption and export. With no national electricity grid, a decentralized renewable energy system could be key to addressing energy needs. This could be community-based, and oriented around both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing adaptive responses to climate change, while contributing to the achievement of the MDGs targets. Somalia has some of the world's best climatic conditions for harnessing alternative energy sources, especially solar and wind energy, which could be channelled into local energy systems. Improved cooking stoves, and portable solar cookers and lamps are other potential technologies.

An agenda for developing sustainable energy requires a national energy policy that is part of an MDG-based national development strategy. Public-private partnerships should be encouraged to assure supplies of quality, safe and affordable renewable energy. Integrating sustainable energy development into a holistic community-based youth programme could bring youth into the development of ideas and innovations for replication, while targeting youth as potential energy entrepreneurs could aid in promoting productive use of energy for enterprise development and green jobs.

Community-based environmental conservation programmes: Adaptation to climate is an important step towards reducing vulnerability. Somalia needs to urgently design and implement a National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA), and recognize the importance of integrating community initiatives in national policy-making. Designing and implementing

community-based adaptation programmes should be the main avenue for localizing the NAPA. These should involve youth as primary environmental actors for widening public awareness, advocacy and outreach. There should be a particular focus on historically excluded groups and future generations, who are most vulnerable to the risks of climate change, while being least responsible for them. There is also the need for developing a National Action Plan to Combat Desertification and Drought in Somalia. It will be an important undertaking that will look into the two main resources for arid and semi-arid regions, i.e., land and water. The action plan should take a bottom-up approach to engage local communities including youth.

Some community based environmental conservation measures that merit urgent action include introducing local borehole drilling for water, and energy technologies like wind and solar pumps. Rainwater harvesting programmes could be expanded. The construction of embankments will help grow plants and trees, increasing land fertility and water supplies. Water harvested from run-off and watercourses can be used for human and livestock consumption, and fodder production. Community-based property rights or lease-hold systems for rangeland management would help address land rights and tenure conflict, and instil greater motivation for sustainably managing land. Finally, a comprehensive disaster risk management framework and action plan should be drawn up in a participatory fashion, with two pillars: the capacities of public institutions and the strength of communities and civil society. A mapping of disaster-prone areas would aid in preparing more effective short- and long-term development programmes. To revitalise interest of youth in environmental sustainability, it is important to support youth-led environmental campaigns, establish green clubs in schools and integrate environment messages in the school curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary levels while at the same time encourage informal youth clubs that work beyond school boundaries.

Strengthening the Knowledge Base

A growing body of research and practice on peacebuilding and development has informed policy makers and development practitioners around the world. Customizing this to Somalia, including to inform policy debates, requires a rich agenda of research, and improvements in national level data and evidence-based analysis. A systematic and comprehensive study on the dynamics of the conflict-development nexus through the specific lens of youth has yet to be conducted. For this, an in-depth national mapping and analysis of at-risk youth in different conflict contexts and the factors underlying their violent and non-violent behaviours is required.

Without comprehensive national living standards measurement and labour force surveys, understanding of the varied dimensions of youth empowerment, equity and sustainability vital to expanding people's freedoms and human development is incomplete. Additionally, such surveys are essential to establish benchmarks from the beginning against which to monitor policy interventions on an ongoing basis.

While social, economic and political inequalities among groups have been advanced as powerful drivers of conflict and poverty, the lack of regionally disaggregated data has limited understanding of how, for example, different grievances interact and reinforce conflict. Another constraint stems from the lack of a universally accepted measure of multiple exclusions. This makes defining and addressing the root causes of conflict

and poverty difficult. What is the minimum threshold of youth exclusion beyond which a given country or society is susceptible to social unrest? What critical factors reinforce multiple exclusions? What is the economic cost associated with the exclusion of youth and the intergenerational impacts on human development? Understanding of the dynamic interaction of inclusion and exclusion concepts, including clan dynamics in Somalia, is equally important towards supporting innovative and creative policy development, particularly where policies targeted at promoting inclusion have proven to have an opposite effect by increasing exclusion.³²⁸

Clearly, a measure of empowerment that factors in social, economic and political exclusions could enhance understanding of their impacts on development and conflict. In spite of the many methodological innovations since the advent of the global Human Development Report in 1990, the existing HDI has not yet captured empowerment as a critical dimension of human development that reinforces both equity and sustainability. Although empowerment was recognized as a key enabling factor for human development in the global HDR 2010 along with equity and sustainability, and some consideration was given to measurement possibilities, it fell short of developing a conceptually sound and operationally feasible measure of empowerment. Arriving at a global consensus on a measurement of empowerment will be quite complex but should lie at the heart of the core agenda of development research and analysis, both at the global and national levels.

Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 See: www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
- 2 Based on the UNDP/World Bank Socio-economic Survey 2002 and UNDP 2005-2010 projection estimates.
- 3 Kemper 2005, and Del Felice and Wisler 2007.
- 4 By definition, work that addresses youth either as a resource or a threat overlaps considerably with work 'with' youth.
- 5 Barro 1999.
- 6 While the MDGs are considered human development goals, they do not reflect all key dimensions of human development. The MDGs highlight the distance to be travelled; the human development approach focuses on how to reach these goals.
- 7 While the goals on achieving universal primary education and promoting gender equality and empowering women target education outcomes for the young, too many young people—some 130 million 15–24-year-olds globally—still cannot read or write. Whereas youth employment is recognized as part of meeting the MDG on a global partnership for development, almost half of the world's unemployed are young people.
- 8 See Hilker and Fraser 2009.
- 9 These structural risk factors have played a causal or perpetuating role in escalating conflict in the Horn of Africa (Fukuda-Par et al. 2008).
- 10 See Hilker and Fraser 2009.
- 11 Exclusion is used instead of social exclusion (a widely used term) in order not to confuse its three dimensions—social, economic and political.
- 12 These processes operate at the macro-level (access to affordable education, equal employment opportunity legislation, cultural and gender norms), and/or the micro-levels (income, occupational status, social networks around race, gender, age, religion).
- 13 The concept of social exclusion is contested, in that it is often difficult to objectively identify who is socially excluded, as it is a matter of the criteria adopted and the judgements used. DFID 2005, p. 3.
- 14 Exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power in a way that benefits the included. Silver 1994, p. 543.
- 15 Amartya Sen's capability approach provides a framework for conceptualizing and analysing empowerment (Sen 1993). The capability approach is similar to the notion of empowerment, comprising three interrelated components: resources, which form the enabling conditions under which choices are made (similar to the notion of primary goods or resources in the capability approach); agency, which is at the heart of the process through which choices are made (similar to the conversion factors influenced by instrumental freedoms); and achievements, which are the outcomes of choices (achieved functionings/capabilities). If human development is about enlarging people's choices by enhancing their functionings and capabilities, empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities at the individual and collective levels that becomes possible through freedom of choice and action.
- 16 Pande and Sharma 2006.
- 17 See Alkire 2010.
- 18 Power in empowerment strategies does not refer to power over, or controlling forms of power, but rather to alternative forms of power: power to; power with and power from within. This focus is on utilizing individual and collective strengths to work towards common goals without coercion or domination (Wartenburg 1990).
- 19 Adapted from World Bank 2002.
- 20 These asset endowments comprise both tangible and intangible assets, namely material/financial, informational, social, psychological and organizational. See Alsop and Heinsohn 2005.
- 21 Enabling conditions are an economic and social base; political will; adequate resource allocations; supportive legal and administrative frameworks; a stable environment of equality, peace and democracy; access to knowledge, information and skills; and a positive value system. See Commonwealth Plan of Action for Youth Empowerment to the year 2005.
- 22 The interaction between assets and opportunity structure can lead to three different degrees of empowerment, namely: the opportunity to make a choice (existence of choice), using the opportunity to choose (use of choice) and choice resulting in a desired result/outcome (achievement of choice). Three types of obstacles to empowerment are: lack of capacity (assets) to make choices despite no opportunity constraint, formal institutional opportunity constraints despite no informal opportunity and asset constraints, and informal opportunity constraints despite no formal and asset constraints. See Alsop and Heinsohn 2005.
- 23 Malhotra and Mather 1997, Kishor 1995 and 2000b, Hashemi et al. 1996, Beegle et al. 1998.
- 24 Rich et al. 1995.
- 25 Labonte 1998.
- 26 Bennett 2002.
- 27 Narayan 2002.
- 28 Baruch, Bush and Folger 1994.
- 29 Protecting people and communities requires guaranteeing public safety, providing lifesaving humanitarian relief and essential services, and returning and integrating people affected by the conflict. Empowering people and communities requires building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities, and restoring governance.
- 30 As a process, it involves building people's capacities by mobilizing and organizing them to channel their collective skills, resources and energies to understand and combat the cause of poverty. As an outcome, it involves people coming together to bring about structural transformation of political, economic, social and cultural conditions to address the causes of their poverty.
- 31 Rich et al. 1995.
- 32 Labonte 1998.
- 33 Narayan 2002.
- 34 The expansion of human knowledge and capabilities, for instance, has an indirect influence on economic and political empowerment.
- 35 Malhotra and Mather 1997, Kishor 1995 and 2000, Hashemi et al. 1996 and Beegle et al. 1998.
- 36 Haq 1995.
- 37 As the 2011 global Human Development Report affirms.
- 38 See UNDP 1994.
- 39 The 1994 global Human Development Report defines human security as: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression; and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in jobs, homes or communities. It developed this definition in relation to seven dimensions of human security/threats: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health and food security. See UNDP 1994.
- 40 Protecting people and communities requires guaranteeing public safety, providing lifesaving humanitarian relief and essential services, and returning and integrating people affected by conflict. Empowering people and communities requires building social capital, nurturing the reconciliation and coexistence of divided communities, and restoring governance. The first school takes a realistic and manageable approach by limiting the focus to protecting individuals from violent conflicts, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms of inequities. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building are the main concerns. The second school advocates a holistic approach in achieving human security and expands the focus beyond violence with an emphasis on development and security goals.
- 41 See UNDP 2004.
- 42 State reforms should guarantee universal access to information, voice and participation for all people, and uphold democratic governance based on accountable, functional and efficient

institutions. Good governance creates an inclusive, participatory environment that helps to remove barriers, and build individual and collective assets and capabilities. This fosters ensure inclusive development, improved governance and justice systems, and a strengthened civil society and people's organizations, which are all essential for empowerment (Narayan 2002).

- 43 See <https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/B22HH77>

Chapter 2

- 44 Samantar. A. D. 2012. Genocidal Politics and the Somali Famine. <http://www.hillaac.net/?p=1684>. The UN has warned that as many as 750,000 people could die as Somalia's drought worsens in the coming months. BBC news (5 September 2011). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14785304>.
- 45 Hassan A. A. 2009. Al Shabaab Threat Clouds the Horn of Africa. http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Feb/03_alshabab_ahmed.html. Also see Marchal. 2011.
- 46 Bradbury and Healy 2010.
- 47 These units were: French Somaliland (which today forms the Republic of Djibouti); British Somaliland; Italian Somaliland; The Northern Frontier District, which formed part of Kenya's crown colony; and the Ogaden region conquered by Menilik of Ethiopia between 1887 and 1895 (it later became an integral part of Ethiopian territory). Solomon 2009.
- 48 Lewis 1994.
- 49 Through the 1970s, Somalia was supported by the Soviet Union and experimented with socialism. Soviet support of Somalia was largely a reaction to US support of Ethiopia. In 1974, a coup in Ethiopia led to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state, so the two superpowers switched their allegiances.
- 50 See "Somalia: Power-sharing deals reached in Djibouti as TFG split widens" at <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/interview-power-sharing-deal-may-break-somali-deadlock>
- 51 The four groups comprised a radical faction of the Salafi Islamist group al-I'tisaam (an offshoot of al-Itihaad), some Islamists who wanted the Islamic Courts to be militarily more efficient, Takfirwa Hijra, and a cluster of Somali militants who had had international experience of jihad either in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Arab world (and may be also in Chechnya). See Marchal 2011.
- 52 The designation was prompted by an Al-Shabaab member becoming the first known American suicide bomber in a series of attacks in northern Somalia, specifically in the two relatively peaceful breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland.
- 53 The fighters are a mix of local and foreign youth, attracted to the group. It is difficult to say how many fighters make up Al-Shabaab's militia. Some estimates suggest between 6,000 and 7,000 See Stratfor Intelligence Service 2008.
- 54 Brandon, 2009.
- 55 Though this group is Islamist, favouring incorporating Islamic law into the laws of the state, Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah adheres to traditional Somali Sufi religious practice—something Al-Shabaab's hard-line Salafi outlook staunchly opposes.

- 56 See Marchal 2011.

57 On 9 June 2011, the TFG President and the Speaker of Parliament signed an agreement in Kampala to extend the mandate of all transitional federal institutions by one year from August 2011.

58 Ahlu Suna Wal-Jama'a (ASWJ), a Sunni/Sufi group with control of southern Mudug, Galgaduud and parts of the Hiraa region, joined the TFG in March 2010 in opposition to Al-Shabaab and Hisbul-Islam.

59 Its opponents include members of the TNG, who felt marginalized with the installation of the TFG, and the Hawiye clan leaders and warlords who saw the TFG as a Darood-dominated entity. Some individuals in the TFG are driven by an interest in enriching themselves and their supporters, and have been indifferent or even hostile to efforts to make the Government more broad-based, advance key transitional tasks, and ensure the government is more functional and accountable. They represent 'internal spoilers' to state-building and peacebuilding (Menkhaus 2011).

60 It also has to face opposition from Puntland due to the perception that the Darood are not sufficiently represented.

61 These enclaves include Puntland, Galmudug, Ximan and Xeeb, and local grassroots movements like Ahlu Suna Wal-Jama'a.

62 International Crisis Group 2010.

63 Menkhaus 2008.

64 Menkhaus 2008.

65 The Bantus, a minority ethnic group in Somalia, are a special case. They have endured discrimination and subjugation in Somalia for 200 years, particularly those with a lineage to slavery. Unlike Somalis, most of whom are nomadic herders, Bantus are mainly sedentary subsistence farmers residing mainly in southern Somalia, near the Juba and Shabelle rivers. They are ethnically, physically and culturally distinct from Somalis, and they have remained marginalized ever since their arrival in Somalia. Since Muslims are prohibited from owning Muslim slaves, some Bantus freed themselves from slavery by converting to Islam. Over time, many others also converted to Islam. There has been very little assimilation between Bantus and Somalis. Inter-marriage is extremely rare. See Lehman and Eno, undated. <http://www.cal.org/co/bantu/sbpeop.html>

66 The significance of kinship is apparent in the proportional distribution of parliamentary seats and cabinet posts in the governments of Somaliland, Puntland and the TFG. See Lewis 1993, p. 47.

67 They include the Barawani and Bendari people of mixed Arab, Pakistani and Portuguese descent, and the Somali Bantus living in farming communities in southern Somalia, mostly in the vicinity of the Shabelle and Juba rivers.

68 For pioneering work on the Somali clan system, see Lewis 1961.

69 This traditional system used to consist of a set of contractual agreements (*xeer*) that defined the rights and responsibilities of the individual within a group bound by ties of kinship based on shared matrilineal descent from a common ancestor. A similar set of agreements regulated the group's relations with neighbouring groups.

70 The Islamic religion is written and codified, compared to the traditional *xeer* which is not written.

71 Menkhaus 2005.

72 The ranking was released in a report by the humanitarian organization CARE shedding light on the greatest challenges women face on a global scale. Among the top 10 worst countries for women, seven are in Africa, where FGM, sexual violence, a lack of education, HIV risks and traditional discrimination are women's worst enemies. Afghanistan is the worst country worldwide, with extremely high maternal death rates and 90 percent of Afghan women experiencing domestic violence. Somalia is ranked second to Afghanistan and worst of all African countries. Somali girls are given away for marriage very young, violence against girls and women is widespread, and traditional laws, used in lieu of a state judiciary, are highly discriminatory against women. Southern Times Writer 12-03-2010, www.southerntimesafrica.com/article.php.

73 Putnam, D.B. and Noor, M.C. 1993 SOMALIS—Their History and Culture Refugee Fact Sheet No.9.<http://www.cal.org/CO/somali/index.html>

74 IUCN 2006. Country Environmental Profile for Somalia. Prepared for The European Commission Somalia Operations Office. IUCN Eastern Africa Regional Office, Nairobi, Kenya.

75 Although women have statutory rights to own and acquire land, traditionally women tend to register land in the names of their husbands or, if they are the head of the household, in the names of their sons or brothers.

76 In parts of south central Somalia, extreme interpretations of sharia law by insurgent groups have led to allegations of grave violations of the right to life and physical integrity. UNDP Somalia 2010. UN Secretary-General's 2009 report to the Security Council on Somalia.

77 The Islamic tradition allows men to marry up to four wives, provided that they are able to support them. But wives are often forced to take up an economic activity to sustain their families, since the man is generally not able to support them all. See www.fao.org/gender/landrights/report/.

78 Gender impacts of war include widespread break-up and displacement of families; loss of male providers and male labour; destruction of homes; loss of household resources; collapse of health centres and schools; increasing feminization of poverty; decreased mobility for women and girls in some areas affecting access to firewood and water, fields for cultivation, livestock, services and support networks; and a lack of employment opportunities.

79 COI, Somalia, Country of information, 27 May 2011.

80 By contrast, a man is identified by his father's clan. His social responsibilities are connected predominantly to this clan.

81 Timmons 2005.

82 These inequalities include, among others, the persistent and increasing burden of poverty on women; sexual and gender-based violence; the effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women; inequality in economic structures, productive activities, assets and access to resources; inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels; a lack of respect for and inadequate promotion and protection of women's human rights; and a lack of access to justice.

- 83 In Somaliland, the Ministry of Family Affairs and Social Development developed a gender policy and strategy in 2009. The Puntland Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs developed the Puntland Gender Policy Paper in 2008, and the TFG drafted a Women's Empowerment Bill that has been awaiting endorsement from the Cabinet and Parliament since 2007. In January 2010, the Somalia Women's Parliamentary Association was established to advocate for Somali women's concerns on economic, cultural, political and social development. Since Somalia has not ratified CEDAW, part of their agenda is to ensure ratification and promote gender equality in the constitutional drafting process.
- 84 GDP is now estimated at \$2.6 billion. See WDI 2012 and EIU 2012.
- 85 Using a poverty line of US \$1 per day (purchasing power parity), the incidence of poverty in Somalia is estimated at 43 percent (see UNDP and the World Bank. 2002).
- 86 CIA Background: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>
- 87 EIU 2012
- 88 A mildly narcotic drug grown in Kenya, Ethiopia and parts of the Middle East.
- 89 Hammond 2007.
- 90 MRF 2011.
- 91 UNDP Somalia's Missing Million, 2009.
- 92 WDI 2012.
- 93 Stewart et al. 2001.
- 94 Norris, J., and B. Bruton. 2011. 'Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia'. A Joint Report from the Center for American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation.
- 95 UNDP Somalia 1998 and 2001.
- 96 For example in 1990, the HDI was presented as a deprivation index so it is not comparable to any HDIs in subsequent reports.
- 97 UNDP Somalia 2001.
- 98 Somalia was omitted from the global report in the absence of national level data, particularly the mean year of schooling and per capita gross national income, for computing the HDI, and the measure for attainment of at least secondary education for computing the GII. For the Somalia Human Development Report, these data were obtained from the report's household survey. The global report remained a source for other indicators required to compute the indices. This should be taken into account when comparing the Somalia ranking. See Annex 2 for details.
- 99 In 2010, the estimate of under-5 child mortality was 180 deaths per 1000 births. This was the worst in the world and is estimated to have been at that level for the last 2 decades. In 2008, the estimate of maternity mortality was 1200 deaths per 100,000 live births. This was the 2nd worst (after Afghanistan) in the world and is estimated to have been at that level for the last 2 decades. In 2005, the average primary school enrolment in Somalia was 22%, much worse than the 73% average for low income countries. See WDI 2012.
- 100 UNDP Somalia NHDR 2001, UNDP Global HDR 2010, also see CIA World Fact Book. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=so&v=30>
- 101 UNDP 2010.
- 102 The 2001 estimate is based on UNDP/World Bank 2002 Socioeconomic survey of Somalia, while the 2010 estimate is based on the survey conducted by this report.
- 103 The index is based on the general means of different orders—the first aggregation is by the geometric mean across dimensions; these means, calculated separately for women and men, are then aggregated using a harmonic mean across genders.
- 104 This value is slightly under the one reported in the 2010 global Human Development Report, but the error would be very small (namely 0.042, compared to the MPI calculated by OPHI. The discrepancy is attributed to the treatment of missing data in some variables (see Annex 2 for details).
- 105 It is noted that although the 2010 global HDR does not rank countries according to the MPI, this report has ranked them to illustrate the relative position of Somalia.
- 106 According to FSNAU, FEWSNET and partners, post Gu 2010 seasonal data.
- 107 Estimates from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR Somalia, July 2010. <http://www.unctsom.org/documents/Total%20IDPs%20in%20Somalia.pdf>
- 108 The UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs reported in January 2010: "During flight and in settlements, the internally displaced remain exposed to grave human rights abuses, in particular rape and domestic violence. Many of their rights and needs, including shelter, food, water, health care and education, remain unaddressed. The severe situation of malnourishment, in particular of children, in camps for internally displaced persons is of deep concern. Protracted displacement situations in all parts of Somalia are exacerbated by the influx of new arrivals. Existing humanitarian assistance is insufficient, because of a lack of humanitarian access as well as a lack of funds. At the same time, recovery and development efforts are needed to strengthen the resilience of the displaced and the absorption capacities of host communities and to find durable solutions for the displaced where this is possible."
- 109 UNDP Somalia 2012 HDR background paper for south central Somalia.
- 110 Famine is declared when acute malnutrition rates among children exceed 30 per cent; more than 2 people per 10,000 die per day; and people are not able to access food and other basic necessities.
- 111 FSNAU and UN OCHA data.
- 112 The economic reforms undermined the fragile exchange relationship between the 'nomadic economy' and the 'sedentary economy'—i.e., between pastoralists and small farmers—which are characterized by money transactions as well as traditional barter (Chossudovsky 1993).
- 113 The five major donors are the governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, the European Commission and the World Bank. They account for some 60 percent of total financial assistance to Somalia. The Reconstruction and Development Programme is the framework used by donors and the United Nations to channel funds to Somalia. In 2008, the programme suggested an investment of US \$373 million for three pillars comprising 66 projects. Donor commitments were only US \$132 million; total disbursement was only US \$95 million.
- 114 Per capita official development assistance in Somalia is estimated at US \$75 (including both humanitarian and development assistance) which is much higher than the average of \$36 per capita for fragile states. But two-thirds of this assistance is channelled to meet humanitarian needs. WDI 2012, OECD/DAC 2012.
- 115 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
- 116 This is based on the 66 development projects funded by the five major donors as a benchmark. Adding another 40 percent as funding for development projects from other donors and international NGOs, the total amount for development projects in 2008 works out at US \$158 million. Per capita aid is derived using the estimated population of 7.7 million in 2008. Humanitarian aid to Somalia in 2008, both inside and outside the Consolidated Appeals Process, was US \$616.5 million or US \$80 per capita (see <http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetailsandappealID=792>).
- 117 Norris and Bruton 2011.
- 118 World Bank 2005.
- 119 Fund for Peace 2010.
- 120 Menkhaus 2003 Osman.
- 121 Fearon and Laitin 1999 (See www.apsanet.org/new/nsf/research/laitin.cfm).
- 122 Furley 2006.
- 123 Homer-Dixon 1994.
- 124 Barnett and Adger 2007.
- 125 See Little 2003. Camel herders, who need acacia trees for their herds, have clashed with charcoal makers destroying these trees for charcoal production.
- 126 The civil war between the Habargidir and the Hawadle clans started over the control of the Kismayo port, for example. See Elmi and Barise 2006.
- 127 UNDP Somalia 1998.
- 128 There is strength in numbers—an exceptionally large youth cohort is often conscious of itself as a larger force than its elders. A large youthful population may place heavy strains on schools, health care, housing and other public services—strains that can overwhelm fragile institutions and erode support for government authorities. Youth who are not given the opportunity to integrate into community and social structures are less able to acquire the skills they need for peaceful and constructive adult lives. See Goldstone 1991, Fuller and Pitts 1990, and Cincotta 2003.
- 129 See Hilker and Fraser 2009.
- 130 These include Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and larger weapons systems, such as anti-aircraft guns and 'technicals' (armoured pick-up trucks with weapons mounted in the back). See Black 2009.
- 131 Ibid.
- 132 Piracy as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 133 Illegal foreign fishing companies or trawlers (known as jariif in Somali) began fishing off the coast of Somalia, taking an estimated US \$300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster each

- year. They have dumped hazardous waste and depleted stocks previously available to local fishermen. Samantar, M. and D. Leonard, 2012. Puntland and the Quandary of Somali Piracy. The issue of piracy off the coast of Puntland. <http://www.radiodajir.com/xview.php?id=867>
- 134 Chatham House 2008.
- 135 The International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau reported 406 attacks in 2009, compared to 293 in 2008, 263 in 2007 and 239 in 2006. See www.asiglobalresponse.com/downloads/piracy_report.pdf.
- 136 Ibid.
- 137 See the Oceans beyond Piracy Project 2011, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000275.
- 138 The borders of Somalia were imposed externally without much consideration for clan configurations, thus dividing kindred clans across boundaries. This situation has led to armed conflict and diplomacy among states being shaped as much by interactions between governments as by cross-border clan relationships.
- 139 Solomon 2009.
- 140 See generally Wood 1996.
- 141 Their border dispute in the late 1990s exploded into a full-scale war that killed tens of thousands. A cease-fire has held since 2000, but both sides have continued their dispute through proxy warfare (see Bruton 2010).
- 142 Menkaus 2011.
- 143 Solomon 2009.
- 144 At its conclusion, the conference's final communiqué promised that the 55 countries and organizations (United Nations, the Arab League, and the African Union) participating in the meeting would: (i) support the handover of power from the TFG to a representative administration by this upcoming August; (ii) provide increased support for African Union peacekeepers; (iii) better coordinate humanitarian aid and assistance and shift focus from short-term to long-term needs; and (iv) put more coordinated pressure on piracy by expanding on international agreements to bring suspects to trial in foreign countries. See London Conference on Somalia: Final Communiqué <http://saraarmedia.com/blog/london-conference-on-somalia-final-communique>
- 145 Although the Conference did not invite or include any Al-Shabaab representatives, the international community signalled to Al-Shabaab members that there was a place for them in the emerging new Somalia if they renounce violence. The conference adopted a two-pronged approach to Al-Shabaab: on the one hand, destroy it militarily; on the other hand, entice members away from the group by inviting those who abandon it a part in the new political process. Al-Shabaab denounced the London Conference, claiming that it represented yet another attempt to colonize the country. See Koscijew 2012.
- 146 Since 1991, factions have multiplied at every peace conference. Four armed movements claimed victory over Siad Barre in 1991, 6 participated in the first Djibouti conference in 1991 and 15 in the Addis talks in 1993. Twenty-six factions attended the 1996 Sodere talks in Ethiopia, while over 30 faction leaders participated in the Safari Park Consultation in Nairobi in January 2004. Representation has been based on including armed groups, clans (the '4.5 formula'), traditional and religious leadership, civil society, regional authorities, women, minorities and the diaspora.
- 147 Menkhaus 2003, p. 21.
- 148 Assumptions regarding the relationship between state-building and peacebuilding have led international actors to neglect key elements of peacebuilding, such as the challenges of negotiating meaningful security arrangements, assuming instead that the revived state will address these questions.
- 149 The successful candidates for the offices of the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament derived their political support from their immediate clan constituencies. They used their respective powers of nomination and appointment to marginalize rivals within their respective clans, and fragment and eclipse their adversaries in other clans.
- ### Chapter 3
- 150 The multiple exclusions faced by youth can be grouped into economic exclusion (e.g., unemployment, underemployment, lack of livelihood, ownership of assets); political exclusion (e.g., lack of political participation, voice and decision-making power); socio-cultural exclusion (e.g., lack of access to education, health, water, sanitation and housing; lack of recognition of a group's cultural practices; discrimination; loss of status/respect, or humiliation/honour; lack of identity).
- 151 Narayan 2002.
- 152 Bennett 2002.
- 153 This is corroborated by the UNDP/World Bank Socio-economic Survey 2002 and UNDP 2005-2010 projection estimates, in which people below age 29 account for 73 percent of the total population, while those between the ages of 15 and 29 comprise 27 percent.
- 154 The rising tide of youth-led transformative changes in the Arab region, which resulted successively in the downfall, after decades in power, of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, has opened new possibilities for re-thinking international development assistance in ways that lend more prominence to the interlocking issues of genuine democratic governance, social justice and equity, employment-led growth and freedoms—be they economic, social, political or cultural.
- 155 The youth bulge theory is becoming popular to explain the relatively high frequency of political violence and civil conflict associated with burgeoning youth populations in the early phases of the demographic transition from high to low birth and death rates, although corruption, ethno-religious tensions, poverty and poor political institutions also play important roles. Urdal 2007.
- 156 The sex ratio in the youth cohort (14 to 29 years) is 109 males per 100 females, higher than the overall sex ratio of 106 for the entire sample population in Somalia. The preponderance of males over females is more pronounced in Somaliland than the other regions.
- 157 The youth bulge in Somalia first appeared in 1995 and is expected to last until 2045. World Bank 2007.
- 158 For country wise trends in age dependency ratio, see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND>
- 159 World Bank 2007.
- 160 British Council Pakistan 2009.
- 161 Decent work programming adopted by all three administrations in conjunction with civil society as well as worker and business organizations remains inchoate and in need of further support. United Nations. 2007.
- 162 World Bank 2007.
- 163 Brenner 1987.
- 164 Dini 2009.
- 165 In many societies, it is also socially and culturally acceptable for the stage of youth to be longer for young males than for young females.
- 166 UNDP Somalia 2010.
- 167 Cultural practices such as FGM are rooted in a set of beliefs, values, cultural and social behaviour patterns that govern the lives of people in society. There are many reasons given for practicing FGM. It is carried out as a means to control women's sexuality (which is argued to be insatiable if parts of the genitalia, especially the clitoris, are not removed). It is thought to ensure virginity before and fidelity after marriage and/or to increase male sexual pleasure. It is also seen as part of a girl's initiation into womanhood and as an intrinsic part of a community's cultural heritage/tradition. Various myths exist about female genitalia (e.g. that if uncut the clitoris will grow to the size of a penis; it would enhance fertility or promote child survival, etc). In many communities, FGM/FGC is a prerequisite for marriage. FGM/FGC sometimes is a prerequisite for the right to inherit. Source <http://www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm#13>
- 168 Female circumcision, as practiced in Somalia, involves the removal of the clitoris and the labia. The vagina is then sewn closed, leaving only a tiny opening, which is enlarged for marriage and enlarged once again for childbirth.
- 169 SONYO 2011.
- 170 Youth were asked to compare their position with other socio-economic groups without specifying those groups in the questionnaire. Since youth are in the majority, lacking both resources and opportunities, they feel they are most excluded.
- 171 Assets can be tangible and intangible, in the form of knowledge, skills, attitudes, behaviours and resources.
- 172 This Somali saying tells it all: "Nin yari intuu geed ka boodo ayuu talo ka booodaa." It means a young man can deliver a sound judgement as much as the height of the bush he can scale in jumping. APD 2010.
- 173 Recently, Somaliland amended its laws to allow youth to stand for public office.
- 174 Somaliland has recently set a minimum age of 16 for voting in local elections.
- 175 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. 1992. Somalia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, <http://countrystudies.us/somalia/52.htm>
- 176 Minister of Finance 2010. Recent increases are expected to go to salaries, and not to higher education and technical skills development.

- 177 According to the survey for this report, the literacy rate of youth respondents aged 14 to 29 was 48 percent.
- 178 UNDP and World Bank 2002.
- 179 *Khat* consumption used to be confined historically to the religious Sufi groups, but was later adopted at a modest level by the salaried sectors of society. In the last half century, consumption skyrocketed, especially during the oppressive years of the military dictatorship, so much so that Siad Barre tried to ban it, but failed dismally.
- 180 SONYO 2011.
- 181 *Khat* consumption increased after the outbreak of the civil war and has now become an addictive habit with myriad side-effects. Combatants chewed it to battle fatigue and fear, while non-combatants chewed it to stay calm in the face of violent conflict and uncertainty. Warlords have an incentive to keep the population addicted to *Khat* because it is a huge source of revenue for them. From an economic perspective it has become the driver of poverty as it reduces productivity and income levels; and diverts hard currency to import it from neighbouring countries. World Bank, 2005.
- 182 ILO 2010.
- 183 ILO 2010.
- 184 Chabaad 2008.
- 185 The tertiary sector of the economy (also known as the service sector or the service industry) is one of the three economic sectors, the others being the secondary sector (approximately the same as manufacturing) and the primary sector (agriculture, fishing and extraction such as mining).
- 186 Key informant interviews and focus group discussions.
- 187 UNDP and World Bank 2002.
- 188 The unemployment rate is measured using the standard ILO definition. It refers to all unemployed youth as a percentage of those who are economically active.
- 189 The youth labour force participation rate is defined as the number of young people aged 14-29 in the labour force as a percentage of the total youth population. To be classified as participating in the labour force, a young person has to be either engaged in a job or looking for work (unemployed).
- 190 The informal economy provides an estimated 90 percent of the jobs in sub-Saharan Africa. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) 2011.
- 191 This was reinforced during the focus group discussions with youth.
- 192 SONYO 2011.
- 193 Recently, the Government there has adopted a constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum age limit for contesting local elections from 35 to 25. SONYO spearheaded the campaign to change the age limit.
- 194 UNDP Somalia 2008
- 195 The mean score is calculated by rating the opinion on a five-point scale from 1 (negligible) to 5 (very high).
- 196 Information on Somalia in January issue of Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, one of the JAMA/Archives journals. Arch
- Pediatr Adolescent Med. 2011;165[1]:9-15. Available at www.jamamedia.org.
- 197 According to the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, violence against women is, "Any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty whether occurring in public or in private life. It also encompasses economic abuse that evolves in part from women's subordinate status in society."
- 198 The survey was conducted by UNDP's Community Safety Project in 2010 through the Somali Organization for Community Development Activities to assess community perceptions of disputes, crimes and security providers, and their overall safety and security needs and priorities.
- 199 The Somaliland Juvenile Justice Law (Law No: 36/2007) came into force on 21 April 2008. It covers people younger than 18 years of age.
- ## Chapter 4
- 200 In contrast to direct violence which is visible, structural violence refers to the violence built into political, social and economic systems which determine unfair distribution of power, resources and opportunities, leading to actors feeling oppressed and unable to meet their basic needs. Galtung 1969.
- 201 Puntland's draft policy was prepared in 2008; Somaliland's was formulated in 2010. Both involved extensive consultations and the cooperative efforts of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, UNICEF, the International Council on National Youth Policy, a wide range of civil society organizations, relevant line ministries, young people, the private sector and the media.
- 202 These include nomadic youth, orphans and vulnerable youth, youth with disabilities, young people living with HIV and AIDS, young women and girls, unemployed and marginalized young people, out-of-school young people and IDP youth. The policy in Somaliland defines youth as between the ages of 14 and 35. Puntland defines them as between the ages of 15 and 30.
- 203 The funds are expected to be supported by the government, international aid groups, the private sector and the diaspora. Their key function would be to respond to priority initiatives under the national youth policy.
- 204 The Somali Youth Development Network (SOYDEN), an umbrella organization comprising 11 youth organizations in Mogadishu, is the only active organization currently supporting skills training programmes, promoting peacebuilding through media campaigns and educational programmes at schools, advocating for the protection of street children and campaigning against FGM.
- 205 A rapid mapping of donor supported programmes was conducted through intensive consultative workshops with youth advisory groups in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia.
- 206 UNFPA. undated. http://www.uneca.org/adfv/docs/AFYouthDEV_ENG.pdf
- 207 Puntland State of Somalia developed a Five Year Development Plan 2007-2011.
- 208 They include most life-skills programmes that many countries are investing in, and most
- programmes for promoting youth citizenship, including student councils, youth parliaments and service learning.
- 209 UNDP Somalia embarked over 2009-2010 a 'peacebuilding infrastructure' project as a foundation for human security and peacebuilding programmes. At the district level, this infrastructure included the following elements: a baseline assessment of crime and conflict; A District Safety Committee (DSC), composed of representatives of all relevant key stakeholders guiding interventions; a Resource Centre for Peace as a physical space where training and awareness raising activities can be held and a District Safety Plan (DSP), developed in a participatory manner to tackle broader factors fuelling crime and conflict.
- 210 UNICEF and ILO have undertaken joint programming with youth over 2009 in Somali region. UNICEF Somalia started a comprehensive Life Skills-Based Education (LSBE) programme in 2009 with the aim to reduce out-of-school adolescents vulnerability to all forms of violence, abuse and exploitation in selected districts in Somaliland and Puntland by providing them with access to LSBE and employment opportunities through intensive infrastructure projects, youth career advisory services and youth entrepreneurship support programmes. The LSBE programme was conceived to provide vulnerable youth with access to services and skills that would empower them through strengthening their personal, social and professional competencies and reduce their possible exposure to protection risks (secondary and tertiary prevention).
- 211 For example, those living in disadvantaged situations who are at risk of dropping out of school or of being unemployed.
- 212 For example, youth who are engaged in risky sexual behaviour but have not yet acquired a sexually transmitted disease.
- 213 For example, youth who have dropped out of school, are incarcerated, are addicted to drugs, or have engaged in criminal activities.
- 214 IDP population estimates are based on data collected through the Population Movement Tracking (PMT) managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the support of the protection cluster. As the PMT system is not specifically designed to capture long-term cumulative data, however, the figures must be treated as a rough estimate only. See IDPs in Somalia—Fact Sheet.
- 215 Based on the household survey for this report, youth aged 14 to 29 comprise a significant proportion (43 percent) of the family size in Somalia.
- 216 Unlike children who are protected by international law, youth occupy a legal grey area, with few protections despite specific vulnerabilities during conflicts, peace processes and after wars.
- 217 UNDP 2006b.
- 218 Ibid 2006.
- 219 Kemper 2005.
- 220 USAID 2005.
- 221 Hilker and Fraser 2009.
- 222 Hart 2004.
- 223 Miall 2004, Uvin 2002.
- 224 Roth and Brooks-Gunn 2003a.

- 225 Catalano et al. 2004.
- 226 Oman et al. 2004.
- 227 Jennings et al. 2006.
- 228 Pittman 1992, Pittman and Wright 1991.
- 229 Empowerment: Women and Gender Issues: Definitions and Conceptual Issues, www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1958#_ftn26.
- 230 These enabling conditions are an economic and social base; political will; adequate resource allocations; supportive legal and administrative frameworks; a stable environment of equality, peace and democracy; access to knowledge, information and skills; and a positive value system. See Commonwealth Secretariat 2007, www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.asp?NodeID=169313.
- 231 Assets and capabilities can be broadly grouped as social (good health, education, other life-enhancing skills including dignity, a sense of belonging, leadership, trust, identity and the capacity to organize and participate in social organizations), economic (physical and financial resources and the right to decent work without exploitation) and political (freedom, power, voice and influence over public policies). They underlie the three broad dimensions of empowerment—socio-cultural, economic and political.
- 232 The interaction between assets and opportunity structure can lead to three different degree of empowerment: opportunity to make choices, using opportunity to choose and choice resulting in desired result. Three types of obstacles to empowerment are: lack of capacities to make choices despite no opportunity constraint, formal institutional opportunity constraints despite no informal opportunity and asset constraints, and informal opportunity constraints despite no formal and asset constraints. See Alsop and Heinsohn 2005.
- 233 Curative or protective interventions are mainly designed to serve people in difficult or at-risk situations, focusing on the restoration of rights that have been violated, and leading to compensatory actions and protective measures. While a preventative intervention tries to counteract the processes that generate a problem, a curative intervention tries to deal with their consequences.
- 234 Fragile contexts are situations in which state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction and development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their population. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) 2007.
- 235 Defined as the range of measures necessary to transform conflict into sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes (Lederach 1995).
- 236 Mercy Corp 2009, www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/CoMobProgrammingGd.pdf.
- 237 Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner 2003; Strand et al. 2003.
- 238 This can potentially renew the underlying causes of conflict. Participatory processes can also be considered threatening to dominant groups, and traditional and other leaders, as they can challenge traditional decision-making structures (USAID 2007, Maynard n.d.).
- 239 World Bank 2006; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner 2003.
- 240 McBride and Patel 2007.
- 241 Community institutions may be of different types: associations, self-help groups, cooperatives (an autonomous voluntary association of people that work together for mutual socioeconomic benefits through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise), community-based organizations, village leadership, or an official, traditional or informal leader at the local level.
- 242 In Sierra Leone, for example, relief agencies set up ad hoc village development committees to support community-based programmes. They ended up being comprised primarily of village elders and elites to the exclusion of the poor, youth, women and internally displaced persons. (Archibald and Richards 2006; Slaymaker, Christiansen and Hemming 2005). The same was found in villages in Afghanistan, where those elected as leaders of community development councils, as part of the National Solidarity Programme, were the relatively well off, powerful or influential.
- 243 McBride and Patel 2007.
- 244 World Bank 2007b. Pp. 218-219.
- 245 World Bank 2005.
- 246 Employment readiness implies that youth understand their options and have skills to pursue them.
- 247 The Academy for Educational Development.
- 248 Life skills are abilities for adaptive and positive behaviour that enable individuals to deal effectively with the demands and challenges of everyday life.
- 249 International experiences also suggest that peer education can sometimes be costly, and not as effective and sustainable as might be expected. This is mainly due to the fact that the peers or youth promoters become adults and cannot or do not want to continue working in peer education.
- 250 Early childhood development typically refers to interventions that take place from birth until the age of five. Since many of these initiatives are preschool programmes, which typically serve children between the ages of two and five, the two terms are often used interchangeably. See Cunningham et al. 2008.
- 251 World Bank 2006a.
- 252 US Surgeon General 2001.
- 253 Second-chance programmes differ from traditional education programmes in several ways: their target group (school dropouts, as opposed to all children); a flexible and innovative structure; lower-cost teaching methods; and specially designed, innovative teaching materials. For equivalency programmes to be most effective, they must be accessible to all school dropouts.
- 254 The children also receive school uniforms, books and a hot meal through the World Food Programme (WFP) feeding programme. Denise Shepherd-Johnson and Woki Munyui, 7 March 2011, www.unctsom.org/unicefstory.html.
- 255 World Bank 2007b.
- 256 Evaluations of life skills programmes from around the world have found that knowledge of life skills can be a protective factor during adolescence. See Mangrulkar et al. 2001 and Cunningham et al. 2008.
- 257 McNulty 2005.
- 258 Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar 2003.
- 259 For example, mobile phone networks in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo created with relatively small investments by enterprising start-ups are now multimillion-dollar ventures. Cyber cafes in Somalia fill the gap between war-damaged telecom facilities and surging local demand.
- 260 The fishing industry needs to be repositioned by both the Government and the business community as a full-time livelihood that employs modern fishing, processing and marketing techniques, and standards of hygiene. That will inevitably lead to increased job creation. (Save the Children et al. 2006).
- 261 Betcherman and Dar 2004.
- 262 A value chain is the full range of activities for a product, from its inception to the final consumer.
- 263 Jaramillo 2006, Betcherman and Dar 2004.
- 264 Social capital is an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural, cognitive, institutional and related assets that increase mutually beneficial cooperative behaviour productive for others as well as for one's self.
- 265 UNDP 2010.
- 266 Altogether, 15 objective indicators were used to capture the three dimensions of empowerment and bring them together in a composite index.
- 267 Appropriate schooling is measured by the percentage of 15–24-year-old youths who attend high schools or colleges, while the quality of education is measured by the standardized mean of proficiency scales in the 8th grade of fundamental education and in the third grade of high schools, in Portuguese and mathematics.
- 268 According to the definitions adopted in the International Classification of Diseases, mortality due to internal causes is measured by the rate of deaths of 15–24-year-olds per every 100,000 youths. The mortality due to external death is measured by the rate of deaths of 15–24-year-olds per every 100,000 youths caused by violence, suicides, motor vehicle accidents and homicides.
- 269 Income is measured by the amount of the monthly family income divided by the number of family members who are youths between the ages of 15 and 24.

Chapter 5

- 270 Several studies confirm that when young people are uprooted, unemployed and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to engage in violence. See Hilker and Fraser 2009, Del Felice and Wisler 2007.
- 271 Del Felice and Wisler 2007.
- 272 Ibid.
- 273 According to the UN peacebuilding concept developed in 1995, peacebuilding is instrumental in achieving peace not only in post-conflict phases but also in preventive diplomacy. The meaning of peacebuilding in practice, however, has lagged behind the extensive use of the concept. There is little consensus on appropriate implementation. United Nations, 2008.
- 274 Galtung 1996, pp 32-33.
- 275 Adapted from the Johns Hopkins School

of Advanced International Studies Conflict Management toolkit: www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/index.html.

- 276 Attitudes refer to assumptions, cognitions and emotions that one party may have about the other. Behaviours refer to the mental, verbal or physical expressions put forth in a conflict. Violent behaviours include hatred or a lack of respect toward the opposing party, and may come in the form of verbal insults, physical abuse, threats, coercion, destructive attacks or the outright denial of people's basic human rights. Contradictions are the perceived incompatibility or clashing of goals between two or more parties. See Galtung 2000.
- 277 Structural violence refers to a form of violence where some political, social and economic systems purportedly harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.
- 278 Frequently, the two are seen as separate realms, and the achievement of one can jeopardize the achievement of the other. While building sustainable peace will require concerted efforts towards reconciliation, this may lead to compromises in holding human rights abusers accountable. See McCan 2000, pp 111-128.
- 279 Since weak states are a threat not only to the human security of their own citizens but possibly also to international security, the international community needs some form of state that can control its territory.
- 280 Brabant 2008.
- 281 The point is not that there are three different types of conflicts, but rather that each conflict has dimensions of all three.
- 282 A resource conflict is a struggle over claims to scarce status, power and resources. It can involve a competition among individuals and groups over material goods, economic benefits, property and power. The outcome is usually some sort of win/lose or compromise situation, without addressing underlying causes of the conflict. Interest-based bargaining aims to maximize the degree to which the expressed interests of both sides can be satisfied without necessarily addressing the underlying values, norms and fears of each of the parties. See Rothman and Friedman 2001.
- 283 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999.
- 284 The logic of development agencies—and especially of bilateral donors—fits better with the logic of conflict management than it does with the logic of empowerment. Empowerment will therefore be often understood only instrumentally, causing project managers to integrate people into the implementation of projects without granting them essential decision-making power in important questions such as budget allocation. Conflicts at the community or intra-community level that impede the implementation of projects will mainly be seen as obstacles or delaying factors, problems that need to be eliminated as quickly as possible. See Bigdon and Korf 2004.
- 285 It seeks to change mutually negative conflict attitudes and values among the parties in order to enable cooperation and communication between them, while recognizing the political imperative to create a new infrastructure for empowerment and recognition of underprivileged groups, thus fostering and enabling true social justice beyond the concerns of the parties directly involved in conflict. See Bigdon and Korf 2004.
- 286 The three layers of Lederach's pyramid are top

leadership, mid-range leaders and grassroots leaders. But in a subsequent article, he has drawn attention to the most strategic gap in vertical relationships: "The challenge of horizontal capacity is how to foster constructive understanding and dialogue across the lines of division in a society. The challenge of the vertical capacity is how to develop genuine recognition that peacebuilding involves multiple activities at different levels of leadership, taking place simultaneously, each level distinct in its needs and interdependent in effects." Lederach 1997.

- 287 These included 1) remnants of UNOSOM-supported district administrations; 2) local and regional administrations created by powerful faction leaders, which levied taxes and provided some security but no services; 3) community-based structures formed through consultative processes by clan elders, religious leaders and other local stakeholders; and 4) clan-based Islamic courts that filled a critical security vacuum and enforced law and order with some popular support.
- 288 Othieno 2008.
- 289 In Somalia, simplistic assumptions about the relationship between state-building and peacebuilding have led international actors to neglect key elements of the latter, notably the challenges of negotiating meaningful transitional security arrangements. Instead, the international community has assumed that the revived state will address these questions.
- 290 Menkhaus 2008.
- 291 In the late 1990s, Ethiopia and other foreign governments lent support to what became known as the 'building block approach' to state revival in Somalia, which envisaged a federation of regional authorities along the lines of Puntland (established in 1998).
- 292 The Garowe Community Constitutional Conference was undertaken by a preparatory committee which organized the whole conference process and drafted the charter with the help of a group of international constitutional lawyers. Interpeace/PDRC. 2008.
- 293 For example, 40 percent of the 90 local peace processes occurred in Lower and Middle Jubba regions, an area of clan heterogeneity endowed with rich agricultural and pastoral potential, and in Kismayo due to its seaport. In contrast, as few as 13 percent of the peace initiatives took place in the central regions of Galgaduud and South Mudug, which are more homogeneous in terms of clans and have fewer natural resources.
- 294 An early example was the 1993 Mudug peace agreement between Habar Gedir clans in Galgaduud and South Mudug, and Majeerteen clans in north Mudug, which ended large-scale confrontations of militia across this clan border. There are also examples of successful political reconciliation at a regional level, like the 2006 Wajid Peace Conference, where agreement between two factions of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army led to social reconciliation between the clans supporting them.

- 295 The powerful clan-based faction leaders that have emerged from the conflict in south central Somalia have consistently challenged traditional elders' authority. They have also promoted their own choice of elders, who lacked local legitimacy and undermined the existing system of leadership.
- 296 Foremost among these is the fact that in this

patrilineal society, a woman's ties to both her father's and husband's lineages means she is not considered a representative of a single clan, and therefore cannot be relied on to negotiate on its behalf.

- 297 UNDP-UNICEF-ILO Somalia 2011.
- 298 The TFG features in Annex I of the 2002 and 2003 Secretary-General's reports on children and armed conflict as among the parties to the conflict recruiting or using children (see S/2002/1299 of November 2002 and S/2003/1053 of November 2003), and was included twice in Annex I of the Secretary-General's reports for 2007 (S/2007/757 December) and 2009 (S/2009/158 March).
- 299 UNICEF 2009.
- 300 Ibid.
- 301 Del Felice and Wisler 2007.
- 302 These multiple dimensions of exclusion include economic exclusion due to unemployment, underemployment, and lack of livelihood or ownership of assets; political exclusion due to lack of political participation, voice and decision-making power; social exclusion due to lack of access to services, such as education, health, water, sanitation and housing; and cultural exclusion due to the lack of recognition of a group's cultural practices, discrimination, loss of status/respect, humiliation/honour or lack of identity. See Stewart 2008 and Kabere 2006.
- 303 In workshops organized by PDRC, 50 participants from youth organizations from all 7 regions of Puntland and two directors from the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports were brought together for a two-day long plenary and group work sessions to present examples on ongoing youth led peace initiatives. See PDRC Garowe 2010.
- 304 MUDAN youth umbrella is a network of youth organizations in Nugal region of Puntland State of Somalia. The umbrella was established on 4th April 2003 following a workshop conducted by UNICEF for youth organizations. The umbrella hosts about 14 youth students' organizations in the 4 main districts of Nugal region of Puntland State of Somalia.
- 305 It is a network of seven different Youth Groups in Mudug, including students groups, sports clubs, and environmental activists, youth development and HIV/AIDS prevention. It was established on 9 January 2003 in Galkayo with the help of UNICEF and Samo Development Organisation (SDO) Somalia
- 306 UN 1986.
- 307 See Jeong 2005, pp. 182–184.
- 308 Elmi and Barise (undated).
- 309 Abu-Nimer 2003.
- 310 See Andrzejewski and Lewis 1964.

Chapter 6

- 311 While the 2011 global Human Development Report has considered the synergies between equity and sustainability for human development, it did not delve into the critical importance of empowerment to achieve these twin goals
- 312 The UNDG Response Strategy recognizes that underlying the popular discontent in the Arab streets are development failures –

- failures of governance, social justice, equity and human rights, and failures in economic models and policies which reinforced a political economy of exclusion and pervasive inequality, especially in the distribution of wealth and access to opportunity. These key development challenges form the analytical underpinnings of UNDG's strategic framework of action and its priority programme areas for Joint UNDG Action, which include: (i) advocacy, policy advice and capacity development towards a new social contract and development model; (ii) youth voice, participation, responsible citizenship and employment; (iii) education quality; (iv) improving alignment between skills supply and work opportunities; (v) economic diversification, decent jobs and social protection; (vi) promoting inclusive markets; (vii) promoting women's empowerment, gender equality, leadership and participation; (viii) localizing MDGs; (ix) food security and climate change; and (x) Arab economic integration. See UNDG (Arab State/MENA), 2011 and UNDP Strategy of Response to Transformative Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region.
- 313 Endorsed by the African Union Heads of States and Governments in July 2006, African Youth Charter is the political and legal document which serves as the strategic framework that gives direction for youth empowerment and development at continental, regional and national levels. The years 2009 to 2018 have been declared as the Decade on Youth Development in Africa.
- 314 The African Ministers in Charge of Youth Affairs endorsed the mid-term priorities of the Decade Plan of Action in April 2011. They include: evidence-based upscaling of good practices in sustainable youth development programmes, specifically in youth employability; coordinated multilateral efforts in youth development policy and programme development, implementation and monitoring; targeting marginalized groups (young women, youth with disabilities and youth in post-conflict areas); consolidating leadership development, participation and a spirit of volunteerism among youth; building a sustainable resource base, both human and financial; and ensuring the availability of comparative disaggregated data on youth development. See African Union. 2011.
- 315 United Nations 2011.
- 316 At the continental level, among other things, the African leaders adopted and approved the African Youth Charter (2006), which has been signed by 37 countries and ratified by 24. Somalia has not ratified the international Covenant of Children for the protection of the rights of children. African Union. 2011.
- 317 Primary School Survey, UNICEF, 2007.
- 318 The concept of barefoot teachers, where teachers belong to a local community, has been successfully practised for nomadic populations in some countries to overcome the problem of lack of access to education.
- 319 Praveen. 2009.
- 320 Commonwealth Youth Credit Initiative (CYCI), is operational in six countries in Africa, Cameroon, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia.
- 321 The Breakthrough Strategy proposes three pillars of interventions: 1) supporting scaled-up implementation of proven and innovative initiatives in multiple impact generating areas like gender, energy, water and sanitation, education, etc; 2) creating an enabling environment to sustain progress through investing in enablers such as effective policies and institutions; improved conditions for peace, security and good governance; public and private investments and 3) strengthening advocacy, partnerships and resources.
- 322 See Brandt et.al 2005 and Mary. 2000.
- 323 See McEvoy-Levy, 2001.
- 324 See McCan, 2000.
- 325 These include early marriage, illiteracy and school dropout, early pregnancy, vulnerability to HIV, patriarchal social structures, gender-based violence and employer discrimination, family responsibilities, limited rights related to land ownership and inheritance.
- 326 See Sharma and Banskota, 2005.
- 327 Experience from a comprehensive Life Skills-based Education programme—a joint initiative of UNICEF and ILO—shows that general programmes for youth do not adequately reach adolescent girls. In order to reach them, such programmes must be designed from the onset with adolescent girls as the target audience.
- 328 This is particularly true of education, where policies aimed at increasing access to education, for example, can lead to an increased incidence of exclusion because of lack of education.

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Annexes

Developing a Somali Youth Charter

The Somali Youth Charter was developed by young Somali women and men who were involved in the production of the *Somalia Human Development Report 2012*.

On studying the African Youth Charter, a group of representatives of various existing youth organizations and groups from Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia came together to produce their very own Charter that addresses issues that relate to their daily lives in Somalia.

The youth attempted to provide a guiding set of principles that stipulates the aspirations, perceptions and needs of the youth.

Subsequent to its formation, the Somali Youth Charter was disseminated among youth in Somalia through youth groups and organizations and volunteers. In south central Somalia, due to limited access, an international NGO, CISP, assisted in reaching out to young Somalis to gather their feedback on the Charter. Through Survey Monkey, the Youth Charter was disseminated to youth within the Somali diaspora for their input.

For the first time, stakeholders can refer to one document that spells out young Somalis' concerns and issues that need to be addressed to empower them socially, economically and politically.

Quotes from Somali Youth on the Charter:

“On behalf of the Somali youth in the UK diaspora, we are very proud that the youth in Somalia have set their differences aside and come to the point where they can have one and only one voice. The fact that the Somali youth demand a social, economic and political change implies that a new dawn has started for them. The encouragement of the youth to participate in the decision making of their future is truly an important step towards a prosperous future. I would also like to emphasize that the charter paves the way for the attainment of women's full rights. We, the Somali youth in the UK diaspora, look forward to co-operating with the youth in Somalia as they seek to implement these changes in the cause of peace and development throughout their country”.

*Mustafa Jama, Youth Chairman,
World G18 Somalia (Somali UK Diaspora Group),
UK*

“This Charter was the first opportunity given (to) the youth. They believed that no one cared about their rights before and with this Charter and its constitution, they feel like their voices can be heard for once. The constitution already states a lot of what they stipulate although there are a few things that are missing from it. Education and their rights as people need to be added to it. With these additions, the Charter can fully empower and accomplish the goals they set out to achieve”.

*Somali youth at discussion on youth charter at CISP
vocational training centre in Guriceel*

The full Somali Youth Charter is presented in English and Somali on the following pages.

The Somali Youth Charter

We, the youth of Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia, acknowledge that we are the present and future of the nation. Bearing this in mind, we would like to have a unified voice: one voice that is heard through this Charter. We want a supportive and enabling environment, in which every young person—women and men—gains ability, authority, agency and opportunities to make effective choices, and translate these in their own lives and the lives of other people.

Recognizing the power and struggle of the Somali Youth League for the liberation of the Somali Republic in 1960, we, the youth of Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia want to have a common voice to address our common challenges for building an inclusive Somali society, in which all Somalis would feel valued and empowered.

Acknowledging that we are a strong force that can propel the country forward to improve overall human development, and address the challenges facing the Somali youth today, and recognizing the aspirations outlined in the Millennium Development Goals, we have set aside our differences and come together with the hope of attaining the following principles:

We, the Somali youth, declare in a unified voice through this Charter the empowerment of youth and the Somali people through:

Policy and Institutional Reform

- Urge the government to develop and implement a comprehensive and coherent national youth policy that is well integrated into national policy and programmes.
- Acknowledge the need to eliminate discrimination against girls and young women according to obligations stipulated in various international, regional and national human rights conventions and instruments designed to protect and promote women's rights.

- Ensure that every young person, both men and women, has the right to participate in decision-making processes in social, political and economic spheres of society.
- Create sustainable national youth empowerment funds.

Social Empowerment

- Wish to change the curricula and make them relevant to local labour market opportunities, patriotism, morals, the dynamic environment and personal development.
- Every young person shall have the right to quality education that encompasses civic education at all levels.
- Provide free and compulsory basic education, and make all forms of secondary education more readily available and accessible by all possible means, also focusing on the nomadic populations.
- Introduce scholarship programmes to encourage entry into post-primary school education and into higher education for outstanding youth from disadvantaged communities, particularly young girls.
- Encourage stakeholders to provide opportunities, such as inclusive education, to physically challenged children and youth.
- Every young person shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health.
- Institute comprehensive programmes to prevent the transmission of sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS and drug abuse, including risks related to maternal health (female genital mutilation, unsafe child delivery and high birth rates) by providing education and awareness creation as well as making protective/rehabilitation measures and youth friendly reproductive health services available, affordable and

relevant with special attention to at-risk youth.

- Access to HIV and AIDS prevention, care and treatment services.
- Zero-tolerance on HIV-related stigma and discrimination.
- Require access to public spaces where we can safely meet, interact and play sports, regardless of gender.
- Request families and governing bodies to encourage sports, particularly as they instill values such as discipline, healthy competition and mental productivity.
- Want to change society's perception of youth as problems to be resolved (deficit approach) to positive agents of change.
- Want the society—our families, friends, policy makers, institutions and fellow citizens—to perceive us as fresh, young, innovative and future visionaries, pioneers and intellectuals.
- Want to practice tolerance and respect of people from different backgrounds (clan, race, tribe or financial disposition).
- Eliminate all traditional practices that undermine the physical integrity and dignity of women.
- Harness the creativity of youth to promote local cultural values and traditions.
- Establish structures that encourage young people in the diaspora to engage in development activities in their country of origin.
- Enhance mitigation strategies for youth who have turned to piracy, extremism, drug abuse and other forms of risky behaviours.

Economic Empowerment

- Every young person shall have the right to gainful employment for sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Ensure equal access to employment and equal pay for equal work, and offer protection against discrimination regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, disability,

religion, and political, social, cultural or economic background.

- Every young person shall have the right to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing work that is harmful to the young person's health or holistic development.
- Foster greater linkages between the labour market and the education and training system to ensure that youth are being trained in fields where employment opportunities are available or are growing.
- Develop employment-led macroeconomic policies on job creation for youth, particularly young women.
- Promote youth entrepreneurship by launching a comprehensive training programme (providing life skills and livelihood skills training, access to credit, mentorship opportunities and better information on market opportunities).
- Institute national youth service programmes to engender community participation and skills development for entry into the labour market.
- Institute a holistic national youth-led community based programme encompassing both peace and development in an integrated package.
- Promote research on Somali youth's common problems to shape poverty-reducing policies.

Political Empowerment

- Guarantee the representation of youth in Parliament.
- Create space and strengthen platforms for youth participation in other decision-making bodies at national, district and local levels of governance.
- Every young person shall be assured the right to express and disseminate his or her ideas and opinions freely in all matters.
- Every young person shall have the right to free association, freedom of peaceful assembly and right to information.

Peacebuilding

- Would like to be involved in, and to contribute substantively to peace processes.
- Would like to change the status quo, and move away from short-term externally driven conflict management to Somali-led conflict transformation, embracing constructive dialogue and addressing challenges innovatively.
- Want to forge close partnerships with the youth in the diaspora.
- Ensure youth representation in all national peace and reconciliation conferences.
- Reinforce traditional peacebuilding methods.

Greening Human Development

- Recognize the vested interest and potential of young people in protecting the natural environment as the inheritors of the environment.

- Support youth organizations in instituting programmes that encourage sustainable energy and environmental preservation, such as waste reduction and recycling programmes using clean technologies.
- Wish to receive information about and introduce or reinforce strategies to protect the environment and prevent climate change, particularly in regard to protecting resources such as land (to avoid overgrazing, improper waste disposal and deforestation) and water (to prevent flooding, illegal fishing and dumping, and protect marine resources), so we may take steps towards protecting the environment and livelihoods.
- Encourage the use of renewable/alternative energy by developing a cadre of youth-led energy entrepreneurs.
- Ensure youth participation in the design, implementation and evaluation of renewable energy and environmental policies, including the conservation of natural resources.

The Youth Charter was adopted by youth representatives from Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia during the consultative workshop held in Garowe, Puntland on 24 September 2011, and disseminated to a wider youth group across the regions through consultations.

Axdiga Qabyo-qoraalka ee Dhallinyarada

Anagoo ah dhallinyarada Somaliland, Puntland iyo Koonfurta iyo Bartamaha Soomaaliya waxaan garwaaqsannahay in aan nahay dhalinyartii maantay iyo tan mustaqbalka ummadda. Annaga oo tan maanka ku hayna, waxaan jeclaan lahayn in aan yeelano cod mideysan; hal cod oo laga wada maqlo Axdigan. Waxaan u baahannahay bey'ad dhiirrigelisa oo awood siisa qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah rag iyo dumarba leh in ay helaan awood, suldo, wakaalad iyo fursado ay ku yeeshaan kala doorashooyin mirodhal ah kuna saleeyaan noloshooda iyo nolosha dadka kale.

Ayadoolagarawsanyahayawooddiiyohalgankii ay Ururkii Dhalinyarada Soomaaliyeed u soo galeen xorayntii Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliya 1960kii, haddaanu nahay dhallinyarada Somaliland, Puntland iyo Koonfurta dhexe ee Soomaaliya waxaan rabnaa in aan yeelanno cod mideysan oo aan wax uga qabaneyno culeysyada naga wada haysta in aan ku dhisno wax ay u dhan yihiin bulshada Soomaaliyeed taas oo Soomaali oo idil ay dareemayso qiimeyn iyo awood ay ka hesho.

Anagoo garwaaqsan in aan nahay quwad xoog leh oo waddanka hor-u-dhaqaajin karta si loo wanaajiyo guud ahaan horumarka bini'aadamka, waxna looga qabto culeysyada haysta dhalinyarada Soomaaliyeed ee maanta; anagoo garawsan hadafyada lagu xusay Hadafyada Horumarinta Mileeniyamka (Millennium Development Goals), waxaan meel iska dhignay farqiyaadeena kala duwan oo aan isku nimid anagoo rajaynayna in aan hanano mabaa'diida soo socota:

Anagoo ah dhalinyarada Soomaaliyeed waxaan cod middaysan ku caddaynayaa Axdigan awood siinta dhalinyarada iyo dadka Soomaaliyeed ayadoo loo maraayo:

Isbeddel Siyaasadeed iyo mid Hay'adeed:

- Waxaan ugu baaqaynaa dowladda in ay bilowdoohirgeliso siyaasadda dhalinyarada qaranka mideysan oo dhamaystiran taasoo si fiican loo dhexgaliyey siyaasadda iyo barnaamijyada qaranka.
- Waxaan garwaaqsaney baahida loo qabo in la suuliyo takoorka lagu hayo gabdhaha, dumarka dhalinyarada ah si waafaqsan waajibaadyada ku qoran heshiisyada iyo shuruucda caalamiga ah, kuwa heer goboleed iyo kuwa heer qaran ee kala duwan ee xaquuqda dadka ee loogu tala galay in lagu ilaaliyo laguna horumariyo xaquuqda haweenka.
- In la hubiyo in qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah rag iyo dumarba ay heystaan xuquuqda ay uga qeybgali karaan howlaha go'aan qaadashada ee arrimaha bulshada, siyaasadda, iyo dhaqaalaha ee dadka.
- In la abuuro maal-gelin/santuuqa dhaqaalaha awood-siinta dhalinyarada qaranka oo waara.

Awood siin Bulsho:

- Waxaandoonaynaa inaan bedelnomanhajka oo ka dhigno mid u habboon fursadaha shaqo ee ka jira gudaha, waddanimada, asluubta qofka, deegaanka is-bedbeddela iyo horumarka shakhsiga ah.
- Qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah waa in uu xaq u yeeshaa in uu helo waxbarasho tayo leh oo ay ka mid tahay heerarka kala duwan ee waxbarashada madaniga ah.
- In la bixiyo waxbarasho aasaasi ah oo lacag la'aan ah qasabna ah, noocyada kala duwan ee waxbarasha dugsiga sarena laga dhigo

kuwo diyaar ah oo qof kastaa heli karo, ayadoo weliba taxadar gaar ah la siinayo dadka reer miyaga.

- In la bilaabo barnaamijyo deeq waxbarasho oo lagu dhiirigalinayo gelitaanka waxbarashada dugisga hoose ka dib iyo tacliinta sare ee dhalinyarada ugu horreysa aqoonta oo ka soo jeeda bulshada tabaalaysan/dayacan, gaar ahaan gabdhaha da'da yar.
- In la bilaabo xarumo cudurka HIV/AIDS oo wax loogu qabto dadka qaba cudurka ayadoo taxadar gaar ah
- la siinayo carruurta dhalatey iyaga oo qaba cudurka HIV/AIDS iyo agoomaha.
- Waxaan jeclaan lahayn in aan aragno iyada oo la kordhiyey helitaanka daryeel caafimaad tayo leh, la awoodi karo, dadka ku habboon (xarumo caafimaad iyo adeegyaba).
- Waxaan rabnaa in aan xog-ogaal u ahaano tallaabooyinka ka hortaga ee cudurada, gaar ahaan kuwa caamka ah si aan u helno nolol buuxda, caafimaad leh, oo wax-soo-saar leh.
- Waxaan ka fileynaa in daryeel caafimaad bixiyeyaaasha ay qoysaska baraan halista la xiriirta caafimaadka dhalmada Jarjaridda Saxaaaxa Dheddiga (Gudniinka), umulidda aan ammaanka ahayn iyo dhalmada badan.
- Waxaan rajaynaynaa in dhalinyarada miyiga helaan xarumaha caafimaadyada ee wareega iyo adeegyo ku abbaaran hab nololeedkooda iyo baahidooda
- In lagu dhiirigaliyaa dadka ay khusayso (stakeholders) in ay siiyan fursado, sida waxbarasho loo dhan yahay oo ay qayb ka yihiin carruurta iyo dhalinyarada naafada ah.
- Waxaan u baahannahay in aan helno goobo bannaan oo dadka u dhaxeeya kuwaas oo aan si nabad ah ku wada kulmi karno, isku dhexgeli karno kuna wada cayaari karno ayadoo aan loo kala sooceyn lab iyo dheddig.
- Waxaan ka codsanaynaa qoysaska iyo dadka haya talada in ay dhiirigaliyaan cayaaraha, gaar ahaan kuwa qofka ku abuuraya

qiyamka sida edebta, tartan caafimaad qaba iyo maskax wax soo saar leh.

- Waxaan rabnaa in aan beddelno fekerka bulshada ay ka qabaan dhalinyarada oo ah in ay yihiin dhibaatooyin u baahan in la xaliyo ah (defucut approach) oo ay u arkaan wakiillo hor u kac leh oo is-beddel horseedaya.
- Waxaan rabnaa in bulshadeenna qoysaskeenna, saaxiibadeen, kuwa siyaasadda dejiya, hay'adaha/wakaaladaha iyo muwaadiniinta -- ay noo arkaan dhalinyaro cusub, fikrad cusub, hal-abuur iyo aragti fog leh, horseedayaal iyo indheergarad.
- Waxaan rabnaa in aan muujinno dulqaad oo aan ixtiraamno dad leh asalo kala duwan (jifo, sinji, qabiil ama hantida ku kala duwan).
- In la suuliyo falal dhaqameedyada liida kaamilnimada jir ahaaneed iyo sharafta haweenka.
- In la isku geeyo hal abuurka dhalinyarada si kor loogu qiyamka dhaqamada iyo caadooyinka degaanka.
- In la aasaaso qaab dhalliyarada qurbaha ku nool ku dhiirrigeliya in ay ka qaybqaataan waxqabadka hormarineed ee dalkii ay asal ahaan ka yimaadeen.
- In kor loo qaado istiraatiijiyadaha yareynta dhibaatooyinka dhalinyarada ku biirtay burcad badeednimo, xag-jir, maandooriyeyaaasha la qabatimay iyo noocyo kale oo dabeecado halis ah.

Awood-siin Dhaqaale:

- Qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah waxuu xaq u leeyahay in uu helo shaqo faa'iido dhal ah oo leh fursado maciishadeed oo joogto ah.
- In la hubiyo in dadku si sinnaan ah u heli karaan shaqo iyo lacag isku-mid ah oo u dhiganta shaqada isku midka u qabtaan iyo in dadka laga ilaaliyo kala takoorka iyada oo aan loo eegeynin isirka, sinjiga, dheddig-laboodka/jinsiga, naafonimo, diinta, iyo siyaasadda, bulshada, dhaqanka ama dhaqaalaha qofka.

- Qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah waxaa uu xaq u leeyahay in laga ilaaliyo ku danaysi dhaqaale iyo in ay qabtaan shaqo waxyeelo ku ah caafimaadka qofka dhalinyarada ah ama horumarkiisa/keeda guud.
- In la kobciyo isku-xirka u dhaxeeya suuqa shaqada iyo waxbarashada iyo hab tababar si loo hubiyo in dhalinyarada loo tababaro meelo fursado shaqo laga helayo ama ku soo kordhayaan.
- In la abuuro siyaasadda dhaqaalaha guud ee shaqadu ugu horayso oo shaqo loogu abuurayo dhalinyarada, gaar ahaan gabdhaha dhalinyarada ah.
- In la dhiirrigeliyo gacansi-abuurista dhalinyarada ayadoo la bilaabay barnaamij tababar baaxad leh (la bixinayo xirfad nololeed iyo tababar xirfad nolol-raadsi, helidda dayn, fursado qof ku haga iyo macluumaad wanaagsan oo ku saabsan fursadaha suuqa ka jira).
- In la diyaariyo barnaamijyada adeegga dhalinyarada qaranka si dheddig-laboodka loogu saleeyo iyo kobcinta xirfadaha gelitaanka suuqa shaqada.
- In la bilaabo barnaamij guud oo bulshada ku saleysan oo ay dhalinyarada qaranka hogaaminayso kaas oo ay ku jiraan xirmo isugu jirta nabadda iyo horumarka labadaba.
- In la dhiirrigeliyo cilmi-baaris lagu sameeyo dhibaatooyinka caamka ah ee haysta dhalinyarada Soomaaliyeed si loo qaabeeyo siyaasadaha yareynta saboolnimada.

Awood-siin Siyaasadeed:

- In la ballan-qaado in baarlamaanka laga helaa dad matala dhalinyarada.
- In la abuuro kaalin lana xoojiyo meel ay dhalinyarada uga mid noqdaan dadka go'aamada gaara heer qaran, degmo iyo heer dowlad hooseba.
- Qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah waa in loo xaqiijiya xaq uu si xor ah uu ku muujin karo kuna soo gudbin karo ra'yigiisa ama ra'yigeeda ku saabsan dhammaan arrimaha kala duwan.

- Qof kasta oo dhalinyaro ah waa in uu leeyahay xaquuq uu ku biiri karo urur, xornimada kulan nabadeed iyo xuquuqda macluumaadka.

Nabad Dhisidda:

- Waxaan jeclaan lahayn in aan ka qayb qaadano oo aan wax la taaban karo ka geysano howlaha nabadda.
- Waxaan jeclaan lahayn in aan bedelno si ay xaaladdu hadda tahay (Status quo), oo aan ka dhaqaaqno xalinta khilaafka muddada gaaban ee dibadda laga wado ee aan u dhaqaaqno qaab lagu beddelayo/dhalan-rogayo khilaafka oo ay Soomali hogaaminayso, ayadoo la qaadanayo wada-hadal wax ku ool ah oo culeysyada jirana si hal-abuur ku dheehan wax looga qabanayo.
- Waxaan rabnaa in aan is-kaashi dhow la yeelanno dhalinyarada qurbo-joogga ah.
- Waxaan rabnaa in la hubiyo ka qaybqaadashada dhalinyarada dhammaan shirarka nabadda iyo dib u heshiisiinta qaranka.
- In dib loo xoojiyo habab dhaqameedka nabad dhisidda.

Doogaynta Horumarka Dadka (horumar la gaaro iyada oo aan wax loo dhimmin deegaanka):

- In la garawsado danta guud iyo karaanka dhalinyarada ay u leeyihiin in ay difaacan deegaanka maaddaama ay yihiin dadkii dhaxli lahaa deegaanka.
- In la taageero ururada dhalinyarada in ay abaabulaan barnaamijyo dhiirigwliya ilaalinta deegaanka iyo tamarta sii socon karta sida dhimista qashinka, dib-u-isticmaalid iyada oo la adeegsanayo farsamooyin nadiif ah;
- Waxaan doonaynaa in aan helno xog ku saabsan deegaanka soona saarno ama dib u xoojino qorsheyaalka lagu ilaalinayo deegaanka, loogana hortagayo is-beddelka cimilada gaar ahaan ayadoo la tixgalinayo difaacidda khayraadka sida dhulka (in laga hortago xaalufinta; daaqid badan, qashin-qub aan habbooneyn iyo dhir jaridda) iyo

- biyaha (in laga hortago daadka/fatahaadaha, kaluumaysi iyo qashin-qub sharci darro ah iyo ilaalinta khayraadka badda), sii aan u qaadno talaabooyin ku wajahan ilaalinta deegaanka iyo nolol-raadisga.
- In la dhiirrigeliyo isticmaalka tamar lagu dhaliyay hab aan waxyeelleyn khayraadka dabiiciga ah iyo deegaanka lana cusbooneysiin karo ayadoo la bilaabayo ganacsi tamarta kku saabsan oo ay dhalinyaro hogaaminayaaan.
 - In la hubiyo ka qaybqaadashada dhalinyarada naqshadda, hirgalinta iyo qiimaynta tamarta la cusboonaysiin karo iyo siyaasadda deegaanka oo ay ku jirto daryeelka/ilaalinta kheyraadka dabiiciga ah.

Waxaa ansixiyay wakiiladda dhalinyarada ka kala socotay Somaliland, Puntland iyo Koonfurta iyo Bartamaha Soomaaliya intii lagu guda jiray aqoon-isweydaarsigii wadatashiga ahaa ee lagu qabtay Garoowe, Puntland taariikhdu markay ahayd 24 Sebtembar, 2011 waxaana lagu faafiyay gobollada kooxaha dhalinyarada ku baahsan yihiin iyada oo wadatashi loo marayo.

Technical Notes on Human Development Indices

The 2010 global Human Development Report introduced an updated version of the human development indices (the HDI, IHDI and GII) and the new MPI. The GII replaces the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), while the MPI replaces the Human Poverty Index (HPI). This technical note presents the methodological underpinnings and illustrative computations for each of these indices for Somalia, together with the data sources and underlying assumptions. It also contains the concept and method used to construct the composite Community Well-being Index for Somalia.

The Human Development Index

The HDI is a summary measure of human development that captures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Prior to the 2010 global Human Development Report, these basic dimensions were measured by life expectancy at birth; adult literacy rate and combined gross enrolment in education; and GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US dollars (PPP US\$), respectively.

The indicators measuring access to knowledge and a decent standard of living have now changed. Access to knowledge is measured by: mean years of schooling or education received in a lifetime by people 25 years and older; and expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. These new education indicators are used because a number of countries, especially those at the top of the HDI ladder, have achieved high levels of combined gross enrolment ratios and adult literacy

rates. As such, the discriminatory power of these indicators has weakened. Mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling for children capture the concept of education better than the previous indicators and have stronger discriminating power across countries. As with the previous indicators, however, they do not assess the quality of education.

The standard of living is now measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita in PPP US\$, instead of GDP per capita in PPP US\$. While GDP is a measure of economic output, it does not reflect a country's disposable income. Some profits may be repatriated abroad, some residents receive remittances from abroad, and in some cases, as in Somalia, aid flows may be sizeable. GNI adjusts the GDP for these factors and is, therefore, a better measure of a country's level of income.

Transformation of dimension indicators, goal posts and method of aggregation: Calculating the HDI first requires the transformation of different units of dimension indicators to a unit-free scale ranging from zero to one, using the minimum and maximum values (goal posts) set for each indicator. The choice of minimum values is motivated by the principle of a subsistence level or 'natural zero', below which there is no possibility for human development, while the maximum values are set at the actual observed maximum value of the indicators from countries over the period 1980 to 2010.

In past reports, the HDI was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the dimension indices. This method of aggregation allowed for perfect substitution between dimensions—in other words, a low achievement in one dimension could be compensated for in the HDI calculation by high achievement in another dimension. In the 2010 report, a multiplicative method of aggregation was used; namely, aggregations

were made using the geometric mean of the dimension indices. This approach reduces the level of substitutability between dimensions, and ensures that a one percent decline in, for example, life expectancy at birth, has the same impact on the HDI as a one percent decline in education or income. Values and rankings across published reports are not directly comparable because the underlying data and methods have changed. Table A.1 summarizes the changes made in the HDI.

Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index

The HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level. The IHDI has been introduced to adjust the HDI for inequality in health, education and income by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. The IHDI is equal to HDI

if there is no inequality among people, but it is less than the HDI as inequality increases. In this sense the IHDI is an index of the actual level of human development, while the HDI can be viewed as potential human development, or the maximum level that could be achieved if there was no inequality. The ‘loss’ in potential human development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, and can be expressed as a percentage.

The IHDI draws on Atkinson (1970)¹ to measure inequality in distribution and sets the aversion parameter equal to 1. In this case, the inequality measure is $A=1-g/\mu$, where g is the geometric mean and μ is the arithmetic mean of the distribution. This can be written as:

$$A = 1 - \frac{\sqrt[n]{X_1 \dots X_n}}{\bar{X}}$$

Table A.1: Summary of HDI Reforms in Terms of Indicators, Goal Posts and Aggregation Method

Dimensions	Previous HDI			Present HDI in 2010 Global HDR		
	Indicators	Transformation		Indicators	Transformation	
		Minimum	Maximum Value		Minimum	Maximum (Observed Values)*
Health	Life expectancy at birth (years)	25	85	Life expectancy at birth (years)	20	83.2 (Japan, 2010)
Knowledge	Adult literacy rate (%)	0	100	Expected years of schooling	0	20.6 (Australia, 2002)
	Combined gross enrolment ratio (%)	0	100	Mean years of schooling	0	13.2 (United States, 2000)
				Combined education index	0	0.951 (New Zealand, 2010)
Standard of living	GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	100	40,000 (capped)	GNI per capita (PPP US\$)	163 (Zimbabwe, 2008)	108,211 (United Arab Emirates, 1980)
Aggregation	Arithmetic mean			Geometric mean		

*The observed maximum values reported in the 2010 global Human Development Report have been changed in the 2011 report as follows: life expectancy at birth (83.4, Japan, 2011); expected years of schooling (capped at 18); combined education index (0.978, New Zealand, 2010); and GNI per capita (PPP US \$107,721, Qatar, 2011). The Somalia report has used the observed maximum values reported in the 2010 global report because the calculation of the HDI for Somalia is based on 2010 data obtained from the 2010 global report and Somalia Household Survey 2010 data. The use of the 2011 observed maximum values to calculate the HDI using 2010 Somalia data would slightly inflate Somalia’s HDI value from 0.285 to 0.307.

¹ Atkinson 1970.

Illustration of HDI Calculation for Somalia

Dimension indicators

Life expectancy at birth (years) = 50.7

Mean years of schooling for ages 25 + = 4.82

Expected years of schooling = 1.8

GNI per capita (PPP 2008 US\$) = 843.352

Dimension indices

$$\text{Life expectancy index} = \frac{50.7 - 20}{83.2 - 20} = 0.486$$

$$\text{Mean years of schooling index} = \frac{4.82 - 0}{13.2 - 0} = 0.365$$

$$\text{Expected years of schooling index} = \frac{1.8 - 0}{20.6 - 0} = 0.087$$

$$\text{Education index} = \frac{\sqrt{0.365 \times 0.087} - 0}{0.951 - 0} = 0.188$$

$$\text{Income index} = \frac{\text{LN}(843.352) - \text{LN}(163)}{\text{LN}(108211) - \text{LN}(163)} = 0.253$$

$$\text{Human development index} = \sqrt[3]{0.486 \times 0.188 \times 0.253} = 0.285$$

Both inequality in years of schooling and per capita income are obtained from the Somalia Household Survey 2010. Inequality in life expectancy is based on the 2009 Life Tables from WHO 2011.

Gender Inequality Index

The GII reflects women's disadvantages in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality² and adolescent fertility rates; empowerment by the share of parliamentary seats held by gender, and attainment of secondary and higher education by gender; and economic activity by the labour market participation rate by gender. The GII shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements. It ranges from 0 (perfect gender inequality) to 1 (perfect gender equality).

Method of aggregation: Aggregation of the GII is first done separately for each gender group using geometric means. The gender-specific means are then aggregated using harmonic means, which capture the inequality between women and men and adjust for association between dimensions. Finally, the GII is expressed as the relative difference between the harmonic mean and the reference mean. The reference mean is obtained assuming equality of genders in all three GII dimensions. The GII is calculated using the association-sensitive inequality measure suggested by Seth (2009).³

Multidimensional Poverty Index

In response to the shortcomings of the traditional headcount measure of income poverty, the global *Human Development Report* introduced the HPI in 1997. It combined different aspects of non-monetary deprivations. While the HPI has contributed to the understanding of poverty,

² It is to be noted that the GII methodology was refined slightly in the 2011 global HDR. Maternal mortality ratio is entered into the GII as 10/MMR instead of 1/MMR. See the technical notes on page 171-172 of the 2011 Global HDR.

³ Seth 2009.

Illustration of IHDI Calculation for Somalia

Dimension indices

LI = Life expectancy index=0.486

EI = Education index=0.188

GI = Per capita income index=0.253

Inequality-adjusted dimensional indices

ILI = Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index

$$= (1 - A_L) \times LI = (1 - 0.426) \times 0.486 = 0.279$$

IEI = Inequality-adjusted education index

$$= (1 - A_E) \times EI = (1 - 0.460) \times 0.188 = 0.102$$

IGI = Inequality-adjusted income index

$$= (1 - A_G) \times GI = (1 - 0.364) \times 0.253 = 0.161$$

$$\text{Inequality adjusted Human development Index} = \sqrt[3]{ILI \times IEI \times IGI} = \sqrt[3]{0.279 \times 0.102 \times 0.161} = 0.166$$

$$\text{HDI loss due to inequality (\%)} = \left(1 - \frac{\text{IHDI}}{\text{HDI}}\right) \times 100 = \left(1 - \frac{0.166}{0.285}\right) \times 100 = 42\%$$

$$\text{Health Index Loss due to inequality (\%)} = \left(1 - \frac{\text{ILI}}{\text{LI}}\right) \times 100 = \left(1 - \frac{0.279}{0.486}\right) \times 100 = 43\%$$

$$\text{Education Index Loss due to inequality (\%)} = \left(1 - \frac{\text{IEI}}{\text{EI}}\right) \times 100 = \left(1 - \frac{0.102}{0.188}\right) \times 100 = 46\%$$

$$\text{Income Index Loss due to inequality (\%)} = \left(1 - \frac{\text{IGI}}{\text{GI}}\right) \times 100 = \left(1 - \frac{0.161}{0.253}\right) \times 100 = 36\%$$

it did not capture overlapping deprivations suffered by individuals or households. Knowing not just who is poor but how and why they are poor is essential for effective human development programmes and policies.

The new MPI aims at capturing both the incidence (headcount) and breadth (intensity of deprivation) of poverty. In identifying those with multiple deprivations, it assists in prioritizing the needs of the poorest of the poor.⁴ The MPI uses 10 indicators underlying the three dimensions of human development, education, health and standard of living, and identifies multiple deprivations in the same households. The education dimension is based on two indicators, schooling and child enrolment; the health dimension on two indicators, child mortality and nutrition; and the standard of living on six indicators, electricity, sanitation, drinking water, floor type, cooking fuel and assets. All

the indicators needed to construct the MPI for a household are taken from the same household survey. The average intensity of deprivation is reflected in the proportion of indicators in which people are deprived.⁵ The MPI can be further disaggregated to see how much each indicator contributes to multidimensional poverty.

Method of aggregation: Each person is assigned a score according to his or her household's deprivation in each of the 10 component indicators, (d). The maximum score is 10, with each dimension equally weighted (the maximum score in each dimension is $3\frac{1}{2}$). The health and education dimensions have two indicators each, so each component is worth $5/3$ (or 1.67). The standard of living dimension has six indicators, so each component is worth $5/9$ (or 0.56).

The health thresholds are: having at least one household member who is malnourished; and

⁴ Traditional headcount measurements in each dimension of deprivation do not illustrate whether or not people deprived in one indicator are also deprived in others (see Alkire and Santos 2010).

⁵ A person who is deprived in 100 percent of the indicators has a greater intensity of poverty than someone deprived in 40 percent.

Illustration of GII Calculation for Somalia

Dimension indicators

Maternal mortality ratio (**MMR**): deaths per 100,000 live births = 1,400

Adolescent fertility ratio (**AFR**): births per 1,000 women aged 15-19 = 70.1

Share of parliamentary seats held (**PR**) (% of total):

Female = 8.2

Male = 91.8

Attainment of at least secondary education (**SE**) (% population aged 25 and above):

Female = 5.1

Male = 11.61

Labour force participation rate (**LFPR**) (%):

Female = 58.0

Male = 86.0

Dimension indices by gender

The MMR is truncated symmetrically at 10 (minimum) and at 1,000 (maximum).

$$\text{Female reproductive health index} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{MMR}\right) \times \left(\frac{1}{AFR}\right)} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{1000}\right) \times \left(\frac{1}{70.1}\right)} = 0.004$$

Male reproductive health index = 1

$$\text{Female empowerment index} = \sqrt{PR_F \times SE_F} = \sqrt{0.082 \times 0.051} = \mathbf{0.065}$$

$$\text{Male empowerment index} = \sqrt{PR_M \times SE_M} = \sqrt{0.918 \times 0.1161} = \mathbf{0.326}$$

Female labour market index ($LFPR_F$) = 0.58;

Male labour market index ($LFPR_M$) = 0.86;

$$\text{Gender index for females } G_F = \sqrt[3]{\left(\frac{1}{MMR}\right) \times \left(\frac{1}{AFR}\right) \times \sqrt{PR_F \times SE_F} \times LFPR_F} = \sqrt[3]{(0.004 \times 0.58 \times 0.064668)} = \mathbf{0.053}$$

$$\text{Gender index for males } G_M = \sqrt[3]{1 \times \sqrt{PR_M \times SE_M} \times LFPR_M} = \sqrt[3]{1 \times 0.326466 \times 0.86} = \mathbf{0.655}$$

Aggregating across gender groups by the harmonic mean to account for inequality

$$HARM(G_F, G_M) = \left[\frac{(G_F)^{-1} + (G_M)^{-1}}{2} \right]^{-1} = \left[\frac{(0.053136)^{-1} + (0.654805)^{-1}}{2} \right]^{-1} = \mathbf{0.098}$$

Treating genders equally

$$G_{F,M} = \sqrt[3]{\text{Health} \times \text{Empowerment} \times \text{LFPR}} = \sqrt[3]{0.502 \times 0.212 \times 0.720} = \mathbf{0.425}$$

$$\text{Where } \overline{\text{Health}} = \left(\sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{MMR}\right) \times \left(\frac{1}{AFR}\right)} + 1 \right) / 2 = \mathbf{0.502}$$

$$\overline{\text{Empowerment}} = (\sqrt{PR_F \times SE_F} + \sqrt{PR_M \times SE_M}) / 2 = \mathbf{0.212}$$

$$\overline{LFPR} = \frac{(LFPR_F + LFPR_M)}{2} = \mathbf{0.720}$$

$$\text{Gender Inequality Index} = 1 - \frac{HARM(G_F, G_M)}{G_{F,M}} = 1 - \frac{0.097}{0.425} = \mathbf{0.773}$$

having had one or more child deaths. The education thresholds are: having no household member who has completed five years of schooling; and having at least one school-age child (up to grade 8) who is not attending school. The standard of living thresholds relate to not having electricity; not having access to

clean drinking water; not having access to adequate sanitation; using 'dirty' cooking fuel (dung, wood or charcoal); having a home with a dirt floor; and owning no car, truck or similar motorized vehicle, and owning at most one of the following assets: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, refrigerator, telephone or television.

To identify the multidimensionally poor, the deprivation scores for each household are summed to obtain the household deprivation. A cut-off of 3, which is the equivalent of one-third of the indicators, is used to distinguish between the poor and non-poor.⁴ If is 3 or greater, that household (and everyone in it) is multidimensionally poor. Households with a deprivation count between 2 and 3 are vulnerable to or at risk of becoming multidimensionally poor. The MPI value is the product of two measures: the multidimensional headcount ratio and the intensity (or breadth) of poverty. The headcount ratio H is the proportion of the population that is multidimensionally poor:

$$H = q/n$$

where q is the number of people who are multidimensionally poor and n is the total population. The intensity of poverty A reflects the proportion of the weighted component indicators, d , in which, on average, poor people are deprived. For poor households only, the deprivation scores are summed and divided by the total number of indicators and by the total number of poor:

$$A = \frac{\sum_1^q c}{qd}$$

where c is the total number of weighted deprivations the poor experience and is the total number of component indicators considered (10 in this case).

Data Sources for Computing the Indices

Data sources for 2010 were available from the WHO for life expectancy at birth and from the Somalia Household Survey 2010 for mean and expected years of schooling. For GNI per capita (PPP US\$), 2010 estimates from the survey and estimates of the conversion factor by UNDP were made based on the World Bank's most recent GNI per capita data from the International

Comparison Program. To ensure as much cross-country comparability as possible, the HDI is based primarily on international data from the UN Human Development Report Office. Reliable estimates from Barro and Lee⁶ have been used—these are based on school attainment data from censuses and school enrolment data compiled by UN agencies including the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the UN Statistics Division. The Somalia report relies on the 2010 global *Human Development Report* data for some indicators required for HDI and GII calculations. See Table A.2.

Estimate of GNI per capita: The global Human Development Report has made it clear that GNI per capita is a more relevant measure of a country's living standards than GDP per capita.⁷ In Somalia, the absence of National Accounts Statistics is an obstacle to calculating GNI, while the absence of price indices prevents calculations of purchasing power conversion for the GNI. For robustness and statistical validity, this report estimates GNI per capita in the last 12 months from the Somalia Household Survey 2010. To overcome the common downward bias of individuals underreporting their income, individuals were also asked during the household survey used for this report about their expenditures, as a proxy for income. Additionally, due to the prevalence of the barter economy in Somalia, expenditures partially account for such household economic behaviour as 'own consumption', which contributes to money-metric income under-reporting.

To generate the conversion PPP factor of 2.500598405 for Somalia so as to adjust the GNI for international comparison, a selection of conversion factors was averaged. Somalia has been experiencing civil unrest but has maintained healthy trading and movement of refugees to neighbouring countries, particularly Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. Uganda was added to further reflect the reality on the ground.

⁶ Barro and Lee 2010.

⁷ Due to large remittances sent by the Somali diaspora and international aid inflows, GNI in Somalia expectedly exceeds GDP. This helps to show the weakness of the country's domestic income on the one hand, and the economic strength of aid and remittances on the other hand in stimulating domestic economic activities. Recipient households spend much of externally derived incomes on their daily consumption.

Example Using Hypothetical Data

Indicators	Household				Weights
	1	2	3	4	
Household Size	4	7	5	4	
Health					
At least one member is malnourished	0	0	1	0	5/3=1.67
One or more children have died	1	1	0	1	5/3=1.67
Education					
No one has completed five years of schooling	0	1	0	1	5/3=1.67
At least one school-age child not enrolled in school	0	1	0	0	5/3=1.67
Living conditions					
No electricity	0	1	1	1	5/9=0.56
No access to clean drinking water	0	0	1	0	5/9=0.56
No access to adequate sanitation	0	1	1	0	5/9=0.56
House has dirt floor	0	0	0	0	5/9=0.56
Household uses 'dirty' cooking fuel (dung, firewood or charcoal)	1	1	1	1	5/9=0.56
Household has no car and owns at most one of the following: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, refrigerator, telephone or television	0	1	0	1	5/9=0.56
Results					
Weighted count of deprivation, c (sum of each deprivation multiplied by its weight)	2.22	7.22	3.89	5.00	
Is the household poor (c > 3)?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Weighted count of deprivations in household 1: $\left(1 \cdot \frac{5}{3}\right) + \left(1 \cdot \frac{5}{9}\right) = 2.22$

Headcount ratio (H) = $\left(\frac{7 + 5 + 4}{4 + 7 + 5 + 4}\right) = 0.80$

(80 percent of people live in poor households)

Intensity of poverty (A) = $\frac{(7.22 \cdot 7) + (3.89 \cdot 5) + (5.00 \cdot 4)}{(7 + 5 + 4) \cdot 10} = 0.56$

(the average poor person is deprived in 56 percent of the weighted indicators).

$MPI = H \cdot A = 0.450$

The inequality coefficient is the estimated value of the Atkinson index, using the 2010 global Human Development Report methodology:

The inequality measure = $1 - \frac{\text{the geometric mean}}{\text{life expectation at age } <1}$

The Atkinson coefficient can also be obtained directly using the World Bank's Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP).

Inequality measure (A1) for life expectancy:

To produce the inequality measure for life

expectancy, the report used the WHO (2009) Life Tables for Somalia, disaggregated by quinary age groups (1-4, 5-9,...,95-99, 100+).⁸ The Life Tables include: 1) nMx - age-specific death rate between ages x and $x+n$; 2) nqx - probability of dying between ages x and $x+n$; 3) lx - number of people left alive at age x ; 4) ndx - number of people dying between ages x and $x+n$; 5) nLx - person-years lived between ages x and $x+n$; 6) Tx - person-years lived above age x ; and 7) ex - expectation of life at age x .

⁸ Using the following link: <http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?vid=710>, choose 'Life Tables', choose 'Somalia', then 'View' and finally 'Export' the data in MS Excel.

Table A.2: Definitions of Indicators and Data Sources

Indicators	Definition	Data Sources
HDI		
Life expectancy at birth	Number of year a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality at the time of birth remain the same throughout the infant's life.	WHO 2011
Mean years of schooling	Average number of years of education received by people aged 25 and older converted from educational attainment level using official duration of each level.	Somalia Household Survey 2010
Expected years of schooling	Numbers of years of schooling that a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child's life.	Global Human Development Report 2010
GNI per capita	Aggregate income of an economy generated by its production and ownership of factors of production less the income paid for the factors of production owned by the rest of the world, converted to international dollars using the PPP rate divided by mid-year population. In the absence of such data for Somalia, per capita household expenditure is used as proxy income and PPP conversion factors are estimated by UNDP based on the World Bank International Comparison Program 2010 (see technical note for robustness and statistical validity).	Somalia Household Survey 2010; World Bank International Comparison Program 2010
IHDI		
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index	The HDI life expectancy index is adjusted for inequality in distribution of expected length of life based on the 2009 Life Tables from WHO 2011.	2009 Life Tables from WHO 2011
Inequality-adjusted education index	The HDI education index is adjusted for inequality in distribution of years of schooling based on data from the Somalia Household Survey 2010.	Somalia Household Survey 2010
Inequality-adjusted income index	The HDI income index adjusted for inequality in income distribution based on data from the Somalia Household Survey 2010.	Somalia Household Survey 2010
GII		
Maternal mortality ratio	Ratio of number of maternal deaths to the number of live births in a given year expressed per 100,000 live births.	Global Human Development Report 2010
Adolescent fertility ratio	Number of births to women ages 15-19 per 1,000 women aged 15-19.	Global Human Development Report 2010
Seats in national Parliament	Proportion of seats held by women in a lower or single house or an upper house, expressed as a percentage of total seats.	Global Human Development Report 2010
Population with at least secondary education	Percentage of the population aged 25 and older that has reached secondary education by gender.	Somalia Household Survey 2010
Labour force participation rate	Proportion of a country's working age population that engages in the labour market, whether by working or actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working age population.	Global Human Development Report 2010
MPI		
Multidimensional poverty headcount	Percentage of the population with a weighted deprivation score of at least 33 percent.	UNICEF Somalia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006
Intensity of deprivation of multidimensional poverty	Average percentage of deprivation experienced by people in multidimensional poverty.	UNICEF Somalia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006

In addition, another indicator is required—average number of years lived by those who die between ages x and $x+n$, called the ‘separation factor’ (nax). Although it is needed in the calculation, this factor is not typically presented

as a column of the Life Tables. In a complete table, a value of 0.5 (i.e., half of one year) is valid from the age of 5. For a simpler calculation, it is also assumed that those who die in the 5-year age intervals of an abridged Life Table live on

average 2.5 years. This report uses values from model Life Tables such as those tabulated by Coale and Demeny, 1966, shown in Table A.3.

According to Table A.3, Somalia is located in the west (zone 4) because the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) for the years (2005-2010) = 110 death per 1,000 births i.e. > 0.100 where we use the separation factor for infant mortality rate > 0.100.

Second: calculating $An(x)$ for each age group, $An(x)$ = beginning of the age group (x) + nax

Third: calculating (W_x = number of deaths) for each age group,

W_x = (number of people left alive at age x - number of people left alive at age $x+1$)/100,000

Fourth: calculating the geometric mean =

$$= \prod_{x+1}^{x_n} (A_x)^{W_x}$$

While: ($x+1$) is the second age group and (x_n) the last age group, we exclude the first age group (i.e. <1) from the calculation.

Fifth: the inequality measure =

$$1 - \frac{\text{the geometric mean}}{\text{life expectation at age } <1}$$

The estimation is based on the WHO Life Tables, separation factors tabulated by Coale and Demeny 1966 at the Pan American Health

Organization, and infant mortality rates from the United Nations 1982.

Mean years of schooling and inequality

adjustment: The mean years of schooling for persons aged 25 and older was computed using Somalia Household Survey 2010 data. One year is added to all valid observations to account for the zeros to compute the Atkinson inequality coefficient:

The inequality measure =

$$1 - \frac{\text{the geometric mean}}{\text{life expectation at age } <1}$$

It is also calculated directly using DASP on Stata to ensure the same results.

MPI: Raw data for estimating regionally disaggregated MPI for Somalia were obtained from the Somalia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006 conducted by UNICEF. The sample size used in calculating the MPI is 33,043 out of a total sample size of 33,557. Given the need for excluding missing value for some assets indicators, the resulting MPI value produced for Somalia in this report differs slightly from that reported in the 2010 global Human Development Report.

Community Well-being Index

In addition to the above updated version of human development indices, this report has constructed

Table A.3: Model Life Tables

	Zones	Separation Factor for Age 0			Separation Factor for Age 1-4		
		Men	Women	Both	Men	Women	Both
Infant mortality rate > 0.100	North (1)	0.33	0.35	0.3500	1.558	1.570	1.5700
	East (2)	0.29	0.31	0.3100	1.313	1.324	1.3240
	South (3)	0.33	0.35	0.3500	1.240	1.239	1.2390
	West (4)	0.33	0.35	0.3500	1.352	1.361	1.3610
Infant mortality rate < 0.100	North (1)	0.0425	0.05	0.0500	1.859	1.733	1.7330
	East (2)	0.0025	0.01	0.0100	1.614	1.487	1.4870
	South (3)	0.0425	0.05	0.0500	1.541	1.402	1.4020
	West (4)	0.0425	0.05	0.0500	1.653	1.524	1.5240

(1) Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; (2) Austria, Czechoslovakia, north-central Italy, Poland and Hungary; (3) southern Italy, Portugal and Spain; (4) rest of the world.

a regionally disaggregated Community Well-being Index for Somalia by bringing together available objective and subjective indicators underlying various dimensions of community infrastructure and human security. Conceptually, the term community well-being⁹ is defined as the combination of social, economic, environmental, and political conditions identified by individuals and their communities as essential for them to flourish and fulfil their potential.¹⁰ Since the capacity of individual to realize their potential is deeply affected by collective and social relationships, the well-being of communities is, therefore, an essential precondition for the well-being of individuals. Individual or community well-being is a multi-dimensional concept that contains interacting objective and subjective elements. While subjective well-being is measured by how satisfied people are with their lives, objective well-being focuses on measuring and analysing the empirically observable material conditions affecting the lives of individuals such as life expectancy, income, nutrition, employment, education, or democratic participation.

Literature cites varying ideas concerning what constitutes well-being for a particular society, and how it is defined and used by institutions as a tool for understanding and shaping policy priorities. The term quality of life or well-being is also used to measure the livability of a given city or nation. The Economist Intelligence Unit's quality-of-life index and Mercer's Quality of Living Reports¹¹ are perhaps two widely known measures used to calculate the livability of countries and cities around the world, respectively, through a combination

of subjective life-satisfaction surveys and objective determinants of quality of life such as safety, and infrastructure. The Happy Planet Index, introduced in 2006, is another unique among quality of life measures in that, in addition to standard determinants of well-being, it uses each country's ecological footprint as an indicator¹² Bhutan has adopted "gross national happiness" as its explicit policy goal.¹³

Despite well-being being an explicit or implicit policy goal, adequate definition and measurement have been elusive. Diverse objective and subjective indicators across a range of disciplines and scales, and recent work on subjective well-being surveys and the psychology of happiness have spurred renewed interest in this type of measurement.¹⁴ For Aristotle, the sources of human well-being are deeper and broader than the achievement of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.¹⁵ Amartya Sen famously defined the purpose of development as expanding the capability, and therefore the "freedom", of individuals to fulfil their potential; to live lives of meaning and value.¹⁶ While Sen's capability approach provide framework for human development concept and its measurement using objective indicators, a consensus is now growing about the need to develop a more comprehensive view of well-being or progress using a thoughtful mix of subjective and objective indicators and measures – one that takes account of social, environmental and economic concerns.¹⁷

It is against this conceptual underpinnings for broader definition/concept of community well-being, this report has constructed a regionally

9 The term 'well-being' is similar to the notion of the quality of life, which is used to evaluate the general well-being of individuals and societies. It is represented as the interaction of human needs and the subjective perception of their fulfilment, mediated by the opportunities available to meet the needs.

10 The term community is used to describe social organisations, both formal and informal, that are bounded by a physical or geographical location, or are constituted on the basis of common interests, goals or needs, or a network of kin. Wiseman and Brasher. 2008.

11 Mercer releases annually the Quality of Living Survey comparing 221 cities based on 39 criteria. Important criteria are safety, education, hygiene, health care, culture, environment, recreation, political-economic stability and public transportation.

12 <http://www.happyplanetindex.org/>

13 Bond, 2003

14 Costanza R. et al. 2007

15 Aristotle. 1953

16 Sen. 1985.

17 OECD/United Nations and World Bank Conference. 2007.

disaggregated Community Well-being Index for Somalia by bringing together community infrastructure and security-related indicators. The calculation of the composite Community Well-being Index for the different zones of Somalia was however guided by the available information from a participatory community census conducted by UNDP from 2005 to 2006 that covered 5,800 out of 7,400 settlements covering the three administrative zones of Somalia— Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia.¹⁸ It was designed to capture information on the overall characteristics of settlements, and the spatial distribution of livelihood systems, infrastructure, administrative structures, governance and vulnerability.

The index captures altogether 36 indicators underlying nine dimensions of community well-being, of which five dimension are related to infrastructure (education, health, transport and communication, electricity and water) and four relate to resilience (social capital, personal security, economic security and environment security). More specifically, the indicators underlying these nine dimensions include the following:

- Health infrastructure is measured by the existence of six types of functional health facilities (mother child health, outpatient department, health post, private clinic, mobile clinic and pharmacy facilities), together with the number of five types of health personnel (doctors, nurses, midwives, trained traditional birth attendants and pharmacists) per 10,000 people.
- Transport facilities are measured by three indicators: existence of markets, motorable roads and public transport.
- Communication is measured by the existence of three types of communication services: VHF, telephone, Internet and newspapers.
- Energy and water capture the availability of electricity and piped water.

- Social capital is measured by the existence of eight types of community organizations: community councils, cultural groups, women's groups, youth groups, cooperatives, school committees, religious groups and security groups.
- Human security is measured by three subjective indicators: current personal and community security (or citizen security), the current law and order situation and current dispute settlement, each rated on a 3 point ordinal scale (3 for good, 2 for average and 1 for poor).
- Economic security captures three indicators: families cultivating more than minimum farm size, minimum size of livestock for sustenance and number of families with minimum or more livestock.
- Environmental security is measured by the impacts of floods and droughts in the last 10 years.

Computation Procedures

Normalization and scaling: Each variable selected for measuring community well-being is normalized through a process of scaling. The method involves selecting a maximum and a minimum value for each variable; the difference between the maximum and the minimum value defines the scale. The normalized variable is constructed by the ratio of difference between the observed value and the minimum value (the path covered by the society in the selected variable) to the difference of the maximum value and the minimum value (the total path to be covered by every society in the variable in question).

In those cases where the indicator is directly proportional to empowerment or well-being, the normalized value is the difference between the observed or chosen value of one indicator and minimum value of the same indicator as a proportion of the difference of the maximum value and the minimum value. Algebraically, it can be expressed as follows:

18 UNDP Somalia, 2005/2006

$$I_{ij} = \frac{X_{ij} - X_{i(min)}}{X_{i(max)} - X_{i(min)}}$$

where I_{ij} is the normalized value of i^{th} indicator for j^{th} settlement. X_{ij} is the observed value of i^{th} indicators for j^{th} settlement whereas $X_{i(max)}$ and $X_{i(min)}$ are maximum and minimum value of the same indicators respectively.

In case where indicators are inversely proportional to well-being, the normalized value is the difference between the maximum value of the indicator and the actual value of the same indicator as proportion of the range of that indicator. Algebraically, it can be expressed as

$$I_{ij}^* = \frac{X_{i(max)} - X_{ij}}{X_{i(max)} - X_{i(min)}}$$

Maxima and minima: The observed minima and maxima of the spatial unit have been used in normalizing the variables.

Weighting: All variables considered for measuring community well-being at the settlement level are given equal weights considering that all the dimensions included in the community well-being index are equally

important and desirable in their own right for building human capabilities.

Aggregation and composite index: Once all the variables are normalized with all the necessary adjustments, a simple mean of various domains is taken to first arrive at the infrastructure and security indices. A composite index of community well-being is the simple arithmetic mean of these two broad dimensions. The maximum value is 1 and the minimum value is 0

$$EI_j = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n I_{ij}$$

where EI_j is the overall Community Well-being Index for j^{th} spatial unit (community and zone) and I_{ij} denotes the normalized value of i^{th} sub-indices comprising infrastructure and resilience for j^{th} spatial unit. N is the number of sub-indices. Within the infrastructure component, three sub-indices have been computed separately for education, health, transport, and electricity and water related information using a simple average of their respective indicators. Likewise, the four sub-indices for social capital, human security, economic security and environmental security have been computed first in order to arrive at the community security or resilience index.

Human Development Statistical Tables

Table A3.1: HDI for Somalia and Selected Countries

Country	HDI	Life Expectancy at Birth	Mean Years of Schooling	Expected Years of Schooling	GNI Per Capita
	Value	Years	Years	Years	PPP US \$2008
	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
Kenya	0.470	55.6	7.0	9.6	1,628
Uganda	0.422	54.1	4.7	10.4	1,224
Djibouti	0.402	56.1	3.8	4.7	2,471
United Republic of Tanzania	0.398	56.9	5.1	5.3	1,344
Rwanda	0.385	51.1	3.3	10.6	1,190
Sudan	0.379	58.9	2.9	4.4	2,051
Ethiopia	0.328	56.1	1.5	8.3	992
Sierra Leone	0.317	48.2	2.9	7.2	809
Liberia	0.300	59.1	3.9	11.0	320
Guinea-Bissau	0.289	48.6	2.3	9.1	538
Mozambique	0.284	48.4	1.2	8.2	854
Burundi	0.282	51.4	2.7	9.6	402
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.239	48.0	3.8	7.8	291
Zimbabwe	0.140	47.0	7.2	9.2	176
Somalia	0.285	50.7	4.8	1.8	843

Note: Somalia's 2010 HDI is calculated using data as reported in Annex 2, while those for selected other countries were taken from the 2010 global Human Development Report. This comparison indicates Somalia's relative position, but strictly speaking the data are not comparable.

Table A3.2: IHDI for Somalia and Selected Countries

Country	HDI	IHDI		Inequality-Adjusted life Expectancy at Birth Index		Inequality-Adjusted Education Index		Inequality-Adjusted Income Index	
	Value	Value	Overall Loss (%)	Value	Loss (%)	Value	Loss (%)	Value	Loss (%)
	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
Kenya	0.47	0.32	31.9	0.354	37.2	0.369	29.2	0.252	28.8
Uganda	0.422	0.286	32.1	0.321	40.7	0.321	28.2	0.229	26.4
Djibouti	0.402	0.252	37.3	0.338	41	0.144	47	0.329	21.3
United Republic of Tanzania	0.398	0.285	28.4	0.365	37.5	0.237	28.7	0.268	17.6
Rwanda	0.385	0.243	37	0.259	47.4	0.263	30.7	0.21	31.5
Sudan	0.379	..	..	0.379	38.5	..	..	..	..
Ethiopia	0.328	0.216	34.3	0.331	42.1	0.137	38.2	0.22	20.8
Sierra Leone	0.317	0.193	39.3	0.248	44.5	0.15	48.2	0.192	22.2
Liberia	0.3	0.188	37.3	0.351	43.3	0.225	46.4	0.084	19
Chad	0.295	0.179	39.3	0.21	54.5	0.119	37.8	0.229	20.8
Guinea-Bissau	0.289	0.166	42.4	0.215	52.5	0.172	40.3	0.124	32.5
Mozambique	0.284	0.155	45.3	0.244	45.7	0.144	28.2	0.107	58.1
Burundi	0.282	0.177	37	0.259	47.8	0.206	36.3	0.104	24.9
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.239	0.153	36.2	0.209	52.9	0.244	29.1	0.07	22.1
Zimbabwe	0.14	0.098	29.9	0.281	34.2	0.416	20.1	0.008	34.5
Somalia	0.285	0.166	41.8	0.279	43	0.102	46	0.161	36

Note: Somalia's 2010 HDI is calculated using data as reported in Annex 2, while those for selected other countries were taken from the 2010 global Human Development Report. This comparison indicates Somalia's relative position, but strictly speaking the data are not comparable.

Table A3.3: GII for Somalia and Selected Countries

Country	GI	Maternal Mortality Ratio	Adolescent Fertility Rate	Seats in Parliament (%)	Population With at Least Secondary Education (% Ages 25 and Older)		Labour Force Participation Rate (%)		
	Value			Female	Female		Male	Female	Male
	2008	2003–2008	1990–2008	2008	2010	2010	2008	2008	
Kenya	0.738	560	103.5	9.8	20.1	38.6	77.6	88.9	
Uganda	0.715	550	150.0	30.7	9.1	20.8	80.5	91.2	
Rwanda	0.638	1300	36.7	50.9	7.4	8.0	87.9	85.9	
Sudan	0.708	450	56.8	16.8	12.8	18.2	32.3	74.0	
Sierra Leone	0.756	2100	126.0	13.2	9.5	20.4	67.1	68.1	
Liberia	0.766	1200	141.6	13.8	15.7	39.2	69.1	76.8	
Mozambique	0.718	520	149.2	34.8	1.5	6.0	85.7	86.6	
Burundi	0.627	1100	18.6	31.7	5.2	9.2	91.5	88.3	
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.814	1100	201.4	7.7	10.7	36.2	57.4	86.8	
Zimbabwe	0.705	880	64.6	18.2	48.8	62.0	60.8	74.5	
Somalia	0.773a	1400	70.1	8.2	5.1	11.6	58.0	86.0	

Note: Somalia's 2010 HDI is calculated using data as reported in Annex 2, while those for selected other countries were taken from the 2010 global Human Development Report. This comparison indicates Somalia's relative position, but strictly speaking the data are not comparable.

Table A3.4: MPI for Somalia and Selected Countries

Country	MPI	Population in Multidimensional Poverty		Population With at Least One Severe Deprivation in		
		Head Count	Intensity of Deprivation	Education	Health	Living Standards
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
	2000–2008	2000–2008	2000–2008	2000–2008	2000–2008	2000–2008
Kenya	0.302	60.4	50.0	21.9	41.4	86.2
Djibouti	0.139	29.3	47.3	39.3	25.6	28.1
United Republic of Tanzania	0.367	65.3	56.3	34.0	35.5	90.6
Rwanda	0.443	81.4	54.4	53.6	46.1	95.3
Ethiopia	0.582	90.0	64.7	83.9	48.2	94.2
Sierra Leone	0.489	81.5	60.0	60.6	58.2	92.4
Liberia	0.484	83.9	57.7	68.9	59.6	91.6
Mozambique	0.481	79.8	60.3	69.1	52.7	86.4
Burundi	0.530	84.5	62.7	71.6	35.5	97.3
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.393	73.2	53.7	48.4	48.2	85.5
Zimbabwe	0.174	38.5	45.2	15.1	29.6	64.5
Somalia	0.471	81.8	57.5	77.4	45.0	84.8
Somalia Urban	0.184	60.8	30.3	67.9	36.3	62.7
Somalia Rural	0.568	94.4	60.1	81.7	50.6	99.0
Somalia Nomadic	0.619	98.9	62.5	89.5	50.7	100.0
Somalia North-west	0.388	71.7	54.1	77.7	28.6	75.2
Somalia North-east	0.401	75.1	53.4	71.7	31.2	83.1
Somalia South Central	0.539	89.4	60.2	79.6	58.6	90.2

Source: UNDP Somalia 2012. *Somalia HDR*, and UNDP 2010. *Global HDR 2010*

Table A3.5: Deprivation in Each Dimension in Somalia by Location

Dimension Indicator	Somalia	Deprivation by Residence			Deprivation by Zone		
		Urban	Rural	Nomadic	North-west	North-east	South Central
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Health							
Child mortality	20.9	17.2	24.1	22.2	13.1	16.0	27.0
Nutrition	33.2	21.9	39.1	40.5	14.7	26.3	39.4
Education							
Schooling	65.3	57.9	70.7	68.7	71.0	62.4	63.8
Child enrolment	26.3	19.0	28.6	39.1	25.8	24.6	27.2
Living conditions							
Electricity	80.7	55.0	96.9	99.0	69.2	77.5	87.4
Sanitation	61.0	23.2	81.3	99.3	57.7	52.6	66.0
Drinking water	69.1	44.8	82.6	92.3	58.4	64.8	76.0
Floor	63.3	20.3	81.6	95.5	49.1	45.3	77.6
Cooking fuel	96.6	98.3	95.4	95.8	90.0	99.3	98.5
Assets	80.6	54.7	96.8	99.8	72.3	77.4	85.9

Source: UNDP Somalia 2012. Somalia HDR 2012

Table A3.6: Composite Community Well-being Index for Somalia

Sub-indices	Number of Indicators	Somaliland	Puntland	South Central	Somalia
		Index Value	Index Value	Index Value	Index Value
I. Community infrastructure index	22	0.274	0.343	0.143	0.221
Educational infrastructure	3	0.327	0.474	0.108	0.245
Health infrastructure	11	0.253	0.271	0.124	0.190
Transport facilities	3	0.396	0.482	0.284	0.356
Communication	3	0.200	0.279	0.101	0.165
Electricity and safe water	2	0.194	0.209	0.100	0.148
II. Community security/ resilience index	16	0.446	0.379	0.328	0.370
Social capital	8	0.285	0.314	0.382	0.342
Human security	3	0.801	0.705	0.358	0.549
Economic security	3	0.234	0.179	0.218	0.214
Environmental security	2	0.464	0.318	0.355	0.376
Composite Community Well-being Index	38	0.360	0.361	0.236	0.295

a. Computed from UNDP participatory community census data 2005-2006.

Table A3.7: Humanitarian and Development Assistance Funding to Somalia by Year (US\$)

Year	Humanitarian and Development Funding	Private Individuals and Donors (20%)	Total
1991	185,800,000	37,200,000	223,000,000
1992	652,900,000	130,600,000	783,400,000
1993	889,800,000	178,000,000	1,067,900,000
1994	535,000,000	107,000,000	642,000,000
1995	187,700,000	37,500,000	225,300,000
1996	88,100,000	17,600,000	105,700,000
1997	80,900,000	16,200,000	97,000,000
1998	80,400,000	16,100,000	96,400,000
1999	114,700,000	23,000,000	137,600,000
2000	101,000,000	20,200,000	121,200,000
2001	147,700,000	29,600,000	177,300,000
2002	146,800,000	29,400,000	176,200,000
2003	173,700,000	34,700,000	208,400,000
2004	198,700,000	39,700,000	238,400,000
2005	237,000,000	47,400,000	284,300,000
2006	391,000,000	78,200,000	469,100,000
2007	384,100,000	76,800,000	461,000,000
2008	762,200,000	152,400,000	914,600,000
2009	661,700,000	132,300,000	793,400,000
2010	--	--	750,000,000*
2011	--	--	1,250,000,000*
Total			9,222,200,000

Source: Norris and Bruton 2011. The authors drew these data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's International Development Statistics on Somalia. The column on private and individual donors is extrapolated from the Official Development Assistance, or ODA, and Other Official Flows, or OOF, totals, with it being reasonably estimated that private charities and other sources not captured by the ODA totals gave a sum equal to 20 percent of the official total for any given year. Numbers have been rounded to the nearest US \$100,000; 2010 and 2011 figures are broad estimates.

Table A3.8: Status of Selected MDG Indicators for Somalia

Indicators for Monitoring Progress	Somalia		Somaliland	Puntland	South Central Somalia
	Year	Value	Value	Value	Value
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger					
Population below US \$1 (PPP) per day, %	2002	43.2	--	--	--
Poorest quintile's share in national income or consumption, %	2002	5.6	--	--	--
Employment-to-population ratio, both sexes, %	2009	65.5	--	--	--
Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, %	2009	13.9	13.9	10.7	16.5
Population undernourished, %	2002	71	--	--	--
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education					
Total net enrolment ratio in primary education, both sexes	2007	78.4	30.2	16.8	43.7
Gross enrolment ratio in primary education, total	2007	30.7	44.4	40.3	21.7
% of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary	2008	15.1	21.1	13.2	13.9
Primary completion rate, both sexes	2006	4	6.1	6.2	3.2
Literacy rates of 15-24 year olds (women)	2006	25	35.5	32.4	19.3
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women					
Gender parity index in primary level enrolment	2006	0.8	0.72	0.83	0.93
Gender parity index in secondary level enrolment	2006	0.5	0.35	0.36	0.74
Gender parity index in tertiary level enrolment	2002	18	--	--	--
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	2002	21.7	--	--	--
Seats held by women in national parliament, %	2010	6.9	--	--	--
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality					
Under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births	2009	180	113	112	--
Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births	2009	109	88	80	--
Children 1 year old immunized against measles, %	2009	85	--	--	--
Goal 5: Improve maternal health					
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births	2008	1200	--	--	1000
Births attended by skilled health personnel, %	2006	33	41.3	36.8	29.7
Current contraceptive use among married women (15-49), %	2006	14.6	25.6	11.9	11.6
Adolescent birth rate, per 1,000 women	2006	123	--	--	--
Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit, %	2006	31.6	39.6	30.2	29.4
Antenatal care coverage, at least four visits, %	2006	6.3	10.3	5.8	5.2
Unmet need for family planning, total, %	2006	26.2	29.2	19.3	26.4
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases					
People living with HIV, 15-49 years old, % (lower bound)	2009	0.5	--	--	--
People living with HIV, 15-49 years old, %	2009	0.7	5.1	--	--

Indicators for Monitoring Progress	Somalia		Somaliland	Puntland	South Central Somalia
	Year	Value	Value	Value	Value
Women 15-24 years old with correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS, %	2006	3.6	--	4	--
Ratio of school attendance rate of orphans to non-orphans	2006	0.78	0.88	1.28	1.06
Children under 5 with fever treated with anti-malarial drugs, %	2006	7.9	3.2	8.4	8.4
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability					
Population using solid fuels, %	2006	99.6	98.9	99.4	99.9
Proportion of the population using improved drinking water	2008	30	40.5	25	25.5
Proportion of the population using improved sanitation facilities	2008	23	40	43.7	35.3
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development					
Telephone lines per 100 inhabitants	2008	1.12	--	--	--
Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 people	2008	7.02	--	--	--
Internet users per 100 inhabitants	2008	1.14	--	--	--

Source: UNDP Somalia 2012. MDG progress Report 2011, Forthcoming

Survey Methodology

Sample Design

A multi-stage stratified cluster sample was designed for the national household and youth survey. The stratum consisted of the region, forming a homogenous domain. Within each stratum, the rural, urban and nomadic populations were taken to form sub-strata. The sample selection was carried out in three stages, starting with the random selection of the allocated number of districts from the strata. During the second stage, the primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected using the probability proportional to size (PPS) method; these comprised the tabeela (the lowest settlement unit) in the urban areas, while in the rural areas and for nomadic populations, they were settlements and water points, respectively. The water points were selected through a systematic sample selection method on the basis of the serialization of all water points. Within the tabeelas and the settlements, the households were selected using the systematic sampling method. The nomads were selected randomly, but on the basis of livestock with a shorter watering period.

The household module of the questionnaire was administered to the household head, or a senior member of the household who was knowledgeable about all the members. One youth among those present in each household was selected randomly for the administration of the youth questionnaire. To ensure equal representation of both young men and women, the selection of youth respondent was based on alternation between successive sample households.

Sample Size

The analyses from the sample provided estimates for the entire zone, and were disaggregated

by rural, urban and nomadic populations and gender. The sample size n was provided by the following formula:

$$n = \frac{t^2 p(1-p)d_{eff}}{e^2}$$

where t is the abscissa of the normal distribution curve at the 95 percent level of significance with $t=1.96$, p is the probability of a given event occurring (e.g., finding a youth in a household), and for the largest sample size it was taken to be .5, while d_{eff} is the design effect which was taken as 2. The desired margin of error was e and was taken as 5 percent.

The total sample size for the survey in the three zones was 3,573, distributed as follows:

South central Somalia	= 1,321 households
Puntland	= 1,174 households
Somaliland	= 1,078 households

The overall response rate of the survey was 93.8 percent, comprising 3,352 households with a zonal distribution of 90.8 percent, 97.8 percent and 93.5 percent in south central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, with 1,200, 1,054 and 1,098 households, respectively. The survey covered a total of 3,338 youth comprising 1,798 males and 1,540 females. The difference between the total number of sample households and the number of youth respondents was attributed to the unavailability of youth in 14 sample households in Puntland.

The sample in each zone was allocated to the sub-domains proportionately on the basis of the following formula:

$$n_h = \frac{nN_h}{N}$$

where n_h is the sample allocation to the h^{th} stratum and N_h is the size of the h^{th} stratum, $h=1...H$ and $N=N_1+...+N_H$ and $n=n_1+...+n_H$. This allocation is appropriate as it ensures that the variances of the estimates are kept to a minimum.

Focus group discussions were also carried out in each sub-stratum (rural, urban and nomadic populations). They were conducted with two groups of youths and two groups of adults (male and female, separately). Key informant interviews took place with community leaders, religious leaders, government officials, local

and international NGOs, and the business community. The distribution of sample size by zone is provided in table 3A. The tables 3.1 to 3.34 have been generated from the data of the survey conducted in 2010 for the Somalia Human Development Report in the three administrative zones of Somalia.

Selected Survey Tables

Table A4A: Distribution of Sample Covered in the Survey by Region

Zone	Region	Number of Districts Covered	Number of Settlements Covered			Number of Households/ Youth Sampled		
			Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
South Central	Mudug	3	13	1	14	78	12	90
	Galgadud	4	20	6	26	48	55	103
	Hiran	4	8	--	8	113	35	148
	Middle Shabelle	5	32	3	35	184	14	198
	Lower Shabelle	3	6	--	6	46	2	48
	Banadir	16	46	--	46	480	14	494
	Bakol	2	9	1	10	40	6	46
	Bay	4	9	--	9	44	2	46
	SH Hoose	2	3	1	4	23	4	27
	Total	43	146	12	158	1,056	144	1,200
Somaliland	Awdal	4	8	16	24	65	122	187
	Wooqoy Galbeed	3	8	9	17	253	49	302
	Togdeer	2	11	13	24	75	130	205
	Sool	4	11	11	22	108	61	169
	Sanaag	4	14	19	33	75	116	191
	Total	17	52	68	120	576	478	1054
Puntland	Mudug	2	14	34	48	108	118	226
	Bari	2	19	31	50	200	143	343
	Nugal	2	5	15	20	35	69	104
	Sanaag	1	12	17	29	84	31	115
	Sool	2	6	12	18	66	47	113
	Ayn	1	6	9	15	58	23	81
	Karkaar	1	6	11	17	93	23	116
	Total	11	68	129	197	644	454	1,098
All Somalia		71	266	209	475	2,276	1,076	3,352

Table A4.1: Age Distribution of Sample Population by Sex and Zone (%)

Age	South Central			Puntland			Somaliland			Somalia		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0-4	3.7	3.7	3.7	13.1	12.5	12.8	7.3	7.8	7.5	7.7	7.7	7.7
5-9	9	9.3	9.1	15.2	14.9	15.1	11.9	10.7	11.3	11.8	11.5	11.6
10-14	15.4	15.8	15.6	15.4	14.9	15.2	15	13.8	14.4	15.3	14.9	15.1
15-19	16.9	15	16	15.9	13.7	14.8	20	18.9	19.4	17.5	15.7	16.6
20-24	13.9	13.5	13.7	10.5	11.3	10.9	12	11.6	11.8	12.3	12.2	12.2
25-29	10.2	9.3	9.8	8.9	11.1	9.9	7.3	8.9	8.1	9	9.7	9.3
30-34	4.2	6.2	5.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.8	5.4	4.6	3.8	5	4.4
35-39	4	7.7	5.8	3.7	6.3	5	4.4	6.7	5.5	4	7	5.5
40-44	4.6	5.9	5.2	4.6	4.1	4.4	5.6	6.7	6.2	4.9	5.6	5.2
45-49	5.2	6.1	5.6	3.3	3.1	3.2	4.2	3.6	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.4
50-54	4.7	3	3.9	2.6	2.1	2.4	3.3	2.8	3.1	3.6	2.7	3.2
55-59	2.8	2.6	2.7	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.8	1	1.8	1.6	1.7
60-64	3.3	1	2.2	1.1	0.8	1	1.9	1	1.4	2.2	0.9	1.6
65-69	1	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.6
70-74	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4
75 +	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	4,365	4,015	8,380	3,432	3,265	6,697	3,211	3,101	6,312	11,008	10,381	21,389

Table A4.2: Summary Profile of Youth and Sample Households

	South Central			Somaliland			Puntland			Somalia		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Population below age 30 (%)	66.3	62.6	65.9	73.1	71.8	72.5	80	76.8	78.7	71.5	72.5	71.8
Youth as % of total population	43.7	45.3	43.9	43.5	43	43.3	40.9	37.2	39.4	42	40.4	41.5
Youth as % of population over age 30	59.8	58.4	59.7	64.2	62.9	63.6	68.9	63.2	66.6	63	62.3	62.8
Youth as % of population aged 15-64	56.5	54.8	56.3	60.9	60	60.5	66.3	59.7	63.8	59.8	59	59.6
Youth as % of population over age 15	52.7	50.2	52.5	59.6	58	58.9	65.4	58.3	62.6	57.2	56.7	57
Sex ratio	108	115	109	103	105	104	106	105	105	106	106	106
Dependency ratio	44	35	43	54	54	54	76	84	79	54	62	55
Average household size	7.1	6.4	7	6.1	5.9	6	6.2	5.9	6.1	6.6	5.9	6.4
Female-headed households (%)	13.6	9.8	13.2	28.8	30.3	29.5	30.3	30.8	30.5	22.2	27.8	24
Married youth (%)	22.5	26.6	22.9	18.8	20.7	19.6	32.5	32.9	32.6	24.1	26.3	24.8
Male	19.3	24.6	19.8	14.5	16.2	15.2	26.6	25.4	26.1	20	21	20.3
Female	26.3	28.7	26.6	23.1	25.5	24.1	38.6	40.7	39.4	28.7	31.9	29.7
% Households with												
Owned house	63.9	76.9	65.4	75.7	81.6	78.4	61.3	65.7	63.1	66.1	74.3	68.7
Piped water	60.8	39.2	58.3	35.8	8.8	23.5	39	19.6	30.9	48.3	17.4	38.4
Electricity for lighting	54.8	36.4	52.6	44.6	15.3	31.3	68.8	20.4	48.8	56.2	20.3	44.6
Radio	88.1	86	87.8	80.9	70.1	76	89.8	73.6	83.1	86.7	73.7	82.6
Mobile phone	76.1	70.6	75.4	65.1	35.8	51.8	87.1	47.7	70.8	76.4	45.4	66.5
Telephone	13.8	2.8	12.5	18.4	5.6	12.6	33.9	14.3	25.8	20.6	8.9	16.9
Television	30.7	16.1	29	37.7	8.4	24.4	39.6	8.6	26.8	35	9.5	26.8
Per capita annual expenditures and composition												
Per capita expenditures (US\$/year)	352	418	360	374	315	344	424	500	456	373	416	385
Std deviation	276	804	377	495	493	495	679	901	781	439	759	551
Food share in total expenditures (%)	66.1	69.4	66.5	63.2	67.2	65.1	80.4	86.6	83.2	69.6	78.0	72.0
Khat and tobacco (%)	7.7	8.1	7.8	11.1	8.7	10.0	6.8	2.6	4.9	7.9	5.3	7.1
Other non-food (%)	26.1	22.6	25.7	25.7	24.1	24.9	12.9	10.8	11.9	22.6	16.7	20.8

Note: The dependency ratio is the number of dependent people (comprising children below the age of 15 and adults above age 64) per 100 working age people (aged 15-64). The sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females.

Table A4.3: Importance Attached by Youth to Different Aspects of Life (% Reporting Very Important)

	Family	Friends	Education	Leisure Time	Politics	Work	Religion	Service to Others
Somaliland	97.0	57.9	82.4	46.1	43.0	87.2	92.8	52.0
Male	96.5	57.5	83.8	44.0	39.4	87.9	93.3	53.1
Female	97.4	58.2	81.1	48.1	46.4	86.5	92.3	50.9
Puntland	93.2	53.9	75.9	24.5	29.0	78.4	90.5	33.7
Male	94.3	57.4	78.3	27.0	33.8	81.7	92.4	35.4
Female	92.1	50.5	73.7	22.2	24.4	75.3	88.7	32.1
South Central	100.0	51.0	87.0	17.0	18.0	92.0	97.0	29.0
Male	99.0	53.0	86.0	17.0	19.0	92.0	96.0	28.0
Female	100.0	47.0	88.0	18.0	17.0	93.0	97.0	31.0
Somalia	96.6	54.1	81.8	28.6	29.5	86.2	93.4	37.9
Male	97.1	55.6	83.1	27.5	29.1	87.7	94.3	37.5
Female	96.2	52.3	80.3	29.9	30.0	84.4	92.3	38.2

Table A4.4: Youth Awareness of Their Rights (%)

	Right to Education	Right to Decent Work	Right to Participation in Organizations	Right to Political Participation	Equal Rights of Young Men and Women	Freedom of Expression
Somaliland	62.05	42.22	43.74	39.66	36.24	48.39
Male	65.38	43.5	46.5	42.9	36.3	52.1
Female	58.8	41.0	41.0	36.5	36.1	44.8
Puntland	82.84	73.2	63.0	50.4	51.3	61.6
Male	86.5	75.3	62.7	51.5	49.6	63.3
Female	79.39	71.3	63.3	49.3	52.9	60.0
South Central	97.92	95.25	87.17	80.0	78.83	89.67
Male	97.61	95.7	87.6	80.1	78.3	90.4
Female	98.44	94.4	86.4	79.9	79.7	88.4
Somalia	81.7	71.4	65.6	57.6	56.4	67.5
Male	85.04	74.6	68.5	61.0	57.8	71.4
Female	77.79	67.5	62.3	53.8	54.9	63.0

Table A4.5: Youth Using Media (%)

	Radio	Television	Newspaper	Internet	Friends, Relatives
Somaliland	69.4	31.8	21.7	24.6	38.6
Male	68.7	33.7	24.6	26.5	40.2
Female	70.0	30.0	18.9	22.7	37.1
Puntland	75.0	42.0	23.8	25.0	44.4
Male	76.0	45.0	26.6	27.4	46.4
Female	75.0	39.0	21.1	22.8	42.5
South Central	94.3	41.3	25.0	40.8	86.6
Male	93.8	40.6	26.1	42.2	86.7
Female	95.3	42.6	23.2	38.6	86.4
Somalia	80.2	38.4	23.6	30.6	57.7
Male	81.1	39.8	25.8	33.3	61.5
Female	79.1	36.8	21.0	27.3	53.4

Table A4.6: Youth Reporting Frequency of Information Use (%)

	% Using Media	Regularly	Occasionally	Rarely	Total
Somaliland					
Radio	69.4	67.9	26.6	5.5	100
Television	31.8	60.9	28.3	10.9	100
Newspaper	97.5	53.5	23.6	22.9	100
Internet	96.5	45.7	29.5	24.8	100
Informal sources	99.3	76.2	16.4	7.4	100
Puntland					
Radio	75.0	60.3	28.6	11.1	100
Television	42.0	29.6	51.5	19.0	100
Newspaper	24.0	18.3	38.5	43.3	100
Internet	25.0	51.9	33.5	14.7	100
Informal sources	44.0	41.8	46.0	12.3	100
South Central					
Radio	94.3	81.6	14.3	4.1	100
Television	41.3	56.0	25.8	18.1	100
Newspaper	96.8	14.1	29.3	56.5	100
Internet	99.2	23.3	57.3	19.4	100
Informal sources	100.0	45.9	51.1	3.1	100
Somalia					
Radio	80.2	71.4	22.0	6.6	100
Television	38.4	47.9	35.6	16.6	100
Newspaper	21.4	24.0	31.5	44.5	100
Internet	27.0	35.2	46.0	18.8	100
Informal sources	57.7	51.1	42.7	6.3	100

Table A4.7: Literacy Status by Age Group (%)

	6 Years and Above	Child (6-13)	Youth (14-29)	Adult (15 +)
South Central	38.0	49.8	52.8	32.4
Male	41.5	51.3	56.4	36.5
Female	34.2	48.3	48.5	28.0
Urban	39.8	51.3	55.1	34.1
Rural	24.1	36.1	34.6	19.3
Somaliland	29.0	33.9	39.8	26.0
Male	33.3	36.4	45.1	31.2
Female	24.5	31.1	34.3	20.7
Urban	33.9	38.9	46.5	30.6
Rural	22.9	28.2	31.2	20.2
Puntland	38.7	41.3	50.8	35.9
Male	41.3	40.8	55.7	39.8
Female	36.0	41.8	45.6	31.9
Urban	48.3	53.5	61.4	44.3
Rural	24.4	23.6	33.2	22.8
Somalia	35.5	42.3	48.3	31.4
Male	39.0	43.2	52.9	35.8
Female	31.8	41.3	43.2	26.9
Urban	40.5	49.2	54.7	35.7
Rural	23.7	26.9	32.5	21.0

Table A4.8: Educational Attainment of People Aged 15 Years and Above (%)

	None	Koranic	Primary	Secondary+	Total
South Central	48.7	18.8	13.9	18.5	100
Male	45.7	17.8	14.9	21.6	100
Female	52.0	20.0	12.8	15.2	100
Urban	46.8	19.0	14.5	19.6	100
Rural	63.4	17.3	9.5	9.8	100
Somaliland	22.6	51.4	17.6	8.3	100
Male	21.3	47.5	20.2	11.0	100
Female	23.9	55.4	15.1	5.6	100
Urban	18.7	50.7	19.2	11.4	100
Rural	27.5	52.3	15.7	4.5	100
Puntland	42.8	21.3	16.4	19.5	100
Male	41.2	19.0	16.9	22.9	100
Female	44.5	23.6	15.9	16.0	100
Urban	41.3	14.4	17.4	27.0	100
Rural	45.2	32.0	14.9	7.8	100
Somalia	39.3	29.3	15.7	15.7	100
Male	37.3	26.9	17.0	18.8	100
Female	41.3	31.8	14.4	12.5	100
Urban	39.0	25.4	16.2	19.4	100
Rural	40.0	39.0	14.4	6.6	100

Table A4.9: Educational Attainment of People Aged 14-29 Years (%)

	None	Koranic	Primary	Secondary +	Total
South Central	30.2	17.0	27.2	25.5	100
Male	27.8	15.8	28.4	28.1	100
Female	33.1	18.5	25.8	22.6	100
Urban	28.3	16.6	28.3	26.7	100
Rural	45.3	20.1	18.4	16.2	100
Somaliland	17.9	42.3	29.0	10.8	100
Male	17.3	37.7	31.6	13.4	100
Female	18.6	47.2	26.2	8.0	100
Urban	13.7	39.8	32.1	14.4	100
Rural	23.3	45.5	25	6.2	100
Puntland	31.5	17.8	26.1	24.7	100
Male	27.9	16.4	28.0	27.7	100
Female	35.2	19.2	24.1	21.6	100
Urban	27.8	10.8	27.4	34	100
Rural	37.6	29.3	23.8	9.3	100
Somalia	26.9	24.9	27.4	20.9	100
Male	24.7	22.4	29.2	23.6	100
Female	29.2	27.6	25.4	17.8	100
Urban	24.7	20.6	29.0	25.7	100
Rural	32.2	35.3	23.5	9.0	100

Table A4.10: Reasons for Not Attending School Among People Aged 6-29 Years (%)

	Puntland			Somaliland			South central			Somalia		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
School very far	25.9	20.6	23.2	15.2	14.1	14.6	7.5	7.7	7.6	13.4	10.7	12.0
Work at home	12.1	26.7	19.7	14.8	25.0	20.0	10.1	29.1	19.5	10.8	32.1	21.7
Cannot afford	36.6	35.2	35.9	46.6	43.8	45.2	35.3	28	31.6	39.9	32.4	36.0
Poor health	2.3	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.6	1.9	2.2
Not useful	3.3	1.3	2.3	4.5	2.9	3.7	29.1	20.2	24.7	21.1	13.6	17.2
Underage	12.6	11.0	11.7	12.1	10.5	11.3	7.9	7.2	7.5	5.4	4.7	5.0
Others	7.2	3.5	5.3	4.5	1.5	3.0	7.8	5.7	6.8	6.9	4.8	5.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A4.11: Youth With Vocational Training (%)

	Male	Female	Both Sexes
South Central	7.2	2.7	5.1
Somaliland	9.2	6.2	7.7
Puntland	13.8	7.4	10.7
Somalia	9.9	9.9	7.6

Table A4.12: Youth Knowledge About Family Planning and HIV and AIDS (%)

	Family Planning	HIV and AIDS Awareness	Availability of Cure for HIV and AIDS	Is HIV Transmittable	Awareness of Protection Against HIV and AIDS
Somaliland	40.7	79.9	18.5	75.0	69.3
Male	39.4	79.0	20.2	73.8	69.4
Female	41.9	80.7	16.9	76.0	69.1
Puntland	41.7	82.8	15.6	75.1	64.5
Male	39.7	83.3	16.9	74.9	64.4
Female	43.5	82.4	14.3	75.3	64.5
South Central	75.7	98.8	8.8	95.6	69.2
Male	74.3	98.7	8.4	96.0	67.2
Female	77.9	99.1	9.4	94.9	72.5
Somalia	53.6	87.7	14.1	82.4	67.7
Male	54.1	88.5	14.3	83.4	67.0
Female	53.0	86.7	13.8	81.2	68.4

Table A4.13: Khat Consumption Pattern Among Youth Respondents by Region

	% Chewing Khat	Frequency of Use Per Week	Average Expense (US\$/Day)
Somaliland	11.7	4.0	8.06
Male	15.0	4.8	8.80
Female	8.4	3.0	6.40
Puntland	7.17	3.6	11.34
Male	10.86	3.8	11.49
Female	3.64	3.0	10.97
South Central	6.0	4.1	5.76
Male	8.24	4.5	5.88
Female	2.23	3.0	5.11
Somalia	8.18	3.5	8.31
Male	10.97	4.4	8.65
Female	4.9	3.0	7.45

Table A4.14: Youth Perception on Decision-making Processes in the Family (%)

	Expenditures	Education and Health	Economic Choices	Political Choices	Marital Decisions	Religious
Somaliland	12.5	16.6	18.7	17.1	19.4	20.1
Male head	70.2	63	60.3	63.8	61.8	60.2
Female head	13.9	17	17.6	14.2	14.1	13.9
Puntland	23.7	34.4	29.8	20.3	31.7	27
Male head	47.4	36.7	41	47.1	34.8	38.8
Female head	16.8	15.3	14.9	13	14.4	13.9
South Central	12.4	6.7	11.3	6.7	12.7	6.4
Male head	59.1	64.5	60.3	65.8	54.9	65.5
Female head	13.8	14.6	13.9	12.8	13.3	12.6
Somalia	16.1	18.8	19.6	14.4	20.9	17.4
Male head	58.8	55	54.1	59.1	50.6	55.2
Female head	14.8	15.6	15.4	13.3	13.9	13.5

Table A4.15: Extent to Which Youth Respondents Make Decisions at the Household Level (%)

	To a Very High Degree	To a Fairly High Degree	To a Small Degree	Not at All	Mean Score
Somaliland					
Education and health	25.9	18.7	15.3	40.1	2.31
Economic choices	23.8	18.8	14.7	42.7	2.24
Political choices	20.8	12.8	12.2	54.2	2.09
Marital decisions	25.1	18.4	14.6	41.9	2.27
Puntland					
Education and health	18.6	27.4	24.8	29.2	2.31
Economic choices	16.9	29.3	21.1	32.7	2.24
Political choices	18.5	25.8	22	33.7	2.00
Marital decisions	18.8	25.3	17.1	38.8	2.27
South Central					
Education and health	25.9	18.7	15.3	40.1	2.30
Economic choices	23.8	18.8	14.7	42.7	2.24
Political choices	20.8	12.8	12.2	54.2	2.00
Marital decisions	25.1	18.4	14.6	41.9	2.27
Somalia					
Education and health	23.5	21.5	18.4	36.6	2.3
Economic choices	21.6	22.2	16.8	39.5	2.3
Political choices	20.0	17.0	15.4	47.6	2.1
Marital decisions	23.0	20.6	15.4	40.9	2.3

Table A4.16: Employment Status of Sample Population Aged 15-64 Years (%)

	Active Population	Inactive Population	Employed	Unemployed
South Central	59.41	40.59	52.54	47.46
Male	57.20	42.80	72.42	27.58
Female	61.81	38.19	32.64	67.36
Urban	59.55	40.45	53.10	46.90
Rural	58.40	41.60	48.09	51.91
Somaliland	70.27	29.73	29.62	70.38
Male	76.41	23.59	36.26	63.74
Female	64.17	35.83	21.79	78.21
Urban	68.33	31.67	32.07	67.93
Rural	72.70	27.30	26.72	73.28
Puntland	83.95	16.05	52.97	47.03
Male	85.56	14.44	61.60	38.40
Female	82.31	17.69	43.84	56.16
Urban	83.16	16.84	45.82	54.18
Rural	85.19	14.81	63.93	36.07
Somalia	69.36	30.64	45.74	54.26
Male	70.50	29.50	57.40	42.60
Female	68.18	31.82	33.24	66.76
Urban	67.13	32.87	45.98	54.02
Rural	74.87	25.13	45.20	54.80

Note: The employment/unemployment rate refers to employed/unemployed persons aged 15-64 as a percent of the economically active population belonging to the same age bracket.

Table A4.17: Employment Status of Youth Population Aged 14-29 Years (%)

	Active Youth Population	Inactive Youth Population	Employed	Unemployed
South Central	42.68	68.61	45.60	54.40
Male	42.59	68.75	53.41	46.59
Female	42.77	68.45	36.42	63.58
Urban	43.03	68.18	45.21	54.79
Rural	39.84	72.09	48.98	51.02
Somaliland	73.58	36.49	15.76	84.24
Male	76.23	33.99	19.96	80.04
Female	70.84	39.07	11.10	88.90
Urban	70.11	39.73	18.24	81.76
Rural	78.00	32.36	12.93	87.07
Puntland	89.02	21.66	37.98	62.02
Male	91.25	19.88	44.12	55.88
Female	86.72	23.49	31.31	68.69
Urban	86.61	21.83	29.55	70.45
Rural	93.23	21.35	51.60	48.40
Somalia	65.60	45.14	32.41	67.59
Male	66.39	44.57	38.41	61.59
Female	64.74	45.77	25.71	74.29
Urban	60.79	49.38	32.01	67.99
Rural	77.65	34.53	33.20	66.80

Note: The employment/unemployment rate refers to employed/unemployed youth as a percent of the economically active youth population.

Table A4.18: Employment Status of Youth Respondents

	Self-employed (%)	Paid Employee (%)	Unpaid Family Worker (%)	Unemployed (%)	Active Youth (%)	Inactive Youth (%)	Total Sample (N)
Somaliland	21.4	10.2	27.2	41.2	63.4	36.6	1054
Male	25.2	9.5	22.6	42.6	58.7	41.3	520
Female	18.2	10.7	31.1	39.9	68.0	32.0	534
Puntland	32.3	16.3	20.2	31.1	77.3	22.7	1084
Male	38.7	19.8	12.2	29.3	74.7	25.3	526
Female	26.7	13.3	27.2	32.8	79.7	20.3	558
South Central	25.4	30.1	23.6	20.9	55.4	44.6	1200
Male	30.8	32.5	15.5	21.2	54.0	46.0	752
Female	17.0	26.3	36.3	20.5	57.8	42.2	448
Somalia	26.9	18.7	23.4	31.1	65.0	35.0	3338
Male	32.1	21.6	16.3	30.0	61.4	38.6	1798
Female	21.5	15.6	30.7	32.2	69.3	30.7	1540

Table A4.19: Reasons for Being Unemployed (%)

	Lack Experience	Low Pay	Lack Access to Credit	Lack of Equal Job Opportunities	Lack of Jobs	Lack of Skills
Somaliland	16.8	16.6	7.0	16.6	13.8	14.7
Male	16.5	16.3	6.0	14.0	13.2	12.6
Female	17.2	17.0	8.0	19.2	14.5	16.8
Puntland	14.7	6.4	6.0	10.0	21.4	16.7
Male	12.7	7.6	6.0	10.5	19.4	13.7
Female	16.4	5.4	5.9	9.7	23.1	19.4
South Central	30.0	39.9	16.0	36.5	37.6	26.4
Male	27.4	35.0	15.5	27.1	32.5	24.9
Female	33.9	47.1	16.7	50.2	44.9	28.6
Somalia	19.5	19.3	8.9	19.6	22.1	18.3
Male	18.6	19.3	8.8	16.8	20.5	16.5
Female	20.4	19.3	9.1	22.4	23.8	20.1

Table A4.20: Reasons for Looking for a Different Job (%)

	Low Pay	Want Full Time Job	Lack of Work Satisfaction	Low Business Returns	Low Farm Returns	Total
Somaliland	74.3	12.9	6.2	3.8	2.9	100
Male	80.0	8.0	8.0	3.0	1.0	100
Female	69.1	17.3	4.5	4.5	4.5	100
Puntland	62.3	16.6	10.8	7.6	2.7	100
Male	66.7	14.2	11.7	3.3	4.2	100
Female	57.3	19.4	9.7	12.6	1.0	100
South Central	72.9	9.3	8.1	8.1	1.6	100
Male	70.1	9.8	9.2	8.6	2.3	100
Female	78.6	8.3	6.0	7.1	0.0	100
Somalia	69.9	12.7	8.4	6.7	2.3	100
Male	71.6	10.7	9.6	5.6	2.5	100
Female	67.7	15.5	6.7	8.1	2.0	100

Table A4.21: Youth Willingness to Migrate by Reason (%)

	Reasons for Joining the Diaspora (%)						Total
	% Willing to Migrate	Get a Well-paying job	Get Better Educational Opportunities	Join Family Members Living Abroad	Work and Invest Abroad	To Escape From Conflict	
Somaliland	64.7	92.8	6.5	0.6	0.1	0	100
Male	63.3	91.5	7.1	1.1	0.3	0	100
Female	66.1	94.0	6.0	0	0	0	100
Puntland	43.5	47.7	35.7	9.7	5.8	1.1	100
Male	46.4	45.5	38.4	9.9	5.4	0.8	100
Female	40.9	50.2	32.7	9.4	6.3	1.3	100
South Central	86.8	50.0	17	2.8	1.6	28.5	100
Male	86.8	48.1	16	2.6	2	31.3	100
Female	86.8	53.4	18.6	3.1	1	23.8	100
Somalia	65.8	63.5	17.5	3.5	2	13.5	100
Male	68.2	59.9	17.8	3.6	2.2	16.5	100
Female	63	68.1	17	3.4	1.8	9.7	100

Table A4.22: Youth Perceptions on the Contributions of the Diaspora (%)

	Somaliland			Puntland			South Central			Somalia		
	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both
Positive Impacts												
Improved education	67.9	68.4	68.1	60.5	58.4	59.4	66.2	70.1	67.7	65.0	65.3	65.1
Improved health institutions	63.5	59.2	61.3	58.2	57.7	57.9	37.5	44.2	40.0	51.1	54.3	52.5
Promotion of trade	38.8	38.6	38.7	32.1	30.3	31.2	33.4	26.6	30.8	34.6	32.1	33.4
Scholarships for community	35.2	34.6	34.9	28.9	24.6	26.7	17.2	21.7	18.8	25.8	27.2	26.5
Promotion of peace	27.9	33.0	30.5	28.9	28.7	28.8	16.5	25.2	19.8	23.4	29.2	26.1
Communication and transport	26.3	28.1	27.2	14.4	15.8	15.1	15.6	17.4	16.3	18.4	20.5	19.4
Negative Impacts												
Diaspora funds diverted to militia	15.2	15.7	15.2	40.3	40.2	40.1	83.2	81.7	82.6	46.9	41.5	44.7
Cultural distortion	38.5	42.1	40.3	53.6	49.1	51.3	78.6	74.3	77.0	59.7	54.0	57.1
High consumption of <i>khat</i>	37.3	41.4	39.4	37.6	36.4	37.0	37.2	35.9	36.8	37.4	38.0	37.7

Table A4.23: Youth Membership in Various Voluntary Organizations (%)

	Youth Group	Women's Group	Religious Group	Peace and Reconciliation Group	Local Council	Entertainment Group	Economic Group	NGO/ Welfare Group	Ethnic-based Group
Somaliland	15.7	3.7	3.2	2.1	1.3	1.4	1.1	2.2	0.4
Male	16.7	2.1	3.8	2.5	1.3	1.7	1.3	2.3	0.6
Female	14.6	5.2	2.6	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.9	2.1	0.2
Puntland	19.4	10	3.8	5.2	1.2	6	1.2	6.5	0.6
Male	23.6	6.3	4.9	5.7	1.3	9.7	1	5.9	0.2
Female	15.4	13.4	2.7	4.7	1.1	2.5	1.4	7.2	0.9
South Central	22.3	15.6	16.1	3.1	8.2	29.8	5.8	3.6	6.5
Male	25.7	6	16.5	2.1	7.7	37.9	5.3	3.1	5.7
Female	16.5	31.7	15.4	4.7	8.9	16.3	6.7	4.5	7.8
Somalia	19.2	10	8	3.4	3.5	13.1	2.8	4.1	2.6
Male	22.5	4.9	9.5	3.3	3.6	19.2	2.9	3.7	2.6
Female	15.5	15.9	6.4	3.6	3.3	6	2.8	4.6	2.7

Table A4.24: Youth Degree of Participation in Youth Organizations

	Negligible (%)	Low (%)	Moderate (%)	High (%)	Very High (%)	Total Cases	Mean Score
Somaliland	20.6	16.9	22.4	22.4	17.5	165	2.99
Male	14.9	17.2	25.3	20.7	21.8	87	3.17
Female	26.9	16.6	19.2	24.4	12.8	78	2.79
Puntland	13.8	19.5	46.2	20.0	0.5	210	2.74
Male	13.7	16.9	45.9	23.4	0.00	124	2.79
Female	13.9	23.2	46.5	15.1	1.5	86	2.66
South Central	1.3	14.3	41.7	30.9	11.6	267	3.38
Male	1.2	15.9	42.0	29.9	10.8	193	3.34
Female	2.4	9.7	40.6	33.9	13.3	74	3.46
Somalia	10.4	16.7	38.2	25.3	9.5	641	3.07
Male	7.9	16.5	39.5	25.9	9.8	405	3.13
Female	14.6	16.7	35.6	23.8	8.8	239	2.95

Table A4.25: Barriers to Youth Participation in Voluntary Organizations (%)

	Reporting Barriers		Poverty	Occupation	Lack of Education	Gender	Age Limit	Political Affiliation	Clan Affiliation
	%	No.	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Somaliland	18	190	8.7	5.5	9.8	1.3	1.6	0.6	0.7
Male	15.8	82	6.7	4.4	8.3	1.0	1.5	0.2	0.8
Female	20.2	108	10.7	6.6	11.2	1.7	1.7	0.9	0.6
Puntland	23.3	253	9.7	2.4	14.3	9.1	6.5	4.2	6.1
Male	24.7	130	10.6	3.6	15.4	7.6	8.4	4.6	7.2
Female	22	123	8.8	1.3	13.3	10.6	4.8	3.9	5.5
South Central	64.3	771	32.6	27.9	29.9	29.1	19.3	31.5	51.3
Male	61.2	460	30.9	26.3	28.1	15.3	17.6	30.2	51.3
Female	69.4	311	35.5	30.6	33	52.2	22.1	33.7	51.1
Somalia	36.4	1,215	17.6	12.6	18.5	13.8	9.6	12.9	20.6
Male	37.4	672	18.0	13.3	18.6	8.9	10.2	14.0	23.8
Female	35.2	542	17.2	11.6	18.3	19.6	8.8	11.6	16.9

Table A4.26: Youth Participation in Politics and Desire to be Involved in the Political Process

	Intended Degree of Involvement (%)							Total
	% Reporting Yes	Much More	A Little More	Neither More Nor Less	A Little Less	Much Less	Not Stated	
Somaliland	12.1	30	20	10	20	0	20	100
Male	13.5	40	10	10	20		20	100
Female	10.9	30	20	10	20	0	20	100
Puntland	35.7	11.1	20.8	14.4	11.5	32.7	9.5	100
Male	35.7	11.4	20.2	13.3	11.6	34.2	9.3	100
Female	35.7	10.8	21.3	15.4	11.5	31.4	9.7	100
South Central	8.4	9.9	24.2	35.8	2.7	26.3	1.3	100
Male	8.8	10.8	27.5	32.8	2.8	24.7	1.3	100
Female	7.8	8.5	18.5	40.6	2.5	28.8	1.1	100
Somalia	18.5	18	20.5	20.1	11	20.1	10.2	100
Male	18	18.7	21.7	20.2	9.6	20.4	9.5	100
Female	19	17.2	19.1	20.1	12.7	19.9	11.1	100

Table A4.27: Youth Perception of Trends in Conflict (%)

	Male			Female			Both		
	Increase	Same as Before	Decrease	Increase	Same as Before	Decrease	Increase	Same as Before	Decreased
Political power conflict									
Somaliland	7.8	58.3	33.9	13.7	62.7	23.5	10.6	60.4	29.0
Puntland	47.8	36.6	15.5	46.7	36.5	16.8	47.3	36.6	16.2
South Central	75.5	22.5	2.0	71.5	27.3	1.2	74.0	24.3	1.7
Somalia	61.7	29.7	8.6	55.8	35.0	9.2	59.2	31.9	8.9
Sexual violence against women									
Somaliland	6.7	51.7	41.7	10.0	58.0	32.0	8.2	54.5	37.3
Puntland	21.8	45.8	32.4	30.6	39.3	30.1	26.1	42.6	31.3
South Central	63.8	25.1	11.1	52.8	35.5	11.7	29.1	11.3	100.0
Somalia	45.9	33.7	20.4	38.8	40.5	20.7	42.9	36.6	20.5
Resource conflict									
Somaliland	8.1	56.6	35.4	11.8	56.4	31.8	10.0	56.5	33.5
Puntland	25.1	49.7	25.1	26.7	51.2	22.1	25.9	50.4	23.6
South Central	62.8	31.2	6.0	57.6	37.3	5.1	60.9	33.5	5.7
Somalia	47.9	38.3	13.8	40.3	44.8	14.9	44.7	41.1	14.3
Family violence									
Somaliland	8.4	50.4	41.2	12.0	53.0	35.0	10.1	51.6	38.3
Puntland	21.7	42.8	35.6	24.3	44.1	31.7	23.0	43.5	33.5
South Central	66.0	29.2	4.8	61.2	35.9	2.9	64.2	31.7	4.1
Somalia	47.2	35.5	17.3	40.3	41.7	18.1	44.2	38.2	17.6

Table A4.28: Youth Experience of Violence in the Last Year (%)

	Physical Attack	Property Crime	Forced Detention	Sexual Violence/ Rape	Kidnapping/ Abduction
South Central					
Experience of violence (%)	26.80	7.10	16.20	5.30	2.20
Male	28.20	7.00	16.50	4.70	1.70
Female	24.30	7.10	15.60	6.30	2.90
Frequency of violence attack (number)	1.50	2.40	1.80	1.20	1.10
Male	1.50	2.50	1.80	1.30	1.20
Female	1.60	2.20	1.90	1.20	1.00
Reporting to authority (%)	11.80	3.30	6.80	1.90	1.20
Male	12.60	3.10	7.20	1.50	0.70
Female	10.50	3.80	6.00	2.70	2.00
Somaliland					
Experience of violence (%)	6.90	2.90	1.50	3.20	1.60
Male	7.50	2.90	2.10	3.50	2.10
Female	6.40	3.00	0.90	3.00	1.10
Frequency of violence attack (number)	2.10	2.20	2.60	2.60	2.80
Male	2.30	1.70	2.20	2.30	2.40
Female	1.80	2.60	3.60	3.20	3.30
Reporting to authority (%)	3.80	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
Male	5.20	2.10	1.30	1.50	2.10
Female	2.40	1.90	0.70	0.60	1.90
Puntland					
Experience of violence (%)	37.60	21.10	5.90	13.30	7.80
Male	38.20	21.10	5.70	13.10	9.30
Female	37.10	21.10	6.10	13.40	6.50
Frequency of violence attack (number)	2.50	2.30	2.40	1.80	2.10
Male	2.50	2.20	2.40	1.80	2.10
Female	2.40	2.30	2.40	1.80	2.10
Reporting to authority (%)	20.70	10.80	2.70	7.90	3.20
Male	21.90	11.20	2.50	8.20	3.80
Female	19.50	10.40	2.90	7.70	2.70
Somalia					
Experience of violence (%)	24.00	10.30	8.20	7.20	3.80
Male	25.10	10.00	9.20	6.80	4.10
Female	23.70	10.80	7.10	7.86	3.60
Frequency of violence attack (number)	2.10	2.30	2.00	1.90	2.00
Male	2.00	2.30	1.90	1.70	2.00
Female	2.40	2.50	2.20	2.30	2.00
Reporting to authority (%)	12.20	5.30	3.60	3.90	1.80
Male	13.20	5.20	4.10	3.60	1.80
Female	11.00	5.50	3.10	4.20	1.80

Table A4.29: Youth Perception of the Level of Trust in Existing Justice Systems (%)

	Very Low	Low	High	Very High	Total
Somaliland					
Community elders	27.9	23.0	13.1	36.1	100
Religious leaders	28.6	14.3	9.5	47.6	100
Council of elders	21.4	28.6	7.1	42.9	100
Judicial courts	48.6	28.6	8.6	14.3	100
Police	38.6	20.5	11.4	29.5	100
Puntland					
Community elders	32.6	41.3	21.7	4.3	100
Religious leaders	37.9	41.4	17.2	3.4	100
Council of elders	44.4	44.4	11.1	0.0	100
Judicial courts	43.8	47.9	4.2	4.2	100
Police	41.5	53.8	1.5	3.1	100
South central					
Community elders	12.1	75.8	8.1	4.0	100
Religious leaders	29.3	56.1	12.2	2.4	100
Council of elders	46.7	40.0	0.0	13.3	100
Judicial courts	0.0	66.7	0.0	33.3	100
Police	39.1	56.5	2.9	1.4	100
Somalia					
Community elders	21.4	52.4	12.6	13.6	100
Religious leaders	31.9	41.8	13.2	13.2	100
Council of elders	38.3	38.3	6.4	17.0	100
Judicial courts	44.2	40.7	5.8	9.3	100
Police	39.9	46.6	4.5	9.0	100

Table A4.30: Perception of Discrimination in Accessing Justice for Youth (%)

	Much Better	A Little Better	Same as Before	A Little Worse	Much Worse	Total
Somaliland	13.0	13.9	65.4	4.7	3.0	100
Male	13.5	12.7	65.1	5.6	3.1	100
Female	12.6	15.0	65.8	3.8	2.8	100
Puntland	15.0	27.1	35.4	9.4	13.1	100
Male	16.2	24.9	36.3	9.8	12.8	100
Female	13.7	29.3	34.6	9.1	13.3	100
South Central	3.3	15.2	41.9	12.3	27.3	100
Male	4.3	16.2	38.6	13.3	27.6	100
Female	1.6	13.2	47.6	10.7	26.9	100
Somalia	9.9	18.1	48.0	8.9	15.1	100
Male	17.9	30.6	5.2	17.6	28.7	100
Female	9.5	19.0	50.3	7.6	13.6	100

Table A4.31: Youth Opinions on Various Issues (Mean Score)

	Somaliland	Puntland	South Central	Somalia
Youth exclusions				
Youth suffer more exclusion than other groups.	3.51	3.42	4.71	3.92
There is much discontent/grievance among youth due to unemployment.	3.35	3.75	4.47	3.89
Education and skills do not match employment opportunities.	4.10	4.02	4.17	4.10
There is no outlet for youth participation in peace and development.	3.99	3.82	4.24	4.03
<i>Khat</i> consumption has adverse impacts on youth potentials.	4.33	3.86	4.16	4.12
Youth are both victims and sources of violent conflict.	3.30	3.72	4.49	3.87
Motives and coping strategies				
There are financial rewards for youth engagement in violence.	2.19	3.75	4.43	3.50
Youth are forced to engage in violence for their protection.	2.47	4.16	4.40	3.70
Youth are lured to leave the country for better opportunities.	3.93	3.87	4.42	4.09
Family issues				
Parents' duty is to support their children at the cost of their own well-being.	3.00	3.47	4.26	3.61
Mentoring of youth by parents has not been adequate.	3.18	3.31	4.09	3.56
Gender issues				
Young women suffer more discrimination than young men.	3.00	3.44	4.05	3.52
Young women are excluded from youth organizations.	3.08	3.75	4.08	3.65
Men should be breadwinners and women should take care of household chores.	3.87	3.26	4.32	3.85
A woman who does the same job as a man should be paid equally.	4.11	3.41	4.35	3.98
When there is job scarcity employers should prefer women to men.	3.36	3.27	4.09	3.61
Some jobs can be performed better by women than men.	3.28	3.27	4.24	3.63

Table A4.32: Youth Experiences of Obstacles in Life (%)

	Somaliland			Puntland			South Central			Somalia		
	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both
Limited education and skills	50.0	55.9	53.0	61	62.9	62	68.5	69.6	68.9	40.1	38.3	39.3
Poor group solidarity and social cohesion	31.7	34.7	33.2	34.8	33.3	34	49.9	49.8	49.9	60.8	62	61.4
Gender discrimination	50.0	55.9	53.0	61	62.9	62	68.5	69.6	68.9	40.1	38.3	39.3
Age discrimination	31.7	34.7	33.2	34.8	33.3	34	49.9	49.8	49.9	22.1	30.4	25.9
Lack of access to information	19.1	20.9	20.0	30	29.2	29.6	18.8	43.8	28.1	24.2	25.3	24.7
Lack of employment opportunities	18.1	21.3	19.7	35.7	33.9	34.8	20.5	19.9	20.3	40.4	40.8	40.6
Lack of participation in decision-making	29.0	35.1	32.0	43.3	42.3	42.8	46.4	46.9	46.6	48.2	44.9	46.7
Domestic violence	23.9	28.0	26.0	44.1	44.3	44.2	68.1	66.7	67.6	34.1	30.8	32.6
Lawlessness	17.5	18.0	17.8	29.7	28	28.8	48.8	50	49.2	45.4	39.5	42.7

Table A4.33: Youth Opinions on the Causes of Frustration in Somalia

	Strongly Agree (%)	Moderately Agree (%)	Undecided (%)	Moderately Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Mean Score
Inadequate understanding of parents	53.5	16.8	8.0	6.3	15.4	3.80
Inability of families to offer support	48	30.8	8.8	6.4	6.0	4.01
Inability of authorities to offer justice	39.6	34.6	11.2	5.9	8.6	3.84
Feelings of humiliation	34	31.8	11.8	7.8	14.6	3.55
Drug abuse	45.1	25.8	14.9	6.4	7.8	3.87
No outlet to express needs, aspiration	52	28.3	10.5	4.4	4.8	4.12
Lack of employment opportunities	62.6	24.7	6.6	3.1	2.9	4.35
Lack of suitable skills training programmes	51.1	35.2	7.8	3.1	2.9	4.22
Lack of economic support programmes	49.9	33.1	9.9	3.4	3.7	4.16
Inadequate recreational facilities	42.6	33.9	11.9	5.7	6.0	3.94
Poor governance	51.4	23.8	9.3	5.9	9.7	3.95
Lack of self-esteem	41.9	24.5	12.6	7.0	14.1	3.66
High cost of living	42.6	33.9	11.9	5.7	6.0	3.86
Greed motive for survival alternatives	48.7	21.6	11.9	8.7	9.0	3.84

Table A4.34: Youth Optimism About Future Prospects

	Very Optimistic (%)	Fairly Optimistic (%)	Indifferent (%)	Fairly Pessimistic (%)	Very Pessimistic (%)	Total Cases	Mean Score
Somaliland							
Male	64.5	22.2	5.2	3.7	4.4	518	4.369
Female	62.4	23.8	5.1	5.8	3.0	534	4.367
Total	63.4	23.0	5.1	4.8	3.7	1052	4.368
Puntland							
Male	41.3	37.8	7.5	7.7	5.8	482	3.675
Female	38.1	35.8	11.8	8.3	6.1	509	3.572
Total	39.7	36.7	9.7	8.0	6.0	991	3.622
South Central							
Male	58.6	22.8	10.2	5.8	2.6	736	4.198
Female	62.2	22.1	10.5	3.4	1.8	439	4.306
Total	59.9	22.6	10.3	4.9	2.3	1175	4.238
Somalia							
Male	55.5	26.8	7.9	5.7	4.0	1736	4.095
Female	54.0	27.4	9.0	5.9	3.7	1482	4.061
Total	54.8	27.1	8.4	5.8	3.9	3218	4.079



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