INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION
IN
UNITED STATES WAR PRODUCTION

A STUDY OF METHODS
AND PROCEDURE

MONTREAL
1948
The present study is the result of a suggestion made in 1944, by the Chairman of the United States War Manpower Commission in agreement with his Management-Labor Policy Committee, that the International Labour Office should prepare a comparable report to the study on *British Joint Production Machinery* which would deal with the United States' experience in obtaining active cooperation from management and labour in manpower mobilisation.¹

The British report had been one of a series of studies made by the Office concerning various aspects of wartime labour supply and production problems for the information of the tripartite meetings of Government officials, employers and workers of Canada and the United States, held under the auspices of the International Labour Office during 1942 and 1943. The present report was intended to form part of this series. The altered programme of work, and in particular the heavy printing schedule of the Office in the period following the end of the war has delayed publication of the study.

The material contained in it would seem to be of particular interest at this moment, in view of the fact that the International Labour Conference has under consideration the problems of freedom of association and the protection of the right to organise. The study does not deal with those subjects, but it deals with a related question, namely the participation of representatives of employers and workers in the mobilisation of manpower for maximum production. It should be noted, however, that no information is included on the work of the wartime agencies after the end of the war in Europe.

The Office wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the help given by many organisations and individuals in the United States to the author of this study, Carol Riegelman of the International Labour Office, through the opening up of official and private files, through personal interviews by Government officials, labour unions and management representatives, and through permission to attend committee meetings of all types, which made possible the collection of information and the comparative analysis requested.

¹ Cf. *British Joint Production Machinery*, Studies and Reports, Series A (Industrial Relations), No. 43, Montreal, 1944.
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This image appears to be a diagram illustrating various committees and advisory boards related to economic stabilization and mobilization efforts during a national crisis. The diagram is complex and includes various agencies and their relationships, such as:

- **Office of Price Administration**
- **Labor Policy Committee**
- **District Labor Committees**
- **Office of Economic Stabilization**
- **Regional Labor Committees**
- **Management-Labor Policy Committee**
- **Women's Advisory Committee**
- **Select Service Committee**
- **Regional Management-Labor Committees**
- **Area Management-Labor Committees**
- **Local Management-Labor Committees**
- **PLANT LABOR MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES**
- **WAR PRODUCTION BOARD**
- **Secretary of War**
- **Secretary of Commerce**
- **Secretary of Agriculture**
- **Chairman of the War Manpower Commission**

The diagram also shows how these various committees and agencies are interconnected, likely to show how decisions are made and how resources are allocated during a period of economic and industrial mobilization. The complexity of the diagram suggests a detailed and coordinated effort to manage and stabilize the economy during a time of national crisis.
INTRODUCTION

The contribution which representatives of labour and management could make to mobilising the nation's labour supply and production resources were drawn upon by the United States Government, under President Roosevelt's leadership, throughout the emergency and war period. This period may be divided into five major stages, each marked by different demands upon the nation's manpower and material resources. Consequently new policies and programmes were formulated at each stage in co-operation with representatives of organised labour and of management.

The first, or "defence period", was characterised by improvisation and the development of semi-independent emergency agencies under the authority first of the Council of National Defense and then of the Office of Production Management. The defence period lasted, roughly, from May 1940 until the entrance of the United States into the war and was marked by the enactment of the Selective Training and Service Act for the mobilisation of the armed services and the establishment of the National Defense Mediation Board for the prevention of industrial disputes.

The second stage of manpower and production organisation lasted from the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 to October 1942 and was characterised by initial mobilisation of a labour force which still seemed sufficiently plentiful to permit some wastage, or at least some leeway in the use of manpower resources. The need for war organisation led to the establishment of three new emergency agencies responsible for preserving industrial peace and mobilising material and human resources: the War Labor Board, the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission. In addition, in order to ensure labour participation at the top policy-making level, the President named, in February 1942, a Labor Victory Committee consisting of the leaders of the national trade union federations.

The third period began in the course of the autumn and winter of 1942 at the time that labour shortages became serious. The establishment, first of an Office of Economic Stabilization, and subsequently of an Office of War Mobilization, indicated realisation that total war would demand of the United States an organisation of manpower more closely approximating to the full mobilisation
of the civilian economy which had taken place earlier in many other parts of the world. From October 1942 to August 1943 the United States labour supply and economic policies generally were altered by the initiation of wage and price controls and manpower restrictions, by decentralisation of administrative authority to local agencies, by increased safeguards to protect the workers whose right to change jobs was limited, and by "voluntary" enforcement of both manpower and economic policies carried out by management and labour co-operating with the Government.

The fourth stage, beginning at the end of 1943 with the development of the "West Coast Plan" for manpower control, and continuing through the period of the extension of controls by the directives issued in the autumn of 1944 by the Office of War Mobilization, was a period requiring budgeting of manpower for essential employment, the meeting of critical local shortages as well as general ones, the modification of local programmes to fit the requirements of an evolving national pattern, and greater interdepartmental co-ordination. It was also during this period that discussion of reconversion planning was begun by the various departments and given formal status in the adoption of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act.

Finally, the fifth period may be said to begin with the change in production planning and manpower demands brought about by the altered war schedule following the German counter-offensive in Europe in December 1944. This period lasted through the close of the war in Europe.

Many of the problems posed and organisational solutions worked out during the fifth period were determined by the procedures and methods evolved during the earlier stages of war organisation. The experience obtained at each stage by the various Governmental agencies in associating labour and management representatives in the formulation and application of labour supply and production policies were drawn upon in the final stages of the planning for war production.

Certain factors underlying the Governmental and industrial structure of the United States which directly affected the development of these consultative procedures throughout the war must be kept in mind when evaluating methods used to obtain labour and management participation in the mobilisation of the United States economy for war production.

In the field of Government, the existence of 48 separate States, whose normal peacetime authority covers many of the functions assumed by the federal Government under emergency powers played a large part in determining the forms and procedures used
in developing a decentralised and regional structure and in the type of relationships worked out between Government departments and labour and management organisations in the field. This was sometimes particularly significant in States where the local Government was in the hands of an opposing political party to that of the federal Government, and in States where traditional hostility to federal encroachment required care to avoid arousing objections from local Governmental or labour or management officials. The variety in industrial development and in political concept of the different States meant that administrative agencies which were taken over by the federal Government for the war duration were uneven in experience and capacity and reflected different local concepts. These differences had to be taken into account in the use that could be made of such agencies in the application of policies.

The constitutional separation of the executive and legislative authorities of the federal Government on occasion resulted in opposing policies being put forward in Congress and by the administrative agencies on subjects such as the amount of compulsion needed to gear the United States material and manpower resources to war requirements. In some cases when the administrative agencies were unable to obtain desired legislation from Congress they endeavoured to carry out policies by recourse to the emergency powers of the President and through the issue of directives and regulations. The separation of authority also meant that central administrative agencies on the one hand, such as the Bureau of the Budget or the Office of War Mobilization in the Executive Office of the President, and congressional investigating committees, on the other hand, undertook separate inquiries and drafted separate recommendations concerning the production programme and the establishment and use during the war of emergency agencies of Government.

Partly because of the difficulty of adapting the functions of the regular Government agencies to undertake new responsibilities, there was a tendency to create new agencies under the more flexible emergency war powers whenever an urgent organisational problem arose, and thus overlapping of jurisdiction occurred.

A multiplicity of advisory committees which included many of the same representatives of employers and workers serving in somewhat different capacities also developed. This inevitably brought about a number of complications, not only at the national level, but also in relation to the structure of Government in regions, States and local communities. However, the multiplication of agencies included an enlarged use of employers and workers by providing for their participation in some aspects of the administration of almost every phase of the war programme.
Industrial factors must also be kept in mind in evaluating methods adopted for emergency mobilisation and production. There was widespread scepticism by labour as well as by employers of intervention by Government in the field of industrial relations and the organisation of industry generally.

Industrial relations in the United States are unevenly developed. While in some parts of American industry unionism is old and strong, with well recognised collective bargaining, in other parts collective bargaining is still subject to question as a method of operation. This unevenness affected wartime developments in labour-management relationships. Many managements dislike collective negotiation and desire to limit the field of collective bargaining to as narrow a scope as possible. Most employers have, generally, never favoured industry-wide collective agreements and have been unwilling either to bargain on an industry-wide basis or to delegate adequate authority to any kind of employers' association to negotiate on their behalf in the field of labour relations or to deal with problems arising out of manpower mobilisation. The lack of management cohesion often made difficult the selection of management leaders who could speak either for management as a whole or for all employers in individual industries, in dealing not only with labour organisations but with Government departments. Partly looking towards post-war developments, management frequently resisted the development for wartime purposes of machinery that might affect long-term labour relations.

On the labour side as well a number of factors added to the difficulties. Conscious of the fact that collective bargaining might still be an issue, the representatives of some unions frequently were as sceptical as management both of industry-wide collective bargaining and of Government intervention. Suspicion among labour organisations arising out of jurisdictional jealousies sometimes provided excuses to those in industry and in Government who wished to avoid as far as possible use of representative labour leaders. Moreover, the need to take into consideration the views of numerous labour organisations, sometimes in conflict, made the machinery of labour consultation cumbrous. Where representation was sought in good faith, however, it proved sufficiently workable to justify the efforts made to ensure the support of organised labour in the development of wartime policies.

The whole procedure of manpower mobilisation in the United States was based, in the first instance, upon the belief that there was an almost unlimited manpower capacity and therefore that labour wastage would not be dangerous or serious. Mobility of labour, large-scale labour turnover and habits of workers "shop-
ping" for jobs and of employers pirating labour from one another were accepted practice in American industry. Finally, probably as a result of the philosophy developed during the period of the extending frontier, both the American worker and the American employer have remained intensely individualistic and consequently reluctant to accept controls on the right to hire, the right to fire or the right to change jobs. This individualism constituted one of the basic factors in determining methods of manpower mobilisation in a country which believed both its manpower and material resources to be inexhaustible, and which desired to base its war methods as much as possible on the belief that the American individual would contribute more fully and more willingly as a result of an appeal to his patriotism and to his economic safety than because of any compulsion obtained by law, such as national service legislation. It led to the conflict in approach that was evident throughout the war between the military and civilian authorities, since the former never fully accepted the philosophy of voluntary mobilisation and the latter never fully accepted the military insistence that legislative control of manpower was required for the prosecution of the war.

The purpose of the present report is to describe the participation of employers' and workers' representatives in the agencies directly concerned with manpower mobilisation and war production planning. The manpower problem itself is only dealt with in so far as this is necessary in order to understand the work or evaluate the contribution of the various consultative management-labour committees of the War Manpower Commission. The report includes some description of other agencies of Government whose experiments with different forms of collaboration between employers' or workers' representatives and the Government affected the participation of employers and workers in the agencies directly concerned with labour supply policy or production organisation. The work of certain permanent departments, such as the Department of Labor, whose operation during the war only indirectly affected labour and management participation in these questions, is described only in so far as the consultative process was influenced. The chart facing p. 1 is intended to illustrate the complexity of the wartime agencies and their inter-relations with the permanent Government departments and with each other through inter-departmental committees at various levels, and their relation to the various advisory committees set up to provide for labour-management participation.

Part I of the report contains a short historical summary of the evolution of labour-management participation, first in the national
defence agencies, and then in the emergency structure established on the entry of the United States into the war, and concludes with an indication of the basic programmes used by these agencies for wartime manpower and production organisation. Part II describes the methods used, primarily by the War Manpower Commission, to carry out voluntary manpower mobilisation on the basis of the full co-operation of labour and management. Part III deals with the various methods used to draw representatives of labour and management into the war production programme, and in particular the operation of the voluntary labour-management production committees in individual war plants. Part IV, primarily for purposes of comparison, reviews the methods used by other Government agencies to secure labour and management participation, such as the tripartite organisation set up by the War Labor Board for the determination of working conditions, or the informal machinery for consultation of other agencies affecting manpower or production. Part V presents comparisons of methods used and conclusions as to the degree of their effectiveness. While the report is limited to war organisation and ends with the close of the war against Germany, it is believed that some of the experience gained during this period may be of use in determining future methods of labour-management consultation. To this end particular stress is laid on wartime experience in dealing with the following questions: how consultative machinery should be set up, what its composition and structure should be, and how committee members should be selected; what functions can be performed successfully by tripartite or bipartite committees and in what cases more informal methods, such as separate consultation of group interests or of individuals are required; what methods of operation are most likely to result in constructive committee work, what is the role of a committee's officers, and what staff assistance needs to be given to committee members; and, finally, what formal or informal relationships among committees, nationally, regionally and locally, are most likely to contribute to effective integration of the varied interests directly concerned in production.
PART I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF LABOUR-MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION IN WAR AGENCIES FOR MANPOWER AND PRODUCTION

THE DEFENCE AGENCIES

Labour and management participated in manpower mobilisation and production planning from an early stage in the development of the defence programme. The first period (May 1940—December 1941) was largely one of improvisation and development of semi-independent emergency agencies; it witnessed the establishment of the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission (the National Defense Advisory Commission), the setting up of the Office of Production Management for the formulation of manpower and production policies, the operation of the National Defense Mediation Board for the maintenance of industrial peace, and the beginning of compulsory military training under the Selective Training and Service Act.

National Defense Advisory Commission

A National Defense Advisory Commission of 7 members, nominated by the Council and appointed by the President, was established to advise the Council of National Defense. The members were chosen on the basis of their ability, as coming from an industry, labour, agriculture, or public administration background, to deal with problems of industrial and farm production, industrial materials, employment and labour supply, transportation, price stabilisation and consumer protection. Both labour and management appointments to the various advisory committees set up under the auspices of the National Defense Advisory Commission, and to the staff servicing the Commission, were made on an indi-

1 39 Stat. 649 of 29 August 1916. The Council, as set up on 28 May 1940, was composed of the Secretaries of War, the Navy, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor.

vidual basis, and were intended to provide representation of the points of view of each group and to procure the services of specially qualified persons. To carry out responsibility in the field of employment and labour supply, a Labor Division was set up under the Commissioner in charge of these questions and a Labor Policy Advisory Committee of 16 leading trade unionists named to give the point of view of organised labour in general. The staff appointed to the Labor Division included not only trade unionists from the three labour organisations (American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations and Railroad Brotherhoods) but also persons with a Government or academic background.

It soon became evident that the whole structure of the National Defense Advisory Commission was too unwieldy and lacking in delegated responsibility to be effective for the mobilisation of industry for defence. The next step therefore was to co-ordinate the policy of the agencies of the Government which were engaged in the various phases of the defence programme, to clarify their responsibilities, and to integrate their work.

Office of Production Management

In January 1941 the production, materials, purchases and labour activities of the National Defense Advisory Commission were transferred to a new agency, the Office of Production Management. The former Commissioner for Industrial Production, selected for his practical experience in industry, and the former Commissioner for Labor and Employment, selected as an outstanding trade union leader, were named by the President as Director-General and Associate Director-General in charge of the O.P.M. and instructed to work as partners in a law firm. In addition, other representatives of management and labour were taken over from the organisation established under the National Defense Advisory Commission to serve on the staff and advisory structure of the new agency. The Labor Policy Advisory Committee, in par-
ticular, was maintained as the policy-making instrument for labour questions.

The period following the establishment of the Office of Production Management was marked by greater integration of various Government agencies concerned with defence production, the development of increased labour supply activities, co-ordination of defence training programmes, emphasis on the need to improve labour relations, and the beginning of decentralisation of administration to a regional organisation. In the spring of 1941 the administrative handling of labour supply and training activities was reorganised as a branch within the Labor Division of the O.P.M. and plans were developed for a series of 12 Regional Labor Supply Committees, which would include interdepartmental representation and representatives of industry and labour. The plans for decentralisation to the regions provided for labour and management representation on an individual basis, and thus extended to the regional and local structure the concept that then prevailed in the national structure — that co-operation of management and labour should be obtained by the participation of individual employers and trade unionists on advisory committees and as administrative staff. From the beginning of the defence period continuity of personnel, and hence to some extent of policy, tended to offset the disruptions caused by the various reorganisations of the emergency agencies throughout the war.

One of the last actions of the Office of Production Management with respect to labour questions was an attempt to integrate the labour supply and training programme of its Labor Division with the work in this field of the Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security Board, responsible for the United States Employment Service. In December 1941, as part of the proposed merger, a Deputy Director for Labor Supply and Training was appointed and advisory committees set up to assist him in both aspects of his work. A National Labour Supply Policy Committee, consisting of 6 representatives each from management and labour (3 from the A.F. of L. and 3 from the C.I.O.) met under an independent Government chairman. The activities of this Committee were developed in conjunction with those of an interdepartmental Labor Supply Committee, which had the same chairman and was composed of representatives of 12 federal agencies.

National Defense Mediation Board

While the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Production Management, in addition to their other in-
terests, were concerned with the promotion of industrial harmony as a means of increasing production, this was not their primary responsibility. On 19 March 1941, therefore, the President established the National Defense Mediation Board "to assure that all work necessary for national defense shall proceed without interruption and with all possible speed". The Board was tripartite in structure, composed of 11 persons appointed by the President, 3 representing the public, 4 the workers and 4 the employers, with provision for alternate members. The selection of both the regular and alternate labour members was made on nomination by the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the Railroad Brotherhoods.

Although the functions of the Board were primarily to deal with disputes which had actually reached the stage of a strike or threatened strike, it could on occasion intervene or be consulted on the adjustment of incipient disputes before actual danger of a strike or lockout. If agreement was not reached by mediation, the Board proposed voluntary arbitration. If this procedure was not accepted by both parties the Board could make recommendations on the basis of a fact-finding investigation. Fundamentally, the aim of the National Mediation Board was to supplement the mediation work of the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and the emergency dispute adjustment arrangements undertaken by the Labor Relations Division of the Office of Production Management.

One of the most significant procedures developed by the Board was its successful insistence that the parties must return to work before settlement of a dispute was undertaken. This policy was also associated with the Board's endeavour to obtain union security clauses in agreements. In November 1941, however, the National Defense Mediation Board procedures broke down over the union shop issue in the bituminous coal industry. But the Board's period of short-lived operation laid the groundwork for the War Labor Board, appointed immediately after, when the entrance of the United States into the war pointed to the necessity of an administrative tribunal which had power to decide disputes and not merely to mediate or conciliate. The experience, even in this short period, with the tripartite composition of the National Defense Mediation

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1 Executive Order No. 8716 of 19 March 1941. A further Executive Order, No. 8731 of 4 April 1941, provided for the appointment of alternate as well as regular members.

2 In a series of decisions the Board evolved a policy that a union's fear of insecurity and management's fear of encroachment would be met by a "maintenance of membership" clause providing that those who were members or who should become members should as a condition of employment remain members in good standing for the life of the contract.
Board was considered so satisfactory that the tripartite principle was continued in the new agency.

**Selective Service System**

Even before procedures had been developed for the mobilisation for defence industry by the Office of Production Management, and for the avoidance of industrial disputes through the National Defense Mediation Board, recruitment for the armed services had begun under the Selective Service System. On 16 September 1940 the National Selective Training and Service Act of 1940\(^1\) was adopted to provide for registration of all men of military age and to set up machinery to determine which of them should go into the armed services and which should be deferred, either by reason of occupational need, personal hardship or military unfitness.

The Selective Service System was initially set up as an independent agency. For local administration it used boards composed of civilians. In practice both employers and labour leaders served on many boards, but they did so as individuals and not as representatives of any particular group, as in the other agencies set up under emergency provisions.

**Establishment of War Agencies for Manpower and Production**

The entrance of the United States into the war brought almost immediate changes in the structure of the various agencies created during the defence period to deal with material production, manpower mobilisation, and industrial relations. Thus the Office of Production Management was taken over by the War Production Board; the War Manpower Commission was set up to co-ordinate the work of all the agencies dealing with labour supply; and the National War Labor Board replaced the National Defense Mediation Board. The experience acquired earlier was widely drawn upon both in the organisation of the new agencies and in the methods of obtaining labour and management participation in the formulation and application of wartime mobilisation policies.

**National Industry-Labor Conference**

The way for the new war agencies was paved by the convening of a National Industry-Labor Conference by the President on 17 December 1941, with the principal object of seeking "a quick agreement for avoiding interruption in production". The Conference

\(^1\) 54 Stat. 885.
was headed by a moderator, who was the public member and Chairman of the National Defense Mediation Board, and an associate moderator, the Chairman of the Senate Labor Committee.\(^1\)

Agreement was reached on three general principles: there should be no strikes or lockouts during the war; all disputes should be settled by peaceful means; and the President should set up a War Labor Board to handle wartime disputes.

The Conference did not solve the difficulties concerning the inclusion of a union shop requirement on which the National Defense Mediation Board had foundered, nor did it concern itself with wage stabilisation. It has been claimed that the Conference failed to go farther in outlining wartime policies for the settlement of labour controversies primarily because no serious preparations had been made to ensure the Conference’s success, and because it was hurriedly called to head off hasty legislation to prevent strikes which was being proposed in Congress. Nevertheless, the agreement reached made it possible to establish machinery for the elimination of industrial disputes on the basis of the no-strike, no-lockout pledge.

\textit{Labour Consultation by the President}

As a result of labour’s attitude in accepting the no-strike agreement and in order to ensure that the labour movement would accept required wartime measures, the President appointed early in 1942 an advisory council composed of 3 representatives of the C.I.O. and 3 of the A.F. of L., including their respective presidents. This advisory committee, sometimes known as the War Labor Council and sometimes as the President’s Labor Victory Committee, met with him from time to time, sometimes formally and more often informally, whenever important questions of policy arose directly affecting labour’s contribution to the war effort. It occupied no formal place in the structure of Government, but it enabled the President to receive the advice of labour leaders in formulating many wartime policies. Its secretary was a Government official, who frequently served as liaison between the two

\(^1\) The Conference was composed of 12 labour representatives, 6 chosen by the American Federation of Labor and 6 by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (and including their respective presidents); and 12 industrial representatives named by the Chairman of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. The Business Advisory Council consists of a representative group of businessmen, who serve for a one-year term, without compensation. It was organised in 1933 by the Secretary of Commerce; it devotes itself to questions referred to it by the President and by the Secretary of Commerce and acts as a clearing house for industrial views on Governmental matters which affect business.
labour groups and the President, and between the labour movement and various other Government agencies.

**War Production Board**

On 16 January 1942 the President, by Executive Order\(^1\), set up the War Production Board as the central civilian agency responsible for the organisation of wartime production and supply. Instead of the dual headship of the Office of Production Management (Director-General and Associate Director-General, selected respectively from a management and labour background) the War Production Board was administered by a single Chairman, and advised by an interdepartmental group comprising the heads of the departments or agencies concerned with supply and production problems.\(^2\) The duties of the War Production Board included the general direction of the war procurement and production programme and the issue of necessary directives to determine the policies and methods of the federal agencies responsible for carrying out war procurement and production in all aspects.

As a result of the establishment of the War Production Board, the Office of Production Management was abolished and the new agency assumed all its functions, among them the work of its National Labor Supply Policy Committee (described above) and of the Labor Division, namely, co-ordination of labour supply, labour relations and labour participation in war production generally. One of the first steps taken after the incorporation of the Labor Division and the National Labor Supply Policy Committee in the War Production Board was the preparation of a proposal to reorganise the structure for control of the labour supply and training programme nationally, regionally and in the local and industrial areas. The plan would have set up interdepartmental councils at all levels, with, in addition, at the local and industrial area level, advisory groups of labour and management representatives, called Industrial Labor Supply Committees.

The proposed reorganisation plan was circulated in March 1942 for the consideration of the national and regional advisory committees which had been set up by the Office of Production Manage-

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\(^1\) Executive Order No. 9024 of 16 January established the W.P.B.; Executive Order 9125 of 7 April 1942 extended the functions under the Second War Powers Act; Executive Orders No. 9280 of 5 December 1942 and No. 9335 of 19 April 1943 altered Board membership, as did letters of the President of 30 June 1943 and 9 December 1944; Executive Order No. 9638 of 4 October 1945 abolished the War Production Board and transferred its remaining functions to the Civilian Production Administration.

\(^2\) See Chapter IX for discussion of the effect upon management and labour participation of the difference in the structure of the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board. The role of management and labour in the War Production Board generally is described in Chapters IX to XIV.
ment. The separation of interdepartmental and labour-management committees, called for under the proposal, was severely criticised in many regions where the existing system of tripartite Regional Labor Supply Committees was preferred. In any case the plan was never wholly effected because, a few weeks later, the labour supply and training functions of the War Production Board were transferred to the newly established War Manpower Commission.

The War Manpower Commission

In April 1942 the War Manpower Commission was established as an interdepartmental board under a Chairman appointed by the President.\(^1\) It consisted of the Chairman and one representative each of the Departments of War, the Navy, Agriculture and Labor, the Federal Security Agency, the War Production Board, the United States Civil Service Commission, the National Housing Agency, the Selective Service System and such other executive departments as the President might determine, and a joint representative of the War Shipping Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation.

The War Manpower Commission was not intended to be an operating agency, but to co-ordinate the activities of the other agencies already operating in the field of labour supply. The functions of the Chairman as defined under the initial Executive Order were to:

(a) formulate plans and programmes and establish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilisation and maximum utilisation of the nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war; and issue such policy and operating directives as may be necessary thereto;

(b) estimate the requirements of manpower for industry; review all other estimates of needs for military, agricultural, and civilian manpower; and direct the several departments and agencies of the Government as to the proper allocation of available manpower;

\(^1\) The War Manpower Commission was initially established under Executive Order 9139 of 18 April 1942; additional functions were transferred to the Commission by Executive Order 9247 of 17 September 1942; Executive Order 9279 of 5 December 1942 transferred the Selective Service System to the War Manpower Commission and provided for the establishment of the Management-Labor Policy Committee; Executive Order 9410 of 23 December 1943 again separated out the Selective Service System as a separate agency. Two other Executive Orders affect the responsibilities of the Commission: Executive Order 9301 of 9 February 1943 makes the War Manpower Commission responsible for administering the application of the 48-hour work week; Executive Order No. 9328 of 8 April 1943 (the "Hold the Line" Order) placed certain responsibilities on the War Manpower Commission in connection with the economic stabilisation programme and provided that the penalty provision of the Stabilization Act of 2 October 1942 may be invoked to secure compliance in case of violation of regulations concerning transfer of workers at higher rates of pay. Executive Order No. 9617 of 19 September 1945 terminated the War Manpower Commission and transferred its functions to the Department of Labor.
(c) determine basic policies for, and take such other steps as are necessary
to co-ordinate the collection and compilation of labour market data by federal
departments and agencies;

(d) establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all federal pro-
grammes relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of
workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture;

(e) prescribe basic policies governing the filling of the federal Government's
requirements for manpower, excluding those of the military and naval forces,
and issue such operating directives as may be necessary thereto; and

(f) formulate legislative programmes designed to facilitate the most effective
mobilisation and utilisation of the manpower of the country; and, with the
approval of the President, recommend such legislation as may be necessary
for this purpose.

After a period of experience\(^1\), the Commission's functions were
redefined by Executive Order in December 1942 and the agency
made directly responsible for mobilising labour supply. The Chair-
man was given the authority to issue policies and procedures re-
quired to carry out his functions. He was authorised to take all
steps needed for controlling employment policies, and the Selective
Service system was made a subordinate agency of the War Man-
power Commission.\(^2\) The Chairman established by administrative
order a consultative National Management-Labor Policy Com-
mittee, the membership of which was largely carried over from the
existing National Labor Supply Policy Committee which had been
set up shortly before by the Labor Division of the War Production
Board, and therefore transferred to the War Manpower Commission
when it took over the labour supply functions of the War Produc-
tion Board.

**The National War Labor Board**

The National War Labor Board, set up in January 1942 by
Executive Order of the President as a 12-man board, in consequence
of the no-strike, no-lockout agreement, was composed of 4 repre-
sentatives each of employers, labour and the public; one of the
public members served as Chairman. It was the one fully tripartite
agency of the federal Government, modelled in structure on the
National Defense Mediation Board, which it replaced, but having
much broader responsibilities as an instrument for the avoidance
or settlement of industrial disputes. Subsequent Executive Orders
altered the composition of the Board to include alternate and asso-
ciate members, and extended its authority. Ultimately it was

\(^1\) See Chapter II.

\(^2\) See Appendix for text of the Executive Order defining the functions of the
War Manpower Commission. In December 1943, by further Executive Order,
the Selective Service System was once again made an independent agency.
given statutory position under the War Labor Disputes Act of June 1943.¹

The full tripartite procedures of the War Labor Board were considered appropriate for the determination of labour conditions because labour and management had a direct group interest in all decisions reached in this field. The type of problem dealt with by the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board called for a different approach. Nevertheless, many of the same people participated both nationally and regionally in machinery set up by the War Labor Board and by the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission. Furthermore, the work of the War Labor Board had some direct influence on both the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission. Wage stabilisation requirements affected the manning of war plants, including recruitment and transfer of workers, and therefore were of frequent direct concern to the War Manpower Commission. The maintenance of industrial peace and the continuation of normal processes of collective bargaining affected war production directly, and affected the work of the Office of Labor Production of the War Production Board and the plant Labor-Management Production Committees indirectly. Finally, there were some direct interrelationships between the three agencies as a result of the provisions for the certification of cases by the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board for special treatment in regard to wage stabilisation if such treatment was deemed necessary for the maintenance or increase of production.

WARTIME CONTROLS AFFECTING LABOUR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES

Although the major wartime agencies directly affecting manpower mobilisation were established either before, or shortly after, the entrance of the United States into the war, most of the specific powers on which they could draw for control over manpower, wages

¹ Executive Order 9017 of 12 January 1942 set up the War Labor Board and abolished the National Defense Mediation Board. This Order was amended by Executive Order 9038 of 24 January 1942, which provided for the appointment of associate members, and Executive Order of 20 November 1943, providing for alternate public members. Executive Order 9240 of 9 September 1942 (amended by Executive Order 9248 of 17 September 1942) dealt with the payment of premium wages, constituting the initial step leading towards wage stabilisation. Executive Order 9250 of 3 October 1942 issued pursuant to the Act of 2 October 1942 (56 Stat. 765) amending the Price Control Act of 1942, extended the authority of the Board to deal with wage stabilisation. Executive Order 9328 of 8 April 1943 (the “Hold the Line” Order) defined the possibilities for permission of wage increase. This was clarified by the Byrnes Directive of 12 May 1943. Executive Order 9370 of 16 August 1943 made provision for effecting compliance through the Director of Economic Stabilization. Executive Order 9672 of 31 December 1945, which established the National Wage Stabilization Board, abolished the War Labor Board.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

and prices came only at a somewhat later period. The progressive need for controls, particularly in regard to manpower, had to be demonstrated fully before they were accepted by equally reluctant representatives of organised labour and of management. Similarly, Congress was always hesitant to take legislative action in these fields, frequently on the ground that sufficient authority was already in existence under the general wartime powers. Consequently only a minimum number of the applied restrictions and limitations, particularly on manpower, had clear legislative backing.¹

Defence Powers and War Powers

When the Office of Production Management was established in January 1941 there were only two statutory powers available to provide for delegation of authority to it, namely, the "Priorities Statute" and a provision in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 which permitted the Army and the Navy to place with manufacturers compulsory orders which had to be accepted under penalty. The necessity for broader powers was quickly recognised, however, and by May 1941 the Priorities Statute was amended to provide the basic authority for the regulatory system used by the Office of Production Management and later by the War Production Board.

In March 1942 Congress passed the Second War Powers Act, under which the President retained his power to issue priorities, and in addition was empowered to allocate materials and facilities, in case of shortage, "as he deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest". It was under these powers that most of the regulations and controls of the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission were developed.

At first the preoccupation of the war agencies was with control of materials, assignment of priorities for construction of plants and tools, conversion of existing plants and expansion of mining facilities. From the beginning, however, the War Manpower Commission concerned itself with development of policies designed to restrict pirating of workers by employers, to arrange for voluntary control of the movement of labour and to prevent the indiscriminate drain of manpower to the armed services through voluntary enlistment. During the autumn of 1942 both the Tolan Committee of the House and the Truman Committee of the Senate discussed the problem of manpower mobilisation, and the possible need for compulsory national service, but both concluded that reorganisation of the war production programme and of the manpower agencies

¹ Cf. Bureau of the Budget, op. cit., for full description of the wartime controls, their cause and effect.
would provide the needed workers on a voluntary basis. To this end, voluntary "employment stabilisation plans", tried out in a few cities suffering from acute labour shortage, were to be applied to other areas. Thus persuasion, administrative action and the use of voluntary employer-worker collaboration nationally, regionally and locally continued to be relied on for compliance with restrictions on freedom of movement and of employment.

**Extension of Control over Civilian Economy**

During the period from October 1942 to August 1943, as a result of the realisation that total war necessitated full mobilisation of the civilian economy, controls were instituted over prices and wages and hence over employment policies. By Executive Order 9250 of 3 October 1942, under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended\(^1\), the President established an Office of Economic Stabilization the function of which was to formulate a comprehensive "national economic policy relating to the control of civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies and all related matters — for the purpose of preventing avoidable increases in the cost of living, cooperating in minimising unnecessary migration of labour from one business, industry or region to another, and facilitating the prosecution of the war".

By the same Order an Economic Stabilization Board was established to act in an advisory capacity to the Director of Economic Stabilization. In addition to departmental representatives (including the Chairman of the National War Labor Board and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission) the Board was composed of two representatives of labour (the Presidents of the A.F. of L. and of the C.I.O.), two representatives of agriculture (the Presidents of the Farmers' Co-operative Union and of the American Farm Bureau Federation) and two representatives of management (the Presidents of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Builders' Lumber and Supply Corporation on behalf of the N.A.M.). The work of the Board is described in Chapter XVI.\(^2\) One of the effects of the Emergency Price Control Act and of the regulations issued by the Director of Economic Stabilization was to give authority to the War Labor Board to control wage and salary movements and to the War Manpower Commission to prevent migration of labour. Moreover, by the Executive Order of 5 December 1942 the role of the Commission was changed from one of co-ordination to one of administration both at the national and

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\(^1\) 56 Stat. 765, approved 2 October 1942.

\(^2\) See below, pp. 301-302.
at the local level. This functional alteration was accompanied by a strengthening of the procedures for labour-management participation in order to provide safeguards for both workers and employers in the light of the increased restrictions.

When in 1943 the question of national service legislation was being urged by the armed services and debated in Congress, the War Manpower Commission insisted that something akin to total mobilisation, and hence the effective utilisation of the nation's manpower resources, could be secured by voluntary co-operation of employers and workers. The Commission interpreted its responsibilities to include two major functions: to allocate manpower as between the armed services and industry, and to promote full mobilisation through voluntary co-operation of employers and workers. Because labour resources and needs were unevenly distributed and because the War Manpower Commission's controls were limited, the policy of decentralisation was agreed upon. By relying upon the voluntary efforts of local employers and workers who were equipped to adapt manpower controls to their own areas by means of local employment stabilisation plans, maximum responsibility at the local level was attained.

Extension of War Production Powers

Parallel with the development of the War Manpower Commission's policy of increased local controls, the War Production Board applied three new measures in the same field. Its Office of Labor Production instructed its field representatives to intervene when necessary in local plants in order to lessen possibilities of industrial disputes; its War Production Drive began actively to sponsor Labor-Management Committees in war plants; and finally, Labor Requirements Committees were set up on an interdepartmental basis in some areas of critical labour shortage, to indicate which local establishments were working on the more urgent or critical production items.

The War Production Board also adopted the Controlled Materials Plan under which each federal agency interested in production divided its portion of available supplies of materials among the producers of the end products under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Board undertook to control the scheduling of various production programmes in line with maximum production possibilities and the strategic requirements of the chiefs of staff.

Co-ordination of Planning — "The West Coast Plan"

By the summer of 1943 the increased use of controls and the increased requirements of war mobilisation resulted in considerable
interdepartmental conflict. Consequently, by Executive Order 9347 of 27 May 1943 the Office of War Mobilization was established to co-ordinate manpower and production requirements. An investigation was carried out into the interdepartmental difficulties and other obstacles to production on the West Coast, particularly in the aircraft industry. As a result the “Labor Budget” or “West Coast Plan” was drawn up, based upon the establishment of interdepartmental committees in local labour market areas, and designed to bring the manpower and production effort into some general focus at the local level. This drastic development, as was explained in the Report submitted to the Office of War Mobilization, entailed the assignment of workers to manufacturers in accordance with the priority of the product and ended the employer’s right to hire as many workers as he pleased.

Although the adoption of the West Coast Plan, particularly in its initial stages, brought widespread criticism from both labour and management, it was gradually extended. Furthermore, in the course of the following year the controls imposed by the Office of War Mobilization had an effect on the whole development of the manpower programme.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission immediately protested against what it considered to be the threat of “creeping compulsion”. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission asked the Committee to study the principles of national service legislation in case this ever became necessary, but the Committee was always opposed to legislation. It consistently upheld a voluntary system and called upon the Office of War Mobilization to reappraise manpower needs, review the organisation and functions of Government agencies and eliminate the “overlapping of agencies and jurisdictional interferences” and “needless administrative burdens and controls”. It urged the formulation of comprehensive plans and the decentralised administration of manpower programmes. Support for local control was likewise expressed by many of the local Management-Labor Committees and by many of the regional administrative organisations on the ground that employment stabilisation had been developed satisfactorily under local autonomy.

During the first six months of 1944 the West Coast Plan was applied in all areas of critical labour scarcity. By the early summer of that year a shortage in production of certain vital war materials was developing, made more acute by an exodus from the war plants in the expectation of an early end to hostilities. The Plan was extended throughout the country, bringing protests at imposition of controls instead of dependence upon voluntary action.
Reconversion Planning

Anticipation of the end of the war led to wide discussion of post-war plans and to the establishment under Act of Congress in 1944 of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to coordinate activities relating to prosecution of the war and plans for peacetime readjustment. The O.W.M.R. replaced the Office of War Mobilization. A 12-man advisory board was set up, consisting of 3 members from agriculture, 3 from labour, 3 from management and 3 to represent the general public. All these members were, however, chosen as individuals to "represent the general public and the public interest" and not as representatives of their respective organisations, but in fact the presidents of the major organisations were included.

1945 Control Procedures

The increased manpower and production requirements in the final phases of the war in Europe brought a last demand for controls and for sanctions. Throughout the winter of 1944-45, Congress debated the demand of the military authorities and others for national service legislation. In the meantime, through the use of the existing controls, vested in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and of possible sanctions available through the Office of Price Administration for withdrawal of rationing coupons and in the War Production Board through control of materials, the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission jointly undertook to meet the increased war production schedules. Management and labour representatives at every level, although protesting against the threat of sanctions, undertook to obtain compliance with the programme and to tighten up enough on employment stabilisation and on the manning of war plants to make possible the conclusion of the war without national service legislation.

Basic Programmes Applied by War Manpower Commission

To cope with the problem of the mobilisation of the nation's resources, the War Manpower Commission formulated a series of programmes, based upon changing stringencies of labour supply and demand in the 300 odd labour market areas into which the country was divided. These programmes were applied through the local Offices of the United States Employment Service, which has been transferred to the War Manpower Commission for the

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1 However, Congress, in 1944, in extending the Economic Stabilization Act, provided that the Office of Price Administration could not use its rationing power as a sanction for any action not directly called for by the Stabilization Act of 1944.
duration of the war. Local participation of management and labour representatives in the adaptation of programmes to the needs of each labour market area was especially important, because stringencies in labour supply began in certain local areas and initially were largely matters of individual skills and occupations. Only gradually was the point reached where manpower shortages were widespread throughout the country and even then sharp stringencies were primarily local rather than national in their impact.

The first programme developed by the War Manpower Commission, in co-operation with management and labour, was designed to curtail wasteful turnover in essential and locally needed activities. It was based upon a requirement that workers who left specified essential jobs should present a statement of availability before being engaged in new jobs.

The second step taken, as the need for essential workers exceeded available supplies in certain occupations and areas, was the adoption of local priority "referral" programmes. Under these programmes certain classes of workers who wished to change jobs were to be hired solely through the United States Employment Service, or other authorised channels, so that they could be offered employment where they would make the greatest contribution to the war effort. The priority, in terms of the war effort, of a specific establishment was determined locally by the War Manpower Commission, with the advice of an interdepartmental committee composed of representatives of agencies requiring labour. The determination was made on the basis of information available to these representatives of the importance of individual local establishments to the national production programme. Provision was made for the whole programme to be administered with the flexibility required by varying local conditions.

The third step taken to meet increased labour shortages was the development, where necessary, of local employment ceiling programmes which operated as a restriction upon new hiring. An employment ceiling programme, as applied to less essential establishments, determined the total number of workers who might be employed over a given period and prohibited the hiring of new workers until the employment level in an establishment had fallen to the fixed ceiling through normal turnover.

If such an employment ceiling programme, administered together with other aspects of the local manpower programme, did not meet urgent manpower needs in a community, the War Manpower Commission took a fourth step, namely, the application of an em-

1 "Referral" is the term used for the sending of a worker to a particular undertaking or job.
ployment ceiling programme designed to secure the transfer through forced release of the required number and types of workers from less urgent or essential to top urgency production in the community.

The National Management-Labor Policy Committee was consulted regarding the formulation of each of these programmes. The determination to put into effect each programme at the local level was made after consultation with the local Management-Labor War Manpower Committee. The local interdepartmental committee was also consulted concerning the decision to apply locally a priority referral or employment ceiling programme.

In addition to the above series of programmes, involving restrictions upon hiring procedures and upon the right of the worker to change jobs, the War Manpower Commission evolved procedures and policies for the best possible use of existing labour supply. The techniques and programmes developed for this purpose included the lengthening of the work week\(^1\), training programmes within and without industry, utilisation studies, and community projects based upon the need to correct local conditions contributing to absenteeism, turnover and lowered output resulting from poor worker morale.

A nation-wide appeals system was provided under which the appropriate Management-Labor Committee heard the case of any individual worker or employer who felt that he was discriminated against by any decision of the War Manpower Commission. The appeals system included provision for further appeal from the Area Committee, through the Regional Committee to the national level.

Finally, as all the programmes were exercised without statutory authority and depended for their application upon the voluntary co-operation of management, labour and community groups, the role of the Management-Labor Committees at every level was of prime importance in the successful achievement of manpower mobilisation for the war effort.

\(^{1}\) Provided by Executive Order of the President, with authority for application delegated to the War Manpower Commission.
PART II

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION
IN VOLUNTARY MANPOWER MOBILISATION
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION IN VOLUNTARY MANPOWER MOBILISATION

In the course of three years of activity the War Manpower Commission, as the agency charged with primary responsibility for developing a "voluntary" labour supply programme, set up a complicated administrative and consultative structure to meet the particular industrial and political requirements called for in order to mobilise United States manpower without recourse to national service legislation. In this structure, provision was made to obtain the experience and influence of management, labour and agriculture at every level.

At the national level the instrument which was evolved for these purposes was the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. This Committee had the dual function of advising the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission concerning manpower policies and programmes and of promoting support for those policies by the members of its constituent organisations.

Instruments similar to the National Management-Labor Policy Committee were developed at the regional, State and area levels. Regional Directors, responsible to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, carried out manpower programmes, in consultation with Regional War Manpower Management-Labor Committees; State and Area Directors, responsible to the Regional Directors for the operation and local application of the programmes, were advised by local War Manpower Management-Labor Committees.

The representative Committees at each level, in addition to their consultative function and their role in enlisting support for manpower policies, had a "judicial" function of hearing appeals, brought by individuals affected, from any action taken by the War Manpower Commission. The composition, functions, methods of operation and actual activities undertaken by Committees at each level varied considerably according to local circumstances; however, they followed in general the broad pattern determined by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in consultation with his National Committee.
CHAPTER II

NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY FOR VOLUNTARY MANPOWER MOBILISATION

The National Management-Labor Policy Committee was originally established by administrative order of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in May 1942 and subsequently put on a more formal basis by Executive Order of the President in the following December.

STATUS OF COMMITTEE

The President had established the War Manpower Commission in April 1942 by an Executive Order, naming as chairman the Federal Security Administrator and requiring him to consult the members of the Commission in carrying out the various functions entrusted to him. Although this Executive Order did not include any provision for consultation of management and labour, the Chairman, by administrative order on 25 May 1942, established a Management-Labor Policy Committee, consisting of an equal number of representatives of management and organised labour.¹

The initial establishment of this advisory committee was substantially influenced by the earlier experience of the defence agencies, the War Production Board, and, in particular, by the work of the National Labor Supply Policy Committee. The original members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee were selected almost entirely from the National Labor Supply Policy Committee. They were appointed as individuals but with a view to obtaining on the one hand a knowledge of the attitude of industry and on the other representation of organised labour.

Experience in the half-year between May and December 1942 demonstrated that the initial organisation of the War Manpower Commission and its relationship to the Management-Labor Policy Committee required alteration. Increased authority for the War Manpower Commission was essential if it was to serve adequately as a co-ordinating body. Moreover, the Management-Labor Policy Committee

¹ Administrative Order No. 4, 25 May 1942. An earlier form of the administrative order called for 7 members from each side.
Committee felt that it should be given a more formal status and that its composition should be altered to make it more fully representative of industry, labour and agriculture.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee urged official recognition of the place occupied by the representatives of labour and management in the policy-making functions of the War Manpower Commission, as an aid to these representatives in their efforts to secure voluntary compliance with the policies and procedures of the War Manpower Commission. The Committee therefore requested "the creation of a Management-Labor Policy Committee with recognised legal status to serve the Chairman in the policy-making deliberations of the War Manpower Commission, the members thereof to be the duly chosen representatives of management and labour". On 5 December 1942 the President, on the basis of the recommendations, issued a new Executive Order, which increased the authority and functions of the War Manpower Commission as the agency responsible for the co-ordination of manpower policy, and gave to the Management-Labor Policy Committee the official recognition and legal status which it desired.

MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE

The character of the membership of the Management-Labor Policy Committee was altered on three separate occasions. As indicated, the Chairman first appointed the Committee from the membership of the National Labor Supply Policy Committee. In October and November 1942, two representatives of railway labour and two agricultural representatives were added. As a result of the Executive Order of 5 December 1942, the Committee membership was increased by the addition of two members to represent management associations. However, the Chairman and the members of the Committee considered that further alteration was required in order to ensure a more representative type of membership for an advisory committee carrying the responsibilities given by the Executive Order. At the suggestion of the Committee, as then composed, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in March 1943 called a meeting of the Presidents of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American

1 Cf. Special Report to the Chairman, submitted by the members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee on 20 November 1942; it was transmitted via the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission to the President.

2 The Executive Order states: "The Chairman shall appoint a Management-Labor Policy Committee to be selected from the fields of labour, agriculture, and industrial management, and shall consult with the members thereof in carrying out his responsibilities. The Chairman may appoint such other advisory committees composed of representatives of Governmental or private groups or both as he deems appropriate."
Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, the National Farmers' Union, the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, to formulate proposals for reconstituting the Committee. The group recommended that Committee members should be "the recognised national spokesmen for labour, agriculture and industrial management, and must be confined to these spokesmen or to duly qualified and authorised representatives thereof, chosen by and closely identified with these recognised national spokesmen, such representatives to be enabled, empowered and obligated to devote whatever time may be required for committee service". The Chairman accepted this recommendation and agreed to reconstitute the Committee as a national consultative committee which would include both principal and alternate members.

In the light of the experience with a large committee whose members came from backgrounds enabling them to present the viewpoints of labour, industry and agriculture but who were not appointed as authorised spokesmen of the three groups, a new procedure was adopted.

In agreement with the national organisations concerned, the Chairman appointed a small committee of three principals and three alternates from labour, industry and agriculture, all of whom were authorised to represent their respective organisations. The principals, who were the leaders of the national organisations, were to be convened only for matters of particular importance or in cases of significant differences of opinion among the alternates. The latter carried on the continued work of the Committee and were available to advise the Chairman regarding technical manpower problems. The membership of the Committee was constituted as follows: for labour, the Presidents of the A.F. of L., the C.I.O. and the Order of Railway Conductors of America; for agriculture, the Master of the Grange, and the Presidents of the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers' Union; for industry, the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the N.A.M. and a third member chosen by the first two or by their organisations.

The request of representatives of women for full membership on the Management-Labor Policy Committee was refused, but provision was made for the Chairman of the Women's Advisory

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1 Cf. Memorandum Regarding the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission, and Reconstitution of the Management-Labor Policy Committee as Adopted by Seven Leaders of Agriculture, Labor and Industrial Management and Accepted by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, 20 March 1943.
Committee to attend all meetings as an observer, and as a participant when desired.¹

The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission attended Committee meetings only from time to time to consult on questions of major policy, or to meet with the principals at their own request. Liaison between the Chairman and the Committee was maintained through the Deputy Chairman and the Executive Director of the staff of the agency.

**FUNCTIONS**

The initial function of the Management-Labor Policy Committee, as outlined in the Order of 25 May 1942 was “to consider and recommend to the Chairman matters of major policy concerning the activities and responsibilities of the Commission” and “to initiate studies and the formulation of policies, as well as consider those referred to it by the Chairman”.

The same administrative order which provided for the reconstitution of the Committee extended its role as an advisory body to the Chairman and defined its function. Its first task was “to make available to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission the advice and counsel of the leaders of these groups in the determination of War Manpower Commission policies and programmes”. Its second duty was “to promote the active co-operation of labour, agriculture and industrial management in securing national compliance with and support of such policies and programmes”.

This second function was significant in giving to the Committee responsibility for ensuring public knowledge of work of the labour, agriculture and industrial management representatives in the formulation of the policies of the War Manpower Commission. It was also important in that it obliged the members of the Committee to exercise the full influence of the organisations they represented in securing compliance with and support of policies which they had a role in formulating. The extension of responsibility was the direct result of the early work of the Management-Labor Policy Committee before its reconstitution.

Consultation with both the Management-Labor Policy Committee and the War Manpower Commission was mandatory on the latter’s Chairman, although he was not required to follow the advice of either group. The existence of two co-ordinate consultative bodies sometimes resulted in conflicting recommendations.

¹The Women’s Advisory Committee was set up by administrative order on 31 August 1942 to consider and recommend to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission matters of major policy concerning the activities and responsibilities of the Commission, particularly as they affected women and the contribution women could make in the successful prosecution of the war.
Reports of discussions in the two groups were frequently exchanged, but joint meetings were not held. Eventually, the Commission itself became largely a formal body, because the co-ordinating functions for which it was responsible were achieved at the operating level by the various interdepartmental committees set up, and at the policy level by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Following the establishment of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the Policy Committee endeavoured to secure clarification of the relationship between its responsibilities in the manpower field and those of the new body. As the latter included the labour and agriculture members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee there was some justification for fearing duplication of function. However, in the resultant discussions the difference in purpose was clearly brought out, namely, that the Board members were chosen as individuals and not as representatives of groups, and that the Board's function was to advise on general policies and not to deal with the work of the individual agencies. It was expected to cover the whole area of national policy regarding both mobilisation and reconversion, including questions of disposal of surplus property, contract cancellation, tax questions, social security, as well as re-employment and retraining and war manpower problems. The Management-Labor Policy Committee therefore continued as the national advisory body which the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission had to consult in carrying out his responsibilities in the operation of manpower mobilisation.

METHODS OF OPERATION

The Committee formulated general rules to guide its methods of operation, including specification as to its officers, the private or open nature of meetings, its relationship with the staff of the War Manpower Commission, the form its decisions should take and the way it should carry out its public relations and liaison functions.2

Officers

After various experiments, the Committee determined that its officers should consist of an ex officio chairman (the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission), an elected chairman (a Gov-

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1 See Chapters I and XVI for descriptions of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization.
2 Cf. documents in Appendix VI, p. 372 adopted by the Committee concerning its own operation, during the period from October 1942 to April 1943, when it was re-examining its functions and methods of operation.
ernment official not a member of the Committee) who would normally preside over the Committee's sittings, and a vice-chairman elected from the Committee members, for a month at a time, to preside in the absence of the elected chairman. The vice-chairmanship was held in turn by labour, management and agriculture. In fact, however, any member of the Committee could preside.

The other officers of the Committee were the Executive Secretary, named by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission on the nomination of the Committee, and two Executive Assistants, who served on the staff of the War Manpower Commission, but who were named by the respective management and labour members of the Committee.¹ The duty of the Executive Secretary was to see that the members of the Committee received adequate material and, in general, to ensure the normal functioning of the Committee itself.

The two Executive Assistants formed an important link between the Policy Committee and the War Manpower Commission, and the fact that they were nominated by the management and labour groups respectively gave their work special authority. They were expected to prepare material on behalf of their Committee constituents, to act on occasion in their name, and even to undertake to serve as substitutes for Committee members on subcommittees or in carrying out investigations approved by the Committee. They also served as an operating link between the Committee members nationally and the outside organisations which the Committee represented. The Executive Assistants were invited to attend all relevant War Manpower Commission executive staff discussions and to make known in these discussions the point of view likely to be put forward by the Committee members. They were also to keep the Committee members informed of developments within the Commission, which the Committee should be prepared to discuss.

In practice, the Committee was frequently not adequately prepared or fully briefed. This was partly because the members tended to delegate so many responsibilities to the Executive Assistants that frequently there was not enough time left to prepare for the work of the Committee as a whole. That preparation was made especially difficult because the Committee work was never fully integrated with the general activities and services of the War Manpower Commission staff. Neither the Committee members nor the Executive Assistants were automatically informed of the

¹ The intention, as agreed by the Committee in February 1943, was to have three Executive Assistants and office accommodation for the servicing of labour, management and agriculture respectively. However, no Executive Assistant for agriculture was appointed.
day-to-day developments of the various operating bureaux; and the fact that they had no direct administrative responsibility or relationship to the various executives or field staff meant that contacts were irregular and, therefore, the point of view of management and labour was often not available at the formative stage of administrative actions.

Nature of Committee Meetings

The Committee's sessions were either "open" or "executive". The latter were attended only by officers and members of the Committee, while "open" sessions also included such regular official observers as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission designated, and individuals specially invited with the approval of the Committee. Invitations were issued, for example, to representatives of other departments, such as the Army, the Navy, the War Production Board, etc., to provide an opportunity to present, for the consideration of the Committee, special problems arising out of changes in the war programme. Finally, the Committee was normally attended by those members of the War Manpower Commission staff, either from headquarters or from the regions, who had some direct concern with the questions under discussion by the Committee.

Form of Decisions

Whether it was composed of principals or of alternates, the Committee could consider any question of major policy referred to it and make specific recommendations, and it could also make suggestions, either on its own initiative or by request, on policies which it considered that the Chairman should put into operation.

Because the arrangement provided that decisions on vitally important matters could be taken by alternate members, it was required as a safeguard that all such decisions should be unanimous; where unanimity was not secured, the question was referred to a meeting of the principals. Unanimous decisions were transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as "policy decisions". If agreement was not reached, this fact was communicated to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and he was given such signed reports as members or groups of members desired to present.

This unanimity requirement for the alternates in the case of a policy decision occasionally delayed the operation of the whole War Manpower Commission on issues of particular importance; but it often acted as a brake on hasty suggestions or bureaucratic
pressure. The requirement was important because it obliged the Committee members to exercise their full influence in securing nation-wide compliance with, and support for, the policies that they helped to formulate. A case in point occurred in March 1943 when, at the time the Committee was reconstituted, the representatives of the national organisations of management, labour and agriculture expressed their willingness to take full responsibility for obtaining support for the War Manpower Commission's policies.

The possibility of the unanimity rule seriously lessening the value of the Committee's work was mitigated by the provision for individual or group reports in case of disagreement. In such matters as manpower utilisation and national service legislation unanimity was unattainable, but through the submission of reports the Committee members had an opportunity to make their views known and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was able to assess the importance of the disagreement.

Subcommittees

The Policy Committee made use of subcommittees in order to carry out studies and prepare preliminary drafts on which to base its recommendations and make final decisions in full session. Subcommittees dealt with such matters as the reorganisation of the Committee, the anti-pirating policy of the War Manpower Commission, advice to be given to the Training-Within-Industry Division of the War Manpower Commission, and the standards of seniority to be included in any regulations concerning recruitment and transfer of workers.

A weakness in the whole Committee operation was that after months of discussion its conclusions on a number of issues never reached final form. Delays in the preparation of reports and in obtaining action by subcommittees arose in a number of instances, and contributed to a general feeling that the Committee itself was sometimes too slow in obtaining enough information to make timely suggestions on urgent current problems.¹

Public Relations and Committee Informational Procedures

From the outset the Policy Committee recognised the importance of securing public support for the policies it wished to implement, and although in the interests of free discussion the press was

¹ At one time the National Committee offered to aid the War Manpower Commission on specific items which appeared insoluble at a lower level; it tried to carry out this programme by means of small subcommittees of two or four Committee members in addition to the Executive Assistants. However, the whole attempt to aid on operating questions of this type proved ineffective and was ultimately abandoned.
questions on its current agenda merely for review or receipt of information.

The Policy Committee on numerous occasions emphasised that the manpower problem was an integral part of the process of mobilising a nation for war, and must, therefore, be considered in close conjunction with military and production planning. It urged that consideration should be given by the competent authorities to closer integration of the manpower and production programmes and, in particular, to relating the allocation of contracts to the availability of adequate manpower. It insisted that manpower mobilisation could be achieved through voluntary procedures by means of co-operation of management, labour and agriculture. It early adopted policies which recommended the cessation of voluntary enlistment, and the transfer of Selective Service to the War Manpower Commission. It advocated centralised administrative authority for the War Manpower Commission to enable it to implement its policies.¹

Organisational Questions

The Policy Committee devoted many meetings, particularly in the early period, largely to drawing up recommendations designed to guide the staff of the agency in formulating procedures which might affect the position or the duties of the Committee itself or of Regional and Area Management-Labor Committees.²

The rules of procedure adopted by the Committee and ultimately issued by the staff provided guides to the establishment of the Regional and Area Committees. They also provided that differences of opinion arising between an Area Director and his committee or a Regional Director and his committee would ultimately come before the National Policy Committee for review. Thus, if an Area Director concurred in any recommendations of an Area Management-Labor Committee, the decision would be final unless a request was made by the Regional Director that the recommendation be submitted to him for review. If an Area Director did not concur with the recommendations of his committee, the committee itself could request the Regional Director to review the matter. If the Regional Director did not concur in the committee's recommendations he would refer the matter to the Regional Committee and require the Area Director to suspend action on the matter.

¹ See, in particular, Interim Report to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, 31 October 1942, and discussions in the Committee.
² Cf. Field Service Memoranda Nos. 2 & 3, of 10 March 1943, which provided for “Appointment and Functions of Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees” and “Procedure for Review of Recommendations of Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees”. These regional and area committees are described in Chapters III and V.
pending review. At the regional level the procedure was similar. At the national level, the Management-Labor Policy Committee undertook the specific role of reviewing any difference of opinion between a Regional Director and his committee, upon application of the Regional Committee. The recommendations of the Management-Labor Policy Committee were submitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission for final decision.

In the early stages the Policy Committee formulated recommendations, which were accepted by the Chairman, dealing with its own reconstitution. In some instances, the Advisory Committee was led to discuss administrative or operational problems that might, by a narrow definition, have been considered outside its scope of activity. Its role on organisational questions was never clearly defined and on a number of occasions the Committee concerned itself with what might be considered administrative matters. However, it avoided becoming too much involved in administrative issues and therefore occasionally drew back from making specific recommendations on matters which were executive rather than policy-making.

Employment Stabilisation and Related Policies

A substantial proportion of the Committee's constructive policy discussions concerned the statements, directives and regulations of the War Manpower Commission dealing with employment stabilisation. In this field, the Committee first dealt with the problem of pirating of war workers.

The discussion at the Committee's initial meeting on 9 June 1942 brought out the relationship of employment stabilisation to Government wage policy, and action was therefore deferred to permit a clarification of that policy. At a meeting on 16 June 1942, following further discussion of wage stabilisation policy, the Committee recommended the adoption of an anti-pirating policy. This provided that if the maximum utilisation of manpower in a designated area had been, or was likely to be, impeded because of:

"(a) the concentration of essential war work in any such area, (b) the shortage of workers for designated occupations therein, (c) an excessive rate of turnover among such workers, or (d) the migration of such workers to other areas", a co-operative plan would be developed by the regional representative of the War Manpower Commission, in conjunction with the management and labour representatives in the area and the regional or local representatives of other Government departments. Restrictions would then be placed

1 This opening presaged much of the later debates in the Policy Committee concerning the general relationship of wage policies and employment stabilisation.
in such critical areas upon the methods of hiring and the kinds of solicitation for the purpose of hiring permitted to employers.

Procedures for the development, approval and operation of co-operative anti-pirating plans were drawn up and finally issued in August 1942 through the joint efforts of the Policy Committee and the staff of the War Manpower Commission. Certain minimum standards were incorporated in the regulations to safeguard existing stabilisation agreements and provisions for standards of employment at prevailing wages and working conditions. Stabilisation policies for specific industries were also issued and general procedures laid down in matters such as the need to provide cost of transportation to workers who were transferring to essential employment in an individual industry.

After the increase in authority of the War Manpower Commission under the Executive Order of December 1942, the role of the Policy Committee assumed broader proportions. The anti-pirating policy was extended to cover employment stabilisation in general by laying down basic stipulations to provide control over hiring in local programmes. It set forth the responsibilities of Regional and Area Manpower Directors and outlined the role of their respective Management-Labor Committees.

The basic method for implementing the employment stabilisation programmes was the so-called statement of availability, the issue of which to a worker enabled him to change jobs; conditions under which an employer could obtain a worker were laid down and provision made for appeal by both worker and employer. The instrument evolved to put the programme into effect was the locally negotiated employment stabilisation plans. Initially these affected only areas of "critical labour shortage" or particular industries within an area, but later they were extended to other areas. As a worker who left a job without a statement of availability could not be hired for a new job for 60 days, the conditions under which such statements might be issued were of vital importance. The Policy Committee gave careful consideration to all aspects of the case, such as, for example, whether employers or only the United States Employment Service should issue statements and what means should be employed to protect customary hiring channels, such as trade union hiring halls.

The Policy Committee had from the first recognised the close relationship between employment stabilisation and Government wage policy. Regulation 4 was issued in April 1943 by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission to carry out the provision in the "Hold the Line" Executive Order of 8 April 1943, which authorised him—
to forbid the employment by any employer of any new employee or the acceptance of employment by a new employee except as authorized in accordance with regulations which may be issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, with the approval of the Economic Stabilization Director, for the purpose of preventing such employment at a wage or salary higher than that received by such new employee in his last employment, unless the change in employment would aid in the effective prosecution of the war.¹

Regulation 4 provided, among other things, that no employer should hire for work in an activity other than essential any new employee who, during the preceding 30-day period, was engaged in an essential activity "if the salary or wage rate to be paid by the employer would exceed the rate most recently received during such period by the employee". In addition, in an area operating under an employment stabilisation programme it provided that no statement of availability should be issued "solely on the ground that an individual's wage or salary rate is substantially less than that prevailing in the locality for the same or substantially similar work".

The Regulation had not been discussed in the Policy Committee and its issue immediately brought protests from the labour movement on the ground that it amounted to a "freeze" upon labour which would prevent workers from improving their status. A delegation urged the Chairman to withdraw or amend the Regulation. During May and June 1943 the Policy Committee discussed various drafts to amend the penalty provisions, which both labour and management considered a form of "creeping compulsion", and to determine conditions and minimum standards to be incorporated in the employment stabilisation programmes so as to permit changes in jobs. Adoption of these stabilisation plans in all areas was thus given impetus, but there was substantial diversity in the terms of the different plans. Consequently the Director of Economic Stabilization was not willing to accept the suggestion that Regulation 4 be simplified to provide that transfer at higher rates of pay would be prohibited "when the transfers were prohibited under approved employment stabilisation programmes", unless some uniform minimum standards were established for these programmes throughout the country. It was primarily to meet this need that Regulation 7 was finally issued in August 1943 to provide uniformity in existing employment stabilisation plans with regard to minimum standards governing worker separations, hirings and solicitations. Thereupon Regulation 4 was amended to provide that "transfers at higher rates of pay were prohibited if prohibited under an approved employment stabilisation plan".

¹ Executive Order 9328 of 8 April 1943.
Regulation 7 itself was thus designed to establish uniform standards for employment stabilisation programmes, to set out major provisions which might be adopted at the option of the local administrator, to establish uniform procedures for the formulation, amendment and approval of employment stabilisation programmes, and finally to set a date (15 October 1943) by which all plans were to be amended to conform to the Regulation. The related wage policy then provided that an individual was entitled to a statement of availability if his last employment in essential or locally needed activity was at a wage or salary at or below a level established or approved by the National War Labor Board as warranting adjustment and the employer had failed to adjust the wage in accordance with that level or had failed to apply to the War Labor Board for its approval of such an adjustment.

In all these discussions both management and labour members of the Policy Committee strongly insisted upon the importance of local autonomy in permitting flexibility suited to local conditions, and upon the danger of headquarters' regulations being used as a form of compulsion. A difference in emphasis was obvious, however, regarding the national standards to be set up. The labour representatives stressed such factors as payment of transportation costs, provision of adequate housing and communication facilities, wage increases, improvement in working conditions, dismissal pay, job priorities for war workers, etc., which they urged as a means of facilitating recruitment and transfer to essential industry and solving shortages without recourse to compulsion in any form. While agreeing with labour in opposition to compulsion, management often favoured more stringent rules or more strict application of existing rules, concerning the granting of statements of availability and was particularly fearful of possible use of War Manpower Commission regulations as an indirect means of raising wages or improving working conditions above those prevailing in peacetime. Moreover, some, but not all, of the management members urged that the national standards should leave as wide a field as possible to the local administration.

The question of national standards as well as the desire for protection for both employers and workers gained particular importance in the summer of 1944 when priority referral programmes (offering workers only jobs in high priority establishments) were extended throughout the country. In spite of lengthy discussion in the Policy Committee, management and labour members could find no unanimous compromise on standards to govern the making of referrals under the programme. Finally draft standards submitted by the labour members were accepted by the Chairman and
incorporated in a field instruction to all Regional and Area Directors, setting forth national priority referral policies and standards. The national standards included a requirement that freedom of choice, both in accepting jobs and in accepting workers, should be maintained to the maximum extent consistent with war needs, and defined what was meant by "good cause" for a worker's refusal of a referral to a job without prejudice to his right to further job offers. Under this instruction, Regional and Area Directors were to explain the programme to their Regional and Area Management-Labor Committees, and to secure from those Committees recommendations concerning additional fair and reasonable standards to apply in their localities.

**National Service Legislation**

When national service legislation first received serious study in August 1942 by subcommittees of the War Manpower Commission, the Management-Labor Policy Committee was not consulted because the Chairman felt that preliminary work should be completed first. However, following a report in the press regarding consideration of national service legislation by the War Manpower Commission and a conference between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Chairman requested the Policy Committee to consider constructively some form for a suitable national service act. A subcommittee of the Policy Committee at once set to work, examining drafts of proposed legislation and discussing divergent points of view.

Neither labour nor management representatives were convinced of the necessity of legislation at that time, holding that the possibilities of voluntary co-operation had not yet been exhausted. The Committee devoted its time to discussion of measures to avoid the need for national service legislation, and in September 1942 unanimously recommended the improvement of voluntary co-operation and the full use of the existing authority of the War Manpower Commission. Reporting to the Chairman in October 1942 the Policy Committee emphasised the necessity for the Government to co-ordinate its war programmes and for management and labour to ensure full mobilisation by voluntary means. It doubted that "conversion of the moral obligation to serve in the war effort into a legal obligation to serve will of itself solve the manpower situ-

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1 The text of the field instruction (416, Supplement 2, 21 June 1944) is basically the same as the standards submitted by the labour members of the Policy Committee. In addition, the field instruction directed that the standards were to be transmitted to all levels of operation, and that each local office must clearly understand the standards before priority referral machinery was installed, and that full local publicity should be given to the standards developed for each area, based on the minimum national standards.
tion”. The Executive Order of 5 December 1942 incorporated many of the suggestions set forth in this report, strengthened the authority of the War Manpower Commission and gave specific status to the Management-Labor Policy Committee itself, thus postponing consideration of national service legislation for the moment.

By April 1943 manpower shortages had become widespread and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission again expressed the opinion that national service legislation might ultimately be necessary. Again the Policy Committee opposed it. Finally in July 1943 the Chairman requested the principal Committee members to consider a suitable bill, which would be acceptable to both management and labour. Once more the Committee insisted that voluntary mobilisation had not been adequately exploited, and concluded its report as follows:

Whereas public opinion polls indicate that the public is willing to be subjected to compulsory service in essential civilian activities, organised labour and management in general are still opposed to national service legislation until all alternatives have been aggressively tried and proved wanting. They point out, for instance, that what is needed are not more controls, but more effective prosecution and enforcement of existing controls. Further, labour and management urge that more aggressive action be taken to remove the causes of the failures to meet the manpower needs rather than to superimpose additional controls upon present failures and try to correct them through coercion.

The West Coast Plan, which had just been worked out by Justice Byrnes to meet the problems arising from current manpower shortages in certain areas and for interdepartmental relations, and which seemed to imply some compulsion, was also considered by the Committee at the time it was drawing up its statement on alternatives to national service legislation.

Since Congress was discussing the need for national service legislation, the Policy Committee issued a formal public statement setting forth its views. It again expressed its opposition to national service legislation on the ground that the American people would provide greater output under a voluntary system than by means of compulsion and regimentation; it pointed out that the critical manpower situations were the results of dislocation, maldistribution of contracts and ineffective manpower mobilisation rather than of an inadequate general labour supply; and finally it reiterated its belief that the solution lay in better interdepartmental coordination and fuller realisation by the people of the need for full and effective mobilisation. It proposed as a solution a series of steps to be taken by the Government and by representatives of labour, agriculture and industrial management to secure maximum utilisation of manpower reserves without recourse to legislation.
The positive programme of seven points put forward by the Committee concluded: "All of these actions must be based on the initial conceptions that the agencies of Government are to serve the people by informing them what has to be done, when and where it must be done, and that the people of the nation are the ones to determine how it shall be done." This concept, rather than national service legislation, remained the basic policy of the majority of the Committee, although in 1945 agricultural management shifted to support of legislation.

In the spring of 1944 a further re-evaluation of manpower programmes was made, and the Policy Committee on 2 May 1944 once again affirmed its faith in a voluntary programme, concluding: "the test of the voluntary system will be the capacity of management, labour and agriculture to strengthen and extend existing community programmes so as to meet these urgent needs". In August 1944, however, the Byrnes directive was issued, ordering the extension of the West Coast Plan and various other manpower controls to many additional areas. The Policy Committee decried this move and in September 1944 issued a statement criticising what it called the attempt to shift from voluntary to compulsory methods.

Finally, during 1945, the Committee again considered the proposals before Congress concerning legislation to require men either to work in war industry or be drafted into the armed forces irrespective of their suitability for combat duty. The Committee once more stated that the existing manpower programmes, and in particular, the Management-Labor Committees at the regional and area levels, afforded the basic machinery for administering policies of labour supply and manpower mobilisation. In these discussions, however, the Committee split 7 to 2: the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange supported some kind of compulsory control and refused to sign the Policy Committee reaffirmation of belief in voluntary procedures.

There seems to be little doubt that the Committee consistently reflected the widespread feeling on the part of both management and labour throughout the country that the manpower needs of war production could be met without the kind of national service legislation demanded by the armed services.

_Employment Standards for Foreign Workers, Prisoners and Minority Groups_

Policies for recruiting and employing aliens, foreign workers admitted temporarily, prisoners of war, furloughed soldiers and
even minority groups as sources of labour supply required careful consideration of long-standing prejudices in American industrial relations and experience. The role of the Policy Committee was therefore of particular importance in foreseeing obstacles and in insisting upon the incorporation of employment standards to prevent undercutting of established domestic labour standards. Although on occasion these discussions seemed to retard the recruiting of such groups, in the long run they probably prevented resentments and local labour disputes, which would certainly have arisen had there not been consultation first.

The most extensive discussions related to the use of prisoners of war and of foreign workers, especially Mexicans. In the course of these discussions there were on several occasions splits between the agricultural management members and the rest of the Committee; sometimes the representative of the National Farmers' Union sided with the industrial management and industrial labour members in insisting that, in the first place, the need for importation of foreign workers or use of prisoners of war must be adequately proved, and that, in the second place, minimum standards must be set up to protect domestic labour. One labour member voted against use of prisoners of war, and consequently the policy had to be implemented without unanimity. It required that prisoners might be used only after consultation in each instance with the appropriate Area Management-Labor Committee. Similarly, consultation took place in the Policy Committee and at the local level regarding the use of Jamaican and other workers brought in by agreement between the Government of the United States and that of the country of which the workers were nationals.

The stand of the Committee was not consistent throughout. For example, in regard to minority groups the Committee at one period was prepared to support the operation of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices and to ensure the working out of co-operative relationships between the Committee and the management-labour groups at various levels. Many members were unwilling, however, to take responsibility for positively advocating the policies developed by the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.\(^1\) In discussing means to overcome opposition by

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1. The original Committee on Fair Employment Practices was set up within the Office of Production Management and then transferred to the War Manpower Commission. A new Committee established by Executive Order of the President replaced the earlier body and was given authority to promote fullest use of all available manpower and to eliminate discriminatory practices on the basis of race, colour or creed. Under a War Manpower Commission directive, any employers who violated the standards fixed by the Fair Employment Practices Committee would not be entitled to have workers sent to them by the United States Employment Service.
either workers or employers to the use of foreign or non-white labour, the labour members suggested that a direct approach by local representatives of management and labour would achieve greater success than would agencies such as the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.

Utilisation Procedures

In January 1943, after study of the proposals of the War Manpower Commission staff, the Policy Committee adopted a policy statement supporting proposals for better utilisation of the national manpower. Because the management members of the Committee feared any encroachment on management's responsibility for plant operation, the 1943 programme carried out by the War Manpower Commission staff was limited to studies in plants where the management voluntarily accepted application of the War Manpower Commission's utilisation techniques. During 1944-45, when the need for proper manpower utilisation became acute, the whole problem was again considered by the Policy Committee. The 1943 statement was re-examined and reaffirmed. The Committee held that Government leadership in securing proper manpower utilisation was entirely proper, and that the War Manpower Commission, after consultation with the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees, should withhold its services from employers and employees who refused to co-operate in conserving manpower.

Unanimity on this point within the Policy Committee was unobtainable, for two of the agricultural members feared it would be construed as opposition to national service legislation, but the Committee recommended to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission that a policy statement be issued over the signatures of the seven concurring principals. However, the Chairman considered it inexpedient to issue such a release at a time when manpower legislation was pending, although he assured the Committee that all suggestions would be studied.

Committee Proposals for Protection of Labour Standards

The Policy Committee, especially on the labour side, was vigilant to protect labour standards, such as seniority rights, wages, and conditions of employment of women and children. Discussions regarding protection of seniority and re-employment rights in case of transfer to essential industry were often held on Committee initiative. Labour members urged the inclusion of a wage standard as a condition of granting a manpower priority to an establishment in need of workers. However, in July 1944 a suggestion was made to the Committee that if 75 per cent. of the workers in an establish-
ment were receiving the minimum "substandards" of living wages fixed by the War Labor Board, the establishment, if otherwise eligible, should be entitled to designation as "locally needed". As this was a lowering of the standard, which required that all workers in an establishment be paid minimum "substandards" approved by the War Labor Board, the labour members of the Committee were unalterably opposed. They also objected to restraining workers from leaving a plant which did not meet the minimum standard previously in effect. By a compromise it was left to the discretion of the Area Management-Labor Committee, which on a unanimous recommendation might permit the Area Director to make an exception if special circumstances or local conditions warranted, always provided that any employee of such an establishment should be free to seek employment elsewhere.

The Committee also initiated discussions relating to conditions of employment of women and young persons and in particular gave attention to the principle of equal pay for equal work.

**Review of Government Actions on Manpower**

Actions of other agencies, particularly where taken without prior consultation with the Committee, were freely discussed. For example, management members protested the issue by the President of the Executive Order prescribing a 48-hour minimum work-week because they believed that the need for the Order should have been previously considered by the Committee. For some time previous to the issuance of the Order, the Committee had been considering the matter of lengthening the work-week to 48 hours, but agreement was delayed partly by management's fear of undue economic hardship for some producers and the difficulties of implementation for some industries, and partly by labour's desire for safeguards against unemployment and loss of seniority rights. Agreement was on the point of being reached when the Executive Order No. 9301 of 9 February 1943 was issued. Although disturbed by the absence of consultation regarding the Order itself, the Committee took an active part in drafting the War Manpower Commission Regulation 3, which implemented the Order, and later discussed possible amendments, received reports on its practical operation and dealt with appeals that arose from its application.

There are many other instances of the Committee's interest in actions taken by other agencies, for it was determined not to be sidetracked or to act as a rubber stamp on any policy. Management and labour were one in their insistence on being consulted in advance on any manpower policy and in their resentment when this was not done.
Advice on Specific Operating Questions

From time to time the Committee concerned itself with specific operating difficulties which led to intervention in individual cases, or in certain industries. This departure from the policy-making or consultative role was not on the whole successful. In dealing with a matter of policy the Committee's approach was constructive and helpful, but for drafting specific operating instructions to the field officials the War Manpower Commission staff found it unsatisfactory.

Attitude to the United States Employment Service

Recognising that the actual application of policies in the field of manpower would ultimately devolve upon the United States Employment Service, the Policy Committee watched its operation and considered its problems with a somewhat critical eye. It recommended, after comparatively short discussion, the original directive of the War Manpower Commission calling for the preparation of a list of essential occupations to guide Employment Service placement and recruitment activities, to assist Selective Service boards in deferment policies and to aid in allocating training programmes.

When the role of the Employment Service became increasingly important under stabilisation plans and particularly under controlled referral procedures, the Policy Committee devoted much more thorough study to its operating policies and programmes. In September 1942, when lack of appropriations was handicapping the effectiveness of the Service, the Policy Committee adopted a strong resolution for submission to Congress emphasising that the Service was the most vital agency in the nation's manpower mobilisation programme. Furthermore, the Policy Committee was particularly concerned to have assurance that the Employment Service was not too rigid in its administration of the stabilisation plans, which restricted a worker's freedom to leave his job, or regarding priority referral programmes which limited the number of jobs offered to the worker or number of workers referred to employers.

Current Information on Labour Supply Needs

The Committee was always kept informed of labour market developments through the review of the general progress of the manpower programme, and of the extent to which production at any given time failed to meet scheduled needs because of manpower difficulties. Initially the Committee complained of lack of information. To facilitate discussion the staff of the War Manpower Commission presented to the Committee general reports, outlining the activities of the Commission and the current classification of labour
markets into four groups according to adequacy of labour supply. During the intensified production programme in early 1945, in view of the "must" plant situation\(^1\), the more general material was supplemented by current reports indicating employment trends in programmes on the national production urgency list, confidential information from the War Production Board concerning the status of the war production programme, and more detailed information concerning difficulties in the staffing of plants in individual areas.

Post-European War Employment Planning

The employment problems and policies likely to arise at the end of the European war were first discussed by the Policy Committee early in the autumn of 1944, when European hostilities seemed to be drawing to a close. Two aspects were considered: first, the kinds of controls that might be eased in the transition period and the role of the Management-Labor Committees in regard to this relaxation; and second, the War Manpower Commission's plans for service to returning veterans and the association of Management-Labor Committees in this work. With the increased urgency of invasion needs during the winter of 1944-45 these plans were put aside for concentration on staffing "must" plants and related problems.

In April 1945 the staff of the War Manpower Commission re-opened the transition problem by presenting to the Policy Committee its own proposals. At the same time the Policy Committee requested the liaison officer of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to present reports on the co-ordinated plans being developed there. Much of the discussion in Committee dealt with the relation of War Manpower Commission programmes during the period between VE Day and VJ Day to proposals for relaxing controls by other agencies\(^2\), and to policies for the allocation of cut-backs and stimulation of industrial reconversion. The Policy Committee was particularly concerned to ensure that Area Management-Labor Committees should be associated with local decisions for maintenance or relaxation of manpower controls.

As a result of full discussion a programme was developed and was announced by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commis-

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\(^1\) From the middle of 1944 the Production Executive Committee of the War Production Board (see Chapter VII) designated a selected list of production programmes as "must", and consequently required that individual plants engaged on a "must" programme should receive first consideration, nationally and locally, for the receipt of manpower. During the first months of 1945 a special drive was made by the War Manpower Commission and the other departments concerned to bring to the attention of interdepartmental and of labour-management committees at every level the needs of individual "must" plants so as to ensure that these plants obtained the best available manpower.

\(^2\) In particular, War Labor Board wage policies and War Production Board material controls.
sion on 11 May 1945, with the unanimous agreement of the Com-
mittee, for reclassification of labour market areas after 1 July, with
maintenance of controls in areas of labour shortage, their progres-
sive relaxation on an optional basis in consultation with local
Management-Labor Committees in balanced labour market areas,
and their elimination in surplus areas. Interim arrangements were
announced for the period up to 1 July. As some aspects of this pro-
gramme were not wholly accepted in some regions and areas, the
Chairman, at the suggestion of the Policy Committee, invited at
least two members of each Regional Committee to meet with the
National Committee and the Regional Directors on 31 May and
1 June to discuss manpower and production conditions, and to
obtain their views on the timing and adequacy of the War Man-
power Commission's new programme.

This Conference\(^1\) marked an innovation in consultative pro-
dcedures by the War Manpower Commission, and its conclusions
were particularly significant in relation to the planning for the final
period of the war and for post-war reconversion. The Regional
Committee members, like the Regional Directors of the War Man-
power Commission, were anxious to increase local responsibility
in the adaptation of plans and to place the initiative for either main-
tenance or removal of controls at the area level. The acceptance
by the Chairman of the unanimous statement of opinion adopted
by the Conference caused some change in the policies of the War
Manpower Commission. The statement is quoted in full:

The first statement is an expression of commendation on the success of the
voluntary manpower system. It is requested that the Congress and the nation
be fully informed of the achievements of the War Manpower Commission Man-
agement-Labor Committees.

The second statement is an expression of a pledge by management and labour
to furnish an abundance of supplies for the speedy prosecution of the Japanese war.

The third statement is an expression about wartime manpower controls.
The following text was accepted as the most accurate expression of the opinion
of the group:

"War manpower controls should be removed from management and labour
in an orderly manner consistent with war production needs and the prevention
of mass unemployment.

"Origin of a decision to retain or remove any or all area controls in an area or
in a plant in an area shall come from the War Manpower Commission Area
Director and the Area Management-Labor Committee.

"Such a decision should be effective at the end of ten days after notice of the
action is received by the Regional Director unless the order should be vetoed
within that period by the Regional Director in consultation with the Regional
Management-Labor Committee; but if the Regional Director approves the order
it should be effective immediately.

\(^1\) Described somewhat more fully in Chapter VIII, concerning relationships
between Management-Labor Committees.
"Nothing in this recommendation should be construed to abrogate any existing appeal privileges."

The fourth statement is an expression concerning suddenness of lay-offs upon cancellation or cutback of war contracts. It is recommended that the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission use his influence to establish a policy by the Government with respect to war contracts that will permit employers to give 30 days' notice before workers are separated from payrolls if there are to be lay-offs or discharges.

**SUMMARY**

The above examples of activities do not present an exhaustive account either of the history of the Committee or of the problems the Committee helped to resolve. In its three years of operation there were few aspects of the manpower programme that it did not touch upon with greater or less effect. Furthermore, only passing reference has been made here to its contribution to the development of standards for women's employment, the relation it had to national and State standards of protective labour policies, to unemployment insurance, to defence of collective bargaining arrangements, and to attempts to decrease turnover and find solutions for absenteeism through better housing, billeting, child care, and feeding facilities, transport arrangements and other methods of improving working conditions. The examples noted of the actions of the Committee on specific policies have been chosen because they illustrate its role in the development of a voluntary organisation for manpower mobilisation and effective use based on group co-operation. In general it may be concluded that the National Committee was least successful when it undertook to deal with administrative or operating aspects of policy questions or with specific problems such as those of the "must" plants. It was most successful in connection with broad policy and in insisting upon safeguards to protect the needs of the various groups it represented. Its achievements can ultimately be judged only by how much it contributed to the wartime production record — $5,000,000,000 of munitions production per month by the end of 1944 — carried out by the use of voluntary methods and with the full collaboration of management and labour.
CHAPTER III

REGIONAL MANPOWER ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Soon after the establishment of the War Manpower Commission, the Chairman delegated to twelve Regional War Manpower Directors the responsibility for carrying out programmes within each region; each Director was to be advised by a Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.\(^1\) The new set-up took over some of the management and labour representatives of the Regional Labor Supply Committees of the Office of Production Management. In some regions continuity in administration and in concepts of organisation was provided by staff transfers. However, since devolution of authority was the fundamental characteristic of the operation of the War Manpower Commission, there remained in actual practice substantial variety and local autonomy within each region and area.

METHOD OF ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL MANAGEMENT-LABOR COMMITTEES

The initial composition, proposed by the War Manpower Commission staff and agreed to by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, was for each Regional Committee to consist of two representatives of the American Federation of Labor, two representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, one representative of the railway labour organisations, and five representatives of management. Representatives were to be nominated by their respective groups on the National Committee, approved by the National Committee as a whole, and formally appointed to the Regional Committees by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

\(^1\) The geographic divisions on which the regional structure was based were those previously established by the Social Security Board. The 12 regional offices were located in: Region 1, Boston, Mass.; Region 2, New York, N.Y.; Region 3, Philadelphia, Pa.; Region 4, Washington, D.C.; Region 5, Cleveland, Ohio; Region 6, Chicago, Ill.; Region 7, Atlanta, Ga.; Region 8, Minneapolis, Minn.; Region 9, Kansas City, Mo.; Region 10, Dallas, Texas; Region 11, Denver, Colo.; Region 12, San Francisco, Calif. (Region 12 includes Alaska). There was a 13th region comprising the Hawaiian Islands, which had its own Director and Management-Labor Committee.
Shortly after the adoption of these proposals, the question of agricultural management and labour representation was raised. The problem was particularly acute in sections where farm labour relations differed substantially from those in other parts of the country. When the National Policy Committee was reorganised on the basis of representative organisations, including agriculture, it suggested that a similar change be made in the regional structure. The Policy Committee, however, never reached agreement on the desirable extent of agricultural representation and, therefore, the Regional Committees continued more or less as initially set up, without including representatives of agriculture.

Similarly, the question of representation of women on Regional and Area Committees was discussed at length by the Policy Committee. In January 1943 the Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee asked that women, selected for their knowledge of management and labour, be appointed to the Regional and Area Committees, and in April proposed that (1) women should be considered when representatives of management, labour and agriculture were being appointed to Area and Regional Committees; (2) where committees had already been set up, women representing the three groups should be added; and (3) the Committee encourage the formation of Women's Advisory Committees, representatives of which would attend the Management-Labor Committees as observers or participants. On 20 April 1943, the Management-Labor Policy Committee recommended to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission "that Women's Advisory Committees be set up and one member sit as an observer at, and participant in, the discussions of the Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees." However, this suggestion was followed out in only a few regions.

There were no specific requirements concerning the types of representatives on Regional Committees; in general, the provision that individuals should be nominated was designed to provide that the representatives would serve on the committees, not as advocates of the point of view or policies of their particular group, but as

1 See p. 32.
2 The question was considered at meetings during 1943 on 5 and 19 March, 2, 9 and 20 April, 11 May (in connection with administrative changes in field organisation), 18 May, and 15 and 22 June.
3 In practice, three of the committees contained 3 representatives of the A.F. of L. and no representatives of the Railroad Brotherhoods. One of the 5 representatives of management of each committee was selected from railroad management. The Regional Committee from Hawaii included 3 general management representatives, one for railroad management, 2 from the A.F. of L. and 2 from the C.I.O. In one region an informal arrangement was made to add the former Deputy Regional Director to the committee as a "public" member. In another region, the former Regional Director was one of the management members of the committee.
individuals approaching a manpower question from the point of view of the experience and knowledge obtained from their respective labour or management background. In a few regions one or more of the management members were, in fact, officials of employer associations rather than individual industrialists.

The principle of selection of regional members as individuals rather than for their representative capacity is in contrast to the basis of selection of the National Policy Committee. This difference in method had little effect upon the labour members of the Regional Committees, since, as members or officers of labour unions, they consulted with and frequently put forward the views of their organisations. Nevertheless, in most cases the Regional members accepted the concept of individual service to the War Manpower Commission, consulting with their respective organisations but not receiving or accepting instructions from them. The sense of responsibility for the decisions reached in committee was a basic factor in the use of the advisory committee structure throughout the War Manpower Commission.

FUNCTIONS

A formal definition of the functions of Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees, agreed to by the national headquarters staff and the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, provided that they should serve as "consultants" to the Regional Directors "within the scope of policies and instructions issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission".

Three specific organisational functions were given to the Regional Committees, as follows: to advise the Regional Director regarding methods for securing full participation by Area Committees in the manpower programme; to render assistance with respect to area situations beyond the scope of an Area Committee, or situations "which require the participation of an impartial, non-area representative"; and to review recommendations of Area Committees making recommendations to the Regional Director. In practice, Regional Committees only occasionally acted in accordance with these specific functions.

METHODS OF OPERATION

The methods of operation of Regional Committees were left very largely to the discretion of the individual Regional War Manpower Director. In almost all cases he served as the chairman.¹ The majority of Committees provided for alternates who might

¹ In one region at least for a long period it was the custom for the Deputy Director to be responsible for committee operation and, frequently, to preside over the meetings.
replace or accompany regular Committee members. In some cases the Committees specifically decided against the appointment or use of alternate members because it was desired to impress upon the Committee members that it was primarily their personal advice which was sought.

Meetings

Most Regional Committees met approximately once a month, but this varied according to the degree of interest in the manpower programme at different periods. There were far more frequent meetings of Regional Committees in the early period, and whenever an important directive or new policy was under consideration. During the summer and autumn of 1944, when few new policies were being developed, there seemed to be insufficient problems of interest to warrant calling the Committees together.

Some of the Regional Committees met in private session, attended by members of the staff directly concerned with problems before the Committee. Other Regional Committees were frequently attended by representatives of other Governmental agencies and departments, including the War Production Board, the procurement agencies, the Selective Service System and the Civil Service Commission. In almost all cases representatives of other agencies were called in when a special problem was under consideration on which an explanation was desired. In still other regions the regular meeting of the Regional Committee was attended by State or Area Directors from the respective States or areas within the region. A few Regional Committee meetings were open to the press.

Similar diversity between regions is found in the relationship of the staff to the Regional Committee and to the local committees operating within the region. In some cases the Regional Director kept the members fully informed; in others, members were called together infrequently and the Directors thus avoided presenting more than generalised issues.

Methods of Voting

Methods of voting also varied. Some Committees required unanimous votes on policy questions. Others arranged for a careful balance between votes from either side so that the number of persons present should never affect the principle of equality of representation. Still others voted only on appeals cases, leaving the

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1 In some cases the Regional or Deputy Regional Director of the War Production Board, in other cases the regional representative of the Office of Labor Production.

2 Apparently the Committees were not attended by representatives from the War Labor Board.
Chairman to interpret the sense of the meeting. Usually, however, Committee members preferred to register formal votes.

In almost all regions some procedure was evolved for drawing up resolutions for transmission through the Regional Director to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Such resolutions covered a wide range in subject matter, such as suggestions concerning part-time employment, proposals for closing hours of places of amusement or plans for “sharing workers” among employers, and even suggestions for modifying and improving unemployment compensation procedures.

**Documentation and Administration**

The documentation of a Regional Committee was normally considered private, with minutes being distributed to the members of the Committee regionally and to national headquarters. In a few regions a specific official was made responsible for preparation of Committee meetings and ensuring that Committee recommendations were followed out.

There was the same diversity in the method of preparing for meetings, planning the agenda and transmitting information to headquarters. In some cases members were canvassed before a meeting for suggestions for the agenda, which, whenever practicable, was circulated in advance. In others, the agenda was based largely on a report of the Director and on questions brought up informally in the course of the meeting. While normally minutes and resolutions were transmitted to headquarters, in only two regions were formal annual reports prepared.

**Examples of Activities of Regional Committees**

In spite of the formal definition of the functions of Regional Committees, adopted by the Management-Labor Policy Committee, there were in practice wide differences in the specific responsibilities assumed by each Regional Committee. Furthermore, the scope of activities changed from time to time as the manpower programme required greater or less collaboration of labour and management. Many Committees which had been active in the formulation and amendment of the programme, especially with regard to stabilisation plans, lost interest once the issue of directives such as Regulation 7 indicated that some of their delegated responsibilities were being assumed by national headquarters.

**“Board of Directors” Concept**

In some regions, when a Regional Management-Labor Committee was first set up, the Regional Director’s view was that it
was a board of directors determining manpower policy and governing his operations. This idea remained firm in certain regions, especially where the opinion prevailed that clearance had to be obtained from the Committee before any new policy might be tried or transmitted to Area Directors and Area Committees for consideration. In these regions Committees debated at considerable length not only the development of stabilisation plans within the region, but practically all the problems debated by the Policy Committee, such as use of foreign labour or prisoners of war, determination of local wage standards, institution of priority referral and employment ceilings.

In most instances, however, as a result of the increasingly uniform character of the national manpower programme, the "board of directors" idea was gradually replaced by a narrower one of consultation. The change in some cases gave the Committees a feeling of frustration but, where they continued to function as a sounding board for the Regional Director, they remained effective.

"Testing Ground" Concept

A most effective use of the Regional Committee was as a "testing ground" to permit the Regional Director to obtain typical reactions to proposed policies or activities in order to plan adaptations to meet the requirements of the region. This permitted active Committees to propose alternative procedures and programmes better suited to given regions than those emanating from either the Regional Director or the national office. Some Committees suggested methods for using part-time labour, procedures for recruiting new workers (particularly women) and publicity programmes to overcome community or State-wide resistance to national proposals approved by the Regional Committee.

Regional Committees also contributed valuable advice on such issues as post-VE Day policies, veterans' employment problems, extension of training programmes and improved utilisation procedures. One Committee developed a detailed plan to encourage the elimination of travel by the exchange of workers between plants on a voluntary basis. Another placed particular emphasis on projects for the control of turn-over and absenteeism, and urged the Regional Director to promote such projects throughout the region.

The adoption of resolutions on the local effect of specific policies, which the Regional Director could transmit to headquarters, was often a most useful device to strengthen the hand of the Regional Director. It furthered the decentralisation of policy development and determination of national policy as a result of regional action. For example, one region, in discussing the extension of con-
trolled referral programmes\(^1\) adopted, with one negative employer vote, a resolution pointing out that the most effective allocation of the labour force in furtherance of the war effort was hampered by the co-existence of widely differing wage and working conditions. It therefore requested:

1. That the Regional Director make all possible representations through appropriate channels to the Director of War Mobilization for the adjustment on either an industry or area basis of those wage ceilings which are currently so low as to interfere with an adequate flow of manpower and with the proper operation of controlled referral plans;

2. That a copy of this Resolution be forwarded to the Headquarters office of the War Manpower Commission and to the National Management-Labor Policy Committee.

Another example of a Regional Committee's expression to headquarters of local reaction against a national proposal concerned the "cut-back" programme. Because adequate advance information in regard to production readjustments was not available to permit either the employers or the workers to plan for shifts in employment, the Committee unanimously adopted a resolution on the joint motion of an employer and a labour member in which it recommended to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and to the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, that the "Commission proceed as quickly as possible to take up the matter of production cut-backs with the appropriate procurement agencies" to the end that "an adequate system of procedures be developed whereby sufficient advance information on such production readjustments be given to contractors and to the interested Government agencies", and that the procedures "be immediately and fully adhered to so that every possible measure can be taken in time to avoid wasteful loss of manpower, production and damage to morale".

Regional Committees acted also as "sounding boards" in regard to wage policies where the members felt national directives to be unrealistic in terms of actual practice in the region. For example, many Regional Committees indicated that they considered staffing of the foundry industry to be closely related to wage rate adjustments, and to require "rare and unusual" treatment on the part of the War Labor Board.\(^2\)

In contrast to these constructive examples, in some cases, particularly where the Regional Committee insisted upon unanimity, its influence was rather negative and in some instances it even acted as a "bottleneck" on transmission to headquarters of pro-

\(^1\) Controlled referral or directed placement has been described in the preceding chapter under stabilisation programmes and related policies.

\(^2\) See Chapter XV for explanation of War Labor Board practice.
posals from Area Committees. In these circumstances the Regional Director had to decide whether to side-track or overrule the Committee or whether to act on a disputed vote.

"Liaison" or "Interpretative" Concept

A more limited view of the functions of a Regional Committee conceived it as a liaison agency to interpret the War Manpower Commission's policies to the organisations and economic or civic groups within the region, as a means of obtaining a better reception for policies which might otherwise be resented. Where this function supplemented regular consultation on policy, it was a contribution to committee work; where it was used by the Regional Director as a substitute for more fundamental consultation, it restricted the committee's utility. One regional office definitely regarded the interpretative function as the chief duty of the committee, and endeavoured to develop this idea rather than to encourage committee discussions of specific policies.

The liaison function was very unevenly carried out, partly because on many occasions headquarters did not give the regional organisation sufficient time to prepare the ground for public reception of a new policy. Some of the difficulties that arose over acceptance of Regulation 7, over the 48-hour work week, and over priority referral and ceiling programmes, might have been avoided or at least lessened had Regional Committees been willing to take responsibility for interpreting the policies to groups of employers and workers, and had they had time to do so before the policies were put into effect. The adoption of resolutions urging co-operation¹, such as those in response to the Management-Labor Policy Committee resolution of May 1944, and to the request for co-operation on the extension of priority referral programmes, are examples of useful committee liaison work. However, the effect of these resolutions largely depended upon the follow-up work done by Regional Committee members through addressing groups of employers and by bringing pressure upon the trade union organisations to make them effective.

¹ The following is a typical example:

"Whereas, the nationwide programme for priority referral of male workers has now been in effect in this region since July 1, 1944, and whereas, evidence has already developed which indicates that this programme is proving of material assistance in filling urgent job openings and hence to the successful prosecution of the war, therefore, be it resolved that the . . . Regional Labor-Management Committee of the War Manpower Commission call upon all representatives of labour and management in this region to actively assist the War Manpower Commission in the equitable and efficient administration of the priority referral programme, and thus aid in the effective prosecution of the war."
The interpretative role of many Regional Committees remained somewhat general in concept and meagre in effect. Some Committees undertook concrete programmes of public relations to promote community understanding of manpower needs, and to this end met with community organisations and issued public statements. Other Committees considered that this function belonged primarily to the local Area Committee and therefore restricted their own activities to stimulating the Area Committee members, approaching directly only those groups which were inaccessible to the local committee.

"Co-ordination" Concept

Another aspect of some Regional Committee activities was the part they took either in channelling and co-ordinating the activities of Area Committees or delegating to them functions that might be carried at either level. Especially in regions where Committee members came from widely scattered places and were not accessible for continuous consultation, their functions tended to be limited to hearing reports on the operation of the manpower programme in the region, bringing to the attention of the regional office certain area difficulties and ratifying rather than influencing general policies. In such instances many of the functions of the Regional Committee in practice devolved upon State or Area Committees. The Regional Committee then continued rather in the role of "co-ordinator" than of "consultant".

The varying degrees of delegation of authority to the area level were reflected in the differing attitudes of Regional Committees to their responsibilities in the development and operation of employment stabilisation plans. All Regional Committees kept in close touch with this process but the degree of concern in the plans themselves was very varied. In all cases resolutions originating in areas or at the national level and requiring modification of plans were channelled through Regional Committees. In some instances responsibility was assumed at an early stage by the Regional Committee for developing regional standards, reviewing in detail the stabilisation plans developed at the local level, and examining every amendment as the plans changed from time to time. In other regions, however, the Regional Committee left much greater responsibility to the local Committee. Either interpretation conformed with national policy, which merely required that at the regional level the Regional Manpower Director review the area stabilisation programme and approve it as submitted "or as amended by him in consultation with the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee".
Operating Functions

In some regions the Committee itself served as an operating instrument of the Regional Director. Thus, in one case a sub-committee was appointed to collaborate with the regional and area staff and Committee members in solving the problems of certain “must” plants which had been particularly difficult to man. This experience was not, however, very successful.

Committee members sometimes directly assisted the Regional Director with regard to relationships with other departments, as when members of the Regional Management-Labor Committee appeared before the War Labor Board at the request of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission and advanced their views concerning possible solutions for the manning of the foundry industry.

Functions Under Specific Regulations: Labour Disputes and Job Referrals

Regional Committees were also given some specific functions under regulations applying the war manpower programme. An example is the provision in regard to referrals to jobs vacant owing to a labour dispute. The policy, approved by the National Management-Labor Committee on 31 August 1943, provided that no referrals were to be made by local employment offices of the United States Employment Service which would aid directly or indirectly in filling a job "(a) which is vacant because the former occupant is on strike or is being locked out in the course of a labour dispute, or (b) the filling of which is an issue in a labour dispute". In spite of these provisions the Regional Director was empowered to direct referrals to jobs involved in disputes if he determined “that the making of such referrals is in the best interest of the war effort”. Under ordinary circumstances he would not raise the question of referral to a job in dispute, but if he considered the circumstances exceptional he was required to consult both the Government agencies concerned with the adjustment of the dispute and his own Regional Management-Labor Committee before issuing statements of availability to the workers concerned.

Experience with the administration of this policy gave rise to difficulties at the regional and local levels, particularly in regard to interpreting the filling of a job “which is an issue in a labour dispute”. Furthermore, Regional Directors considered that the procedure for making exceptions to the policy was sometimes long and cumbersome, particularly in regions where the members of the

1 War Manpower Commission Policy, 21 October 1943.
Regional Committee were not easily available. An alternative suggestion providing for a recommendation from an Area Management-Labor Committee in lieu of consultation with the Regional Committee was never adopted.

**Compliance Functions**

The role of Regional Committees in assisting the Regional Directors to obtain compliance with general and specific programmes was important in all regions. For example, the regulations concerning the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission in regard to minority groups and discriminatory practices provided that Regional and Area Directors should call upon their Management-Labor Committees for assistance in eliminating "any real or imaginary difficulties with respect to the employment of certain minority groups involved in the operation of the stabilisation programme".\(^1\) Similarly, Committee members frequently assisted in obtaining compliance with orders such as the 48-hour minimum work-week, and received appeals under these regulations.

The usefulness of a Regional Committee in dealing with questions of non-compliance was illustrated in one region where certain engineering firms were employing technical and skilled men and reselling their services to industry at a profit. The Regional Committee gave widespread publicity to a resolution which unequivocably condemned "the disruptive and illegal activities of these camouflaged labour brokers"; supported the Regional Director "in whatever steps he may consider necessary to suppress the practice"; recommended him, first, to request that the War Labor Board "take appropriate legal action to enforce the Wage Stabilisation Act in these cases"; second, to negotiate "with the Procurement Agencies of the Armed Services with a view to their disallowance of charges made by these spurious engineering concerns in the settlement of contracts"; and finally urged that the War Manpower Commission "take proper criminal action in cases involving the violation of the applicable statutes and W.M.C. regulations and directives".

In general, Regional Committees co-operated fully in obtaining compliance with manpower regulations and in promoting understanding of the need to respect essential labour controls which had been accepted through voluntary methods. This was particularly important since the whole War Manpower Commission programme was based upon community action and compliance, which in turn

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\(^1\) Procedures developed for handling cases of discrimination include taking of specific action on reports, reviewing the report with the Committees and submitting it to the appropriate Regional Director of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.
made public opinion an essential factor in its practical application. The Regional Committees were of prime importance, therefore, in compliance questions because of their standing in the community and their influence on public opinion.

**SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IN 1945**

Regional Management-Labor Committees undertook varying activities and interpreted their responsibilities somewhat differently as manpower restrictions were extended in application. Regional Directors have testified that they could not have administered the manpower programmes in their regions without the assistance of a Management-Labor Committee, especially in dealing with the organised and civil groups as well as with individual leaders within the community. However, much of this was only made possible through the use of the local Committees at the State and area level. In the spring of 1945¹ the question was raised by members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee as to whether the Committees at both levels were being given a full opportunity to carry out their functions. The discussion indicated that there were still differences in concept regarding the nature of the functions of Committees and what constituted full utilisation. The Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission stated that Regional Committees were chiefly concerned with the operation of policies established at the national level, and that Area Committees were operating groups dealing with the immediate problems arising in their respective areas. The underlying issue involved in this discussion was the difference between the respective views of the staff and the committees regarding the horizontal and vertical relationships of Management-Labor Committees.²

Finally, the work of all the Regional Committees as appeal bodies contributed widely to manpower mobilisation as a whole. Because of their importance the appeals procedures are dealt with in a separate chapter.³ The significance of Regional Committees in general depended not only upon the direct effect of their activities in the various regions but upon their indirect achievements in promoting better community understanding of the manpower problem and improved relationships between representatives of labour and management in each region.

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¹ Discussion in Regional Directors' Conference, 22 February 1945, and Minutes of the Management-Labor Policy Committee, 6 March 1945.
² Discussed more fully in Chapter VI.
³ See Chapter VIII.
CHAPTER IV

ADVISORY ORGANISATION AT THE STATE LEVEL

The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission established an administrative unit at the State level only after the integration of the United States Employment Service within the Commission had called for specific recognition of the State unit and for a supervisory field organisation responsible for work with the various existing Governmental and industrial State agencies. The appointment, wherever they were considered useful, of State Management-Labor Committees to advise State War Manpower Directors came at a still later period in the evolution of the labour supply machinery; at the close of the European war such Committees existed in less than one third of the States.

At this level there were other advisory agencies, set up in connection with the State administration of the Employment Service and in connection with State systems of unemployment compensation, which included in their membership persons from a labour and from a management background. These State advisory agencies are described briefly in order to compare them with the management-labour structure of the War Manpower Commission with a view to the possible future use at the State level of some advisory organisation composed on one or the other basis.

EVOLUTION OF THE ADVISORY AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

Tripartite advisory agencies at the Federal and State levels were called for under the Act of 1933, which established the United States Employment Service and provided for a Federal system of public employment offices. The Act placed the Employment Service in the Federal Department of Labor and made the Department responsible for co-ordinating Federal and State employment offices and for negotiating agreements with the separate States regarding the operation of individual local offices. It also specifically provided for the establishment of a representative Federal Advisory Council and for similar advisory councils at the State level, both Federal and State Councils to be "composed of men and women representing employers and employees in equal num-
bers, and the public". Their purpose was to formulate policies and discuss problems relating to employment, and ensure impartiality, neutrality and freedom from political influence in the solution of such problems.

The Federal Advisory Council, comprising 60 persons selected according to the required tripartite system, was set up immediately. State Advisory Councils were established more gradually as agreements were reached between the individual States and the United States Employment Service.

The State Advisory Councils were given a new function as a result of the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. This called for a joint programme of unemployment compensation and placement, both based upon the use of the State Employment Offices as operating units assisted by the State Advisory Councils.

In 1939, the advisory structure was again given a different emphasis with the transference of the Employment Service from the Department of Labor to the Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security Board. The existing State Advisory Councils were maintained by the Board and the Federal Advisory Council continued as the Federal Advisory Council for Employment Security. At the same time the establishment of State Unemployment Compensation Advisory Councils was encouraged by the Social Security Board. In several States either initially or subsequently these councils were identical with the State Employment Advisory Councils.

During the so-called "defence period" further encouragement was given to the establishment and use of the State and local advisory agencies. The Social Security Board accepted recommendations submitted to it by the Federal Advisory Council for Employment Security and designed to meet wartime needs. They urged that steps be taken to "bring to full strength and effectiveness both State and local Advisory Councils", on a tripartite basis.¹ However, comparatively little progress was made during the following year towards increasing the effectiveness of the State Advisory Councils. At 30 June 1941, thirty-one States had joint advisory councils covering unemployment compensation and the employment service operations; eleven States had two separate councils, one for unemployment compensation and one for the employment service; while four States had employment service councils.² However, although the councils were in existence in 26 States, one or both had not met at all during the previous fiscal year. In January

² No information was available concerning the remaining States and the District of Columbia.
1942, the United States Employment Service was altered for war use from a Federal-State to a nationally operated basis; and in September 1942 it was incorporated in the War Manpower Commission.

At the meeting of the Federal Advisory Council held in October 1942, which followed the transfer of the Service to the War Manpower Commission, the Council was given a full review of the manpower programme and procedures. The recommendations included reiteration of the need for collaboration of management and labour, and for the establishment of local advisory committees of labour, management and public representatives, co-ordinated with advisory groups handling such aspects of other national war measures as affect the labour force, and called for continued study of Federal-State relationships and of relationships between unemployment compensation systems under Social Security Board supervision and employment functions transferred to the War Manpower Commission. The recommendations concluded with the statement: "The extension and utilisation of advisory councils is of special importance at this time when much can be done to obtain full utilisation of our labour supply by co-operation in the locality between employers and employees and the public."

With the development of the War Manpower Commission procedures and consultative bodies, the State Advisory Councils dealing with unemployment compensation entirely dropped their employment service functions. Some of the councils continued to operate throughout the war, although no longer concerned with employment service questions. The Federal Advisory Council itself continued in existence, receiving regular progress reports on unemployment compensation problems as well as of the work of the War Manpower Commission and of various phases of both Federal and State post-war planning. In this connection consideration has been given to the future use of advisory councils and to the advisability of separating in the future State-wide employment service councils from State unemployment compensation advisory councils.

DEVELOPMENT OF WAR MANPOWER ORGANISATION
AT THE STATE LEVEL

When the War Manpower Commission itself was established in April 1942, its field organisation was based on the regional

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1 By telegram, on 15 December 1941, President Roosevelt requested State and Territorial Governors to transfer the State Employment Service facilities to Federal jurisdiction as of 1 January 1942, for the duration of the war, in order to aid in the war production effort.

2 By Executive Order 9247 of 17 September 1942.
organisation of the Bureau of Employment Security and various other Government agencies, which involved subdivision into industrial areas without special regard to State boundaries. When the United States Employment Service was transferred to the Manpower Commission in September 1942, this regional and area administrative organisation was not considered satisfactory, particularly by Congressional representatives from certain States and by those from State administrations who wished to retain the Federal-State pattern of the United States Employment Service as unbroken as possible and to make the greatest possible use of State administrative machinery where it was available.

Therefore, in the spring of 1943, the War Manpower Commission, in agreement with its regional directors, decided that provision should be made within the agency for operation on a State basis under supervision from the regional level. State War Manpower Directors were therefore appointed under the authority of the Regional War Manpower Directors, and the Area War Manpower Directors were placed under the jurisdiction of the State Directors. The local Employment Service office managers remained under the authority of the Area War Manpower Directors.

Each Regional Director was left considerable latitude in determining under the new organisation the inter-relationship between his regional staff and State directors, and his Area Directors, and whether State Management-Labor Committees should be appointed to advise the State Directors in carrying out their responsibilities. Moreover, many Regional Directors did not insist upon strict standardisation of the organisational structure within an individual region, but left it sufficiently flexible to meet the varying problems that inevitably arose out of the geographical diversities within a region. Thus, for example, in some regions the State Director, whose office was located in a most important area, combined the duties of State Director and Area Director; another region split one major State into two, setting up two State offices because of the distance and the location of population and industry within the State. In some parts of this same region the State directors considered Area Directors almost unnecessary, and in other States within the same region the State Directors preferred to work with a larger number of area units.

**STATE MANAGEMENT-LABOR COMMITTEES**

When the State level was added in the administrative organisation of the War Manpower Commission, it had not been expected that State Management-Labor Committees would be necessary
primarily because the State office was to serve as an operating unit within the regional structure, and the Area Management-Labor Committees were deemed adequate for the consultative purposes required by the War Manpower Commission procedures. Nevertheless, State Management-Labor Committees were established in five regions. Of these, some were State Committees which, largely for geographical reasons, took the place of Area Committees, and some were State-wide Committees operating in addition to Area Committees. Furthermore, in two other regions Area Committees in particularly important cities served as State Committees for the whole State.

No formal provision was made for the composition or for the functions of State Management-Labor Committees (except where they acted in place of Area Committees), since the regulations which conferred definite functions on Management-Labor Committees in almost all instances referred to either region or area. The structure, operation, functions and general working of the State Committees were therefore based on the appropriate regulations for Area Management-Labor Committees, to which they may be regarded as analogous.

The addition of a State organisation between the region and the area in many cases caused administrative confusion. The existence of a State Management-Labor Committee sometimes impinged upon the Regional Committee, on the one hand, and the Area Committee on the other. The establishment of three levels of advisory Management-Labor Committees often developed into a rather unwieldy machinery.

It may be argued, nevertheless, that had a State-wide organisation and State-wide advisory Management-Labor Committees been set up at the outset, it might have facilitated some of the inter-relationship between the War Manpower Commission administrative machinery and the work in the field of labour supply and labour protection of some of the separate States. Thus, for example, the bearing of State protective labour legislation and State labour standards on some of the regulations and procedures of the War Manpower Commission might have been more clearly determined if it had been administratively easier to establish some interdepartmental State and Federal committee which included members of the State Management-Labor War Manpower Committees. Similarly, a State structure might have been more closely related to the development of some of the education and training pro-

1 In an early period of the Defense Program a Federal-State co-ordinator had been appointed to deal with the impact of the Federal Defense Program on State policies and to develop co-operation between regional and State Defense Councils.
grammes, since the Office of Education administered its war training programme through State vocational educational offices.\(^1\)

Furthermore, where a State Management-Labor Committee was established instead of an Area Committee, it sometimes proved to be a useful instrument for the administrative consultation of both management and labour groups. The fact that it coincided not only with State organisation, but with the normal unit of both employers' trade associations and of organised trade union federations and councils contributed to the work of these Committees.

\(^1\) In March 1945 there were, under the War Manpower Commission training structure, 12 regional and 156 State and area training councils which included employer and labour representatives in their membership.
CHAPTER V

ADVISORY COMMITTEES OF THE AREA MANPOWER ORGANISATION

The basic unit of the War Manpower Commission consultative structure was the Area Management-Labor Committee, which furnished direct contact between the Area Director and the local community, and advised him on how to make locally practicable those national policies aimed at mobilisation of the nation's manpower. In May 1945, 336 Management-Labor Committees, having a total membership of more than 2,500 people, selected to represent the industrial and agricultural interests of local areas, were carrying the burden of the so-called "voluntary" mobilisation programme.

A few of these Committees were already operating, before the establishment of the War Manpower Commission, as local agencies of the Labor Supply Branch of the Office of Production Management. In a few particularly critical areas, Industrial Area Labor Supply Committees had been set up, composed of two or four representatives of management and labour respectively. They were made responsible for obtaining local acceptance of policies laid down by the National Labor Supply Committee, for obtaining the cooperation of local labour and management in the solution of labour supply policies, and for efficient conversion of plant facilities to achieve war production. The War Manpower Commission took over these Committees, wherever they existed, and elsewhere established new Committees on a similar community-wide basis.

METHODS OF ESTABLISHMENT

Two alternative procedures were approved by the Management-Labor Policy Committee for determining the composition and method of selection of Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees. The ordinary procedure, based upon the earlier practice in establishing local Committees, was for an Area Committee to be composed of one or two representatives of the A.F. of L., one or two representatives of the C.I.O. and two or four representatives of management. Where a transportation problem existed, the Area Committee was to be enlarged to include a representative of railway labour organisations and a representative of railroad man-
agement. If the Committee were so constituted, the Regional Man-
power Director requested nominations from industrial employer
associations or other appropriate groups in the area, the local A.F.
of L. and C.I.O. organisations and, where appropriate, the railway
management and railway labour unions, and from these nomina-
tions he appointed the members of the Area Committee.

An alternative procedure was applied in areas where this normal
composition was not deemed sufficiently representative. It could be
adopted on the authority of the Regional Director after consulta-
tion with the Regional Management-Labor Committee. A number
of Area Committees thereby included in their composition either
a special representative of agricultural labour, an independent
labour representative, or a representative of agricultural manage-
ment, the latter usually chosen from the American Farm Bureau
Federation or the National Grange. This flexibility permitted
specific agricultural representation where deemed necessary, and
provided for labour representatives in a few cases from organisa-
tions independent of the two national congresses, provided such
independent unions had been certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.

The selection of many of the Area Committees was carried out
by more informal procedures, particularly in areas where some
disagreement had arisen either over the labour representation or
over the inability to agree as to the representative capacity of in-
dividuals from an area. It was sometimes found necessary to call
upon a member of the national headquarters staff of the War Man-
power Commission to get agreement upon Committee members.
Similar disagreement sometimes required further informal negotia-
tion before an Area Director acceptable to the local community
could be found.

In areas where there had been a jurisdictional conflict or a
request for representation of an independent union, protracted
negotiations were called for before nominations for Area Committee
membership were accepted by the Regional Committee. The re-
quirement that the Regional Committee be consulted upon the
method of selection of the members of Area Committees was a
useful safeguard in ensuring bona fide representation. On the other
hand, the interpretation of this provision by a number of Regional
Committees that they must give their approval and not merely be
consulted led in some instances to difficult controversies and post-
ponement of Committee appointments.

The size of Area Committees varied from a minimum of 4 mem-
bers to a maximum of 18. Most Committees had alternate as well
as principal members.
Functions

The National Management-Labor Policy Committee and the staff of the War Manpower Commission, in defining the functions of Area Committees, enlarged the initial definition of functions given to the local labour supply committees under the Office of Production Management.¹

Each Area Committee was to be responsible for:

(a) obtaining local co-operation in executing the policies and programmes approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(b) obtaining the co-operation of local management and labour in the solution, on a local basis, of all manpower problems relating primarily to management, labour, or management and labour, such solutions to be within the framework of the policies and programme approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(c) facilitating the work of the War Manpower Commission in effecting the orderly transfer of needed workers to essential activities;

(d) hearing complaints of individual workers or employers, or groups of workers or employers, concerning any action or failure to act by local representatives of Governmental agencies which were carrying out any part of the programme of the War Manpower Commission, the Committee making recommendations to the Area Manpower Director concerning such cases.

In addition, formal provisions were made concerning the review of Area Committee recommendations by a Regional Committee, and the role of an Area Committee with regard to appeals.² Furthermore, additional specific functions were given to Area Committees in virtue of stabilisation regulations and other policies and rules evolved under the War Manpower Commission programme; other duties were undertaken by Area Committees in the 1944-45 period in dealing with specific difficulties in the staffing of "must" plants, in meeting manpower problems that arose under the 1945 production step-up, and finally in conjunction with the work of the Manpower Priorities Committees described in Chapter VII.

Methods of Operation

Area Committees were left free to determine their own methods of operation, including schedule of meetings, attendance and degree of formality. Consequently it is practically impossible to generalise as to their practice. In almost all instances the Committee met under the chairmanship of the Area Director, who had no vote; in a few instances the chairmanship was carried by a member of the Committee. There was obviously a direct relationship between the regularity of meetings, the degree of interest in committee work and the effectiveness of the Committee in advising the Area Director.

¹ See above, Chapter I, p. 11.
² See Chapter VIII.
concerning the operation of the manpower programme. For example, one Committee met almost without interruption on a weekly basis from its establishment in September 1942, and participated in every development within its area; another Committee, which had only a limited role, under a weak director, met at irregular intervals, and had no meetings over periods of three months. Many Committees met weekly as a general rule in the early stages of the stabilisation programme, but later tended to meet less frequently and showed poor attendance when meetings were called.

Many committee meetings were attended by representatives of other Government agencies, but some objected to the attendance at their meetings of anyone not directly concerned with the work of the Committee. Sometimes, however, meetings were informal and anyone who could contribute to the discussion of a problem was welcomed.

Public Relations

Although the majority of Committees did not invite the press to attend their meetings, in a number of instances this became a regular practice, and in others every meeting was made at least the occasion for a conference with the local press representatives. The question of publicity and press relations is obviously different in small communities and in large cities. However, the relation of the Committees to the press was a significant factor in the acceptance of many restrictive regulations. Although local publicity was frequently good, the discussion on national service legislation showed that there was inadequate total or nation-wide public knowledge of the constructive work and large responsibilities carried by the Area Committees.

Documentation

There was the same diversity of practice in regard to committee documentation. In some cases committee minutes were rather widely distributed and a full record kept. In other cases, a bare outline of proceedings was made available to committee members and submitted to the regional office. In general, where the Committees were conducted with the aid of formal agenda, documentation and regular reporting, there was a correspondingly serious concern with the work undertaken. One weakness in the operation of a number of Committees was the inexperience of the Manpower Director in handling Committees, and therefore lack of guidance in discussion and lack of preparation by committee members prior to meetings. Often Committees were hampered by members lacking the time to give adequate attention to the work. But an outstand-
ing feature of most of the Committees was their cordial relationship with the State or Area Director and the personal confidence that developed between the Director and the members.¹

Some Area Committees, like some Regional Committees, insisted upon unanimity as a basis for action, but in most instances the Committees were able to dispense with a vote except on specific formal questions, such as appeals.

Many Area Management-Labor Committees, like Regional Committees, made use of subcommittees (or in a few instances executive committees) to carry out their functions and on occasion delegated to individual members specific tasks on behalf of the Committee. In some cases subcommittees or individual members were asked to represent the Management-Labor Committee on other community committees set up to carry out special war programmes or to bring a wider backing to the War Manpower Commission itself. Thus, for example, in many areas the Management-Labor Committee delegated members to serve on Veterans Information Committees, or to work with local Office of Price Administration Committees, or with special committees dealing with apprenticeship or training activities. Sometimes Committees formally requested the Area Manpower Director to represent them on such activities and report back to the Committee on work undertaken.

Relation to Community Committees

Similarly, in a number of areas local community committees were constituted to inform the community of the aims and purposes of the War Manpower Commission programme and to promote community-wide acceptance of manpower restrictions, on the one hand, and recruitment programmes, on the other. These often operated in close co-operation with the Area Management-Labor Committee. In a few communities, by contrast, committees were set up under local auspices in order to counteract the role of the manpower programme where the community considered the programme contrary to its interest.

Community committees were in some instances temporary, in others permanent. For example, in one community a temporary committee was set up to aid in securing acceptance of the stabilisation plan at a time of particular local difficulty. By contrast, in another area a “Community Manpower Mobilisation Committee” was a continuing influence, working not only with community repre-

¹ One example of Committee support for an Area or State Director was the insistence of a Committee, including the management members, that they would resign if the Civil Service Commission continued to object to the naming of the Acting Director as Director. By contrast, another Committee insisted upon the resignation of an Area Director because it considered him unsatisfactory.
sentation but encompassing the plant Labor-Management Com-
mittees of the War Production Board.

Other committees of a somewhat similar nature collaborated
on a temporary basis in recruiting for "must" plants. In two areas
the War Manpower Director organised committees in conjunction
with community officials, including some members of the Manage-
ment-Labor Committees, and such other community representatives
as retail store owners. These groups contributed money to finance
local publicity, so that every citizen was made aware of the changing
aspects of the manpower programme.

**Examples of Activities**

The vitality of the Area Management-Labor Committees did
not depend upon the formal role assigned to them by national or
even by regional policies; the strength of the Committees was based
upon the activities that developed in response to committee initi-
ative and the needs of the local community. In considering exam-
pies it should be kept in mind that the degree of responsibility that
many Committees assumed often depended upon the extent to
which the Regional Management-Labor Committee had under-
taken detailed responsibility for reviewing stabilisation plans,
carrying out public relations programmes and similar questions, or
had preferred to let these duties devolve upon the State or area
levels.

*Procedures Affecting Use of Available Labour*

*Employment Stabilisation.*

Almost every Area Management-Labor Committee was con-
cerned with the formulation and application of an employment
stabilisation plan and every Committee had a part in the appeals
procedures, developed in conjunction with the manpower pro-
gramme in general, but with the employment stabilisation plans in
particular. Some of the Committees' discussions dated back to
the "Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers" of 16 July 1942¹,
by which a co-operative plan was to be developed by the regional
representatives of the War Manpower Commission, in conjunction
with the management and labour representatives in the area and
the regional or local representatives of other Government depart-
ments.

Other early stabilisation policies, whose application was based
largely on the work of local Management-Labor Committees,
covered particular industries, such as non-ferrous metals and
lumbering, and gave to the Area Committees specific responsibili-

¹ Described more fully in Chapter II.
ties with respect to administration of the stabilisation plan, including the hearing of appeals, assisting the Area Manpower Director in obtaining compliance, disseminating information as to rights and obligations of employers and workers under the plan, and advising the Area Manpower Director as to co-operation with other Governmental agencies.¹

Following the increase in authority of the War Manpower Commission under the December 1942 Executive Order, when the more extensive policy providing for "employment stabilisation programmes" was put into effect, specific provisions were made for the Area Manpower Director to consult his Management-Labor Committee in regard to the formulation and application of a local employment stabilisation plan, and the Committees were "authorised to consider questions of policy, standards and safeguards in connection with the exercise of any authority delegated to their respective Area Manpower Directors" in connection with the development of employment stabilisation plans. It was through this procedure that most of the area stabilisation plans took shape, and local initiative and co-operative effort, obtained through the Area Management-Labor Committees, were used in the solution of manpower problems.

The initial plans already in effect at the local level were substantially affected at the next stage of the development of controls by the issue of the "Hold the Line" Executive Order, providing for the stabilisation of wages, prices and salaries, described in Chapter II. Regulation 4, issued in April 1943 to implement the Executive Order, was the subject of discussion by Management-Labor Committees at every level, since it affected employment stabilisation programmes, calling, in many cases, for substantial tightening of employment controls and requiring, in particular, their amendment to restrict transfer on the basis of increased wages. Discussion of Regulation 4 was, at the national level, related to employment stabilisation and consequently to the need for national standards to govern local employment stabilisation programmes. These standards, which were issued ultimately in the form of Regulation 7, in many instances required amendment of plans already formulated by Area Committees, approved at the regional level and in operation in the various areas.

Although Regulations 4 and 7 in their final forms had been drawn up after close consideration of many local stabilisation plans

¹ In addition, one particularly interesting plan provided for the establishment of Labor-Management Plant Manpower Committees, wherever a bona fide collective bargaining agency existed, to assist in handling certificates of separation under the stabilisation plan, and to perform such other functions as the Area Manpower Director might specify.
and consultation with the Management-Labor Policy Committee, their reception by Area Committees was usually unfavourable. No Committee willingly altered its plan, even if the alteration needed was slight. Some of the discontent was alleviated by the explanations sent to all labour members of Committees by the National Committee members representing labour; but these explanations were still not fully accepted locally. After much discussion, most of the Area Committees ultimately accepted the regulations and put them into effect. A few, however, maintained their own plans and carried the issue of non-conformity back to the national level.

The final solution to the question of conformity of local stabilisation plans and national standards, reached towards the close of 1944, was to permit approval of the provisions of a stabilisation plan which was in conflict with Regulation 7 if such provisions were approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, after consultation with the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. This procedure eliminated a bitter source of discontent.\(^1\)

**Controlled or Priority Referral and Employment Ceilings.**

Even though the basic employment stabilisation plans had been put into effect throughout the country, increased production needs made it essential to devise ways of ensuring that the local available labour supply was sent to the establishments where it was most needed. Therefore, many of the activities of the Area and State Management-Labor Committees related to allocation of the existing supply of labour as well as to its proper utilisation.\(^2\)

**Relations with the United States Employment Service.**

In areas with few industrial centres, the Management-Labor Committee often maintained direct contact with some or all of the local employment offices, the manager of the largest local employment office usually attending the meetings of the Area Management-Labor Committee and frequently reporting to the Committee in some detail the placement and referral activities carried out by the local office. Moreover, in many instances, the Area Manpower Director himself was selected from the Employment Service.

\(^1\) It should be noted that not all the area provisions in conflict with Regulation 7 erred on the side of too great laxity.

\(^2\) The role of the Committees in connection with the programmes which were first formulated as “controlled referral” and then later developed as priority referral, as well as the devices of “employment ceilings” and “validation of demand”, are discussed in Chapter VII. The use of the ceiling programme in 1945 and the so-called “forced release” procedure are described separately at the close of the present chapter.
staff, and used this staff directly in connection with the Management-Labor Committee work. In some cases the local office manager was simply given the additional responsibility of serving as Area Director. In other areas, particularly those encompassing a large city or geographical territory where contact between the local office and the area manpower office or Area Management-Labor Committee was difficult, subcommittees or local appeal panels\(^1\) were set up in a local office of the United States Employment Service. While the primary purpose of these subcommittees was to deal with appeals under the stabilisation programme, in some instances they guided the operations of the employment offices. For example, committees pointed out that the nature of appeal cases coming to them indicated in some instances that the employment office might have been unduly harsh, or that workers might have been inadequately counselled or directed without sufficient regard to skill. In other cases committees suggested to the employment office procedures for increasing their usefulness to local employers. The effect of these discussions often convinced committee members, sometimes for the first time, of the utility of the employment office.

\textit{Labour Utilisation and Aid in Individual Plants.}

The role of Area Management-Labor Committees in improving utilisation of labour in individual plants was of varied significance at different periods. In the early period, a number of committee members voluntarily undertook to assist individual plants which were having difficulty either in regard to labour utilisation or training programmes. Intervention in individual plant problems by Area Committee members, however, was usually limited to those plants which clearly requested or welcomed it.\(^2\)

In the fall of 1944 the Management-Labor Policy Committee discussed the possible use of sanctions implied in the Byrnes directive of 4 August, and recommended that Regional and Area Directors make greater use of their Management-Labor Committees in overcoming critical shortages. As a consequence of this recommendation, the War Manpower Commission staff asked the Regional and Area Directors what assistance Management-Labor Committees

\(^1\) Vide Chapter VIII concerning appeals.

\(^2\) Discussions at an early period as to the division of function between the War Manpower Commission Committees and the War Production Board indicated that the War Production Board considered itself solely responsible for dealing with plant Labor-Management Production Committees and that any question of industrial relations should be the concern of its local labour representatives. More often industrial relations problems were taken up by the procurement agency's labour officer concerned with a particular plant, and, of course, by the conciliation officers of the Department of Labor and the War Labor Board.
at the area level could contribute to the staffing of “must” plants. The result of this inquiry showed a wide diversity of practice. Replies indicated that in several instances an Area Management-Labor Committee, either corporately or through the pressure of individual members, had been of assistance in arranging for loans of skilled labour from one individual plant to another, in persuading individual companies to utilise labour more effectively, to improve workers' facilities in the plant, and to adjust substandard wages. In one area, it was indicated that the Management-Labor Committee had been particularly useful in persuading individual employers to transfer workers within their own plants from less essential to essential employment, and to make larger use of women and minority groups. Still another Area Committee had been particularly helpful in bringing procurement agencies into line with regard to better utilisation of labour and avoidance of hoarding skill.

In a community in which the heavy tyre programme had affected the labour market situation, individual members of the Committee co-operated with the Area Director to effect the transfer of workers from other less urgent plants to a large rubber company. Another Committee co-operated in the actual development of relationships between the local offices of the United States Employment Service and the individual employers in the area. In yet another area in which there had been considerable difficulties in the logging industry and dissatisfaction with hiring of labour in shipyards, the Committee members were helpful in assisting the State Director to secure agreement on the elimination of the individual problems of the yards concerned and to overcome labour resentment over bad management policies.

In general, however, the experience of the Management-Labor Committees in dealing with local plant problems was less successful than with the problems arising out of application of manpower programmes to the total industry of an area. The lack of greater success in individual problems may be attributed primarily to two factors: first, the traditional managerial opposition to what seemed to threaten intervention, particularly by labour representatives, in “management prerogatives”; and, second, the competitive nature of United States industry, which made individual plant managements suspicious of representatives from other plants.

Activities Directed to Increasing Labour Supply

Minimum Work-Week Order.

Practically every Area Management-Labor Committee at one time or another was concerned with the application of the minimum
wartime work-week of 48 hours to establishments or groups of employers in its area. Although the initial list of areas in which the 48-hour week had to be established was limited to those which were designated in May 1943 as the critical labour shortage areas, and to a specified list of industries and undertakings, the Order at one time or another affected almost all areas throughout the country. The Committees therefore contributed to the application of the regulations in their specific areas, and heard appeals from the application of the regulations to individual employers.

Introduction of Foreign Workers.

Another question which actively concerned a very large number of Area Committees was the introduction of foreign workers — including Mexicans for particular occupations, British subjects such as Jamaicans, Bahamians and Barbadians, and also Hondurans — who entered the United States under agreements between the Government of the United States and the other Governments concerned. The attitude taken by Area Committees to the use of these workers was varied and depended in some cases upon the community reaction, or upon the unwillingness of the employers to meet the necessary standards of employment, or upon the fear of the labour representatives that these workers would compete with local labour. Thus, many of the same issues thrashed out in the National and Regional Committees had to be faced again at a local level. Although in many instances agreement was reached, subject to proof of necessity and to the safeguards laid down, the continuing opposition of labour groups in a substantial number of areas prevented the use of foreign workers. In these areas the Committees resisted primarily on the ground that the foreign workers were being recruited as an easier alternative to improvement of labour utilisation and to raising wages to a level where domestic labour would accept employment.

Prisoners of War.

A closely related problem was that of the use of prisoners of war, which was also discussed in a great many areas. Here the factor of community protest had sometimes arisen, as well as the fear that the prisoners might not be adequately guarded. Many Area Committees ultimately agreed to this step also, once it was proved to be absolutely necessary. However, all the areas in one region and many areas in five other regions remained adamant. In those areas prisoners of war were not employed.
Recruitment and Measures to Combat Absenteeism.

Almost all Committees were concerned with local or inter-regional recruitment programmes, and took positive steps to encourage, where necessary, employment of women, part-time work, summer and vacation activities. They also aided in the development of child-care programmes and other factors facilitating increase in local labour supply.1 Similarly they often attempted to devise procedures to limit turnover and absenteeism as a means of increasing labour supply. For example, one Committee had its members call on employer and worker organisations and on individual employers throughout the area to discuss with them methods of combating absenteeism and emphasising the importance of these problems.


Although Area Management-Labor Committees had no specific role in connection with the classification of areas according to the labour market situation, the regulations provided that “whenever possible, arrangements should be made to advise Area War Manpower Committees of the classification of the area in advance of its official release. An explanation of the labour market conditions responsible for the classification of the area should also be provided to the Area War Manpower Committee.” This provision was used in almost every area as a basis for furnishing the necessary information on the position of employment and contract placement in the area to Committee members. A number of Committees undertook a double role, on the one hand proving to employers the necessity for accurate reporting on their labour supply needs and, on the other, aiding the Area Director in his discussions with procurement agencies regarding contract placement in relation to availability of labour. One Area Committee was so useful in persuading employers to bring their reports on needed labour down to a realistic basis that the area was able to be reclassified from Group 2 to Group 3.

In some instances Management-Labor Committees in labour shortage areas particularly urged that no further contracts be placed in their areas or that they be given the right to veto the placement of contracts in any locality where additional production would increase the labour supply difficulties.

1 One programme undertaken by an Area Committee was a three-month community project which successfully convinced all retail stores to stay open two nights a week in order to assist in the control of absenteeism and facilitate living conditions of war workers. In another area, the Committee succeeded not only in changing the hours of retail stores, but also of banks, beauty parlours, barber shops, recreation halls, etc.
Other Committees took the view that they could ensure that the community would meet the increased labour demand, through the positive programme of the Management-Labor Committee, and urged the placing of additional contracts in the area.

**Compliance Functions.**

Practically all Area Committees aided the Area Manpower Directors in ensuring compliance with the manpower programme. In a number of cases where there had been difficulty in bringing individual employers into line, Committee members aided the Area Director by calling upon the individual employer and by making use of community pressure to enforce compliance. This kind of pressure was not only directed against employers already in essential work; Area Committee members were also useful in prevailing upon employers and workers in commercial or service activities that they also must honour the so-called voluntary programme. Like the Regional Directors, most Area Directors indicated that the use of their Committee for compliance purposes was an essential part of its activities.

'Committees in Labour Shortage Areas.'

Management-Labor Committees in areas of extreme labour shortage generally tended to accept comparatively stringent labour controls, while stressing the safeguards essential for employers and workers in the application of such controls. The first employment stabilisation plans naturally developed in areas where shortages of skilled labour were aggravated by hoarding of labour, and where acute turnover was increased by "job shopping" on the one hand and employer pirating on the other. To meet this situation in some areas local War Manpower Commission officials had brought together representatives of employers and workers (often thereby establishing the initial Management-Labor Committee) and negotiated voluntary agreements to stabilise employment in the area through voluntary control of hiring, and by requiring a worker in essential industry to obtain a clearance through the United States Employment Service before he could be employed in another essential job.

As the labour shortage extended in some areas from skilled workers to the total labour force, the plans were extended to cover employers producing for civilian consumption as well as direct war use. Furthermore, the provisions for the issue of statements of availability were tightened up, making of even greater importance the safeguards permitting the individual to appeal to a joint committee against the local office decision. In areas of labour short-
national policy statement of 16 July 1942, the plan was put into effect without regard to the regional standards. Ultimately, however, in the middle of 1943, it was revised to conform to the required national standards, and in particular to separate the appeals procedures from the stabilisation plan and provide that in the case of a divided decision an appeal would be referred from the area level to the State and regional levels.

The active role that the Committee had taken throughout this formative period, and its whole approach to the manpower programme, led both the Area Director and the members of the Committee, when the West Coast Plan was under discussion, to urge that there should be representation of the Committee on the proposed Manpower Priorities Committee. Although this was refused, comparatively frequent joint meetings were arranged between the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Management-Labor Committee to determine and review the procedures involved in setting priorities and employment ceilings.

Committees in Labour Surplus Areas.

Most of the Committees in labour surplus areas were set up at a later date than those in labour shortage areas. Consequently in developing the stabilisation plans they could draw upon experience obtained in other areas which in many cases had been subject to scrutiny by Regional or National Committees. The Area Committee was frequently directed towards encouraging employers to seek war contracts, and urging upon procurement agencies that pools of labour could be utilised locally if facilities and contracts could be brought into the area. The emphasis, therefore, was on improvement of community facilities, better procedures for training, and on re-employment of workers who had been thrown out of employment through curtailment of civilian activities, shortages of material or poor contract placement.

These Committees frequently tended to react violently to proposals designed to control local hiring and aid in the inter-regional recruitment policy, and designed to move workers out of the area to meet shortages elsewhere. Many took a defensive attitude because of their feeling that the area had become a pool for labour at the cost of its own long-term industrial position. Where the Area Director was in agreement with this view, he was inclined to hide behind Committee resolutions in order to avoid putting restrictive programmes into effect. This was particularly the case in certain agricultural communities where the Area Committees con-

1 See Chapter VII.
considered themselves the sole defenders of agriculture against industrial encroachment. Where the Area Director tried to force the application of programmes over a Committee's opposition, he was often met with the formation of an independent community manpower committee, sometimes under the direction of the mayor or some local official, the purpose of which was avowedly to promote policies contrary to the manpower programme.\footnote{However, it should not be assumed that community opposition was necessarily always limited to labour surplus areas; it was also found in some labour shortage areas.}

In spite of difficulties of this kind, many Committees in surplus areas were positive and effective in the national interest. In some communities, particularly certain cities in which little war industry was located, the Management-Labor Committees were particularly useful in convincing the public of the value of continuing much of the normal civilian production, and yet promoting the release of labour and encouraging transfer to other areas where it was needed more vitally.

One Committee in a labour surplus area, under the leadership of a broad-visioned Area Director, had a particularly interesting record. It met weekly from its establishment in March 1943 until January 1944, and thereafter regularly every two weeks. It considered questions of policy, standards and safeguards in connection with the administration of the employment stabilisation plan that it developed for the area, and made recommendations to the Area Director on all phases of the manpower programme.

At the first meeting to develop the area stabilisation plan, the Committee was attended by the Regional Director and by representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Corps, Selective Service, War Production Board and other civilian war agencies. An extensive series of meetings was also held with representatives of management and labour in the community to discuss the implications of the stabilisation plan. The local plan, put into effect in April 1943, was designed to provide for the voluntary recruitment and utilisation of manpower and the orderly recruitment and transfer of labour within the area.

The initial plan remained in effect until October 1943 when it was revised to conform with national standards. Conformity, in this case, meant an extension of the plan to include elimination of turnover, reduction of unnecessary migration, orderly transfer, and closer direction of the flow of labour to those places where it was most needed in the war programme. Further revision in the plan was not needed until March 1944 when a Manpower Priorities Committee was first set up in the area, and consequently in the
following months priority referral (for males only) and employment ceilings were applied in the area.

In addition to its contribution to the formulation and amendment of the stabilisation plan, the Area Management-Labor Committee developed an educational programme for making known the needs for manpower throughout the area. It recommended to the Area Director the designation of laundries, ash and garbage collection, dry cleaning, ice delivery, milk distribution, restaurant service and the solid fuel industry as locally needed essential industries in the area, and brought them under the stabilisation plan. The Committee also developed a programme to aid farmers by loan of workers from industry on the basis of temporary release of experienced men, who were urged to take vacations with pay at times when they would be most useful on farms.

In October 1943, when the area threatened to become a shortage area, the Committee organised a war workers' recruitment campaign to attract persons, primarily women, not yet in the labour market and to encourage transfers from less essential activities to meet the critical needs of particular undertakings. At the same time the Committee approved putting into effect the minimum 48-hour work-week to prevent the threatened labour shortage. Although the shortage was dealt with by a cancellation of contracts and an imposition of a ceiling on the largest establishment, the 48-hour week, by agreement with the Committee, was maintained in operation and contributed substantially towards increasing production in the firms employing eight or more workers in the area.

This same Committee undertook an active programme, in cooperation with a special Manpower Conservation Committee organised in the area, to assist in the reabsorption of veterans. In the pulpwood and logging industries and in the canning industry, shortages were met by use of prisoners of war in agreement with the Area Committee. Finally, the Committee gave active aid in recruitment for the limited number of "must" establishments falling within the boundaries of the area.

This Committee maintained close co-operation with labour and employers in the area, and with representatives of the Government departments. From time to time it extended invitations to representatives of management and labour other than Committee members to attend meetings of the Committee and to explain any special problems in which they were interested. It had a standing policy of open invitation to members of procurement agencies and civilian war agencies, thus ensuring co-ordination of the work of the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Area Management-Labor Committee. Representatives of the Manpower Priorities Committee
attended Area Committee meetings and received first-hand knowledge of how the Committee felt about manpower policies and activities.

Committees in other Labour Market Areas.

The largest number of Management-Labor Committees probably operated in labour market areas falling between the two extremes of labour shortage and labour surplus, and experienced both critical shortage and easing up at various periods in the war. In a small community, cancellation of one large contract or increased production of one article could substantially alter the character of the labour market. Similarly, the problems of areas which had long had a highly industrialised and diversified economy were very different from those of areas where shipbuilding, aircraft, and other war developments had forced an industrial population on to a community unprepared to absorb it. The activities of the Management-Labor Committees in these different areas varied in accordance with their particular needs.

Many of these Committees were either set up or first came into active operation in the middle of 1943 when stabilisation patterns were largely determined. Others were only created towards the close of 1943 at the time of the establishment of Manpower Priorities Committees and Production Urgency Committees. A few Committees first became active even later in the summer of 1944, following the Byrnes directive extending the system of Manpower Priorities Committees and Production Urgency Committees to all areas. Those developed late in the war were less concerned with many of the problems dealt with in earlier Committees. They mainly dealt with referral problems, tightening up of the stabilisation plans, exemptions from the 48-hour week order, and the problems arising from inter-regional recruitment, particularly for high priority firms. Some also discussed questions of training and up-grading of minority groups, and in particular Negroes, especially where they were operating in southern or semi-southern areas.

1945 Programmes.

As consequence of the stepped-up war production requirements following the invasion of Europe, the activities of many Area Management-Labor Committees were re-examined and their emphasis altered.

Some Committees, during the late summer and fall of 1944, went through a period of discouragement and under-use. Earlier serious activities were replaced by discussion of such unimportant or untimely questions as VE Day programmes and possible post-war activities. When it suddenly became important to use the
Committees once more in order to meet the pressing needs of December 1944, new steps had to be taken to be sure that Area Directors throughout the country could make the fullest possible use of their own Committees. The national Management-Labor Policy Committee called directly upon Committee members to aid in meeting the difficulties in "must" plants and to help wherever possible on utilisation functions. The headquarters staff urged Regional Directors to have Area Directors call immediate meetings of their Committees and reiterate the urgency of the matter so that all Committees would undertake full responsibilities and carry out their functions to the fullest possible extent. To this end the following points were emphasised.

Area Management-Labor Committees should be more closely associated in utilisation techniques by receiving more complete information. They should be asked to make individual contacts with the management of any plant in which a utilisation study was recommended, and to encourage management and labour in the community to make full use of available information on good utilisation. They should be urged to associate with the Director in joint discussions with the appropriate procurement representatives concerning the necessity and means for obtaining better utilisation in specific situations.

Area Management Labor Committees should be more thoroughly informed about training programmes, and their assistance should be used in obtaining management and labour acceptance of such programmes.

In regard to employment stabilisation programmes, re-emphasis should be placed on the need for keeping Management-Labor Committee members fully informed on actions taken by the Commission under priority referral and employment ceiling programmes, and where inspection programmes revealed non-compliance by workers or employers, Management-Labor Committees should be specifically advised in order that they might use their influence in getting employers and workers to observe fully the provisions of employment stabilisation programmes.

Finally, Area Management-Labor Committees should be used more fully to provide leadership in the community, for special recruiting campaigns, to increase wherever possible the labour force and to secure the acceptance, on the part of employers and workers, of the use of minority groups, and, where U.S. labour was not available, the use of foreign workers and prisoners of war.¹

Still further changes in war production requirements in the spring of 1945 called for additional modification of manpower pro-

¹ W.M.C. Field Instruction No. 680, 25 January 1945.
grammes, and the activities of Area Management-Labor Committees evolved to conform to the new policies. For example, not only specified "must" plants but all "war production activities" were to be aided to the maximum extent; consequently, the emphasis of Area Committees was once more broadened.

This is illustrated by the so-called "forced release" programme of early 1945, which was, in practice, an additional measure in the employment ceiling procedure already applied in most areas. In the most successful cases it took the form of "negotiated transfer" providing for the loan of workers from less essential to more essential establishments. The Area Management-Labor Committees had an important role both in aiding directly in negotiations for transfer and in preparing the community to understand the need for such a programme. The following examples demonstrate the effect of reliance on consultation and voluntary action.

A certain industrial centre was selected for the first full trial of the "selective" ceiling programme because it had all the factors that made general application feasible: composite geographical make-up, urgent need in a few war plants, and less essential industry of the type that would provide the categories of labour force needed. The procedures used were on a voluntary basis, with full co-operation of the community, industry and labour. The programme was approved initially by the Area Committee, and members of the Committee then addressed the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. to give a thorough explanation of the whole programme.

In another case a 14-point "in-plant manpower" programme was formulated by the Area Director, in agreement with his Area Committee, as part of the application of the selective ceiling procedures. This programme included asking the executive officers of all war production and essential establishments to study and note as "good", "fair" or "poor" for their own plant, each of the listed 14 points: (1) selecting (present job specifications); (2) utilisation (has a utilisation survey been made?); (3) training (what use is being made of training programmes and possibilities?); (4) in-plant transfers (in case of plants not working on 100 per cent. of "must" list items); (5) Negro workers (is there any discrimination?); (6) other minority groups (including women); (7) releases (how many given in the past month?); (8) induction plan (and possible effect on turnover); (9) indifference to job applicants (how long it takes to get a job?); (10) morale and incentive conditioning (is there a War Production Drive Committee and a suggestion system?); (11) performance standards (including exit interviews);

1 And of the detailed plans set forth in the Byrnes Directive and Field Instruction 505.
(12) labour relations (are there unsettled grievances?); (13) part-time workers (are they being used?); and (14) length of work-week (can it be extended to 48, or from 48 to 50, 52 or 54?).

In a third city a "labour pool" plan had been worked out prior to the programme of selective ceilings and transfer on the initiative of the local unions, but in discussion with the Area Management-Labor Committee. Although this plan was not put into operation, its discussion opened the way to the development of a detailed programme for ceiling reduction and transfer, which should include protection of both employers and workers. Only male workers were covered in the determination of ceilings, which were set on a selective basis dependent upon the types of worker employed in an individual establishment and the current needs of war industry. Consideration was given to undue hardship, both on individual establishments and on individual workers. The detailed programme included arrangements for in-plant transfer, careful screening of the validity of employer demands, safeguards to avoid a worker being separated from employment without assurance of suitable new employment, protecting collective bargaining agreements or existing seniority rights, and as far as possible assuring new employment in the same occupations, membership in the same union and comparable wage rates. The accepted standards under priority referral were employed, including assurance that no worker should be referred to any plant not making full utilisation of its existing work force, and ensuring right of appeal to the Area Management-Labor Appeals Panel; protection was also given to the position of the worker under Selective Service regulations before transfer was arranged. Finally, the Area Director "with the assistance of the Management-Labor Committee", to the maximum extent possible, worked out arrangements with employers and unions affected by the programme to place workers whose release was required on leave without pay, or furlough, in order to protect their seniority, re-employment or other rights.

The success of these various forms of programme for negotiated transfer and use of selective ceiling procedure, worked out in close conjunction with the Management-Labor Committee, may be contrasted with the more rigid use of the "forced release" procedure, which was attempted at about the same time in a fourth city. The immediate problem here was to secure a limited number of employees to man three shifts at the two plants in the area which were engaged in the manufacture of tyre cord, duck yarn and assault wire insulation for the armed forces. The local labour position had been one of acute manpower shortage from the beginning of the war, and from August 1943 the area had been classified as
one of utmost labour shortage. From October 1944 the manpower requirements of the two establishments concerned had been assigned the manpower priority rating reserved for items of the utmost urgency for the war effort which were behind schedule for manpower reasons. Between 25 October 1944 and 13 February 1945 various efforts were made both by the War Manpower Commission and by an interdepartmental task force (representing Army, Navy, War Manpower Commission and War Production Board) to provide the workers required by the two plants for their "must" production. The procedures tried out during the period October to February included extension of the priority referral programme to all workers in the area seeking new work, and special arrangements for channelling the workers to the two plants under consideration; gate hiring privileges for the plants; area-wide employment ceilings instituted to reduce the employment levels of less essential and less urgent plants by attrition; extensive publicity campaigns to apply for work in the "must" plants, including canvassing of former trained workers on a house-to-house basis; and repeated efforts to induce management and labour in the less urgent establishments in the area to consent to the loan of workers to the "must" plants. Finally, strong representations were made to the War Labor Board to expedite decisions on wage and grievance cases that were pending before it.

During this period the Area Management-Labor Committee held a series of meetings at which all members were requested to assist in the situation. At a meeting on 27 December 1944 the Committee unanimously adopted a resolution stating that as the companies concerned were in conflict with labour and in view of the explanation offered by the two members representing labour, it was the opinion of the Committee that it would be impossible to staff these plants under existing conditions. Part of the claim made by the labour representatives both in the Area Management-Labor Committee and in a meeting with the interdepartmental task force was that the conditions within the two plants made it impossible for them to co-operate in the staffing of the plants. They were convinced that many of the difficulties were created by the refusal of one management to accept the insurance system and the third shift differential in effect under union contract at the fine goods mills in the area; by the other management's long delay in negotiating a union contract; and by lack of child care facilities in the city, which they claimed prevented the return of women workers to the industry.

When convinced, after consultation with the Area Management-Labor Committee, that the programme already undertaken would
not meet the manpower requirements of the two plants, the War Manpower Commission decided to put into effect an employment ceiling programme requiring the release of workers. The Area Management-Labor Committee was notified of this decision at a meeting on 13 February. The Area Director then reviewed with the Committee all the various steps which had been taken in the area to supply the workers required by the two mills, reported the results obtained and the outstanding needs, and advised the Committee of his conclusion (reached in conjunction with the Regional Director, and confirmed by the headquarters of the War Manpower Commission) that an employment ceiling programme providing for the release of workers was imperative. The Committee then voted to put the programme into effect. Controversy subsequently developed on the grounds that the Committee had adopted this motion without understanding its significance and that the programme had been put into effect without prior consultation. At a meeting on 12 March 1945, the Area Director refused to entertain a motion to rescind the vote taken in February, but accepted a substitute motion to request a conference in Washington with the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. The operation of the programme brought substantially increased community resistance as well as labour union objections, including the seeking of an injunction by the Textile Workers' Union against the Area Director to prevent him carrying through the procedure.

The individual workers concerned then appealed against the action of the Area Director, and the Area Committee requested a joint meeting with the National Committee. After a series of conferences between the Area and National Committees, the latter took the view that there had not been adequate consultation and that the programme itself should be revoked. Ultimately the War Manpower Commission revoked the programme, not for the reasons put forward by the National Committee but because of the general relaxation of manpower and war production stringencies and because the need for the production of the two plants had so far diminished as to render the release programme unnecessary. However, the experience remains a significant example of the different interpretations that may be made concerning the degree of consultation of a Committee, and of the problem of obtaining compliance on a programme seriously opposed in a local community.

**Post-VE Day Programmes**

The role of Management-Labor Committees at the area level after the end of the war in Europe had, preceding VE Day, received some consideration — primarily during the period just prior to
the German break-through in the Ardennes. While the debates in Area Committees at that time were doubtless premature, the preliminary discussions indicated that many Area Committees had been convinced by their wartime activities of their own utility and that most Committee members were prepared to consider continuing their services after the war. Many of these discussions brought forth one significant qualification, namely, that Committee members would only continue to serve if they saw some direct responsibility allocated to them, and if it were proved to them that their opinions and decisions carried some real authority.

The significance of Area Committees in the period between VE Day and VJ Day was emphasised at a conference of management and labour members of the National and Regional Committees. This conference expressed the opinion that any decision to retain or remove controls in an area or in a plant should originate from the War Manpower Commission Area Director and the Area Management-Labor Committee. Following the conference, the War Manpower Commission prepared a revised post-VE Day programme providing for flexibility in the application of the War Manpower Commission’s programmes and indicating that in determining whether manpower controls should be relaxed in accordance with the recommendations of the National and Regional Committees, the Area and Regional Directors must give first consideration to war production needs. Under the new programme the Area Committees had a significant role in advising the Area Directors concerning the type of war manpower programme to be in effect in each area in the final war period.
CHAPTER VI

RELATIONS BETWEEN WAR MANPOWER MANAGEMENT-LABOR COMMITTEES

The structure of the War Manpower Commission was based on two concepts of administration: first, a so-called "staff and line" division of administrative responsibility; and second, a belief in maximum decentralisation of operation. These two concepts largely determined the pattern of the relationships initially established among the Management-Labor Committees at the various levels, as well as between the Management-Labor Committees and the War Manpower Commission staff. Thus, the Policy Committee was to serve primarily as an advisory agency to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission; and the Regional and Area War Manpower Committees were to aid the Regional and Area Directors respectively. Nevertheless, as the manpower programme evolved, closer links than those envisaged by these limitations developed between the various consultative Management-Labor Committees, and the existence of these relationships contributed to the effectiveness of the whole programme of manpower mobilisation.

RELATIONSHIP OF MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE TO REGIONAL COMMITTEES

The Management-Labor Policy Committee, from the beginning of its activities, had specific responsibilities regarding the nomination of members to Regional Committees; all such nominations had to be approved by the Committee. An additional responsibility of the Policy Committee was that of reviewing Regional Committee recommendations. This involved four separate activities. First, resolutions from Regional Committees were addressed to the Policy Committee. In some cases, after discussion, they were transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission with favourable recommendations from the Policy Committee either for direct action by him or for generalisation by communication to other

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1 Cf. Chapter III.
regions. Recommendations of Regional Committees did not always receive full attention or action by the Policy Committee, and the Regional Committees sometimes lost confidence in the value of transmitting suggestions or problems. Second, the Policy Committee had to review regional stabilisation plans and other activities to ensure conformity of regional with national standards, and to call for alteration when plans were in violation of these standards. Third, in case of disagreement between a Regional Committee and a Regional Director, the Policy Committee would review the situation and make recommendations to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Finally, the Policy Committee had a definite relationship to Regional Committees under the appeal procedures.

Another specific relationship between the Policy Committee and Regional Committees was somewhat the reverse operation to the review of recommendations of Regional Committees. The Policy Committee on several occasions sent to members of Regional Committees recommendations and formal statements which it had adopted. In some cases these communications called upon Regional Committees to take some action in support of a manpower policy or of a decision made by the Policy Committee at the national level. Many of these recommendations, however, merely requested Regional Committees to ensure their transmission to Area Committees, and the degree of attention which they received varied according to the point of view of the various Regional Committees. In a few instances either the management or the labour members of the Policy Committee undertook to prepare and transmit to the regions some explanatory document concerning recommendations of this kind, or designed to guide regional and area members in the carrying out of a recommendation. On occasion a Regional Committee asked what the stand of the Policy Committee was on a particular programme, such as selective ceilings or forced transfer, and indicated its wish to know more directly the results of discussions in the Policy Committee.

In addition to the formal relationship between the Policy Committee and the Regional Committees, a number of informal con-

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1 The "Can you spare a worker" resolution is an example of an idea which came up from one region and was, after discussion in the Policy Committee, sent to all regions with the suggestion that they carry out a similar scheme. Another somewhat different example was the race-track closing suggestion, which came up from an Area Committee, through a Regional Committee, and ultimately was issued in the Byrnes directive.

2 See Chapter VIII.

3 Cf. Suggestions on Developing Employment Stabilisation Programs Conforming to Regulation Number 7 of the War Manpower Commission: Prepared for the Labor Members of Area and Regional War Manpower Committees by the Labor Members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission.
Contacts were developed. On a few occasions individual members of a Regional Committee attended as observers at the Policy Committee meetings. Similarly, in a few instances, one or more members of the Policy Committee attended meetings of a Regional Committee in order to explain the implication or reason behind some particular policy. However, this practice was relatively infrequent, and the great majority of the Regional Committees had almost no contact with the members of the Policy Committee.

Efforts in 1944 to arrange informal meetings between the principals of the Management-Labor Policy Committee and representatives from each Regional Committee largely failed. The intention had been to hold two parallel meetings simultaneously, one of the labour principals with labour members, and the other of the management principals with management members, selected from each Regional Committee. Although difficulties prevented the full Conference at this time, some of the principal management members of the National Committee, members selected from each region from the management side, and members of the War Manpower Commission staff attended a meeting in Chicago in August 1944. Many of the suggestions made by this meeting, calling for closer relationship between the national and the regional members, were gradually put into effect in the following months.

The War Manpower Commission did not provide for regular direct contact between the Policy Committee members and the Regional Committee members for a number of reasons. Since the administration was set up on the “staff and line” basis, it was feared that if direct contacts between Committee members at the national and the regional level were encouraged, an organisation might be developed within the scheme as a whole which would formulate conflicting policies and be difficult to administer. Under the theory of decentralisation, implying that Regional Committees were to serve primarily as the advisory agencies of the War Manpower Directors at the regional level, Regional Committees were not designed as sub-branches or locals of the Policy Committee, but rather as their counterpart at the regional level. Consequently much direct contact between them was believed to be unnecessary and even undesirable.

Another factor working against closer relationship was the different type of membership on the Committees at the various levels. The Policy Committee, as reorganised in 1943, was specifically composed in such a way as to represent national constituent organisations. It was believed that if there were direct contact between the Regional Committee members and the Policy Committee it

1 The original plans were not carried out until June 1945.
would result in a more personal relationship, and might tend to weaken the degree of organisational responsibility at the national level. Furthermore it was suggested that such direct contacts might have the reverse effect and prompt regional members to act less as community representatives and more as spokesmen for their respective "interest" groups. Much of the success of the Regional Committees was attributed to the character of their membership and to the fact that their members generally took a broad community-wide view and did not act solely as representatives of any particular group.

A further organisational factor was a concern that if Regional or Area Committees received information on new regulations or policies directly from Committee members at the national level, they might in some cases be inclined to give out public statements which would be in conflict with, or in advance of, the official administrative interpretations. This would have increased the possibilities of confusion, particularly in view of the difficulties that frequently arose over conflicting policy interpretations made by varying Government agencies.

Nevertheless, the tendency was towards more direct relationship. The best example was a conference called by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission on 31 May and 1 June 1945, including representatives from Regional Management-Labor Committees, members of the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, the Regional Directors and Headquarters Staff. Several varieties of meetings were held at this conference. The regional and national labour representatives met as a group with their executive assistants. The management representatives did likewise. Then followed a joint session between the two groups at which recommendations concerning the committee members' views on the War Manpower Commission programme were adopted for submission to the Chairman. The Regional Committee members were able to convince the national members of the need for maximum local autonomy in the period following VE Day. Later sessions were attended by the Chairman of the War Manpower Comm-

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1 In fact, this was more true in theory than in practice, since the organisation of the Chamber of Commerce did not really lend itself to policy discussion; the National Association of Manufacturers did something along this line, but not a great deal; the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. made greater use of their constituent organisations. While the Executive Assistants substantially helped in making information available and in carrying out this kind of direct contact, the arrangement was not really analogous to the kind of organisational consultation made possible in countries such as Great Britain, where the character of the organisations themselves made the arrangement of outside contact and policy control formulation for each group much simpler.

2 See Chapter II for text of recommendations adopted at the Conference, submitted to the Chairman and the President, and made public at a White House reception for the Conference.
mission, his Regional Directors, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion and other Government officials. Opportunity was thus provided, first, to review the extent and nature of the manpower and production problems involved in concluding the war against Japan; second, to consider the full manpower programme proposed to meet these needs; third, to obtain views regarding the role of Management-Labor Committees after the war. A resolution adopted by the conference requesting periodic conferences of a similar nature indicated the belief of the members in the continuing value of the work.

RELATIONSHIP OF MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE TO STATE OR AREA COMMITTEES

The Management-Labor Policy Committee had still less direct contact with individual State or Area Committees than with Regional Committees, though in so far as the Policy Committee was consulted regarding operating policies, the result of this consultation reached down to the State and area as well as regional levels.

The reasons for the lack of personal contact are evident. The concept of the use of the local Committee as the link between the Area Director and the community required that Committees should operate without too much intervention from higher levels. Consequently, most Area Committees did not meet with any member of the Policy Committee. There were some exceptions since individual members of the National Committee from time to time visited Area Committees in a more or less personal capacity, either when investigating the situation in a particular locality, when on home visits, or on tour. Similarly, on a few occasions delegations from Area Committees went to Washington to present a local issue that seemed to call for some special treatment and at that time met members of the Policy Committee.

Area Committees were often conscious of a sense of isolation, and a feeling that headquarters was not fully aware of what was happening in the rest of the country. The attempts to resolve this problem were of concern to the Policy Committee.¹

¹ In the discussion in the Policy Committee on 6 March 1945 as to the effective use of Management-Labor Committees throughout the country, it was pointed out that the lack of both vertical and horizontal communications between the various levels meant that in fact the National Committee did not know sufficiently the extent to which Regional and Area Committees were being used locally, were co-operating in the carrying out of policies or were working together, or whether the representation in the Regional and Area Committees was adequate, or the real adequacy of national policies at the regional and area level. Similarly, Regional and Area Committees lacked information on the reasons behind the work of the National Committee or of other Regional and Area Committees. Consequently, as a result of the discussion a subcommittee was set up of the Management-Labor Policy Committee to make a study of the use of Management-Labor Committees and to submit appropriate recommendations.
MANPOWER MOBILISATION

RELATIONSHIP OF REGIONAL WITH STATE OR AREA MANAGEMENT-LABOR COMMITTEES

The relationships that developed between members of a Regional Management-Labor Committee and the State or Area Management-Labor Committees operating under its jurisdiction also varied in different sections of the country. Some formal relationships were provided under the regulations of the War Manpower Commission which affected all regions equally. These, it will be recalled, concerned especially the determination of the methods of establishment of Area Committees and approval of their membership by the Regional Committee, the review of Area Committee recommendations, approval and amendment of stabilisation programmes developed by Area Committees and the hearing of appeals. Similarly, provision was made for the direct transmission of Regional Committee recommendations, resolutions and standards to Area Committees.

In a few instances one or more members of the Regional Committee were also members of an Area Committee within the region or had at some earlier period served upon an Area Committee. Where this was the case, a useful link was provided between the Committees at the two levels. Members who had experience at the local level tended, in general, to be more understanding of the implication of a policy where it must be put into effect. This was particularly true in regard to review by the Regional Committees of local stabilisation plans and to the attempts of Regional Directors, in consultation with their Committees, to prevail upon Area Committees to accept modification in plans already in effect.

Another device adopted in one or more regions to overcome difficulties in maintaining direct contact was for the Regional Committee to move about, meeting in turn with the various Area Committees within its orbit. This was, of course, subject to wartime transport difficulties and to the disadvantage of holding meetings outside the regular office. Still another practice was to invite one or more Area Committee members to attend regional meetings. Yet it is probable that the majority of Area Committees in the country had never met even one member of a Regional Committee, and in a great number of instances the Regional Committee members had no personal acquaintance with members of Area Committees.

1 In one region, at least, the Regional Committee met with the State Committees (in two States of the region) at the time of their establishment, indoctrinating the State Committees in their new duties and responsibilities.
There was practically no contact between committees at the same horizontal level, and therefore almost every Regional or Area Committee believed that its own resolutions, point of view, and approach on a policy were unique.

This isolation had two effects. On the one hand, it prevented any "contagion" or "ganging up" of committees in expressing hostility to necessary controls, and it ensured that each committee made its recommendations on the grounds of the local implications of a policy, and was therefore a fair barometer of local reactions. On the other hand, it was more difficult for the committees to look at local problems in a broader regional or national perspective than might have been the case if they had learned of the implications of each problem on other areas through some kind of joint meetings between committees, or through inter-area and inter-regional conferences.

There was rarely any relationship between any of the Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission and the joint Labor-Management Committees in operation in individual establishments (except indirectly through their constituent organisations). This reflected the interdepartmental division of responsibility which provided that in-plant committees would be promoted by the War Production Board and would deal largely with production problems.

Another reason for this lack of integration was that many industry and some labour members of Area Committees of the War Manpower Commission feared the development of joint plant committees and were therefore unwilling to have their uses or establishment discussed in Area or Regional War Manpower Committees. In one area, at the time of the establishment of the Area Management-Labor Committee, it was specifically provided that the Management-Labor Committee would not be responsible for "the stimulation or development of individual labor-production committees". In another area the management members of the committee specifically refused to discuss any question concerning the establishment or use of committees, and voted down a resolution recommending their establishment where possible. In a third area the labour members over a long period regularly brought up discussion of the use and improvement of plant committees with
the suggestion that they be integrated with the War Manpower Commission programme, but this never led to any positive action.

The emphasis in this chapter has been upon the pattern of formal relationships. To this must be added the extensive informal methods of assuring committee inter-relationship. The degree of effective inter-penetration of ideas, as well as of policies and procedures, depended very substantially on the way in which each Director utilised his committee, and upon the way in which the committee carried out its own responsibility of liaison with the community. It was often the informal transmission of suggestions, sometimes by memoranda and sometimes, still less formally, by telephone or in staff meetings, that ensured day-to-day relationships. Nevertheless, a somewhat more extensive system of formal relationships might have made the pattern clearer and more uniform.
CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS OF MANAGEMENT-LABOR WAR MANPOWER COMMITTEES WITH INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES

The contribution made by Management-Labor Committees was closely related to the activities of various consultative interdepartmental committees composed of Government officials, which were set up by either the War Manpower Commission or the War Production Board to assist the individual agencies in carrying out their specific responsibilities. They dealt with such questions as determination of the relative urgency of production items, and the steps to be taken by each competent department to meet changing needs. The technical advice and guidance given by these interdepartmental committees to the various agencies, and especially to the War Manpower Commission, necessarily affected the role of the Management-Labor Committees. Furthermore, the semi-judicial function of the latter¹ — that of providing appeals machinery for relief from the application of War Manpower Commission programmes — influenced the technical procedures developed in conjunction with the interdepartmental committees. The development of effective inter-relationships between the two types of advisory committees, one composed of Government officials and the other of representatives of management, labour and (in some instances) agriculture, took place gradually as their respective responsibilities were defined by changing war needs.

EVOLUTION OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Interdepartmental advisory committees² designed to give technical advice on questions affecting manpower mobilisation were first established in the national defence period by the Office of Production Management. Initially, there were at the national and at the industrial area level separate interdepartmental and management-labour committees, presided over by the same chairman, while at the regional level a single committee was constituted including one

¹ Described in Chapter VIII.
² For a description of these Committees, see Chapter I.
representative of labour and one of management. However, few of the Regional or Area Committees had come into effective operation when the entrance of the United States into the war brought changes in the whole emergency structure.

At the next stage, the separation of administrative responsibility for manpower mobilisation and production programmes between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board affected the methods developed both to bring management and labour representation into labour supply and production planning and to obtain interdepartmental co-ordination. Various experiments were made during 1942-43 to ensure that firms making the most essential products would be favoured in the recruitment and referral of labour by the employment service. These included, on the one hand, the employment stabilisation and related programmes already described, which were developed by the War Manpower Commission with the assistance of its National Management-Labor Policy Commission and its Regional and Area Management-Labor Committees; and, on the other hand, interdepartmental committees such as the Essential Activities Committee of the War Manpower Commission, the Labor Requirements Committee of the War Production Board and various types of informal interdepartmental committees, some set up by the War Manpower Commission and others by the War Production Board. Some of these Committees operated at the national level and others in regions or areas. The work of the various interdepartmental committees was frequently discussed in the Management-Labor Committees, in some cases with appreciation of the utility of bringing the representatives of the procurement agencies into closer relation with the civilian departments, in others with suspicion that the interagency committees might take over their own advisory functions.

By the middle of 1943, general difficulties in the war effort had resulted in the establishment of the Office of War Mobilization.

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1 The National Labor Requirements Committee of the War Production Board had been established to help the War Production Board to translate production programmes into preference ratings for labour according to their relative urgency in the achievement and maintenance of a balanced war supply programme. Thus the Board would be able to advise the War Manpower Commission as to the filling of job openings. Regional and Area Labor Requirements Committees were to advise the representatives of the War Production Board on the assignment of labour priorities for the production of essential goods and services within each locality. These priority ratings were to be transmitted to the local representatives of the War Manpower Commission. Regional Labor Requirements Committees had been established, by 15 December 1942, in San Francisco, Cleveland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Atlanta; and Area Committees in Portland, Seattle, and Baltimore. Shortly after, Regional Committees were set up in Detroit and Chicago, and Area Committees in Bridgeport, Buffalo, Mobile, Los Angeles, Akron and Dayton. One of the first committees was organised in San Francisco in September 1942, and continued in operation until August 1943 when it was finally abolished as being of little use to the War Manpower Commission.
charged with securing effective co-ordination of manpower and production. Working in conjunction with the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board and all the other agencies concerned, the Office of War Mobilization developed the "West Coast Manpower Program". This was designed to solve two basic organisational problems in the technical field: first, which department should be primarily responsible for determining the relative urgency of a given product and the relative priority of orders for manpower; and second, how far responsibility for making these determinations could be decentralised provided that co-ordination between the various departments was ensured through local interdepartmental advisory committees.

The West Coast Program was issued in a Directive of the Office of War Mobilization, on 4 September 1943 and provided for two separate series of interdepartmental advisory committees to be established in all critical labour areas. Production Urgency Committees, meeting under the chairmanship of the War Production Board, were to determine the relative urgency to the national production programme of the product being made by each establishment in the area. Manpower Priorities Committees, meeting under the chairmanship of the War Manpower Commission, were to consider the relative priority of the labour demands of each establishment, based upon the urgency rating recommended by the Production Urgency Committee.

The recommendations of the Manpower Priorities Committees necessarily affected the carrying out of the policies and programmes of the War Manpower Commission. Therefore provisions were incorporated to give the Management-Labor Committees specific local functions in relation to the local Manpower Priorities Committee.

As national manpower stringencies increased, the machinery established under the West Coast procedure for critical labour areas, was extended, in slightly modified form, to cover even areas of labour surplus. The nationwide extension of the whole priority referral system was undertaken by the War Manpower Commission in July 1944 and given backing by a Directive of the Office of War Mobilization issued on 4 August 1944, which required the establishment of Manpower Priorities Committees and Production Urgency Committees to cover all labour market areas.

This extension of the system contributed to some of the dissatisfaction expressed by a number of Area Management-Labor Committees in the fall of 1944, particularly where they considered

1 In some States or areas, Modified Production Urgency Committees, as they were then called because of their less extensive functions, were established.
that the interdepartmental advisory committees were infringing upon their own responsibilities. The need for clarification of the respective functions subsequently led to a re-examination at various levels of the real relationship between the management-labour advisory committees and the interdepartmental advisory committees.

**National Interdepartmental Committees**

The activities of a number of interdepartmental advisory committees at the national level, had direct or indirect bearing upon the work of the Management-Labor Committees. These were, in addition to the interdepartmental War Manpower Commission itself, the Essential Activities Committee and the National Manpower Priorities Committee, both of which were presided over by representatives of the Commission staff; the Production Executive Committee of the War Production Board, and the committees operating under its authority, in particular the Production Readjustment Committee (and the Production Adjustment Division, the Period 1 Subcommittee and the Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee) and the National Production Urgency List Committee.

*The Essential Activities Committee*

An Essential Activities Committee was established in July 1942 composed of representatives of the military and civilian departments concerned with the use of manpower on war production. Its purpose was to assist the United States Employment Service in maintaining lists of essential activities and occupations, in accordance with War Manpower Commission policy. The lists drawn up by the Committee as to which activities should receive the largest share of the manpower available, and which occupations should be considered for receipt of occupational deferment, were transmitted to the local offices of the United States Employment Service and to the local boards of Selective Service. They were also currently transmitted for information to the National Management-Labor Committee, since they constituted a basic instrument in manpower mobilisation, supplementing the determination of essentiality of products.

*National Manpower Priorities Committee*

The National Manpower Priorities Committee was established by administrative order of the Chairman of the War Manpower

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1 The representative of the War Production Board was a labour leader serving initially in the Labor Production Division and later in the Office of Manpower Requirements.
Commission in June 1944, and consisted of the representatives of the War Production Board, the War and Navy Departments, the Maritime Commission, the Aircraft Resources Control Office, the Selective Service System and the Civil Service Commission. It met under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

When the committee was first established, its primary purpose was to recommend the firms whose orders for workers should be authorised for inter-regional recruitment, the priority which should be accorded such orders, and any related matters which might be submitted to the committee by its chairman. Its functions were later extended and it was made responsible for advising the War Manpower Commission on the formulation of policy instructions regarding labour supply, to be carried out in the various regions and areas. A further responsibility of the committee was to advise on the development of a priority rating system for the guidance of local committees in the determination of different categories of priority. It was, however, an advisory body only; any final procedures governing the Manpower Priorities Committees being drawn up by the War Manpower Commission staff.

The National Manpower Priorities Committee also functioned as a board of appeal from the application of decisions by Regional Directors in regard to manpower priority ratings. This provided for appeals by employers or workers affected. In case a Government agency objected to a determination by an Area Director, provision was made for review by the Regional Manpower Director, and failing satisfactory adjustment at the regional level, by the War Manpower Commission at the national level. In such case, final decision was made by the Chairman of the National Manpower Priorities Committee, after consultation with the committee.

Because the decisions of the National Manpower Priorities Committee often affected the carrying out of the manpower programme, the Management-Labor Policy Committee from time to time received reports on its discussions.

Production Executive Committee

The Production Executive Committee, first set up in September 1942, was the central interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of the War Production Board, responsible for the scheduling of the various production programmes of the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and other agencies participating in the national war production programme. Its work was therefore of direct concern to the manpower programme.

1 See Chapter VIII.
In May 1944 the Production Executive Committee appointed a special "Production Executive Committee staff", which was interdepartmental in composition, and constituted a subcommittee to study and recommend action on scheduling resumption, expansion and curtailment of production. This subcommittee operated for approximately six months, after which it was replaced by the Production Readjustment Committee.

**Production Readjustment Committee**

Established in December 1944 under the authority and subject to the direction of the Production Executive Committee, the Production Readjustment Committee was also interdepartmental in character. Its general responsibilities were to develop policies with regard to current cutbacks\(^1\), runouts\(^2\), or other adjustments for the period following VE Day. The Production Readjustment Committee, from March 1945, was responsible for the most effective utilisation of released facilities, with particular emphasis upon channelling war production and advancing the effective dates of cutbacks so that existing production organisations could be preserved.

**Current Production Adjustments Division**

Three interdepartmental groups directly affecting the use of manpower and production facilities, were set up under the authority of the Production Readjustment Committee. The first of these, the Current Production Adjustments Division, was primarily a staff group responsible for making available to the Production Readjustment Committee information concerning proposed cutbacks. In addition, it was responsible for working out procedures for informing each local Termination Committee\(^3\) of impending cutbacks, and recommending procedures for notifying both workers and management in the plants concerned. At the national level the Current Production Adjustments Division took steps to ensure that the Office of Labor Production of the War Production Board, which was staffed by labour leaders, was informed of any cutback in time to ensure that the national labour unions were informed and could co-operate in the affected localities with their representatives.

**Period 1 Adjustments Group**

A formal subcommittee of the Production Readjustment Committee was the Period 1 Adjustments Group, made up of repre-

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\(^1\) A cutback was defined as "a revision of delivery schedules under contract that (a) eliminates all or part of the items to be delivered . . . or (b) reduces the rate of deliveries scheduled . . . ."

\(^2\) A runout meant simply the end of a contract which would not be renewed.

\(^3\) A subcommittee of the local Production Urgency Committee.
sentatives of the same agencies and offices as the parent committee. Period 1 was defined as the period elapsing between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Group examined the plans of the various procurement agencies for general cutbacks and determined which plants should be curtailed. Its primary function was to make recommendations to the Production Readjustment Committee and to the procurement services on alterations in production that should be taken into account in developing the production programme in the interim period.

Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee

The Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee, organised by the Production Executive Committee, drew up operating instructions to guide the local Production Urgency Committees in implementing decisions taken by the Production Readjustment Committee. It included representatives from the same departments as the Production Readjustment Committee and was primarily administrative in function. However, it also handled all appeals brought up from the local level by a Government department concerning the decision of a local Production Urgency Committee.¹

National Production Urgency List Committee

A National Production Urgency List Committee was set up under the authority of the Production Readjustment Committee, but reporting directly to the Production Executive Committee. Composed of the same agencies as those participating in the Production Readjustment Committee, it had the following responsibilities: to recommend the general policy for the national production urgency list within the policies established by the Production Executive Committee; to recommend all changes in the national production urgency list based on the importance of the programme and the need for obtaining labour referrals; to review periodically interim requests from the military services and divisions of the War Production Board for specific additions to, or deletions from, lists of programmes or plants; and to review the local lists of plants given top production urgency ratings by the local Production Urgency Committees.

The Production Urgency List Committee periodically issued information for the guidance of local Production Urgency Com-

¹ Throughout the period from the extension of the West Coast Plan early in 1944 until the close of the war in Europe, the Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee was known as the Co-ordinating Area Production Urgency Committee and was responsible for the formulation of the instructions affecting these local committees.
mittees in establishing urgencies designed to assist the War Manpower Committees in determining manpower priority ratings. Seven urgency rating bands were established, to which Production Urgency Committees could assign establishments on the basis of the products or services produced therein, but there were limitations on the type of product or programme which could be put in each band. However, only two of the seven urgency ratings were directly affected by the decisions of the National Production Urgency List Committee, the rest being left to local decision. The national list of urgency ratings was revised each time the war programme changed, and instructions were then issued through the list to guide the local committees in rating plants for production urgency and consequently for manpower priority.

The general purpose of the national production urgency list and the work of the Production Readjustment Committee and its various groups was to ensure that a balance was kept throughout the country in the placing of contracts according to available production facilities and manpower. The application of these policies was carried out through the local committees.

Because of its interest in the operation of these interdepartmental committees, the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission periodically received information concerning changes in the national production urgency list and data regarding the various employment trends in the programmes on the list, so that it might be aware of the vital production factors affecting the application of manpower policies.

LOCAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

It was at the State and area level that the interdepartmental committees had the greatest significance, and were most closely related to the work of the Management-Labor Committees. Each State or Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee had a series of specific functions arising out of the activities of a State or Area Manpower Priorities Committee. Although it did not have the same specific functions in regard to Production Urgency Committees, there was a close relationship between the work of these two interdepartmental committees, with resultant effects on the operation of the Management-Labor Committees.

The functions of the Management-Labor Committees with regard to the Manpower Priorities Committees were originally outlined in the War Manpower Commission field instructions providing for the setting up of the Manpower Priorities Committees as follows:
(a) A Manpower Priorities Committee is established after consultation with the appropriate Management-Labor Committee.

(b) The Management-Labor Committee shall recommend the Chairman for the Manpower Priorities Committee.

(c) The Area War Manpower Commission Director shall consult the Management-Labor Committee with respect to additional representatives on the Manpower Priorities Committee.

(d) The Management-Labor Committee shall recommend to the Area Director standards and safeguards for the establishment of manpower allowances, employment ceilings and manpower priorities.

(e) The Management-Labor Committee shall be supplied with periodic reports on the activities of the Manpower Priorities Committee and may, in its discretion, review the actions of, and make recommendation on the operation of, the Manpower Priorities Committee.

(f) Decisions made with respect to the withholding of referrals from a specific establishment, or the denial of a referral to an individual as a result of employment ceilings, manpower allowances or manpower priorities, may be appealed in accordance with the regulations of the War Manpower Commission concerning appeals.

Although provision was thus made for ensuring some regular relationship between the Management-Labor Committees and the Manpower Priorities Committees, the extent of their co-ordination varied according to the point of view of individual Area Directors and the attitude of the procurement representatives on the interdepartmental committees. The need for ensuring a close relationship between the two committees was recognised by the War Manpower Commission and by many of the other agencies and departments concerned, but there were widely differing views as to how it should be achieved.

Establishment of Interdepartmental Committees

At first, Manpower Priorities Committees were to be established only in areas of labour shortage, in some of which informal interdepartmental committees had already been carrying out many of the functions proposed for the Priorities Committees. Consequently in many areas there was little difficulty in obtaining approval from the Management-Labor Committee for the establishment of a Manpower Priorities Committee. Where objection was raised, it was ultimately overruled. When more widespread labour supply difficulties resulted in proposals for establishment of these committees in other areas, the Management-Labor Committees were consulted and seldom raised objection.

Production Urgency Committees were established by the appropriate Regional Director of the War Production Board, origin-

1 Group I and II labour market areas.
ally on the West Coast and in some other critical areas, and later in any area determined by the Chairman of the War Production Board "acting through the Production Executive Committee." The Management-Labor Committees were not consulted on the establishment of these committees since they were advisory to the War Production Board and not to the War Manpower Commission.

In some cases Manpower Priorities and Production Urgency Committees were established on a State instead of an area basis. Where these State Committees covered different areas from those covered by the Management-Labor Committees it was difficult to provide for much inter-relationship. In a number of cases, however, State Management-Labor Committees could play the same part in connection with the State Manpower Priorities Committees as was done at the area level.²

Chairmanship

The provision requiring the Area Management-Labor Committee to recommend the Chairman of the Manpower Priorities Committee, who was to be preferably "an outstanding citizen not affiliated with any of the above agencies, nor identified with a dominant group interest, or if such person is not available, a member of the staff of the War Manpower Commission", was carried out differently, according to the approach of the committees. Many Management-Labor Committees either took no action under this provision whatsoever, or refused to name a chairman as a protest against the establishment of the Committee, or named the Area Director as Chairman. In some regions the Regional Management-Labor Committee specifically opposed the suggestion of an outside chairman. The result was that a member of the staff of the War Manpower Commission presided over all Manpower Priorities Committees.

The Chairman of the Production Urgency Committee was appointed by the appropriate Regional Director of the War Production Board, and in accordance with the formal instructions, was supposed to be "a member of the community of such prominence that he shall secure local co-operation as well as results. This assignment shall be his primary function as an employee of the War Production Board". The Chairman was most frequently the district manager of the War Production Board, who had himself often been selected because of a local industrial background.

¹ War Production Board General Administrative Order No. 2-126.
² By VE Day there were 22 State Manpower Priorities Committees and 22 State Production Urgency Committees, but a smaller number of State Management-Labor Committees.
Membership

Although initially it was the responsibility of the Area Director, after consulting with the Management-Labor Committee, to add representatives from agencies representing claimants for manpower in the area, it was subsequently decided to include representatives of all the departments concerned with war production. This addition also included the local labour representative of the War Production Board.

Membership of the Production Urgency Committee, which was determined by the Production Executive Committee, usually consisted of representatives of the same departments as those serving on the Manpower Priorities Committee, with one or two exceptions.\(^1\)

The principal reason for restricting membership had been the desire for efficient and continued operation of the Committees. At the time of their establishment there was, on the one hand, pressure from many Government agencies to be represented, and on the other a desire on the part of many Management-Labor Committees to participate directly in the work of the Committees. After considerable discussion both at headquarters and in some local areas it was decided, primarily on the grounds of efficiency, to make the meetings as small as possible, thus eliminating a number of Government departments. Furthermore, partly on the ground of the confidential nature of the documents and information required in order to set urgency ratings on individual plants, but primarily in view of the technical advisory character of their work, it was decided to limit the meetings to Government officials.

However, indirect representation of employers and of workers was provided for on both the Manpower Priorities Committees and the Production Urgency Committees. The Area Director of the War Manpower Commission was presumed not only to represent this Commission, but also to put forward the point of view of his own advisory Management-Labor Committee. The district representative of the War Production Board was in almost all cases a businessman serving temporarily as a Government official.\(^2\) The joint local labour representative of the Office of Labor Production and the Office of Manpower Requirements of the War Production Board was always a trade union official on leave, temporarily serving with the Government.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The Selective Service System was not represented on the Production Urgency Committee, while the Office of Civilian Requirements usually was represented.

\(^2\) In a great many cases he was a dollar-a-year man and very frequently had been selected from the district because of his knowledge of business conditions and acquaintanceship with employers in the district.

\(^3\) Whether he came from the A.F. of L. or the C.I.O. largely depended on which group represented the largest amount of war industry in the particular district.
The Government war or civilian procurement agencies were expected to represent directly the individual contracting employers for whom they acted as claimant representatives. Thus, each employer's demands for manpower were put forward by a sponsoring Government agency.

Review by Management-Labor Committee of Actions of Manpower Priorities Committee

The provision that the Management-Labor Committee receive reports on the activities of the Manpower Priorities Committee enabled the Area Director to obtain from the former guidance in his dealings with not only the M.P.C., but also with the Production Urgency Committee. It also gave him an opportunity to present to the Management-Labor Committee urgent problems that arose in the discussions of the other two committees. The extent of such reporting varied in different areas.

Furthermore, there were different interpretations of the additional provision calling for review of the actions of the Manpower Priorities Committee by the Management-Labor Committee. In some instances it was interpreted by the procurement agencies to mean that the Manpower Priorities Committee should review and recommend procedures to the Management-Labor Committee. This difference of opinion as to the relationship of the two types of committee was particularly evident in the discussions concerning tightening and extension of labour control.

An instruction issued by the War Manpower Commission stated that "in order to develop a full understanding of the ceiling programme, to encourage the maximum community co-operation with it and bring to bear on its administration the best judgment of the community, the Area Director should provide for joint meetings of the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Management-Labor Committee to discuss programme requirements when labour market conditions necessitate changes in programme".¹

The War Department took the view that because a dominant factor in the establishment of manpower controls in an area was the Management-Labor Committee, it was essential that the Manpower Priorities Committee should have the right to recommend necessary manpower controls to the Area Management-Labor Committee. The War Department therefore stated that a sound working relationship was desirable between these two committees so that each should be available to the other for full discussion of mutual problems. "The needs of the armed services can be pro-

¹ War Manpower Commission Field Instruction No. 505, Part 1, revised, Bureau of Placement, No. 217, 13 January 1945.
jected through the Management-Labor Committee to representatives of the community, and necessary demonstration be made, where applicable, of the importance in the national interest of subordinating purely local interests or postwar considerations to war needs."

The point of view of the Navy in regard to the relationships between the committees, as indicated in its Manual of Field Operations, was that "the District Civilian Personnel Directors should assert an affirmative influence in the development of policy at meetings of Management-Labor Committees, Manpower Priorities Committees, and other groups and activities in the field."\(^1\)

The way in which review should be carried out was left to the discretion of the local officials. In some areas and States joint meetings of the Management-Labor Committee and the interdepartmental committees were held when the Manpower Priorities Committees were first formally established. In a number of cases these joint meetings were continued either when a new policy or programme such as the ceiling programme was under consideration, or on a more or less regular basis. Sometimes these meetings were quite formal, and afforded the opportunity for full consideration of the manpower programme in the area. In other cases however the meetings took the form of a luncheon or a joint attendance to meet with some outside visitor, or on the occasion of some area demonstration. Such meetings were useful in that the two Committees became acquainted but they seldom led to policy developments.

The greatest variety was apparent in the amount of information given to the Management-Labor Committee concerning the actual operation of the Manpower Priorities Committee. In some cases full and frequent reports were made, not only of general policies but on decisions of Committees in regard to individual establishments and the background information on the basis of which the Manpower Priorities Committee had reached its decisions.

Where these reports were full and periodic, and where the Management-Labor Committee had discussed and understood the technical nature of the work of the Manpower Priorities Committee, there was more recognition of the need for an interdepartmental committee and more appreciation of the whole manpower programme by the Management-Labor Committee. On the other hand, where the Management-Labor Committee received only generalised reports, it often tended to question the validity of some of the work of the Manpower Priorities Committee. Where the

\(^1\) Production and Manpower Bulletin No. 16, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Washington, 19 September 1944.
\(^2\) Instructions to District Civilian Personnel Directors, Navy Department.
Area Director was able to ensure full and cordial relationship between the two Committees, there is little doubt that the general programme was smoother in operation.

**Technical Functions of Interdepartmental Committees and Recommendation of Standards by Management-Labor Committees**

The provision calling for Management-Labor Committees to recommend to the Area Director standards and safeguards for the establishment of manpower priorities and employment ceilings was particularly important in ensuring co-ordination between the work of the Management-Labor and the interdepartmental committees. It meant that the Management-Labor Committee was normally consulted regarding the general functions and activities of both the Manpower Priorities Committees and the Production Urgency Committees.

Once the Area Director had consulted his Management-Labor Committee concerning the standards to be set, he consulted his Manpower Priorities Committee as to the use of these devices in controlling manpower in the area. The Manpower Priorities Committee advised him as to what priority should be accorded to each individual employer's request for manpower and what employment ceilings should be fixed, so that the total employment should be limited to the minimum number of workers required to meet the urgent production schedules, or that the amount of manpower available in the area should be allocated to those most urgently requiring it. The Manpower Priorities Committee in its discussions evaluated the employers' total manpower needs and cooperated with the Area Manpower Director in securing action to minimise these needs.

In recommending to the Area Director the priorities to be given to the various plants, the Manpower Priorities Committee took into consideration the working conditions in the respective plants, and recommended improvements through the efforts of the agency representing the plant, in co-operation with the utilisation staff of the War Manpower Commission, in order to reduce labour requirements. The endeavour of each Manpower Priorities Committee was to assure proper assignment of high priority to those firms whose production urgency rating was high and whose schedule was in arrears.

The Manpower Priorities Committee was required to be guided in its listing of plants for priority by the urgency ratings which were set by the Production Urgency Committee. The Production Urgency Chairman, advised by his Committee, prepared a list indicating the urgency of each establishment, within the area, based
first on the relative urgency of the product or service in the war programme, and second on whether the establishment was on or behind its schedule. The Chairman transmitted this list to the Manpower Priorities Committee\(^1\), which then rated each establishment for priority in the receipt of labour.

Most changes in requirements of the armed forces were reflected at the local level by changes in the contract situation, in some cases calling for increased production in a given establishment, and in other cases for cutbacks. This meant that urgency ratings on many plants changed from week to week, and that the local lists were therefore under constant readjustment. Similarly, the priority rating had to be constantly adjusted, both to meet new demands and to shift emphasis according to the greatest need at a given moment. Most of the committees, therefore, began their work by a review of the urgency ratings and then took up reports on each establishment to see where it should be placed in the priority categories.

Management-Labor Committee participation, from a policy-making point of view, in setting standards to be followed in the determination of employment ceilings took on particular significance after the Byrnes Directive of August 1944 which extended the number and type of establishments subject to manpower ceilings. Previously, ceilings had only been set by the Manpower Priorities Committee for certain categories of undertakings and in certain areas. From August 1944 until VE Day they were fixed on a much wider scale, and employers had to abide by the ceilings set for them—subject to right of appeal to the Management-Labor Committee for review of the actual figure set on the advice of the Manpower Priorities Committee. In two areas the Byrnes Directive set ceilings on all war industries, partly in the hope of obtaining better utilisation of existing manpower. Ceilings were also established for less essential industries in order to make labour available for essential production. In any areas where ceilings had previously not been required, they were then established if there were one or more plants within the area placed in Priority Category 1 or 3.\(^2\)

In order to determine ceilings, therefore, the Manpower Priorities Committee had to have before it information concerning the

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\(^1\) Just as the Manpower Priorities Committee was an advisory agency to the Area Director of the War Manpower Commission, who retained the final determination and responsibility for the administrative application of decisions reached, so the Production Urgency Committee was advisory to its Chairman (usually the district manager of the War Production Board), who retained the final authority for implementing these decisions.

\(^2\) Priorities were fixed by categories. Category 1 was limited to orders from firms which had been named by the National Manpower Priorities Committee as of special importance nationally. Category 3 was for orders from establishments which had a local urgency rating fixed by the Area Production Urgency Committee of three, and which were behind schedule because of manpower shortage. (Priority Category 2 was reserved for emergency situations.)
MANPOWER MOBILISATION

general labour supply in the area, including details as to available male and female workers, age range and occupational qualifications, as well as information as to the qualifications of workers in each establishment.

Only total ceilings were placed on each establishment in the initial period of ceiling-fixing. Under the later procedure for selective ceilings more detailed information was required, since in such cases the ceilings differentiated between male and female workers, and in a few rare instances between categories of skill. Such rigid ceilings, however, were only to be fixed in areas of acute labour shortage. In an area where, for example, there was a shortage of critical skills or a shortage of male workers, but not of female workers, females were excluded from the ceiling limitation.

Furthermore, the employment ceilings fixed on each establishment in an area had to be reviewed regularly, one purpose of the review being to increase ceilings of any plant in a high priority band which was behind schedule because of the manpower factor.

This was done particularly whenever a step-up in production had been called for, and the claimant agency proved that a greater total number of workers was required in a given plant. The reverse operation was the attempt of the committee to lower ceilings in order to release workers from establishments not absolutely requiring them, who could be transferred to work in those having a greater need.

Obtaining adequate information and "validating" employers’ demands for workers therefore became an important part of the whole employment control procedure.\(^1\) Moreover, the functions of the Production Urgency Committees and the Manpower Priorities Committees increased during the last period of the war in Europe as control over both contract allocation and manpower allocation was tightened either through national directive or through local determination. In addition to the fixing of ceilings and the establishment of priorities, the functions of the Manpower Priorities Committee included discussion with the Area Manpower Director of how to assure that referrals of manpower were made in full accord with the priority ratings of each firm\(^2\), and calling to his

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\(^1\) It was pointed out at a 1945 Regional Directors' Conference that one difficulty in finding sufficient staff to undertake large-scale utilisation studies was caused by the use of the existing utilisation staff on "validating" demands and fixing ceilings.

\(^2\) The War Department in particular took the view that although the Area Manpower Director was responsible for seeing that referrals of manpower were made by the United States Employment Service, in accordance with established priority ratings, it was the duty of the members of the Manpower Priorities Committee to assure themselves that this policy was really carried out through actual referrals.
attention the occasional need for some specific improvements in the manpower programme of the area. The committee, if so requested by the Area Manpower Director, could also assist him in assuring compliance with ceilings and in negotiating transfer of workers from less essential to more essential activities.

In the period just before the end of the war in Europe, when the manpower situation was particularly acute, the War Manpower Commission tried out the so-called "selective" ceiling programme as a final attempt to obtain the transfer of workers from plants whose ceilings were lowered, to needy plants with high priority.¹ The programme was formulated in February 1945, in some detail, in a joint memorandum of the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board outlining the several actions to be taken by local War Manpower Commission and War Production Board authorities and their respective advisory committees.² In carrying out each phase the Area Manpower Director could request cooperation from both the Management-Labor Committee and the Manpower Priorities Committee. In any case, methods for "negotiated" transfer were usually worked out in consultation with both committees, sometimes by means of joint meetings.

If "negotiated" transfer did not prove adequate, the final procedure was the so-called "forced" release programme. This procedure, carried out by the Area War Manpower Director after consultation with both his advisory committees, required an employer to release specified groups of workers, or even individual workers, who were considered by the Manpower Priorities Committee to be more urgently needed elsewhere. However, there was no direct way of requiring the released worker to go into the plant where he was most needed. He would be given a referral to one of the plants on high priority, unless he could show "good cause" for refusal to go, and any employer was forbidden to employ him without a referral.

This procedure was tried out in a limited number of areas, and was never fully satisfactory. It was denounced in some instances by Management-Labor Committees as being compulsion without legislation, and was never widely approved. It was a procedure which in any case was to be used only if all other efforts in a given area had been tried out, and the area still was unable to meet the demands of its most urgent plants. Where it did succeed, community co-operation and the aid of the Area Management-Labor Committees had created a situation permitting the programme to

¹ Cf. series of War Manpower Commission Field Instructions 505 and supplements.
² This programme was revoked in July 1945 as no longer necessary.
work relatively well. In one outstanding instance of failure the "forced" release programme resulted in controversy, appeal to the National Management-Labor Committee, difference of opinion between the Committee and the Chairman as to the nature of the consultation carried out locally, and the need for the programme. Ultimately it was withdrawn and the cases dismissed when the imminence of VE Day made final action impracticable.¹

**Compliance Procedures**

The methods by which these various manpower restrictions could be enforced were gradually increased by Executive Order and Directive but the legal basis for enforcement was never fully ascertained. Therefore, enforcement was largely assured, on the one hand by the "voluntary" actions taken by the Management-Labor Committees, and on the other, by the assistance and sanctions available to the other civilian and service departments represented on the interdepartmental advisory committees.²

Thus, for example, once ceilings were fixed on all the plants coming within the jurisdiction of a given Management-Labor or interdepartmental committee, the Area Manpower Director might discuss with committee members measures for ensuring that the ceilings were complied with. "Spot" checks were carried out either by the sponsoring agency or the War Manpower Commission, to see that employers were respecting the ceilings and the requirements that no workers should be engaged in their establishments without clearance from the employment service or an authorised referral agency. Employers found to be not complying might be subject to sanctions applied on the advice of the Manpower Priorities Committee, such as withholding of essential materials by the War Production Board³, or contract cancellation by procurement agencies. The Area or State Manpower Director was to consult his Management-Labor Committee on any non-compliance case that he certified to the War Production Board under the Priorities Regulation; his recommendation was accompanied by a statement as to the Committee's advice.⁴ Many committees, therefore, when cases of violation were reported to them, worked out procedures to secure compliance. Nevertheless, the difficulties which arose led

¹ See Chapter V for a fuller description.
² Arrangements were developed to make use of the inspectors of the Wage and Hour and Public Contract Division of the Department of Labor on compliance questions and for recourse to legal assistance on State questions of compliance at the State level. (W.M.C. Field Instruction No. 729, 16 March 1945.)
³ Priorities Regulation (P.R. 26) was issued on 25 December 1944 by the War Production Board in respect of compliance with War Manpower Commission regulations.
⁴ Field Instruction 865, Part V, Supplement No. 2, 30 December 1944.
the War Manpower Commission, at one time at least, to ask for legislative powers to enforce its programmes.

*Extended Production Urgency Committee Functions*

The technical advisory functions of the Production Urgency Committees were extended and came in practice to include, in addition to the establishment of the local production urgency list, the review of proposals to build new facilities which would require manpower for construction and operation, and also proposals for the resumption and increase of civilian production. In areas of acute labour shortage the Committees received additional functions, which were optional for committees in looser labour areas. They had to review certain new war contracts which were proposed for placement in a tight labour area in order to prevent additional labour demands being created which could not be met and which would affect more important production in the area. They could recommend that production be redistributed in the area through contract placement, and through subcontracting from plants which were behind schedule or had large backlogs to other plants that had open capacity. They could refuse authorisation for materials to increase production which would require additional manpower, and could reduce less essential civilian production by all practicable means so as to make labour available for more important needs. Where necessary, they could take action to remove less essential war contracts that could be placed elsewhere, so as to make labour available for more essential war production in the area.

At the close of the war in Europe the functions of the Committees were redefined to take into account the experience during the previous period, and to prepare for reconversion. The Chairman of each Committee, assumed a number of technical functions involving in many cases extensive co-operation with the War Manpower Commission. Thus, in addition to determining what production programmes were feasible within an area, and their relative urgency, and assigning and renewing urgency ratings, the Chairman, after consulting his Committee, was to review proposals\(^1\) for new facilities in an area. He could promote redistribution of production from one plant to another within his area, according to manpower and production needs, and recommend to the Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee its redistribution to another area so as to reduce the demands of plants for labour. He was to inform the War Manpower Commission of approved production schedules or requirements with a view to the setting of manpower priorities

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\(^1\) With certain exceptions.
and employment ceilings, and co-operate fully in attaining prompt utilisation of labour released by production changes.

Certain of the technical functions, of particular concern to the Manpower Priorities and Management-Labor Committees and to particular employers and workers in an area, warrant somewhat fuller description.

**Joint Information Programme.**

In February 1945 the Chairmen of the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board signed a joint memorandum outlining the need for collaboration in local industrial areas for disseminating information. This was designed to explain production and manpower problems and requirements, aid in the most efficient placement of workers by specific skills, reduce turnover and absenteeism, build production morale, and assist in meeting the manpower problems raised by future change, curtailment, or cancellation of war contracts. In order to carry out this programme at the local level a Joint Program Information Committee was formed in each area by the Production Urgency Committee and the Manpower Priorities Committee. This was composed of key representatives of all Government and military services in the area, with a representative of the Office of War Information wherever possible and of any civilians concerned with local public relations projects whose collaboration was considered desirable. The chairman was to be approved by the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission because of the importance of manpower information in the work of the committee.

**Termination Committee.**

Closely related to the above was the activity of the Termination Committee, a subcommittee of the Production Urgency Committee set up to carry out locally the responsibilities allocated to it by the War Production Board concerning use of released resources. Significant aspects of the local Termination Committees' work were the supervision of press releases concerning adjustments in the production programme, and of steps taken by the appropriate agencies for notifying the workers concerned in any cutback. The Termination Committee Chairman took the initiative in making arrangements for meetings of the Committee with the contractor, representatives of the workers and of the War Manpower Commission to plan the use of released facilities and the employment of laid-off workers. The procedures differed in accordance with the

1 The Joint Information Program Committee was utilised in the preparation of the release.
number of workers concerned and the impact on the local labour market. Similarly, on the advice of the National Current Production Adjustments Group, parallel methods were worked out for different kinds of contracts—production, construction projects, etc. Since the carrying out of proper arrangements for referral of laid-off workers was a responsibility of the War Manpower Commission, consultations often were carried out by the local Area Director with his own Management-Labor Committee regarding impending cutbacks and procedures to be followed on information from the Termination Committee.

**Civilian Production Authorisation.**

The question of authorising civilian production in different local areas was necessarily related to the labour market situation, and thus involved a series of technical considerations which were worked out in various interdepartmental committees. Grounds for refusal to permit increases or renewals in civilian production were the shortage of labour and the possibility of using any available labour on more urgent war production. Since these decisions, taken on the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission, might affect the individual employers or workers concerned, they could be appealed to the Management-Labor Committees.1

Requests for permission to undertake, resume or expand civilian production, designed primarily as preparation for conversion to peacetime production, were subject to rather rigid limitations. Thus, one of the particular functions of the Manpower Priorities Committee was to advise the Area Director regarding the availability of labour for civilian production, so that he in turn might advise the Production Urgency Committee whether to recommend approval or disapproval of any request for materials for such a purpose. The authorisation needed for different types of civilian production and the actions to be taken by both committees were formulated nationally and applied locally.

From December 1944 until VE Day all such permissions were stopped in areas of labour shortage2, and in other areas they were subject to a series of rigid conditions and limitations which were determined in the Manpower Priorities and Production Urgency Committees. Thus, for example, a recommendation for approval could be based on the provision that the producer would accept further war contracts when available. Similarly, the approval

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1 The appeal arrangements are described in Chapter VIII.
2 They were initially stopped in December 1944 for 90 days by agreement between the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission; in March 1945 the period was increased for a further 90 days (or until further notice). The special limitations for labour shortage areas were removed on 7 May 1945.
could be subject to the condition that production or construction would be undertaken within a certain period of time.

Limitations regarding labour, however, had to be dealt with separately from those concerning facilities. Thus, a separate agreement fixing manpower restrictions might be reached between the War Manpower Commission and a firm, and these conditions might be attached to the authorisation to proceed with the project.¹

While the respective functions of the Manpower Priorities Committee and the Production Urgency Committee in regard to treatment of civilian production were clearly defined, the role of the Management-Labor Committees, apart from their appeals functions, remained somewhat obscure. The more general role of the Management-Labor Committees depended very largely upon the attitude of the various Manpower Directors in dealing with individual problems as they arose. In many areas both management and labour were anxious to obtain permission for expansion of civilian production, and, where possible, for permitting reconversion to get under way. They sometimes stated that the interdepartmental committees tended to be too restrictive and protested that there had been local discrimination—particularly where unfortunate publicity and faulty information had led one community to believe that competing industry in another community was going to get a "head start" for postwar business. The role of the Manpower Director was therefore important in enabling the Management-Labor Committee to discuss fully the grounds on which decisions were reached in the interdepartmental committee, and in giving to the Management-Labor Committee sufficient knowledge to explain recommendations of the interdepartmental committees to the community and ensure a more favourable general reception.

**Summary**

In summing up the role of interdepartmental advisory committees on the one hand, and the relationship of these committees to the advisory Management-Labor Committees on the other, it is evident that the two types of committee were woven into a complex pattern, which varied at different levels, and was altered from time to time to meet the evolving needs of national defence and war production. The existence of the two types of committee buttressed the work of the individual departments and strengthened the machinery for manpower mobilisation and production planning.

¹ For example, an authorisation from the War Production Board could state: "The War Manpower Commission has informed us that this production will be carried on in the following manner: 'Not more than a maximum of 30 male employees will be used to produce pressure cookers, and no workers will be transferred from war production going on in the plant'".
Although both types of committees were primarily advisory in character, their functions were different; neither type of committee took precedence over the other. The interdepartmental committees had technical functions, and the Management-Labor Committees were primarily policy-making.

The interdepartmental advisory committees, whether meeting under the sponsorship of the War Production Board or of the War Manpower Commission, were designed to provide interchange of technical information, first on the production needs and facilities, and then on the manpower available to meet those needs. The Management-Labor Committees, by contrast, were concerned with, and management of, the operations carried out by the War Manpower Commission. This was partly effected through their appeal function.

Thus, although there was no necessary conflict over the functions of the two kinds of advisory committees, their discussion of some of the same problems at times led to misunderstanding of their respective roles, and some friction developed from their different approaches. Moreover, the intricacy of the pattern of relationship differed at various levels and in different parts of the country. Whether a still closer formal relationship between the members of the two types of committees could usefully have been established is a matter on which objective judgment is difficult. There is no doubt, however, that a very substantial informal relationship developed in most areas, and that there was, in practice, inter-penetration of ideas, usually through the staff of the War Manpower Commission, from one kind of committee to another. By and large the use of the two types of committees solved many of the most urgent problems of manpower mobilisation without recourse to compulsory national service.
CHAPTER VIII

EMPLOYER-WORKER APPEALS FROM MANPOWER CONTROLS: WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION

The War Manpower Commission endeavoured to obtain voluntary agreement to its restrictions upon the movement and hiring of workers. It therefore evolved machinery permitting both employers and workers to appeal from any apparent injustices in the application of its programme. This provided that decisions could be reconsidered, (i) by an Area Management-Labor Appeals Panel; (ii) by a Regional Management-Labor Appeals Panel¹; and (iii) by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, whose recommendations were transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

ESTABLISHMENT OF APPEALS PROCEDURES

Formal appeals procedures were established under the first policy statement of 16 July 1942, concerning the stabilisation of employment and entitled "Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers".² This statement, issued by the Chairman after consultation with the Management-Labor Policy Committee, provided for specific restrictions upon the free movement of labour and upon the hiring practices of employers. It declared that any worker or employer or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied with any act or failure to act pursuant to this policy, should be given a fair opportunity to present his or their case to an Industrial Area Management-Labor Committee.³ Such Committee should make recommendations concerning such cases, as well as other matters pertinent to the carrying out of this policy in its area, to the War Manpower Area Director for appropriate action. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission should prescribe rules, regulations and procedures for the carrying out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this policy, including procedures for the review of the recommendations of the Area Committees by Regional Management-Labor Committees and by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee.

¹ The full Area or Regional Committee sometimes heard appeals.
² Manual of Operations, Title III, Section 2-1, of 16 July 1942.
³ As the Area Management-Labor Committee was then called.
The rules, regulations and procedures for putting the appeals system into effect were developed on the basis of consultation with, and in accordance with the recommendations of, the Management-Labor Committees at each administrative level. The Management-Labor Policy Committee, during many of its early meetings, discussed the methods to be followed in hearing appeals at each level. When the directive concerning effective mobilisation and allocation of manpower was before the Policy Committee, at its meeting on 16 June 1942, the Committee members insisted that provision for appeals must be included to prevent workers from being forced into undesirable working conditions, to prevent a skilled worker from being drafted and replaced by an unskilled one, to protect seniority rights, and to provide recourse for a blacklisted employer from decisions of a local employment office.¹

From June 1942 until May 1943, Regional and Area Committees formulated their own procedures for the handling of individual employer and employee appeals. In most instances those procedures were incorporated in the local employment stabilisation plans. Considerable diversity developed in the appeal methods of the various regions and areas. In the early spring of 1943 therefore, in virtue of the Executive Order (9279) requiring the Chairman to provide procedures for appeal from War Manpower Commission actions, the Management-Labor Policy Committee took up the question of a national appeals regulation with a view to providing more standardised operation throughout the country.²

During the discussion³ of a draft for such a regulation differences of opinion were expressed in the Policy Committee as to the desirability of uniform regulations and the extent to which local autonomy should be permitted. Fear was expressed that the imposition of a detailed appeals procedure would conflict with satisfactory machinery already functioning in a large number of areas. The proposed power of the Area Director to reject recommendations of the appeals committee was also opposed. It was suggested that the Area Management-Labor Committees should serve as mediation boards, any disagreement to be referred to panels appointed by the

¹ Minutes of 16 June 1942.
² Cf. Minutes, 19 March 1943. A subcommittee, under the chairmanship of a labour member, was appointed to review a draft regulation on appeals. During discussion of this document, information was submitted concerning the different kinds of appeals procedure practiced in various areas. For example, in some areas cases were "screened" so that only those of particular importance were handled directly by the Area Director. Further, the time-limit for filing an appeal varied under different stabilisation plans; it was believed that rigidity might cause considerable difficulty in certain areas. The whole problem of conduct of appeals hearings and lack of procedures to obtain adequate information in order to make determinations at each level had caused difficulties.
³ Cf. Minutes, 9, 20 and 26 April 1943, and 4 May 1943.
Regional Director. The suggestion that this could be done by adopting a War Labor Board procedure which permitted the filing of a minority report by dissenting members of the panel was criticised as not applicable because of the different composition of the two boards.¹

The attitude of the Policy Committee was reflected in the following recommendations which it made: area and regional appeals panels, nominated by the respective Management-Labor Committees, should be established; a unanimous decision of the panel on the area or regional level could not be overruled by the Area or Regional Director; if the decision were not unanimous, majority and minority reports might be filed; a decision of the appeals panel should be final unless the employer or employee concerned wished to appeal at the next level.

The draft regulation incorporated these views of the Policy Committee and was subsequently recommended to the Chairman, with one amendment, requested by the agricultural representatives, providing for representation of their industry in case of appeals taken by agricultural workers or employers. Further, a provision was added giving the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission the right to take jurisdiction over any appeal at whatever level it might be pending, and to render a final decision.

This resulted in Regulation No. 5, issued by the Chairman on 22 May 1943. Subsequent experience at the area, regional and national levels demonstrated the need for certain amendments. Further discussion therefore took place in the Policy Committee, resulting in an amendment which became effective 13 March 1944. The amended regulation, with subsequent minor drafting changes, continued to govern the appeals procedures of the War Manpower Commission.

Subsequently, principles were also laid down for the handling of appeals from War Manpower Commission determinations as to the availability of labour for civilian production, described in the previous chapter.²

RIGHT OF APPEAL

Regulation 5, as issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission on 13 March 1944, provided:

Any person who claims that any action taken, action denied or decision rendered with respect to him, with respect to his employer or with respect to any of his workers, under any War Manpower Commission regulation, programme or

¹ The War Labor Board consisted of management, labour and public representatives, while the Area War Manpower Committee consisted only of management and labour representatives.
² See Field Instruction 303, Part III, Supplements 3 and 4, issued 27 September and 6 October 1944.
policy, is unfair or unreasonable as applied to him, or is inconsistent with any such regulation, programme or policy, may appeal from such action or decision in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.

An appeal could thus be taken only from the application of a regulation to a particular employer or worker in a specific case.

**Employment Stabilisation Plans**

The specific appeals coming up under stabilisation plans were usually based on the issuance or denial of a statement of availability, or on the issuance or denial of a referral.1 The grounds for issuance of a statement of availability, permitting an individual to leave employment, or of a referral, were set forth in Regulation 7 providing general standards for employment stabilisation. These were incorporated in all local employment stabilisation plans. The grounds for the issuance of a statement of availability to an individual by an employer were, under the Regulation, that:

1. He has been discharged, or his employment has been otherwise terminated by his employer, or
2. He has been laid off for an indefinite period, or for a period of seven or more days, or
3. Continuance of his employment would involve undue personal hardship, or
4. Such employment is or was at a wage or salary or under working conditions below standards established by State or Federal law or regulation, or
5. Such employment is or was at a wage or salary below a level established or approved by the National War Labor Board (or other agency authorised to adjust wages or approve adjustments thereof) as warranting adjustment, and the employer has failed to adjust the wage in accordance with such level or to apply to the appropriate agency for such adjustment or approval thereof.

The United States Employment Service was empowered to issue a statement of availability if any of the circumstances indicated above were found to apply and the employer failed or refused to issue such a statement, or if the Employment Service found that an employer had not complied with any War Manpower Commission employment stabilisation programme, regulation or policy.

The issue by the United States Employment Service of a referral to other available employment was authorised if “good cause” for

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1 Under the initial form of Regulation 5, as promulgated in May 1943, a worker could appeal whenever the War Manpower Commission refused to refer him to or consent to his being hired in employment in which, under an applicable War Manpower Commission order, regulation or other direction, he could be hired only upon referral by or with the consent of the War Manpower Commission, or when the Commission refused to issue to him a statement of availability; or required or permitted his employer to release him under a War Manpower Commission policy, regulation or other direction; or determined that he was violating or had violated any provision of any order, regulation or other directive of the War Manpower Commission.
changing jobs was shown, as in the case of an individual employed at less than full time or at a job which did not utilise his highest recognised skill for which there was need in the war effort.

The most usual claim on which a worker came before an appeal board was that to require him to continue in his present position would cause "undue personal hardship". This term was subject to various interpretations by local appeals panels and was intentionally chosen so as to provide an equitable remedy for such conditions as personal health, family obligations, travelling time, distance, housing, etc., which might make it unfair to keep a worker in a particular job. The strictness of the interpretation of "undue hardship" tended to vary with the essentiality of the work on which the individual was employed and the degree of labour shortage in the area.

For instance, a worker requested permission to go from a highly essential job to one of about equal essentiality in a distant area. He made his appeal on two grounds, first that the new job would be a greater contribution to the war effort, and second on the basis of personal hardship in view of the fact that he had just been divorced and wished to change residence. The appeals committee debated at length whether his personal hardship grounds were sufficiently strong to warrant a flexible interpretation of degree of essentiality—for in the course of discussion it became clear that the new job would involve travel and would not in fact permit any greater contribution to the war effort. The two worker members and one employer carried the decision against granting permission, partly because the town in which he was employed was in an area of such acute labour shortage that they considered this must override the personal issue. In another instance, in a relatively loose labour market area, an appeal was unanimously granted to authorise a worker to change from one essential job to another of somewhat less importance when the worker indicated to the appeals committee that the new job, because of its time-table, would permit him to aid his wife, who had been ill, to look after several children.

Another ground for appeal under stabilisation plans was the claim of the worker that he had been unfairly discharged or laid off and should be reinstated in his former position. The issue in this type of case was whether there were justifiable grounds for the worker's discharge; if it were established that a worker had been laid off or discharged because of gross misconduct, lack of work, requirements of law or of a collective bargaining agreement, or because of other circumstances or conditions beyond the employer's control, the discharge or lay-off was deemed justifiable and reinstatement was not directed.
Workers' appeals were frequently based on the fact that they were receiving "substandard" wages for the occupation on which they were employed, or that they had been forced to transfer within the plant to a position resulting in substantially lower earnings than they had previously been receiving. Although under the employment stabilisation programmes\(^1\) it was not permissible for a worker to change jobs solely in order to obtain higher wages, he was entitled to a statement of availability if he could prove that his last employment in essential or locally needed activity was paid at less than a level approved by the War Labor Board, and the employer had failed either to adjust the wage or to apply to the Board for its approval of such adjustment. This provision was not confined to "substandard wage" levels, but applied to any individual whose rate of pay was below a "sound and tested wage bracket" established by the Board. The great majority of appeals, however, involved "substandard" wage cases.

Employer objections to the release of their employees on wage grounds were usually that the employee was receiving wages in accordance with the agreement made when he was hired, or that he was not competent to perform work warranting the increased rate of pay, or that he had been transferred to another job at a lower rate of pay because of incompetency, or that he was employed on a piece-work basis at rates approved by the War Labor Board for his area, or that the employer was financially unable to increase the wage rate to the level approved by the Board.

A substantial number of the issues before appeals committees were based on the claim that the worker wished to transfer to another employer because he would be used at a higher grade of work and would thus make better use of his skill and usually obtain greater earnings. The objection raised to such transfers by employers was often that the worker did not really have the higher skill he claimed, and that, although transfer might apparently result in increased responsibility or use of higher skill, the claim was in fact a subterfuge for payment by another employer of higher wages for the same job, and that this was an avenue for the attainment of post-war security. Frequently connected with this issue was the statement by many workers that they were kept standing around in a given plant where there was either bad utilisation or labour hoarding, and that they could therefore make a greater contribution to the war effort if they could move to another employer where their time would be fully utilised.

A few instances may illustrate the cases appealed on this kind of issue. A man in a large electrical plant was employed as an

\(^1\) As explained in Chapter II.
engineer-machinist. Another firm offered him employment as a methods engineer — a job rated in a higher classification as calling for higher skill, and consequently paid at a higher wage rate. In the appeals hearing, both the original and the prospective employer appeared along with the appellant. The first employer explained that the man did not in fact have higher skill than that of a machinist, although he had taken some courses as a methods engineer, and insisted that the transfer requested was merely to give him higher pay. The prospective employer stated that he believed the appellant was capable of doing a methods engineer job and needed him for that particular job in his plant — a small undertaking. As both employers were on essential war work, the question of essentiality did not enter into the case. In this particular instance the committee split on a management-labour basis, the labour men believing the man should be released. It was appealed to a higher level where ultimately it was agreed that the man might go to the higher classified job. In another case a worker claimed that by transfer from a large war plant to a laundry he would continue to contribute equally to the war effort, but would at the same time make fuller use of his time as the war plant kept him standing around. In the course of cross-questioning by the appeals committee members, it appeared that although there was some hoarding in this particular plant, the worker's real purpose was to change to a job which would be continued after the war. The transfer was unanimously refused — particularly as this was at a time of critical war need. A by-product of the hearing, however, was that the War Manpower Commission requested the war plant to let them undertake a personnel utilisation study.

Employers sometimes appealed against the issue of a statement of availability to one of their workers in the hope that, if the appeal were won, the worker would either be persuaded to return to his former employment or, by being prevented from obtaining other essential employment for 60 days, would be almost obliged to return. The claim most frequently made by the employer in appeals hearings was that the maintenance in his plant of a larger number of workers would ensure greater contribution to the war effort.¹

¹ Under the more specific phraseology of the May 1943 form of Regulation 5, employers had the right to appeal whenever the War Manpower Commission: (a) refused to refer or to consent to his hiring a worker or workers if, under an applicable War Manpower Commission order, regulation or other direction, he might hire such worker or workers only upon referral by or with the consent of the War Manpower Commission; or (b) issued a statement of availability to any of his workers; or (c) required him to release or refused to permit him to release any workers; or (d) determined that he was violating or had violated any provisions of any order, regulation or other direction of the War Manpower Commission; or (e) required him to extend the work-week of any of his workers.
Many of the appeals raised by employers against stabilisation plans were not merely to contest an individual worker's right to a statement of availability, but to establish or maintain a principle, so that one such statement should not set a precedent under which other workers could leave the plant; or again, so that a precedent should not be set for the local employment office to limit or lessen the number of referrals to the plant. Cases of principle frequently were appealed from the Area Committee to higher levels, sometimes as high as the Chairman.

Not only individual employers, but also representatives of Government agencies acting as employers (such as the War Shipping Administration which recruited for the maritime service, or the Civil Service Commission which acted as hirer for all Government employment) brought appeals against statements of availability under stabilisation plans, again largely in order to establish the degree of essentiality of employment in the respective services as against other war work or essential production in an area. For instance, a representative of the War Shipping Administration argued in an appeal case against a man being granted permission to shift from the post of ship's second officer, in which he served as navigator part of the time, to that of a navigator on an Army Air Transport plane. The Shipping Administration won the case by proving that no higher degree of skill would be used in a plane, and that the two employments were equally essential.

**Locally Needed Activities**

A War Manpower Commission regulation specified in what circumstances an activity might be designated as locally needed. Individual employers frequently appealed against the refusal of the War Manpower Commission to make this designation. Such appeals were usually in order to obtain the aid of the United States Employment Service and referral of workers which would otherwise be refused. For example, when an employer making chewing gum requested designation of his establishment as locally needed, his appeal was unanimously refused; when a delivery service in a rural community requested such designation it was granted.

**Manpower Priority Classification and Employment Ceilings**

Another type of appeal arose out of the manpower priority category in which an establishment had been placed or the level at which its employment ceiling had been fixed. Although no appeal could be taken against the decision to fix manpower priorities or set employment ceilings in an area, taken by the Area Director on the advice of his Manpower Priorities and Management-Labor
Committees, an employer might appeal against the particular category of priority in which he had been placed or against the figure which had been named as his employment ceiling. When appeals of this sort were taken to an Area, State or Regional Committee by an employer, it was usual for an Area Director, or his representative on the Manpower Priorities Committee, to explain the grounds on which either the priority classification or the employment ceiling had been determined.

In some instances the result of an appeal was to indicate informally to the employer procedures by which he could improve his priority or obtain better sponsorship in the Manpower Priorities Committee responsible for advising on his classification. In other cases, concern of the members of the appeals committees with community interests affected the decisions. For example, the representatives of a newly organised company came before an appeals panel to request a priority which would permit them to open as a tool repair plant, the lack of tool repair service in the community being given as grounds for the request. The appeal for priority was granted because such repair was needed, with the proviso that the staff of the War Manpower Commission would first investigate statements made by the company representative as to the type of work to be undertaken and the need for it.

The position of a worker in regard to manpower priority determinations and employment ceilings was substantially different from that of the employer. The assignment, by the War Manpower Commission, of a priority rating to an order in a particular establishment was an action taken not with respect to a worker employed there, but with respect to his employer; therefore, it would only be in the rarest type of case that a worker could claim such an assignment to be unfair or unreasonable as applied to him. Similarly, the establishment of an employment ceiling, if to be achieved by attrition or normal turnover, was not an action taken with respect to the personnel; but if such a ceiling required the release of workers the action could be appealed by them. A release was directed only after the worker had, without good cause, failed to appear at a local employment office for interview, or if after an interview it had been determined that suitable work in an activity

1 In some instances, if the appeal came before a full meeting of an Area Committee, representatives of the procurement agencies were present and explained the steps to be taken to obtain sponsorship.

2 One such case was appealed to the Chairman, but the manpower priority determination in that case was not the basic issue. The rating assigned was allowable only if the establishment was in compliance with the 48-hour minimum workweek regulation, and the basic issue therefore involved the proper application of that regulation.

3 As it did under the selective ceiling programme in some instances.
urgently needed for the prosecution of the war was available and he had no good cause to refuse it. If the worker appealed from any such determination his release was not required until a final decision had been made.¹

The appeals bodies had a particularly important role in cases involving employment ceilings and manpower priority determinations—to assure that such determinations were not “arbitrary, capricious or prejudicial, to inquire into the facts and determinations involving labour utilisation, labour supply and other matters of primary War Manpower Commission responsibility and to assure that applicable War Manpower Commission policies and standards have been observed”.²

Expansion or Resumption of Civilian Production

Provision was also made for appeals in regard to determinations on availability of labour for civilian type production. In accordance with the provisions under the Directive of the Office of War Mobilisation of August 1944 the War Manpower Commission certified whether labour was available for such production. In making this certification the War Manpower Commission was to be guided by the principle that labour should not be deemed available if the civilian type production would result in the employment of individuals qualified for and needed in jobs covered by top priority orders. Workers should be deemed needed for top priority jobs as long as the Regional Director doubted his ability to fill his top priority orders on schedule. The factors to be considered in determining whether labour was available included probable cancellations, completion of contracts, production schedules involving release of workers likely to take place in the area, and whether or not the War Manpower Commission had reason to believe that a given establishment’s request for labour for civilian type production was in compliance with the regulations and employment stabilisation programmes. Appeals might be made against the determination of the Regional Manpower Director.³ Appeals of this nature were particularly significant in affecting the balance between continued war production in the final period of the war and the beginning of reconversion in certain areas.

¹ See Field Instruction 505, Part 4, for detailed explanation showing the right of appeal and the methods for handling appeals in connection with the review of employment ceilings and manpower priority determinations.
² Ibid.
³ If the employer was refused the right to undertake civilian production on grounds other than the availability of labour, his appeal was not to a Management-Labor Committee but to the interdepartmental committees responsible for making determinations on such other grounds.
Non-Compliance with a War Manpower Commission Programme

Finally, appeals might also be taken against the determination that a violation of a War Manpower Commission regulation or requirement had occurred. Such determination constituted grounds for issuing statements of availability by the United States Employment Service to all workers in the non-complying establishment. In cases of this sort War Manpower Commission officials would first confer with the employer in an effort to secure his voluntary compliance. If their efforts failed, the War Manpower Commission made a determination that the violation or non-compliance had occurred, and this might involve application to the employer of certain sanctions, including the withdrawing of material under War Production Board Priorities Regulation 26. In all cases involving non-compliance and possible use of sanctions the employer might appeal.

Labour Disputes and Job Referrals Policy

The War Manpower Commission policy with respect to referrals to jobs vacant because of a labour dispute provided that, except in accordance with specific instructions from the Regional Manpower Director, the United States Employment Service should make no referral that would aid directly or indirectly in filling a job which was vacant because the former occupant was on strike or being locked out in the course of a labour dispute, or the filling of which was an issue in a labour dispute.

Appeals arising out of the application of that policy involved questions as to whether the filling of particular jobs was an issue in a labour dispute, and as to whether referrals to jobs vacant because of a strike or lockout should be made in particular cases in order to promote the war effort.

48-Hour Week Order

Worker appeals under the 48-hour minimum wartime workweek order were very rare. The few which occurred were on the grounds that an exemption should or should not have been granted to the worker's employer. In some cases workers objected to being required to work a 48-hour week; in other cases workers objected to their employers' having been granted an exemption by the War Manpower Commission.

The employer might appeal against the application of the order to him, either on the grounds of local inequality, or alleging that his particular establishment was not adaptable to a 48 (or 44) hour week, and that in any case there would be no release of workers through the lengthening of hours.
An appeal had to refer to an individual employer, but frequently a representative of a whole industry or occupation — for example, the Hotel Keepers' Association or Retail Goods Association, or the insurance companies or banks — would bring an appeal before the appropriate panel and make out a case for application or extension of the exemption to each of the associated employers in the area. Frequently when these appeals were granted it was on the ground that the shorter hours would permit some of the workers to undertake part-time employment in an essential undertaking, or in agriculture.

Statistical Summary

A tabulation of appeals coming up to the national level between May 1943 and November 1944, made by the legal department of the War Manpower Commission, indicated the issues raised in 751 cases, many involving more than one issue. The chief ground or issue was: undue personal hardship, 371 cases; discharge, 28; lay-off, 6; wages, 16; statements of availability, 28; under-utilisation, 300; referrals, 45; 48-hour week provision, 12; employment ceilings, 4; the reinstatement provision, 42; and locally needed activities, 2.

During 1945 there were increasing numbers of cases involving exemptions from the 48-hour minimum work-week, "locally needed" designations and expansion or resumption of civilian type production. There had been only one case (until May 1945) appealed to the national level involving the assignment of a manpower priority rating. The absence of such appeals was probably due principally to the difficulty that a private employer would have in determining the relative urgency for the war effort of his needs as compared with the needs of other employers.

Owing to lack of information it is not possible to summarise the nature of the cases dealt with at the regional or local level, but many of the regional cases, particularly in 1945, were concerned with employer appeals from ceilings fixed by the Area Director on the advice of his local Manpower Priorities Committee, and in certain regions a substantial number of cases under civilian reconversion were received during October and November 1944. This flow ceased almost entirely with the postponement and changed procedures for civilian production that took place as a consequence of the stepped-up production needs, but began again with the beginning of full reconversion programmes.

Appeals Procedures

The national regulation not only set forth the conditions giving rise to the right of appeal but also outlined the basic principles and requirements applicable to the taking of appeals, the conduct of
hearings, the rendering of decisions, and the several steps through which an appeal might be carried. It was designed to assure maximum local autonomy; under it, Area and Regional Directors, in consultation with their Management-Labor Committees, could exercise wide discretion with respect to methods of operation.

General Provisions

The national regulation specified that any employer or worker, who had a right to appeal, should be fully apprised of his appeal rights, and that, at the time of notification, he must be informed of the method of taking appeal, except that such notice might be given through posting or publication in cases where personal notification was deemed impracticable. In such cases, the employer or worker was to be allowed a reasonable time, after the posting or publication, within which to indicate his intention to appeal.

The time within which an appeal must be taken to the area or regional level was to be prescribed by the Regional Manpower Director and be not less than three days nor more than seven days following the date of receipt of the notice, or of its posting or publication. Appeals to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission similarly had to be taken within seven days following receipt of notice. Notice of appeal might be given in person or in writing, or in any other manner which duly apprised the War Manpower Commission of the taking of the appeal.

Other provisions for the methods of handling appeals laid down that any action which a person or organisation might wish to take under the regulation could be taken on his or its behalf by a duly authorised representative; that the appellant, and any other person entitled to appeal, must be given reasonable notice of the time and place of any hearing; that whenever appropriate for the full and expeditious determination of common questions raised by two or more appeals, the chairman of the committee to whom such appeals were taken might consolidate them.

The regulation also provided that, except in case of a statement of availability or a referral, the taking of an appeal suspended the action appealed from, pending the final decision, unless the chairman of the committee to whom an appeal was taken specifically directed otherwise.¹ The requirement that an individual found by

¹ "Whenever, in the first instance, or pursuant to a decision in an appeal, the War Manpower Commission or any agent or agency acting on its behalf issues a statement of availability to, or makes a referral of, any worker, neither the appeal of the employer nor any decision on such an appeal (other than a final decision finding fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the worker) shall in any way prejudice the right of the worker, to whom the statement or referral has been issued, to accept new work on the basis thereof; or the right of an employer to retain a worker whom he has hired in reliance upon such statement or referral..."
the War Manpower Commission to be entitled to a statement of availability or a referral should benefit immediately, notwithstanding any appeal, was necessary in order to prevent undue hardship which might have occurred if he were not permitted to work while an appeal taken by the employer was pending.

An optional procedure with respect to the issuance of statements of availability and making of referrals, which might be adopted by any Area Manpower Director after consultation with his Area Management-Labor Committee, enabled the issuance of a statement of availability or the making of a referral, on personal hardship or under-utilisation grounds, to be suspended in order that the employer might have reasonable time to be heard before the employee was released.

All these general provisions served primarily as minimum basic safeguards to orient the handling of appeals from the local Employment Service up through area and regional appeals, to action by the National Management-Labor Policy Committees and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

Preliminary Action

Although the appeals procedures really began at the area level, there was a preliminary action taken under most local employment stabilisation plans that constituted part of the general procedure of review and of opportunity given to the individual worker for a fair hearing. In most of the United States Employment Service local offices some provision was made for an initial re-examination of the decision of the interviewer to refuse a statement of availability. This was part of the ordinary administrative action of the War Manpower Commission, and a review unit was set up prior to the intitiation of an appeal. This review unit usually consisted of two or more members of the office staff, who examined the case with or without the worker being present. This operation should not be confused with that of the first step in the appeals procedure.

A particularly significant form of preliminary action provided for under one local employment stabilisation plan consisted of a delegation of authority, either to joint plant committees in individual establishments, or to Industry War Manpower Committees composed of labour and management representatives from individual industries. They were authorised to act in some cases in lieu of the employer in passing upon application for statements of availability; in other instances they acted in lieu of the Area Director and the United States Employment Service (appeals
from its decisions going direct to an appeals body) and passed upon the issuance of a statement of availability which had been denied by the employer. The powers of such plant and industry committees were limited to those matters that concerned employees under their specific jurisdiction. They received requests in writing from employees who desired to terminate their employment; decided on such requests; issued statements of availability; advised applicants of their right to appeal; and performed such other duties as the State Manpower Director assigned to them.

The grounds on which one of these committees could act were defined under the plan in question. In all instances, they were instructed to keep in mind that the fundamental objectives of the local employment stabilisation plan were to eliminate wasteful turnover and to direct the flow of available manpower to employers engaged in activities important to the war effort. The committee therefore had first to learn whether the applicant had been discharged or had his employment otherwise terminated by his employer; and whether the employer was not willing to re-employ the applicant at the same pay and in the same position as formerly. If the committee found that the employment had been terminated, but that the employer was willing to re-employ the worker, it should as a rule refuse to decide the request for termination, and notify the applicant that he must return to the job as a condition for the hearing of his request. If employment had not been terminated, or if circumstances warranted the worker quitting before clearance was granted, the committee was to make its decision on the following grounds: whether the continuance of the employment would involve undue personal hardship; whether the employment was at a wage or salary or under working conditions below standards established by State or federal law or regulation or by the National War Labor Board; whether the employer had failed to adjust the wages accordingly; and whether the applicant had been regularly employed at less than the established full work-week of the plant, or at a job which did not utilise his highest recognised skill, which was needed for the war effort.\(^1\)

Experience with this preliminary procedure indicated that it was doubly useful: it gave the members on the joint committees an opportunity to review plant or industry problems that were causing requests by workers to change employment; and the fact that a worker had to wait—usually three days—between his request for a statement of availability and its examination often meant that he reconsidered and withdrew his request to leave the plant.

\(^1\) See Operating Manual for War Manpower Commission Local and Industry Committees, Northern California State Area.
First Stage: Area Level

The provisions on operation of appeals at the first formal stage gradually evolved as practical experience was gained.

In the regulations of May 1943 the only direction given concerning the first appeal level was a requirement that where an Area Manpower Director and an Area Management-Labor Committee were appointed, appeals should be heard before such Committee or—at its discretion—before an Area Appeals Committee. This was to be composed of an equal number of management and labour representatives, with representatives of agricultural management and labour whenever agricultural employment was under consideration, selected by the Director from a panel chosen by the Management-Labor Committee. The Area Manpower Director or his representative was to serve as the non-voting Chairman\(^1\) of the full Area Committee or of the Appeals Committee.\(^2\) Provision was also made in all regulations, from the outset, that hearings on original and subsequent appeals should be conducted informally and in a manner that would best develop the facts.

Area Appeals Committees, Boards or Panels were sometimes composed of members or alternate members of the full Area Management-Labor Committee, and in other cases the Committee members themselves (whether principals or alternates) only took jurisdiction on particularly important cases. On some occasions they re-heard a case as part of the intermediate level described below. Under these conditions, all other cases were heard and decided by appeals panels. Special arrangements provided for the establishment also of a Shipyard Appeal Board providing the first stage in the appeals procedure for employers who were a party to the master agreement between the Pacific Coast Shipbuilders and the Pacific Coast Metal Trades Council. The Shipyard Appeal Board was composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labour and followed the same procedures as a local Area Appeal Board in dealing with the employers and employees coming under its jurisdiction.\(^3\)

At the first appeals stage, whether it was the Area Appeals

\(^1\) Under the earlier appeals procedures prior to the issuance of the regulations and standards, the Chairman of the Area Appeals Committee cast a deciding vote, thus bringing the War Manpower Commission itself into the actual appeals decisions. This was objected to and changed at a later stage.

\(^2\) Where no Management-Labor Committee was appointed, an Area Appeals Committee was to be set up composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labour selected by the Regional Manpower Director from a panel chosen by the Regional Management-Labor Committee with, as a non-voting Chairman, a representative designated by the Regional Manpower Director. This provision went out of existence with the uniform application of stabilisation plans in accordance with Regulation 7.

\(^3\) See War Manpower Commission Employment Stabilisation Programme for Northern California, "Procedure for Shipyard Committees".
Committee, an Appeals Board, a Shipyard Committee or a full Management-Labor Committee, the decision was rendered by merit, on the record of the action from which the appeal was taken and on the evidence presented at the hearing. Decision by a majority of the Committee was final unless a further appeal was taken. Members of the Committee might file majority and minority reports. In the event of a tie vote, the case, including the complete record, was transmitted promptly to the next appeals stage.\(^1\)

There was considerable variation in the way in which Appeals Panels were conducted.\(^2\) Sometimes a summary of each case was given to the members of the Panel for study and examination prior to the hearing, or at the opening of the hearing prior to the appearance of the appellant. Sometimes a brief discussion of the case and a review of the findings of the local office of the United States Employment Service was given orally by the representative of the War Manpower Commission before the appearance of the appellant. In other areas, by contrast, the entire case was presented for the first time to the Board in the presence of the parties to the appeal; and in still other cases, a representative of the United States Employment Service, who had initially denied a statement of availability, might be present to explain the grounds on which the statement was denied.

The amount of time taken on individual cases depended somewhat on the size of the load before the Committee, as well as on the degree of thoroughness which individual Committee members demanded. In some areas, particularly in the early stages of the development of stabilisation plans, Appeals Committees were meeting constantly, since both employers and workers were urged to appeal whenever there was any doubt on a decision in order to have maximum discussion of difficulties and provide a clinic to study the real effects of the stabilisation plan. In other areas the local office of the Employment Service discouraged appeals and attempted to satisfy both sides without recourse to appeal.

**Optional Intermediate Stage**

The national regulations provided for an intermediate appeals stage on an optional basis, which was used in a number of regions.

\(^1\) An Area Management-Labor Committee might take jurisdiction of, hear and decide, a case at any time after it had been assigned to an Area Appeals Panel or Committee and before it had been taken to the regional level.

\(^2\) Some panels were conducted almost as a court, while others were entirely informal, the appellant being encouraged to talk freely and the committee members themselves sometimes arguing with the appellant and in other cases waiting to go over his statements after he had been dismissed. Furthermore, there was frequently argument among the employers and workers before decision was reached, in order to achieve unanimity in as many cases as possible.
The Regional Manpower Director, with the specific approval of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, might with respect to an area presenting special problems, and for which a duly constituted Management-Labor War Manpower Committee was functioning, provide for an intermediate review stage between area and region. The review of appeals at such an intermediate stage was subject in all respects to the procedures and requirements applying to the review of appeals at the second level, and is therefore described in connection with the second level.

Second Stage: Regional Level

Appeals from decisions on original appeals were taken to the appropriate Regional Management-Labor Committee, or at its discretion to a Regional Appeals Committee composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labour (including agricultural representatives when appropriate), selected by the Regional Manpower Director from a panel chosen by the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee. The Regional Director, or his representative, served as the non-voting Chairman of the full Committee acting on appeals cases, or of Regional Appeals Committees. In almost all instances the regional attorney or an assistant attorney presided.

The decisions rendered at the second stage were made on the basis of the record unless in the judgment of the Appeals Committee a further hearing was necessary. If so, the further hearing could either be conducted at the regional level, or the case could be remanded to the area stage. The decision by a majority of the Committee was final, unless further appeal was taken to the national level. Members of the Committee might file majority and minority reports. In the event of a tie vote on a case in which a decision had been rendered at the area level, such decision became final unless further appeal was taken. In case of a tie vote at both the area and regional appeals levels, the case, including the complete record, had to be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission for decision at the national level.

A Regional Management-Labor Committee could take over a case assigned to its own Appeals Committee and reverse the latter's decision in the same way as provided at the area level.

Appeals at the second stage showed many of the same variations in trend between regions as between areas. In almost all regions the mass of ordinary cases was dealt with through Appeals Panels or Boards, but the degree of interest shown by regular members of Regional Committees in the appeals work differed from region to region. Some of the busiest members of Regional Manage-
ment-Labor Committees insisted, particularly in the early period of the war manpower programme, in devoting very considerable time and attention to the appeals work, considering, as did the members of Committees at the area level, that this was one of the best procedures for judging and evaluating the implication and operation of the policy of the War Manpower Commission as a whole. Furthermore, the question of the appearance in person of the appellant at the regional level depended primarily upon geographical conditions, smaller regions being more inclined to encourage such appearances. The same variation in the method of handling Regional Appeals Panels was apparent as at the area level. In some instances the representative of the War Manpower Commission directed the discussion and intervened considerably to guide the Committee members; in other instances, he refrained from intervention except to clarify a question of evidence, procedure or precedent.

Special appeals procedures were developed at the regional level for dealing with appeals cases involving determinations as to availability of labour for increased civilian-type production. Since such determinations were made in the first instance by the Regional War Manpower Director, the appeals were taken to the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee or to a Regional Appeals Committee. Appeals might be filed either with the Regional or with the State or Area Manpower Director; in the latter case they were transmitted to the Regional Director. Subsequent appeals were taken to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, who made the final decision, as in other appeals cases, after consideration of the record and of recommendations from the National Management-Labor Policy Committee.

Since the special Regional Appeals Committee was usually located in the same city as the regional office, provision was made for taking testimony from appellants in distant localities by a duly authorised War Manpower Commission official at a point convenient to the employer. The regulations also set forth detailed considerations to govern appeals on these grounds.

Statistics are apparently not available from all regions as to the number and classification of appeals which came up from the area to the regional level, nor the proportion of reversals. In some regions it was indicated that reversals had taken place in about 50

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1 In one region where there had been considerable difficulty between the area and regional level over reversal of cases, the region developed the practice of having a panel of members from the local area concerned attend whenever its cases were up for consideration. This procedure proved very salutary in improving the relationship between the two groups and in making clear to the area the basis of the regional action.

per cent. of the cases, and in others that the tendency of the Regional Committee was to sustain the decision at the area level failing very strong evidence against this course. In almost all cases where statistics were available, unanimous decisions at the first stage were sustained at the second.

**Final Stage: National Level**

Any person entitled to appeal from a decision at the area level might also appeal, within the prescribed time, from a decision at the regional level to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Within the same time, the Regional Manpower Director, upon his own initiative, might transmit any case to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission for review after the decision at the regional level. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission might, at his discretion, also take jurisdiction of any appeal at any stage of the appeals process and render a final decision on it.

The decision of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was final in all cases. It was made after consideration of the record and on the basis of recommendations submitted to him by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. The Chairman took immediate jurisdiction only in a very limited number of cases. In all of these an important policy issue was involved or a final decision required promptly in order to avoid undue hardship or to expedite a programme.¹

Appeals were handled at the national level in a substantially different manner than at the area or regional level. Each individual case was processed by the legal staff of the War Manpower Commission and then presented to a subcommittee of the Management-Labor Policy Committee. This subcommittee normally consisted of the two Executive Assistants of the Management-Labor Policy Committee from labour and management respectively and two alternate members of the Committee. It reviewed the cases on the basis of the analyses submitted by the legal staff, including recommended decisions reflecting the policies and principles developed by the Appeals Panel, which had worked closely with the legal staff over a long period. Consequently, except in particularly difficult

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¹ For example, in one case the Director of Economic Stabilization had issued a directive to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission with respect to the referral of workers who had refused to work in accordance with an order of the War Labor Board and an Executive Order of the President. The Chairman assumed jurisdiction of the appeal of such a worker from a denial of a referral because of the novelty and significance of the question presented and of the desirability of a prompt decision in the case. In assuming jurisdiction, the Chairman directed that a full and fair hearing be accorded the parties in their own locality before a representative panel consisting of an equal number of representatives of management and labour. His decision was based on the transcript of the testimony so presented.
issues, the panel usually found itself in accord with the suggestions made by the staff. As a general rule, the subcommittee tended to uphold the decisions of the lower level, except where the case came up because of a split decision. The recommendations of the subcommittee were then reported to the full meetings of the Management-Labor Committee. Initially the Management-Labor Committee itself reviewed individual cases; subsequently it accepted a report from the subcommittee on the recommendations made to it and only took up an individual case on which some special policy decision was required.

Except in a very few cases, the Chairman accepted the recommendations of the subcommittee as transmitted through the full Management-Labor Policy Committee. In the rare instances in which the Chairman did not accept these recommendations, the reason was a difference of view between the Committee and the Chairman as to the requirements of War Manpower Commission policies or regulations. If the Chairman concluded that he could not accept a recommendation of the Committee, prior to rendering his decision, he would send the case back to it for reconsideration.

Special procedures were developed for the Chairman's assumption of jurisdiction in employment ceiling and manpower priority cases of extreme urgency and importance to the war effort. The Area Director was responsible for maintaining a continuous scrutiny of such cases and for bringing to the attention of the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission, through regular channels, those cases which he believed should be appealed directly to the Chairman. For example, a special provision empowered the Area Director to recommend that a case involving release of a worker under an employment ceiling programme be referred directly to the Chairman for prompt and final decision. Similarly, cases of extreme urgency and importance to the war effort, involving the resumption or expansion of civilian-type production, were to be recommended for the immediate jurisdiction of the Chairman. Finally, a Regional Director could recommend jurisdiction by the

However, in one particularly interesting case, there was a difference of opinion between the Chairman and the Committee as to the grounds on which the Chairman and the Committee should act. A case had been appealed under a stabilisation plan which was found to be not in conformity with Regulation 7. In this instance the Committee considered that, as the stabilisation plan was in practical operation, the decision must be in virtue of the stabilisation plan and not of Regulation 7. The Chairman considered that his decision must be taken in virtue of his own regulation, namely Regulation 7. The Policy Committee then insisted that the Chairman must enforce amendment of the stabilisation plan to bring it into conformity. Ultimately the Chairman made his decision on the basis of Regulation 7 and insisted that the stabilisation plan be brought into conformity. However, the stabilisation plan was never so amended because, in the meantime, the optional provisions of Regulation 7 were amended to provide a method for approving the provisions in the local plan.
Chairman if it appeared that multiple appeals might unduly delay withdrawal of War Production Board priorities and allowances of material from an employer who had refused to comply with an employment ceiling or hiring regulation within a reasonable time after having been notified to do so.

The lapse of time between the date of the original appeal to the local office and the Chairman's final decisions was found to average 96 days, 234 being the longest and 30 days the shortest time. The average time between decision at the regional level and the Chairman's decision was 54 days, 122 being the longest and 11 days the shortest time. These figures, however, do not accurately reflect the time required for decision of cases at the national stage because they include the period between regional decision and its receipt at the national level. Nevertheless, undue delay at the national and regional levels is indicated. The backlog at the national level was later eliminated and cases were decided by the Chairman within a week or 10 days from their receipt, unless further information or other unusual circumstances entailed further delay.

EVALUATION OF APPEALS SYSTEM

Experience throughout the country with the appeals system at the various levels, regarding the extent to which the manpower programme was equitably applied, was apparently generally satisfactory.

It is interesting to note the extent to which the decisions of this management-labour machinery at the area (or State), regional and national levels were attained by unanimous vote, or by a split on an individual rather than on an occupational basis.

The voting on requests for statements of availability was a tribute to the fairness of the approach of most of the Appeals Committees. Only in rare instances, when the appeal was on the ground of undue personal hardship, did the worker members support the appellant's claim and the employer members that of the employer or the United States Employment Service in a request to maintain the worker in essential employment. In the large majority of cases the decisions were reached on a unanimous basis, or a split occurred in which the division was clearly individual.

In the appeals discussions on under-utilisation of skill and on labour hoarding, there was the same objectivity of approach. By contrast, in the appeals under claims of discharge, lay-off, reinstatement and requests for higher wages, there was much more frequent division on the basis of employer-worker approach.

1 These figures apply to the 18 months May 1943 - November 1944.
Questions of referral of workers to plants in which a labour dispute was in process was another issue which gave rise to rather sharp division between the employer and worker members of Appeals Panels at different levels.

As manpower controls developed, the nature of the appeals changed; more cases of principle were given consideration and the parties encouraged to appeal typical cases from one level to the other, while simple cases were most often decided by unanimous vote at the first level.

Members of Appeals Panels and Committees at all levels stated their conviction that the time spent on appeals work was exceptionally rewarding both for its direct effect on flexible application of the manpower controls, and for its indirect effect on industrial relations, increased understanding of the point of view and the good faith of employers and trade union officials respectively.

The experience in the areas which made use of plant and industry committees as a preliminary level was that these committees contributed substantially to employment stabilisation and formed a significant phase of the appeals procedure in the area. These local arrangements also promoted understanding of the local stabilisation plan and the War Manpower Commission programme by the hundreds of individuals serving on the various committees.

The work at the area level was perhaps of the greatest significance both to the individuals and to the communities concerned. It was in the constant meetings of Appeals Boards, Panels and Committees at this level that a substantial number of members of the community became intimately acquainted with the work of the War Manpower Commission as a whole. These Appeals Committees provided an opportunity for a very large number of employers and trade union representatives to come together and discuss the effect of the manpower regulations on individuals. In many cases they discovered, frequently for the first time, that the points of view of the employer and of the union agent were not substantially different when they were dealing with a question that had no direct controversial issue to divide them. Recognition of the fair-mindedness in approach of both sides made a substantial contribution, not only to the fairness with which the manpower programme was applied, but to general industrial relations in the community.

Persons who served on Regional Appeals Panels, whether they were full or alternate members of the Regional War Manpower Committee or members appointed for appeals work only, gave similar expressions of satisfaction with time spent on appeals work. The indirect effects in improving the general structure of industrial
relations were particularly stressed in regions where industrialisation was relatively new and where the acceptance of trade unionism was still either an open issue or one which had developed extensively during the war.

At the national level the appeals work became of less general interest to many of the Committee members as the procedure of subcommittee review was developed. However, the fact that each case which came up to the national level was again examined by a joint committee helped to convince the parties that at no stage would a decision be rendered by a Government official without advice from representatives of industry and of labour. Furthermore, particularly in the early stages of the formulation of controls, consideration of individual appeals by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee contributed substantially to its own appreciation of the impact upon the communities of each regulation adopted.

Finally, it was this procedure of joint consideration at every level which constituted the unique character of the War Manpower Commission appeals proceedings. Almost all other such procedures provide that appeals go either from a joint or tripartite decision at one level to a second level where decision is made by a tripartite vote or by a responsible Government official. Under the Selective Service provision, appeal from a decision could be taken to the competent official. The War Labor Board provisions established review by tripartite bodies. Appeals procedures under most manpower regulations in other countries normally provide for a hearing by a joint appeals body, but for final decision at the second stage by a Government department. In most unemployment compensation provisions, appeals are taken to an independent referee.

Although the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission himself had the final authority and, as has been indicated, in a limited number of cases overruled the conclusion of the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, the general experience of the Commission was that equitable and satisfactory decisions could be reached at one level or another through the hearing of an appeal by a joint committee of employers' and workers' representatives. This experiment may have a lesson for the future. It warrants close examination in countries where the establishment or revision of controls upon employment or industry in the post-war period may be considered.
PART III

LABOUR-MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION
IN WAR PRODUCTION PLANNING
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION IN WAR PRODUCTION PLANNING

To ensure participation of labour and management representatives within the complex administrative pattern of the War Production Board, and in particular to provide means for obtaining the advice of industry and labour when dealing with questions directly related to manpower, a number of procedures were adopted, differing generally in concept from the method of consultation through joint committees practised by the War Manpower Commission.

At the national level participation was obtained first, by placing in key policy-making and administrative posts individuals having the confidence of industry and labour respectively, because of their own personal background and experience; and second, by establishing a series of management advisory committees and labour advisory committees whose respective functions were to make the advice of the two sections of industry available to the staff of the War Production Board. These committees did not generally meet together. With the exception of a formal and largely nominal Management Labour Council, the Board had no joint advisory committee.

At the regional and district levels, the War Production Board obtained management and labour participation in its operation through the use of its field personnel. This was drawn partly from a management background and, in addition, each local office had on its staff one or more representatives loaned from the labour movement and responsible to the two national Offices of Manpower Requirements and of Labor Production.

Finally, the War Production Board initiated and sponsored the voluntary joint Labor Management Production Committees established in individual plants, mills, mines and shipyards to promote co-operation for better wartime production.
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

Management and labour participated both in the policy-making and in the administrative structure of the War Production Board; the procedures making this participation possible were adapted to the changing requirements of war production and to the alterations in the wartime administrative machinery.

The initial administrative structure of the War Production Board was based, to a large extent, upon the system set up by the Office of Production Management, whose responsibilities in production organisation, labour supply, training and labour relations were assumed by the Board. Much of the administrative staff and many of the consultative and operating procedures were also taken over. Consequently, in addition to staff recruited from government service, universities and other research institutions persons with a general industrial or business background — often dollar-a-year men in the Office of Production Management — continued to occupy some of the key administrative posts in the War Production Board. Furthermore, labour leaders, on leave from their unions, participated in the War Production Board on somewhat the same basis as in the Office of Production Management and were responsible for putting forward labour’s point of view on all production questions.

CONSULTATION AT THE POLICY LEVEL

The composition of the War Production Board itself, as established in 1942\(^1\) affected the position of management and labour at the policy-making level. The policy of the Office of Production Management had been determined by a Council consisting of a Director-General and Associate Director-General, chosen on the basis of their respective management and labour backgrounds, in addition to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. But the War Production Board was administered by a single Chairman, charged with full responsibility for the operation of the agency and advised by an interdepartmental board composed of represent-

\(^1\) Executive Order 9024 of 16 January 1942, amplified by Executive Order 9040 of 24 January 1942.
atives of the other agencies concerned with war production. The abolition of the positions of Director-General and Associate Director-General of the Office of Production Management thus removed management and labour representatives from the top level. For a time, the former Associate Director-General was a member of the interdepartmental Board, but, following his transfer to another position, he was not replaced on the Board by any other labour leader.2

Management-Labor Council

In response to various demands for joint representation at the policy-making level, the Chairman, on 30 March 1943, established a Management-Labor Council composed of eight members. He himself named four, the presidents of the National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Each of these representatives then nominated to the Council an additional member from his own organisation. The Management-Labor Council continued in existence but met infrequently and never fully served the general purposes for which it was established.3 It had no permanent secretariat, and its members did not take any continuing interest in meeting together in this capacity, nor in making the Council an effective policy instrument. Consequently, the real participation of labour and management in the functions of the Board was obtained rather at the administrative and operating levels.

Management and Labour Participation in Administrative Machinery

In the final period of the war the administrative organisation of the War Product on Board at the national level was under the direction of a Chairman, with experience in industry and public service, and nine Vice-Chairmen under whom operating divisions were grouped. Two of the Vice-Chairmen were on loan from the labour movement while four came from private industry, two from academic life, and one, a former Congressman and mayor, had been a Government official from the outbreak of war. This system grew out of a series of reorganisations, each of which affected both the top administrative machinery and the operating divisions. Its origin is found in the Office of Production Management.

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1 Mr. Sidney Hillman, then on leave from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (C.I.O.).
2 The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was subsequently appointed to the Board because of his responsibilities regarding labour supply.
3 The Chairman intended that the Council would provide a formal medium for joint discussions and present the opportunity for inviting outstanding citizens with broad experience to contribute to particular discussions.
Men with industrial experience had largely directed and staffed the "Industry Divisions" of the Office of Production Management, which controlled industrial production. They were also important in staffing other divisions, such as the Purchases Division which controlled the allocation of contracts. In addition, men still actively associated with their companies were called in to advise on methods for converting individual industries to war production.¹

Labour questions were the responsibility of a Labor Division, which had allocated to it three distinct functions: labour supply and training; labour relations; and presentation of labour's point of view on production problems and policies being developed by the operating divisions.

More than half of the functions of the Labor Division and, in particular, its labour supply and training functions, were transferred from the War Production Board to the War Manpower Commission when the latter body was set up in April 1943. Because the Labor Division no longer was concerned with labour supply questions its title was changed to Labor Production. Its trade union Director was replaced by a Director selected from Government service, but named after consultation with the national trade union leaders. He, in turn, appointed representatives of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations to serve as Associate Directors and to be in charge of the labour participation in the operating staff. The Director of the Division also appointed a Labor Policy Committee, composed of three representatives each from the two national labour organisations, to advise him in determining major questions of production policy. The appointees to the committee were the labour members then serving on the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission.

Labour participation in the functions of the Labor Division was achieved primarily by means of trade union leaders serving on the staff of the Division, and management participation through a panel of management consultants available whenever a situation required either a wholly management or a joint labour-management approach. In some industries the Labor Division had made use of permanent tripartite labour relations committees, such as a Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee and an Aircraft Industry Committee, to deal with special problems involving wage adjustments.

¹ The procedure used to obtain such advice was the establishment of industry advisory committees attached to the various industry and commodity divisions. The whole structure of divisions and committees was taken over by the War Production Board.
or employment stabilisation.¹ In other industries, such as automobiles, aluminium and silk, special tripartite conferences of employers, workers and the Government were held, but permanent machinery was not set up.

A number of additional procedures were developed by the Labor Division to carry out its more general responsibility of presenting the labour point of view on production problems. These included attendance of its own staff members at meetings called by other divisions and the establishment of a series of Labor Advisory Committees composed of nominees of A.F. of L. headquarters and of the C.I.O. affiliates and independent unions concerned. The principal early interest of the Labor Advisory Committees was in connection with plans suggested by trade unions for conversion to defence and war production in industries such as rubber, paper, printing and publishing, automobiles, aluminium, furniture, durable consumer goods, and steel. The Labor Advisory Committees, like the Industry Committees, acted only in an advisory capacity and could suggest but not determine policies.

Later, when the "War Production Drive", which led to the formation of Labor-Management Committees in war plants, was inaugurated by the Chairman of the War Production Board in 1942, a new activity of immediate concern to the Labor Division developed.²

*Management and Labour under First Reorganisation*

During the summer and autumn of 1942 the War Production Board went through one of its first substantial administrative re-organisations, designed to bring the Board into closer touch with military and production requirements, to control and expedite the flow of materials, and to bring production schedules into balance with available resources and with one another. It was at this time that provision for the appointment of Vice-Chairmen (then three in number), was first made, so as to relieve the pressure upon the Chairman. The operating work of the Industry and Commodity Division and their respective Industry Advisory Committees³ was

¹ The Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee had been established in November 1940 when the Labor Division was still part of the National Defense Advisory Commission.

² Labour-management co-operation through these joint committees is described in Chapters XI to XIV.

³ General Administrative Order 2-45, issued on 8 July 1942, established within the Board the positions of Vice-Chairman, Vice-Chairman on Program Determination, Deputy Chairman on Program Progress, Deputy Chairman on Smaller War Plants and Director-General for Operations. (The Deputy Chairman on Smaller War Plants was also the Chairman of the Smaller War Plants Corporation created by law on 11 June 1942.) A Production Vice-Chairman was appointed in September 1942.
also strengthened. In September 1942 a Production Executive Committee was established, and an existing Requirements Committee given further tasks. Both committees, by bringing together representatives of other participating agencies, provided for interdepartmental consultation in the war production programme.

The labour movement was not satisfied with its position in the War Production Board under the first administrative reorganisation. Representatives of 20 A.F. of L. and C.I.O. unions, meeting with the Chairman of the Board in August 1942, requested that labour be empowered to name its own representatives on the Board. Protests were raised against having separate industry and labor advisory committees and so many separate labor policy committees; and planned and organised representation was urged.

The demands for a stronger position for labour in the Board were reiterated by the leaders of both labour groups in the following months, in their own national organisations and at meetings of the Labor Policy Committee of the Labor Production Division. Although these demands were never met to any large extent, they resulted in the appointment of labour advisers to various operating divisions of the War Production Board on an experimental basis.\(^1\)

The work of the Industry Divisions was greatly increased in importance under the controlled materials plan developed toward the close of 1942. This provided a system for authorising essential war and civilian production designed to balance the supply and demand, first for basic materials and later also for critical components, thereby eliminating unbalanced production programmes which were causing uneven burdens on war industries. The administrative organisation under the plan included assignment of representatives of labour, industry and seven “claimant” Government agencies to each Industry Division. The Industry Advisory Committees were widely used in carrying out the Divisions' work.

Two other administrative developments during the same period affected the role of labour within the War Production Board. Two labour union leaders, nominated by the presidents of the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., were appointed in September 1942 to advise the Smaller War Plants Division of the Board. The increasing significance of this office rested in its responsibility for seeing that direct contracts were awarded to small firms or that adequate subcontracting was carried out. Labour advisers had a role in indicating where labour could be best utilised.

As a result of the necessity to supply the War Manpower Commission with information on the relative importance of items of

\(^1\) For example, Assistant Directors for Labor were then named to the Pulp and Paper Division, the Printing and Publishing Division and the Steel Division.
war production, for its guidance in allocating manpower, a Manpower Requirements Branch\(^1\) was established within the Office of Program Determination. The functions of the Branch were to determine the relative importance of manpower requirements for particular industries and localities, to advise on the adequacy of manpower resources to meet the over-all production programme, and to provide the staff for a newly-established interdepartmental Labor Requirements Committee. This advisory committee, under the direction of the War Production Board, was to help in compiling information on the production programme desired by the War Manpower Commission and to aid its determination of manpower policies.

**Altered Place of Management and Labour in Second Reorganisation**

Continued objection to the methods of the War Production Board and a shift in production needs brought about further changes in the administrative set-up of the War Production Board. National machinery was needed, capable of reducing the volume of construction, providing wider distribution of war contracts, avoiding the excessive production demands which had been placed on labour shortage areas, and ensuring more efficient utilisation of plants, materials, manpower, tools, transportation and other limited resources. To meet those needs, the Board established a series of controls and restrictions\(^2\) permitting it to exercise detailed supervision over the placement of orders for critical components of a number of important war products.\(^3\)

In order to obtain greater integration of operations at the national level, particularly between planning production and allocating scarce materials and components, an Executive Vice-Chairman on loan from a large industry was appointed to the Board in March 1943 and made responsible for determination and execution of policy subject to the direction of the Chairman. The number of vice-chairmen was again increased and additional staff members appointed from an industry background.

The demand for strengthened labour representation in the higher administrative structure was met in a manner which preserved the Chairman's principle that vice-chairmen must hold functional positions, and at the same time took account of the

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\(^1\) Under the direction of a trade unionist on leave from one of the Railroad Brotherhoods.

\(^2\) Developed through such agencies as the Requirements Committee and the Production Executive Committee.

\(^3\) In recognising that components rather than raw materials had become the bottleneck, the War Production Board changed the emphasis to closer restrictions over production and distribution of component items rather than over end products and raw materials only.
divided character of the labour movement. The Director of the
Labor Production Division resigned and was replaced by his former
Associate Director, an officer of the American Federation of Labor.
An equal place for the Congress of Industrial Organizations was
found through the creation of an Office of Manpower Requirements\(^1\)
and the appointment of an official of the United Steel Workers of
America, a C.I.O. union, as its head. Each of these labour men was
then made a vice-chairman of the War Production Board.\(^2\)

**PROGRAMME CHANGES CAUSING FURTHER REORGANISATION**

By the fall of 1943 it had become clear that manpower was the
item in most critically short supply, and that some practical arrange­
ments must be made to link contracts with labour market needs
and strategic war urgency. Difficulties in the aircraft industry,
especially on the West Coast, led to a special investigation by the
Office of War Mobilisation into interdepartmental relations and
the work of the different departments at both regional and local
levels.

As a result of this investigation the War Production Board
inaugurated an extensive programme to strengthen interdepart­
mental committees, nationally and regionally, and to decentralise
and strengthen its own regional and district offices.\(^3\)

A still further shift in emphasis was brought about in the War
Production Board organisation in the spring and summer of 1944,
when resumption of civilian production was envisaged as materials
became available and as the war production schedule determined
by the chiefs of staff was temporarily reduced. For this purpose the
Board established a Production Executive Committee Staff in June
1944.

As part of the 1944 planning for reconversion, an Office of
Labor Advisory Committees was set up in the Office of Labor Pro­
duction, but under the joint responsibility of the Vice-Chairmen
for Labor Production and for Manpower Requirements, so as to
secure the assistance of labour in the production programme
“through the medium of Labor Advisory Committees”. This new
Office was to revitalise the existing — but long inactive — Labor
Advisory Committees that had served during the early period of

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\(^1\) This office took over the duties of the Manpower Requirements Branch from
the Office of Labor Production.
\(^2\) The Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements also served as Vice-Chair­
man of the War Manpower Commission. He therefore provided liaison between
the two agencies on manpower questions.
\(^3\) See Chapter VII.
conversion to war production, and to establish new committees wherever appropriate.

During the summer of 1944 further reorganisation took place, following differences of opinion between the Chairman and the Executive Vice-Chairman, particularly on the timing of reconversion planning and its effects on large and small industry. With the resignation of the Executive Vice-Chairman the post was abolished. Shortly after, the Chairman of the War Production Board himself also resigned, and was replaced by a man who had formerly served as Vice-Chairman in charge of programme development.\(^1\) The changes which he made in the methods of operation of the Board affected the way in which both management and labour representatives were used throughout the structure.

**Management and Labour under Final Structure**

In the final period of the war the general administrative organisation of the Board consisted of the Chairman and nine Vice-Chairmen, who reported to him and were respectively responsible for supply, programme, operations, metals and minerals, field operations, smaller war plants, civilian requirements, manpower requirements and labour production. Only the work of the Office of the Chairman, and of those Vice-Chairmen’s Offices which provided for direct participation of either management or labour is described here.

The Chairman himself exercised control over all War Production Board policies and operations and was responsible for the presentation of these policies to Congress, the President, and other Government agencies. He presided over the most important interdepartmental committee, the Production Executive Committee\(^2\), which served as the central administrative agency directing the scheduling of the various production programmes and the development of operating policies.\(^3\) Although there was no direct participation of labour or management as such, its decisions affected directly the work of the operating divisions and of the consultative and representative bodies attached to these. The membership of the War Manpower Commission on the Production Executive was designed to ensure that the labour supply problems involved in any decision were understood. The implications of its decisions on the labour movement itself were carried down through the Board’s Vice-

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\(^1\) In the intervening period he had been with the Navy.

\(^2\) Composed of representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, the Army Air Force, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, the Maritime Commission and the War Manpower Commission.

\(^3\) He also presided over the Aircraft Production Board, another interdepartmental committee, referred to in Chapter XVI.
Chairmen responsible for manpower requirements and labour production.

The *Program Vice-Chairman's Office* included not only the Requirements Committee, which consisted of representatives of agencies authorised to present demands for critical materials, components and products, and therefore had a significant role in the determination of actual production planning and allocation, but also the various bureaux in charge of the determination and administration of war production controls. The Vice-Chairman in 1945 was a former university professor, but all five of his predecessors had been drawn from a business or industry background, as had a large part of the staff.

The Office of the *Vice-Chairman for Field Operations* was responsible for the work of the regional offices and of committees or divisions directly affecting the execution of policy in the field. This Vice-Chairman or his Deputy consequently presided over the various committees, such as the Production Readjustment Committee or the Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee to which the Production Executive Committee had delegated the task of co-ordinating work at the area level.¹

Most of the operating industry divisions, and the Office of Industry Advisory Committees, were responsible to the *Vice-Chairman for Operations*. The Metals and Minerals Division and the advisory committees established by it were responsible to the *Vice-Chairman for Metals and Minerals*. It was through these operating divisions, from the time of their inception under the Office of Production Management until the end of the war, that the most extensive relationships with private industry were developed. They were staffed largely by men drawn from an industrial background. However, in order to provide for the labour point of view and at the insistence of the labour movement, either Assistant Directors or members of the staff known as joint representatives were appointed from the labour movement.² In general, the practice was

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¹ The work of these committees and their effect on both management and labour is described in Chapter VII.
² There was an Assistant Director or special assistant for labour questions in the divisions dealing with the following industries: automotive, building materials, chemicals, consumer durable goods, containers, farm machinery and equipment, general industrial equipment, tools, lumber and lumber products, paper and paper board, plumbing and heating, printing and publishing, radio and radar, shipbuilding, textiles (including clothing and leather), and transportation equipment (all of which reported to the Operations Vice-Chairman); steel (which reported to the Vice-Chairman for Metals and Minerals); and war utilities (which reported directly to the Office of War Utilities). In addition, there were joint representatives in construction machinery, rubber, safety and technical equipment, and service equipment (reporting to the Operations Vice-Chairman), aluminium, copper, cork, asbestos and fibrous glass, mining, miscellaneous minerals, tin, lead and zinc (reporting to the Vice-Chairman for Metals and Minerals) and aircraft (reporting directly to the Chairman).
to choose a labour representative or a labour assistant for the Industry Divisions from whichever of the A.F. of L., C.I.O. or Railway Labor unions had the greatest strength in the particular industry. The labour assistant in an Industry Division was expected to consult with organised labour and see that its ideas and point of view were made known before programmes were undertaken by any Industry Division. Where no labour assistant was appointed a joint representative from the staff of the Office of Labor Production representing both labour offices acted in his place.

The Director of each Industry Division, as part of his general responsibility for promoting war production, undertook to determine the probable effects of manpower shortages on the output of industries under his Division. He assisted, with the Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements, in reducing demands for labour in shortage areas by adjustment of production schedules, location of new plants and other action necessary to carry out the policies of the War Manpower Commission. Furthermore, the Director of each Industry Division had a number of specific functions, carried out in consultation with the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production. He was expected to guide and assist in the application of programmes for stimulating production in war plants, to report any evident lack of labour utilisation that was interfering with production in accordance with the agreement reached between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board, to aid in the establishment of joint plant Labor-Management Committees, and to assist the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production in preparing materials for an increase of production in critical industries. In the same way as he advised the Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements regarding the effect of labour productivity on plant manpower requirement estimates, so he advised the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production regarding the need for programmes of recruitment, training and up-grading of workers. Finally, the Director of each Industry Division was expected to obtain the co-operation and assistance of labour and management groups through consultation with both industry and labour advisory committees.¹

The Office established under the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production was the most general instrument in the War Production Board for expression of the labour viewpoint. The responsibilities of the Office included labour relations, wage cases in so far as they directly affected production, the improvement of plant and community conditions for war workers, and promotion of joint production committees in war plants; it also presented labour views on policies to the industry divisions in order to guide and assist them

¹ Described in Chapter X.
in planning and executing programmes for increased production.

Although many responsibilities of the Office fell upon the headquarters staff, an important part of the work devolved on the field staff of regional and district representatives, and on "trouble shooters" from the national staff, sent out whenever a particularly difficult production problem arose in an industry or in an area.

Within the Office of Labor Production, the Shipbuilding Stabilization staff of the War Production Board was carried over without substantial alteration from its original set-up in the Labor Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission, and in the Office of Production Management. The Director of the Division was the Chairman of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, which consisted of Government representatives from the Maritime Commission, the Navy Department, and the War Department, and 24 representatives of management and labour. The Committee was responsible for supervising the series of zone wage and employment stabilisation agreements, which were negotiated by the unions and the shipyards to determine conditions of work in shipbuilding on the Atlantic, the Gulf, the Pacific, and the Great Lakes. Shipbuilding stabilisation was organised on a zone basis, a series of tripartite zone conferences having been sponsored by the committee to take into consideration the different working conditions in shipyards in the various parts of the country. Zone conferences could be called at any time at the request of the parties to the respective agreements, and in any case met annually. The National Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee met quarterly for one or two days to discuss developments in the shipbuilding industry and ensure that agreements were being maintained. Earlier, it had to make any necessary adjustments for changes in cost of living, wage rates, etc. This latter function, however, was later carried on largely by the Shipbuilding Commission of the War Labor Board. The work in this field was one of the most successful of the tripartite agencies developed during the war.¹

The industrial relations function of the Office of Labor Production continued almost without change from the initial work undertaken by the Labor Division during the national defence period; it was responsible for investigating incipient industrial disputes and any kind of wage or other difficulties, and for working jointly with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, the War Labor Board and the National Labor Relations Board. It was also responsible for assisting the regional and local representatives of the War Production Drive in the promotion and establishment of plant Labor-Management Committees. Since it had originally

¹ Cf. section of Chapter XVI covering the Maritime Commission.
been responsible for developing the idea of Labor-Management Committees, it continued to work in close co-operation with the staff of the War Production Drive itself.1

Finally, the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production was administratively responsible for the Office of Labor Advisory Committees described in the next chapter.

The function of the Office of the *Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements*2 was to secure a balance between manpower supply and the demands made upon it from war and essential civilian production. The Office consisted of a small operating staff, organised under two Deputy Vice-Chairmen selected from national trade unions. It was responsible for presentation of labour requirements to the War Manpower Commission, and for the collection of labour market information useful in directing production away from the labour shortage areas and developing policy regarding the most suitable location of new plants. The work of the Office of Manpower Requirements specifically included briefing the labour member (representing itself and the Office of Labor Production) who sat on the interdepartmental Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee, and issuing instructions to the field staff for their presentation of labour's viewpoint within the War Production Board, and in the Area Manpower Priorities Committees and the Area Production Urgency Committees.

Much of the influence of the Office of Manpower Requirements on the placing and adjustment of production was exercised through its membership on the staff of the Production Executive Committee and on the Production Readjustment Committee and sub-committees3, as well as through the labour representatives in the several industry divisions of the Board.

The activities in the field of manpower recruitment largely took the form of liaison and advice to other parts of the War Production Board, and work with agencies specifically responsible for carrying out policies in this field. Although the Office of Manpower Requirements was authorised to develop manpower policies for the War Production Board, it was not in a position to assure the adoption of such policies.

In general, the Office of Manpower Requirements conceived its duties to be largely those of technical experts in the field of manpower; but it believed that a substantial part of its job was, on the

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1 Late in the war the Office was somewhat reorganised with the establishment of a Critical Products Division which encompassed the remaining functions of the former Office of Labor Production, and a Production Readjustment Division responsible for work on reconversion, cutbacks and relations with the Production Readjustment Committee.

2 An official on leave from the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

3 Described in Chapter VII.
one hand, to interpret to the Board the attitude of organised labour towards the latter's proposals, and, on the other, to explain War Production Board policies and procedures to labour and so obtain union support in the solution of war production problems. The distinction between its work and that of the Office of Labor Production was not always easy to maintain, even though the orders establishing the two offices had defined their respective responsibilities. Labour relations questions, wage rates and similar matters were difficult to separate from other manpower problems. The Office of Manpower Requirements and the Office of Labor Production frequently made joint appointments, for example, their representatives in the industry divisions. The provision for this labour representation was particularly significant in opening the way for much greater participation by labour in the day-to-day operating decisions taken by the various decisions of the Board.

Much of the work of the Office of Manpower Requirements was carried out in close co-operation with the War Manpower Commission, but occasionally jurisdictional conflicts between the two bodies arose. Moreover, the approach to various questions sometimes differed in emphasis, partly because of a difference in concept underlying the methods of consulting employers and workers in the two agencies.

Finally, two other Offices, those of the Vice-Chairman for Smaller War Plants and of the Vice-Chairman for Civilian Requirements made special provision for labour participation through the establishment in each case of a labour section and labour consultants from the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O., serving on leave from their unions. The primary interest of the labour movement in the work of both of these Offices was with a view to their relation to the preparation for post-war reconversion.

MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE REGIONAL ORGANISATION

The regional organisation of the War Production Board differed from that of the War Manpower Commission in its methods of obtaining management and labour participation, in the degree of decentralisation of responsibility, and in some instances, in its geographic boundaries. The War Production Board divided its field organisation into 13 regions, the boundaries of which followed in some instances industrial organisation rather than State lines.¹

¹ The regional offices of the War Production Board were located as follows: Region 1, Boston, Mass.; Region 2, New York, N.Y.; Region 3, Philadelphia, Pa.; Region 4, Atlanta, Ga.; Region 5, Cleveland, Ohio; Region 6, Chicago, Ill.; Region 7, Kansas City, Mo.; Region 8, Dallas, Texas; Region 9, Denver, Colo.; Region 10, San Francisco, Calif.; Region 11, Detroit, Mich.; Region 12, Minneapolis, Minn.; and Region 13, Seattle, Wash.
Regional Directors were appointed, but at first relatively little authority was delegated to them, and the regional representatives of the various divisions and offices of the Board served mainly as outstationed headquarters officials. This situation was substantially altered under the administrative reorganisation in the autumn of 1943, when the recommendations of the Office of War Mobilization called for increased regional responsibility along with improved interdepartmental co-ordination. The whole regional structure of the War Production Board was strengthened, but the Board still did not delegate as much responsibility as did the War Manpower Commission.

The principal method used to ensure management and labour participation in the regional War Production Board organisation was, as at the national level, the appointment of individuals from a management or a labour background serving on leave from their usual occupations. The War Production Board had no formal advisory regional committees; but recourse was sometimes had to the Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission when the advice of a cross-section of management and labour in the region was desired.

Regional Directors and Management Representation

The Regional Director and his Deputy were in many regions selected from an industrial background because of the need to deal extensively with industrial leadership in the region. In some cases the Regional Directors were stationed in the field after experience at the national headquarters; in other cases they were originally chosen because of their knowledge of a certain region.

The Regional Director or his Deputy was responsible for ensuring liaison with the other Federal agencies in the region in order to co-ordinate production programmes. This meant close co-operation with the regional representatives of the procurement agencies, cooperation with the War Manpower Commission in the field of labour supply, and with the War Labor Board in the field of labour relations. Therefore the Regional Director or his Deputy in many regions personally organised informal interdepartmental meetings and attended, whenever possible, meetings of the Management-Labor Committee of the War Manpower Commission on which provided contact with the most important industrial and trade union leaders in the region.

In addition to the operating staff responsible for certain aspects of production co-ordination, and directly related matters, a number of special regional representatives dealt with questions of labour
supply, industrial relations, civilian requirements, and the promotion of particular programmes such as Labor-Management Committees. While responsible to the Regional Director, these officials also reported to the national headquarters branch of the War Production Board, with whose activities they were concerned. A large proportion of the regional staff was selected because of experience in industry or relationship with management. However, some staff members were named to put forward the consumer's point of view and to deal with the labour movement.

**Regional Labour Representatives**

Labour representatives were assigned to regional offices by the Office of Labor Production, in agreement with the Regional Director, to carry out in the region the functions both of the Office of Labor Production and the Office of Manpower Requirements. In most regions there was a regional labour representative and a deputy chosen respectively in agreement with the two national trade union organisations. These regional representatives had additional staff selected from the trade unions to assist them in the regional and district offices.

There was a close working relationship between the labour members of the War Manpower Commission Management-Labor Committee and the regional labour representatives of the War Production Board, but no formal arrangement developed. In a number of regions liaison was strengthened by frequent attendance by the labour representatives, with or in place of the Regional Director of the War Production Board, at the meetings of the Management-Labor Committee.

The dual functions of the regional labour representatives on behalf of the Office of Labor Production and the Office of Manpower Requirements involved them in questions both of labour supply and of industrial relations, and therefore they frequently maintained a close operating relationship with the regional staff of the War Manpower Commission and the War Labor Board. Often the regional representative of the War Production Board was called upon to go into a local plant in which either an industrial dispute threatened or was in process, or in which the unions claimed bad working conditions, labour hoarding, under-utilisation of labour, or unwillingness to set up a plant Labor-Management Committee. The functions of the labour representative included investigation as to the facts behind union claims, mediation, and promotion of war production and labour supply policies at both regional and local levels.
Ad hoc Labour and Industry Conferences

Ad hoc conferences of industry and labour, organised by the Regional Director, were employed by the War Production Board for acquainting both employers and workers with critical needs of war production at any given time and with special problems in regions where particular difficulties had arisen. These conferences were sometimes used by the Chairman of the War Production Board, frequently accompanied by headquarters officials of the Board and of other federal agencies, to explain particularly difficult problems and to seek the suggestions and advice of the employers and trade unions in the industries concerned.

It was the policy of the War Production Board to hold separate conferences of management and labour on the grounds that franker discussion and consequently greater assistance could be obtained from industrialists if there were no trade union leaders present. This concept of separate consultative meetings is in sharp contrast with the joint conferences of management and labour members of Regional and Area Committees which the War Manpower Commission used in the same regions whenever there was a particularly urgent manpower question to be discussed.

Representation in District Organisation

The War Production Board developed within the regional organisation a district structure which corresponded roughly to the area organisation of the War Manpower Commission. Each district office was under a district manager, who, like the Regional Director, was usually selected from a management background and wherever possible from the local community in which the district office was located.

The activities of the district office became of particular importance following the devolution of authority to the regional and local level, and the establishment of the interdepartmental Area Production Urgency Committees and Area Manpower Priorities Committees. The district office manager himself was usually the Chairman of the Area Production Urgency Committee (which as a rule covered the same territory as the district) and also the War Production Board member of the Area Manpower Priorities Committee. In most of the larger industrial districts the manager included on his staff one or more labour representatives, and, frequently, district representatives of the Office of Civilian Requirements and of the War Production Drive. When the system of

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1 Described in Chapter VII.
2 In a number of cases one man carried the two positions.
interdepartmental committees had first been established the district labour representative was sometimes a member of the Production Urgency Committee, and in some but not all districts he served as the alternate to the district manager on the Manpower Priorities committee. Subsequently, he was made a regular member of these committees, the consequent responsibilities then becoming a significant part of his work in the district. The representative of the Office of Civilian Requirements was frequently, but not automatically, accorded membership.

Thus, at the district as at the regional level, there was both labour and management participation on the staff of the War Production Board although there were no Management-Labor Advisory Committees directly attached to the district offices. However, in the district as in the case of the region, the district manager and in many cases the labour representative frequently attended meetings of the Area Management-Labor Committee of the War Manpower Commission and took the opportunity to secure the advice of labour and management representatives. This practice also varied according to different districts, depending both on the interest of the War Production Board in the work of the Management-Labor Committee locally and on whether, in the particular area, the Management-Labor Committee or the War Manpower Director desired to maintain close liaison with the War Production Board.

**SUMMARY**

The War Production Board experimented with various methods for securing participation of management and labour throughout its operation. The Management-Labor Council\(^1\), established by the first Chairman to secure the advice of both sides at the top administrative level, was never formally abolished, but ceased to have any real functions.

There was no direct participation by management or labour representatives as such in the top policy-making committees of the War Production Board, namely the Production Executive Committee and the committees to which it delegated authority.

However, although there was little use of joint management-labour consultative procedures in the structure of the War Production Board committees, there was extensive use of both labour and business leadership throughout the operating staff, including steadily increasing integration of the labour leadership found in the

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\(^1\) Composed of the Presidents of the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, with additional industry and labour members chosen by these four bodies.
Office of Labor Production and the Office of Manpower Requirements, and throughout the administrative work of the War Production Board as a whole. Liaison was developed between the labour staff of these Divisions and the separate Industry Divisions which were to a very large extent staffed by men from a management background.

Joint labour-management conferences on an individual industry-wide basis were tried out on rare occasions and with only limited success. However, the separate Office of Industry Advisory Committees and Office of Labor Advisory Committees developed special procedures for drawing management and labour respectively into the production organisation. The War Production Board maintained these committees as separate entities, in spite of the request of labour for joint committees, because of the belief of a significant part of the staff that the opposition of industry would make joint committees less effective than separate organisations.

At the regional and district levels the War Production Board similarly obtained labour and management participation by borrowing, from organised labour and from management, individuals to serve on the staff of the regional and district offices as spokesmen for labour and management respectively. Here, too, the approach was to seek separately the advice of labour and management rather than to employ joint advisory committees.

Finally, the War Production Board was responsible, both at the national and the local level, for promoting joint Labor-Management War Production Committees in individual war establishments.

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1 Described in considerable detail in Chapters XI-XIV.
CHAPTER X

OPERATION OF INDUSTRY AND LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The use of separate advisory committees, composed in the one case of representatives of the companies producing a given product, and in the other of representatives of the national unions and of organised labour in the individual firms, to obtain the advice of management and labour in the organisation of production was initiated by the Office of Production Management. The War Production Board took over the committees then in operation and developed them as instruments for consultation regarding both organisation of war production and plans for reconversion to peace production. Industry Advisory Committees were more extensive in number and, in most cases, had longer and fuller experience than the Labor Advisory Committees, but both groups contributed to drawing large numbers of management and labour representatives directly into production planning.

INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEES

By the end of the war there were nearly 800 Industry Advisory Committees whose task was to ensure that the various Industry Divisions had the full co-operation and assistance of representatives from a fair cross-section of firms in each given industry.¹

Office of Industry Advisory Committees

An Office of Industry Advisory Committees, under the Operations Vice-Chairman, served as the focal point for all matters concerning the formation and operation of these committees, including approval of membership, maintenance of a list of all the committees and their membership, approval of the time, place and agenda for

each meeting, and arrangements for appropriate publicity with respect to the committees. However, responsibility for the substantive work of each Industry Committee rested with the particular Industry Division which sought the advice of its members.

**Procedures Governing the Establishment of Committees**

Specific rules governed the convening of industry representatives for formal meetings of Industry Advisory Committees, or for any informal conferences of representatives of an industry, or any small "task group" for the consideration of any special problems concerning an industry. These formal instructions were to ensure that such meetings should not be in any way in violation of the anti-trust laws which prevent combinations in restraint of trade. The limitations on function required that Advisory Committees should not undertake to determine policies for the industry, nor compel any person to comply with orders of the Government presiding officer or public authority, nor reach any agreement among themselves or with the Government presiding officer regarding specific action to be taken by the industry. Committee members might, however, agree on recommendations.

**Tasks of Committees**

The positive function of each Industry Advisory Committee was to discuss any suggestion, pertinent to the war programme and to the industry involved, at a meeting presided over by a Government presiding officer; it could furnish information, render advice and make recommendations to the Government presiding officer as requested.

Furthermore, the appropriate Industry Advisory Committee or Committees had to be consulted before any limitation or conservation order or amendment to the order could be issued by the War Production Board which would result in a substantial change in the rate of operations of an industry. However, in case of an unusually confidential order or one requiring exceptional speed in its circulation or issuance, the Director of the responsible Industry Division could make special arrangements for clearing the order and providing for subsequent consultation with the committee members.

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1 General Administrative Order No. 2-100 (amended) 10 March 1944.
2 Ibid., No. 2-141, 14 January 1944, recognised the committees as the official instrument of contact between the War Production Board and industry, and contained a guarantee agreed to by the Attorney-General that, provided the committees limited their activities as instructed, no prosecution under the anti-trust laws would be instituted against members.
Methods of Operation

An Industry Advisory Committee was established on the proposal of the Director of an Industry Division with the approval of the Director of the Office of Industry Advisory Committees. The appropriate Industry Division Director appointed a member of the staff to serve as the Government presiding officer.

If the Office of Industry Advisory Committees was satisfied that the committee membership proposed by the Division Director was representative, it established the committee and issued the invitations to the first meeting. All meetings were held in Washington unless a special authorisation was first obtained from the Director of the Office of Industry Advisory Committees and the General Counsel. A meeting of a committee could be proposed by any three of its members. The Government presiding officer served as chairman at all meetings and was responsible for the preparation of the agenda. He could also request that each member of an Industry Advisory Committee send a representative with special qualifications to a particular meeting. Information concerning meetings was given out in press releases and widely distributed to all committee members and to trade associations throughout each industry concerned. When items affecting another agency were on the agenda, that agency was also represented at the meeting to explain its point of view.

Informal Industry Conferences

Provision was also made for calling informal conferences of industry representatives if the intention were merely to consider or obtain advice or information on some specialised or technical problem with a group not necessarily representative of the industry. However, no action could be taken by the War Production Board on the subject considered at such an informal meeting without first affording the appropriate Industry Advisory Committee an opportunity to consider the subject. Furthermore, the invitation, agenda and subsequent minutes were filed with the Office of Industry Advisory Committees after the conference. A similar procedure was followed for a "task group" set up to study some limited subject.

No representative of the War Production Board could attend any meeting called by a trade association or any other industry organisation or group of representatives unless the meeting was a

1 In order to make each committee as representative as practicable, the Director of the Office of Industry Advisory Committees might change the membership, keeping the Government presiding officer informed of any changes proposed.
"sizeable one to which all members of the trade in the vicinity" were invited or would be admitted, or unless the meeting was public in character. No representative of the War Production Board could attend any informal meeting of limited attendance called by industry representatives. This restriction, like the limitation on the function of Industry Advisory Committees, ensured that there should be no violation by the War Production Board of the antitrust laws and prevented any possible use of a committee for allocating orders.

**Labor Advisory Committees**

By the middle of 1942 about fifty Labor Advisory Committees as established by the Office of Production Management were extant, but when the conversion period was completed the use for these early committees petered out and little demand was made, either by the Government or by the committees themselves, for their continuance.

In June 1944 the War Production Board announced that the Labor Advisory Committees would be renewed and that they would be formally set up since it was its policy "through the medium of Labor Advisory Committees to secure the assistance of labour in the solution of production problems and to promote maximum co-operation between the Government and labour in the formulation and execution of official programmes". This move was taken partly because of the conversion discussions which were beginning, and of the tremendous pressure for certain critical products. At that time 14 committees were functioning, the first — the Foundry and Forge Committee — having been set up in September 1943, and a number of others in the spring of 1944.

By November 1944 some 20 Labor Advisory Committees were meeting more or less regularly and 12 more were in process of establishment.\(^1\) This number contrasted greatly with the 769 Industry Advisory Committees that were already in operation at the time of the new effort to set up active Labor Advisory Committees. However, the difference did not reflect the industry coverage, since it was considered desirable to bring many more sections of an

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\(^1\) Labor Advisory Committees in November 1944 covered the following industries: anti-friction bearings, automotive, cotton textiles, domestic laundry equipment, domestic vacuum cleaners, forge and foundry, electric flat iron, fractional horse-power motors, jewellery; logging and lumbering, machine tools, mechanical refrigerators, printing and publishing, radio and radar, sewing machine, steel, superphosphate and wrought iron. In addition, Labor Advisory Committees were in process of establishment, designed to represent the following industries: building materials, construction machinery, plumbing and heating, rubber products, transportation equipment, general industrial equipment, general electrical appliances and non-ferrous mining and non-ferrous mill products.
industry within one Labor Advisory Committee. The Industry Divisions preferred to narrow the scope of the Industry Committees to ensure that the discussions of each should be as technical as possible, and should include representatives of the subdivision of an industry rather than, as in the case of the Labor Advisory Committees, people who could speak for either a whole industry or an industry and its allied trades.

**Office of Labor Advisory Committees**

In order to co-ordinate the contribution that might be made by the Labor Advisory Committees, a special Office of Labor Advisory Committees was established in June 1944. For administrative purposes it was placed in the Office of the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production, but the functions were carried out jointly by representatives of the Office of Labor Production and of the Office of Manpower Requirements. It thus channelled the procedures by which members of either one or the other Office assisted the Industry Divisions of the War Production Board. The order which created the Office pointed out that the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production and the Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements, in consultation with the appropriate other Vice-Chairmen, were responsible for jointly establishing “the plans, policies and general methods to guide the Industry Division in discharging their functions with regard to the use of Labor Advisory Committees”. The Office of Labor Advisory Committees was to assist in formulating policies to govern the Labor Advisory Committees and in facilitating the work of the separate committees.

**Establishment and Functions of Labor Committees**

The same order provided for the establishment, functions and methods of operation of the various Labor Advisory Committees. Three types of responsibility were allocated by the order to the Labor Advisory Committees. Each committee was to discuss problems affecting the industry represented and pertinent to the war production programme, at meetings formally convened under procedures set forth in the order. Second, each committee was to furnish information, render assistance and make reports and recommendations to the appropriate officers of the War Production Board. Finally, each committee was to review and make recommendations on proposed War Production Board orders and programmes, which would, in the judgment of the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production or the Vice-Chairman for Manpower Requirements, result in a substantial curtailment, expansion or other change in the rate of operation of an industry affecting labour.
In such case the Vice-Chairman would recommend to the Director of the Industry Division sponsoring the proposed order or programme that the appropriate Labor Advisory Committee be consulted. If this was agreed to by the Division Director, the Division Labor Assistant made arrangements for consulting the Labor Advisory Committee.

The role of the committees was limited to these specific functions, and any action beyond the scope laid down in the order setting them up was deemed to be taken by the individuals making up the committee in their private capacity and not by the committee as such.

Formal provision was made as in the case of the Industry Advisory Committees for the composition of a Labor Advisory Committee and its methods of operation. Any Industry Division Labor Assistant might propose the establishment of a Labor Advisory Committee in a memorandum indicating its purpose and proposed composition, the date of the first meeting of the committee, and the Government representatives to be notified. The Office of Labor Advisory Committees, if it agreed, determined the composition of the committee and stated its approval in writing, setting forth the name and address, union affiliation and position, if any, of each committee member.

The committee members were selected by the Office of Labor Advisory Committees, from nominees of the unions concerned, the number depending primarily on the relative strength of each within the industry. Usually some of the members were representatives of the unions in Washington or from union headquarters, but a substantial number were union leaders in major plants. The appropriate Division Director named all Government presiding officers for Labor Advisory Committees as in the case of the Industry Advisory Committees.

Meetings of Labor Advisory Committees were convened at the request of the Government presiding officer or the Office of Labor Advisory Committees with the approval of the Division Director. Members of a committee who wished to suggest a meeting addressed their request, with a proposed agenda, to the appropriate Division Labor Assistant or Government presiding officer, who would inform the Office of Labor Advisory Committees of proposed meetings, and was responsible for furnishing "a carefully considered agenda and a list of persons to whom invitations shall be extended". The Office of Labor Advisory Committees made the necessary arrangements for holding meetings and for sending invitations, copies of the agenda and notices. All regular meetings were held in Washington under "the supervision of the Government presiding
officer”, except that this officer might authorise a committee to meet outside Washington and in his absence if the purpose of the meeting was solely to formulate a report requested by him. The Office of Labor Advisory Committees was responsible for keeping minutes of each meeting and determining their form and distribution.

The Government presiding officer could appoint special subcommittees of a Labor Advisory Committee in order to deal with technical or special problems of interest to labour, or with problems affecting only a segment of the industry represented.

No compensation or expenses could be paid to committee members.

**Examples of Labor Advisory Committee Activities**

The following are examples of the kind of contribution made by the various separate Labor Advisory Committees. In the production field, the initial Automotive Labor Advisory Committee made two recommendations of special interest: namely, the establishment of price ceilings on used automobiles so that they could be bought at a reasonable cost by war workers; and the establishment of “car reconditioning centres”, where automobiles could be repaired. Similarly, to break the bottleneck in cotton textiles, particularly in the manufacture of cotton duck for military uses, the Cotton Textile Labor Advisory Committee proposed that the mills in a given area be integrated to secure fuller utilisation of labour, facilities and materials.

Suggestions from committees in regard to conversion back to peacetime production included: (1) that the War Production Board permit manufacturers to accumulate parts of consumers' goods for assembly when production should be authorised; (2) that the War Production Board help to hasten the advance production of machine tools needed for reconversion; (3) that military production contracts be equalised among the companies in an industry; (4) that adequate notice be given to both management and labour whenever cut-backs were planned, so that proper plans could be formulated for the use of released manpower and facilities; and (5) that preference in the production of civilian goods be given to those industries judged to be the most essential to the civilian economy.

An interesting example of a Labor Advisory Committee was the special Foundry and Forge Shop Committee initially established on 2 September 1943 under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Raw Materials Section of the Office of Labor Production. Twelve committee members attended the first meeting from the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., two being Washington representatives and the others
coming from various parts of the country where there had been particular difficulty in the forge and foundry industry. The Chairman emphasised the necessity of increasing output of foundries and presented a production plan requiring the co-operation and the integration of the activities of the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, Office of Price Administration, War Labor Board, Selective Service, War Manpower Commission and War Production Board. Instead of attempting to cover the whole industry, a list of about 200 foundries and forges had been selected because of the nature and volume of their output. A utilisation survey was to be made in each foundry, with designations of the firms to receive special treatment. Local Foundry and Forge Shop Task Committees, consisting of representatives of the Army, Navy, War Manpower Commission and War Production Board, were to co-operate, with labour and management in each of the selected plants, working with the plant Management-Labor Committees or attempting to set them up where none existed. After a full discussion in the Labor Advisory Committee as to the kind of problems being encountered and the extent to which the difficulties were due to turnover, absenteeism, inadequate wage rates, safety and health and labour production scheduling, a series of recommendations were drawn up. It was agreed in the course of discussion that one of the major difficulties lay in wage rates, and that the War Labor Board intended to set up a national panel to consider wage increases, but that these should be plant by plant, on the basis of "going and tested rates" for an industry in a given labour market area, rather than an increase for the industry as a whole. The meeting recommended the establishment of a special Foundry and Forge Shop Labor Advisory Committee on a permanent basis, to meet every 30 days and be furnished immediately with a complete list of all critical firms in the industry, and with the names and addresses of the Task Committee for each area and the agencies represented.

Although this Committee did not meet as regularly as had been intended, it held meetings every few months to review the situation. The Committee urged the establishment of a special foundry panel by the National War Labor Board and that labour organisations might be notified of impending establishment of "going and tested wages" as criterion. When in May 1944 the situation became even more critical, a three-day session was held to enable the committee to review the fresh problems and the possibility both of a national wage stabilisation programme and the employment of Mexican labour in foundries.

An examination of the agenda of a typical Industry Committee meeting, held in December 1944, illustrates the operation of a Com-
mittee in the later period. The first item on the agenda was “Present Supply-Requirement Situation”. Reports on a specified product were given to the committee by representatives of the Office of Procurement and Material, Army Air Corps and Army Service Forces, and the Assistant Director of the Industry Division concerned. On the second item — relaxation of controls in the industry after VE Day — a report from the council to the Industry Division outlined plans being developed for relaxing the restrictions on the use of the product as well as its fabrication. The third item was post-VE Day cutbacks and programmes for handling them, on which the Director of the Program and Planning Bureau of the War Production Board reported. The fourth question discussed was the distribution of surplus stocks, on which there was a report from the department concerned. The final item, post-VE Day employment prospects, was discussed by the Chief of the Industrial Analysis Branch of the Office of Manpower Requirements.

RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEES

A few of the Labor Advisory Committees from time to time proposed that there should be some direct relationship between the Labor Advisory Committee and the Industry Advisory Committee in a given industry, and to this end suggested the holding of joint meetings. These were especially urged by the labour movement in the automobile industry. Twice in 1944, the Automotive Labor Advisory Committee requested that the War Production Board convene a meeting of a joint Management-Labor Automotive Committee. In response to a request from the Chairman of the War Production Board for an agenda, the President of the United Automobile Workers suggested a discussion of the recommendations on reconversion in the automotive industry submitted to the War Production Board by the U.A.W.

These proposals included the establishment of a Council on Reconversion, composed of an equal number of representatives of Government, management and labour, to develop detailed plans for reconversion and to ensure full distribution and continuous full employment. The need was stressed for immediate construction of new and replacement machine tools and for the establishment of area and industry “tool pools” to expedite war production tooling and facilitate advance conversion tooling. It was suggested that the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission should jointly authorise advance designing, tooling and maintenance work wherever possible before VE Day. In preparation for VE Day the plan urged that procurement agencies “tag” Government
machinery which would be required for continued production after VE Day, and immediately determine what materials should be given top priority for war work and secondary priority for essential civilian production. Finally, it was proposed that plans be made immediately by the War Production Board, in co-operation with other federal agencies, to provide labour in the automotive industry with an over-all programme and area cutback information on the national level, and with plans for plant cutbacks at the local level; information on cutbacks should be given to labour at the same time as to management.

There was precedent for a joint Management-Labor Automotive Committee, namely a large joint conference held in 1941 during the period when the automobile industry was converting from peace to war production. At this meeting the labour movement had come forward with a larger number of proposals than the employers, and from then on there had been continued resistance by members of the industry to joint conferences. The Chairman of the War Production Board therefore, after considering the 1944 proposals of the Automotive Labor Advisory Committee, indicated his unwillingness to convene a joint meeting without the consent of the Industry Advisory Committee members.

The desire for joint meetings was expressed frequently by various labour leaders in other industries, but the resistance on the part of management was sufficiently articulate to convince the War Production Board generally to continue the method of seeking advice from labour on the one hand, and from management on the other, meeting in separate sets of committees.

**SUMMARY**

The experience of the War Production Board with separate representative Industry Advisory Committees and Labor Advisory Committees, set up on a formal basis as a means for obtaining the aid and the consent of those directly affected by production controls marked a significant experiment in administrative procedure. At the national level this structure of separate committees may be contrasted with the single joint Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission, set up to fulfil some of the same purposes in the field of manpower. The War Production Board's general policy was to rely on varied and individual rather than unified or joint methods of consultation. It was only at the plant level, as will be seen in the following chapters, that the Board to any large degree promoted management-labour co-operation on a joint basis.
CHAPTER XI

ESTABLISHMENT OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT PRODUCTION COMMITTEES IN WAR PLANTS

By the beginning of 1945, according to the War Production Board, over 5,000 Labor-Management Production Committees representing over seven million workers were operating in war plants in the United States. How large a part of war industry these committees covered, and how substantial a role they played in the achievement of war production cannot be evaluated accurately; a committee, which at one point may have saved many thousands of man-hours of work, may at another stage in the war effort have lost interest and continued in name only. Furthermore, countless plants throughout the country unquestionably sought the aid of labour-management co-operation although they did not register a formal committee with the War Production Board. Thus the number of Labor-Management Production Committees and of workers covered by them is relatively unimportant in estimating their use.1 Nevertheless the following breakdown of the “registered” committees by industry, prepared by the War Production Board as of September 1944, may be of interest. This figure had fallen to 3,224 by July 1945.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial classification</th>
<th>Percentage of committees</th>
<th>Percentage of total number of employees</th>
<th>Number of committees</th>
<th>Number of employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total United States (all classifications)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,835</td>
<td>7,265,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipbuilding and ship parts.</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1,132,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>1,162,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and aircraft parts</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>811,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>728,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engines and engine parts</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>404,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and iron mines</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>178,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication equipment</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>294,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and industrial equipment</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>286,660</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synthetic products (except rubber)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>200,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific instruments</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>171,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine tools</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>136,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>117,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>164,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Textiles and textile products.</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>144,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and wood products</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>29,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather and leather products</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber and rubber products</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>83,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States naval shore establishments</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>748,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>420,280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Total represents average number of employees exclusive of 748,600 employees in 46 naval shore establishments.
The joint approach by an employer and representatives of his employees to the problems of an individual undertaking is not new in American industrial methods, but there had been only limited experience of management-labour co-operation in most of the industries of direct concern to war production. Precedents, moreover, were based upon a series of experiments undertaken for differing reasons. A considerable number of pre-war plans for joint committees in factories had been developed primarily by management in order to interest workers in the successful operation of factories and in many instances had been aimed at undercutting the development of unionism. Consequently, for a long period many union leaders were suspicious of "partnership" proposals. On the other hand, a number of unions, convinced of the value of union-management co-operation, had sought to obtain worker participation in joint committees, overcoming in some instances the fear of management that such committees would infringe on their own prerogatives.

In the months immediately preceding the establishment of the War Production Board, the initiative had been taken by a few of the labour unions, which urged the establishment of industry councils or factory committees, in order to make full use of the workers' knowledge of industry and practical production ideas to increase efficiency and thus enlarge war output. While some companies had welcomed the initiative and were successfully operating Labor-Management Committees, these existed only in a comparatively limited number of war plants. It was the War Production Drive which extended the use of joint committees so that they became a substantial factor in the achievement of the war effort.

Evolution of the War Production Drive

On 27 February 1942 President Roosevelt officially launched the War Production Drive by requesting the Chairman of the War Production Board "to take every possible step to raise production and to bring home to labour and management alike the supreme importance of war production this critical spring". The Chairman's response was to call upon labour and management in war plants, mills, mines and shipyards voluntarily to work together to form joint Labor-Management War Production Drive Committees throughout war industry. An official plan book was sent to the management and labour representatives of 2,000 prime contractors,

1 In particular the United Steel Workers of America (C.I.O.), the United Automobile Workers of America (C.I.O.), the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America (C.I.O.), and the International Association of Machinists (A.F. of L.).
explaining to them the way to set up a Labor-Management Committee. It was accompanied by a request for organisation, and for reports from the committees so set up by 1 April 1942. Radio publicity was also used.

After the launching of the War Production Drive, a promotional programme was developed to obtain acceptance of the idea throughout the country.¹ Thirty-one regional conferences of labour and management representatives from prime contracting plants engaged in making guns, ships, planes, tanks and machine tools were convened by the War Production Board to explain the purposes and status of the joint committees, and to outline the methods of establishment of such committees and the activities they should undertake. A formal statement by the Chairman of the War Production Board, which was read to all the initial regional conferences, stated:

The War Production Drive is a voluntary effort. Its success is up to the men and women, both labour and management, in the plant.

The plan provides for joint committees representing labour and management in each plant to stimulate war production.

This drive is designed to increase the production of weapons now and not to further special interests of any group. It is not a plan to promote company unions. It is not a device to add to or to tear down the power or position of any union. It does not interfere with bargaining machinery where it exists.

It is not designed to conform to any plan that contemplates a measure of control of management by labour.

It does not put management in labour or labour in management. It is not a management plan, a labour plan, or any other plan. It is the War Production Drive plan. It is a perfectly simple, straightforward effort to increase production.

The plan calls for greater plant efficiency through co-operation. That means that if anyone has a suggestion as to how we can do the job faster and smoother, that suggestion must be passed along to where it will do the most good — the most good for our country and for free men and women everywhere.

_Labour-Management Reception of Drive_

The first reactions of the Drive for Labor-Management Committees were varied. The President of the C.I.O. welcomed the proposal, pointing out that the programme "has been one of the basic principles which the C.I.O. and its affiliated organisations have been promoting since the initiation of our war effort". He requested that the national organisations support the programme and see that information be made available to the local unions, "in order that there might be established as soon as possible joint

¹The drive was initially established as part of the Office of Information (predecessor of the Office of War Information) with the co-operation of the Information Branch and of the Labor Division of the War Production Board.
Labor-Management Victory Committees in all plants throughout the nation”. The first union to take up active promotion of the committees was the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, which had long been promoting the establishment of some kind of joint councils throughout the steel industry.

The American Federation of Labor pointed out that “the real way to assure maximum production was by genuine union-management co-operation”, and outlined the procedure for obtaining such co-operation. A statement released in April 1942\(^1\) emphasised:

Union-management co-operation depends first of all on the employer’s recognition of the union as a constructive part of shop or plant organisation. The union must first be set up, with its normal committees for collective bargaining and handling grievances; an agreement must be in effect covering work conditions.

When the union is functioning and a relationship of good faith exists between management and union representatives, the next step is to set up a co-operative committee. This committee is made up of an equal number of management and union representatives; its functions are confined to problems of production: to increase output, improve quality, prevent waste, increase efficiency.

The National Association of Manufacturers initially received the proposal with some scepticism, asking first whether it was not, in fact, an acceptance of labour’s desire to enter the field of management’s prerogatives. The president of one of the largest automobile corporations stated that he welcomed the idea of joint production committees only when the committees served as clearing houses for suggestions to improve production and had purely advisory powers. To the extent that such committees tended to usurp the responsibilities of management, he added, he was unequivocally opposed. This point of view led some managements, who had been prepared to set up joint committees, to withdraw.

Subsequently, however, the National Association of Manufacturers’ Board of Directors issued a statement pledging “to Director Nelson of the War Production Board its wholehearted support in his efforts to increase war production” and, on the basis of the clarification by Mr. Nelson (on 23 March), endorsed the establishment of Labor-Management War Production Committees, pointing out that the plan must not be misused to disturb existing labour relations, but was intended “solely to stimulate increased production and to bring home to both management and labour the vital importance of their combined efforts”. The Board of Directors urged all members “to investigate the possibilities of increasing the volume and speed of production by any of the features of this voluntary plan and to put into operation all those which are suitable to the conditions and problems of their companies”.

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\(^1\) Cf. Labor’s Monthly Survey, April 1942.
War Production Drive Headquarters and Labor-Management Policy Committee

The need to overcome management hesitation led the Chairman of the War Production Board to emphasise the voluntary character of the whole plan.

In October 1942, as part of the general effort by the War Production Board to strengthen management and labour participation in its own staff and to clarify the functions of the various Divisions, the Chairman reorganised the War Production Drive Headquarters, separating it from the Office of Information and clearly defining those functions which the Labor Production Division was to exercise in assisting the War Production Drive.¹

A five-man Policy Committee was appointed to meet under the chairmanship of an industrial relations specialist on loan from a large manufacturing concern, who was also named as Director of the War Production Drive Headquarters. The four other members of the Policy Committee were the President of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (C.I.O.), the Director of Organisation of the A.F. of L., the president of a manufacturing company nominated by the National Association of Manufacturers, and the president of a steel foundry nominated by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The functions of the War Production Drive Headquarters were twofold. Subject to the direction of the Chairman, it was to “determine policies under which joint Labor-Management Committees in war plants and other plants can best contribute to war production”; and “implement these policies by contact with Labor-Management Committees and with the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and other agencies to the end that such policies are made most effective”.²

The formal establishment of the War Production Drive Headquarters in this way cleared the ground for the national headquarters of the Drive to develop and expand its programme for the promotion of the joint committees throughout the country. However, the Policy Committee only met twice and was of little value to the work of the staff. To balance the initial hesitation on the

¹ When the Office of War Information replaced the Office of Information it had been felt desirable by the staff of War Production Drive Headquarters that the work be transferred directly to the office of the Chairman of the W.P.B. who had sponsored the programme. The War Production Drive Headquarters was first established in the W.P.B. as part of the Office of Information and staffed largely by information specialists, including people drawn from the Department of Interior, the Office of Information, the Department of Labor, and by one representative assigned to it from the Labor Production Division.

² Administrative Order of 15 October 1942 signed by W. L. Batt, Vice-Chairman.
part of both the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, some public support by the two groups was clearly indispensable. In 1943 the presidents of the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce issued a “Basic Endorsement” which was also signed by the presidents of the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., supporting the Labor-Management Committee programme as a plan “to increase production by increasing efficiency through greater management and labour co-operation”.

After the appointment of an Executive Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board, who was personally interested in the work of the committees and had been active in initiating them in his own firm, the War Production Drive Headquarters was transferred directly to his office. The Policy Committee was abolished and a Director-General of the War Production Drive Headquarters was appointed to work closely with the Executive Vice-Chairman. He was also directed to consult on matters of general policy with the Vice-Chairman for Labor Production, the Operations Vice-Chairman, “and where appropriate, with the Management-Labor Council”. One of the first steps taken by the Director-General was the placing of field representatives of the War Production Drive Headquarters in each War Production Board regional office, thus for the first time giving the full responsibility for the field work of the War Production Drive to its own staff. As many of the new field appointments came from a management — and sometimes an advertising — background, and as the Director-General stressed the need for promotion of committees in large numbers, the War Production Drive Headquarters began to be looked at with suspicion by some parts of the labour movement.

During this same period a separate Management Consultant Division was set up, reporting directly to the Executive Vice-Chairman. Its functions included study of broad management practices in plants producing war materials; assisting, on the request of the Office of Labor Production, in the settlement of potential labour disputes; and making recommendations on such matters as wage incentive plans and production standards. It also gave particular aid from a management point of view to the establishment of joint Labor-Management Production Committees, and provided for regular consultation at the national level with leading representatives of industry and business.

1 Cf. General Administrative Order No. 2-111, 21 June 1943.
2 This Council, it will be recalled, included the presidents of the C.I.O., the A.F. of L., the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, and four other members named respectively by these organisations.
3 General Administrative Order No. 2-118, 24 July 1943.
After the resignation of the Executive Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board, which was followed by that of the Director of War Production Drive Headquarters, the latter office was transferred to the Office of the Vice-Chairman for Field Operations so that the two organisations would be more closely integrated, both nationally and in the regions, with the operating staff of the War Production Board, which was directly responsible for the administration of production questions.

A War Production Drive Advisory Committee was constituted, presided over by the Director of the Drive, and composed of officials of the War Production Board, two members having a labour and two a management background.

**Assistance in Setting up Committees**

Although the decision to establish a Labor-Management Production Committee in any individual plant was finally made by the management and labour representatives of the individual undertaking, the Government, the trade unions and the employers' organisations urged both labour and management in given undertakings to set up joint committees and assisted in the initial stage of establishment.

**Role of Government in Establishing Committees**

The War Production Board, through its national, regional and local representatives in the War Production Drive, developed a series of measures for promoting Labor-Management Committees and for giving assistance to any individual plant willing to consider the establishment of a committee.

The first step usually taken by the War Production Drive was to provide published information on procedures for setting up committees and on the experience of existing committees. National Headquarters prepared pamphlets, including a general *Official Plan Book*, written in 1942 and rewritten in 1943 to include more of the practical techniques that had been reported by operating committees in the course of the year's experience. Two particularly useful pamphlets brought out by the War Production Drive Headquarters were a *Production Guide for Labor-Management Committees*, which described somewhat more technically the way in which a Labor-Management Committee could be effective in dealing directly with production problems, and a folder entitled *How to Establish and Operate a Labor-Management Committee*. Other pamphlets of a similar type were concerned with such questions as absenteeism, music in war plants, ways of handling suggestion systems and various procedures for issuing awards. Folders were also
issued outlining the work of subcommittees on such matters as
health, safety, good food, replacement and recruiting, absenteeism,
turnover and publicity. In addition the War Production Drive
Headquarters distributed a series of special pamphlets directed to
individual industries. Thus, for example, special plan books were
drawn up to guide in the establishment of production committees
in coal mines and in lumber camps. Others described the successful
methods of operation of suggestion systems to increase production
in shipbuilding, tool and die and electrical and machine shop instru­
ments, aircraft engines, marine engines, automotive, welding, forge
and foundries, rubber tyres and other industries.

Besides material in pamphlet form, the War Production Drive
Headquarters issued a periodical, The Labor and Management
News, for the guidance of Labor-Management Committees in
general. Reprints, as well as the regular edition of the News, were
available to those interested in the work of the committees. All
the various publications of this sort were offered to any firm inter­
ested in setting up a committee.

In addition to the literature issued by the Drive Headquarters
from Washington, a number of the regional offices issued local
bulletins to firms having committees or interested in establishing
them. Another procedure was a series of expositions held in differ­
et parts of the country, at which Labor-Management Committees
exhibited their own experiences and speeches and demonstrations
were used to convince other firms to set up similar committees.

As the Drive got under way and personnel became available
a more direct approach was taken and field representatives played
an increasingly important part. The ordinary procedure was for
the field representative to call upon the management of any firm
where establishment of a committee was thought to be under con­
sideration, and to offer the available literature and his personal
services. Meetings were held with the management alone or jointly
with worker representatives. If there were a recognised collective
bargaining agency in the firm, the War Production Drive repre­
sentative discussed the matter with delegates of the union, or for
this purpose utilised the services of individuals — of the same union
affiliation — representing the Office of Labor Production in the
district or region concerned. In many instances the representatives
of the union and of the War Production Drive were able to obtain
invitations from the management to meet jointly and discuss estab­
ishment of a committee with delegates of labour and management
in the firm. If there was no recognised collective bargaining agency,
or if the agency was an independent union, in some cases relation­ships were sufficiently cordial to permit the same kind of approach,
but more often under these conditions the War Production Drive representative alone tried to obtain both management and labour interest in the establishment of a committee.

This personal approach had widely different results, according to the personal relationships which the War Production Drive representative had developed among the firms within his district, but also having regard to the general industrial background of the particular area. There was likely to be a difference between the reception given to the suggestion, on the one hand in areas and industries with a long history of bitter industrial relations, and on the other hand in areas where trade unionism had been finally accepted and the disputes that still arose were not concerned with organisation. Still another situation arose in those parts of the country where both trade unionism and industrial development were relatively new — being in some instances almost entirely war phenomena — and where consequently there was either a lack of experience in industrial relations or an imported leadership with preconceived notions.

The role of the War Production Board in promoting committees under the varying circumstances of American industry therefore proved sometimes peculiarly difficult and had to be flexible in method. The Board, moreover, consistently maintained that the actual establishment of a committee was a voluntary move. However, the interest of the W.P.B. did not end with the decision of the company to establish a committee. The Board representatives also assisted committees once they were in operation, or revitalised them if they went through a period of under-use, by aiding them to overcome obstacles that developed in the course of operation. However, Board participation at this second stage was in general only carried out at the special request of the management or in some cases of the unions concerned in a particular plant. In order to facilitate these services each plant with a Labor-Management Committee was requested to fill in a registration form giving information as to the name, location, membership and union affiliation. The fact that there was no official relationship between any given committee and a Government department made it impossible for the War Production Board to intervene in committee operation if the management objected; every committee therefore continued its wholly voluntary approach to co-operative action.

Although the War Production Board was the Government department chiefly concerned with the establishment of joint committees, other agencies had some specific relationships in this regard. For example, the War Manpower Commission had in some cases recommended the establishment of committees through its area
organisation. Area Manpower Directors on occasion worked with the War Production Board's local representatives in persuading employers or workers to establish a committee, and in some Area Management-Labor Committees — usually at the initiative of the trade union members — discussion took place on the best ways to have joint Labor-Management Committees established in plants which felt a shortage of labour. A formal agreement was reached between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board concerning the relationship of W.M.C consultants to plant Labor-Management Committees, and providing for co-operation between the two groups.¹ Whenever a War Manpower Commission consultant undertook a labour utilisation survey, one of the questions that he asked the employer was whether or not a Labor-Management Committee existed in his plant. Although it was not the function of the W.M.C consultant to intervene regarding the establishment of such a committee, he was expected to inform the War Production Drive representative if none was in existence, so that the War Production Board might obtain the establishment of a committee should this be needed. If there was a committee, he was instructed to consult its members as part of the utilisation survey and include any information thus obtained in his report. The degree of activity shown by the local W.M.C consultants and by the Area Directors in furthering and making use of these committees depended, however, both on their own interest in labour-management co-operation and on the degree of cordiality and helpfulness established locally between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board. In many areas the appointment of a War Production Drive representative, or of an active labour representative by the War Production Board, had the effect of lessening the interest of the War Manpower Commission in the committees. Frequently the lack of specific responsibility on the part of the local War Manpower Commission officials and advisory committees for the establishment or operation of the joint plant committees meant that their promotion and effectiveness received little active assistance from the W.M.C. Furthermore, as indicated in Part II, where joint plant committees were established under the War Manpower Commission sponsorship as part of employment stabilisation plans and appeals procedures, they were separate from the plant production committees.

While the War Department did not formally assist in the promotion of joint committees, either at Government plants or at

¹ This will be discussed below in relation to the activities of plant committees. Cf. W.M.C. Field Instruction No. 151, 16 December 1943, and War Production Drive Headquarters Field Service Bulletin, S. April 1944.
private plants with Army contracts, both the Labor Branch of its Industrial Personnel Division and the Industrial Services Division of its Bureau of Public Relations used committees, where they already existed, as a medium for improving morale and for carrying out incentive programmes. Field officers of these units of the War Department often helped War Production Board representatives to set up or service joint production committees. The extent of this co-operation depended, of course, upon the individual field officer and his personal relationship with the War Production Board representative.

The War Department preferred to have the War Production Drive handle only such requests for assistance as might be made by the Commanding Officers themselves at Army installations. Such committees, however, when established, were registered by Drive Headquarters, and materials and services made available to them.

An Army Service Forces circular of January 1944 outlined the purposes of the civilian employee committees in Army Service Forces installations, explained their functions, called attention to the use of the War Production Board experience, and authorised the Commanding Officer of any Army Service Forces installation who was interested in the possibilities of a War Production Drive Committee to contact regional representatives of the Board for advice and technical assistance on the subject. A similar communication was sent out subsequently by the Army Air Forces.

The Navy Department's official attitude toward joint committees in private plants was approximately the same as that of the War Department. Unofficially, however, its field officers concerned with labour relations and production incentive were, in general, even more inclined than the corresponding field officers of the War Department to co-operate with field representatives of the War Production Drive. This was particularly true of field officers of the Navy's Industrial Incentive Division.

Unlike the War Department, which sent "permissive circulars" concerning the establishment of joint committees to the Commanding Officers at Army Service Forces and Army Air Force installations, the Navy Department, as early as April 1942, sent a positive directive to the Commanding Officers at naval shore establishments. As a result of this directive, War Production Drive Headquarters officially registered some fifty committees, representing 750,000 workers, at naval shore establishments.

The Maritime Commission instructed many of its representatives in shipbuilding plants not only to aid the War Production Drive representatives in promoting the establishment of committees
in the plants, but personally to attend meetings of the committees and assist them in solving any difficulties that arose. Consequently much depended on the individual representative. The Maritime Commission, through its publication *Victory Fleet*, encouraged its contract yards to organise committees, and tried to publicise the more effective techniques used by shipyard committees.

**Role of Management Associations in Establishment of Committees**

In spite of initial hesitation by the large management associations after the formal endorsement of Labor-Management Committees made in 1943 by the President of the National Association of Manufacturers and the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, management associations generally supported their establishment. Similarly, a substantial number of individual trade associations and chambers of commerce either came out specifically in favour of the committees or issued manuals and articles presenting their purposes in a favourable light and outlining the policies and techniques under which such committees operated. The Industrial Relations Department of the National Association of Manufacturers issued a manual, based on a study of plant committees in action, to give assistance to "those plants believing that a joint Labor-Management Production Committee may prove helpful to the attainment of increased production". The manual, which presented a composite picture of various committee programmes, emphasised the importance of initial group meetings under management sponsorship to get the committee off to a good start, analysed the most satisfactory methods of composition of the committee, outlined suitable topics for discussion, and presented numerous examples of both positive and negative results obtained by various individual committees.¹

**Role of Organised Labour in Establishment of Committees**

The representatives of the national federations of labour and of many of the individual and national unions warmly supported

the establishment of plant committees. This support took the form not only of pamphlets, speeches and radio broadcasts, but also of resolutions adopted at the national conventions held each year of the war and at regular State and local meetings of trade unions. Most active support was given by those unions which had taken the lead in furthering the movement before the war or by those whose leadership was in close touch with the Office of Labor Production; but practically all the unions took some steps to assist in the establishment of the committees. However, the degree to which the unions actively promoted the committees varied by industry and by locality, and depended somewhat upon the particular union's relationship with individual employers.

An example of the way in which the unions assisted early in 1943 was the series of regional conferences, called by the United Steelworkers of America, of members of Labor-Management Committees within each region and of union officials interested in discussing the establishment of such committees. These conferences, which were made the opportunity for members of the W.P.B. staff of labour consultants to explain the purposes of the Drive and to outline the ways of establishing committees, were frequently attended by management as well as by labour members of the committees and gave rise to interesting indications of the various views held in different plants in the initial stage, as to how a joint committee should operate and what it could accomplish. Although the unions did not continue these regional conferences, many of the leaders encouraged discussion at union meetings of how committees should be set up and used to augment war production and increase the workers' interest in the operation of plants.

Most of the trade union organisations both nationally and in the areas were overworked and understaffed, and therefore in many instances relegated to a position of secondary importance the promotion of joint committees in the plants. This had the unfortunate effect, in many cases, of lessening the interest of plant labour leaders in requesting managements to establish joint committees; they lacked either the spur or the guidance of any continued discussion, in local industry councils or federation meetings, of the purposes for which a committee could be used or of the most effective techniques used.

However, at the national level, support for the Labor-Manage-

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ment Committees was given continually. In October 1942, at the first A.F. of L. Convention after the launching of the Drive, a resolution was adopted unanimously calling upon all unions to exercise their fullest efforts towards the establishment of such committees.

Similarly, at the C.I.O. Convention, held in November 1942, a unanimous resolution supported Labor-Management Committees and expressed regret that on account of the opposition of many employers "too few" such committees had been organised. The resolution called upon the War Production Board and the responsible Government officials to give effective support to the endeavours of the C.I.O. unions to organise a Labor-Management Committee in each war plant and compel employers, where necessary, to participate; it also urged the affiliated unions to intensify efforts to increase production by granting special union production awards and publishing special honour rolls.

Continued interest of both the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. in the work of these committees was reiterated in two resolutions passed at their respective national conventions in 1944. The A.F. of L. included the question of joint committees in a general resolution on labour-management co-operation which urged that "industrialists and trade union officers and members continue their forward-looking and excellent work in plant Labor-Management Committees and that the Government assist these committees in dealing with production problems, care of tools, improving quality and other matters affecting war production and the reconversion programme".

The C.I.O. resolution stated that:

Whereas, (1) labour and management have co-operated in thousands of Labor-Management Committees throughout the United States to assist in the miracle of American war production; (2) over 1,500 of these committees have been participated in by locals of unions affiliated with the C.I.O.; (3) local union officers and shop stewards have served as members of these committees and have thus assisted their membership in making this important contribution to the war effort; and (4) these committees are essential to the maintenance of war production until the day of final peace, and to the adjustments to be made in the reconversion period; now, therefore, be it resolved, (1) that these committees and our membership be commended for their valuable work in the prosecution of the war, and be encouraged to continue and to develop these functions on production problems as part of and an extension of union-employer relationships; (2) the Government of the United States continue to assist these committees, not primarily in a promotional way, but as a technical service in this field of union-employer dealings.

FUNCTIONS

The general purpose of the Labor-Management Production Committees was to raise the quantity and quality of output for war production by the joint effort of labour and management in
each war plant. The exact definition given to this general purpose, however, was determined by the attitude of management and labour, in the plant, towards the work of its committee. Since committees were non-governmental voluntary bodies, they had no compulsory functions. However, the War Production Drive Headquarters and some of the national trade associations and labour unions aided the individual committees to determine their own responsibilities by indicating the kinds of problem that were suitable for solution through co-operative action and specifying the fields which should be closed to consideration by joint committees. The negative guidance given was in some cases as important as the positive, since joint committees which undertook unsuitable activities would prejudice the success of the whole movement for improved labour-management co-operation.

Relation to Collective Bargaining Functions

The War Production Drive Headquarters emphasised in its Official Plan Book, its other pamphlets, and on every possible occasion, that Labor-Management Production Committees should not concern themselves with any collective bargaining issue or grievance question, but should refer such issues to the appropriate machinery. This prohibition was reiterated by both the trade unions and the employers’ associations throughout the country; it covered any problems involving wages, hours and working conditions, the whole range of questions which might be covered in a collective agreement, such as seniority rights, discharge or lay-off, severance pay or any other matter affecting the economic interest of the worker (which was also interpreted to include insurance policies and related questions).

The exclusion of all questions coming within the collective bargaining agreement sometimes meant elimination of responsibilities on which joint committees might have been able to make a contribution. In some of the smaller plants, by agreement between both the union and the management, collective bargaining and labour-management functions were merged in one committee. However, this practice was rare. In general, the distinction between the two functions helped to keep controversial subjects out of the joint Labor-Management Committees and to avoid overlapping or conflict with the normal work of the collective bargaining machinery.

The War Production Drive Headquarters on various occasions issued guiding principles regarding the relationship of collective

1 See report on Labor-Management Production Committees participated in by the U.E. (C.I.O.).
bargaining and production functions. In particular, in the case of companies where there was a Labor-Management Production Committee and no recognised agent for collective bargaining, any discussion of collective bargaining issues might lead to the suggestion that the firm was using the committee as a company union and substituting it for a true collective bargaining agent. In this connection the National Labor Relations Board, in October 1943, judging a case in which a plant committee performed both bargaining and production functions, decided that the particular committee was "an illegally dominated and assisted labour organisation" and recommended "that it be disestablished as the collective bargaining representative of any of the respondent’s employees".¹

Nevertheless, in companies in which there were mutual confidence and trust between management and labour and a satisfactory recognised collective bargaining procedure in operation, if both labour and management preferred to make use of this procedure instead of setting up a separate production committee, the War Production Drive Headquarters raised no objection. But it pointed out that, particularly in a large organisation, a considerable amount of the time of the production committee might be consumed in the discussion of collective bargaining issues and therefore that such questions should probably be handled by a separate subcommittee and in any case in separate meetings.

Relation to Responsibilities of Management

Any intervention in matters considered the sole responsibility of management was excluded from the functions of a production committee. In explaining the aims of the committees, the War Production Drive on many occasions emphasised that they were "not designed to conform to any plan that contemplates a measure of control of management by labour". This general reservation was required in order to obtain support both nationally by employers' representatives and locally by individual employers. It was therefore accepted by many of the unions. For example, one union instructed its members specifically that "the authority to run the plant is in the hands of management. The union personnel of the committees should not try to assume these management functions."

The effect of this limitation in function depended upon its interpretation by individual management members of committees. Where the management was particularly fearful of intervention

¹ Cf. War Production Drive Field Services Bulletin, 17 January 1944. (This committee, however, had never been officially registered at War Production Drive Headquarters.)
by a joint committee in programmes initiated under management jurisdiction, it tended to narrow even more rigidly the possible functions of the committee and to limit joint activities to questions of morale or safety, avoiding more fundamental production problems. Where the management was broad in approach, specific provisions to safeguard so-called management prerogatives were rarely insisted upon. Furthermore, the practical activities carried out by a committee, as will be seen below, were conditioned very largely by the position and responsibilities held by the members of the committee within the plant.

Functions Defined by War Production Board

The tasks appropriate for the committees to undertake in carrying out their general function of increasing output were set forth, as a guide to committee discussions, by the War Production Drive Division and sometimes by other Government agencies, such as the War and Navy Departments and Maritime Commission.

In the *Official Plan Book*, the main functions suggested were: development of systems for bringing forward workers' ideas and suggestions to increase production; methods of improving quality of work; improving production equipment through better use of tools, elimination of bottlenecks, better repair work, etc.; conservation and salvage to prevent waste and make better use of materials; care of tools and equipment; special war activities such as war bond drives, community fund campaigns and blood banks; combating absenteeism; improvement of feeding facilities in war plants; medical services; co-operation in safety promotion; arrangements for worker transportation, including car pooling and gas rationing; and education and publicity stressing the importance of the individual's contribution to war production.

After an initial period of committee experience it became evident that many committees would value more specific guidance regarding their functions and the ways in which these might best be carried out; in particular, assistance was needed in determining the specific subjects on which a joint approach would be most effective. The development of the area organisation of the War Manpower Commission, and the allocation to different Government agencies of responsibility for supplying manpower and for increasing production, reduced the extent to which many of the joint plant committees could effectively contribute to the solution of manpower problems.

As the course of the war changed, various Government departments altered their emphasis and frequently urged that plant com-
mittees deal with whatever question seemed particularly important at a given moment. Thus, for example, in the initial period of conversion to wartime production the emphasis of the War Production Board itself was largely placed on the development of systems which would enable workers to suggest better methods for converting plants, greater use of existing manpower and facilities, and consequent elimination of bottlenecks. When shortages of certain materials were particularly acute, a number of Government departments stressed the significance of conservation and salvage.

*Functions Allocated by the Office of Price Administration*

Only one Government department, the Office of Price Administration, took the initiative of giving specific responsibility to the plant committees for administering Government regulations. This Office required that workers in plants employing more than 100 persons must have their gasoline and tyre rations certified by a representative of an Organized Transportation Plan, which must be set up by an agreement between labour and management representatives and provide for car pooling and the most economic use of its transportation facilities. Whenever possible, the plan was to be administered by the joint plant committees.

*Manpower Functions*

As labour shortages brought manpower questions to the fore, absenteeism and turnover were suggested as particularly suitable for action by plant committees. When the question of labour utilisation acquired particular prominence, interdepartmental arrangements were worked out to provide that plant committees, wherever possible, should be given specific responsibilities in this connection.

*Functions Under Changing Production Programmes*

When, in the autumn of 1944, there was widespread discussion of reconversion to peacetime activities, suggestions were made by the War Production Drive Headquarters to many Labor-Management Committees that their functions be interpreted to include discussion of any changes in the production programme, arrangements for possible lay-off or transfer of workers, re-employment of veterans and post-VE Day and post-war implications of contract changes on the workers and on the plant. It was suggested that plant committees could be useful, on the one hand, in putting forward the point of view of the workers, and, on the other, in providing a procedure for reassuring the workers regarding the post-war plans of individual companies.
By contrast, in the period of intensification of production during the winter of 1944-45, the War Production Drive, the trade unions and the employers' associations, stressed the functions that the Labor-Management Committees could undertake in increasing output, improving general efficiency, and removing the underlying obstacles to the manning of those "must" plants which were behind schedule.

**Emphasis on Special Industries**

In addition to the responsibilities proposed for Labor-Management Committees in general, suggestions were made for specific tasks that should be undertaken by these committees in particular industries.

The War Production Drive, for example, proposed a series of special activities which might be included in the programmes of joint committees in coal, lumber, tyres, foundries, and other trades. Emphasis was placed on the difficulty of replacing the special tools and equipment required in the coal industry, and the extent to which rubber insulation, copper cable, copper wire, hose and other critical mine materials would continue to be in short supply. Special importance was attached to the need for plant or camp efficiency in the lumber industry, and adaptations of the suggestion systems and organisational plans to meet the requirements of a lumber camp or saw mill were provided. In the foundry industry, in order to meet the particularly difficult problem of adequate manpower, Labor-Management Committees were asked to assist in the recruitment and induction of new employees, in training and up-grading programmes, and in improving in every possible way the sanitary, ventilation and other hygienic conditions in the foundries.

**Positive Duties of Committees**

The positive functions generally undertaken by the Labor-Management Committees were grouped by the War Production Board into three categories: production issues, manpower problems, and education and publicity programmes. Successful handling by committees of any part of these functions contributed to the war effort. Where the committees related their functions to the long-term operation of their plants or to increased understanding of the social or economic issues underlying temporary bottlenecks or difficulties, they sometimes paved the way for later participation.
in wider issues of industrial production. But even these extensions of the general function of committees were accepted only when kept within the sphere allocated to wartime committees — without infringement on collective bargaining on the one hand or on management prerogatives on the other. Their general function was to increase and improve production through the joint effort of management and labour in each war plant, better industrial relations figuring as an exceedingly important by-product.
CHAPTER XII

METHODS OF OPERATION OF PLANT LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

Although indications could be given by the War Production Board and by the trade union and employers' associations as to the desirability of setting up a Labor-Management Committee in a war plant, the responsibility for determining whether and how a committee should be established ultimately necessarily rested with the management and workers' representatives within the individual plant. The successful operation of the committee, moreover, frequently depended upon the way in which it was initially set up, including the type of announcement within the plant of the intention of management and workers' representatives to establish a committee, the method of selection of the members, and finally the understanding arrived at between management and labour as to the responsibilities that would be delegated to the committee.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF COMMITTEE ESTABLISHMENT

Experience with the operation of plant committees indicated that top management, plant superintendents, production engineers and industrial relations and employment officers must support the establishment of a committee if it was to operate successfully. This had to be clearly demonstrated to the workers in the plant at the initial stage. Furthermore, it was essential for this demonstration to be such that foremen and shop stewards were not left in doubt as to their own position with regard to the work of the Labor-Management Committee; and frequently these persons were informed that they could become members and that the committee tasks would not in any way undermine their own responsibilities for the carrying out of the normal work of the shop. The War Production Board and the trade unions and employers' associations pointed out in discussions and in literature that management and labour representatives should make this clear to all concerned when announcing the establishment of a committee. It should, they suggested, be done through plant meetings of employees, any existing plant public address system or plant newspaper, discus-
sions in trade union meetings and in canteens and any other available facilities. A great many individual employers were careful to follow some at least of these procedures. However, in some cases where the committee was being established simply to meet the request of the War Production Board, little care was taken to acquaint the mass of the workers, or the lower supervisory staff, of its existence. This was one of the reasons why a number of the committees registered with the War Production Board did not effectively increase production.

In a substantial number of cases, where the initial operation of the committee did not prove satisfactory, a second start was made at the end of the first six months or year, with a public explanation of the aims and purposes of the committee, altered membership and a new atmosphere.

Selection of Members

The methods of selection of members for the committee on the management and labour sides were necessarily different.

Qualifications for Management Members

The War Production Board frequently pointed out, and experience also indicated, that it was essential for the management members to include at least one member at a sufficiently high level of authority to ensure that committee recommendations would be put into effect or receive attention without delay. A wide gap between top management and the management members of the committee often prevented final action on committee recommendations and made the proceedings largely a waste of time. Furthermore, unless top management was prepared to undertake direct responsibility and interest in the work of the committee, the members and the workers throughout the plant inevitably questioned its sincerity.

Second, as the chief aim of the committee normally was to increase production, the management members had to include representation from the production or engineering departments. In a number of instances the committee was unable to deal effectively with production questions because of the absence of competent technical representation, and therefore emphasised morale or peripheral issues.

1 See, for example, suggestions made in the Official Plan Book, reprints from the Labor and Management News (especially Vol. II, No. 29, 3 June 1944, "How to Establish and Operate a Labor-Management Committee"), the special pamphlets concerning individual industries, the U.A.W.—C.I.O. War Policy Manual and other trade union publications.
A third problem in management representation was the relationship of the committee to the employment and industrial relations departments. This was particularly important in large undertakings where specialisation involved separation of responsibility for collective bargaining from employment, personnel and welfare. In many instances, the effect of such specialisation was that the industrial relations department dominated the committee on the management side, to the exclusion of plant top management, production and personnel departments. In other cases there was a tendency for the management members of the committee to be drawn largely from the personnel or welfare department and not from industrial relations or production. This sometimes resulted in a conflict of policy between the collective bargaining body and the Labor-Management Committee. In some cases this was met by having a subordinate official from the industrial relations department attend the Labor-Management Committee meetings, but in other cases it was more satisfactory to ensure that the same person participated in the two committees. Where the employment or welfare department was represented on the management side, the committee was more frequently used for handling such questions as absenteeism, health and safety programmes, recruitment of workers and related questions. Representation of the employment department was found to be very useful, provided that it did not exclude representation of production or industrial relations.

Another problem on the management side was the role of the public relations department. This usually arose in large companies and to some extent in those where the committee was established in response to the initial organising drive of 1942. In such cases it sometimes happened that the leadership of the committee was placed in the hands of a public relations or information officer, with the result that more attention was paid to informational work — publicity as to the serious character of war needs, function of the plant's products in the war effort, use of slogans and contests to stimulate worker interest and co-operation, and similar activities. The danger of over-emphasis on such programmes in lieu of dealing more directly with production and manpower problems was pointed out in later stages of the War Production Drive; but in some cases firms which had initially wished the committee to be looked upon as an agency for promoting morale were disposed to keep it that way. Nevertheless, the significance of adequate public relations and at least attendance by a public relations officer at committee meetings were important. Where the committees had no relationship with the informational activity in a plant, it was often far more difficult to keep the activities of the committee sufficiently in the
forefront of plant relationships. Participation of public relations officers from the management side facilitated active reporting of the work of the committees in plant publications, and helped to encourage better understanding of the activities and purposes of the committee.

Finally, an important issue that faced management in selecting its members was how to ensure adequate representation of the various levels of supervisory staff, and particularly of foremen. This problem was often solved by using foremen extensively on subcommittees and departmental committees. Moreover, experience indicated that inadequate representation of plant supervision might arouse jealousy and prevent any real co-operation by those responsible for putting the recommendations of the Labor-Management Committee into effect.

Selection of Labour Members

The question of labour membership, on the other hand, was one not so much of position within the plant (though the abilities, interest and experience of members were important) as of relationship of committee members to unions and to the workers as a whole.

In any plant where there was a single recognised bargaining agency the usual procedure recommended by the War Production Board was for the bargaining agency representatives to name the labour members of the committee. The union had to decide whether to name its own officers and whether to include in the production committee members of the negotiating committee, shop stewards or representatives chosen from the union membership at large. In a considerable number of cases the bargaining agency named some of its officers and some shop stewards. There were cases where management insisted that no shop stewards should serve on a joint committee; but in one case at least, this restriction stultified further action, and the union withdrew support of the committee. The union officers sometimes selected organisers or business agents from outside the plant, or workers in the plant who were also serving as union officials. In some plants the business agents were members of the main committee or steering committee while shop stewards or rank and file members participated in the departmental or subcommittees. In some cases the union officers who were members included the union president, but in others the president refused to be a member or preferred to serve ex-officio. His active participation would probably make union support more likely but there might arise the difficulty of conciliating — and distinguishing between — union business and joint production work.
In some cases the union used the committee as an instrument to draw more of its members into an activity of interest to the union. It then had to decide on what basis to appoint members at large or whether to name them through a democratic procedure such as an election. The possibility of elections, however, had a wider implication which will be considered below.

In plants where there were several collective bargaining agents the question of labour membership was more complicated. One procedure that was satisfactorily used in many cases was to determine the number of members on the committee, from each union, roughly in accordance with the proportionate representation of the union in the plant. Another procedure was to allocate committee membership among the unions on an equal or on a departmental basis. This again raised the question of subcommittees as against a departmental structure, the choice being affected by the size of the undertaking. In some instances, particularly where the union membership was by crafts, there were so many unions in the plant that even one representative from each on a main committee, particularly when matched by an equal number of management members, would have constituted too large a body for satisfactory operation. One solution was to insist upon the unions agreeing, sometimes on a rotating basis, as to which should name one or more members to the committee. There were in a few instances general elections for membership, but such a procedure was rare because of the jurisdictional jealousy which often meant opposition to an election by all the unions. Where the unions were themselves organised in some central body, e.g., the Metal Trades Council, it was asked to name the committee members.

In plants where an independent union had been certified as a collective bargaining agency, it was dealt with in the same way as the national unions, save that in cases where the independent union only covered a single plant there could be no outside business agent or union official to participate in the work of the committee.

A somewhat different problem arose in choosing members to represent the workers in an unorganised or only partially organised undertaking. The War Production Drive policy required that in all plants where a union was certified as the collective bargaining agent, the union should determine directly the method of selection of the labour members of the committee. Where there was no certified bargaining agent, the Drive Headquarters recommended that there should be an election of members and outlined the general principles for conduct of such elections. In small plants the Drive Headquarters suggested that labour members be elected by informal
procedure at the initial explanatory meeting, and that in large plants an election committee, including both management and labour, should decide on the number of labour representatives to be elected, preparation of notices, supervision of polling, counting of ballots, etc. In this event, management would appoint its members to the election committee, and labour would choose its members either by electing them at a plant or departmental meeting or through some existing employee machinery. The election committee would then have to work out the most satisfactory form of election, including the best way of securing nomination of candidates\(^1\), provision for secret ballot, distribution of electoral groups by department or trade, indication of method, time and place of election, distribution of poll cards or ballot boxes, and publicity regarding the elections.

Committee members could be elected whether the plant was organised or not. In plants where there was a collective bargaining agency, one procedure used in a few instances was for the union or unions to put up candidates for committee membership, either for the whole plant or in individual departments. In such cases, the main issue was whether all personnel or only union members might participate. If the voting were limited to union members, the election was more usually held at a union meeting. If the voting were open to all, it could be done by ballot papers distributed throughout the plant.

The obvious advantage of an election was the amount of interest that it aroused throughout the plant in the operation of the committee. On the other hand, some managements objected to the electioneering and other activities involved. Most national offices of the main unions refused to take any position on the holding of elections, leaving this to the local branch of the union or of the management itself.

An analysis made by the War Production Board of 1,343 committees' procedures indicated that in 58 per cent. of the committees the labour members were appointed by the participating unions. Plant elections had been held in 16 per cent.; the elections were confined chiefly to non-union plants. In 6 per cent. of the cases, management had selected the labour members in peacetime. In 9 per cent. labour members were selected by an existing plant committee on the basis of seniority, position in the plant, and other individual systems. Eleven per cent. were unclassified.

\(^1\) The Drive Headquarters proposed that nominations be secured by one of three ways: nomination at an open meeting, either by voice, vote or ballot; nominating petition requiring signatures of 20 workers; or a nominating ballot distributed in pay envelopes.
Qualifications of Workers' Members

It was difficult to ensure that the representatives, whether elected or nominated, were adequately qualified for their position. In the case of an election there was always the danger that members of the committee would be chosen on the basis of popularity rather than on the technical contribution they could make or their capacity to bring forward constructively the suggestions and point of view of the personnel.¹ In the case of nomination or election within the union hall, there was the danger that the members appointed would regard themselves as delegates of the union and consider not the good of the plant or even of its personnel but only what they believed to be union policy.

Another necessary qualification was the ability to put forward adequately the views of the various types of workers. Experienced skilled men who had long taken part in craft unions were frequently obvious candidates for this reason, and were usually also well qualified to deal with some of the technical production questions. However, the large numbers of new wartime workers, particularly women or young people and other special groups (for example, Negroes), had particular problems and points of view which required representation. In some cases special places were kept on the committees for representation of these categories if they constituted only a minority of the personnel. Where they constituted a majority, they were more likely to be among the regular union-named or elected members. In some cases, where there was inadequate representation of these groups, they were added to the committee as regular members or put on subcommittees when problems of particular concern to them arose. Some of the unions stressed the importance of representation of minority groups in any plant.

Committees did not specify any length of service in a given plant or in war industry as a qualification for membership.² This enabled more complete representation, given the rapid labour turnover, than if membership had been limited to workers of long standing. On the other hand committee members were not, in some cases, as familiar with custom and developments within the plant as they might have been. Consequently, both the War Production Board and many individual employers urged that, in the selec-

¹ The War Production Drive Headquarters in its recommendations concerning the elections of labour members in non-union plants pointed out that executives and supervisory employees with authority to hire and fire, or to recommend hiring and firing, should not be eligible to vote for or be elected labour members of the committee.

² The War Production Drive suggested, in an instruction to its field representatives, that a worker would have to be employed by a company for at least 6 months before becoming eligible to serve on a committee.
tion of labour representatives, consideration be given to the degree of experience of members with company policies and industrial relations as well as with the production problems of the various shops and departments. Where this was assured committees operated with a greater sense of responsibility. However, this practice sometimes led to misunderstanding and to the accusation by newer employees that committee members did not serve as their representatives but were co-operating too much in management policies.

Officers

Chairman

Most committees provided that if the chairman was named from among the management members there should be a vice-chairman, co-chairman, or secretary from the worker members, and vice versa. The office of chairman was sometimes particularly important in determining the atmosphere and activities of the committee itself. The choice of the chairman often indicated the degree of interest that top management had in the work of the committee. When the plant superintendent or the operating vice-chairman of the company, or some equally responsible official took the chair, it was often possible for the committee to reach final decisions and its recommendations would certainly receive full first-hand consideration at the decisive level. If, on the other hand, the chairman was a member of the public relations department or a personnel or welfare officer, he sometimes had to refer recommendations to a higher level before they could be put into effect. Therefore, in many instances where management was sincerely anxious to make the committee a successful experiment, a member of top management presided. Here, however, frequent absence of the chairman on other business required the vice- or co-chairman to preside too often or meant postponement and irregularity of meetings.

The capability of the vice-chairman or co-chairman selected from the labour side was especially important in committees where he often had to preside. In some of the most successful committees there was frequent alternation of officers, the presiding officer at one sitting coming from the management and at the next from labour. In one particular committee the management chairman turned over the responsibility of presiding to the worker vice-chairman half-way through each sitting, thereby ensuring a complete sense of joint responsibility for its success. Some co-chairmen alternated at three-month intervals.
In a number of instances a chairman who was not particularly favourable to the idea of joint committee action made use of his position to prevent the committee from taking up many questions which he considered would impinge upon the prerogatives of his own office, or on the production policy of the plant itself. The office of chairman was important therefore, not only from the positive point of view, but also because it could be used to stultify committee operations. This was found to be the case particularly where a committee had been established with the full approval of top management but somewhat against the desire of the supervisory staff, who then kept the committee in operation but prevented it undertaking any serious activities. This danger was recognised by the War Production Board representatives and by the trade union movement. A change in chairmanship was required as a means of revitalising committee activity in several plants where it had become clear that the committee had ceased to be a constructive factor in operation.

Secretary

There were two general concepts of the office of secretary of a Labor-Management Committee. One was that of an active executive who would select the activities of the committee, ensure regular meetings, plan the agenda, make material arrangements and carry out or follow up the committee’s decisions and recommendations. The alternative procedure was to have rather a committee clerk — in many instances the personal assistant of the chairman or a member of the employment office — to attend the meeting and keep the records. Whichever course was adopted, the secretary might be a normally appointed member of the committee, selected by it from either side, or might simply be present ex officio. Sometimes, particularly in large undertakings, he was jointly designated as a full-time official.

The secretary played a particularly important role in ensuring that the committee was kept in touch with related outside activities and in tying the work of the committee into the rank and file of the plant. These duties included, for example, maintenance of relations with the local representative of the War Production Drive, and in particular informing him of any change in committee organisation, activities, etc.

Other significant duties of the secretary included preparing the minutes and agenda, ensuring that members of the committee were kept in touch with any changing programmes, and facilitating the contact of committee members with the workers throughout the plant. A weakness in the operation of a substantial number
of committees was the lack of regular channels for the members to obtain the opinions of the rank and file on questions to be decided, and the lack of provision for any kind of caucus to determine committee policies. This was particularly evident in non-union plants, and in multi-union plants where general caucuses regarding questions dealt with by the Labor-Management Committee were seldom held at union meetings. An active secretary could frequently overcome this difficulty either by personal discussions with committee members or by ensuring that time was given to consideration of committee problems outside of and in addition to the regular meetings.

**Committee Organisation**

*Committee Structure*

Labor-Management Committees usually were organised under one variation or another of three general patterns, modified to fit the particular needs of individual plants and taking into consideration the physical layout of the undertaking (mine, factory, shipyard, etc.) and the number of employees to be represented.

A committee in a relatively small or medium-sized firm — anything from 100 to 1,000 employees — was frequently organised as a single main body, consisting of between 10 and 20 members selected to represent the various departments of the firm. Such a committee often appointed a series of subcommittees out of its own membership to deal with various specific problems. There might, for example, be one of these to deal with production efficiency, another on the suggestions system, a third on manpower problems, and a fourth on publicity, morale and similar questions. Such subcommittees usually had the right to co-opt additional management or labour personnel from within the plant to help in specific tasks. These persons might be temporary members and might be exempt from qualifications for committee membership, such as particular union affiliation or length of service in the plant. In a committee of this sort there was usually no need for a formal steering committee or for departmental committees.

A second type of structure, used most frequently in large firms where it was difficult to ensure that any 10 or 20 people could represent all the workers (or indeed implement the programme of the committee), consisted of departmental or zone committees in each main branch of the plant, their co-chairmen making up the main committee.

In a large firm there was frequently, in addition, a series of standing subcommittees dealing with particular subjects and made
up of individuals named by the main committee or by its executive, steering committee or other operating body. In one plant, for example, which had a main committee, a steering committee, zone committees, and special subcommittees, there were 140 people participating directly on one or another of these.

Sometimes, and particularly in very large firms, there were divisional committees in addition. For example one firm, whose committee operation was outstandingly successful, had a top advisory committee of six members, eight activity committees with over 60 members, six division committees composed of department foremen, and 46 department committees with nearly 200 members.¹

A variation of this general structure, introduced in a number of large enterprises in addition to the standing subcommittees mentioned above, was special task committees², appointed when a particular problem was under consideration. These were composed of members of the main committee, or the departmental committee, or at least had as chairmen members of the main committee with the right to co-opt other persons throughout the plant. Thus, in one firm, a particular task or project was selected at the monthly meeting of the main committee for emphasis during the following month, and a chairman named to carry through the activity and report back to the next meeting of the main committee. For example, if a blood bank were to be organised, or if there had been particular difficulty with turnover, or if some bottleneck had developed in the flow of material, a special task committee would develop programmes and measures to deal with the question. This procedure was particularly satisfactory in plants which had longer experience with a Labor-Management Committee and where its general routine discussions ceased to interest the plant as a whole. The disadvantage was that the normal discussion of day-to-day problems of production received less stress and their relegation to a secondary position sometimes made less significant the co-operative approach to production generally. Committees which succeeded in both fields were particularly fortunate.

The third form of organisation tried in many cases was the appointment of a small committee to meet regularly with top management, or with the industrial relations or personnel department. Lack of sufficient effort to keep in touch with the feeling of the plant as a whole sometimes jeopardised the success of such committees. In a large plant there was considerable danger that a small committee would be isolated or would fail to reach and secure the co-operation of foremen, department heads or workers.

¹ This committee had a full-time executive secretary with two clerical assistants and a monthly budget of $1,166.
² Sometimes called activity committees or project expediting committees.
The War Production Drive made a series of detailed studies of the committee structure in various kinds of establishments. It also tabulated the size and types of committees and subcommittees reported from approximately 1,300 plants. Forty per cent. of the committees covered were in plants having over 500 employees, with 30 per cent. in plants having less than 250, and six per cent. in plants of 5,000 and over. The tabulation indicated that about 41 per cent. of the committees had activity subcommittees in operation and about 22 per cent. had department or section subcommittees. Thirty-four per cent. of the plants in question had between 10 and 50 persons engaged in various committee activities, including plant-wide subcommittees or department committees; 42 per cent. had 10 or less, and 10 per cent. had 50 or more persons engaged in such work. The latter were mostly plants with 1,000 or more employees.

Relation of Committee Organisation to General Atmosphere of Co-operation

Although subcommittees were essential if a Labor-Management Committee was to undertake the varied tasks of which it was capable and to serve as the joint body interpreting wartime production needs to the workers in the plant as a whole, no matter how elaborate the committee organisation and promotional work might be it could operate successfully only if it had the full confidence of top management, of supervisory staff, of the trade unions and of the rank and file in the plant. In some cases an elaborate structure and an emphasis on the various marginal activities were substituted for serious consideration of actual production problems, manpower problems, or questions vitally affecting the workers’ long-term interest in the plant. Where top management was prepared to come to meetings regularly, to outline production problems, and to put forward enough details regarding the production schedules, the possible competitive position of the plant, and the relationship of wartime to peacetime production, it was possible to use the committee not only to increase output but to make members conscious of the many wartime difficulties facing management in the planning of production, and thereby to secure co-operation of workers and greater tolerance in situations which managements could not adequately meet.

Successful committee operation was often found to depend on the manner of the management representatives attending the meeting, on the degree of seriousness with which they treated the committee, and on the extent to which they brought their problems to
its attention; though some managements went to the opposite extreme, dominated the committees and made worker initiative impossible. Where the agenda was largely made up of brief reports from subcommittees, or of proposals or objections raised impromptu at the committee by worker members, management often tended simply to treat the committee as a grievance body and not to present real problems to it. Some committees started with grievance discussions, and by careful handling were able to shift to constructive activities. A few committees started out with a sincere programme but, because of the attitude of committee members on either side, after a period of operation either deteriorated into debating societies or concerned themselves with wholly unimportant issues.

The procedure adopted for the hearing of reports on application of earlier decisions was important in keeping committee discussions on a constructive level, and on results obtained. The check-up and follow-through of recommendations were in many committees the responsibility either of the particular subcommittee chairman, or of the secretary of the committee as a whole. In other committees responsibility was delegated to a given member for enforcement of each decision, and he was expected to report progress on the issue at the next meeting. In some committees such an individual was named in the minutes, and a report called for as soon as the meeting opened. This kind of procedure was particularly important in large plants where there was danger of committees' recommendations being lost sight of.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETINGS

Regular meetings, at fixed times, were found to be most satisfactory for running a Labor-Management Committee. However, the length of the meeting and the period of time between sittings varied according to the committee's size and structure and the activities under consideration. Where there was a single committee of some ten or twenty members, without subcommittees or departmental committees, it was usually necessary to provide an adequately long period for meetings to cover a considerable amount of business, and to have such meetings held more frequently than when operation was through a steering committee with a subcommittee structure.

Periodicity

Many committees, when first established, attempted to meet weekly and then, later, changed to fortnightly or monthly meetings.
Too frequent meetings meant poor attendance and generated a feeling of wasting time. However, if meetings were held irregularly, it was often more difficult to carry on any continuous programme or to ensure that the same members kept the time free to attend regularly.

**Time of Meeting**

Where committee work was of sufficiently vital interest to the members that they would devote to it an evening every two or four weeks, full discussion of underlying issues could be provided for. On the other hand, the day-to-day work of the committee was often more easily carried out by short meetings called regularly in the plant during working hours.

Particularly in companies where committee members were selected from two or even three shifts, it was necessary to make special arrangements so that all the members could meet together, at least from time to time, even if committee meetings alternated so as to include various shift members. One of the difficulties was in persuading the management representatives and office staff members to make provision for meetings at such times as to permit attendance by members of the night shift. Consequently, in many plants, the work of the Labor-Management Committee was far more effective for the day shift than for the night or swing shift.

**Place of Meeting**

The place of meeting was also frequently a significant, psychological factor in the atmosphere created for the operation of the committee. Where top management was willing to call the committee members in and make use of the board of directors' room or similar office, the resulting dignity aided in the general morale work of the committee. On the other hand, particularly in plants where the committee was called upon to deal with specific production problems or temporary bottlenecks, there were advantages in having committee meetings held close to the place of work, where it was easy to call in any particular worker whose job or machine had to be considered. A solution used in some plants was to have the departmental or production subcommittee meet in the plant, either in the superintendent's office or as near as possible to the department under consideration, and to provide for meetings of the main committee, attended by top management, on a monthly basis in some quiet office or board room. Where committee meetings were shunted off to a back corner of a cafeteria or, at the other extreme, made into a mass meeting open to too many visitors, the
atmosphere and practical efficiency of discussion were seriously affected.

**Payment for Committee Attendance**

The question of payment for committee attendance was often of importance in providing regular interest in committee meetings. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division stated: "Employees who serve as voluntary members of Labor-Management plant committees, formation of which has been encouraged by the War Production Board, need not be compensated under the Fair Labor Standards Act for time spent in committee meetings outside their regular working hours. They must be compensated, however, for time spent in committee meetings during regular working hours." But although this provision covered the legal requirements, in the majority of cases payment was made for all time spent at regular meetings, whether held during working hours or not. Supplementary meetings or duties undertaken as a result of some special request were usually not compensated.

**Committee Documentation**

The method for handling material given to committees varied somewhat in accordance with the role of the committee in any given plant. Where the committee was attended by a public relations officer or had an executive secretary on a full-time basis, care was usually taken to provide for the preparation of full minutes — a stenographic record or a summary — and either their issue to members or their publication throughout the plant (by distribution, posting on bulletin boards or publication in a plant newspaper). In fact, in some plants one of the chief functions of the committee became that of editing a plant newspaper and providing material and information for it. In plants where the committee was used primarily to operate a suggestion system or to consider technical production problems there was sometimes less emphasis on the documentation made available to the committee and more on the difficulties with which it had to deal.

**Agenda Preparation**

The significance of adequate preparation and of advance distribution of the agenda to the committee members was sometimes overlooked. In the majority of committees no formal agenda was prepared ahead of time and committee members came to the meeting with little specific knowledge of what would be discussed. In others some brief agenda was prepared, or the minutes of the previ-
ous meeting served as the basis for discussion and custom indicated what topics would be dealt with. In some committees the chairman and secretary prepared an agenda from suggestions submitted by members, but this was a rare procedure. Short notices were often sent to committee members — particularly in case of change from the normal operation or in the date or place of meeting, or if some visitor were expected. Many meetings based their discussions on the reports of subcommittees.

However, the customary procedure was for a committee meeting to follow an order of discussion fixed by the chairman which might or might not be distributed to the members present. While this kind of procedure facilitated informality and easy exchange of views, it often lost the possible advantage of committee members discussing in advance, from either the management or the labour side, the kind of questions or points of view they wished to put forward at a given meeting, and it added a sense of superficiality to much of the debate.

Minutes

There was also wide difference in methods of keeping committee minutes and in the content of the minutes. Often the meeting began by the formal adoption of the minutes of the previous sitting, but in many committees this involved reading aloud the actual minutes and thus wasting time. Minutes were usually prepared in duplicate form and one or two sets sent to the regional or national office of the War Production Drive. In the case of a Government-owned plant or one working for the Maritime Commission, copies of the minutes were usually sent to the Government department concerned. Very few unions received copies of minutes of committees except when they requested them for some particular reason. The sending in of minutes was, of course, entirely voluntary and was requested only in order to permit evaluation of the committee and to give Government departments some clue as to which committee might be usefully given assistance or more extensively used.

According to information collected by the War Production Board, about 67 per cent. of 1,343 committees covered kept minutes, of which only 49 per cent. distributed them to members of the committee.

In some cases, when questions of a commercial or productive nature which affected the competitive position of a given firm were being dealt with, management demanded, as a condition to frank speech, that the confidential nature of the discussion be respected and the minutes considered as confidential documents.
Minutes sometimes were considered confidential also if the discussion concerned a production status or contract situation or any technical bottleneck in a secret process, which, for military reasons, was not to be disclosed either outside the plant or even to the majority of workers in the plant. In this type of case, minutes were more often limited to a brief report and marked "confidential", with, in some instances, a numbered distribution so that a check could be kept on every copy. In some cases minutes were so marked but still transmitted to the War Production Board, or under special circumstances, to the War Manpower Commission. There were numerous examples of serious technical discussion of such nature that the context had to be kept confidential; but the majority of the committees limited their discussion to far more general problems, which raised no issue of secrecy either for military or for commercial reasons.

Reports

Apart from minutes and agenda, many committees issued formal, short or summarised reports on their activities. These reports were usually published and made available to as large a number of the workers inside and outside the plant as possible. Their purpose was to acquaint plant workers with problems in which the committee requested their co-operation, and to inform them of activities and results obtained.

Public Relations Procedures

Publicity and promotional activities frequently formed a substantial part of the committee's work. They were considered to be a question of committee operation, since the way in which committee activities were brought to the attention of the workers in the plant, and the extent to which they were concerned with the discussion in the committee, was significant in determining its contribution to the war effort. Where a labour union made a point of discussing the Labor-Management Committee's function in union meetings, it was possible to assure a closer collaboration between the general memberships and the limited number of union officials or shop stewards serving on the committee. The type of promotional activity and the reports made available through bulletin boards, lunch room activities, speeches in the cafeteria, or announcements over a loud-speaking apparatus, largely determined the depth to which a committee's co-operative approach affected general industrial relations within the plant. Therefore, a large number of the big companies placed at the service of the Labor-
Management Committee not only the plant newspaper but also much of the general public relations procedures of the plant itself, and related the Labor-Management Committee to the general production incentive work carried on in connection with the War or Navy Departments. In small plants where it was not possible to provide for large-scale publicity activities, the Labor-Management Committee often had to serve as its own promotional agency.
CHAPTER XIII

EXAMPLES OF JOINT PLANT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

The War Production Board and the trade union and employer associations alike deliberately avoided laying down any rigid pattern to guide committee activities. The widely varied structure of industrial relations, the differing coverage of collective bargaining procedures, and the degree of concern of employees in the economic development of individual plants, called for a changing pattern with emphasis varying according to each individual undertaking. Each committee had to select its activities and develop its own pattern of operation. On the positive side, this meant unusual success and constructive contributions by a limited number of committees; on the negative side it meant that a large number of committees never succeeded in making the contribution to the war effort for which they were designed.

The War Production Drive Headquarters, in describing the responsibilities that might be undertaken by joint committees in general, grouped its suggested programme under three general headings: production items, manpower problems, and informational or educational activities. It pointed out that most committees undertook one or more activities in each of these general fields. However, the emphasis of any given committee necessarily varied from time to time according to the particular interests and needs of its own plant; an individual committee frequently altered its programme on the basis either of its own experience or of the experience of others, and committees have tended also to adapt their programmes with the development of different products within the plant or changes in its personnel.

While few committees dealt with all the suggestions for general action, the selection of items for discussion was often a determining factor in the success of a committee's work. Obviously the size of the plant and the committee structure also affected the choice of subjects. The extreme dangers were that a committee either attempted to deal with so many questions that its activities remained superficial, or that its work was so restricted as not to be of general interest or value to the plant.
WAR PRODUCTION PLANNING

PRODUCTION ITEMS

The items dealt with by committees under the general category of production or output ranged from the actual assignment of work and organisation of the plant for war production to possible later use of the machinery in the reconversion and post-war periods. Examples of the various subjects covered will illustrate this.

Production Planning and Contract Scheduling

The approach of any plant committee to the production organisation of the plant itself, and to relating the contract schedules in the plant to actual output, depended almost entirely on the attitude of the top management and its representatives in the committee. In a number of plants management recognised that a joint committee might be of greater assistance in discussing bottlenecks and in improving general production efficiency if its members were adequately acquainted with management's own difficulties in organising production and with the current schedules which the plant or a given department had to meet.

The management representatives in a few plants made a practice of presenting to the committee at regular intervals an explanation of the schedules planned, indicating what products or parts were of particular urgency and which departments were facing difficulty. In some cases this information was broken down to specific questions for advice by the committee. Thus, in a company making a certain type of electrical equipment, the committee was kept informed of the exact status of deliveries, and of any change in specifications or materials used that could affect either the employment programme or the actual organisation of work. Whenever this occurred, the committee's advice was asked as to the best way of meeting the technical difficulty or of making use of any time lost during an adjustment. Furthermore, even in some plants where the product was highly secret for military reasons or owing to commercial competition, the committee members were taken into the confidence of the management and informed of the executive reasons for changes, use of parts, etc.

However, full use of committee members on a confidential basis for the discussion of either technical or secret production processes was comparatively rare. In a greater number of plants top management was unwilling to confide to the joint committee information on the company's production plans, sometimes for fear of disclosing processes, and in other instances, particularly after rapid expansion, for fear of revealing inefficiency. In many cases full discussion of production organisation was prevented by the feeling of some of the
management representatives, and particularly of production engineers, that workers' representatives had no real contribution to make to the engineering knowledge collected in the special technical departments. Where this attitude prevailed it was particularly difficult for the joint committee to undertake discussion of any of the more fundamental issues of production organisation or to find ways of bringing the co-operative effort and thinking of the workers to bear upon the problem.

The difficulties that arose in this connection, it may be noted, did not always come from management. Particularly in plants where there had been a bad history of industrial disputes or a sense of frustration on the part of trade union officials, labour members frequently opposed aiding management to straighten out production difficulties and thus make greater profits. Such an attitude proved particularly difficult to combat in firms whose wartime work was not fundamentally different from their peacetime operation, or where, before the war, either speed-up or wage cuts had created a difficult background.

In still other firms an apparent lack of discussion of production planning arose, not from unwillingness on the part of either labour or management to deal with such questions but because both groups preferred to discuss them in more limited meetings between management and trade union officials, sometimes as part of the normal process of collective bargaining. In these cases, both the trade union and the management members of the Labor-Management Committee were inclined to limit its discussion to questions of direct concern to workers' welfare and to keep general policy issues for the collective bargaining machinery.

Furthermore, in some instances Labor-Management Committees were prevented from discussing the technical production side of a plant's operation by order of a Government department, on the ground that military secrecy required that technical information or planning on certain war items be discussed as little as possible. In such cases the Labor-Management Committee had to limit its discussions to the more general aspects of plant organisation and other suitable items of activity.

Methods of Discussing Production Questions

The degree of concern of a committee with either general or specific issues involved in production was sometimes determined by the way in which the agenda of each meeting was handled and by the kinds of question which members brought up under this heading. For example, many committees had a subcommittee, sometimes called a Production Efficiency Committee, whose func-
tion was to consider production problems and report recommendations to the main body. Sometimes in a large plant the Production Efficiency Committee would delegate members to work with departmental committees and ensure that recommendations affecting a particular department were brought to the notice of the departmental committee for execution, and vice versa that proposals developed in a departmental committee and bearing on the organisation of more than one department were given more general consideration.¹

Many of the examples of co-operative contribution to production which brought increased output — and honorary plant awards from the Army, Navy or War Production Board — developed out of discussion in subcommittees or full sessions. It was in these discussions that most frequently proposals were made or explanation given for changes in blueprints or design of products, and for procedures required by a change in contract or a conversion from one product to another. The following is a concrete example of this in one large firm.

In shifting to wartime production many departments of the firm found themselves with an entirely different item to produce, and a limitation of space and critical materials, a shortage of tools, etc. In some of these departments the labor-management department subcommittees were confronted with some difficult production problems. One such department was XXX where insecticide dispensers were made for the Army. These "insect bombs" were loaded with an insecticide for killing insects and bugs in Army tents in the tropics. XXX was the old refrigerator compressor department. The space was limited. The old equipment was used in making the new product. The XXX committee worked out a system of multiple stamping of discs which went into the insect bombs. Rather than stamp these discs from steel strips they devised a method of stamping five at a time from steel sheets. This not only increased production 400 per cent., but also saved 401,380 pounds of steel annually.

A new type of ferrule (copper ring) was devised to eliminate a high percentage of rejects. A new copper ring was used for diaphragm brazing. An enclosed holder was devised for tubes at the welding station. A method was perfected for pinching off leaks, for decreasing diaphragm and ferrules, and for cleaning the inside of cans (bombs) by exploding the cans inside the furnace. The bottoms of the cans were made flat so they could ride through the brazing furnace on the belt.

One worker in the department suggested a method for dipping a basket full of cans instead of one at a time. He received a $350.00 award for his idea.

The labour representative of the committee suggested a new assembly line

¹ It was either in the work of the production efficiency subcommittee or in the full committee's discussion of its report that most committees found the opportunity to examine such problems as the most efficient use of a limited number of cranes or derricks, the most effective operation of furnaces, the arrangement of the machinery within the plant, methods for improving heat controls, adequate flow of materials or component parts, the designing, hardening, improving, modifying or even acquiring of particular machine tools or equipment, and many similar questions related equally to the day-by-day activities of the plant and to the organisation of its machinery, supplies and output.
procedure where the cans would be placed on hooks and proceed on a continuing line, through paint, etc., which idea, with some improvements, has been developed. These were the results of the many ideas worked out in this department: quota had been set at 600 per day; 24,000 per day were being turned out.

**Suggestion Systems**

The majority of Labor-Management Committees dealt with production problems through some kind of suggestion system. In many cases this system antedated the establishment of a wartime Labor-Management Committee and was simply taken over by the committee or co-ordinated with the new body. In the earlier period many of the suggestion systems were viewed with suspicion by the unions because they were frequently operated wholly or largely as a management project and often served to elicit ideas from individual workers, which were then used by management either with insufficient credit or financial award given to the worker, or with the result that improved methods brought decreased employment. Moreover, many managements which had operated suggestion systems in earlier times had grown sceptical of their value and fearful that they were being used largely for airing grievances. Consequently, when the War Production Drive Headquarters urged the revitalisation or initiation of suggestion systems as part of the functions of Labor-Management Committees, a body of experience could be drawn upon, but a substantial amount of both management and labour prejudice had also to be overcome. The War Production Drive outlined a series of procedures for suggestion systems¹ and a number of the principal unions laid down conditions for their own participation in such systems. For example, the United Automobile Workers, in its War Policy Manual, while supporting the use of suggestion systems, emphasised that work on production problems should not be confined to these. In addition, it pointed out that no system should be approved until it was definitely understood that, unless agreed by the union, no worker should suffer a cut in take-home pay or lose his job because of the resulting changes. Similarly, the U.A.W. went on, union officials and labour representatives on committees should see to it that patents were taken out for employees with patentable suggestions; the employee would then be protected should plants adopt the idea, and if proper steps were not taken he might lose all claim.

When suggestion systems became part of the wartime Labor-Management Committee structure, they were usually made the

¹ A special pamphlet entitled *Suggestions Guide for Labor-Management Committees: Ways of Handling Suggestions as Part of the War Production Drive* was issued by the War Production Board to aid committees in operating suggestion systems.
responsibility of a special suggestions subcommittee. The wide variety of experience available on the operation of suggestion systems indicates that, although a few simple prerequisites must be followed, successful committees often adopted very different methods. Full support from both management and union was generally recognised as essential, but the extent to which systems were operated as a joint responsibility varied. In all cases where the suggestion system came under the general sponsorship of the Labor-Management Committee, the awards were decided by a joint body. The variation related to methods of deciding awards and particularly to methods of determining acceptance or rejection. The managements of many firms, particularly those which had long operated suggestion systems insisted that it was management's responsibility to decide whether or not a suggestion should be accepted. Some went farther and insisted that if any cash award was to be given by the company, the determination of its amount and allocation were also management's responsibility. In still other instances management took the view that, if a suggestion was technical in character, the production or engineering department alone was competent to decide on its acceptability; while, if it affected local work organisation, the foremen or superintendents must make the final decision. In some cases all suggestions were referred to the competent officials designated by management, the joint committee only discussing the awards to be given and methods for applying suggestions approved by these officials. While in many instances this arrangement proved satisfactory, in a greater number of cases it tended to lessen the workers' interest in the system.

The fullest joint consideration was given where all suggestions had to be examined by a joint committee. In a large plant this meant a tremendous amount of work, and various methods were developed to deal with it. For example, some committees divided up all the suggestions received every week or month, and assigned them in lots amongst the members; each suggestion was then reported on by a labour and a management member, those receiving favourable reports from both sides being considered by the whole committee for award. Where suggestions were considered by at least one member from each side, there was less likelihood that the fairness of decisions would be challenged.

Systems based entirely on written reports regarding the content of suggestions, and on joint discussion only regarding recommendations for award, may have saved committee time, but they sacrificed any constructive modifications which might have resulted from examination by a joint committee. For example, where the suggestion system was closely related to a production subcommittee, or
to the full committee's discussion of production, there might be
discussion on the effect which a given technical suggestion would
have upon the production organisation or upon the workers affected.
These discussions gave reality to the production aspect of Labor-
Management Committee work and made possible the constructive
use of workers' ideas regarding their own jobs.

The handling of a particular suggestions subcommittee's report
may serve as an example. A list of new suggestions was read by the
secretary and put up for discussion. The first suggestion dealt with
a lighting hazard in the parking lot and a method for dealing with
the situation without overloading the power line; it was agreed that
this warranted a small cash award, provided it could be put into
effect. A second suggestion dealt with a new kind of pencil shar­
pener; the committee agreed in this instance that the man should
only be thanked, because the order department's analysis did not
indicate any real use to the plant, but that the suggestion should be
forwarded to the manufacturer. The third suggestion concerned
tooling for a new product that was just coming into production;
several of the members present were working upon the product and
considered the suggestion of importance, but the production en­
gineer pointed out that in this particular instance the whole tooling
was being revised and that, while technical suggestions would be
appreciated by the management, it did not seem fair to give awards
on them until the final lay-out had been decided and the period of
experimentation completed; this was unanimously agreed. The
final suggestion discussed at this particular meeting concerned a
new tool which had been developed as a result of a suggestion made
earlier. The suggestion had been originated in one department,
then taken up by a girl in the methods department and finally
processed in the engineering department. The suggestion had gone
in for national patenting and the names attached to the patent for
financial award were the originator of the idea and the final pro­
cessor. The committee considered that the girl who had in fact
developed the suggestion should also receive some credit, and that
the company should give her the same financial award as the other
two.

A number of the prerequisites for handling suggestion systems
that were outlined by the War Production Drive Headquarters
covered such questions as location of suggestion boxes, convenient
forms on which to note suggestions, methods for ensuring anonymity
where this was desired, and provision that the receipt of suggestions
would be welcomed by both foremen and shop stewards. Closely
related to these and equally essential were provisions for acknow­
ledging suggestions, whether accepted or rejected, and assurance
to the individual worker that the submission of a suggestion would not under any consideration be used against him.

Furthermore, particularly in plants having large numbers of new workers, it was often found necessary to encourage suggestions by providing the workers with aid in writing out or illustrating their suggestions.

In many cases the suggestion system was closely related to the educational or public relations work of the committee, so that any ideas gathered could be given full publicity, and in order to convince the workers of the value of suggestions to the war effort.

A number of firms organised contests to encourage the submission of suggestions. The Labor-Management Committee of one firm organised a monthly competition open to all employees, except those regularly engaged in production improvement design, for the most constructive suggestions. Three cash awards were made each month — a first prize of $100 and two runner-up prizes of $75 each. The awards were based on originality, completeness and the value of the suggestion to the construction programme. Judges were named by the Labor-Management Committee to determine the winners of the contest each month. Suggestions could deal with such questions as full utilisation of machinery, adaptation of old machinery to new uses, breaking production bottlenecks, breakdown prevention through better care, elimination of waste materials, accident prevention, absenteeism and turnover, housing, and transportation.

A widely discussed issue regarding suggestion systems was the effect of various kinds of award. In many plants, there were three types available: those given by the plant itself, those obtained from the War Production Board, and those from the sponsoring procurement agency.\(^1\) In many instances the individual plant management gave winners public recognition or financial award or both. The financial awards could take the form of war bonds or cash, sometimes paid on a monthly basis, either in fixed amounts or as a percentage of the net savings made through the suggestion. In some cases suggestions which had been put into effect were reconsidered at the end of a stated period to see whether the initial award represented an adequate proportion of the financial savings caused. In many plants awards took the form of public honour, recognition in the plant newspaper, rallies, announcements over the loudspeaker system, and even in some cases promotion.

The following are instances of suggestions which received financial awards. One plant indicated that in a single week the Labor-

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\(^1\) War or Navy Department or Maritime Commission.
Management Committee awarded $2,200 to 47 employees. Awards were given in this particular plant for the following ideas:

1. After tanks were cured in one department they were cooled by a spray of water on the outside — taking 45 to 60 minutes. The suggestion was to equip the tanks with a spray on the vent hose, connecting the vent manifold to a water line. Thus tanks were cooled outside and inside — in about 30 minutes.

2. Use of an electric booster pad for various types of repairing resulted in less buffing and curing time.

3. Installing four coils of copper tubing in grease pans in a leakage assembly line allowed water to cool the grease and prevent the leakage assembly from getting hot, thus saving brass bushings and grease.

4. Considerable difficulty experienced in running several kinds of breaker and flipper due to a previous knife set-up was eliminated by the suggester with a temporary set-up of knives in wooden blocks which were later duplicated with metal holders.

The following information from 4 plants indicates considerable success. One stated that in 13 months 5,331 suggestions were submitted and 584 accepted; another that savings effected from suggestions amounted to $1,610,000; a third had received 1,000 suggestions each month, of which 22 per cent. were adopted; and a fourth indicated that in 26 months 2,305 suggestions were received and $10,468 paid out in awards.

In addition to awards given by individual companies, various Government departments developed award and incentive plans. The War Production Board gave honours "for production ideas" submitted to its Headquarters by suggestion committees. An award for production ideas could be issued by a plant Labor-Management Committee on forms provided for the purpose by the War Production Drive Headquarters. Suggestions of special merit, adopted and tried out by a plant, were then sent to Headquarters, where a Board for Individual Awards composed of technicians outstanding in various industrial fields analysed the suggestions and recommended the granting of honours to those of outstanding significance. There were four types of honour. The first stage was a Letter of Commendation for suggestions of local value only; second, an Honorable Mention, issued by Drive Headquarters on the recommendation of the Awards Board, for ideas of local value which gave promise of wider application; third, a Certificate similarly issued for ideas which had application throughout industry; and finally a Citation conferred by the Chairman of the War Production Board on the recommendation of the Board for Individual Awards, for ideas which constituted outstanding contributions to the entire war programme.

These four types of honour, open to workers for production suggestions which had been accepted by a Labor-Management Com-
mittee, were obtained by several thousand individuals. They were given for suggestions effecting practical improvements in tools and shop practices, ideas which saved time and materials, fostered plant safety or ease of production. Frequently, if a suggestion was particularly striking or significant, the War Production Drive Headquarters published it in the Labor and Management News and made it available to as wide a number of firms as possible. It was in order to apply useful suggestions to as many plants as possible that the War Production Drive Headquarters urged not only that suggestion systems be established and awards issued but also that Labor-Management Committees send in detailed descriptions of suggestions which were then nationally publicised and made available in complete technical detail to any plant interested. The Labor-Management Committee of a firm in the tyre industry reported issuing 336 awards for suggestions during the first five months of 1944. Workers recommended by this particular committee received 2 Citations, 9 Certificates, 16 Honorable Mentions and 8 Commendations for production ideas from the War Production Board.

The following is an example of a suggestion that received a high award from the War Production Board. Two workers in a firm making radio tubes were dealing with specifications which called for a hair-like filament to go through a microscopic hole in the top mica and pass by a damper bar and a network of grid wires. This threading was done on a more or less hit-or-miss operation. Two of the workers doing the threading devised a jig which automatically positioned the filament in the top hole so that when vibration was applied by means of an electric buzzer the filament passed by the proper side of the damper bar through the bottom mica. This suggestion was accepted by the Labor-Management Committee and, after being put into effect in the plant, submitted to the War Production Board for consideration. Both workers were awarded Certificates for Production Ideas. It is stated that 42,000 operator hours were saved per year in the plant concerned.

Cash for suggestions was paid to civilian employees at War Department installations and naval shore establishments. A War Department suggestion system operated in 1,591 War Department installations, covering 1,186,046 civilian employees. Between June 1943 and February 1945, 218,693 suggestions were submitted, of which 29,698 were adopted, and cash awards were given totalling $785,230.50. The accumulated annual savings as a result of the suggestions were stated to be $83,897,234. Under the War Department system there was no limit to the amount of money that an installation could award per month. The average cash award for
the year was $31.00. Individual awards varied from $5.00 to $2,750.

Under the Navy Department suggestion programmes an average of 161 "naval activities" reported suggestions annually covering approximately 620,500 civilian employees. During 1943 and 1944, 72,825 suggestions were submitted, of which 16.9 per cent. were adopted; and 16,112 during the first quarter of 1945, with 20.2 per cent. adopted. Awards granted in 1943 and 1944 totalled $348,000, and $99,464 in the first quarter of 1945. The suggestions produced an estimated savings of $45,000,000 for the two years of 1943 and 1944. An award, or awards, for an individual suggestion totalling up to $250 might be granted in the field. Higher awards required approval by the Board on Awards to Civil Employees, which met in Washington. The lowest award given was $5.00 and the highest $3,800.

The Maritime Commission authorised the companies working on its contracts to pay out of Maritime Commission funds not more than $250.00 a month for suggestions. The highest award permitted was $100 and the lowest, $25. The total granted during the period from August 1942 to December 1944 was $143,500. The system operated in 43 shipyards, employing 600,000 persons. In the 2½-year period 3,020 suggestions were transmitted by the Maritime Commission regional offices to Washington, with an estimated saving of $44,838,639 in man-hours and materials. The Maritime Commission also issued Certificates of Merit to shipyard employees who received awards, and citations for outstanding suggestions, to be determined by the Shipyard Efficiency Awards Committee. This committee, composed of the Director of the Division of Shipyard Labor Relations, the special assistant to the Commissioner in charge of shipyard production, and a liaison officer, reviewed the suggestions and recommendations submitted by the individual Labor-Management Committees, through the Commission's regional offices, and determined which suggestions merited an award from the individual shipyard and the amount to be granted.

Many plant committees published, on notice boards or in plant newspapers, the names of all workers who received awards or honourable mentions, either from the plant itself or from the War Production Board or other Government agency, as a procedure for stimulating general interest in the plant suggestions system.

Although the development of suggestion systems was one of the most useful activities of the Labor-Management Committees, and one of their most widely known fields of work, experience indicated that emphasis on such systems alone might be unwise. It could prevent a Labor-Management Committee from undertaking other
important joint activities, and could be used by management or labour, or both, to give the impression of labour-management co-operation in a plant where bad industrial relations or poor management prevented full discussion of production planning or manpower questions. For example, in one firm the Labor-Management Committee organised an active suggestion system with a full-time staff, whose duties included the examination of all suggestions and following up their effect both in the plant and as regards public relations. This particular plant received numerous honours for the suggestions it submitted to the War Production Board. Nevertheless, it was frequently on the "must" list as being behind schedule and had a record of such exceptionally bad absenteeism that the Army refused to give it the honorary "E" which it might have otherwise deserved. The industrial relations situation in the plant was consistently difficult, but the isolation of the Labor-Management Committee in its work on suggestions and publicity was such that the committee could meet without paying any attention to the problems impeding output in the plant. Safety questions, labour relations growing out of absenteeism, and attempts to improve utilisation, were all made separate functions of the union, of management or of separate committees and divorced from the work of the Labor-Management Committee. Thus it was possible for the latter to hold a routine meeting at the very time when a strike was in progress in one part of the plant, and when absenteeism and turnover were so bad that the various Government departments concerned were seeking all means to help the plant meet its production schedule.

By contrast, another more typical plant with an effective suggestion system co-ordinated its operation with the whole system of departmental subcommittees and main committee, and had the discussion of suggestions include proposals brought up by individual workers, the foremen's comments upon them, and various ideas that management wished to be tried out. It gave awards on the basis not only of the actual suggestion made, but of the time and interest put into its presentation. In this particular plant, it may be added, post-war and normal peacetime operation plans were also discussed widely with the various joint committees, and workers thus fully realised that proposals for plant improvement were of long-term interest to all concerned with the company. Where this attitude prevailed, the suggestion system could become part of more widespread joint co-operation rather than serve as a substitute for the solution of difficulties in other fields.

In order to encourage Labor-Management Committees to set up suggestion systems and to make available the experience of different plants in operating such systems, the War Production
Board representatives in a few areas sponsored the establishment of area suggestions councils. These were established on a wholly voluntary basis and usually consisted of two or more representatives of all the Labor-Management Committees in the area which desired to join. The work of a council was twofold. It served to make available procedural experience in handling suggestions with which plants in the same area had experimented, and it facilitated the exchange of actual suggestions among local plants. However, there were in 1945 only a limited number of these councils and their experience was so new that their contribution could not be evaluated. Other area councils of wider scope included in their functions discussion of the suggestion systems of some of the plants covered.

Conservation of Tools

Another production activity undertaken by joint committees was promotion of the care of tools and preservation of equipment. Many committees developed constructive procedures to provide for better arrangement of tools in the plant and for storerooms designed both to save time and to ensure availability of scarce tools or those used by many workers.

Contributions made by one joint committee in regard to tools — simplification of design and adaptation of standards to existing machinery — were frequently made available for use in a great many plants. War Production Drive Headquarters assisted committees working on tool conservation through the issuance of a Tool Guide, which summarised information from various committees, helped committees to undertake education and displays in care and use of tools, cost of broken tools and difficulties in obtaining replacement, and stressed the need for training programmes, particularly for new workers, in the use of tools. Some committees made full use of this kind of information and reported substantial savings as a result.

Conservation of Materials and Salvage

Most Labor-Management Committees developed methods for conservation of materials and salvage of waste or scrap. The emphasis on conservation was obviously greater in plants using materials in short supply and plants where the use of materials could be affected by individual care. Consequently in many undertakings this kind of problem was dealt with in relation to general plant morale rather than in technical terms, since the solution often lay primarily in convincing workers to take sufficient care of their materials. This applied notably in firms whose wartime personnel included large numbers of workers new to industry.
Many firms reported substantial savings in their use of copper and other critical items as a result of strict controls imposed by the Labor-Management Committee and suggestions made by workers. Such controls were sometimes carried out by the committee's designating members to go about the plant, checking up on the use of material and working with the foremen and shop stewards to prevent misuse and loss of materials. For example, in one plant the representatives responsible for conservation received complaints from the first shift that the third shift left their materials in such condition as to result in wastage. It was then the duty of the salvage representatives to meet with the third shift and convince each individual of the effect of any carelessness on the worker who would follow him. Another example was in a large forge and foundry where the conservation subcommittee reported that there had been considerable loss of material and time because the moulds were not properly oiled by the swing shift and that, when they were dealt with at the next stage, the first material put into the moulds usually had to be rejected. The result of committee discussion of the conservation subcommittee's report was to work out a whole new procedure affecting the heating process, the use of the moulds, which were at that time in particularly short supply, and arrangements for replacement of worn moulds when new ones were again available.

Another phase of conservation or salvage was the collection of scrap in plants, mills and shipyards for re-use or sale. This question was part of the general problem of good plant housekeeping, procedures for efficient arrangements in the plant, and adequate clearing up at the close of each period of work. Many committees organised scrap campaigns, sometimes as a production activity and sometimes as a special aspect of an educational programme designed to teach both the use of scrap and the advantages of clean work practices. Scrap campaigns, although they were sometimes handled through permanent salvage subcommittees, were most frequently dealt with by a special activity committee, set up during a drive for special kinds of scrap, or through the organisation of a permanent interdepartmental committee. Such campaigns were usually most effective if carried out from time to time whenever bad practices accumulated wastage in a plant; they were often stimulated through the offering of awards or prizes by the joint committee, based either on the amount accumulated or on the cleanliness of the plant under investigation.

Many committee activities included promoting collections, for example, of scrap metal, rubber, silk and paper, not only from within the plant, but also from employees' homes. Such scrap was
often sold under the auspices of the joint committee, and the proceeds in some cases turned over to a charitable organisation or the Red Cross. In this same field, one committee introduced a new scheme to expedite the salvaging of obsolete dies, jigs, forms and patterns when a new item was going into production.

Another form of contribution by a scrap or salvage committee was the improvement of the quality of scrap, so that the proceeds of the company from its sale were greatly increased. In this particular case the scrap committee, after surveying each department of the plant, designed special containers, set them up in suitable places and installed sieves to clean materials, thus improving the quality of the scrap. The principal method used for this purpose was careful segregation of each type of metal and alloy, so that high-priced scrap was not mixed with cheaper materials.

Quality Control

Improvement of quality was an important contribution made by many committees. In plants experimenting with new products, the committees were particularly useful in finding ways to improve the quality of work and test workmanship and machine accuracy at a stage early enough to permit correction. The War Production Drive Headquarters stressed the value of committees' undertaking quality control programmes and frequently assisted individual committees to develop them. A number of managements indicated that the result of the committee's emphasis on quality control throughout the plant had been so to reduce rejects as to save the company from losing contracts. In one particular case it was pointed out that the committee reduced rejects by 54 per cent.

Many active joint committees set up permanent quality control committees, some aided by flying squads of co-opted members whose function was to go through the plant, testing at random the quality of the workmanship and the number of rejects and reporting this kind of information to meetings of the quality control committee. Other committees set about systematically analysing inspection reports in each department, so as to locate the items and operators where a high percentage of rejects were occurring. These items were then checked by experienced workers and foremen in each department, so as to discover the source and cause of the difficulty. Frequently they found that cutting tools were worn down so that finished work exceeded specified tolerances, or the bearings of the machines were worn away, thus permitting "chattering" and spoiled work, or the operator was issued with cutters of improper hardness or improperly ground, or that he needed additional training, or was just careless. The location and systematic
correction by these specialised subcommittees of hundreds of causes for poor quality production did much to increase net output and conserve materials and labour.

It was found essential to have quality control experts closely related to the production department of a plant and to assure that their work had the full co-operation of all union officials as well as of the workers' representatives on the Labor-Management Committee. Union backing was needed because quality testing sometimes entailed changes in the process or in the use of labour, and necessitated new time studies which ultimately affected earnings. There was no phase of production on which greater co-operation was needed from labour than in the maintenance of high quality workmanship. Unless workers understood the impact of poor quality production on operating costs and wages, and felt themselves a part of the production control machinery, they were not apt to co-operate fully. Therefore the War Production Board emphasised that quality control work must not be looked upon with suspicion by the collective bargaining representatives and that, in case any collective bargaining issue resulted, it should be referred to the appropriate procedure.

Cutbacks and Reconversion Planning

The War Production Drive Headquarters provided information as to the type of contribution that committees could make in dealing with cutbacks and reconversion questions. For example, it suggested that the committees could kill false rumours of changes in contracts by explaining the actual facts. When cutbacks necessarily took place, committee members could improve worker morale by co-operating with the United States Employment Service in its conduct of personal interviews and mass registrations for interplant transfer, and by assisting the collective bargaining machinery to handle questions of priority of transfer, either between departments or to other plants in the community, and of shift in occupation or wage rates. Committees could propose shortening of hours or staggered vacations if a cutback occurred in an area of labour surplus.

The experience of Labor-Management Committees in this field, however, was still rather limited by the end of the war. Most plants where committees operated were, by VE Day, still almost entirely on war work and in a large proportion of cases their production was urgently required. They therefore did not have the cutback problem to face.

There were instances where a plant committee took a large amount of responsibility in arranging for the transfer of workers
and assisting management and union officials in the orderly change-over from one job to another. One committee in particular was very proud of its co-operation with the local office of the United States Employment Service and with the union — several thousand workers having been transferred with practically not an hour's loss in production time.

**MANPOWER AND RELATED QUESTIONS**

A similar variety of subjects was dealt with by committees in connection with better use of labour supply in individual plants, or with improvement of conditions affecting the daily life of the worker in the plant or in the community.

**Absenteeism**

Control of absenteeism was stressed as an activity particularly suited to Labor-Management Committees. The War Production Drive Headquarters issued a special pamphlet for their guidance on this question, as part of a joint inter-agency programme undertaken in the spring of 1943 when the question was in the forefront of public discussion and an object of congressional investigation. At that time it was agreed that Area War Manpower Management-Labor Committees would deal with the community aspects of absenteeism and that the War Production Board would encourage the plant Labor-Management Committees to concentrate their energies on lowering absenteeism figures wherever this was a problem.

Many committees set up special subcommittees to consider absenteeism, while some dealt with the question in full sittings. The problem was approached from two different angles. Some committees considered it their duty to collect and examine general statistics of absenteeism in the plant, to look for ways of eliminating its causes, and to deal with the general problem of attendance. Statistics were assembled for each department, for each shift, for males and females, and analysed to ascertain the specific causes and to propose remedies. Sometimes these committees worked directly with the employment officers, a representative of the plant employment office usually presenting to the committee a report on current attendance rates and the results of any committee activities. There were many examples, however, of subcommittees on absenteeism undertaking the work that might be considered the responsibility of the employment department, with a member actually compiling the statistics on the extent and causes of absenteeism for the benefit of the main committee.
In either of these cases the approach of the committee was to deal with the general problem and not to undertake special cases of discipline.

While there can be no over-all statistics as to the amount by which absenteeism was reduced, examples of committee action may be chosen at random from plants in various industries. One committee noted that its absenteeism had been reduced from 4.5 to 1.25 per cent. in the year ending February 1943. Another showed a decrease in absenteeism from 22,000 lost man-hours in April 1942 to 6,000 in January 1943. A third committee announced that the absenteeism rate was decreased from 7.8 per cent. in December 1943 to 3.2 per cent. in June 1944. Still another stated that a four-week campaign reduced its absenteeism from 12 to 4 per cent.

The second approach was for a joint committee to serve as a disciplinary body examining case records, interviewing chronic absentees and sometimes investigating the reasons for an individual's absence from the plant. This kind of activity was sometimes undertaken by the full committee, but more often by a series of subcommittees operating in each department. Emphasis upon the disciplinary aspect of joint committee activity in this field, however, could often be dangerous to its general usefulness both because such work might occupy too large a proportion of the committee's time and because association of disciplinary measures with joint committee activity sometimes weakened the constructive possibilities of committee action in other fields. Furthermore, disciplinary activities of this type often formed part of the grievance and union machinery\(^1\), and overlapping in this kind of unpopular work could endanger the acceptance of a joint committee in the plant as a whole. Nevertheless, where disciplinary procedures were kept in a sufficiently subordinate position among the activities of a committee, they proved singularly effective in dealing with persistent absentees. This was especially the case when absentees, after interview by an employment department, were requested to appear before a joint committee and explain their reasons for absence, and heard from the labour representatives the same kind of disapproval as that expressed by the management.

The fact that there was no legal obligation upon a worker to attend to his work and no penalty possible other than discharge meant that the joint committee could only use moral pressure or some voluntarily accepted procedure as a disciplinary measure.\(^2\) It

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\(^1\) Relatively few unions in practice took strong action against members for absenteeism.

\(^2\) This is in contrast to the British procedures, where the joint committees had a specific responsibility under the Essential Work Orders and formed a stage in proceedings which ultimately could lead to court action and application of penalties.
also meant, therefore, that discussions of absenteeism were frequently related to morale, educational activities and methods for convincing employees of the significance to the war effort and to their fellow-workers of regular attendance at the plant. One of the methods used by many committees, and advocated by the War Production Board, was to emphasise "presenteeism" campaigns and run competitions for good attendance, resulting in prizes and public acclaim for the workers or departments having the best total attendance record. The programme adopted by one committee which emphasised control of absenteeism was described as follows:

1. Each morning, the personnel office calls those persons absent, who have not explained their absence, on the telephone with emphasis on reasons and attempt to be helpful.
2. Then persons absent without reason are sent a letter signed by the industrial relations manager, explaining the importance of staying on the job and not being "missing in action".
3. Habitual absentees are interviewed by a labour member of the committee and the foreman. Labour members state that in practically all of the cases the situation is corrected.
4. If the above procedure does not work, the absentee is called before the entire Labor-Management Committee for further hearing.
5. Where a worker has been absent without cause, he does not receive his pay cheque at the regular pay time, but is told to go into the office of the personnel manager where he will receive his cheque.
6. Both labour and management are insistent that the absentee problem can only be attacked on an individual basis and not on a general basis.
7. Each time a woman is hired, the personnel office attempts to make sure before hiring that, if there are any children at home, adequate provision is made for their care in the absence of the mother.

An example of the same approach was the award of badges for attendance records. In one plant the Labor-Management Committee organised a ceremony for the presentation of badges to 600 employees who had perfect attendance records from September 1943 to September 1944. It was noted in making the awards that the majority of these workers had been with the company from five to thirty-five years. Other badges were given for three, six and nine months of perfect attendance respectively. In some cases these were given to employees whose records were perfect for the length of time they had been in the plant.1

1 It may be noted that in this particular plant the Labor-Management Committee was consistently effective and that the plant itself had received in September 1944 the Army-Navy "E", accepted on behalf of the employees by a member of the Labor-Management Committee, who was also president of the local union.
Turnover

Labour turnover, like absenteeism, constituted a manpower problem on the agenda of many Labor-Management Committees. The causes of absenteeism and turnover were frequently found to be the same. The War Production Drive Headquarters issued a pamphlet on this question to aid committees in developing programmes to combat turnover, and emphasised the relationship between low turnover rates and induction programmes adapting new workers to plant conditions. The emphasis placed on turnover by committees depended very largely on the proportions of quits in the plant, the attitude of the personnel department to this use of a joint committee, the local labour market situation and the type of labour coming into employment. In plants where the personnel department had desired the assistance of the Labor-Management Committee, its members or those of a special subcommittee sometimes worked with personnel officers both on the induction training programme for new workers and on exit interviews intended to prevent workers from leaving the plant. This procedure was related to local employment stabilisation plans of the War Manpower Commission, which required statements of availability for workers desiring to change employment. As already indicated in Chapters V and VIII, in a few areas arrangements were made for some kind of joint plant committees to act as a preliminary stage in the appeals procedure and to recommend the issuance of statements of availability. However, these committees were usually entirely separate from the Labor-Management Committees established under the initiative of the War Production Board, and the number of the latter which made a practical contribution to the turnover problem was much smaller than might have been the case if there had been closer relationship between the two structures. The emphasis of the joint production committees with regard to turnover was frequently placed on the development of community programmes or plant welfare services. In many plants the combined effect of committee programmes devoted to increasing efficiency and to improving conditions in the plant and community prevailed on workers to stay on their jobs when they might otherwise have gone to less essential work.

Manpower Utilisation Activities

The role of plant committees in dealing with labour utilisation gave rise to some interdepartmental controversy with the result that, while a few committees themselves carried out substantial
programmes in this field, others were discouraged from dealing directly with allocation of manpower inside the plant. At an early stage in the evolution of the War Production Drive, manpower utilisation programmes were suggested as particularly suitable for joint committees, which could thereby both lessen the need for manpower and increase production by better use of labour as a corollary to better use of materials and tools. When the War Manpower Commission established its Bureau of Manpower Utilisation, an agreement—referred to above—was reached between the W.P.B. and the W.M.C., providing that whenever a utilisation consultant went into a plant he would ask whether or not there was a Labor-Management Committee there and report to the War Production Board on this fact. In addition the cooperation of the plant committee was to be obtained, wherever possible, in the making of the utilisation survey.

As has already been indicated in the chapters dealing with the War Manpower Commission, the extent to which utilisation consultants dealt with Labor-Management Committees was very uneven, partly because many of the consultants were not interested in or willing to work with the plant committees, and partly because in many plants the management did not wish to have the committees participate in this kind of survey undertaken by the War Manpower Commission. Nevertheless, there are examples of Labor-Management Committees which were of substantial use, either in assisting in the preparation of a utilisation survey and making recommendations concerning utilisation, or in developing utilisation programmes of their own quite apart from Government investigation. Managements reported that suggestions by Labor-Management Committees made it possible for them to transfer workers, or to obtain additional part-time and overtime, and thus to eliminate manpower bottlenecks, aid in training and increase the output of the plant. The various Labor-Management Committee programmes for reducing absenteeism and saving man-hours through health and safety projects also contributed to better labour utilisation in many individual plants.

In addition to the restraining influence of managements' insistence that utilisation was solely a managerial responsibility, a number of union officials considered that this was a matter for collective bargaining, since it might affect seniority and wages and even, ultimately, the elimination of jobs entirely, and that it should not come before the Labor-Management Committee.

However, it was precisely in committees where collective bargaining machinery and labour-management machinery were adequately co-ordinated, with adequate identity of membership, that
manpower utilisation questions were most fully considered by the plant committees.

Recruitment

A large number of committees either set up special subcommittees to deal with recruitment, or organised campaigns from time to time to bring new workers into war employment. Often in these campaigns each worker in the plant was personally urged to bring in one or more new employees and (in agreement with the United States Employment Service or whatever local employment stabilisation plan was in effect in the area) to convince friends in less essential industry, or without employment, to enter war plants. Recruitment, like manpower utilisation, was one of the fields in which the functions of Labor-Management Committees were not clearly defined. Consequently in many instances the proposals for committee action were rather vague, and committees hesitated to undertake real responsibility for wide-scale recruitment. Where committees agreed to enter into recruitment campaigns, they often used the occasion to obtain an improvement in plant conditions, including physical facilities such as lighting, ventilation or cafeterias, and to secure better industrial relations and general plant morale, urging that these factors would attract new personnel.

Safety

The activities of joint committees in the field of safety date back to long before the war, since a joint committee as part of a safety programme had long been advocated by some unions, by many industrial managements and, in particular, by the Department of Labor—the Federal department with the most extensive experience in safety work. The trade unions were active over many years in promoting safety practices in plants and, to this end, in urging the development of joint committees. Similarly, State Labor Departments, as well as the Federal Labor Department, had long urged the use of joint committees to make workers themselves directly responsible for administering safety regulations and to ensure that workers in the plant carried out the basic requirements laid down either for their own safety or for the safety of others.

The Division of Labor Standards of the Department of Labor was mainly responsible for organising a nation-wide safety programme, and served as the secretariat of the National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in War Industries. This committee was composed of 22 members appointed by the Secretary of Labor in 1940, including safety experts from private industry, labour representatives, and State officials administering safety and
health laws. The safety programme included encouragement of plant, departmental and shop safety committees as a basic part of industrial safety organisation. Information was made available as to the best methods for setting up special safety committees, their field of operation and their relation to other committees in the plant.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Joint Safety Committees at Work}, Bulletin No. 61, U.S. Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, which surveys union participation in safety committees.} Certificates of Achievement for reduction of accidents by 40 per cent. or more were issued as awards to plants. In view of the positive sponsorship of safety committees and of full safety programmes by the National Committee on the Conservation of Manpower and the Department of Labor, the War Production Drive Headquarters urged that their Production Committees make full use of existing programmes, and called attention in its publications to the importance of safety work in relation to output, the need for increasing the number of safety committees, and the fact that elimination of accidents contributed to production by preventing loss of manpower and of output.

As a guide to new safety committees or to subcommittees of Labor-Management Committees, the War Production Drive Headquarters called attention to the work of the National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in War Industry and in particular its courses in industrial safety for representatives of industry and labour. The Drive Headquarters also urged that the Labor-Management Committees draw as many workers as possible into safety committees and, wherever possible, require that safety representatives undertake Red Cross courses and be prepared to give first aid. In some cases, the work of the safety committees was co-ordinated with the publicity and informational work of the general Labor-Management Committees as a method of bringing safety rules and reports to the attention of all workers as regularly and as frequently as possible. Thousands of safety suggestions were turned in through the committee-operated suggestion systems. These were also used for the prompt reporting by workers of hazards which were developing in and around their workplaces.

\textit{Nutrition and Health}

The work of Labor-Management Committees in the field of health was also often directly related to pre-war practices in the plant. In many instances a special committee was set up, sometimes as part of the safety committee, to deal with health questions, medical aid, nursing and dental services. In other cases the health work was connected more closely with feeding—teaching the ad-
vantages of better nutrition, giving demonstrations on improved feeding practices, or securing the improvement of in-plant food.

Particularly in mushroom-growth war plants, facilities in the community were often grossly inadequate, and various plant committees investigated ways of improving community feeding facilities, pressed for action by the management, or arranged for the installation and supervision of cafeterias, mobile food wagons and canteens in the various departments. The work of joint committees in this field was necessarily more extensive in large plants, particularly where the Labor-Management Committee was organised on a fairly elaborate scale with time and people available for developing activities of this kind in addition to work on production.

Transportation and Rationing

As a consequence of the responsibility allocated to joint committees by the Office of Price Administration in regard to rationing programmes, almost all committees were active in this field. The Labor Section of the Office of Civilian Defense, at the outset of the gasoline rationing programme, called attention to the "Organised Transportation Plan" defined under the Office of Price Administration regulations, and emphasised that experience of joint management-labour plans under tyre rationing regulations could be applied under other transportation plans. This responsibility in many cases served as a spur to get committees into operation and to show to the plant as a whole that committee members were playing an active part in its daily operation. However, many committees found that the duties involved were burdensome, time-consuming and, in instances where the issuance of supplementary rations had to be refused, unpleasant. Consequently, in many cases where management was prepared to organise this kind of undertaking and make available office staff and equipment for carrying out transportation plans and rationing arrangements, the Labor-Management Committees were more than pleased to turn over the work, while maintaining some supervision and receiving periodical reports on the operation of the programme. On the contrary, many managements which first started handling gasoline and tyre rationing found that a joint body could better inspire the workers' confidence and therefore turned the matter over to the Labor-Management Committee.

In addition to carrying out formal responsibilities, many committees were active in aiding the organisation of car pooling, working with the community to improve public transportation systems so as to meet the needs of individual plants, and seeking ways of
improving parking lots and other arrangements for the comfort of the workers. Committees on occasion devoted whole sittings to discussing such questions as proper marking in parking lots, need for protection of cars in bad weather, and related matters. Arrangements with local garages for repair of workers' cars while at work were carried out by many committees as a time-saving device for all concerned. Emphasis on questions of this kind on occasion lessened the capacity of a committee to deal with more direct economic problems and even in some cases was used by the management as a way of side-tracking committee discussions. Nevertheless, where it was carried out through subcommittees as a part of a general programme, it unquestionably added to the general contribution of the Labor-Management Committees in obtaining smoother plant operation.

**Community Services**

In addition to the specific activities of Labor-Management Committees in connection with in-plant problems, many committees related the needs of the workers in their plants to the general community facilities and services. Members of a committee were delegated to discuss with stores an arrangement of shopping hours to meet factory schedules. Similarly, committee members arranged with school systems for use of facilities for evening classes, or for nursery schools and child care provisions. Housing questions, often of extreme importance to new workers coming into a community, were frequently dealt with by the Labor-Management Committee. Members investigated suggestions for housing to see whether proposals or advertisements in newspapers were in fact appropriate. For example, in an undertaking where a large number of Negro workers had been brought into the community, a special subcommittee of the Labor-Management Committee was delegated to investigate the housing situation and report whether several new housing developments that were proposed would really be suitable to the workers in the plant.

Labor-Management Committees co-operated with barber shops, beauty parlours, laundries, garages, restaurants and similar community enterprises to make their services available to workers after working hours. This kind of activity was needed in areas such as new shipyards where plants were established far from existing community development and where facilities brought in by housing authorities or other Government agencies were inadequate. Similarly, some committees aided in obtaining coal or other essential family supplies when workers could prove that difficulties
of this type were preventing regular attendance and full emphasis on war production.

One of the services related to welfare work performed by a number of committees was assistance in the preparation of income tax returns and arrangements for savings schemes on the basis of payroll deductions or insurance plans.

In some cases the relationship of the joint committees to community activities was facilitated through the development of Area Councils. Furthermore, where it was possible for plant committees to work with local Area Management-Labor Committees better co-ordination was achieved between plant needs and community needs. However, this kind of relationship was not general throughout the country.

Veterans’ Service

The re-employment and adjustment of veterans to plant activities gained in importance as the numbers of returning veterans increased. Consequently, the War Production Board urged committees to set up special veterans' subcommittees and to consider the best methods of dealing with veterans' employment rights within individual plants. Only a few committees had any substantial experience with returning veterans before the end of the war, but many had plans for their reception and how they would affect general plant arrangements. The trade union movement also sometimes encouraged the setting up of special veterans' subcommittees, but in other cases, in view of the direct relationship to seniority provisions and collective bargaining rights, favoured treatment of specific veterans' questions by collective bargaining machinery, only the more general questions of readjustment to plant conditions being the concern of the Labor-Management Committee.

Information and Educational Activities

The War Production Drive Headquarters had from the beginning emphasised the informational and educational subjects with which committees could deal, and placed materials and suggestions at their disposal. Consequently, the large majority of committees included in their programme promotional activities of one kind or another. These covered various so-called morale functions, including war bond drives, blood bank organisation, Red Cross and related war service activities, and distribution of cigarettes, Christmas baskets, etc., to former employees in the armed forces. Further,

1 Described below.
many of the recreational activities were particularly designed for workers on third shifts, making the shifts more attractive and therefore easier to man.

Promotional Programmes

The procedures used by committees in carrying out their promotional activities, many on the recommendation of the War Production Drive Headquarters, included use of bulletin boards, information stands, slogan contests, buttons, leaflets, production charts and barometers, posters, plant newspapers, music, broadcasts, plant rallies, luncheon and cafeteria programmes, motion pictures, visits by heroes from the battle-fields, Army and Navy war shows of captured equipment and simulated battles, and similar devices for bringing the importance of war production to the attention of individual workers. The emphasis placed on this kind of committee activity and on the material used to promote the "educational" aspect of committee work not only varied in accordance with the individual membership of plant committees but also depended somewhat on the attitude of Government officials in particular areas and regions. In some areas, partly as a publicity experiment, a radio programme was run by various Labor-Management Committees, with discussions and descriptions of their work, using the "forum" procedure.

Public relations activity of this kind kept the Labor-Management Committees in touch with the workers throughout the plant. For example, in one engineering plant working on Navy contracts a series of "ensigns" were named by the Labor-Management Committee and given special badges permitting them to go throughout the plant soliciting for particular war drives, and incidentally acting as the salesmen for the committee as a whole. Concentration of the members of a Labor-Management Committee on organising various contests (including beauty as well as production efficiency!) and the sending of employees to participate in area contests, although apparently a waste of production time, undoubtedly called the attention of an exceptionally large number of workers to the existence of a Labor-Management Committee, and tended to counterbalance the adverse effects of committee endorsement of unpopular measures.

Morale Activities Generally

Finally, while the organisation of an employees' dance or other form of recreational activity may seem a far cry from a labour-management production programme, there is widespread evidence
that these morale activities, when they were successful and supplemented by other work, contributed to the actual output of many plants. There is little doubt that the greatest possible contribution to the war effort was made by those committees which, while giving their main attention to material achievements, ensured also that their work would be appreciated by the average employee in the plant.
CHAPTER XIV

RELATIONS BETWEEN PLANT LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES AND EVALUATIONS OF WARTIME EXPERIENCE

Since the object of each individual committee was to increase production and improve relationships within its own undertaking, the general emphasis was on the autonomy of the committee as a self-contained unit. But because of the desire of many committees to learn the experience of others, and because of the relationship of individual plants to the surrounding community and to the wider factors of manpower, production, employer organisations and trade unions, there also developed various kinds of inter-relationships among Labor-Management Committees. Arrangements for facilitating such relationships were worked out on a voluntary basis, but in some instances either under Government initiative or under the auspices of national trade unions.

LOCAL COUNCILS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

In response to the desire of committee members in one particular area to meet together, the War Production Drive Headquarters organised the first local Council of Labor-Management Committees, and out of the experience obtained with the first council it subsequently sponsored local councils on a city-wide or area basis wherever there was indication that they would be useful. By the beginning of 1945 there were local Councils of Labor-Management Committees functioning in approximately a dozen cities or industrial areas, while a few more councils were in process of formation.  

While the experience of these councils was therefore relatively limited, it indicated that there were specific functions which could usefully be undertaken by joint meetings of delegates from Labor-

1 The first local council was set up in 1942 in Buffalo, N.Y. By the beginning of 1945 local councils had been established in the following cities and industrial areas: Niagara Frontier (Buffalo and contiguous territory); Newark, New Jersey (counties of Union, Hudson, Essex); Fairfield County, Conn. (cities of Bridgeport, Norwalk, Stamford); Kentucky (Louisville Area); New Jersey (Passaic, Morris, Bergen Counties). The establishment of local councils was then under discussion in: Cleveland, Ohio; Akron, Ohio; Youngstown, Ohio; Canton, Ohio; Mansfield, Ohio; Indianapolis, Indiana; Seattle, Washington; Long Island City, N.Y.; and Niagara Falls, N.Y.
Management Committees, that these meetings were more practical if organised on a regular basis, and that such councils might assist in the development of effective Labor-Management Committees within an area. Therefore, although the War Production Drive Headquarters maintained that the establishment of a Labor-Management Council, like that of an individual committee, must be a wholly voluntary undertaking developed by the parties directly concerned, the Drive assisted in the establishment of councils, both through publications and through its field staff.

Establishment of Area Council

The War Production Drive Headquarters issued a guide to the formation of Labor-Management Committee Councils, which outlined the purpose and methods of organisation of a local council, suggested a model constitution or by-laws, and provided examples from the experience of existing councils of the activities most likely to be suitable to council work.¹

The organisation of a city area council late in 1944 drew upon the accumulated experience of the previous two years. The preliminary arrangements undertaken under the sponsorship of the War Production Drive Headquarters included the enlisting of the support of both labour and management in the area and the setting up of a temporary executive board with two co-chairmen, one from the management of a large manufacturing firm, the other a representative of an important A.F. of L. union in the metalworking industry. The treasurer of the temporary executive board, selected from the management side, was the chairman of a committee in the area which had a long history of successful operation; the secretary of the board was a labour member of a committee in a plant with an independent union as bargaining agent. The other members of the temporary executive board responsible for the organisation of the council included five management and five labour representatives from different firms, plus, in addition, a representative of the War Production Drive. When nearly 250 plants in the area had expressed their desire to participate in a council, the temporary executive board invited each of the Labor-Management Committees to send a management and a labour member to a general meeting.

The programme of the meeting included, in addition to explanations by the chairman of the temporary executive board and by the regional manager of the War Production Drive as to the purposes of a council, a statement by the Regional Director of the War

Production Board on the production needs of the area. The meeting adopted the proposed by-laws for the establishment of the council and, by written ballot, elected its officers and executive board. Following discussion of the questions the council should deal with, suggestions were collected to guide the executive board in the organisation of the work of the council.

Once the council was organised, responsibility shifted from the temporary executive board to the permanent board and officers; and the role of the War Production Drive became primarily that of giving advice and assistance to the elected officers of the council.

**Constitution and Membership of Councils**

The constitution adopted by the above-mentioned Council defined its purposes, stating that it would:

1. seek to increase the effectiveness of existing plant Labor-Management Committees;
2. in co-operation with other agencies, assist management and labour in establishing committees in plants where they did not yet exist;
3. find solutions by joint effort and action for those community-wide problems affecting production and labour utilisation which cannot be solved by individual plant committee action; and
4. engage in such other activities involving joint action by labour and management as shall be deemed appropriate.

This definition was based upon the experience of several councils already in operation.

According to various council constitutions, membership would be open to all joint Labor-Management War Production Drive Committees in a given area. Each committee ordinarily would have two delegates to the council, one from management and one from labour, who must be members of, and selected by, the top Labor-Management Committee of their respective plants.

**Operation of Councils**

It was suggested by Headquarters that council meetings be held periodically. Some constitutions provided for meetings twice monthly with special meetings called by the executive board; others considered this too frequent and provided for general membership meetings to be held at stated times, in some cases only quarterly, with special meetings whenever necessary. The quorum was usually based on the presence in the council of either a stated number (such as 20) or a certain percentage of the plant delegations belonging to it.

The officers recommended for area councils were a chairman, a co-chairman, a secretary, and a treasurer, elected by the executive board for a fixed period, usually one year. Provision was always
made that officers be delegates to the council and that the four officers be evenly divided between the labour and management members.

The executive board usually consisted of the officers and between 10 and 14 members elected from the council and equally divided between the labour and management delegates.

In accordance with the model constitution and general practice, formal provision was made for the time and method of holding elections for the executive board on the basis of lists prepared by a nominating committee, additional nominations permitted from the floor, voting by written ballot and even representation between management and labour.

Other constitutional provisions of the various councils included arrangements for filling vacancies, procedure for amendment, and financial proposals.

Dues varied from small contributions, such as $2.00 per month per committee fixed by one council, to a membership fee of $50.00 per committee, plus an initiation fee, planned by another council in order to provide adequate funds for the full organisation of its work.

Programme of Council Activities

Once a council was organised and a formal constitution adopted, its success often depended upon its programme of meetings. A number of subjects were suggested as particularly useful for council discussion. In the first place, on questions having community implications—such as removal of transport difficulties, improvement of shopping facilities and other problems which might affect absenteeism in all the plants—local council discussion often yielded results. Some of the local councils called in representatives of Governmental agencies, such as the local Defense Council, the War Food Administration, the War Manpower Commission, school officials, public transport officials and ration board members, in order to discuss community difficulties and possible solutions. Since one of the basic purposes of the council was to enable committees to benefit from each other's experience on specific questions, council meetings were frequently made the occasion both for informal reports on methods of operation and for general discussion of the solutions that different committees found for common problems. In order to ensure that committees covered questions of most vital local interest, the executive board of some communities had, in accordance with the recommendation of the War Production Drive Headquarters, circulated a check list to council members, asking them to number a list of subjects in the order of
interest to their committees. These lists included committee organisational problems, suggestion systems, lessening of rejects, tool conservation and equipment, safety and health measures, in-plant feeding, car pooling and tyre and gas rationing, various forms of public relations such as films for war workers or use of the public address system, various manpower questions, recruitment of workers, veterans' re-employment and the role of the committee in regard to cut-backs and post-war procedures. On the basis of the replies to this list the executive board determined the agenda for various meetings.

One of the programme devices used by some of the councils was the organisation of a labour-management clinic to analyse problems met by individual committees. For example, a member of the council or a Government official might be asked by the council to select some Labor-Management Committee and make a survey of its operation. The name of the selected plant was kept confidential. The report of the survey was then sent to three or four members of the council for preliminary examination. At the council meeting the members, who had had time to study the report in advance, criticised it publicly, bringing forth the good and bad features of the particular Labor-Management Committee. Out of this kind of discussion, standards were outlined which were useful to other committees in improving their own methods. Furthermore, in addition to providing general standards of operation and a scale of criticism, an opportunity was afforded to any member of the area council to bring up in general discussion whatever particular problem was facing his own committee, and to do this without involving his own plant.

Other activities undertaken by area councils sometimes included general public relations matters, thus assisting members of the council to study how their own procedures might be improved. The councils were also used by various Government departments as a convenient channel for indicating war needs at particular moments.

In some instances a relationship was established between the Area Council of Labor-Management Committees and either the Area Management-Labor Committee of the War Manpower Commission or some more general community manpower mobilisation committee, in order to utilise the plant Labor-Management Committees for manpower questions. One difficulty in the operation of area councils was the organisation of programmes of sufficient interest and variety to maintain the attention of the members over long periods of time. One of the councils which was established early in 1942 considered disbanding two years later. However,
after some discussion as to whether its work warranted the time and effort, the council agreed to continue for another six months, during which an active executive committee renewed the activities of the council and convinced the members that it was worth continuation. Area councils, like the plant committees themselves, particularly because of their voluntary character, represented a further stage in joint management-labour co-operation in a community, through which, if it were successful, similar work might be carried on in the post-war period.

**INTER-PLANT RELATIONS**

Although no formal arrangements other than the establishment of area councils were suggested for co-operation between the joint committees of different plants, informal co-operation was occasionally organised between two or more specified committees, sometimes within one company and sometimes between different firms. For example, a number of companies which had Labor-Management Committees in several factories, often located in widely separated parts of the country, provided for pooling experience. Where one of these plants had a particularly effective Labor-Management Committee, the firm sometimes organised visits by members of committees from their other plants. Arrangements were also made for visits by one committee or, a delegate from it, to the meetings of a committee of a neighbouring firm. A third form of co-operation was the sending of one or more members of a given committee to attend the meetings of several other committees in order to obtain information and ideas on committee operation.

Difficulties of war transport and the fear of wasting productive time limited the number of such visits, but many committees indicated that if they were continued after the war or if transport facilities and other arrangements became easier, they would welcome the opportunity of meeting with other committees, inviting visitors and making visits themselves.

**LOCAL CONFERENCES UNDER GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP**

The War Production Board from time to time called conferences or general meetings of members of local Labor-Management Committees to discuss with them some particular problem or activity that needed to be taken up by them. For example, a War Production Board district manager called together two or more members of all the committees registered within his district in order to discuss with them the particular production urgencies that had developed at a given time. Furthermore, in some districts the manager
called meetings of representatives of labour and management in the most important industries in order to discuss the manpower situation and the ways in which the formation of Labor-Management Committees might help in dealing with a particular critical situation. In these cases the district meetings served rather to sponsor the development of committees than to guide those already in operation.

The War Production Board, either under its own sponsorship or in conjunction with other departments, sometimes called meetings of representatives from Labor-Management Committees to receive information concerning area urgencies and to serve as a morale channel for the area. Thus, when the Chairman of the War Production Board addressed a series of meetings of industry representatives from particular industries, the invitations to the meetings often included the officers of Labor-Management Committees in plants in the industries under consideration. While these were ad hoc meetings, they served to give the committees new impetus.

Finally, a wholly informal experiment was tried out by the War Production Board when it organised a series of panel discussions between members of local Labor-Management Committees, members of the War Production Drive staff and students, held under the auspices of a group of colleges. The panel discussions afforded an opportunity to raise questions in the same manner as the clinic organised by the area councils, and it had the advantage of making the work of Labor-Management Committees subject to the criticism of students on a wholly academic basis.

**Joint Conferences under Union Auspices**

A number of the international unions called meetings of their representatives on Labor-Management Committees in order to discuss committee operation and functions. Many of these conferences were called, particularly in the initial period of the War Production Drive, as part of the union methods for promoting the establishment and work of the committees.¹ Later conferences of this nature endorsed the principle of labor-management production committees for the post-war period.

**Evaluations of Wartime Committee Experience**

Evaluation of the three years' experience of Labor-Management Committees at the plant level and of their contribution to various

¹ Most of the conferences were called by unions in the electrical, shipbuilding and steel industries. For more details, see Chapter XI, "Establishment of Labor-Management Committees in War Plants".
aspects of labour supply and war production is made particularly
difficult by the uneven development of this wholly voluntary co-
operative action at the plant level.

While there seems little doubt that the committees made a sub-
stantial contribution to plant output, a number of the committees
did not aid to as great an extent as had been expected when the
Chairman of the War Production Board launched the 1942 drive
for increased production through team work and joint co-operation.
Some committees, at the insistence of management, emphasised
activities which only indirectly increased production through
educational and publicity work. Others, at the request of the
unions, sometimes hesitated to undertake a wide programme of
direct production activities. Nevertheless, even these committees
of comparatively limited scope, through their furtherance of co-
operative methods and through encouraging management and
labour representatives to approach mutual problems jointly, often
had a decisive effect upon the understanding of management
problems by labour and vice versa.

A number of committees did undertake extensive programmes
to increase production, improve labour utilisation, and give educa-
tion in management to the committee members themselves and to
the workers throughout the plant. The success or failure of these
committees depended upon general industrial relations in the indi-
vidual plant, the sincerity of both management and labour in the
operation and use of joint committees, and their choice of the
techniques best suited to their objectives.

The wartime movement for Labor-Management Production
Committees was initiated at the national level, sponsored by the
Chairman of the War Production Board, and publicly endorsed by
the presidents of the national associations of employers and of
labour. Measures were taken nationally, regionally and locally by
Government, by management and by labour, to promote the setting
up of the committees and to aid in their operation. Although there
was both employer and trade union support, and although in some
cases the initiative came from the management, the workers, or
the joint desire for a committee in the individual enterprise, the
catalytic agent was most often the War Production Drive, fre-
cently assisted by the Office of Labor Production of the War
Production Board.

The allocation of responsibility for labour supply, production
planning and actual procurement among various federal depart-
ments, the varying regional and area organisation of the respective
departments and agencies, and the local autonomy of individual
plants all tended to prevent close co-ordination between plant com-
mittees and the area, regional or national machinery for production or for manpower. Labour-management consultation at the plant level generally remained separate from the area, regional or national procedures designed to bring labour and management into the planning of the war effort.

The sponsorship of plant committees and of area councils during the war was primarily the responsibility of a wartime agency—the War Production Board. Suggestions have been made that this assistance should be carried on as a peacetime function of either the Department of Labor, or the Department of Commerce, or both.

Another suggestion made was that some voluntary national organisation of business and labour should be constructed which would include in its responsibilities the furtherance of co-operation at the plant level. "The New Charter for Labor and Management", announced in March 1945 over the signature of the presidents of the Chamber of Commerce, the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., reflected the desire for improved relationships at every stage. The Charter proposed a "national committee composed of representatives of business and labour organisations"; this committee would promote a code of principles, to include acceptance of collective bargaining, increased prosperity based on high production and employment, and acknowledgment of the right and responsibility of management to direct the operations of its own enterprise.

Whether a Government department, a tripartite committee or a privately sponsored joint body undertook to promote the setting up of committees, peacetime production might be aided by informing industry and labour of the programmes successfully developed by individual plant committees.

Finally, the growth of plant co-operation must in the long run depend upon the relation of plant committees to collective bargaining processes. From the outset of the movement, unions and Government alike were alert to the danger that some managements might try to substitute joint plant committees for collective trade-union negotiation or allow plant committees to encroach upon the normal sphere of collective bargaining machinery. Similarly, management and Government were both aware that some unions might exert pressure to use the co-operative committees for their own collective bargaining purposes or for encroachment on "management prerogatives". Neither of these alternatives was evident to any great extent during the war. The future use of plant committees seems to require clear indication that not only in war production but also in peacetime uses they can only operate with full success in their own defined field of activities and within the
favourable atmosphere developed by confident collective negotiation. In general it may be said that the committees were most successful in unionised plants and, in particular, in those plants where the unions welcomed this extension of their activities and played an active part in the work of the committees.

Thus the wartime experience in the use of labour-management co-operation may aid the future Labor-Management Plant Production Committee to supplement collective bargaining machinery and so enlarge the area on which agreement can be reached between labour and management in joint discussion of plant problems.
PART IV

ROLE OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR IN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
ROLE OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR 
IN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The two previous parts of this report have dealt in considerable
detail with the methods used by the War Manpower Commission
to provide for management-labour consultation in obtaining
voluntary manpower mobilisation, and by the War Production
Board to provide direct labour and management participation in
the organisation of war production. In order to supplement this
description and to show contrasting procedures, the following
chapters present a survey of consultative methods used by other
Government agencies whose work was directly or indirectly related
to labour supply and production planning. A separate chapter is
devoted to a description and analysis of the tripartite system used
by the War Labor Board, which was the only agency so operated.
The other Government agencies which had recourse to joint com­
mittees, separate management or labour advisory committees, or
less formal methods of consultation, are grouped together. The
description of these agencies is completed by that of still other
forms of tripartite or multipartite consultation tried out by the
Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion. The advisory boards in these two cases are
dealt with at some length as experiments in consultative procedures.
CHAPTER XV

TRIPARTITE ORGANISATION FOR DETERMINATION OF CONDITIONS OF WORK: THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD

The National War Labor Board, established by Executive Order of the President and subsequently given further specific responsibility by Act of Congress for the wartime settlement of labour disputes and control of wage rate changes, was the only federal agency operating under a tripartite board with equal representation of employers, workers and the public. The composition and purposes of the Board were initially recommended by the national management-labour conference, which, meeting immediately after the entrance of the United States into the war, adopted the "no strike, no lockout" pledge during hostilities. The tripartite principle, based on the earlier experience of the National Defense Mediation Board, was carried into every phase of the Board's work, from policy decisions to administrative operations. The composition and procedure of the Board are examined in brief only because of the effect of some of the Board's work on problems of wartime labour supply and production, and of the experience gained in the use of a tripartite system to determine conditions of work, as contrasted with the bipartite advisory methods of the War Manpower Commission and the still different procedures used by the War Production Board.

COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

The National War Labor Board was originally composed of twelve full members appointed by the President—four each representing the public, labour and management. Subsequently, four more public members were added, subject to the rule that each group retained equality of voting. Two of the four labour representatives were selected on the nomination of the American Federation of Labor and two on that of the Congress of Industrial Organiza-

1 Cf. Chapter I for summary of Conference proceedings and for work of the National Defense Mediation Board which preceded the establishment of the National War Labor Board.
In addition, there were alternates and substitutes. The regular and alternate members were all appointed by the President. The industry and labour substitute members were proposed by their respective groups on the Board, and named by the full Board. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen of the Board were designated by the President from the public members. In most cases the public members also carried some administrative responsibility in the operating staff.

In order to carry out the heavy load of work that developed as its responsibilities were extended under the various Executive Orders, directives and policies, the National War Labor Board established a series of tripartite divisions of the Board itself and created panels, commissions and committees to assist it at the national level; it also decentralised its work by the establishment, early in 1943, of Regional War Labor Boards which, in turn, set up regional panels and committees.

Regional Boards were composed in a similar manner to the National Board with four regular labour and four regular industry members, and an unspecified number of regular public members, of which four had to be available for service at any time. In addition, there were four alternate and twelve substitute labour members and an equal number for industry. The members were appointed by the National Board, which also designated the chairman and one or more vice-chairmen from among the public members. In case of both Regional Boards and national commissions, nominations of public members were proposed by the deputy executive director, while the labour and industry groups of the National Board respectively presented the names of proposed labour and industry members.

The tripartite structure was thus maintained throughout, with the consequence that representatives of labour and of industry all over the country were brought into active participation in the work of the War Labor Board. Decentralisation was significant at the local level, in showing both plant managers and union leaders the value of the tripartite approach in the settlement of day-to-day industrial relations problems.

In addition to the tripartite composition and methods of the National and Regional Boards themselves, the tripartite method

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1 In 1943 ten Regional Boards were set up. Later Region 11 was cut off from Region 5, and Region 12 from Region 10. Then Region 13 was established for the Hawaiian Islands. The 13 Regional Boards finally were located as follows: Region 1, Boston, Mass.; Region 2, New York, N.Y.; Region 3, Philadelphia, Pa.; Region 4, Atlanta, Georgia; Region 5, Cleveland, Ohio; Region 6, Chicago, Ill.; Region 7, Kansas City, Missouri; Region 8, Dallas, Texas; Region 9, Denver, Colo.; Region 10, San Francisco, Calif.; Region 11, Detroit, Mich.; Region 12, Seattle, Wash.; and Region 13, Honolulu, Hawaii.
was carried into the approval of certain administrative and staff actions. Tripartite board approval was customarily sought at the national level for executive and deputy executive directors, division directors and assistant directors. The extent of tripartite clearance for staff at the regional level varied in the different regions, but it usually covered the most responsible senior posts. Assent was often obtained by informal consultation. The travel of Board and Commission members required tripartite approval, as did all administrative instructions, by the Board itself, or a Committee on Instructions, reviewing and acting on them.¹

FUNCTIONS

The functions of the War Labor Board were defined both by Executive Orders and by statute; they were enlarged from the original purpose of settling industrial disputes to include wage stabilisation. The procedures evolved for dealing with the increased functions also affected the distribution of responsibility between the national and regional levels.

The effect of decentralisation to commissions and standing panels for particular industries and to Regional Boards made the National War Labor Board itself a "supreme court" for labour disputes. The authority of Regional War Labor Boards to make decisions in labour disputes and in voluntary wage and salary adjustment cases was subject to an appeal, or to review by the National Board on its motion. Appeals and major cases were handled, and general policy directives issued, by the National Board in Washington. Policy was determined at the national level and application left to the Regional Boards. In addition all administrative procedures were developed at the national level for purposes of uniformity throughout the country.²

The original concept of the Board's functions had been, in virtue of the "no strike, no lockout" pledge, to provide machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes. It was this aspect of its work which was given statutory authority under the War Labor Disputes Act of 28 June 1943, authorising the Board to settle disputes and "provide for terms and conditions to govern the relations between the parties". The Board also had authority under the Act to order contract provisions "customarily included in collective

¹ Routine business management instructions could be approved by the Executive Director.
² A device used to check on administrative procedures and ensure uniform practices on such matters as forms of reporting and similar questions was the establishment of a field liaison group to go into the various regions and discuss administrative difficulties, procedures, etc.
bargaining agreements”. The initial procedures to be followed in case of a dispute were:

(a) The parties shall first resort to direct negotiations or to the procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement. (b) If not settled in this manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor shall be notified, if they have not already intervened in the dispute. (c) If not promptly settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall certify the dispute to the Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion after consultation with the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own action.

After it takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and for this purpose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules established by the Board.

This did not apply to labour disputes for which procedures for adjustment or settlement were otherwise provided, such as the National Mediation Board for Railroads.

The issues that were dealt with by the Board in the settlement or avoidance of disputes covered virtually every issue in a collective agreement, including union security, the check-off clause, maintenance of membership, seniority, functions of management, and methods for settling grievances and maintaining collective bargaining relationships, as well as the whole range of wage questions, such as incentive proposals, hourly rate adjustments and piece rates. In virtue of this function a former Chairman of the National War Labor Board stated that experience had shown the value of proper grievance procedures.

The wage stabilisation functions of the Board were initially only those which arose in connection with industrial disputes and were based primarily on the policy enunciated by the President in his Message to Congress of April 1942: “Wages in general can and should be kept at existing scales” with “due consideration to inequities and the elimination of substandard of living”.

In July 1942, faced with the question of an industry-wide wage increase demanded by the steel workers in the “Little Steel” cases, the Board developed what later became known as the “Little Steel Formula.” It stated that the workers in question, unlike most others in manufacturing industry, had not received wage increases sufficient to compensate for the rise in cost of living during the period from January 1941 to May 1942; and continued: “If any group of workers averaged less than a 15 per cent. increase in hourly wage-rates during or immediately preceding or following this period, their established peacetime standards have been broken. If any group of workers averaged a 15 per cent. wage increase or more, their established peacetime standards have been preserved.”
The Board then refused to grant general wage increases that were inconsistent with this ruling except to correct gross inequities between plants, or to raise rates up to a standard level—gradually pushed up from 40 cents to 55 cents an hour. The scope of the Board’s authority in wage stabilisation was subsequently extended by Executive Order issued on 3 October 1942, in consequence of the Economic Stabilisation Act passed by Congress the previous day, which required Board approval of changes in wage rates and in salary rates under $5,000. Control of higher salaries was entrusted to the Secretary of the Treasury, of agricultural wages to the Secretary of Agriculture, and of railroad and air transport wages to the Chairman of the National Railway Panel. In November 1942, following this extension of scope, the Board unanimously adopted a wage policy under which increases to correct maladjustments would be limited by the Little Steel formula. Otherwise, only manifest injustices arising from unusual and unreasonable differences in wage rates were to be adjusted. The Board also announced that it would “not approve wage increases for the purpose of influencing or directing the flow of manpower”.

Subsequently, the President’s “Hold the Line” Order, which was designed primarily to stabilise wages, permitting increases only to correct maladjustments and to correct substandards of living, required the Board to exercise a tighter control of wage increases. The Board revised its wage policy in June 1943 and developed its activities in the field of wage stabilisation. The test was that any proposal must meet the sound prevailing practice in the industry or area.¹

¹ The revised wage policy was stated as follows:

General wage increases related to the cost of living to be limited to the amount due under the Little Steel formula.

Gross inequities between plants to be corrected up to the minimum of the sound and tested going rates being paid for the job in the same labour market area. Regional Boards to determine sound and tested rates.

Wage inequities within plants to be corrected within the general level of wages. Substandards of living to be corrected. In voluntary cases, substandards to be corrected up to 50 cents an hour (in 1945 changed to 55 cents) or to whatever rate or rates below 50 cents an hour (in 1945 changed to 55 cents) each Regional Board fixed as the standard for its region or part thereof. In dispute cases involving substandards of living, the Regional Boards to consider, in addition, the minima of appropriate wage brackets.

“In rare and unusual cases where critical war production cannot otherwise be obtained” the Board to grant increases above the minimum of sound and tested going rates. A showing by the War Production Board, War Manpower Commission, and other Government agencies that needed production could not otherwise be obtained, is required but not conclusive.

Other adjustments such as shift bonuses, vacation pay, premium pay for overtime, or the providing by employers of necessary tools or clothing, could also be ordered. True incentive plans to be approved if they did not increase unit production costs. Such adjustments had to be submitted for Board approval where the parties had agreed upon them.
METHODS OF OPERATION

The methods of operation of the full Board and the various committees and panels which were developed in the course of the three years indicated the structure required for dealing with labour disputes and wage stabilisation when a tripartite system was maintained at every point.

National Board Procedures

The National Board itself operated as a full board consisting of the titular members, each individual casting his own vote; as a full 12-member board attended by one or more alternate members; or as a division of the full Board, which voted either as a 6-man division, two votes for each employer, worker and public group, or as a 9-man division, three votes per group. Proxy voting was a common practice within a group. The determination of whether the Board should operate as a division or as a full board was made primarily on the grounds of the importance of the case. From time to time the National Board had a full board policy meeting, attended by at least some of the titular members, which discussed questions or cases of general importance referred by divisions or presented by chief staff members.

The meetings of the National Board, whether acting as a division or as a full board, were not open to the public, except when parties were summoned to a public hearing. The cases were presented to the Board by a staff member, usually the Chairman of some tripartite committee which had previously discussed the case and made recommendations. He distributed a prepared digest of the committee's action and participated to some extent in the discussion. The New Case Committee reported on proposed handling of dispute cases. The Review Committee examined reports from case panels and hearing officers in dispute cases and applications for approval of wage rate changes. The nomenclature and scope of these committees differed in the several regional boards and commissions. The Appeals Committees of the National Board reported on requests for the review of decisions of Regional Boards and Industry Commissions. The public members could always have a question reviewed if they were outvoted. The point of view of both the workers and of the management in the particular case was usually explained by one or more of the worker or employer members of the Board; there was no direct representation of the company or union involved at the final stage of the Board decision, and the record of the discussion was confidential, only decisions and formal opinions being announced subsequently.
The decision was taken in each case on the basis of a formal recorded vote. Where the vote was not unanimous, opinions were often written. Through their votes, explained when desired by such opinions, worker and employer members were directly implicated in each decision. It was not possible, as under the procedure of the War Manpower Commission, for the War Labor Board to conclude its work by an informal "sense of the meeting" discussion or to avoid decision by a negative vote.

The way in which the Board members were divided is illustrated by the following typical statistics, covering both dispute and voluntary cases in the period from 15 June to 15 September 1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting combination</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unanimous</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-labour concurrence (industry dissent)</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-industry concurrence (labour dissent)</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry-labour concurrence (public dissent)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed dissent(^1)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,407</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Daily Minutes, National War Labor Board.*

\(^1\) Includes some cases in which one or more representatives of both industry and labour dissented in different issues in same case.

**Case Assignment**

Cases were of two main types. Previous to the Act of 2 October 1942 the Board's sole function was the settlement of labour disputes. This generally meant disputes between employers or associations of employers and unions which had jurisdiction, as provided under the National Labor Relations Board, to represent all employees in a bargaining unit. Occasionally the Board undertook to settle disputes not of this standard type—usually by a reference to an arbitrator to decide inter-union demarcation controversies or "minority union" grievances in a plant where no bargaining representative had been named—but these cases were not typical. The second function of the Board arose out of the above-mentioned Act and executive orders which developed its purpose of controlling wage rate changes. This task of preventing changes that unions and employers (or, in an unorganised shop, the employer alone) wished to effect had not been contemplated by the Government when either the Board or its precursor, the National Defense Mediation Board, were set up; it related only to changes in rates of compensation (in the broadest sense, including vacation pay,
bonuses, etc.). The present discussion refers chiefly or wholly to dispute jurisdiction, rather than to voluntary wage applications.

Although the National Board could reach out for cases on its own motion, they were in the first instance normally certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National War Labor Board after the Conciliation Service had failed to induce the parties to agree. Each case arising out of a dispute was first considered by the New Case Committee of the National Board, which consisted of two representatives of industry, two of labour and either one or two representatives of the public as the Board from time to time prescribed. The public representatives acted as chairmen. When the New Case Committee received a case it could take any one of the following actions: retain the case for disposition by the Board; refer it to the appropriate agent of the Board or to a tripartite panel (or, with the consent of the parties, to a single hearing officer); retain some of the issues for disposition by the National Board and refer the remainder to the appropriate agent or panel; return the case to the Department of Labor Conciliation Service for further mediation; refer it to an agent of the Board for preliminary investigation in accordance with the committee's instructions; or take other action with respect to assignment. Any member of the New Case Committee could have its decision reviewed at once by the Board, but the parties could not.

Panel Hearing

A tripartite panel to which a case might be referred at the national level, or by a Regional Board or commission, consisted of three members, representative of the public, industry and labour. They were selected from a roster, maintained by the Assignment Section of the Disputes Division of the Board, of persons approved by the Board. The labour representative on a tripartite panel had to be of the same affiliation as the union involved in the case (A.F. of L. or C.I.O.). If an independent union was involved, a person associated with another independent union was named to the panel. Similarly, one of the public members of the roster for nomination to a tripartite panel might be selected as hearing officer. If the case was dealt with directly by the National Board or its permanent agency, or was assigned to a panel or a hearing officer, the

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1 An agent included Regional War Labor Boards, Industry Commissions and standing panels of the National War Labor Board, and the Wage Adjustment Board for the Building Construction Industry. To these agencies the National War Labor Board delegated authority to issue, subject to review, rulings on voluntary applications for approval of wage or salary adjustments, and (except the standing panels) final directive orders in dispute cases.

2 Panels with a second public member or enlarged industry and labour membership were sometimes set up to give a more representative character.
parties to the case were informed that they might submit evidence and argument in writing and at a public hearing.

After the public hearing before a panel or hearing officer, findings and recommendations were drawn up and submitted to the Director of the Disputes Division of the Board, who would send the report, or reports in case of disagreement, to the parties for comment. Memoranda of the Disputes Division and the Wage Stabilization Division were then prepared.

A significant aspect of the work of the tripartite panels was in mediation, since panels strove to obtain full agreement between the parties or at least to reduce the number of disposal issues in each case. Panels were highly effective instruments for strengthening collective bargaining and reducing to a minimum the area of disagreement in regard to which a Board directive had to be issued.

**Review Committee**

Panel or hearing officers' reports, parties' comments and staff memoranda were then sometimes considered by a division of the Board; more often, at the national level, by a Review Committee, appointed by the Board from personnel outside its own membership, and consisting of two representatives of labour, two of industry and two public members, one of whom served as chairman. The recommendations of the Review Committee were then presented to the Board in executive session by one of the chairmen. Occasionally the Review Committee held a supplementary hearing, or recommended the Board to do so, before deciding a case.

**Industry Commissions, Standing Panels and Regional Procedures**

The New Case Committee could refer cases to one of the commissions or standing panels set up to deal with particular industries, to the National Board itself, or to the appropriate Regional Board. The chief difference between a commission and a panel was that the latter issued recommendations only, while the former made binding decisions, subject to review by or appeal to the National Board.

A case sent to a Regional Board went through a series of procedures closely similar to the operation at the national level. Each

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1 A panel might adjourn discussion and refer a case back to the parties for consideration if it thought that there was a possibility of agreement being reached directly.

2 The National Air Frame Panel, Telephone Panel, War Shipping Panel, Trucking Commission, Shipbuilding Commission, Wage Adjustment Board for the Construction Industry (all in Washington), the Tool and Die Commission (Detroit), the Newspaper Panel (Chicago), the West Coast Lumber Commission (Portland, Oregon) the Non-Ferrous Metals Commission (Denver), the Meat Packing Commission, the Textile Commission and the Steel Commission.
Regional Board had a New Case Committee resembling that of the National Board, which determined the procedure to be followed for individual cases. The primary function of the New Case Committee of a Regional Board was to set the case down for hearing, notify the parties of the date for filing briefs, etc. On reference from the New Case Committee, a member of the staff of the Regional Board, usually the assistant disputes director, was responsible for setting up a panel from a roster of approved names. The Regional panel, like the National panel, was tripartite, and the processing was similar to that of National Board cases. As at the National level, the industry and labour members of the Regional Board most directly interested in the case usually argued it from the point of view of the respective parties. The unions and the employers, since they could not attend the executive session, frequently briefed members on their respective sides, who in fact then presented the case as if directly concerned, and argued it for the benefit of the public members. While the industry and labour members thus acted somewhat as partisans, they also argued their interpretation of the facts on the basis of Board policy.

Following the argument in the Board session in cases of secondary importance, or in a Board division, it was usual for the vote to be taken immediately and in informal manner. As in the case of the National Board, however, the individual votes were recorded. On more difficult questions and on any question referred to a full Board from a division, the public members customarily withdrew to discuss the case without the employer or worker members and then returned to announce their decision. The decision of the four public members, however, was not necessarily unanimous. In rare cases the public members split, as did the employer (or worker) members in others.

1 A panel hearing, and in important cases a hearing of a division or a full Regional Board, could be held at the place of the dispute so as to enable the maximum amount of local evidence to be obtained.

2 An interesting procedural question involving the tripartite structure was the method of handling a panel report on a case before a Regional Board. If there were any difficulty in understanding the digest it was customary to call in the hearing officer to explain any points that might not be clear in his recommendations. In the case of panel recommendations, the question was raised as to whether the chairman of the panel — a public member — could explain the recommendations to the Board in the same way as would a hearing officer. In one instance at least, the labour members protested the appearance of a chairman on the grounds that he could not speak for the panel as a whole and insisted that unless the whole panel were present his advice should only be given to the public members outside of an actual meeting. A somewhat similar procedure at the National Board was the explanation of recommendations of the New Case, Appeals, and Review Committees by their chairmen. Industry and labour members of these committees could not participate in the discussion of committee reports by the Board except by unanimous consent.

3 Panel recommendations were usually approved unanimously. In some cases dealing with frequently discussed issues, dissents for the record were made but without any discussion.
After the voting, an opinion might be written by one of the public members and concurring and dissenting opinions by other members.

A dissenting opinion by labour or employer members was sometimes written with the assistance of the legal adviser of the union or the company concerned. The fact that the employers and workers recorded votes and wrote opinions added to the responsibility on their part as members participating in the work of the Boards. Disputes referred to commissions were dealt with along similar lines, but less elaborately since the hearing was usually conducted by the commission itself.

**Appeals**

Following decision by either the Regional or the National Board, appeals might be taken by either side.\(^1\) When an appeal was forwarded from the Regional Board to the National Board, the Board Agency Review Section of the National Board Disputes Division and the corresponding Division of the National Board Wage Stabilisation Division prepared memoranda (if needed) before the case was considered by a tripartite Appeals Committee, which—within the narrower scope of review of a Board agency’s directive order—acted and reported to the Board in the same way as the National Board Review Committee.\(^2\)

**Relations with other Government Agencies**

**Department of Labor**

Co-operation was established between the War Labor Board and the Department of Labor enabling the Board to deal with the Conciliation Service in regard to certification of disputes, with the Bureau of Labor Statistics regarding statistical analyses, and with the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division in regard to applications for wage adjustments, investigations and compliance procedures.

Applications for approval of voluntary wage adjustments were filed by the parties initially in the local offices of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor, which ruled as to whether War Labor Board approval was required

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1 The term "reconsideration" was used to refer to an appeal to the same agency and "review" to an appeal to a higher agency. Petitions usually requested reconsideration and review and were required to be filed with the Board issuing the order.

2 Appeals from (or petitions to reconsider) National Board orders and requests for their interpretation were in general handled by the National Board Review Committee, which made its recommendations to the Board. The standing panels handled cases in their fields.
for the adjustment. If the answer was in the affirmative, the application was sent to the Regional War Labor Board. In general since the War Labor Board never established any unit below the region, it depended upon the Department of Labor for local facilities.

War Manpower Commission

The work of the War Labor Board directly affected actions taken by the War Manpower Commission. The general wage policy of the Board was to permit or order wage adjustments under the formula for correction of maladjustment to cost of living—*i.e.* if wage rates were substandard, or if adjustments were required because of "gross inequity" of rates as compared with rates paid for the same work by other employers in the same industry and labour market area, or in "rare and unusual" cases to attract or retain personnel in enterprises necessary "for the effective prosecution of the war".

The question of substandard wages affected the War Manpower Commission because under employment stabilisation provisions an employer could not refuse a certificate of availability to a worker if he was paying wages defined as substandard by the War Labor Board.

For a long period the National Board took the stand that it would not grant wage increases for the purpose of affecting employment. However, it provided a procedure whereby the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board and the procurement agencies could certify to the National Board cases which they considered as "rare and unusual" in that a wage adjustment appeared necessary to ensure essential production.

In some cases representatives of the Area Management-Labor Committees appeared at public hearings of the War Labor Board to explain the point of view of the committee on wage stabilisation in particularly difficult industries, such as the foundry industry. In general there was no regular close relationship between the War Labor Board and the War Manpower Commission and War Production Board agencies, because the War Labor Board in the region frequently considered that it must make its own decisions, both on disputes and on wage applications, without regard to the type of question dealt with by the other departments. There was nevertheless frequent informal collaboration and understanding, since in a great many instances members of an Area or Regional Management-Labor Committee also belonged to either a Regional War Labor Board or one of the National War Labor Board's industry commissions or panels.
The extent to which the War Labor Board, through its stabilisation of wartime industrial relations and wage levels, contributed to mobilisation of the nation's manpower and production facilities was summarised by the Executive Director in a report to the National War Labor Board issued in January 1945. This report indicated the volume of work accomplished, the extent of public acceptance of Board decisions and the value of its tripartite composition.

Between 12 January 1942 and 27 October 1944, 10,304 dispute cases involving 7,686,000 workers were dealt with. Of these, 2,213 cases were decided by the National Board, 6,900 by Regional Boards and 1,191 by commissions. Statistics concerning appeals cases cover a somewhat different period. During the calendar year 1944 appeals from Regional Board decisions totalled 2,429. In disposing of 2,172 such appeals, the National Board reversed the decisions of Regional Boards and commissions in 34 cases and modified 151 decisions.

During the two-year period following 3 October 1942, when the Board began to function in the field of wage stabilisation, 260,912 voluntary cases were ruled on by Regional Boards and 8,238 by commissions. The Regional Boards denied 40,212 of these cases, and the commissions 411. Appeals to the National War Labor Board from Regional Boards and from commissions were relatively few. For example, during the calendar year 1944, in which approximately 175,000 rulings were made by Regional Boards and commissions, 1,309 petitions for review were lodged with the National Board. Of 1,003 such petitions acted upon, only 69 were reversed and 58 modified.

The report further pointed out that a study of appeals and petitions for reconsideration or review of Regional Board and commission decisions showed, first, that employers and unions accepted initial rulings in the vast majority of cases, and second, that the National Board reversed Regional Boards or commissions in only a very small percentage of cases.

In commenting upon the operation of the Board, the Executive Director stated:

Although the Executive Orders and the War Labor Disputes Act have given the War Labor Board the power and duty to prescribe the terms for settling labour disputes, the effectiveness of the Board depends upon general acceptance of its rulings by the thousands of employers and the millions of employees within the Board's jurisdiction.

The Board could not long survive opposition to the principle of Governmental control of wartime disputes and wages, if that principle were not the popular will. An important factor in this voluntary acceptance of Board rulings is the tri-
partite nature of the War Labor Board, which affords equal responsibility and equal voice in its decisions to representatives of industry, labour and the public.

Under this system, decisions arrived at through the democratic processes of persuasion and the vote of the majority have been acceptable to all but an infinitesimal number of American businessmen and American workers.

The tripartite system also has found the dissenting minority on the Board standing uniformly with the majority for compliance with Board orders once the decision is made.

In concluding the analysis he noted: "The small number of recalcitrant employers and unions, in contrast to the thousands of rulings given, speaks eloquently for the nation's co-operation with War Labor Board operations under the tripartite system."

In evaluating the use of the tripartite system it may be well to consider both the strength and the weakness that were revealed in its practical operation, and some of the varied opinions expressed regarding the work of the Board both nationally and regionally. The strength of the tripartite method, as is partly indicated by the statistics given above, was most evident in the handling of dispute cases and in all instances where, by tripartite mediation, the Board helped to reduce the area of dispute and buttress collective bargaining procedures. The Regional Boards, in particular, contributed continuously to day-to-day industrial relations, bringing tripartite mediation procedures close to local communities and local situations. One of the important assets of the labour and industry members, particularly in dealing with dispute cases, was the practical knowledge of labour and industry problems in the shop, which were introduced into the discussion of each case, often balancing the more abstract judgments of the public members. Furthermore, the tripartite system had a significant by-product in improved industrial relations, because representatives of labour and management were made aware of each other's views and ideas under conditions where they dealt with differences frankly, and undertook to reconcile particular views in particular cases.

The weakness of the tripartite system was more evident in handling voluntary wage cases. Here the War Labor Board primarily administered a law and there was occasionally a tendency to seek to apply the law primarily for the benefit of one of the parties. Thus, for example, labour members frequently argued in voluntary cases that since the parties agreed upon a particular adjustment it should be approved, even though it was not in accord with the wage stabilisation policy. Similarly, industry members were often less vigorous in their opposition in voluntary cases than in dispute cases where the employer in the case was opposed to the adjustment. However, even on these occasions there seems little doubt that the tripartite method was generally valuable, except in the
comparatively few instances of lack of balance between the abilities and talents of the three groups. There were also occasional attempts to influence the staff of the Board on recommendations. Though infrequent, this had to be watched and, where necessary, prevented by centralising administrative responsibility in the public members, subject to criticism and suggestion from the tripartite Board. However, this weakness appeared in individual instances rather than in any general sense.

The judgments of labour and management groups as to the fairness of the Board varied in different regions, depending somewhat on the public members and staff of the local Board. For example, in one region the labour movement was convinced that the Board tended to be anti-labour and attributed this tendency to ignorance of the public members regarding underlying issues and local circumstances. In another region, by contrast, the employer members accused the public members of leaning somewhat towards the workers. But these tendencies or accusations indicated slight differentiation only, for they were not sufficiently public or widespread to force changes in the public membership. Similarly, although the degree of decentralisation of responsibility was the same in all regions, some Boards looked more closely to national leadership while others tended to establish policies and uphold them unless reversed by the National Board.

Criticisms were raised against the National Board and a number of the regions for delay in reaching their decisions—occasionally attributed to bad administration. Most of these objections were gradually met, and by 1945 the general operation did not seem subject to widespread criticism by any of the parties concerned.

The report of the Executive Director referred to above also made available some statistics as to the average time taken in dealing with cases and in reaching decisions. During the period from 1 July to 30 September 1944, 61.5 per cent. of all voluntary applications were being disposed of within a month of filing with the Regional Board, and 86 per cent. of such cases in less than two months.

The disposition of dispute cases naturally required a much longer period. Disputes were being settled at a rate of 150 per week, requiring on the average 20 weeks for settlement. This longer period was occasioned by the need for carrying out the provisions of the War Labour Disputes Act—that the Board should provide the parties with adequate opportunity to present all their facts and arguments and should make a fair and equitable settlement of the dispute.
Furthermore, in evaluating the Board's use of the tripartite structure, it may be noted that in many instances employers and workers associated with various wartime agencies such as the War Manpower Commission or the War Production Board were convinced that they themselves could play a larger part in the work of the War Labor Board than in either of the other agencies. By contrast to this view, however, the fact that decisions of the Board at every level were reached by majority vote and therefore depended very largely upon the views of the public members sometimes led industry and labour members to feel that they were serving largely as assessors for the public members, who in practice held the balance of power. However, the most widely expressed view was that the registration of a formal vote and the writing of an opinion had ensured a greater sense of participation than if the Board had operated as a public court with the employer and worker members serving in an advisory or assessor capacity.

Although the detailed work of the War Labor Board as an instrument for settling industrial disputes, its long-term effects on collective bargaining and its work in the field of wage stabilisation are largely outside the scope of this report, the effect it had on the development of industrial relations and on the establishment of conditions favourable to war production constituted a prime factor in labour supply and in output for war purposes.
CHAPTER XVI

CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AFFECTING MANPOWER AND PRODUCTION

Labour and management participated in a number of Government agencies, including those which were claimants for manpower, serviced the agencies directly responsible for labour supply operations, controlled various factors in the civilian economy or coordinated national manpower and production planning for war and post-war adjustment. Some indication of the procedures used by these other Government agencies to obtain the views of labour or management serves to round off the picture of the place of labour and management in the war organisation of labour supply, production planning and directly related matters.¹

CLAIMANT AGENCIES

The major claimant agencies which directly or indirectly affected the role of management and labour were the Selective Service System, responsible for recruiting for the armed services, and the various military and civilian departments requiring manpower for their own installations or for private employers producing war products. Other Government agencies sponsoring employment and so affecting the manpower situation were the Office of Defense Transportation, the National Housing Authority², the War Food Administration³ and the Civil Service Commission.⁴

Because it had a part in the general manpower and production situation, each agency established a special division or section at

¹ Although agricultural representation and the need for farm labour constituted a significant factor in the total organisation of labour supply, agricultural questions and representation are not covered in the present study.
² The National Housing Authority is not dealt with in this report although, from time to time, it developed consultative procedures both nationally and locally to draw labour representatives into its work.
³ Both the War Food Administration and the Department of Agriculture consulted extensively with industry and labour, as well as agriculture, particularly in respect of food production and distribution; but, as indicated in footnote 1 above, they are outside the scope of this report.
⁴ The War and Navy Departments had an agreement with the Civil Service Commission to act as claimants for civil employees on Army and Navy installations.
the national level and appointed representatives in the regions specially charged with investigating manpower problems, labour relations, production efficiency, plant morale and similar questions. There were various degrees of decentralisation from the respective national headquarters to these regional or local representatives. Each agency made provision for participation of employers and labour leaders in its work. This might be formal or informal and either nationally planned or locally improvised, as shown by the following examples.

**Selective Service System**

The effect on individual employers and workers of the Selective Service System was evident from its purpose—the raising of men for the armed forces. The letter and spirit of the Act establishing the system directed that it work with the least possible disturbance of civilian economy, essential industry, and social structure consistent with the needs of the armed forces.

The organisation of Selective Service consisted of a national headquarters in Washington, State headquarters in each of the States, territories and possessions and 6,443 local boards (a further local board was set up for each additional 30,000 population). These boards classified the men liable for service in the armed forces according to the provisions of the Act, as interpreted by regulations and information from national and State headquarters.

The need for a two-way information service between the Selective Service System and various labour, management and other groups and organisations was met on an informal basis, usually through direct contact between the appropriate organisation and national or State headquarters or local boards, as the need developed.

Attached to each State headquarters were co-ordinators who kept the local boards informed about labour supply and other facts pertinent to occupational deferment problems. These co-ordinators kept in close touch with the various regional and area agencies operating under the War Manpower Commission and all other sources of information concerning the labour situation and require-

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1 The Selective Service System was established as an agency directly responsible to the President by the Selective Training and Service Act of 16 September 1940. As amended immediately after Pearl Harbor the Act provided that all male residents of the United States between the ages of 18 and 45 — with a few designated exceptions — were liable for military service. From December 1942 men over 38 were not acceptable to the armed forces and were not inducted. (Cf. 41 Stat. 763 of 4 June 1920.) Executive Order 9279 of 5 December 1942 placed the Selective Service System under the jurisdiction of the War Manpower Commission; Executive Order 9410 of 23 December 1943 again made it a separate agency.

2 New York City had a headquarters similar to that of a State.
ments. They occasionally attended meetings of the Regional, State or Area Management-Labor Committees of the War Man­power Commission, and participated in the interdepartmental Area Manpower Priorities Committees.

Local boards used all available information in determining individual classifications and not infrequently called upon the regional offices of the War Production Board, County Extension Agents of the Department of Agriculture, United States Employment Service Offices of the War Manpower Commission, union branches, employers, civic organisations, and other sources for information on local labour needs and on other facts of importance to the civilian economy.

The interests of the registrant and of the Government were protected by provisions which permitted appeal from any local board classification, except IV-F. Unless the decision of the Board of Appeal was unanimous, a further appeal could be taken to the President by the registrant or his employer. A registrant or any other person who filed written evidence of the occupational necessity of a registrant, such as an employer or a labour union, or a person who claimed to be a dependent of a registrant, was entitled to appeal. The Government agent might appeal on behalf of a registrant or of the Government. The Director of Selective Service and the State Director were also authorised to appeal classification whenever their judgment dictated.

There were one or more appeal boards in each State, territory and possession. The Selective Service System recognised the advisability of having an appropriate cross-section of representation on its appeal boards in order to obtain the benefit of various viewpoints. The regulations specified that a board normally should be composed of five members, to include one from labour, one from industry, one physician, one lawyer and, where applicable, one member from agriculture. Although many employers and trade union officials served as members of local boards and boards of appeal they were not appointed for the purpose of looking after the special interest which they represented. They functioned, as did all other members of the board, in the interest of all registrants regardless of affiliation.

The War Department (Army Service Forces)

The War Department established a national, regional and area organisation and made provision in the structure for co-operation

1 IV-F classification covered the physically, mentally or morally unfit for military service.
of management and labour in carrying out its responsibilities in the field of labour supply and production.

The services and supplies required by the War Department were furnished by three types of establishments, and the nature of the Department's labour responsibility differed in each. Thus, in Government-owned, Government-operated establishments, such as the arsenals, depots and camps, the War Department served directly as the employer of labour. In privately owned and privately operated establishments working on War Department contracts, the Department assumed responsibility for seeing that production was not interfered with by labour problems. It therefore worked to obtain manpower, and insisted that employers take steps to solve any labour difficulties rapidly and prevent any delays to the procurement programme. In the relatively few Government-owned, privately operated establishments the War Department in most instances, retained the right to approve labour and other costs in advance and to insist upon any controls which it considered necessary in its own interest.

In order to carry out these responsibilities, which included participation in the Area Production Urgency Committees and Area Manpower Priorities Committees described in Chapter VII, the Army Service Forces established an Industrial Personnel Division, responsible at the national level for all labour supply and labour relations activities of the Army Service Forces. A Production Division, responsible for army production matters, advised the Industrial Personnel Division on matters of production urgency, production schedules, contract review, facility review, redistribution of production, and civilian production. Matters of labour supply generally were administered in the field by thirteen regional organisations, the geographic area of which corresponded to the War Production Board regions. Labour relations responsibility was vested in the Labor Branches of nine Army Service Commands. The responsibilities of the thirteen Army Service Forces labour supply regional offices, headed by regional representatives, included the following: dealing with industry and labour representatives within the region, with Government agencies, with community groups and, in particular, with the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission on all matters of labour supply; appointing area Army Service Forces representatives and their alternates on local Production Urgency and Manpower Priorities Committees; coordinating the work of the Army Service Forces representatives on these committees; and carrying general responsibility for all matters of Army Service Forces labour supply within their respective regions. However, the regional offices were not concerned with
matters of labour relations, which responsibility rested with the nine Service Command Labor Branches.¹

These Service Command Labor Branches were responsible throughout the Service Command for labour dispute functions, including intervention in strikes and other serious stoppages of work, in-plant labour responsibilities for Service Command installations, labour problems regarding the use of prisoners of war, labour problems arising in connection with internal security, and for expediting War Labor Board action on cases before Regional Boards. They received their staff direction from the Industrial Personnel Division at headquarters in Washington.

At the area level an Army Service Forces area representative was responsible to the Army Service Forces regional representative in connection with all activities of the Production Urgency and Manpower Priorities Committees on which he served. His duties included dealing with industry and labour representatives, community groups and Government agencies within an area, as well as representing—on the Production Urgency and Manpower Priorities Committees—the interests of all prime contractors and suppliers of the Army Service Forces in the area. He was advised in the larger areas by an Army Area Advisory Committee including representatives of Army components having important interests in the area.

Each of the Technical Services² within the Army Service Forces also had a labour branch. These were responsible for the in-plant personnel management activities of plants holding their contracts.

Although no formal joint consultative machinery was provided, labour and management participation was obtained in several ways. To begin with, some of the army temporary appointees at each of the levels were drawn from a civilian background of either industry or social service and had experience in labour relations of some kind. Then there were frequent conferences at Army Service Forces headquarters with representatives of both management and labour in connection with the production requirements of the Army. Moreover the Army maintained a close relationship with the advisory Management-Labor committees of the War Manpower Commission. The War Department took the view that these committees

¹ The regional organisation included, in addition to the regional representative and his labour adviser, an Army Regional Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of the Technical Services, the Service Commands, the Army Air Force and any other Army components having an important interest in the area, and the separate Service Command labour branches, to advise on appropriate matters.
² Quartermaster Corps, Transportation Corps, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, Surgeon-General's Office, Corps of Engineers, and Chemical Warfare Service.
should be used whenever possible as a channel for relationship with labour and industry in the regions and areas; consequently the regional and area representatives of the War Department participated frequently in the Management-Labor Committee meetings whenever such participation was welcomed by the respective committees. Furthermore, considerable attention was paid by the Army Industrial Services Division to the local Labor-Management Committees of individual plants as a means of establishing direct relations with labour and management.

Finally, one rather specialised use of consultative procedures for drawing industry into its work was made by the Ordnance Department, which established in May 1942 industry integration committees somewhat similar in concept to the industry advisory committees of the War Production Board. A committee was set up for each major class of Army ordnance items with the general purpose of making available to each manufacturer "the benefit of the production experience and technique of all manufacturers in a group, and so to integrate the facilities of the group as to attain maximum production in the shortest possible time".\(^1\) An ordnance industry was defined as all the manufacturers producing a given end item or class of end items. Each committee comprised a representative of each manufacturer, the members acting under the supervision of the Ordnance Department; their function was limited to the collection, correlation and analysis of information, and to the making of recommendations to the chairman of the committee.

### Navy Department

The Navy Department, like the War Department, had a special staff at headquarters, field offices located in the various naval districts, and individual representatives serving in local areas to deal with labour supply and industrial relations problems. Information and instructions were given by the headquarters staff to the various field representatives who served on Area Production Urgency Committees and Manpower Priorities Committees. As the Navy did not have subdivisions and separate service commands, there were no regional or area committees advising the Navy representatives. Furthermore, labour relations duties and labour supply problems were closely integrated both at headquarters and in the field. A District Civilian Personnel Director, attached to the staff of the District Commandant, co-ordinated these responsibilities at the district level.

Responsibilities of the District Civilian Personnel Director included co-ordination and direct liaison work, in the field of labour supply, with management, labour and Government agencies. Relationship with the War Manpower Commission at the district level was carried out directly by the District Civilian Personnel Director. He had specific instructions to assert an affirmative influence on policy at meetings of Management-Labor Committees, Manpower Priorities Committees and other groups and activities operating in the field. Under his direction were various specialists: a recruiting officer for civilian personnel of Navy establishments gave general advice to Navy suppliers and contractors; an adviser regarding Selective Service questions assisted Navy contractors in the use of Selective Service forms, aided them in properly describing the occupations and essentiality of men liable for drafting, and in general, provided liaison between Navy contractors and the Selective Service; a specialist helped in the use of training activities and, in some cases, co-ordinated various training programmes instituted in contractors' plants; a position classification officer advised the Navy yards; a safety engineering officer was available to Navy yards and contractors for promotion of safety programmes of various types; and an officer specially responsible for labour utilisation activities co-ordinated recruiting and training programmes with efforts to reduce turnover and absenteeism. Finally, a labour relations officer on the district staff was primarily responsible for preventing labour disputes. To this end he sought to anticipate and forestall "the development or continuance of dissatisfaction or unrest among employees engaged on Navy work that might threaten morale, or otherwise lead to interference with production". His responsibilities included maintaining co-operative relations with other Government agencies, such as the War Production Board, the War Labor Board and the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, to see that any threatened dispute was acted on quickly, and that the Conciliation or Mediation Services were called in without delay. He had also to become acquainted with the representatives of organised labour and with the managements of all the firms in the district engaged on Navy contracts. As the labour relations officers were all selected on the basis of experience in industrial relations, either on the labour or the production side, they had full responsibility in this field, and the various other officers reporting to the District Civilian Personnel Director were not permitted to interfere in industrial relations questions.

At the area level there was a single officer charged with carrying out the various functions of the District Civilian Personnel Directors. He called on the various specialists from the district office.
whenever needed on a given problem. The Navy Department's local representatives responsible for labour supply and labour relations functions were stationed in the offices of the War Manpower Commission, thereby maintaining a particularly close relationship between the agencies.

Finally, the Navy maintained an Industrial Incentives Division, attached to the Inspector of Naval Production, to aid in the development of suggestion systems and other procedures for improving output. Moreover, the Department provided, through a directive issued by the Secretary of the Navy, for the establishment of Labor-Management Production Committees in all Navy yards; and co-operated with the War Production Board in promoting joint committees in private contractors' establishments.

_Aircraft Resources Control Office_

A special inter-departmental Aircraft Production Board was established under the Chairman of the War Production Board. An Aircraft Resources Control Office served as its executive agency on all matters affecting manpower, materials and machine tools. The Director of the Control Office, in consultation with his inter-departmental board, determined the policies to be carried out and the production programmes to be pushed in the national committees for production scheduling and manpower priorities, and in the various local committees.

The organisation of the regional staff followed the six districts of the Army Air Forces, while industrial manpower offices were established in each of the areas in which production and matériel for the Air Forces were located. The representatives who sat on the Area Manpower Priorities Committees and Production Urgency Committees had substantial discretion as to how they should vote. On most committees, the Aircraft Resources Control Office represented both the Army Air Forces and the Navy Aeronautical Department, but in a few cases where there were particularly large Navy establishments, there would be a separate representative from the N.A.D.

While there was no direct representation of labour or management in the organisation of the Aircraft Resources Control Office, as in the case of both the War Department and the Navy Department, the local representatives on occasion worked with the

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1 The Board was comprised of the Lieutenant-General in charge of War Department Production, the Commanding General of the Matériel Command, who was the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff of the Army Air Forces in charge of matériel maintenance and distribution, the Rear Admiral, who was Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department, and a Recorder appointed with the approval of the representatives of the armed services.
Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission, the local trade union officials and the plant Labor-Management Committees regarding both manpower and labour relations questions.

The Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration

The Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration operated under the same Administrator; they therefore frequently made joint use of procedures for obtaining labour-management co-operation and advice, and acted jointly regarding labour supply and labour relations problems in connection with both shipping and shipbuilding. These two agencies likewise had joint representation, at the national level, on the Manpower Priorities Committee and Co-ordinating Production Urgency Committee, as well as on the corresponding bodies at the area level. In addition to participation in the latter, their representatives also occasionally attended meetings of the War Manpower Commission Area or Regional Management-Labor Committees.

Full labour-management co-operation was also obtained in the discharge of the special responsibilities entrusted to the Maritime Commission in regard to shipping and shipbuilding.

Shipping.

One of the first instances of the use of labour-management co-operation by the Maritime Commission was the conduct of hearings on all coasts to determine the minimum wage and working conditions to be applied in accordance with the Maritime Act on vessels subsidised by the Maritime Commission. At these hearings a positive effort was made to secure from both labour and management advice and assistance, not only in setting minimum wage and manning scales, but also in the establishment of reasonable working conditions. Although these questions go somewhat beyond the subject matter of this report, an indication of what management and labour have contributed may illustrate the type of joint co-operation obtained by both the Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration.

A survey made during the defence period revealed that the bulk of the vessels comprising the American Merchant Marine were obsolescent, and that the quarters provided thereon for crews were in many instances substandard. Accordingly, the Maritime Commission set up a Crews' Quarters Committee which, in establishing its standards, consulted at all times with labour and management on an informal basis. As a result of the activities of this committee, several million dollars were spent in the improvement
of crews’ quarters, considerable reliance being placed upon the informal advice and guidance of representatives of maritime unions as well as of shipping companies.

Probably the outstanding instance of labour-management cooperation in the difficulties immediately following Pearl Harbor, occurred on 18 December 1941, when, with the general approval of the Chairman, and under the direction of the Commissioner in charge of labour matters, a labour-management-Government conference was called for the purpose of outlining principles upon which all three parties might stand in the prosecution of the war. The results of this conference were: (1) the adoption by management and labour, under the sponsorship of the Maritime Commission and the Department of Labor, of a Statement of Principles regarding procedures for voluntary settlement of disputes, maintenance of collective bargaining, and waiving of restrictive priorities; and (2) the establishment of the Maritime War Emergency Board for the primary purpose of acting on bonuses for extra-hazardous war risks, and designed to expedite and co-ordinate the war efforts of employers and labour in the maritime industry.¹

**Shipbuilding.**

As early as June 1940, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, faced with a tremendous defence shipbuilding programme, took the initiative in directing a study and analysis of methods whereby stabilisation of employment and wages might be achieved in shipbuilding. The Director of the Division of Shipyard Labor Relations made a study and presented recommendations, which were forwarded by the Chairman to the Labor Commissioner of the Advisory Commission for the Council of National Defense. This resulted in the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee², established within the Labor Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission and subsequently transferred to the War Production Board. It sponsored meetings on the Pacific Coast, the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf and the Great Lakes, attended by representatives of labour, management and Government interested in shipbuilding to determine working conditions on a zone basis. Stabilisation standards were evolved which stood the test of the whole war, although formulated and put into effect in all instances prior to Pearl Harbor. Later, in 1942, the need for a central body which was more than a sponsor became evident, and the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, with a tripartite membership,

¹ Cf. Statement of Principles and President's memorandum of 19 December 1941 establishing the Maritime War Emergency Board.
² Cf. Chapter IX, p. 166
was authorised to ensure compliance with, interpretation of, and
definition of coverage of the several Zone Standards Agreements
negotiated by the Unions and the shipyards in each zone. This
Committee represents one of the foremost developments in labour-
management co-operation.¹

Civil Service Commission

The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency
of the United States Government and, as such, served as man­
power claimant for all federal civilian employment in military
installations and Government departments. It represented, in
fact, the largest single employer in the country.

The Commission was actively associated, from its inception,
with the over-all manpower programme of the Government.
Throughout the defence and war programmes it proceeded on the
assumption that, when employing labour, the Government should
be treated on the same basis as private industry. Consequently
Federal authorities were not released from the controls imposed on
the employers, and received—through the Commission—the same
consideration as private employers regarding manpower needs.

The Civil Service Commission had a representative on the
War Manpower Commission itself, staff representatives serving in
all the latter's principal bureaux, and regional directors on the
regional staffs of the W.M.C. Likewise, representatives of the
Commission served on the staffs of the W.M.C. Area directors
wherever Government was an important factor in the manpower
picture within an area. In the conduct of its recruitment and
placement activities, the Commission drew very heavily on the
resources of other departments and agencies. However, it assumed
the responsibility for ensuring that these recruiting programmes
were carried on in complete harmony with the controls established
by the W.M.C. This agency also looked to the Civil Service Com­
mmission to act as its representative in connection with the develop­
ment of programmes in the various departments and agencies for
the better utilisation of existing personnel.

Office of Defense Transportation

The Office of Defense Transportation, in contrast to the other
claimant agencies, initially undertook to make formal provision for
labour and management collaboration regarding manpower. When

¹ Another form of sponsorship of labour-management co-operation was the
work of the Maritime Commission in conjunction with the War Production Board
in promoting the shipyard Labor-Management Committees, described in Chap­
ters X, XI and XIII.
it was originally established\textsuperscript{1} the Commissioner in charge called a series of conferences to ensure participation of the railroads and the trucking industry in the organisation of defence transportation.

Subsequently, the Office of Defense Transportation became an independent agency. Its general activities included the operation of railroad traffic, the movement of freight and the formulation of measures to relieve or forestall terminal congestion. It determined the loading of cars and the freezing of passenger schedules, and applied necessary restrictions. Similarly, in the field of automotive transportation, it brought about greater utilisation and conservation of motor trucks and commercial vehicles.

In attempting to determine its initial policies, the Office of Defense Transportation called in 1942 a series of industry labour meetings for railroads and motor transport. A Railway Labor-Management Conference composed of six railway chief executives and six Railway Brotherhood officials was held to enlist support in the maximum utilisation of railroad facilities. While this Conference was set up as a permanent organisation and expected to meet regularly, the consultation was usually on a more informal basis, the Office of Defense Transportation maintaining close regular relationships with the various labour and management groups, nationally and locally. By mutual agreement, in view of the urgency of work of both groups, formal conferences were kept to a minimum.

In the trucking and motor transport industries, a similar national joint Labor-Management Committee was established in 1942, and 28 local committees followed. In the later periods these committees were rarely convened, in line with the policy of the Office to limit meetings and conventions throughout the country.

In addition to these joint committees, the Office of Defense Transportation used industry advisory committees at the national and regional levels and in connection with district and local offices. These were composed of representatives of producers, motor carriers, processors and dealers, selected by methods similar to those used by the War Production Board for the establishment of its industry advisory committees. Once a committee was established, it elected its own chairman, who then filed with the O.D.T. information concerning type of industry, membership, method of selection and area to be covered. National advisory committees covered special sections of the industry such as livestock or solid fuels. They were aided by district advisory committees and by similar official bodies whenever necessary. Perhaps the most signi-

\textsuperscript{1} As the Transportation Division of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense.
significant aspect of the O.D.T. industry advisory committees was their use in local communities where voluntary transportation plans were developed by all the local members of the industry to provide for pooled deliveries or curtailed service and, by joint action, to conserve manpower, gasoline, rubber and other vital materials and equipment.

Finally, because it was a claimant for manpower, the Office of Defense Transportation had local representatives on the Area Manpower Priorities Committees. These persons had great freedom of action and could take any point of view they thought fit regarding the use of manpower on transport facilities, but there was no instruction to attend the Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission, and consequently this was only done in particular instances where some urgent problem called for an explanation of the O.D.T. point of view in a given area. At the national level the O.D.T. was not a regular member of the National Manpower Priorities Committee or of the Co-ordinating Area Production Urgency Committee, although from time to time it pressed for such membership.

Service Agencies

The agencies responsible for operating the wartime manpower and production programme called upon various other Government agencies from time to time to provide information and assistance. Most of the latter, in doing so, also made use of procedures for consulting labour or management. For example, the Office of Education of the Federal Security Administration and the State departments of education rendered substantial aid to the vocational training activities of the War Manpower Commission; in organising these activities the Office of Education obtained advice, largely by informal methods, from union leaders and persons experienced in personnel work. Similarly, the Social Security Board aided on various aspects of health and welfare and to this end worked with both unions and employers in community welfare planning.

Department of Labor

The most significant example of wartime responsibility of this type was the contribution made by the Department of Labor, which had the longest experience in dealing with many phases of labour supply and labour relations problems, and in the use of varied forms of labour and management consultation.

At the top policy-making level the Labor Department relied generally on informal methods of consultation, instead of establish-
ing any regular labour or labour-management advisory committee. There was always at least one Assistant Secretary drawn directly from the labour movement. Representatives of the national labour federations and of the individual national unions advised the Secretary on major issues and were frequently called in for informal consultation.

More formal arrangements were made by many of the separate bureaux and divisions. In some cases the methods used during the war were simply a continuation of normal peacetime practices. In others, committees were appointed to deal with particular wartime questions.

The most extensive formal consultation of labour and management groups was undertaken by the Division of Labor Standards, the office responsible for the organisation of the annual National Conference on Labor Legislation, which included representatives of the Governors and of the State Departments of Labor as well as a substantial number of union representatives from headquarters offices and individual States. This Division always worked with an advisory committee of management and labour to assist it in formulating labour standards and industrial practices and in making recommendations to the various States on their labour legislation. In addition, committees on particular questions were established on the initiative of the Division; these all included members from a management and a labour background.

The Federal Committee on Apprenticeship, which was initially established by the Division of Labor Standards, comprised both management and union representatives, in addition to members from the general public and others chosen for their technical knowledge or from the education and training branches of Government.

The National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in War Industries\(^1\) included safety experts from private industry, representatives of organised labour, State officials administering safety and health laws, and officials of the Department of Labor. Eight members of the national committee served as regional representatives, charged with development of the programme in strategic industrial regions and maintenance of contact with State labour officials and representatives of organised labour and individual management. The committee and the Division of Labor Standards prepared material on accident prevention, and emphasised the value of joint labour-management safety committees in war plants.

\(^1\) Established by the Secretary of Labor in June 1940 to assist in the control of industrial accidents and diseases in priority plants producing war materials on Government contracts.
agencies experimented with new procedures for obtaining participation of management and labour. Another agency, the Petroleum Administration for War, controlled the nation's supply of fuel; although there was no labour participation in its activities, this Administration developed a significant form of Government co-operation with industry.

**Office of Price Administration (O.P.A.)**

The methods used by the O.P.A. to obtain the collaboration of industry and labour were adapted to its character and major functions. Extensive industry participation was required by the legislation determining the responsibilities and structure of the agency; labour's contribution was obtained more informally in accordance with arrangements made spontaneously by the Administrator.

The functions of the O.P.A. fell into three general groups: control of maximum prices, authority to set maximum rents, and the rationing of commodities. The Office set up nine regional offices, each under the direction of a Regional Administrator, over 90 district offices and approximately 5,500 local war price and rationing boards. It made use of area panels and joint plant committees to handle rationing and transportation problems at the factory level.

The Price Control Act\(^1\) required the Administrator to consult with representatives of industry in carrying out price control. He could, by regulation or order, set maximum prices for commodities whenever prices had risen, or threatened to rise, in such a way as to cause inflation or affect the economic stabilisation which the Act was designed to obtain. Before issuing any regulation or order for this purpose under the Act, the Administrator was, so far as practicable, to consult representative members of the industry which would be affected; and, in the case of any commodity for which a maximum price was established, the Administrator, at the request of any substantial portion of the industry involved, was to “appoint an industry advisory committee, or committees, either national or regional or both, consisting of such number of representatives of the industry as may be necessary in order to constitute a committee truly representative of the industry, or of the industry in such region, as the case may be.” Consultations between the committee and the Administrator were arranged at either's request.

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\(^1\) The O.P.A. was first established as the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply by Executive Order No. 8734 of 11 April 1941; its name and functions were changed by Executive Order No. 8875, of 28 Aug. 1941; it was established as an independent agency and its functions defined by the Emergency Price Control Act of 30 Jan. 1942 (56 Stat. 23).
The Administrator issued regulations for the formation and operation of the industry advisory committees and for obtaining maximum participation of industry in the field of price control.\(^1\) Power to use the committees was delegated to the respective O.P.A. price executives, but the Administrator retained authority for the appointment and removal of members. In determining the membership of the committee for a given industry, consideration was given to the substantial differences in organisation, size, method of operation, and location of the various concerns engaged therein. Any person occupied in the industry in a supervisory, managerial or technical capacity, connected with the production, distribution or use of a relevant commodity, was eligible for membership.

There were 580 formal industry advisory committees at the national level, and an additional series of informal industry or trade committees. In addition, there were 60 agricultural advisory committees in the district offices, which also had labour advisory committees and consumer advisory committees, described below.

The procedures governing the operation of the industry advisory committees of the Office of Price Administration, though generally similar to those established under the Industry Division Directors of the War Production Board\(^2\), nevertheless differed in some respects. For example, the chairman of each committee was usually a member of it rather than a representative of the O.P.A. Again, O.P.A. committees were permitted to request and receive contributions for their maintenance from the industry, and such expenses as salaries, travel and necessary staff could be paid by the companies participating in the committee. The O.P.A. itself did not contribute funds for committee expenses.

The industry advisory committees provided for formal advisory participation of industry in the work of the O.P.A. Further, the requirement added by Congress in the Appropriation Act of 1944 that no salary or expenses might be paid to any person "who directs the formulation of any price policy, rise in price, or price ceiling with respect to any article or commodity, unless, in the judgment of the Administrator, such person shall be qualified by experience in business, industry or commerce" meant that a substantial proportion of the price executives and those concerned with questions of this type were drawn from business.

Labour participation in the Office of Price Administration, though informal and without statutory provision, was equally ex-

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\(^2\) Cf. Chapter X for description of War Production Board Committees.
tensive. At an early stage, the Administrator established a Labor Policy Committee and provided facilities and services to ensure its effective work. A Labor Office was established with the primary function of initiating and supervising methods for obtaining full participation of organised labour in the work of the O.P.A. This Committee was composed of three representatives from each of the three major labour groups, and one alternate for each member. An executive committee of one member from each of the three groups carried on the day-to-day work. Members served without compensation. They had full access to O.P.A. information; meetings were attended by the Administrator and members of the top staff so that the committee might fully discuss O.P.A. policies. Plenary meetings, held fortnightly, were in general well attended.

The stated functions of the Labor Policy Committee were to enquire into pending price, rent and rationing regulations, confer with the Administrator and staff, and make recommendations with respect to the effect of policies on the consuming public and the purchasing power of wages. The Committee also explained effective regulations to the labour organisations which it formally represented, and to the consuming public at large.

The contribution of the Labor Policy Committee is indicated by the type of subjects with which it dealt. For example, it helped to draw union members into service on local war prices and rationing boards. It promoted labour-management co-operation at the local level in formulating war workers' transportation plans. When the scope of rationing was under consideration, the Labor Policy Committee urged its wider extension. Similarly, it urged the development of retail price controls on food and clothing. In the discussion as to methods of increasing low-priced textile and clothing production, the committee insisted that the Office of Price Administration should not permit price increases as the principal method. Finally, it emphasised the need to protect the interests of consumers under price, rent and rationing regulations, and to this end informed members of the O.P.A. district labour advisory committees, and State and local union offices, of the need for vigilance to this end in both local and national action.

In general, the Labor Policy Committee represented consumer interests within the O.P.A., since in its view wage-earners constituted the largest number of consumers and the group most affected by price increases. On several occasions, its discussion expedited more effective control over price increases and called attention to

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policies which would have affected consumer interests adversely. Much of the struggle between conflicting wage and price policies, in fact, took place in the Labor Policy Committee, since the O.P.A., lay between labour's demand for a roll-back of prices to meet the rising cost of living, and the producers' demand for higher prices to offset wage increases. Initially there was conflict between the O.P.A. and organised labour, since wage stabilisation had previously been undertaken by the former, but the transfer of this responsibility to the War Labor Board changed the general emphasis of labour's participation in the O.P.A. Once discussions were no longer centred about labour's demands for higher wages, the labour representatives could look at the whole question of price and rationing control from the more general standpoint of consumers' interest and press the O.P.A. both to withstand producers' demands for increased prices, and to extend price and rationing regulations. In fact, most of the objections raised by organised labour in the committee concerned issues outside the O.P.A.'s jurisdiction. For example, the Labor Policy Committee urged the extension of rationing, but the power to do this lay principally with the War Production Board or the War Food Administration, while the power to make final decisions on fruit and vegetable prices lay with the Office of Economic Stabilization. Again, the Labor Policy Committee strongly urged that price and rationing regulations could be more effectively enforced by permitting the restoration of graded labelling requirements, whereas Congress was unwilling to give this authority to the O.P.A.

The effectiveness of the Labor Policy Committee was made possible to a substantial extent by the work of the Labor Office of the O.P.A. This was headed by the labour relations adviser and staffed by liaison officers from major organised labour groups and the women's auxiliaries, all of whom devoted full time to O.P.A. activities and to the service of the Labor Policy Committee. The labour relations adviser was in constant touch with the Administrator, and in a position to ensure that the views of labour were understood at the policy-making and administrative level. The Labor Office also serviced District Labor Advisory Committees, kept the labour representatives at the national and district levels informed of developments in the programme affecting the consumer or labour interests of workers or their families, and indicated methods for handling inquiries and complaints.

At the district level there were approximately 100 Labor Advisory Committees varying in size from 3 to 49 members, named by the district directors from nominations of State and local labour organisations. The principal activities of these committees were to
advise the district directors regarding the programme, recommend changes and report any complaints based upon local experience. Their work was largely determined by the functions of the district offices. These were to supervise the local war prices and rationing boards, establish price ceilings and act as the primary points for the publication, interpretation and enforcement of O.P.A. price, rationing and rent regulations. For example, as a rule price ceilings were computed at the district level every three months, while those for perishable products, such as fruits, vegetables, fish and eggs, were computed weekly. The local committees co-operated actively with the district offices in distributing price, rent and rationing information to union members, holding cost-of-living conferences, and helping union members to protect themselves through cost-of-living committees and the price panels of local boards. The attitude of the district Labor Advisory Committees varied, some working closely with the district offices and others spending a disproportionate amount of time in protesting regulations outside the competence of the district office. In general, these committees were helpful in organising recruitment of labour members for local boards, and enlisting price panel assistants from union women's auxiliaries.

At the local level there were some 5,500 local boards with a total membership of approximately 80,000 persons, of which about 5,000 were union members. Most local boards operated through panels; each panel was concerned with a particular part of the programme—for example, prices, gas rationing, or tyre rationing. Board members and panel members served without pay and were selected to reflect the social and economic composition of the community as a whole; individuals from agriculture, labour, business, housewives and the professions were included according to local conditions. In recruiting union members to participate on local boards, the district Labor Advisory Committees provided district directors with the names of individual union members or officers who were willing and able to put in the necessary time, competent to understand and apply the regulations, and personally acceptable to the other members of boards to which they were being nominated. The functions of the boards included interpretation and administration of the price and rationing regulations at the local level. They had no power to fix price ceilings, and complaints and appeals were to be taken to the district office.

Finally, there were over 30,000 plant transportation committees, composed of representatives of management and labour in each plant, whose functions were to certify to local boards the applications submitted by employees of the plant for supplementary
gas rations, and sometimes also for tyres, automobiles, safety shoes and bicycles. They served primarily to expedite the work of the local boards and to save the time of the workers concerned.¹

The participation of industry in the O.P.A. and through the industry advisory committees was primarily technical in character. The industry representatives were principally interested in procedures for price control, and in the form of rationing adopted. The labour movement, on the other hand, took primarily a general policy-making and advisory position throughout. The result of the detailed and constant efforts to ensure consultation at every level was to give labour a general familiarity with O.P.A. objectives and procedures, and to increase labour leaders' awareness of the interests which their own members had, as consumers, in the work of the Office.

Office of Economic Stabilization (O.E.S.)

The Executive Order establishing the Office of Economic Stabilization provided for consultation of management and labour through a tripartite advisory board. This procedure was selected as the most suitable for a policy-determining agency formulating controls over civilian economy. The original functions of the O.E.S. were to formulate policies relating to the control of civilian purchases, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies and related matters "for the purpose of preventing avoidable increases in the cost of living, co-operating in minimising the unnecessary migration of labour from one business, industry or region to another, and facilitating the prosecution of the war".² Increased functions were subsequently allocated to the Economic Stabilization Director by the "Hold-the-Line" Executive Order, designed to control economic factors which might lead to inflation.³

The initial Executive Order, providing for the appointment of an Economic Stabilization Director, established an Economic Stabilization Board "with which the Director, shall advise and consult". The advisory board was interdepartmental and also

¹ Some fuller description has already been given of the work of the labour-management transportation committees in Chapter XIII dealing with Labor-Management Committees generally.

² This Executive Order (No. 9250 of 3 October 1942) outlined the functions of the O.E.S. and set forth methods of carrying out wage and salary stabilisation, providing for its administration through the National War Labor Board, prescribing the procedures for determining the prices of agricultural commodities, profits and subsidies, and indicating policies to govern the fixing of profits and subsidies by the Office of Price Administration and other Federal departments concerned.

³ No. 9328 of 8 April 1943, which defined the functions of the Office of Economic Stabilization in maintaining wage and price stabilisation and set forth the relationship of the directives and policies that would be issued by the Economic Stabilization Director to the operating Federal agencies, such as the War Food Administration, the National War Labor Board and the War Manpower Commission.
represented group interests, including, on the one hand, the heads of the various departments affected by economic stabilisation¹ and, on the other, two representatives each of labour, management and agriculture. Subsequently the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was also made a member of the Board. The Director of Economic Stabilisation was authorised to formulate policies and issue directives to the Federal departments and agencies concerned, with the approval of the President. There was no requirement that he consult the advisory board in regard to individual directives; and most of these were issued only in consultation with certain of the departments and agencies concerned with their execution. Consultation with the full Board, therefore, depended largely on the discretion of the Director.

At first the Board had little opportunity to make an effective contribution. Although it met fairly regularly from its establishment until the spring of 1944, its meetings, particularly in the early period, were primarily used for general discussion by those members who wished to attend. There were no subcommittees and no regular secretariat. As the Board decided at one of its first meetings that there could be no substitute members, and as many of the representative members were often unable to attend owing to the nation-wide calls upon their time, meetings were mainly interdepartmental in composition. Certain discussions caused bitterness among the representatives of industrial and farm labour, who felt that their advice was being ignored. Later, however, the Board took on a more positive role. Meetings were held at fixed times, staff was made available, and it was agreed that the Board should deal with specific items and have advance notice of what was to be discussed.

In the spring of 1945 a new impetus was given to the Board by the appointment as Director of the former Chairman of the War Labor Board—a man long experienced and interested in consultative and tripartite procedures, who was determined to give the Board every opportunity to make a real contribution. The technical staff of the O.E.S. was given access to the Board, and the Board provided with documentary material and full staff assistance. To enable it to participate in practical studies, subcommittees were named for particular problems, and the Government agencies most directly concerned were asked to make memoranda and material available. The initial meetings under the new Director gave promise that the Board would become a realistic instrument for full tripartite consultation, but the danger remained that

¹ Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Federal Reserve System, Budget, Price Administration, and the National War Labor Board.
its wide membership might encourage general debate rather than practical recommendations to the Director.¹

Petroleum Administration for War (P.A.W.)

The Petroleum Administration for War, an agency controlling a commodity of outstanding civilian and military importance, made a unique experiment: it provided for the organisation of the industry by its own representatives, meeting together in more than 200 industry advisory committees established at every level, and working directly with the national and local administration of the agency. The basis for this organisation went back to the defence period when, in May 1941, the Secretary of the Interior was named by the President as Petroleum Co-ordinator for National Defense and made responsible for establishing national and local machinery to co-ordinate the industry. The organisation developed by the Co-ordinator, including its industry committees, was transformed by Executive Order, in December 1943, into the Petroleum Administration for War, the Secretary of the Interior then being named Petroleum Administrator.

The structure for obtaining assistance of industry was built up on lines parallel to the administrative machinery, which had been devised to fit both the functional and the geographic structure of the petroleum industry. It therefore included, at the national level, central advisory committees and functional advisory committees for both domestic and foreign operations, and a central district committee with functional advisory committees in each of the five districts into which the country was divided.

At the national level, a central office of the Petroleum Administration for War was established to determine over-all policies and programmes, and provide general co-ordination over their execution. The national office was assisted, on the one hand, by a series of interdepartmental boards and committees made up of the various agencies affecting the use of petroleum, either nationally or abroad, and on the other hand, by the Petroleum Industry War Council, named by the Administrator, and consisting of 78 representatives of all branches of the industry. The general functions of this War Council were to advise the Petroleum Administration in the formulation of national policies and programmes. Its specific duties were to advise, with respect to any matter submitted to it by the Administration for advice or information; to consider and propose to the Administration any action relating to the proper co-ordination

¹ The Office of Economic Stabilization was abolished by Executive Order No. 9620 of 20 Sept. 1945; its functions were transferred to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion but the advisory board was not maintained.
of the petroleum industry for defence and war purposes; and to function as specified in any formal recommendation of the Administration. The Council was authorised to direct inquiries and questionnaires, to obtain expert assistance, and to enable any interested or affected persons to present their views. Its operating expenses came from a fund to which contributions were made by companies or individuals engaged in the petroleum industry.

The national office of the Petroleum Administration for War was organised on a functional basis. The five major divisions affecting domestic operation dealt with production, natural gas and gasoline, refining, supply and transportation, distribution and marketing. In addition, there were divisions for foreign operations, others covering such questions as programme, research, and similar questions, and a separate division concerning manpower. This structure was supplemented by a series of national industry committees, which in the domestic field worked through the Petroleum Industry War Council. Thus, there was an industry committee for each of the five major functional divisions, and additional industry committees covering national oil policies; petroleum economics; technical questions; protection of petroleum facilities; product conservation; manpower; renegotiation; and disposition of Government facilities. The membership of the committees was selected by the Petroleum Industry War Council, with the approval of the Petroleum Administration. The Council, on the request or approval of the Administrator, used these committees, both for the study of the special problems involved and for putting recommendations and orders into effect.

At the district level there was a Petroleum Administration office in charge of a director, whose function was to administer national policies and programmes within the district and act as the primary point of contact with the industry. The district structure was similar to that at the national level; there were the same five major functional divisions within the office with corresponding committees and, in addition, a District General Committee, composed of the chairmen of the five major committees with a general chairman. The purpose of the District General Committee was to assist in mobilising the resources of the industry and carrying out Petroleum Administration policies and programmes in the district. The five major functional committees were each composed of the most important companies in the district, up to a maximum of five.

All committees had both advisory and administrative responsibilities delegated to them by the Petroleum Administration through the district office, and were vested with authority in the district to make enquiries and utilise expert assistance. The district com-
mittees determined their own time and place of meeting, and were authorised, when necessary, to appoint temporary subcommittees on specific problems.

The relationship between the committees provided for by the Petroleum Administration for War was particularly interesting. Although the district committees served primarily to advise the local director, each functional committee maintained contact both with the district functional organisation, the national functional organisation and the national functional industry committee. Thus, for example, the 30 chairmen of the functional district industry committees were *ex officio* members of the Petroleum Industry War Council. Moreover, when, for example, a particular production question affected two or more districts, there were sometimes joint meetings of the production advisory committees of the districts concerned, which on occasion, also included the members of the national production committee. The general organisation of petroleum industry committees was based upon extensive decentralisation of responsibility to the functional committees in the different districts. The use of the various advisory committees at every level enabled representatives of the industry to contribute directly to the national and local administration of the P.A.W.¹

**CO-ORDINATION OF WAR AND POST-WAR PLANNING**

The central co-ordinating agency concerned with war and post-war planning initially the Office of War Mobilization and later the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, noted the contribution made by management and labour in the administrative agencies and in their own advisory committees, and considered this contribution in the recommendations for future action submitted to the President.

*Office of War Mobilization (O.W.M.)*

The O.W.M. was established by Executive Order in 1943, under the President's emergency powers, to provide for the more effective co-ordination of the mobilisation of the nation for war.² Its Director was advised by a general interdepartmental advisory committee; in addition, a number of other boards composed on an interdepart-


² Executive Order 9347 of 27 May 1943 established the Office of War Mobilization and Executive Order 9361 of 15 July 1943 expanded its functions to include co-ordination of Government agencies affecting foreign supply, foreign procurement and other foreign economic affairs in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States Executive Order 9488 of 3 October 1944 transferred its functions and staff to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
mental basis were appointed to deal with specific questions, such as unified contract termination, handling of surplus war property, and retraining and re-employment of persons discharged or released from the armed services or other work.\(^1\)

**Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (O.W.M.R.)**

The O.W.M.R. was set up by Act of Congress\(^2\) in October 1944 and placed under a Director who was advised by a representative Advisory Board, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The new office absorbed the old O.W.M., and was to supervise the activities of the Office of Contract Settlement, the Surplus War Property Administration and Surplus Property Policy Board, and the Retraining and Re-employment Administration. The Director was to be responsible for making the plans needed to effect the transition from war to peace, for guiding and co-ordinating the activities of Government agencies not under his direct supervision, for promoting the development of demobilisation and reconversion plans by all Government agencies, and for recommending legislation to Congress on reconversion. He was authorised to determine the need for simplification of the existing executive structure, and to study the relaxation or removal of emergency war controls. He was asked to institute a specific study of the functions of agencies working in the manpower field and to develop a programme for reorganising and consolidating these agencies to the fullest extent practicable. He was required by the Act to consult and co-operate with State and local Governments, industry, labour, agriculture and other groups concerning the problems of the transition from war to peace.

To carry out the requirement that the Director consult with industry, labour and agriculture, the Act provided for an Advisory Board of 12 members "to represent the general public and the public interest", including three with experience in business management, three in matters relating to labour and three with experience in agriculture; one of the other members was to be designated by the President as chairman.

It is clear from the legislative history of the Act under which the Board was established that Congress intended it to represent a

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\(^1\) A Retraining and Re-employment Administration assisted by an inter-departmental Retraining and Re-employment Policy Board had been established by Executive Order 9427 of 24 February 1944 within the Office of War Mobilization. The advisory board, as well as the general planning procedures of the Retraining and Re-employment Administration, were taken over by the independent agency set up by Act of Congress later in 1944. The agency was transferred to the Department of Labor by Executive Order 9617 of 19 September 1945.

\(^2\) War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944, signed on 3 October 1944. 58 Stat. 785.
cross-section of the American public and expected the Board's advice and recommendations to be in the interests of the nation as a whole.\(^1\)

Congress indicated in the Act that the general functions of the Board were to advise the Director with respect to war mobilisation and reconversion and to make such recommendations to him relating to legislation, policy and procedure as it deemed necessary. This general mandate meant that the effectiveness of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, like the Advisory Board of the Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization, depended to a substantial degree on the attitude of the Director towards consultative machinery.

In April 1945 when there was a change in the Directorship of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the Advisory Board took the opportunity to transmit to the President a letter formalising the Board's conviction of the value of industry, labour and agricultural co-operation in achieving war production, and the possibilities of attaining full employment and full use of national resources as the foundation for future world peace. In reply to this letter, President Roosevelt addressed to the Board a statement which was in fact the last he made on this subject. Because of its unique interest, his letter is reproduced in full.

The White House, Washington.
April 6, 1945.

Dear Max,

I am deeply grateful to the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion for its expression of faith — both in our war effort and in the necessity that our certain victory mean at home a peace-time economy far more abundant and productive than we have ever had before. You know how completely I agree. I want you to know also how much I appreciate the agreement of such Americans as compose your board.

We have been fortunate in finding in Justice Byrnes and Judge Vinson public servants equal to our great tasks. They emphasize, as do the members of your

\(^{1}\) The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944 resulted from Senate Bill 2051, 78th Congress. As that Bill originally passed the Senate it provided for an Advisory Board, the members of which were simply to "include three representatives of industry, three representatives of labour, three representatives of agriculture, and three public members, one of whom shall be chairman". The Report of the Conference between the Senate and the House contained the following statement on the subject:

"The principal difference between the Senate and the House provisions was that the membership of the Board, under the Senate provision, was to include representatives of different economic groups, while, under the House provision, all of the members of the Board were to represent the general public and the public interest, but its membership was to include persons with experience in different economic fields. This section in the Conference agreement follows the provisions of the House amendment."
board, that there has been no shrinkage in the stature and the spirit of the American. Indeed, I am sure that Americans who have done so much in the winning of the war have no doubt that we can give victory the rich meaning of full employment in the United States and of assistance to other nations in their reconstruction. Victory, without the use for abundance of the powers we have developed in production for war, would be, indeed, a hollow victory.

We must plan security and abundance together. Such a stronger American economy will be essential to carry out the responsibilities that lie in plans made at Bretton Woods, Hot Springs and Dumbarton Oaks. Similarly, abundance at home depends upon organization for order and security in the world.

America is fortunate to have such a reaffirmation of the uninterrupted tradition of an advancing America enunciated by men who represent great organizations of labor, industry and agriculture working together with others who represent the public. As such Americans chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate, you have well stated the program by which we fight a victorious war and seek a meaningful peace.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Honorable O. Max Gardner,
Chairman of the Advisory Board of the
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
Washington, D.C.

In April 1945, some alterations were made in the operation of the Advisory Board, with a view to enabling it to undertake more continuous constructive work. Under the new procedure, topics were set down in advance, and the secretariat prepared for the members reports on questions before the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, particularly those affecting inter-agency coordination. Representatives of the various agencies concerned were called in to explain their programmes to the Advisory Board and give to the various segments of society represented on it a picture of the problems which would come up in the final war period and during reconversion. At the meetings held between 1 April and the close of the war in Europe, the Advisory Board discussed military requirements between VE and VJ Day; reconversion food problems; and civilian requirements, wage, price and material controls, national tax problems and national wage policy—all in the reconversion period.

In the discussion of reconversion proposals there was a striking contrast between the proceedings of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and those of the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission. Although the two bodies included a number of the same people, there were fundamental differences in the form of membership and concept of operation. As was indicated earlier, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War
Manpower Commission met as representatives of their constituent organisations and the week-by-week advisory responsibility was carried, not by the principal members, but by alternates authorised to speak for them and for the organisations concerned. The members of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, on the other hand, sat as individuals contributing their knowledge but not purporting to represent any organisation or group. Thus members of the Board, as individuals advising the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, put forward views, and on a few occasions recommended proposals, which they themselves or other representatives of their organisations might not have accepted in their more strictly functional capacity as members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee. These contrasting concepts of advisory procedures were evident in the discussions of the two bodies regarding some of the proposals for relaxation of manpower controls during the transition period.

Finally, the fact that the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was set up by statutory authority, and based on the idea that administrative responsibility should be carried out in consultation with those having closer knowledge of the interests affected, may be of long-term significance in the development of consultative procedures designed to bring management and labour, into the framing of Government policy.

**Summary**

The methods of consultation resorted to by the various Government agencies described above may be classified under a number of types.

There was the more or less informal procedure of calling in, either individually or in groups, as occasion arose, persons qualified to give advice, either because their own experience in the field of management or labour enabled them to envisage the impact of any proposed action from the appropriate point of view, or because their position as businessmen, association representatives or labour leaders permitted them to speak for various interested groups. This procedure was used extensively by the Department of Labor and to a more limited extent by the procurement agencies.

Closely related to this method was the even more widespread practice of placing on the staff of the various agencies individuals able to make a personal contribution and to reflect the respective attitudes of labour and management because of previous association with one or the other group. This method was used to a very large extent by the procurement agencies, and to some extent by all the departments. Such individuals were Government employees
for the duration of their service; they were, in some instances, expected to carry technical responsibilities and at the same time to reflect the thinking of the interest from which they were drawn; in others, they were appointed primarily in order to fulfil a liaison role and speak for their groups in the departmental or interdepartmental discussions.

A more formal consultative procedure, used to the greatest extent by the Office of Price Administration and the Petroleum Administration for War, was the establishment of industry committees, patterned on the industry committees of the War Production Board but with more definite delegated authority, to bring representatives of individual industries into the formulation of agency programmes and sometimes into their application. Members of these committees were selected to provide full representation for each industry.

Complementing these procedures for consulting individual industry representatives were the more general labour advisory committees, such as those established by the Office of Price Administration to obtain the advice of labour in carrying out certain of its responsibilities, and the joint management-labour committees or separate management and labour groups set up by the Office of Defense Transportation with somewhat similar functions.

Finally, two different but related methods were used by the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion for obtaining the views of various functional groups regarding their respective duties. The Office of Economic Stabilization had an advisory board composed of nominees of Government departments, plus two representatives each of labour, management and agriculture. The individual members were appointed as representatives of their various interests, and expected to participate in this capacity. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was advised by a board composed of 12 members to represent the general public and the public interest, but selected on the grounds that three had experience in business management, three in labour matters and three in agriculture. The members served as individuals, and gave their advice not as representatives but on the basis of their specialised personal experience.

Each of these methods differs in some respect from the others and from the procedures used by the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board or the War Labor Board. No department used all the various procedures for consultation, and in view of the differing functions served, it is impossible to evaluate one as against another.
PART V

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER XVII

WARTIME METHODS OF LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

The similarities in the wartime organisation of labour-management consultation in the United States and in Great Britain derive generally from the determination of each country's Government to maintain customary democratic methods to the greatest possible degree. This meant acceptance of the concept that both labour and management must be consulted and, wherever possible, made an active participant in the taking of decisions directly affecting the mobilisation or utilisation of human or material resources. Democratic procedures in both nations, furthermore, meant not merely experimentation, willingness to alter methods according to changing needs, and progress largely by trial and error, but also unwillingness to rely upon preconceived plans or theories or even upon the experience gained in 1914-1918 and in the inter-war period. In both countries voluntary methods were drawn upon wherever possible. In Great Britain the effort was directed to keeping the greatest possible element of voluntaryism within a statutory framework permitting legal coercion where necessary. In the United States the emphasis was upon achieving mobilisation without sacrificing formal voluntary procedures, thereby avoiding acceptance of even a framework of legal obligations.


For a detailed description of the machinery of consultation used in Great Britain, see I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Series A (Industrial Relations), No. 43: British Joint Production Machinery (Montreal, 1944). See also, particularly in regard to methods of handling manpower mobilisation, Studies and Reports, Series C, No. 24: Wartime Transference of Labour in Great Britain (Montreal, 1942). For a fuller description of more recent developments in British methods of consultation, see International Labour Review, Vol. L, No. 6, Dec. 1944, p. 772; Vol. LI, No. 6, June 1945, pp. 759 and 766.
The contrasts, on the other hand, result from differences in the structure of government, from the varied degree of acceptance of collective industrial relations, from the widely divergent geography of the two countries, and from the different industrial situation and the different position in which the two civilian populations were placed. This last factor naturally produced different concepts both as to the need for tight emergency controls by Government and as to the possibilities for widespread co-operation by representatives of group interests which had been in conflict in peacetime. There could be no real substitute in the United States for the effect of the bombing of Great Britain in producing a unified approach and acceptance of the need for individual sacrifice by all elements of the community.

Wartime government in the United States was to a very considerable extent based upon the emergency executive powers of the President; with the consequence that emergency agencies were established, designed to carry special wartime responsibilities. By contrast, in Great Britain, manpower mobilisation was carried out on the basis of direct parliamentary action, with delegation of authority to existing Government departments wherever their machinery was adequate or could be adapted to new duties, and by the setting up of temporary departments only where there was no existing department which could suitably have its responsibilities increased or altered to meet wartime requirements. But in Great Britain as in the United States, the mobilisation of manpower and of industrial resources was the responsibility of several separate departments, with a consequent need for interdepartmental arrangements. The latter evolved along generally similar lines in the two countries.

Moreover, the acceptance by labour and management in Great Britain of legislative controls was conditioned by the existence of direct parliamentary responsibility of Ministers, of a political Labour Party, of a Coalition Government, in office from May 1940 until after the end of the war in Europe — a Government which included a trade union leader as Minister of Labour and National Service and a Conservative business leader as Minister of Production — and of a generally unified labour movement and nationally organised employers. This was in contrast to the situation in the United States. But, at the next stage, the British representatives of labour and management jointly assisted in the formulation and application of these controls, and they participated, in much the same way as did the representatives of labour and management in the United States under the system of solely voluntary co-operation, in securing the support and compliance necessary for the full war effort.
The wartime methods used to obtain labour and management participation, both by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, a permanent Government department given extended war duties and charged with mobilisation for the armed forces as well as for industry, and by the Ministry of Production, a temporary wartime department responsible for the co-ordination of production, were based upon a long-established procedure of consulting national trade union leaders and employers' representatives. It is this procedure which may be contrasted with the wartime methods improvised by the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board respectively in carrying out manpower mobilisation and war production in the United States.

The similarities between the methods of the two countries are greatest at the national level. The contrasts, resulting from different geographies and the existence of the Federal-State relationship in the United States, are more evident at the regional and area level, where the British procedures for interdepartmental co-ordination and labour-management consultation were more fully and easily integrated than those of the United States. Finally, the effect of the different degree of experience in industrial relations is most noticeable at the plant level, particularly in respect of the relationship of the joint production committees with trade union structure and with government machinery in Great Britain, which may be contrasted with the position of the United States labour-management committees in individual war plants.

National Consultation

Machinery for Consultation on Manpower

Bipartite consultative committees were used both by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission of the United States and by the Minister of Labour and National Service of Great Britain for obtaining the advice of employers' and workers' representatives in carrying out their respective functions. The work of the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission was generally similar to that of the National Joint Advisory Council — or the smaller group of this Council, the Joint Consultative Committee — of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. However, there were significant differences in their status, composition, functions, and methods of operation which reflect somewhat the difference in the way in which the two agencies were organised.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee, although initially established by administrative action of the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission, was subsequently given more formal status by an Executive Order of President Roosevelt which required the Chairman to consult with the Committee. The advisory committees of the Ministry of Labour and National Service were set up by the Minister, in agreement with the employers' and trade union organisations, to provide a wartime instrument for extending the customary practice of calling on employers' and workers' representatives for their opinions on all questions affecting them.

The membership of the committees in the two countries was also determined on a somewhat different basis. Initially the Management-Labor Policy Committee consisted of persons selected by the Chairman to represent management and labour\(^1\); ultimately, on the Committee's own initiative, it was reconstituted to comprise nine members, known as the principal members, and nine alternate members, three of each group being nominated by national organisations of labour, agriculture, and industrial management. The National Joint Advisory Council consisted of thirty members appointed by the Minister of Labour and National Service shortly after the outbreak of war, half of them on the nomination of the Trades Union Congress and half on the nomination of the British Employers' Confederation. The Joint Consultative Committee, set up by the new Minister of Labour and National Service after the formation of the Coalition Government in May 1940, was composed of fourteen members, half nominated by the Trades Union Congress and half by the British Employers' Confederation. It was made smaller than the Council to enable the Minister to consult it more easily and frequently. In neither country were women included as regular members of the consultative committees, but they were appointed to special women's advisory committees, aiding respectively the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and the Minister of Labour and National Service.

Both the United States and the British committees were entirely advisory in character, there being no obligation upon the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission or the Minister of Labour and National Service to accept their recommendations. The two committees sometimes interpreted their respective functions somewhat differently. The purpose of the British committee was to provide an opportunity for the representatives of the employers' and workers' organisations which composed its membership to meet with the Minister in order to give him the views of their organisations on questions of policy, to assist him in the framing of any orders and regulations, and to draw his attention to any difficulties which might result from his proposals. The members also used the

\(^1\) See Chapter II.
occasion of a meeting to bring forward the views of their respective organisations on various questions arising out of wartime manpower mobilisation.

The functions of the United States committee, as defined under the Executive Order establishing it and as developed by practice, were primarily to advise the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission on all policy matters, to express the opinion of the organisations represented by its members regarding manpower problems, and to make any recommendations it wished to the Chairman. Moreover, it undertook to assist the War Manpower Commission in carrying out certain tasks related to the application of policies; it was on occasion willing to serve almost as an administrative arm or agent of the War Manpower Commission; it protested if its advice was not accepted by the Chairman. Furthermore, it had a semi-judicial function in that it recommended to the Chairman what action he should take on any appeal from the application of any War Manpower Commission regulation to individuals (workers or employers) which came to the Chairman through the established appeal procedure. The Committee itself had a significant role in formulating these appeal provisions. Its appeal function gave it a unique influence upon the impact of the whole manpower programme on individual employers and workers throughout the nation. Finally, the Committee had a major part in making manpower mobilisation possible in the United States through voluntary nation-wide acceptance of the policies and procedures framed by the War Manpower Commission.

The methods of operation followed by the United States and the British committees respectively reflect the divergence in the responsibilities which they assumed. Except on rare occasions, the British Minister of Labour and National Service presided over the Joint Consultative Committee. There was no formal provision either for substitute members of the Committee or for replacing the Minister by a member of his staff. The agenda was usually circulated in advance, partly to enable the members to discuss the items with their respective organisations so that when they gave their views to the Minister they could speak for British labour and British management as a whole. If the members desired technical assistance or secretarial aid in preparing for a discussion, such assistance was normally obtained from their respective organisations, that is, the Trades Union Congress or the British Employers' Confederation. There was no provision for giving the Committee staff assistance in the Ministry of Labour and National Service, nor for direct participation of its members in the actions of the Ministry as such. Furthermore, the Committee seldom attemp-
ted to arrive at a formal decision on any item on the agenda or to take a formal vote on any question. Members of the Committee issued no public statements and did not draw up reports based on its discussions.

This whole type of procedure is in contrast with the practice developed deliberately by the United States Management-Labor Policy Committee, in agreement with the War Manpower Commission. There, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and the principal members met together only on special occasions or to deal with particularly difficult problems; the alternate members and the Committee's own officers met regularly to discuss questions placed on the agenda by the Committee's Executive Secretary, in consultation with the Deputy Chairman and other members of the operating staff of the War Manpower Commission. In order that a committee so constituted, of principal members who were only convened to meetings occasionally and alternate members who met regularly and who were supposed to be available for consultation at any time, might be able to carry on its work effectively, a special procedure was devised for arriving at decisions. Any decision reached by the alternate members had to be unanimous; if unanimity could not be obtained, the question had to be referred to the principals; if the principals were not in agreement, the majority and minority views would both be submitted to the Chairman to enable him to know the views of each member.

Although the Committee remained an advisory body to the Chairman, it became a semi-independent unit within the War Manpower Commission agency, having its own office space and staff, including "executive assistants", responsible for providing the Committee with technical information on manpower problems and serving the separate group members, and receiving any necessary secretarial assistance. The Committee, moreover, was neither wholly integrated with the operating staff of the agency nor wholly separate from it; its executive assistants participated in staff meetings whenever they so desired, with full access to the agency's records and operations. The Committee adopted formal reports for submission to the Chairman, and on occasion made public its own views or the views of individual members on problems submitted to it by the Chairman or raised in the Committee on its own initiative. The principal members or their alternates were each named to represent an organisation; taken together, the organisations composed the major organised portion of United States industry, labour and agriculture. However, in contrast to the British structure, where the close industrial organisation enabled the trade union members to speak for labour in general and the employer
members to speak for management in general, each of the United States committee members spoke for a particular organisation. This contrast is a reflection not so much of a difference in administrative methods as of the degree of industrial organisation of the two countries.

Consultation on Production

A number of methods were used both in Great Britain and in the United States to provide for the participation of management and labour representatives in the machinery for production planning. In both countries, the production machinery underwent repeated reorganisation in the course of the war, and the procedure for employer and worker collaboration also was altered at different phases in the war effort.

In the early stages of British war organisation, the co-ordination of production was obtained primarily by means of an interdepartmental committee, the Production Executive\(^1\) (presided over by the Minister of Labour and National Service), to which was attached a Central Production Advisory Committee, composed of thirteen employers' representatives selected by the Federation of British Industries and the British Employers' Confederation, and thirteen workers' representatives selected by the Trades Union Congress. In addition, an Advisory Trade Union Committee was available for consultation by the Ministry of Supply and the Air Ministry.

This whole structure proved inadequate, and early in 1942 a new Ministry was created and a single Minister of Production appointed, charged with responsibility for the co-ordination of war production as a whole. To advise him in determining production policies, the Minister established an interdepartmental committee (replacing the Production Executive), which was somewhat similar to the interdepartmental War Production Board whose Chairman was in charge of production planning in the United States.

To associate representatives of employers and workers on a consultative basis in the framing of policy, the Minister of Production also appointed a National Production Advisory Council. This Council differed in composition and functions from the earlier Central Production Advisory Committee, and also from the Joint Consultative Committee of the Minister of Labour and National Service, in that it included, along with national representatives of the employers' and trade union organisations, the vice-chairmen (who were either employers' or workers' representatives) of the eleven regional production boards, which will be described below.

\(^1\) A still earlier Production Council had been in operation from May 1940 until Jan. 1941, under the chairmanship of a Minister without portfolio.
Furthermore, because the National Production Advisory Council covered production questions that arose at the regional level, as well as advising the Minister of Production on general production matters, its meetings were usually attended also by the other Ministers concerned with war organisation, or their representatives. The Council, at regular monthly meetings, discussed the development of the production machinery, both national and regional, and the gearing-in of the advisory machinery in the field of production, from the joint production committees in the factories, through the district and regional organisation, to the national level. The representation on the Council of the regional boards meant that the national decisions could be taken with full knowledge of their effect on the industrial groups participating in the regional organisation.

There was no full counterpart in the United States to the National Production Advisory Council, for in practice neither the Chairman of the War Production Board nor the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission made any arrangement for regular consultation at the national level with members of the labour or management representatives serving on regional or area committees. The procedures used at the national level by the War Production Board were, as in Great Britain, developed in the course of a series of reorganisations, the final structure having been completed following the appointment of a new Chairman in the winter of 1944. Although at one time the Chairman of the War Production Board established a Labor-Management Council, composed of representatives of the national trade union federations and the leading general employers' associations, to advise him on production questions, this Council, which had been intended to be somewhat analogous to the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, did not in practice have great effect.

While the interdepartmental policy-making and administrative committees meeting under the Chairman of the War Production Board did not include employers' or workers' representatives in their membership, several of the Vice-Chairmen of the War Production Board and substantial numbers of their staff were drawn directly from either a management or a labour background; as was pointed out in earlier chapters, the points of view of labour and management were thus expressed through membership on the staff rather than through regular joint advisory committees.

In addition, a different type of consultative procedure was

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1 See Chapter IX.
2 See, in particular, Chapters I, VII and IX.
evolved through the use of a series of separate industry advisory committees and of labour advisory committees, appointed, under a formalised procedure, to contribute the point of view of industry and of labour respectively on the war production problems affecting particular industries. The functions of these committees and their relationship to the officials of the War Production Board were carefully defined to take into account the legal restrictions of the anti-trust legislation preventing any action which might be considered a combination in restraint of trade. The industry advisory committees and labour advisory committees generally met separately, primarily because of the belief, voiced most often by the management representatives on the committees and by the staff members drawn from a management background, that joint meetings would not be effective. This point of view was never accepted by the members of the labour advisory committees, nor by many of the officials of the staff on leave from positions in the labour movement.

An interesting feature of the work of some of the labour advisory committees was that on occasion the members considered themselves to be speaking for consumers' interests rather than solely as representatives of labour in the industry concerned. Thus they urged low-priced models, standardisation of products, etc., not because these affected labour directly in the industry, but because they were important to low-income consumers' groups throughout the country. In these cases the labour members served to fill a vacuum caused in many cases by inadequate representation of consumers' interests.

Although in Great Britain there was nothing exactly parallel to the use made of the industry advisory committees or the labour advisory committees by the War Production Board, some similarity could be noted between the industry committees of the War Production Board and some of the specialised committees established

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1 For a full description of these committees, see Chapter X.
2 The Office of Price Administration made use of three methods for obtaining industry, labour, and consumer co-operation, described in Chapter XVI. Industry advisory committees, generally similar in structure and methods of operation to the War Production Board industry advisory committees, were established to aid in determining price fixing. A Labor Policy Committee, with a Labor Office to service it, advised the Administrator at the national level on all questions affecting labour, and, in particular, regarding rationing and related matters; labour advisory committees, assisted by labour consultants, served at the regional and district levels. Consumer advisory committees were appointed at the various levels with the specific function of representing the consumers' point of view, particularly in discussions of price fixing and rationing. In Great Britain, the Central Price Regulation Committee established by the Board of Trade included trade union representatives and also a representative of the co-operative movement, who were presumed to represent consumers. Similarly, the Ministry of Food had a Trade Union Advisory Committee. Trade union representation on both general and special committees dealing with rationing and price fixing was particularly effective in putting forward the needs of the consumer.
by the Board of Trade to deal with the reconversion of certain industries to peacetime needs. These committees included in their functions the making of recommendations regarding availability of supplies and raw materials, problems arising out of the wartime system of licensing, and other related matters referred to them from time to time by the President of the Board of Trade. In addition, there were special trade union advisory committees appointed by various ministries, and, in particular, by the Minister of Reconstruction, for obtaining trade union advice in a manner not unlike that in which advice was made available by the labour advisory committees.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the organisation of many of the individual industry controls in the various separate supply ministries, as well as the Ministry of Production, in Great Britain was based on the lending of individuals from private industry under procedures very much like those used in the United States for the staffing of the industry and related production divisions of the War Production Board. Similarly, there was some use in Great Britain — though on a smaller scale — of individuals on the staff of various ministries drawn from a labour background or serving on leave from union positions.

**Tripartite Methods of Settling Disputes and Determining Working Conditions**

The machinery established in the United States and Great Britain for the wartime settlement of industrial disputes was fully tripartite in structure. Similar voluntary agreements were reached by representatives of management and of labour for the setting up of wartime machinery to avoid industrial disputes and stoppages of work. But in this field, too, there were differences in the methods used, and in particular, as regards the scope of the activities covered by the agencies concerned.

Consultations carried out by the Minister of Labour and National Service in Great Britain had led to a unanimous agreement to outlaw strikes and lockouts for the duration of the war and to settle disputes by peaceful means. On the recommendation of the employers' and workers' representatives on the Joint Consultative Committee, the Minister put this agreement into effect through the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940\(^1\), which provided for the continuation of existing methods of negotiation of wages and other working conditions, for the obligatory observance by employers of recognised terms and conditions of employment, and for the setting up of a National Arbitration

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\(^1\) Cf. I.L.O.: *Legislative Series*, 1941, G.B. 3 (B).
Tribunal, composed of representatives of employers, workers and impartial public members, which was authorised to arbitrate on matters in dispute. The Tribunal might, however, only be referred to after failure of the voluntary methods for the settlement of disputes.

It was not found necessary in Great Britain, even in wartime, for the Government to intervene in the normal processes of collective bargaining and in the settlement of wage questions. The result was that, although there were a number of short strikes or threats of strikes, and although there were rises in wage rates, the voluntary agreement by the national organisations not to permit industrial disputes that would interfere with the war effort and not to insist upon extreme rises in wages was sufficient to maintain the situation without additional Government intervention. It should be noted, however, that basically it was not necessary to put a ceiling on wage rates, partly because the wage adjustments sought, and the differences in wage rates themselves, fell within a relatively limited span, and partly because of the application of other types of control, including employment restrictions and price fixing, as well as a strict rationing system and other measures affecting the general economy. In general, the United States accepted more wartime control over wages and Great Britain accepted more control over employment.

In the United States, immediately after Pearl Harbor, a national conference of employers’ and workers’ representatives, convened to formulate a wartime labour relations policy, accepted a no-strike, no-lockout pledge and urged the establishment of machinery for the avoidance of disputes. As a result, the President established the tripartite War Labor Board, which was made responsible initially for the settlement of industrial disputes, but whose functions were extended to control wage rate changes, even when such changes were desired by both employers and workers. Its full tripartite structure meant an extension of responsibility by a tripartite agency into fields not previously open to these methods in the United States. The functions of the War Labor Board were wider than those of the British National Arbitration Tribunal, because, as already indicated, the scope of that body was limited to supplementing already existing instruments for the collective arbitration and settlement of disputes (which included voluntary arbitration machinery as well as an Industrial Court).

The structure of the War Labor Board was generally similar to that of the National Arbitration Tribunal, since the Board was composed of representatives of employers, representatives of

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1 See Chapters I and XV.
workers, and representatives of the public, defined in a broad sense. However, the public members of the War Labor Board had many of the functions and attributes of Government officials in view of the administrative duties of the Board, even though they were selected not on the basis of Government experience but as representatives of the public, and were drawn from universities, legal work, and various other professional activities. The tripartite structure was maintained throughout the operation of the War Labor Board, affecting each step in the settlement of disputes and most stages in the settlement of voluntary stabilisation cases, whether at the national or the regional level, and whether in the preliminary or in the final stage. The experience thus gained throughout the country during the war may, in the long run, affect the development of industrial relations and the methods of collective bargaining in the United States.

There was no exact parallel to this experience in Great Britain, since the National Arbitration Tribunal only came into operation, as indicated earlier, when normal processes of collective bargaining broke down, and since it was built upon existing practice rather than constituting an innovation in procedure.

REGIONAL AND AREA CONSULTATION

The most marked contrasts between the British and United States methods were apparent at the regional and area levels, and it was here that the procedures used by the various separate wartime agencies in the United States showed the greatest diversity.

A first basic cause of difference was purely geographical — the size of the units covered. A British region comprised a territory which was somewhere between the United States definition of a region and of an industrial or labour market area. There was nothing in Great Britain corresponding to the State, and consequently, there were none of the complications caused by the existence of separate State administrations. The British region became a significant administrative unit during the war, when for defence purposes in case of invasion the country was divided under regional commissioners. The central Government departments established machinery in civil defence regions, to which they delegated responsibility for the application of policies initially formulated at the national level.

A second distinction lay in the different extent to which the regional boundaries of the various departments were co-ordinated in the two countries. Some departments in Great Britain, as in the United States, possessed some kind of regional organisation at the outbreak of war and before the establishment of the civil
defence regions. For example, the Ministry of Labour and National Service had well-established regional machinery under the direction of regional controllers, to whom had been delegated, *inter alia*, responsibility for supervising the operation of the local employment exchanges. The boundaries of the civil defence regions were generally based upon those of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. A number of other permanent departments, such as the Ministry of Health, maintained a substantial regional organisation. The supply departments during the initial phases of the war were highly centralised, their field representatives having comparatively little authority and being stationed in the field with little regard to the regional structure of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. One of the significant changes made in the course of reorganisation to meet intensified production needs, following an investigation of the regional structure, was the requirement that the regional arrangements of the various departments should be co-ordinated. With some slight alterations, the regional structure of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, as the department with the most fully developed local offices, was taken as the basis for the regional structure. The regional boundaries of other departments, therefore, were brought into conformity wherever possible. Subsequently, efforts were made to bring the regional structure of the different departments into as close correspondence as possible in order to facilitate interdepartmental contact at the regional level.¹

In the United States the various regional boundaries were never entirely co-ordinated. Those of the War Manpower Commission followed the regions established before the war by the Social Security Board (which took into consideration State lines), while the regional boundaries of the War Production Board and of the War Labor Board were each slightly different (in some cases taking into consideration the distribution of production rather than State lines). The War Department, the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the various other departments dealing with particular aspects of labour supply and production frequently maintained their own regional structure, determined according to the location of industry and various other service or supply requirements, without necessarily taking into consideration the regional boundaries of other agencies. While this did not cause serious difficulty, it inevitably meant less ease of consultation and, in some cases, difficulties in ensuring full and regular co-operation between the departments at the regional level. This in turn, as will be seen

¹ This was not, however, achieved in all instances (cf. *British Joint Production Machinery, op. cit.*, pp. 53-55).
below, also affected in some cases the procedures for consulting management and labour.

The basic difference between the regional structure in the United States and in Great Britain, however, was not merely the different type of interdepartmental co-ordination, but the use of different procedures for consulting management and labour at the regional, the State, and the area levels. In both countries the procedures used changed in the course of the war, but in Great Britain greater co-ordination, and more complete integration of responsibility, was ultimately achieved, particularly in regard to regional administrative problems, between the representatives of employers and workers and the representatives of various departments. This intimate co-operation of Government representatives with group interest representatives was a significant development resulting from the British wartime decentralisation of authority to the regional level. The way it was achieved may therefore be compared with the developments in the United States.

**Regional Consultation in Great Britain**

The British regional consultative organisation, as it finally emerged in 1942, consisted of a central tripartite board in each region, which, meeting under the chairmanship of the regional controller of the Minister of Production, included in its membership the regional controller of the Minister of Labour and National Service, the regional representatives of all the supply departments, and of the other departments, including the Board of Trade, whose activities affected labour supply or production, along with three employers' representatives and three labour representatives. The officers of each regional board consisted of the chairman, two vice-chairmen (one selected from the employers' and one from the workers' members), and a secretary appointed from the regional staff of the Ministry of Production. The participation of one of the employers' or workers' vice-chairmen, as already indicated, in the National Production Advisory Council, ensured relationship between the regional boards and the national consultative machinery.

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1 Cf. *British Joint Production Machinery*, op. cit., pp. 17-21 and 53 et seq., for a description of the evolution of the British regional machinery and the work of the special committee of enquiry which had been appointed by the Minister of Production and was composed of employers' and workers' representatives under the chairmanship of the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress. This committee was largely responsible for the final structure of the regional organisation. After investigating the situation, it reported to the Minister, stressing the importance of linking the regional machinery, on the one hand, to the national production machinery, and, on the other hand, to the joint production committees that were being set up at that time in individual workshops. In addition, it recommended much greater delegation of authority by all departments to the regional level.
In 1942, each department substantially increased the degree of devolution of authority to its representatives on the regional boards and to the boards as a whole, thus bringing the employers' and workers' representatives on the boards directly into both policy making and administration at the regional level. Furthermore, as the minutes of all the regional boards were sent not only to the headquarters of the Ministry of Production and of the other departments concerned, but also to the headquarters of the trade unions and the employers' associations, any questions of special interest arising in a given regional board could be considered by the trade unions and employers' organisations, and brought up for discussion before the National Production Advisory Council of the Minister of Production.

Operating under the jurisdiction of the regional boards, district committees composed of employers' and workers' representatives were established, working in conjunction with the district offices of the Ministry of Production, to aid in the solution of labour and production problems and to provide machinery for consultation at the local level. These committees dealt particularly with such questions as the use of available productive capacity, arrangements for part-time work, transport problems, shopping needs, and similar local issues.

The experience of the regional boards and, in particular, of their methods for consultation of employers and workers was considered of such value in Great Britain that the Board of Trade, early in 1945, decided to strengthen its own regional structure and to continue to work with the regional boards in carrying out proposals for the reconversion of industry to peacetime production.

Regional and Area Consultation in the United States

No machinery in the United States corresponded exactly to a British regional board and its district committees. A parallel, for purposes of comparison, would be a mixture of a regional, a State and an area management-labor committee of the War Manpower Commission, an area manpower priorities committee — the interdepartmental committee which met under the chairmanship of an area director of the War Manpower Commission — and a production urgency committee — the interdepartmental group which met under the chairmanship of the district manager of the War Production Board. The structure, methods of operation, and activities of these various committees, as described in earlier chapters, changed from time to time in the course of the war and a pattern of inter-

\(^1\) Described in Chapters III, IV and V.
\(^2\) Described in Chapter VII.
\(^3\) See Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII and IX.
relationship between them was developed. Nevertheless, in con­
trast to the British machinery, although all the committees were
advisory in character, they remained separately constituted com­
mittees with defined independent functions. This structure may
be recapitulated briefly in order to note the contrast with the
British machinery.

Each of the twelve regional directors of the War Manpower
Commission was advised by a management-labour committee,
meeting under his chairmanship and composed of an equal number
(usually five) of outstanding employers on the one hand and of
representatives of the American Federation of Labor (A.F. of L.),
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), and the railway
labour organisations, on the other, appointed by the Chairman of
the War Manpower Commission, after approval by the national
Management-Labor Policy Committee. Each of the 300-odd
area (and in some cases, State) manpower directors was advised
by a management-labour committee, constituted as a rule in the
same way and consisting of two or four representatives of industrial
management and one or two representatives of the A.F. of L.
and the C.I.O. respectively, with, when necessary, an additional
representative of the railway labour organisations and a representa­
tive of railway management (in a few areas special representatives
of agriculture were also included). The members of the area com­
mittees were appointed by the regional director, on the nomination
of appropriate groups in the area and after consultation with the
regional committees. Each area (and, where necessary, State) man­
power director was also advised by a manpower priorities committee,
composed of representatives of the War Production Board, the
procurement agencies, and other departments directly concerned
with manpower problems. Each district manager of the War
Production Board (a district corresponding in most cases to a man­
power area) was advised by a production urgency committee,
composed in most cases of the same members as constituted the
manpower priorities committee.

Basically, each regional management-labour committee was to
assist the regional director and to serve as a liaison agency between
the regional director and the management and labour groups it was
designed to represent. Each area management-labour committee
served somewhat the same purpose at the area level, and, in parti­
cular, assisted the local application of manpower programmes,
ensuring full co-operation between the area director and the com­
unity. The role given to the area manpower priorities committee
was essentially that of furnishing the area director with advice and
the technical information needed for the allotment of available
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

manpower to those establishments whose war production was in greatest need of workers. The purpose of the production urgency committee was to provide the information needed on the relative urgency of the items being produced by the establishments in an area. In general, therefore, the interdepartmental advisory committees, whether under the sponsorship of the War Production Board or of the War Manpower Commission, were devised to provide an interchange of technical information, first, on production needs, and then on the manpower available to meet these needs. The management-labour committee, by contrast, had a general policy-making function and was concerned with the effect on both labour and management of the operations carried out by the War Manpower Commission. Inter-relationship between the committees, both horizontally and vertically, was assured by the respective regional and area directors of the War Manpower Commission and the regional directors and district managers of the War Production Board.

It was never deemed advisable in the United States to provide for extensive formal direct relations between the committees, or to combine them in the manner of the British regional boards. However, the provisions made in 1945 for closer co-operation between the national and regional management-labour committees of the War Manpower Commission and for more regular joint meetings at the area level between the management-labour committees and the manpower priorities committees indicated a development somewhat along the lines of the reorganisation that took place in Great Britain in 1942 to obtain closer national and regional co-operation between departments and with employers and workers, under the auspices of the Ministry of Production. In both cases the increased responsibility delegated to local levels constituted an important factor in manpower mobilisation and production organisation and gave wide significance to the role of the local representatives of management and labour.

In some respects, moreover, more responsibility was given to the management and labour representatives, on both regional and on area committees, in the United States than in Great Britain, since, at least in the field of manpower, the United States committees played a substantial part in the formulation of policy and its adaptation to local needs. Particularly in some regions where the management-labour committees were sometimes given more than a purely consultative role, or where committee members were consulted by the regional director on a wide variety of issues, or where the committees assumed a full measure of responsibility for interpreting the manpower programme to the community and
for ensuring that employers and workers complied with the pro-
gramme, their contribution to the whole labour supply programme
was a basic factor in its success.

Similarly, at the area level, the work of the management-labour
committees in advising upon the formulation of employment stabi-
lisation plans, in serving as a link between the community and the
War Manpower Commission, and in dealing with the varied prob-
lems raised by wartime manpower mobilisation proved the extent
to which bipartite consultative procedures could be utilised through-
out the country. Close integration was particularly evident where
the area director used members of the management-labour com-
mittee to assist him in various kinds of activities, including not only
the general furtherance of manpower programmes, but relations
with particular employers and particular trade unions and general
aid in the application of policy. This type of labour supply activity
was not undertaken to such a substantial extent by the British
labour or management members of the tripartite regional boards and
only on occasion by their tripartite district committees since their
duties were more related to production. Finally, the very significant
appeal functions\(^1\) of both regional and area management-labour
committees in the United States had no exact counterpart under
the British system, where appeals were dealt with in a different
manner. Partly because manpower mobilisation in Great Britain
was carried out on the basis of legislation, including direct legal
sanctions and penalties, appeals against a direction of a national
service officer were taken first to a tripartite local appeal board
and then to officials of the Ministry of Labour and National Service.
In general, the procedure was more closely akin to the judicial
system than to the type of system developed in the United States.\(^2\)

However, not all the regional or area management-labour com-
mittees participated to the same degree in the formulation and
application of the manpower programme in the United States.
Moreover, in the War Production Board there was no structure for
joint consultation at the regional and area levels corresponding to
that of the War Manpower Commission. Whereas the use of the
British regional boards brought labour and management representa-
tives into direct contact with production problems, in the United
States consultation on production matters was customarily carried
out by placing on the staff of the regional and district offices of the
War Production Board persons drawn from a management and a
labour background.\(^3\)

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1 Described in Chapter VIII.
2 Cf. Wartime Transference of Labour in Great Britain, op. cit., pp. 96-99, for a
description of the British appeals machinery.
3 Described in Chapter IX.
Both at the regional and at the area level the different concepts of the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board as to methods for obtaining management and labour participation were evident. As at the national level, the War Manpower Commission established advisory management-labour committees parallel in function and in structure with the national Management-Labor Policy Committee, while the War Production Board had recourse to individuals with a management or labour background to represent their respective points of view.

The War Labor Board, in its regional organisation, carried out the tripartite structure, its regional procedures following the pattern of collaboration established at the national level.¹ The British National Arbitration Tribunal, instead of decentralising its work to the regional level, held sittings in various parts of the country in order to overcome the inconvenience of calling the parties to London, and, for the same reason, in some instances stationed some of its members, or substitute members, in distant parts of the country. The adoption of this procedure in place of establishing a full regional structure was feasible since the Tribunal's burden of work, as a court of last resort, was lighter than that of the War Labor Board.

Furthermore, at the area or local level in both countries widespread participation of labour officials was called for in the administration of rationing and price control. The membership of trade unionists on local war price and rationing boards, on price panels, on district labour advisory committees, and as union members on consumer advisory committees in the United States was clearly comparable to the role of British trade unionists on the local price regulation committees and local food control committees.

**Consultation in the Factory**

At the factory level the sharpest contrasts result from the different structure of industrial relations in the two countries. In Great Britain joint production committees, whose primary aim was to increase output in each war plant, were set up under the sponsorship, and often on the initiative, of the trade unions. The committees in particular factories were established in accordance with one or other of two types of national agreement, negotiated by the trade unions either with representatives of the Government or with national employers' federations. The agreements between the engineering trade unions and the Government — in particular, the Ministry of Supply — covered Government-owned and Government-operated plants. An agreement with the National Allied and

¹ Described in Chapter XV.
Engineering Employers' Federation covered the majority of private employers in direct war employment, notably, the metal trades and shipyards. A separate and somewhat different arrangement covered coal mines, in view of the partial Government control of the industry. Other agreements between the trade unions and federations of employers dealt with certain other separate industries.¹

The British joint production committees had a definite relationship to the regional board structure, so that if any committee met with difficulty in solving a problem, or if there was disagreement as to the nature of a problem, the issue could be brought before the tripartite regional board for consideration; if the regional board did not reach a satisfactory solution, provision was made for taking the problem to the National Production Advisory Council, or to the headquarters machinery (which in most instances included some advisory tripartite or joint committee) of whatever supply department was directly concerned with contracts in, or the operation of, the particular plant. Furthermore, this same procedure was used not only in case of complaints or difficulties, but also for transmitting positive suggestions or proposals involving action by an authority with wider competence than that of an individual plant.

There was no corresponding formal arrangement in the United States for carrying the complaints or difficulties of a joint plant committee to any bipartite or tripartite regional committee², nor was there any parallel to the other procedures for associating the joint plant production committees with the regional boards and the National Production Advisory Council. However, there is a basis for comparing the work of various British Government departments — and notably the Ministry of Production — in encouraging the operation of plant committees with the activities of the United States War Production Drive headquarters and its regional representatives. The purpose of the War Production Drive was to promote the establishment of plant production committees, to register committees and their officers, and to render service and assistance to the committees through making information available to all concerned, through direct aid, and through the transmission of any suggestions or complaints to the appropriate authorities. The staff of the British Ministry of Production undertook some of these functions, encouraging the establishment of

¹ For texts of these agreements, see British Joint Production Machinery, op. cit., Appendix III, and for later amendments, International Labour Review, Vol. LI, No. 6, June 1945, p. 767.
² The closest analogy in the United States to this British provision was the appeal procedure referred to above, of the War Manpower Commission, enabling any employer or worker affected by a programme or action of the War Manpower Commission to appeal through a series of joint committees, first at the area, then at the regional, and, finally, at the national level.
committees, enquiring whether committees had in fact been set up in individual factories, keeping records of the committees' officers and of any problems that were referred by the committees to the regional boards. But the Ministry took the view that it was unwise to take too detailed an interest in the operating of these committees, believing that they were more likely to secure effective collaboration between employers and workers if they were not subject to official supervision. Detailed assistance to the individual committees, and practical help in enabling them to carry on in the most effective manner possible, was considered to be the responsibility of the national and local employers' organisations and trade unions.

Moreover, the British joint production committees were more directly linked than the United States committees to the normal machinery of collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. Although the functions of joint production committees in Great Britain were more rigidly defined even than in the United States to exclude any "matters which are trade questions, such as wages, and like subjects, or which are covered by agreements with trade unions or are normally dealt with by the approved machinery of negotiation and discussion", the establishment and practical operation of the committees were more directly related to the collective bargaining machinery. The trade unions watched closely the working of the individual committees, and provided machinery for the examination of complaints, for giving assistance and even "schooling" to the trade union members of the committees, and for relating the committees to the district trade union machinery.

The plant production committees in the United States were also warmly endorsed by the labour movement, and their functions defined to exclude questions covered by collective agreements or by existing machinery of negotiation. But in many cases the unions, particularly in their local organisation, took less responsibility than the British unions for ensuring that their committee members made the greatest possible contribution to each plant committee. Although no special trade union machinery was created by the unions in the United States to assist the work of these committees, the most successful committees were in plants where unions were strong and the setting up of committees was favoured.

Furthermore, a larger proportion of British industry was covered by joint production committees than was the case in the United States, primarily as a result of the greater degree of industrial organisation and of the extent to which the national agreements between the workers' and employers' organisations (as well as between the trade unions and the Government) were able to ensure the setting up of such committees in individual factories throughout the country.
Although the definition of the responsibilities of the factory committees in the two countries was generally similar, in practice there was some difference in general emphasis in the activities undertaken by the committees. In the United States, partly because of the distance of war factories from the actual battle operations, the committees necessarily devoted a larger part of their work to problems of morale, war incentives, and proving to the individual worker the relationship of his own job to the war effort. As part of this last problem, and as a means of obtaining greater productive efficiency, the various Government departments gave substantial encouragement to the idea that the committees should concern themselves with suggestion systems. In Great Britain, there was a tendency to consider morale activities, and in some cases even suggestion systems, as of less importance than general discussions in the committee of specific production problems, such as the reasons for delays or difficulties in production, the allocation and utilisation of manpower within the factory, and facilities for enabling greater output to be obtained from the labour force available to the factory.

Reconversion and Post-War Use of Consultative Techniques

Since much of the machinery for labour-management consultation described here was built upon emergency needs and wartime conditions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess how far it could be adapted to peacetime organisation. In this connection an additional advisory agency in the United States may be mentioned in order to round out the general picture. The Act of 3 October 1944 which established the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, headed by a Director, also provided for an Advisory Board to “advise with the Director with respect to war mobilisation and reconversion, and make to him such recommendations, relating to legislation, policies, and procedures as it may deem necessary”. This Board “shall consist of twelve members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”. And the Act proceeds to specify that “all of the members of the Board shall represent the general public and the public interest, but in order that the Board may have the benefit of experience in the matters with which it will deal under this Act, three members of the Board shall have had experience in business management, three members shall have had experience in matters relating to labour, and three members shall have had experience in agriculture”.

1 78th Congress, Public Law 458; see Chapter XVI for a fuller description of the work of the Advisory Board.
The composition of the Board as determined by the Act is thus different from that of any of the other advisory agencies described in this survey, in that its members were appointed not as representatives of management or labour or agriculture, but rather as representatives of the public interest having particular experience in each of these fields. Although in fact many of the individuals serving on this Advisory Board were also principal members of the national Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission, and of other advisory agencies, the attitude taken by them on these various bodies was not necessarily the same, because of the difference both in the capacities in which they served and in the functions of the various agencies. Furthermore, as members of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion they advised the Director on several occasions concerning the reconversion policies proposed by the various wartime agencies, such as the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board, the War Labor Board, and the Office of Price Administration, which were charged with formulating and applying specific policies in their various fields affecting both wartime and transitional employment and production matters.

There was no body in Great Britain comparable to the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. The nearest parallel was the joint committee of employers' and workers' representatives appointed by the Minister of Reconstruction, but the part it played, at least up to the break-up of the Coalition Government, was not extensive.

The significant conclusion to be drawn is not based on the obvious contrasts in the detailed procedures developed, but on the basic similarity of intent underlying the wartime experiments in the two democratic nations. In spite of the difference in distance from the battle fronts, in the impact of the war on the civilian economy, in the structure of industrial relations, and in the form of government — differences which necessarily called for variation in the methods used and in the emphasis placed upon the agencies of co-operation — the same basic experiments were made by both nations to learn the best methods of obtaining labour and management co-operation with Government in a broadening field of activity. The question in both the United States and Great Britain is just how much lasting effect this wartime experience will have had on extending the working relationships between labour, management and Government.
CHAPTER XVIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Some evaluation of the wartime procedures for labour-management co-operation in the United States might be inferred from the comparisons and contrasts drawn, in the preceding chapter, with the parallel British procedures. Those interested in appraising past experience in terms of possible continuing or modified application may derive some assistance from the methods used during the war to forge co-operative instruments. The following summary is therefore intended to note the results of the United States' experience with the techniques of co-operation.

METHODS OF ESTABLISHING INSTRUMENTS OF LABOUR-MANAGEMENT-GOVERNMENT CO-OPERATION

Techniques to obtain labour-management participation in meeting wartime problems were developed through various types of Governmental procedures or under Government sponsorship. The choice of method obviously depended very largely upon the functions to be allotted to the consultative machinery. Apparently the general tendency during the war was to move from less formal to more formal methods, primarily because the status given to an advisory committee frequently affected the amount of responsibility that its members assumed, and the regularity with which it was used.

The most formal procedure involves an Act of Congress explicitly prescribing the methods by which consultation shall be carried out. Acts vary, however, as to the amount of detail in which such methods are defined. Under the War Labor Disputes Act, the tripartite structure of the War Labor Board was given clear statutory backing. Under the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act, provision was made for an Advisory Board which the administrator must consult and which must include in its membership individuals with experience in management, labour and agriculture. By an Act of Congress, staff members of the Office of Price Administration with policy-making responsibility in regard to price fixing must have had business experience. These wartime provisions in Acts of Congress directly affected only the structure at the national level, and all of them related to instruments of wide scope.
Another formal procedure for establishing an instrument of cooperation is provided by Executive Order of the President. Many of the Executive Orders derived from specific Acts of Congress, such as the War Powers Acts, which enabled the President to place formal requirements upon the administrators to whom he delegated authority under the Acts. Therefore, consultative bodies established by Executive Order have practically the same status as if established directly by Act of Congress. This was the procedure used most extensively during the war, the two most significant examples having been the War Labor Board and the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission. Executive Orders providing for the establishment of the War Labor Board determined its tripartite structure. The Executive Order outlining the responsibilities of the War Manpower Commission required the establishment of an advisory committee composed of representatives of industrial management, labour and agriculture, with which the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was required to consult.

In the largest number of cases labour-management consultation was provided for through some kind of administrative action. Sometimes a formal administrative order laid down the composition, functions and even procedures to be used by consultative committees; sometimes simply an administrative decision was relied upon to establish a consultative committee or call in individuals able to give advice from a labour or management point of view.

Almost all the wartime agencies made some use of the more formal administrative orders. The Management-Labor Policy Committee and the Regional and Area Management-Labor Committee, of the War Manpower Commission were all established in accordance with administrative orders of the Chairman of the Commission, the status of the Policy Committee being confirmed by Executive Order only in the second period of its operation. The various advisory committees of the War Production Board, including the Management-Labor Council, Labor Advisory Committees and Industry Advisory Committees, were set up in accordance with administrative orders, issued under the authority of the Chairman of the War Production Board. Furthermore, administrative orders provided the basis for the appointments and functions of individuals, such as the Vice-Chairmen for Labor Production, Labor Requirements, Operations, and Program.

The Labor Policy Committee of the Office of Price Administration and the various District Labor Advisory Committees are examples of special wartime advisory agencies created by less
formal administrative action\(^1\), partly because the responsibilities of this type of committee were less specific.

Practically all the Government departments used extensively the still less formal methods of calling in representatives of labour or management, or both, individually or in committees, to deal with special questions as they arose.

Finally, the War Production Board, assisted by other Government departments, devised a special form of co-operation limited to Government sponsorship of committees. For instance, the establishment of the Labor-Management Production Committees in individual war plants was promoted by a Government department, which did not participate directly in the work of the committees themselves.

**Composition and Structure**

Instruments of consultation have been multipartite, tripartite, bipartite with a Government chairman, representative of one group only with a Government chairman, or jointly composed of management and labour, with no direct relationship to a Government agency.

Irrespective of the structure of the committees, the method of selection of members was of the utmost importance to their satisfactory operation. Composition, like structure, varied in accordance with the problems with which the committees dealt, and with the political and administrative concepts of the Government agencies responsible for their establishment. It was found to be essential to determine clearly whether the members of an advisory board were named as representatives of a particular interest or group, or whether — though selected because of special knowledge and experience gained from particular affiliation — they were to represent the public interest. This distinction was not always sharply made in the wartime consultative agencies, and members of committees did not always act clearly in one capacity or the other.

The Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion is a significant example of a multipartite committee. Its members were named on the basis of their respective individual experience in the fields of labour, agriculture, business or public service. To obtain such experienced individuals in the fields of labour and management, the President selected members from among the leaders of the most representative labour unions and management organisations; he also selected some individual man-

\(^1\) But the O.P.A.'s Industry Advisory Committees had a more formal foundation.
agement representatives who were not officers of an employers' organisation. In no case, however, was the individual nominated by his respective organisation. Furthermore, the Board itself decided that a member could not be replaced at a meeting by a substitute, since the composition of the Committee was based on the contribution to the public interest that each member could individually make.

The labour and management members of the tripartite War Labor Board, at the national level, were named by the President, in consultation with labour unions and employer organisations respectively. At the regional level the members were named by the full National Board, on the nomination of the respective employers' and workers' groups of the Board. In each case provision was made for substitute members.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission finally consisted of principal members and alternate members, all named by the Chairman of the Commission as officers of, or on nomination by, representative organisations of labour, industrial management and agriculture. This procedure was determined, after experience with an earlier committee composed of individuals named by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, on the assumption that the position and experience of members would enable them to speak for their respective groups, although they were not formally appointed by them. The change in composition and method of selection of the Committee, at the national level, was made at the Committee's own request. At the regional level an earlier procedure was maintained, that of naming members, after approval by their respective groups in the national Committee, on the basis of their individual capacity to speak for management and labour in the region, rather than necessarily as representatives of specific organisations. In practice, as the labour members were in all cases trade union officials, with a balance between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., they at least, therefore, were representative of organisations. Thus, in general, the War Manpower Commission named its committee members to act as spokesmen for management and labour, so that they could adequately serve as liaison between these organised groups and the Government agencies. However, when carrying out appeals functions, the members dropped their representative capacity and acted from the standpoint of the public interest.

Members of the various Labor and Industry Advisory Committees established by the War Production Board, and other agencies, were selected by these agencies on the basis of their capacity to represent the various elements in the industry — i.e. as manage-
ment or labour spokesmen — and not on the basis of trade association affiliations. Since the chief function of the committees was to make available technical advice, the selection was determined primarily on the basis of technical requirements rather than of nomination by the respective organisations or formal consultation with them.

At the plant level, membership of Labor-Management Production Committees was, in the main, usually determined by individual management appointing its members and the unions in the plant choosing the labour members. Election of members was a very rare procedure.

From time to time there was some confusion as to the role of individuals serving on the staff of an agency. For example, it was sometimes particularly difficult in the War Production Board for the individuals on loan from either labour or industry to determine just how far they should put forward the views of their groups and how far, as public officials, they had to take whatever action seemed best from the public interest.

Wartime experience indicates that an agency can make use of both types of advisory techniques, provided that persons named to represent particular groups, and those serving because of previous experience with a certain type of organisation clearly and continuously appreciate their respective roles. Moreover, the activities of staff selected from a management or a labour background can be supplemented by the suggestions of the representative advisory agencies; while the proposals of the advisory committees can often be given greatest effect through the work of staff whose background gives them standing with the respective labour or management committee members.

**Definition of Functions**

The responsibilities allocated to the various consultative bodies may be as varied as their composition. The clarity of definition of the aims and functions of a committee often conditions the extent of its success. The boards or committees attached to the wartime agencies and composed of representatives of functional groups — particularly labour and management — were in almost all cases advisory in character. Each of the Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission had, in addition, the semi-judicial function of hearing appeals from any action by the War Manpower Commission affecting an individual employer or worker. Only the War Labor Board, whose functions of arbitration and wage stabilisation were generally different from those of the consultative
committees, included representatives of labour and management in the final decision-making authority.

There was, however, wide diversity in the type of duties assumed by the various advisory committees — not only between agencies, but even between committees set up by the same agency. In some instances difficulties arose because there was disagreement, regarding the functions of a given committee, between its members and the staff of the agency concerned. For example, according to the Executive Order, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission was to consult with the members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee in carrying out his responsibilities. On the whole, the Committee was consulted regularly on all policy questions and assumed large responsibility in translating policy into administrative practice. However, a satisfactory interpretation of the meaning of “shall consult with” was only reached after a series of difficulties and misunderstandings as to the role of the Committee and its relationship to the formulation and application of manpower programmes.

At the regional and area levels the Management-Labor Committees were given analogous responsibilities in regard to their respective Regional and Area Directors. The interpretations adopted and the duties assumed by individual committees varied from the most far-reaching view that the committee was a “board of directors” which must pass upon all actions carried out in the region by the War Manpower Commission staff, to that of infrequent consultation without clear indication of authority. This difference in concept was derived partly from the fact that committees were initially set up in many instances before their role in the whole programme had been definitely formulated, and partly from the policy of decentralisation which allocated to Regional Directors the greatest possible administrative discretion. Difficulties developed, particularly in instances where committee members had become accustomed to consider themselves a “board of directors” and subsequently found their responsibilities limited to those of a consultative body. In some cases this change in definition engendered a feeling of frustration on the part of committee members. Such situations varied according to the personality of the individuals concerned, and according to the way in which Regional or Area Directors had presented to committees, first, the initial concept of their functions, and second, their responsibilities under more fully established plans. There was never serious difficulty regarding the appeals work, where the semi-judicial role of the committee members at each level was clearly understood from the outset. In any case, a sharp definition of the responsibilities and degree of author-
ity delegated to the various War Manpower Management-Labor Committees was an essential requirement for the optimum usefulness of the individual committees.

The same type of problem arose in defining the responsibilities of the advisory committees in other agencies. Such bodies — for instance, the Advisory Boards of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion and of the Office of Economic Stabilization — were used by the Administrators to widely different extents where the requirement to consult with them was general in character; this seems to prove that the committees require specific tasks as well as general advisory functions if the constant and responsible participation of members is to be obtained. On the other hand, the danger of committees assuming authority, particularly in dealing with the details of administrative problems, which would be inconsistent with their advisory nature, was encountered in a number of instances. This again emphasises the need for clarity in the definition of the responsibility and authority of any representative committee.

Finally, experience with the operation of the plant Labor-Management Production Committees demonstrates the importance not only of a clear understanding of the advisory nature of the committees, but of the relationship of their functions, on the one hand, with duties of a wholly managerial nature, and on the other, with responsibilities belonging to the collective bargaining machinery. In the majority of instances the specific wartime tasks that the committees might usefully undertake were understood by both the labour and management members of committees, but were frequently confined within somewhat narrow limits. Peacetime utilisation might require redefinition of functions and broadening of scope if the potential value of joint discussion is to be achieved.

**Methods of Operation**

The wartime experiments of the various agencies reveal the emphasis that should be placed on measures to guide the operation of advisory committees. The significance of these technical procedure questions, however, was not always fully appreciated at the time, either by the staff of the agencies or by the committee members.

Clearly, the type of officers named to a committee can substantially affect both its work and its relationship to the appropriate agency. Committee chairmen in some cases were named directly by the President of the United States from among the public members. In other cases the chairman was the administrative official
whom the committee advised — for example, where a committee was composed either of representatives of labour and management, or of one side only, named to give advice to a particular official. In other cases, again, the chairman was selected by the committee from among its own members. Still another procedure was for it to select an outside chairman (usually, but not necessarily, a Government official) in order to ensure complete impartiality and keep the balance of the committee. Obviously, the duties of the chairmen differed in these varying circumstances. In the cases where the chairman himself assumed a large measure of responsibility in determining the convocation of the committee, its agenda and the information submitted to it, and could even influence the form of its decisions, he had to have both experience and interest in committee technique. The significance of effective chairmanship was recognised in many cases. In a substantial number, however, ineffectiveness of committee operation was the direct result of poor chairmanship.

Where the chairman was himself a committee member, the role of the secretary or other officers often proved of almost equal importance, since frequently in such cases the secretary, or some official designated to service the committee, was responsible for the preparatory and follow-up work needed for effective operation. One danger was that insufficient preparation and documentation on the questions before it, due to inadequate staff, might result in waste of the committee's time. The opposite situation arose, however, in some cases where members, particularly if well briefed and prepared, became so closely involved in the solution of problems that the committee's work was indistinguishable from that of the agency responsible for carrying out the recommendations. Diversity of operation and staff relationship was evident not only between agencies, but among similar committees within the same agency, as for instance, various Area War Manpower Committees of the War Manpower Commission, the Labor or Industry Advisory Committees of the War Production Board, and different plant committees dealing with similar problems. General experience, however, indicates clearly that the servicing of a committee by its officers and staff is almost as important as its composition.

A series of relatively subordinate questions, such as the type of agenda, the form of minutes, the kind of decisions reached by committees, and the reports they issue, cumulatively often play a substantial part in a committee's achievements. Although no standard pattern can be evolved, owing to the varied responsibilities of the different representative committees, all benefit from giving close attention to formality and regularity on such detailed matters.
On the question of compensation experience has differed considerably. For example, Management-Labor Committee members of the War Manpower Commission were not paid for attending meetings, because of the nature of their responsibilities; War Labor Board members all received subsistence allowances, and part-time or full-time payment, depending on their role in the various Regional or National Boards or Commissions; Labor and Industry Advisory Committee members of the War Production Board ordinarily received travel expenses, not from the W.P.B. but from their respective companies, and served without compensation; Industry Advisory Committee members of the Office of Price Administration were paid from a fund contributed by the individual industries. At the plant level, in most cases, committee members met in company time and received their regular pay.

The channels of communication established between committee members and their constituent organisations, the type of reports issued regarding the results of discussions, and the general public relations policies maintained by the committees, constitute significant factors in their operation. This is true also of two other problems closely connected with this group, namely, the form of reaching decisions, and the method of announcing a committee's views.

Some committees, such as the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, maintained that complete privacy of meetings, and of all committee documentation, facilitated free discussion and enabled committee members to give to the Administrator the most useful and frank advice. Since the responsibilities of a board of this nature did not specifically include obtaining support for decisions from constituent organisations, this approach to committee operation was less open to question than in agencies of a different nature. Furthermore, since the Board was limited to advising the Administrator, the question of voting and issuance of reports did not arise in the same way as in other instances.

The War Labor Board, as a decision-making committee, had a somewhat different problem. Its discussions of individual cases and use of confidential documentation necessarily remained private; but it held public hearings in order to obtain the information required for decisions, it issued both majority and minority reports, and through its voting procedure deliberately associated the representative members in decisions requiring support and compliance from labour and management throughout the country.

The Management-Labor Committees of the War Manpower Commission had a still different problem, in that a large part of their responsibility included obtaining the compliance of the groups,
and organisations represented, and of the community in general, with programmes and policies determined by the agency, after consultation with the committee. Moreover, each committee, to the maximum degree possible, attempted to reach unanimous recommendations on matters of policy. At the national level, specific procedures were therefore developed under which alternate members could only arrive at a decision if unanimity was obtained; otherwise a question had to be submitted to the principals, after which a statement or recommendation could be released over the signature of those principal members who approved it. Furthermore, to secure the needed public and group support, the committees, at all levels, developed means of transmitting their recommendations to their constituent organisations, provided for issuance of public reports on their deliberations, and maintained direct contact with the press and other public relations bodies. Favourable press relations were more completely achieved in some regions and areas than in others, but the variation in most cases was due to method and not to principle, since, in general, wide informative public relations policies were sought by the agency staff and by the committees.

The methods used by the Industry Advisory Committees and Labor Advisory Committees of the War Production Board were determined in a formal memorandum, drafted in agreement with the Attorney General, which set forth procedures for reaching decisions, communicating them to the responsible official, and distributing minutes and documentation. In addition specific procedures were laid down to govern the committees' public relations policies generally. The separate Industry Advisory Committees of the Office of Price Administration and the Petroleum Administration for War were governed by similar rules, since, in each of these cases, care had to be taken that the operation of the committees was not "combination in restraint of trade".

The plant Labor-Management Committees had a still different problem in regard to general public relations and information work. One of the principal aims of the committee, after discussion and agreement, was to ensure that the workers in the factory understood the decisions and appreciated the need for any programme worked out. The main procedural question was, therefore, how to obtain the best selective distribution of information. The methods used included union meetings, notice boards, radio programmes, loud speakers, plant publications, etc.

In general, wartime experience brought out the danger, present in all such operations, of separating an advisory committee too sharply from execution of the policies it has developed. The need
was also demonstrated for sufficient stress upon adequate preparation of committee meetings and for the agency staff or the plant management to be in constant touch with members, so that each individual can come to meetings prepared to make the greatest possible direct contribution to the work of the committee.

**Pattern of Inter-relationship**

There was considerable difference of opinion in the United States war agencies as to the desirability of providing for formal or informal inter-relationships between advisory committees of different agencies and between committees of the same agency at different levels.

Few formal relationships were established horizontally between the advisory committees of different agencies. The War Manpower Commission Management-Labor Committees constituted the most elaborate structure of committees at different levels; but the vertical relationships between committees were deliberately maintained chiefly through the staff of the Commission and not through direct contact between members. This structure was insisted upon by the staff in view of the policy of decentralisation and of "staff and line" organisation. On the other hand, committee members frequently sought for more direct contacts and, in particular, the National Committee wished to promote direct relationships with Regional Committees. In practice, although formal relations were not always extensive, there was widespread informal interpenetration of ideas.

There is little doubt that the success of the Management-Labor Committee structure was, to a large degree, the result of the spread of ideas, suggestions and points of view throughout the constituent organisations represented on the committees. It was through these organisations and through the work of the individual committee members that voluntary support for the manpower programme was obtained. The existence of committees at many levels and, especially in the regions and the areas, composed in different ways, brought large numbers of management and labour representatives into one or another phase of the wartime programme, and thus buttressed the whole structure of manpower mobilisation and war production. However, no provisions were made for the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to have recourse to any advisory structure of its own at the regional, area or plant level which could support the proposals of its members, nor could it call upon the advisory committees established at each level by other agencies.
Whether more formal relationships between the committee members of the different agencies would have further strengthened the wartime organisation is a matter for conjecture. Examination of the United States' practice, and the contrasts drawn with British experience in the previous chapter, point to the advantages of more closely integrating the activities of labour and management representatives and of the official representatives in the various agencies, and of closer links between memberships of the representative committees built up from the workshop to the national level.

In the future, responsibility for encouraging consultative committees of labour and management in any country may fall to a Government department, a national tripartite committee or agency of some sort, or a joint body of national representatives of management and labour. There seems little doubt that some impartial Government agency could render service to peacetime production by making available at all times, both to industry and to labour, a knowledge of new experiments and techniques for furthering labour-management co-operation on production questions. Such organised interchange of information might contribute to the further development of consultative committees of various types.

Ultimately, the growth of labour-management co-operation, not only in the factory, but also regionally and nationally, must in the long run depend upon its relation to collective bargaining processes. Thus the most lasting contribution made by the wartime experiments with techniques for increased labour-management co-operation may be the projection into the future of these techniques as supplementary instruments to the normal collective bargaining machinery, capable of extending the area of agreement between labour and management and Government, and of enlarging the scope of discussion of problems of mutual concern.

Implicit in wartime industrial mobilisation and production was the idea of obtaining the consent of those directly affected by the social and economic policies determining the war effort. To obtain such voluntary co-operation a broad structure of consultation was built up through the establishment of advisory committees at the national level, in the regions and areas, and in the individual workshops. The war period provided a unique opportunity for the development and use of advisory machinery to assist in the framing and application of wartime policies. The results of the wartime experience might be of real significance if applied in the economy of peace.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY BOARD, JULY 1940

The members of the Advisory Council submitted the following recommendations to the Social Security Board and the National Advisory Defense Commission in July 1940 concerning the part to be played by the public employment service in the national defence programme. The recommendations were then accepted by the Social Security Board and the National Defense Advisory Commission and transmitted to the State employment security agencies for their consideration and application. The recommendations, which are referred to in Chapter IV, are given in full both because they were framed by a council including employers and workers and because they were ultimately put into effect in the course of the war.

REPORT OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL TO SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD

Re: (1) Organization of the Labor Market, and (2) Training Programs

The national defense emergency sharpens the need of knowing what workers are available, where they are, and what they can do — or what they could do with minimum training—and of so streamlining the functioning of the public-employment service that both normal and emergency employment requirements may be known and met with a minimum of time, expense, and confusion.

The Federal Advisory Council to the Social Security Board, subject to the controlling approval and acceptance of the National Defense Commission, therefore recommends that:

1. All employers be encouraged to file promptly with their local public-employment office, either directly or through such employment agencies as they regularly use, both (a) their immediate requirements and (b) their prospective requirements by occupation and skill; and not to advertise or solicit competitively anywhere, nor to recruit outside their immediate locality, until the local employment office has had an opportunity to meet such requirements locally or through its intercity and interstate clearance machinery.

2. All persons employable for needed occupations but not now registered with public-employment offices—including skilled workers now employed on semiskilled and unskilled jobs—be encouraged to register promptly with their local public-employment offices and not to apply for work or move to other cities without first ascertaining from their local public-employment office the localities in which there is a demand for their type and grade of skill.

If recommendations 1 and 2 are systematically and thoroughly followed, undesirable and unwarranted dislocation will be minimized.

3. The employment offices immediately proceed, in order of indicated need, with a reexamination of applicants in both the active and inactive files, in order...
to ascertain the primary and secondary skills available in occupations for which demands are increasing.

4. As a basis for, and to the end of insuring a comprehensive, flexible, and high-speed program of training to meet immediate and long-term needs for production and skilled workers:

(A) The Employment Service at the same time ascertain the capacity of such workers to qualify for:

(a) essential occupations by supplementary training;
(b) immediate attention be given to the problem of selection and training of instructors for service within public and private agencies;
(c) all training programs for national defense and all cooperating educational institutions which are federally aided, supported or controlled, be maintained without discrimination, in the admission and treatment of trainees or students, on the grounds of race, creed, or color;
(d) the National Defense Commission give organized attention to the early coordination of all needed facilities and activities for training and retraining purposes.

5. To effectuate the foregoing, the Bureau of Employment Security proceed at once to a reappraisal of its organization, procedures, and personnel at Federal, State, and local levels, to insure that it is adequately prepared and staffed to meet all needs that the National Defense Commission may place upon it.

6. Since the success of any employment and training program depends upon maximum decentralization and efficiency in each locality where supply and demand meet at the job level, steps be taken immediately to bring to full strength and effectiveness both State and local advisory councils to the employment service (as respectively required and recommended under the Wagner-Peyser Act), the same to be fully representative of the parties at interest — i.e. an equal number of representatives of labor and of employers and, included among the public representatives, interested and qualified representatives of such groups or services as veterans, rehabilitation, junior-employment schools and vocational guidance, training, social and relief agencies, and of any other major groups dealing with employment and training whose recourses and activities can best be coordinated with the National Defense Program through the public-employment service.

7. Insofar as the powers of the Social Security Board permit, priority or preference be given to citizens and to those who have taken out first citizenship papers.

8. We recommend that in the event of universal registration for defense such an act require information from registrants concerning their employment, employability, and qualifications for employment to the end that a complete inventory of labor supply may be made available to the Bureau of Employment Security.
APPENDIX II

EXECUTIVE ORDERS ESTABLISHING THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION

The two basic Executive Orders, that of 18 April 1942, No. 9139, and that of 5 December 1942, No. 9279, establishing the War Manpower Commission and providing for mobilisation and utilisation of the national manpower, are given in full as basic texts, essential to the understanding of the wartime manpower programme.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9139 ESTABLISHING THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND TRANSFERRING AND COORDINATING CERTAIN FUNCTIONS TO FACILITATE THE MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes, including the First War Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and for the purpose of assuring the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower, it is hereby ordered:

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President a War Manpower Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall consist of the Federal Security Administrator as Chairman, and a representative of each of the following Departments and agencies: The Department of War, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the War Production Board, the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the Selective Service System, and the United States Civil Service Commission.

2. The Chairman, after consultation with the members of the Commission, shall:

   a. Formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war; and issue such policy and operating directives as may be necessary thereto.

   b. Estimate the requirements of manpower for industry; review all other estimates of needs for military, agricultural, and civilian manpower; and direct the several departments and agencies of the Government as to the proper allocation of available manpower.

   c. Determine basic policies for, and take such other steps as are necessary to coordinate, the collection and compilation of labor market data by Federal departments and agencies.

   d. Establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal programs relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture.

   e. Prescribe basic policies governing the filling of the Federal Government’s requirements for manpower, excluding those of the military and naval forces, and issue such operating directives as may be necessary thereto.
f. Formulate legislative programs designed to facilitate the most effective mobilization and utilization of the manpower of the country; and, with the approval of the President, recommend such legislation as may be necessary for this purpose.

3. The following agencies shall conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by this Order, and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed upon him:

a. The Selective Service System with respect to the use and classification of manpower needed for critical industrial, agricultural and governmental employment.
b. The Federal Security Agency with respect to employment service and defense training functions.
c. The Work Projects Administration with respect to placement and training functions.
d. The United States Civil Service Commission with respect to functions relating to the filling of positions in the Government service.
e. The Railroad Retirement Board with respect to employment service activities.
g. The Labor Production Division of the War Production Board.
h. The Civilian Conservation Corps.
i. The Department of Agriculture with respect to farm labor statistics, farm labor camp programs, and other labor market activities.
j. The Office of Defense Transportation with respect to labor supply and requirement activities.

Similarly, all other Federal Departments and agencies which perform functions relating to the recruitment or utilization of manpower shall, in discharging such functions, conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by this Order; and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed upon him.

4. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the War Manpower Commission:

a. The labor supply functions of the Labor Division of the War Production Board.

5. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the Office of the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, and shall be administered under the direction and supervision of such officer or employee as the Federal Security Administrator shall designate:

a. The Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor Standards of the Department of Labor and its functions.
b. The training functions of the Labor Division of the War Production Board.
6. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel transferred to the War Manpower Commission and the Apprenticeship Section transferred to the Federal Security Agency shall be preserved as organizational entities within the War Manpower Commission and the Federal Security Agency respectively.

7. The functions of the head of any department or agency relating to the administration of the agency or function transferred from his department or agency by this Order are transferred to, and shall be exercised by, the head of the department or agency to which such transferred agency or function is transferred by this Order.

8. All records and property (including office equipment) of the several agencies and all records and property used primarily in the administration of any functions transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the administration of such agencies and functions (including officers whose chief duties relate to such administration) are transferred to the respective agencies concerned, for use in the administration of the agencies and functions transferred or consolidated by this Order; provided, that any personnel transferred to any agency by this Order, found by the head of such agency to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration of the functions transferred to his agency, shall be retransferred under existing procedure to other positions in the Government service or separated from the service. So much of the unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the use of any agency in the exercise of any function transferred or consolidated by this Order or for the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any function so transferred or consolidated, as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget with the approval of the President shall determine, shall be transferred to the agency concerned, for use in connection with the exercise of functions so transferred or consolidated. In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations incurred against such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the transfer or consolidation.

9. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available for that purpose, the Chairman may appoint such personnel and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order. The Chairman may appoint an executive officer of the Commission and may exercise and perform the powers, authorities, and duties set forth in this Order through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.

Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The White House, April 18, 1942.  

Executive Order No. 9279 Providing for the Most Effective Mobilization and Utilization of the National Manpower and Transferring the Selective Service System to the War Manpower Commission

In order to promote the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower and to eliminate so far as possible waste of manpower due to disruptive recruitment and undue migration of workers, and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes, including the First War Powers Act, 1941, and the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The War Manpower Commission (established by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 9139, dated April 18, 1942) shall consist of a Chairman appointed by
the President and one representative, designated subject to the approval of the Chairman, of each of the following departments and agencies: The Department of War, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Federal Security Agency, the War Production Board, the United States Civil Service Commission, the National Housing Agency, and such other executive departments and agencies as the President shall determine; and a joint representative of the War Shipping Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation, designated by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Chairman).

2. (a) The Selective Service System created and established for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, and all of its functions, powers, duties, personnel (including the Director of Selective Service), records, property, and funds (including all unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the administration of said Act, as amended) are transferred to the War Manpower Commission in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President, and shall be administered under the supervision and direction of the Chairman. The local boards and appeal boards of the Selective Service System shall, subject to the supervision and direction of the Chairman, continue to exercise the functions, powers, and duties vested in them by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

(b) The functions, powers, and duties of the Directors of Selective Service, including authority delegated to him by the President under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, are transferred to the Chairman and may be exercised through the Director of Selective Service and such other officers, agents, and persons and in such manner as the Chairman may determine.

(c) The Chief of Finance, United States Army, shall act as the fiscal, disbursing, and accounting agent of the Chairman in carrying out the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall, after consultation with the Chairman, determine the number of men required to be selected each month in order to fulfill the total respective requirements of the Army and Navy as approved by the President. The Chairman shall furnish the required number of men through the Selective Service System.

4. After the effective date of this Order no male person who has attained the eighteenth anniversary and has not attained the thirty-eighth anniversary of the day of his birth shall be inducted into the enlisted personnel of the armed forces (including reserve components), except, under provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended; but any such person who has, on or before the effective date of this Order, submitted a bona fide application for voluntary enlistment may be enlisted within ten days after said date.

5. Insofar as the effective prosecution of the war requires it, the Chairman shall take all lawful and appropriate steps to assure that (a) all hiring, rehiring, solicitation, and recruitment of workers in or for work in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation, or area designated by the Chairman as subject to the provisions of this section shall be conducted solely through the United States Employment Service or in accordance with such arrangements as the Chairman may approve; and (b) no employer shall retain in his employ any worker whose services are more urgently needed in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation, or area designated as more essential by the Chairman pursuant to this section.

6. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall take such steps as may be necessary to assure that all training programs for the armed forces
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION IN THE U.S.A.

including their reserve components) and the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, which are carried on in non-Federal educational institutions, conform with such policies or regulations as the Chairman, after consultation with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, prescribes as necessary to insure the efficient utilization of the Nation’s educational facilities and personnel for the effective prosecution of the war.

7. The Chairman shall (a) issue such policies, rules, regulations, and general or special orders as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order, (b) take steps to prevent and relieve gross inequities or undue hardships arising from the exercise of the provisions of Section 5 of this Order insofar as he finds so doing will not interfere with the effective prosecution of the war, and (c) establish such procedures (including appeals) as are necessary to assure a hearing to any person claiming that any action, taken by any local or regional agent or agency of the War Manpower Commission pursuant to Section 5 of this Order and said Executive Order No. 9139, is unfair or unreasonable as applied to him.

8. (a) The Chairman may perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers, authority, and discretion conferred upon him by this Order or any other Order of the President through such officers, agents, and persons and in such manner as he shall determine.

(b) The Chairman may avail himself of the services and facilities of such Executive departments and agencies as he determines may be of assistance in carrying out the provisions of this Order. He may accept the services and facilities of State and local agencies.

9. Subject to appeal to the President or to such agent or agency as the President may designate, each Executive department and agency shall so utilize its facilities, services, and personnel and take such action, under authority vested in it by law, as the Chairman, after consultation with such department or agency, determines necessary to promote compliance with the provisions of this Order or of policies, directives, or regulations prescribed under said Executive Order No. 9139.

10. The Chairman shall appoint a Management-Labor Policy Committee to be selected from the fields of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, and shall consult with the members thereof in carrying out his responsibilities. The Chairman may appoint such other advisory committees composed of representatives of governmental or private groups or both as he deems appropriate.

11. The Chairman shall be ex officio an additional member of the Economic Stabilization Board established by Executive Order No. 9250, dated October 3, 1942.

12. All prior Executive Orders, insofar as they are in conflict herewith, are amended accordingly. All prior regulations, rulings, and other directives relating to the Selective Service System shall remain in effect, except insofar as they are in conflict with this Order or are hereafter amended by regulations, rulings, or other directives issued by or under the direction of the Chairman.

13. This Order shall take effect immediately and shall continue in force and effect until the termination of Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The White House,
December 5, 1942.
APPENDIX III

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS ESTABLISHING THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE

The text of the initial Administrative Order of 25 May 1942 and its two revisions on 8 January 1943 and 3 April 1943 are given in full since they define the relationship of the Management-Labor Policy Committee to the War Manpower Commission, and outline the functions and methods of operation of the National Committee.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the following order is promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:

1. There is hereby established in the Office of the Chairman of the Commission a Management-Labor Policy Committee consisting of an equal number of representatives of Management and Organized Labor.

2. The Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall be chairman of this Committee, and he may designate a presiding chairman to serve in his stead.

3. The Management-Labor Policy Committee is authorized to consider and recommend to the Chairman, matters of major policy concerning the activities and responsibilities of the Commission. The Committee shall initiate studies and the formulation of policies, as well as consider those referred to it by the Chairman.

PAUL V. McNUTT.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4 (REVISED) 2

Establishment of Management-Labor Policy Committee

In conformity with the provisions of section 10 of Executive Order 9279, the following Order is promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:

1. There is hereby established in the Office of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission a Management-Labor Policy Committee consisting of eight representatives of organized labor, eight representatives of management, and two representatives of agriculture.

2. The members of the Committee shall be appointed by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Each member of the Committee shall be entitled to nominate an alternate. Such nominations must, however, be passed upon and

2 Dated 25 May 1942.
3 Dated 8 January 1943.
approved by the Chairman before the persons nominated shall be eligible to serve on the Committee.

3. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall designate a Chairman of the Committee and also an Executive Secretary of the Committee. Nominations for these positions may be submitted to the Chairman by the members of the Committee.

4. The Committee may, if it so desires, select, in accordance with such procedures as it may prescribe, from among its own members an Executive Committee not to exceed six members. This Executive Committee shall perform such duties as may be assigned to it by the members of the full Committee.

5. The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall consider such questions of major policy as are referred to it, and shall make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, specific recommendations as to the action which, in its judgment, he should take. The Committee may also, on its own motion, make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, recommendations relative to policies which, in its judgment, should be put into operation by him.

6. The Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall act as the Chairman's representative in insuring that the Committee is provided with adequate staff assistance and other necessary facilities for the carrying on of its activities, shall participate with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in the presentation of matters to the Committee, and in receiving and considering the recommendations of the Committee, and shall, in the absence of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, act in his stead in placing matters before the Committee and in receiving the Committee's recommendations.

7. The Committee may make such rules relative to time and place of meeting, attendance at meetings, and order of business as are, in its judgment, necessary for the successful carrying out of the duties and responsibilities assigned to it.

Administrative Order No. 4 (Revised)\(^1\)

Establishment of Management-Labor Policy Committee

1. Purpose.

.01 It is the purpose of this order to reconstitute the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee so that the members thereof will be truly representatives of labor, agriculture and industrial management.

.02 The purpose of a committee composed of representatives selected by labor, agriculture and industrial management is to make available to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission the advice and counsel of the leaders of these groups in the determination of War Manpower Commission policies and programs and to promote the active cooperation of labor, agriculture and industrial management in securing national compliance with and support of such policies and programs.

2. Authority.

.01 Section 10 of Executive Order No. 9279 provides as follows:

"The Chairman shall appoint a Management-Labor Policy Committee to be selected from the fields of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, and

\(^1\) Dated 3 April, 1943.
shall consult with the members thereof in carrying out his responsibilities. The Chairman may appoint such other advisory committees composed of representatives of governmental or private groups or both as he deems appropriate."

3. Selection and Appointment.

.01 The Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission shall be composed of three representatives of labor, three representatives of agriculture, and three representatives of industrial management.

.02 Labor shall be represented by one member chosen by each of the following representative labor organizations:

The American Federation of Labor;
The Congress of Industrial Organizations;
The Railroad Brotherhoods.

.03 Agriculture shall be represented by one member chosen by each of the following representative agricultural organizations:

The American Farm Bureau Federation;
The National Grange;
The National Farmers Union.

.04 Industrial management shall be represented by one member chosen by the United States Chamber of Commerce, one member chosen by the National Association of Manufacturers, and a third member chosen by the first two or by the organizations represented by the first two.

.05 The representatives of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, selected in accordance with the procedure prescribed above, shall be nominated to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, who shall, if he agrees therewith, appoint them as members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee.

4. Officers.

.01 The Committee shall elect a chairman and a vice-chairman subject to the approval of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and shall nominate to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission a person to be appointed Executive Secretary to the Committee.

.02 The Committee may select, in accordance with such procedures as it may prescribe, from among its own members an Executive Committee not to exceed six members. The Executive Committee shall perform such duties as may be assigned to it by the members of the full Committee.

.03 The Committee shall notify the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission of any proposed changes in these offices or the Executive Committee.

5. Alternates.

.01 There shall be one, and only one, alternate member for each member of the Management-Labor Policy Committee.

.02 Each alternate member shall be nominated by the member he is to represent and shall be appointed by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

.03 A member and/or his alternate may attend any meeting of the Committee. When both are present, only the member shall be entitled to vote. It is anticipated that alternate members will attend most of the meetings and do most of the work.
6. Rules.

.01 The Committee may adopt such rules relative to time and place of meetings, attendance at meetings, and order of business not in conflict with this order, as are, in its judgment, necessary for the successful carrying out of the duties and responsibilities assigned to it.

7. Procedure.

.01 The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall consider such questions of major policy as are referred to it, and shall make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, specific recommendations as to the action which, in its judgment, he should take.

.02 The Commission may also, on its own motion, make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, recommendations relative to policies which, in its judgment, should be put into operation by him.


.01 All decisions of the Committee, participated in by alternate members shall be reached by unanimous agreement.

.02 When the Committee, in which alternate members are participating, fails to reach unanimous agreement, the question shall be referred to a meeting of the members of the Committee.

.03 Unanimous decisions of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as "Policy Decisions" of the Committee.

.04 Where the members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee fail to reach unanimous agreement, the chairman of the Committee shall report that fact to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and shall transmit to him such reports as individual members or groups of members wish to make. Such reports shall be signed by the members agreeing to them.
MEMORANDA PROVIDING FOR APPOINTMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF REGIONAL AND AREA MANAGEMENT-LABOR COMMITTEES

The texts of the two Field Service Memoranda of 10 March 1943 outlining the relations of the National Management-Labor Policy Committee to the Regional and Area Committees, and the structure and methods of operation of these committees, are given in full since they constitute basic texts.

FIELD SERVICE MEMORANDUM NO. 2, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 10 MARCH 1943

Appointment and Functions of Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees

1. This memorandum, originally approved by the Management-Labor Policy Committee on June 30, 1942, has been edited as to organizational titles and phraseology without material change in content.

2. General.

The effective utilization of the nation's manpower necessitates the participation of Management, Labor and the public in the development of policies dealing with manpower. To facilitate this participation there has been established at the national level a Management-Labor Policy Committee which initiates or reviews proposed policies and makes recommendations to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission with respect thereto. The proper execution of the program and policies of the War Manpower Commission through the Regional and Area Manpower Directors requires the assistance of Management and Labor in effectuating such policies; therefore there shall be established in each region a Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and such Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees as may be necessary. The selection of Management and Labor representatives on such committees shall be so made that those chosen truly represent the point of view of their groups and will, as a result, be helpful in securing the cooperation of Management and Labor in the execution of the program and policies developed.


In addition to the functions heretofore vested in the Management-Labor Policy Committee, that committee shall be authorized to review any recommendation of a Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and shall submit its advice with respect thereto to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.


.01 Composition.
The Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees shall be composed of:

Two representatives of the American Federation of Labor;
Two representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations;
One representative of the Railway Labor Organizations;
Five representatives of Management.

The Regional Manpower Director shall be the non-voting Chairman of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

Selection.

The Labor representatives of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall nominate a panel of individuals, recommended by such representatives as labor members of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

The Management representatives of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall nominate a panel of individuals recommended by such representatives as Management members of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall recommend a panel of individuals, consisting of an equal number of individuals from the panels nominated by the Labor representatives and by the Management representatives of the Committee, respectively, from which an equal number of Management and Labor members will be appointed to each Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

Functions.

The Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees shall serve as consultants to the Regional Manpower Director within the scope of policies and instructions issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. In addition, and subject to such policies and instructions, each such Committee shall:

(a) Advise the Regional Manpower Director as to methods for securing full participation by Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees;
(b) Through its individual members, or as a Committee, render assistance with respect to area situations which are beyond the scope of an Area committee or situations which require the participation of an impartial non-local representative;
(c) Review recommendations of Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees for the purpose of making recommendations to the Regional Manpower Director regarding actions to be taken.

5. Organization of Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

Composition.

The Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees shall be composed of:

One or two representatives of the American Federation of Labor;
One or two representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations;
Two or four representatives of Management.

The Area Manpower Director shall be the non-voting Chairman of the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

Where a transportation problem exists (other than local transportation),
the Committee may be enlarged to include a representative of Railway Labor Organizations and a representative of Railroad Management.

.02 Selection.

.021 The following procedure will be followed in selecting members:

(a) The Regional Manpower Director shall, in writing, request the various area employer associations or other appropriate groups to nominate the required number of representatives of employers engaged in essential activities to serve as representatives of Management. If it is determined that there is need for a Railroad Management representative the Regional Manpower Director shall request Railroad Management to nominate an employer representative to serve on the Committee;

(b) The Regional Manpower Director shall, in writing, request the local American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations labor organizations to nominate the required number of individuals representing workers engaged in essential activities, to serve as representatives of Labor. If it is determined that there is need for a Railway Labor Representative, the Regional Manpower Director shall request appropriate Railway Labor organizations to nominate a Labor representative to serve on the Committee;

(c) From the nominations so submitted, the Regional Manpower Director shall appoint the Labor and Management representative of the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

.03 Alternative Composition and Selection.

.031 When in the judgment of the Regional Manpower Director the War Manpower program can be better served by a different composition or method of selection of either Management or Labor representatives, such other composition or method of selection may be adopted after consultation with the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

.04 Functions.

.041 The Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee shall function on the basis of and within the scope of policies approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

.042 The Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees shall be responsible for:

(a) Obtaining local cooperation in effectuating the policies and program approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(b) Obtaining the cooperation of local Management and Labor in the solution, on a local basis, of all manpower problems relating primarily to Management, Labor, or Management and Labor, such solutions to be within the framework of the policies and program approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(c) Facilitating the work of the War Manpower Commission in effecting the orderly transfer of needed workers to essential activities;

(d) Hearing complaints of individual workers or employers, or groups of workers or employers, concerning any action or failure to act by local representatives of governmental agencies which are carrying out any part of the program of the War Manpower Commission. The Committee shall make recommendations to the Area Manpower Director concerning such cases.

LAWRENCE A. APPLEY,
Executive Director.
FIELD SERVICE MEMORANDUM NO. 3, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 10 MARCH 1943

Procedure for Review of Recommendations of Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees

1. This memorandum, originally approved by the Management-Labor Policy Committee on June 30, 1942, has been edited as to organizational titles and phraseology without material change in content.

2. Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee Recommendations.

   .01 The recommendations of Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees shall be made to the Area Manpower Director. If the Area Manpower Director concurs in such recommendations, his decision shall be final, unless the Regional Manpower Director requests that the matter be submitted to him for review.
   
   .02 If the Area Manpower Director does not concur in any such recommendation, the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee may request the Regional Manpower Director to review the matter.
   
   .03 If the Regional Manpower Director concurs in the Committee recommendations, he shall instruct the Area Manpower Director accordingly.

   .04 If the Regional Manpower Director does not concur in the Committee's recommendations, he shall refer the matter to the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and may direct the Area Manpower Director to suspend action on the matter involved, pending the review by that Committee.

3. Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee Recommendations.

   .01 The recommendations of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee shall be made to the Regional Manpower Director. Such recommendations may be with respect to matters originating at the regional level or with respect to matters originating in an Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and reviewed by the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

   .02 If the Regional Manpower Director accepts the recommendation of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee, his decision shall be final. If the matter involved has been considered by an Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee, the Regional Manpower Director shall inform the Area Manpower Director of his decision and the Area Manpower Director shall inform the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.

   .03 If the Regional Manpower Director does not concur in the recommendation of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee, the Management-Labor Policy Committee may, upon application of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee, request that no action be taken on the matter pending its review of the Committee's recommendations.

   .04 The Regional Manpower Director may suspend action on the matter involved pending the review by the Management-Labor Policy Committee. That Committee shall submit its recommendations to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

   .05 The Chairman's decision shall be final and shall be communicated to the Regional Manpower Director who shall advise the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and, if necessary, the Area Manpower Director.
4. *Procedures and Quorum.*

.01 Each Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee shall determine its own rules and methods of procedure.

.02 No meeting of a Regional or Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee shall proceed unless at least one representative of Management and one representative of Labor are present.

LAWRENCE A. APPLEY,  
*Executive Director.*
APPENDIX V

WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, REGULATION No. 5—APPEALS

The text of Regulation No. 5, as amended on 13 March 1943, which outlines the methods of taking appeals and authority for appeals procedures, is given in full, since references to it are made in Chapter VIII.

REGULATION No. 5

906.1 Right of appeal. Any person who claims that any action taken, action denied or decision rendered with respect to him, with respect to his employer or with respect to any of his workers, under any War Manpower Commission regulation, program, or policy, is unfair or unreasonable as applied to him, or is inconsistent with any such regulation, program or policy, may appeal from such action or decision in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.

906.2 First appeals stage: area level. (a) To whom appeals taken. In areas for which an Area Manpower Director and an Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee have been appointed appeals shall be taken to such Committee and hearings shall be afforded before such Committee, or, at the discretion of that Committee, before one or more Area Appeals Committees composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labor (including agricultural representation, as provided in Section 906.6 (h)), selected by the Area Manpower Director from a panel chosen by the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee. The Area Director, or his designated representative, shall serve as the non-voting chairman of the Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee in appeals hearings and of the Area Appeals Committees.

(b) Decision at first appeals stage.

(1) At the first appeal stage, a decision shall be rendered on the merits of the case on the basis of the record of the action from which appeal is taken and the evidence presented at the hearing. The decision by a majority of the Committee shall be final unless further appeal is taken in accordance with Section 906.3 (a) of this regulation. Members of the Committee may file majority and minority reports. In the event of a tie vote, the case including the complete record thereon, shall be transmitted promptly to the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee for review and decision in accordance with Section 906.3 (b) and (c) of this regulation.

(2) An Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee may take jurisdiction of, hear and render a decision, which shall supersede any decision rendered by an Area Appeals Committee, on any case assigned by that Committee to an Area Appeals Committee, at any time after the assignment of the case to an Area Appeals Committee and prior to the expiration of the period for further appeal or the filing of a further appeal to the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee.
(c) Intermediate appeals stage between area and regional levels. A Regional Manpower Director, with the specific approval of the Chairman, may, with respect to an area presenting special problems and for which a duly constituted Management-Labor War Manpower Committee is functioning, provide for an intermediate review stage between the area appeals stage and the regional level. The review of appeals at such an intermediate review stage shall be subject, in all respects, to the procedures and requirements set forth in this regulation with respect to review of appeals at the regional level.

906.3 Second appeals stage: regional level. (a) Who may appeal to regional level. Any person who (i) has a right to appeal as provided in Section 906.1 of this regulation and (ii) has attended the hearing at the area appeal level in person or by a representative, or shows good cause for his failure to attend such hearing, may appeal to the regional level within the time prescribed for taking such appeal. Within the same time, the Area Manpower Director, upon his own initiative, may transmit any case for review at the regional level, after decision at the area level.

(b) To whom appeals taken. Further appeal from decisions at the area appeals level shall be taken to the appropriate Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee which may at the discretion of that Committee, act through a Regional Appeals Committee composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labor (including agricultural representation, as provided in Section 906.6 (h), selected by the Regional Manpower Director from a panel chosen by the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee. The Regional Manpower Director, or his designated representative, shall serve as the non-voting chairman of the Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee in appeals cases and of Regional Appeals Committees.

(c) Decision at second appeals stage.

(1) The Regional Committee shall render a decision on the basis of the record in the case unless, in its judgment, a further hearing is necessary to enable the Committee to reach a fair and just decision. If the Committee determines that further hearing is necessary, the Committee may either conduct such hearing itself, or remand the case to the area level for such further hearing. The decision by a majority of the Committee shall be final unless further appeal is taken in accordance with Section 906.4 (a). Members of the Committee may file majority and minority reports. In the event of a tie vote on a case in which a decision has been rendered at the area appeals level, the decision at that level shall be final unless further appeal is taken. In the event of a tie vote at both the area and regional appeals levels, the case, including the complete record thereon, shall be transmitted promptly to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission for decision in accordance with Section 906.4 of this regulation.

(2) A Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee may take jurisdiction of, hear and render a decision, which shall supersede any decision rendered by a Regional Appeals Committee, on any case assigned by that Committee to a Regional Appeals Committee, at any time after assignment of the case to a Regional Appeals Committee and prior to the expiration of the period for further appeal or the filing of a further appeal to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

906.4 Appeal to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. (a) Who may appeal. Any person entitled to appeal from a decision at the area appeals level may appeal from a decision at the regional level to the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission, within the time prescribed for taking such appeal. Within the same time, the Regional Manpower Director, upon his own initiative, may transmit any case to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission for review, after decision at the regional level.

(b) **Taking of jurisdiction by Chairman.** The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may, in his discretion, take jurisdiction of any appeals case at any stage of the appeals process and render a final decision on that appeal.

(c) **Final decision by the Chairman.** The decision of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission made after consideration of the record in the case and recommendations submitted by the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, shall be final in all cases.

906.5 Effect of appeal on action appealed from or on further action in accordance with decision appealed from. (a) **Effect of appeal.** Whenever, in the first instance or pursuant to a decision on appeal, the War Manpower Commission or any agent or agency acting on its behalf or with its consent, issues a statement of availability to or makes a referral of any worker, neither the appeal of the employer nor any decision on such appeal (other than a final decision finding fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the worker) shall in any way prejudice the right of the worker to whom the statement or referral had been issued to accept new work on the basis thereof, or the right of an employer to retain a worker whom he has hired in reliance upon such statement or referral. In all other cases the taking of an appeal shall suspend the action appealed from pending final decision, unless the Chairman of the Committee to whom an appeal is taken specifically directs otherwise.

(b) **Immediate issuance of statements of availability or making of referrals.** Except as otherwise provided pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, an individual found to be entitled to a statement of availability or a referral pursuant to a determination of the War Manpower Commission or any agent or agency acting on its behalf or with its consent, or pursuant to any appeal decision, shall be entitled to immediate issuance of such statement or referral notwithstanding any appeal or further appeal from such determination or decision.

(c) **Optional procedure with respect to issuance of statements of availability and making of referrals.**

(1) **Method of exercising option.** Any Area Manpower Director, after consultation with his Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committee, may elect to make applicable in his area the procedure described in this subsection with respect to issuance of statements of availability to and making referrals of workers. Such election shall be evidenced by an order issued by the Area Manpower Director, and approved by the Regional Manpower Director, a copy of which order shall be filed with the Chairman prior to the effective date thereof. Such election shall be effective until revoked by further order of the Area Manpower Director, approved and filed in the same manner. Any such election shall have general application in the area, and may not be made with respect to particular cases only.

(2) **Procedure governing suspension of issuance of statements of availability and making of referrals.**

(i) In and only in any case in which it is determined by the War Manpower Commission, or any agent or agency acting on its behalf or with its consent, that a statement of availability should be issued to a worker on the ground that continuance of his employment would involve undue personal hardship or that referral of the worker should
be made to other available employment in which the individual will be more fully utilized in the war effort, the issuance of such statement of availability or the making of such referral shall be suspended for a period, designated by the Area Director, which shall not be more than three days from the date of notification to the employer of the determination to issue the statement of availability or make the referral.

(ii) The employer shall be immediately notified of the determination to issue the statement of availability or make the referral. If the employer does not file his appeal, in writing, within the period designated by the Area Director pursuant to paragraph (i) hereof, the statement of availability or referral shall be issued in accordance with such determination without prejudice however, to the employer's right to appeal therefrom on the merits as provided in this regulation. If the employer files his appeal in writing within such period, the issuance of the statement of availability or referral shall be suspended for a further period, designated by the Area Director, which shall not be more than ten days from the date of notification to the employer of the determination to issue the statement of availability or make the referral. If within such designated further period, the case has not been decided at the area level, the statement of availability or referral shall be issued immediately upon the expiration of such period. Except as permitted in this paragraph, no suspension of the issuance of a statement of availability or referral shall be directed or authorized.

(iii) If the employer, upon notification of a determination to issue the statement of availability or make the referral, indicates that he does not intend to appeal, the statement of availability shall be issued or the referral shall be made immediately; if the employer indicates his intention to appeal but does not perfect his appeal, in writing, within the period designated by the Area Director pursuant to paragraph (i) hereof, the statement of availability shall be issued or the referral made immediately upon the expiration of such period.

(iv) An Area Director may withhold the application of the procedure set forth in this subsection for suspending the issuance of statements of availability and referrals as regards an employer whom the War Manpower Commission finds, after notice, hearing and final decision, to be arbitrarily and capriciously abusing his right of appeal under this subsection and for so long as such employer fails to satisfy the Area Director that such abuse will be corrected.

906.6 General provisions. (a) Notification of action or decision and right to appeal. Any worker or employer who has a right to appeal from any action or decision shall be notified of such action or decision, and shall be advised at the time of notification of his appeal rights and of the method of taking an appeal, except that this subsection shall be construed to permit reasonable posting or publication of notices in cases in which personal notice is deemed impracticable.

(b) Time for taking appeals. Appeals to the area and regional levels shall be taken within the time prescribed by the Regional Manpower Director, which shall be not less than three and not more than seven days following receipt of notice or posting or publication of notice, as the case may be, of the action or decision. Appeals to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall be taken within seven days following receipt of notice or posting or publication of the notice, as
the case may be, of the decision. When notice of the action or decision is given by mail, such notice shall be deemed to have been received on the second day following the date of mailing, and an appeal shall be deemed to have been taken on the date of mailing of a notice that appeal is taken.

(c) Method of taking appeal. Any person entitled to appeal as provided in Section 906.1 of this regulation may give notice of his appeal in person, in writing, or in any other manner which duly apprises the War Manpower Commission of the taking of the appeal.

(d) Notice of hearings and further appeal. The appellant and any other person who, following the decision to be made on appeal would be entitled to appeal, shall be given reasonable notice of the time and place of any hearing upon the appeal, and shall be promptly advised of any further appeal.

(e) Appearance by interested persons. Any worker or employer, group or organization of workers or employers, and other persons or organizations who claim to be prejudiced by any action which is the subject of an appeal under this regulation may be permitted by the Chairman of the Committee hearing an appeal from such action to attend and be heard at the hearing.

(f) Right to representation. Any action which any person or organization may take under this regulation may be taken on his behalf by his duly authorized representative.

(g) Consolidation of appeals. Whenever appropriate for the full and expeditious determination of common questions raised by two or more appeals, the Chairman of the Committee to whom such appeals are taken may consolidate them.

(h) Agricultural management and labor representation. Whenever agricultural employment is involved in an appeal, the Committee before whom such appeal is pending shall include representatives of agricultural management and labor.

(i) Conduct of hearings on appeal. All hearings on appeals shall be conducted informally and in a manner that will best develop the facts, and assure a fair and just decision in the matter, without regard to whether a worker or employer has erred as to the issues involved or as to his grounds for relief.

(j) Decisions based on evidence presented at a hearing. A decision of an appeal made on the record as provided in Sections 906.3 (c) and 906.4 (c) of this regulation shall be made exclusively upon evidence presented at a hearing before a lower appeals committee, but written or oral evidence which is submitted subsequent to a hearing in an appeals case may be considered by the appeals committee which afforded the hearing or on any subsequent appeal, if all the parties agree in writing to the consideration of such evidence, or if such evidence is presented in the course of a subsequent hearing which all parties have been afforded an opportunity to attend, or if such evidence has been requested by the Committee before which the appeal is pending.

(k) Impartial appeals committees. Any person directly interested in the outcome of an appeal shall be disqualified from acting as a member of any appeals committee considering the appeal.

(l) Committee attendance required for consideration of appeals cases. On the hearing of appeals by Regional or Area Management-Labor Committees or by Regional or Area Appeals Committees, an equal number of representatives of management and labor, respectively, shall be present and participate as voting members of the committee.

(m) Interim appeals committees. At any appeals level for which a Management-Labor War Manpower Committee has not been appointed, appeals shall be taken to, and hearings shall be afforded before, an Appeals Committee in the locality composed of an equal number of representatives of management and labor (including agricultural representation, as provided in Section 906.6 (h)), selected
by the Regional or Area Manpower Director. A representative designated by the Regional or Area Manpower Director shall serve as the non-voting chairman of the Appeals Committee.

(n) Inapplicability to special appeals. Nothing in this regulation shall be construed as applicable to actions taken or decisions rendered under War Manpower Commission Regulations Nos. 1 and 6, or Executive Order No. 9309, or to transfers between Executive departments or agencies of the Federal Government under Executive Order No. 9243.

(o) Modification of other policies. The provisions of any prior War Manpower Commission policy, program, regulation or other direction, to the extent that they are inconsistent with this regulation, are hereby modified to conform with the provisions of this regulation.

(Signed) Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.

February 11, 1944.
APPENDIX VI

REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, OF THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE

The reports which follow, issued on 31 October 1942, 30 December 1942, 20 March 1943, 2 April 1943 and 9 April 1943, constitute the basic organisational memoranda prepared by the Management-Labor Policy Committee and submitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission concerning the operation, responsibilities and membership of the National Committee itself. Discussion of their significance is found in Chapter II.

INTERIM REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION
Submitted by the Management-Labor Policy Committee

Pursuant to the request of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Management-Labor Policy Committee has been giving careful study to fundamental questions of policy that are involved in the consideration of National War Service Legislation. During this study, the Committee has conducted a comprehensive review of the national manpower and womanpower problems that have come before the Committee since it was established by order of the Chairman on May 25, 1942. Salient points of this review, together with certain conclusions and recommendations, are set forth herein.

Part I — Review of Progress to Date.

The Committee, composed of equal numbers representing management and organized labor, has worked diligently since its first meeting on June 9, 1942. Regular meetings have been held each week. At these meetings all major matters of War Manpower Commission policy have been carefully considered by the representatives of labor and management. The Committee members are gratified at the opportunity they have had and now have to participate in the development of policies and procedures involved in the manpower problem, matters that are vital to the war effort and to the lives of all people in the nation.

Numerous major items of manpower policy have been acted upon by the Committee. It is a tribute to the democratic processes that the nation is defending to note that, after full discussion and participation by the representatives of management and labor under the guidance of Government, all policies acted upon to date have been approved by unanimous agreement of the participants.

The Chairman has seen fit to implement the policies approved by the Committee and has not approved any policy until it has been submitted to and approved by the Committee. Of the policies thus far developed, the War Manpower Employment Stabilization and Migration Control Policy is the most significant. This policy, together with other related policies and procedures, is established to

1 Dated 31 October 1942.
permit maximum utilization of the forces of cooperative action by Government, Management and Labor at the national, regional and local industrial area levels.

The Policy provides for the establishment of regional and local industrial area War Manpower Directors under direct line administration of the War Manpower Commission’s Chairman, and for the aid and assistance by regional and local industrial area War Manpower Committees composed of the representatives of labor and management.

It seeks to bring about, at the source and by voluntary action of those involved, the solutions to all manpower problems that can be handled in this manner. The policy includes appropriate safeguards for action by Government where voluntary solutions are not forthcoming or where the problems do not lend themselves to local treatment. It can be applied to a local area, to a region comprising a number of states, or even to the nation on the basis of occupations or industries.

That much has been accomplished by these policies is apparent to the Committee. Numerous complicated and difficult problems in manpower have been dealt with. Others are under active consideration by representatives of Government, Labor and Management in such critical manpower areas as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Detroit, etc. Millions of workers have transferred voluntarily to more essential industries during the past two years. While most of this movement has been independent of direct Government guidance, the United States Employment Service, now a part of the War Manpower Commission, is currently guiding workers into jobs at the rate of about 7.5 million per year.

However, it is the considered opinion of the Committee that major weaknesses exist in the present approach to the overall manpower situation, weaknesses that require immediate attention and correction, and which, if not corrected, will seriously impede the war effort.

Part II — Outline of Immediate Requirements.

It is the Committee’s understanding that the present manpower program will require the services of at least 62.5 million people, including the armed forces, by the end of 1943. The unemployed reserve, which has been decreasing since June, 1940, cannot be reduced much further. Increasing reliance must be placed on transference to more essential activities of workers now employed in the less essential activities. Even if the utmost in this regard is done, it is believed the nation will still be faced with the necessity of recruiting and training 5 million new workers in addition to the normal entrance of young people in the labor force. The great majority of these new workers of necessity will be women. All women without small children or other urgent household responsibilities will be needed and should prepare to enter employment.

The situation is worse than these figures suggest because of the fact that labor requirements are highly concentrated in a comparatively few war production centers. At the present time, several industrial centers are faced with a general shortage of labor and many additional areas expect a general shortage to develop before next summer. In a few areas, labor shortages are so acute that work essential to the support of the armed forces remains undone. Labor shortages are also highly concentrated by occupation. Critical shortages now exist in numerous occupations, including most of the skilled and semi-skilled jobs in shipbuilding, aircraft, and ordnance plants.

The problem can be met only by prompt and vigorous action along several related lines. Losses of manpower from essential industries through needless migration and turnover must be stopped. Transference of labor from less essential to more essential activities must be accelerated. Additional labor supplies
must be mobilized, trained, and placed in employment. All workers must be fully employed at work requiring their highest skills.

The complications incidental to a problem of such magnitude are stupendous. They can be overcome only by a higher degree of initiative, cooperation and unselfish service than the nation has ever known.

After careful study of the situation, the Committee respectfully submits the following specific conclusions and recommendations for immediate consideration:

1. The manpower problem is an integral part of the process of mobilizing the entire nation for war, and must be considered in close conjunction with military and production planning. Decisions concerning the ultimate size and rate of growth of the armed forces must precede the formulation of detailed manpower policies. Conservation of the manpower resources requires that the available supply be apportioned between the military and essential civilian activities. The number, as well as the rate at which men are to be withdrawn from civilian activities for the armed forces, must be determined in the light of the overall demands upon the nation's supply of manpower.

Therefore, in the belief that first things must come first, the Committee recommends that the authority and responsibility for the apportionment of manpower, as between the armed services and essential civilian activities, in short the formulation of the overall program, be centralized in the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy, the Lend-Lease Administrator, the Chairman of the War Production Board, and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

In addition, it is suggested that consideration be given to closer integration of the manpower and production programs.

2. Responsibility for administration of the manpower program has been placed in the War Manpower Commission. In order to carry out the program and satisfactorily discharge this responsibility, the War Manpower Commission must possess centralized authority sufficient to insure compliance with its established policies and operating programs. In this connection, the Committee believes critical weaknesses exist at present.

(a) As the rate of induction is stepped up and employment increases, the supply of skilled and semi-skilled men must be most carefully distributed between the armed forces and industry in such manner that each individual may be placed where he can be of maximum use to the war effort. The Committee believes this will require a greater degree of integration with respect to deferment and replacement policies than is possible if the Selective Service System operates independently of the War Manpower Commission. It is desirable that the Selective Service System be made an integral part of the War Manpower Commission, and the Committee so recommends. In making this recommendation, the Committee is fully aware of the excellent job that is being done by the Selective Service System at all levels from the Director to the 6,500 local boards. However, it is increasingly evident to the Committee that centralized authority is essential to successful conduct of the manpower program.

(b) Centralization of authority over manpower must encompass the cessation of voluntary enlistment, which results in an uncontrolled flow of manpower from civilian employment into the armed forces. This flow has serious repercussions on vital production. Employers cannot anticipate enlistments and hence cannot plan for replacement. Skilled men leave essential industry without an evaluation of their relative contribution to the war as civilians or members of the armed forces. The Committee therefore recommends the cessation of voluntary enlistments.
(c) The armed forces are dependent upon an adequate supply of skilled men. The cessation of voluntary enlistments would require definite arrangements for supplying these men. The Committee therefore recommends that this function be assigned to the Selective Service System, and that practices of the Selective Service System be revised in such manner as to permit the proper discharge of this duty through special draft calls.

(d) The Committee believes that the training program for various branches of the armed forces, which are conducted in civilian establishments, can be coordinated with essential civilian training programs in such a manner as to increase the effectiveness of colleges and universities as the producers of vitally needed technical men. The Committee, therefore, recommends that arrangements be made whereby these programs will be coordinated with civilian programs under general policies prescribed by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

(e) The administrative and operating organization and resources of the War Manpower Commission must be increased sufficiently to cope with the tremendous load of work required to handle the manpower program. Recent transfer of the United States Employment Service to the War Manpower Commission was a step in the right direction. The network of local employment offices, operating under direction of national, regional and area War Manpower Directors, can and should be made the primary clearance agency for the recruitment and employment of workers. However, this can not be accomplished unless Congress makes additional funds available to the Employment Service, and removes impediments that have been placed in the way of effective Employment Service operations. The creation of a full and effective administrative and operating organization is one of the most important problems now confronting the War Manpower Commission. It is therefore recommended by the Committee that strong and vigorous action be directed to this end immediately.

3. Successful prosecution of the war requires that employers, employees, and potential employees alike, assume their full share of obligation in the manpower program. In its efforts to discharge its responsibilities, the War Manpower Commission is confronted with four major problems, the correction of which must fall largely upon industrial and agricultural management and labor, and upon those not now in employment or the armed forces, but who can render service. These problems concern the need to:

(a) Reduce the excessively high rate of labor turnover to vital war activities.
(b) Eliminate the waste that results from the needless shifting of large numbers of workers from one essential activity to another.
(c) Remove the hesitancy of workers in non-essential activities to transfer into essential activities.
(d) Accelerate the rate at which those not presently employed but capable of performing essential service, are mobilized, trained and placed in employment.

The Committee recommends that the public at large be fully informed as to these problems with the attendant obligations, and that authority of the War Manpower Commission be extended sufficiently to assure the successful operation of plans that can be put into effect under the Employment Stabilization and Migration Control Policy referred to in Part I of this report.
In summary of the immediate requirements, the Committee respectfully but urgently calls upon Government, Industry, Agriculture, and Labor for strong leadership, aggressive action and maximum cooperation to bring about the following:

**By Government.**

1. Centralized authority and responsibility for determination of the overall manpower program.
2. Centralized authority and responsibility for the administration of the manpower program, which requires:
   - (a) Transfer of the Selective Service System to the War Manpower Commission.
   - (b) Cessation of voluntary enlistments.
   - (c) Provision for special calls by the Army and Navy through the Selective Service System for men with specialized skills.
   - (d) Coordination by the War Manpower Commission of military and civilian training programs conducted in non-military educational institutions.
   - (e) Establishment of a strong administrative and operating organization for the War Manpower Commission.
3. Implementation of the War Manpower Employment Stabilization and Migration Control Policy by wide public distribution, and by extension of the War Manpower Commission’s authority to regulate hiring, rehiring, solicitation, and recruitment in labor shortage areas.

**By Management and Labor.**

1. Uniform acceptance of and compliance with the War Manpower Commission’s policies and directives.
2. Elimination of wasteful labor turnover in civilian war activities.
3. Acceleration in the rate of transfer from non-essential to essential activities.
4. Acceleration in the rate of mobilizing, training and employing those who are presently unemployed but who are able to render service.
5. Maximum utilization of labor in a manner insuring maximum use of the skills and capacities of workers.
6. Accelerated rate at which men of the military age group, who are engaged in essential activities, can be released for service in the armed forces.
7. Elimination of all barriers, restrictions or obstructions incidental to successful accomplishment of points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 above.

**Part III — Viewpoint of the Committee with respect to National War Service Legislation.**

The Chairman will recall that he appeared before the Management-Labor Policy Committee on August 14, 1942, and requested that the Committee proceed immediately to a full consideration of the fundamental questions of policy that must be solved as a prerequisite to the preparation of an appropriate National War Service Law.

Accordingly, the Committee made arrangements whereby a sub-committee (composed of two representatives of labor, two representatives of management, and a sub-committee chairman representing Government) immediately undertook the discharge of this obligation. The Committee instructed this sub-committee to proceed jointly with a sub-committee of the War Manpower Commission which was already at work on the same project.
The study has proceeded as requested. To date, two progress reports have been returned to the full Management-Labor Policy Committee. These reports reveal the fact that unanimous agreement has been reached on some of the matters of fundamental policy, discussions of other points are not completed, and still other major problems have not yet been considered.

Discussions of the Committee up to the present writing have served to acquaint the Committee with the magnitude of the manpower problem, to crystallize the recommendations outlined in Part II of this report, and to develop certain convictions that appear to be pertinent at this point. They are as follows:

1. The Committee recognized that in this time of national peril and world crisis, each individual person of or in this nation has a supreme moral obligation to render personal service in the war effort in such manner as his or her capabilities will permit. The Committee believes a great majority of the people of the nation fully recognize this obligation and stand ready to serve.

2. The Committee is convinced that sacrifice and unselfish service by all will be required to achieve success in the war effort.

3. The Committee doubts that conversion of the moral obligation to serve in the war effort, into a legal obligation to serve will of itself solve the manpower situation. The problems of administering the manpower program, as outlined in Part II of this report, must be solved and enactment of a law will not solve them.

4. The Committee has confidence that the voluntary and cooperative efforts of the people, under strong leadership on the part of Government, Management and Labor, will provide the answer to this all important war manpower problem. Experiences in the months which lie ahead may reveal that the Executive Branch of the Government requires supplementary authority from the Congress in order to carry forward the manpower program in an effective manner. The Committee therefore will continue the study requested by the Chairman and, in the light of accumulating experiences, will be prepared to make appropriate recommendations from time to time.

R. Conrad Cooper, Management.
E. B. Dighridge, Management.
Frank P. Fenton, Labor.
Joseph McDonagh, Labor.
R. Randall Irwin, Management.
Julius G. Luhrs, Labor.
George Masterton, Labor.

Kenneth Gardner, Management.
R. E. Gillmer, Management.
Clinton S. Golden, Labor.
John Green, Labor.
Martin H. Miller, Labor.
Walter P. Reuther, Labor.
C. J. Whipple, Management.

Arthur S. Flemming,
Presiding Officer.

Recommendations regarding the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission

Executive Order No. 9279 which was signed by the President of the United States on December 5, 1942 states in part:

The Chairman shall appoint a Management-Labor Policy Committee to be selected from the fields of labor, agriculture, and industrial management,

1 Dated 30 December 1942.
and shall consult with the members thereof in carrying out his responsibilities.

Members of the Committee are duly conscious of the trust thus placed in them. They recognize their responsibility as related to the national welfare and the war effort. It is their intention to assume this responsibility in a manner that will afford maximum assistance to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. To that end the Committee adopts specific rules of procedure which are set forth herein, and offers certain recommendations to the Chairman.

The Committee believes that the importance of the manpower problem cannot be over emphasized. The complications involved therein are tremendous. Close and continuous coordination of matters under consideration from time to time by the Chairman, the War Manpower Commission and the Management-Labor Policy Committee is essential to enlightened decisions in minimum time. In order to afford maximum cooperation the Management-Labor Policy Committee adopts the following:

Rules of Procedure

I. Schedule of Meetings.

Regular meetings of the Management-Labor Policy Committee will be held on Friday of each week from the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Saturday forenoon will be held open for additional meetings as needed, for special meetings, and for meetings with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as arranged from time to time.

II. Committee Member Attendance at Meetings.

Members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall consider themselves obligated to attend all regular Committee meetings and shall so arrange their personal affairs. The practice of alternates shall be discouraged except in cases where a principal member designates an alternate to attend regularly in his place.

III. Continuous Day to Day Contact.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall appoint a standing subcommittee thereof as follows:

(a) The sub-committee shall be known as the Executive Committee.
(b) The Executive Committee shall be composed of six members, two to be chosen from those representing labor, two to be chosen from those representing industrial management and two to be chosen from those representing agriculture.
(c) Executive Committee appointees shall be designated by members of their respective groups and shall be subject to recall at any time by their designators.
(d) Members of the Executive Committee shall arrange their affairs in a manner that will permit at least three members of the Executive Committee to be available, on hand or on call, at all times to serve the Chairman and the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission.
(e) The Executive Committee may be empowered to act in the name of the full Management-Labor Policy Committee on matters where, in the judgment of the full Management-Labor Policy Committee, the time factor so justifies: Provided that all six members proceed together as a unit and that they act only by unanimous agreement.
IV. Agenda for Committee Meetings.

It is understood that meetings of the Management-Labor Policy Committee will be confined to an orderly program of subjects of which all Committee members have advance notice. Preparation of the agenda shall be governed by the following rules:

(a) No subjects other than those that originate under Executive Order No. 9139 or Executive Order No. 9279 and which bear directly on the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower shall be acted upon by the Committee.

(b) Subjects first presented in one regular meeting will not be acted upon until the next regular meeting unless, in a particular situation the Committee members unanimously agree to waive the rule, or unless arrangement for action has been made by advance clearance through the Executive Committee.

(c) The normal order of business shall be:
   1. Unfinished business in executive session;
      Approve or amend and approve minutes of preceding meeting;
      Report of Committee Chairman;
      Report of Executive Committee;
      Report of other sub-committees;
      Committee action on unfinished matters.
   2. New business in open session.

V. Admissions to Meetings.

(a) Executive Sessions shall be open only to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee, the Committee Chairman, the Committee Executive Secretary and assistant, the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission and the Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee.

(b) Open sessions shall be open to those eligible to attend executive sessions, such regular attending official observers as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may see fit to designate, and such special individuals as are invited from time to time through the Executive Secretary. Such invitations shall have advance approval by the Executive Committee, or by the full Management-Labor Policy Committee.

VI. Transmittal of Resolutions and Recommendations.

All resolutions and recommendations shall be transmitted to the Chairman in person, either by the full Management-Labor Policy Committee, by the Executive Committee, or by the Committee Chairman. In the event the Committee members do not concur in a unanimous recommendation on any given matter that comes before them officially, the dissenting members shall prepare and submit to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, a dissenting opinion and minority recommendation if they so desire.

* * *

The Committee believes that certain services and facilities are necessary to enable the satisfactory discharge of its obligations, and therefore recommends to the Chairman, provision of the following:
Services and Facilities


The position in full charge of the relationships with the representatives of labor, industrial management and agriculture will require an individual with broad knowledge of the workings of government, and intimate acquaintance with the intricacies of the manpower problem. It will require an individual capable of commanding the complete respect and confidence of the Committee members. Under these circumstances it seems appropriate to request the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission to designate an individual subject to approval by the Committee.

2. Executive Secretary of the Management-Labor Policy Committee.

The position in full charge of arrangements for committee meetings and all of the details incidental thereto will require an individual of unusual tact and secretarial ability. It will require an individual capable of commanding the complete respect and confidence of the committee members. Again under these circumstances it seems appropriate to request the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission to designate an individual subject to approval by the Committee.

3. Executive Committee Accommodations.

In order to function effectively it is believed the Executive Committee will need:

(a) An office for the representatives of labor, consisting of accommodations for the two Executive Committee members with one secretary, and conference space for the eight labor members.

(b) An office for the representatives of Management, consisting of accommodations for the two Executive Committee members with one secretary, and conference space for the eight management members.

(c) An office for the representatives of agriculture, consisting of accommodations for the two Executive Committee members and for one secretary.


It is recommended that the Executive Secretary and the Executive Committee members be located in offices as nearly adjoined as possible; that the Executive Secretary be supplied with adequate and competent stenographic, clerical and filing assistance; and that all four offices regularly receive copies of general orders, staff instructions, directives, press releases, etc., as they are issued from time to time. It is further suggested that, if the Chairman deems it appropriate, designation of the Executive Committee members as official observers at Commission and executive staff meetings would enable a better understanding and appreciation of the day to day problems as they arise.

Memorandum regarding the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission

On May 25, 1942 Mr. Paul V. McNutt, Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, voluntarily issued an order to establish the Management-Labor Policy Committee. This order stated in part—

1 Dated 20 March 1943.
“There is hereby established in the Office of the Chairman of the Commission a Management-Labor Policy Committee consisting of seven representatives of Management and seven representatives from Organized Labor.”

“The Management-Labor Policy Committee is authorized to consider and recommend to the Chairman, matters of major policy concerning the activities and responsibilities of the Commission. The Committee shall initiate studies and the formulation of policies, as well as consider those referred to it by the Chairman.”

Appointments were made by Chairman McNutt, and the Committee convened shortly thereafter. During the ensuing months the Committee met at regular intervals and considered all major policy matters of the Commission’s manpower program. It is a fair statement to say that no major policies were put into effect without prior approval of the Committee, and that the Chairman has consistently followed the Committee’s recommendations.

Prior to December 1942 the Committee was enlarged to include two representatives of railway labor and two representatives of agriculture.

On December 5, 1942 the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 9279 “providing for the most effective mobilization and utilization of the National manpower . . . . . . . .” This Executive Order accomplished a number of points that had been recommended by the Committee in its October 31, 1942 “Interim Report to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission”, including:

1. Centralized authority and responsibility for determination of the over-all manpower program.
2. Transfer of the Selective Service System to the War Manpower Commission.
3. Cessation of voluntary enlistments.
4. Coordination by the War Manpower Commission of military and civilian training programs conducted in non-military educational institutions.

Among others, Executive Order No. 9279 included a provision to the effect that—

“The Chairman shall appoint a Management-Labor Policy Committee to be selected from the fields of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, and shall consult with the members thereof in carrying out his responsibilities.”

Promptly thereafter Chairman McNutt reappointed the Committee members, and made certain additional and replacement appointments. On January 8, 1943, the Chairman issued Administrative Order No. 4 which, among others, included a provision to the effect that:

“The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall consider such questions of major policy as are referred to it, and shall make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, specific recommendations as to the actions which, in its judgment, he should take. The Committee may also, on its own motion, make, in writing or in consultation with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, recommendations relative to policies which, in its judgment, should be put into operation by him.”

During the ensuing interval of time to date, the Committee met at regular intervals and considered all new major policy matters of the Commission’s manpower program. Again, it is a fair statement to say that no major policies were put into effect without prior approval of the Committee, and that the Chairman has consistently followed the Committee’s recommendations.
There can be no doubt but that deliberations of the Management-Labor Policy Committee have had much constructive effect upon the manpower program. However, helpful as these efforts may have been, after some ten months of experience it is now definitely clear that the maximum force of full and complete cooperative effort of government, labor, agriculture, and industrial management has not yet been brought to bear on the manpower problem.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 9279 above quoted, and the long demonstrated good faith intent of Chairman McNutt to utilize the council and cooperative efforts of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, the representatives thereof have an unprecedented opportunity to make an outstanding contribution to the public welfare during a time of national crisis.

In order to bring about maximum contribution to the manpower program, certain actions should come to pass immediately. It is believed by the Committee that:

1. The Management Labor Policy Committee must be reconstituted in such manner as to afford appropriate proportional representation for labor, agriculture, and industrial management respectively.
2. Committee membership should consist of the recognized national spokesmen for labor, agriculture and industrial management, and must be confined to these spokesmen or to duly qualified and authorized representatives thereof, chosen by and closely identified with these recognized national spokesmen, such representatives to be enabled, empowered and obligated to devote whatever time may be required for Committee service.
3. Public relations policies of the War Manpower Commission and of the organizations of labor, agriculture, and industrial management must be established in such manner as to secure widespread public knowledge of the fact that duly qualified representatives of labor, agriculture and industrial management actively participate in the formulation of War Manpower Commission policies.
4. Having participated in formulating War Manpower Commission policies, the national organizations of labor, agriculture, and industrial management must take vigorous action, through their respective organizations, to exercise their full influence in securing national compliance with and support of such War Manpower Commission policies.

Reconstitution of Management-Labor Policy Committee as Adopted by Seven Leaders of Agriculture, Labor and Industrial Management and Accepted by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission

1. The Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission shall be composed of three representatives of labor, three representatives of agriculture, and three representatives of industrial management.
2. From the field of labor, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of labor, namely:
   - Mr. William Green, President, A.F. of L.
   - Mr. Philip Murray, President, C.I.O.
   A representative of the Railroad Brotherhoods is yet to be selected.
3. From the field of agriculture, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of agriculture, namely:

1 Dated 20 March 1943.
Mr. Edward A. O'Neal, President American Farm Bureau Federation.
Mr. Albert S. Goss, Master, National Grange.
Mr. James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union.

4. From the field of industrial management, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of industrial management, namely:

Mr. Eric A. Johnston, President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Frederick C. Crawford, President, National Association of Manufacturers.
Mr. R. Conrad Cooper, Assistant Vice President in Charge of Operations, Wheeling Steel Corporation.

5. Public relations policies of the represented organizations of Government, labor, agriculture, and industrial management shall be established in such manner as to secure widespread public knowledge of the fact that duly qualified representatives of labor, agriculture and industrial management actively participate in the formulation of policies of the War Manpower Commission.

6. The represented organizations of labor, agriculture, and industrial management shall take vigorous action through their respective organizations to exercise their full influence in securing national compliance with and support of the policies and programs approved by the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission.

It was agreed that each of the nine members will have an alternate who will do the work. The alternates will be on hand most of the time. It was further agreed that:

1. The alternates shall reach a unanimous decision before presenting their decision to the War Manpower Commission, and that
2. If the alternates cannot reach a unanimous decision the principals shall be called in to see if they can reach a unanimous decision, and
3. In the event that the principals cannot agree, both a minority and a majority report shall be filed.

REVIEW REPORT OF THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE

A. Reconstitution of the Management-Labor Policy Committee

During Committee deliberations from February 26 to March 19, 1943 arrangements were made whereby, in order to enhance effectiveness of the Committee and to bring about full force of the voluntary cooperative efforts of Government, labor, agriculture, and industrial management in the war manpower program, seven recognized national spokesmen of labor, agriculture and industrial management were brought together on March 20, 1943 to consider certain major problems in connection therewith.

The seven recognized national spokesmen deliberated at length and by unanimous agreement, submitted to Chairman Paul V. McNutt the following recommendations:

1. The Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission shall be composed of three representatives of labor, three representatives of agriculture, and three representatives of industrial management;

1Dated 2 April 1943.
2. From the field of labor, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of labor, namely:

Mr. William Green, President, A.F. of L.
Mr. Philip Murray, President, C.I.O.
A representative of the Railroad Brotherhoods is yet to be selected.

3. From the field of agriculture, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of agriculture, namely:

Mr. Edward A. O'Neal, President, American Farm Bureau Federation.
Mr. Albert S. Goss, Master, National Grange.
Mr. James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union.

4. From the field of industrial management, members of the Management Labor Policy Committee shall be duly qualified and authorized representatives of industrial management, namely:

Mr. Eric A. Johnston, President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Frederick C. Crawford, President, National Association of Manufacturers.
Mr. R. Conrad Cooper, Assistant Vice President in Charge of Operations, Wheeling Steel Corporation.

5. Public relations policies of the represented organizations of Government, labor, agriculture, and industrial management shall be established in such manner as to secure widespread public knowledge of the fact that duly qualified representatives of labor, agriculture and industrial management actively participate in the formulation of policies of the War Manpower Commission.

6. The represented organizations of labor, agriculture, and industrial management shall take vigorous action through their respective organizations to exercise their full influence in securing national compliance with and support of the policies and programs approved by the Management-Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission.

It was agreed that each of the nine members will have an alternate who will do the work. The alternates will be on hand most of the time. It was further agreed that:

1. The alternates shall reach a unanimous decision before presenting their decision to the War Manpower Commission, and that
2. If the alternates cannot reach a unanimous decision the principals shall be called in to see if they can reach a unanimous decision, and
3. In the event that the principals cannot agree, both a minority and a majority report shall be filed.

Mr. McNutt promptly accepted these recommendations and put them into effect by issuance of Administrative Order No. 4 (revised), copy of which is attached. Confirming appointments of the above named members have gone forth, together with request that nominations for the respective alternates be submitted for confirming appointment as soon as possible. To date the following alternates have been named:

Mr. Paul Sifton, alternate agriculture member for Mr. James G. Patton.
B. Rules of Procedure

On December 30, 1942 the Management-Labor Policy Committee adopted certain rules of procedure as follows:

I. Schedule of Meetings.

Regular meetings of the Management-Labor Policy Committee will be held on Friday of each week from the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. Saturday forenoon will be held open for additional meetings as needed, for special meetings, and for meetings with the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as arranged from time to time.

II. Committee Member Attendance at Meetings.

Members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee or their alternates shall consider themselves obligated to attend all regular Committee meetings and shall so arrange their personal affairs.

III. Continuous Day to Day Contact.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee shall appoint a standing subcommittee thereof as follows:

(a) The sub-committee shall be known as the Executive Committee.
(b) The Executive Committee shall be composed of six members, two to be chosen from those representing labor, two to be chosen from those representing industrial management and two to be chosen from those representing agriculture. ¹
(c) Executive Committee appointees shall be designated by members of their respective groups and shall be subject to recall at any time by their designators.
(d) Members of the Executive Committee shall arrange their affairs in a manner that will permit at least three members of the Executive Committee to be available, on hand or on call, at all times to serve the Chairman and the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission.
(e) The Executive Committee may be empowered to act in the name of the full Management-Labor Policy Committee on matters where, in the judgment of the full Management-Labor Policy Committee, the time factor so justifies: Provided that all six members proceed together as a unit and that they act only by unanimous agreement.

IV. Agenda for Committee Meetings.

It is understood that meetings of the Management-Labor Policy Committee will be confined to an orderly program of subjects of which all Committee members have advance notice where possible. Preparation of the agenda shall be governed by the following rules:

(a) No subjects other than those that originate under Executive Order No. 9139 or Executive Order No. 9279 and which bear directly on the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower shall be acted upon by the Committee.
(b) The order of business shall be:
   1. Unfinished business in Executive Session;
   2. Approve or amend and approve minutes of preceding meeting;

¹ Action deferred until appointment of railway member.
Report of Committee Chairman;
Report of Executive Committee;
Report of other sub-committees;
Committee action on unfinished matters.

2. New business in Open Session.

V. Admissions to Meetings.

(a) Executive Sessions shall be open only to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee, the Committee Chairman, vice Chairman, the Committee Executive Secretary and assistant, the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission and the Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee.

(b) Open sessions shall be open to those eligible to attend executive sessions, such regular attending official observers as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may see fit to designate, and such special individuals as are invited from time to time through the Executive Secretary. Such invitations shall have advance approval by the Executive Committee, or by the full Management-Labor Policy Committee.

VI. Transmittal of Resolutions and Recommendations.

All resolutions and recommendations shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in accordance with Section 8 of Administrative Order No. 4 which reads as follows:

.01 All decisions of the Committee, participated in by alternate members, shall be reached by unanimous agreement.

.02 When the Committee, in which alternate members are participating, fails to reach unanimous agreement the question shall be referred to a meeting of the members of the Committee.

.03 Unanimous decisions of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as "Policy Decisions" of the Committee.

.04 Where the members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee fail to reach unanimous agreement, the chairman of the Committee shall report that fact to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and shall transmit to him such reports as individual members or groups of members wish to make. Such reports shall be signed by the members agreeing to them.

C. Sub-Committees

On July 21, 1942 the Management-Labor Policy Committee established a standing Sub-Committee to counsel and advise the Training-within-Industry division. This Sub-Committee was composed of Messrs. Golden, Fenton, Gillmore and Irwin. On December 19, 1942 Mr. Gillmore withdrew from Committee service and no replacement has been designated as yet.

Reconstitution of the Management-Labor Policy Committee automatically dissolves this Sub-Committee. Consequently consideration should be given as to whether or not the T.W.I. Sub-Committee is to be re-established.

On December 30, 1942 the Management-Labor Policy Committee established a standing sub-committee known as the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was composed of Messrs. Golden, Fenton, Sifton, Ogg, Irwin and Cooper.
Reconstitution of the Management-Labor Policy Committee automatically dissolves the Executive Committee. This matter is involved in "B" above.

D. Unfinished Business of the Executive Committee

1. Review of the Anti-pirating Policy of the War Manpower Commission. (The Executive Committee conducted preliminary review; concluded the Anti-pirating Policy was superseded by the War Manpower Commission, February 1, 1943 "Policies for Employment Stabilization Programs which include the Exercise of Hiring Controls in Areas of Manpower Shortage"; and requested of the Executive Director that the matter be reviewed by the Executive Staff.)

2. Review of the constituency of Management-Labor War Manpower Committees on regional and area levels, with special reference to proposal of the Women’s Advisory Committee for representation thereon. Copy of the existing arrangement in this connection is attached.

3. Develop national policies, standards and safeguards in connection with the decentralized authority of Section 5 (a) and Section 7 of Executive Order No. 9279 (War Manpower Commission’s February 1, 1943 “Policies for Employment Stabilization Programs which include the Exercise of Hiring Controls in Areas of Manpower Shortage”).

4. Develop proposal on labor standards (Workmen’s Compensation, etc.). In view of the Committee’s reconstitution, it is appropriate for the new Committee to determine what action it desires to take in connection with these items.

REGIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREA MANAGEMENT-LABOR WAR MANPOWER COMMITTEES

I. General

The effective utilization of the nation’s manpower necessitates the participation of management, labor and the public in the development of policies dealing with manpower. To facilitate this participation there has been established at the national level a Management-Labor Policy Committee which initiates or reviews proposed policies and makes recommendations to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission with respect thereto. The proper execution of the program and policies of the War Manpower Commission through the Regional and Industrial Area representatives of the War Manpower Commission requires the assistance of management and labor in effectuating such policies. There will be established in each region a Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committee and such Industrial Area Management-Labor Committees as may be necessary. The selection of management and labor representatives on such committees will be so made that those chosen truly represent the point of view of their groups and will, as a result, be helpful in securing the cooperation of management and labor in the execution of the program and policies developed.

II. National Management-Labor Policy Committee

In addition to the functions heretofore vested in the National Management-Labor Policy Committee, that committee shall be authorized to review any recommendation of a Regional Management-Labor Committee and shall submit its advice with respect thereto to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.
III. Organisation of Regional and Area Committees

A. Regional Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

1. Composition. The Regional Committees will be composed of:
   Two representatives of the American Federation of Labor.
   Two representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
   One representative of the Railway Labor Organizations.
   Five representatives of Management.
   The Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission shall be the non-voting Chairman of the Regional Committee.

2. Selection. The Labor representatives of the National Management-Labor Policy Committee shall nominate a panel of individuals, recommended by such representatives as labor members of the Regional Committees.
   The Management representatives of the National Management-Labor Policy Committee shall nominate a panel of individuals recommended by such representatives as Management members of the Regional Committees.
   The National Management-Labor Policy Committee shall recommend a panel of individuals, consisting of an equal number of individuals from the panels nominated by the labor representatives and by the management representatives of the Committee, respectively, from which an equal number of management and labor members will be appointed to each Regional Management Committee by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

3. Functions. The Regional Committees shall serve as consultants to the Regional Director within the scope of policies and instructions issued by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. In addition, and subject to such policies and instructions, each such Committee shall:
   (a) Advise the Regional Director as to methods for securing full participation by Industrial Area Committees;
   (b) Through its individual members, or as a Regional Committee, render assistance with respect to industrial area situations which are beyond the scope of a local committee or situations which require the participation of an impartial non-local representative;
   (c) Review recommendations of Industrial Area Committees for the purpose of making recommendations to the Regional Director regarding actions to be taken.

B. Industrial Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

1. Composition. The Industrial Area Committees shall be composed of:
   One or two representatives of the American Federation of Labor.
   One or two representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
   Two or four representatives of Management.
   The Area Director shall be the non-voting Chairman of the Industrial Area Committee.
   Where a transportation problem exists (other than local transportation), the Area Committee may be enlarged to include a representative of Railway Labor Organizations and a representative of Railroad Management.

2. Selection. The following procedure will be followed in selecting members:
   (a) The Regional Director shall, in writing, request the various industrial area employer associations or other appropriate groups to nominate the required number of representatives of employers engaged in essential
activities to serve as representatives of Management. If it is determined that there is need for a Railroad Management representative the Regional Director shall request Railroad Management to nominate an employer representative to serve on the Committee;

(b) The Regional Director shall, in writing, request the local American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization's labor organizations to nominate the required number of individuals representing workers engaged in essential activities, to serve as representatives of Labor. If it is determined that there is need for a Railway Labor Representative, the Regional Director shall request appropriate Railway Labor organizations to nominate a Labor representative to serve on the Committee;

(e) From the nominations so submitted, the Regional Director shall appoint the Labor and Management representative of the Area Committee.

3. Alternative Composition and Selection. When in the judgment of the Regional Director the interest of the War Manpower program can be better served by a different composition or method of selection of either Management or Labor representatives, such other composition or method of selection may be adopted after consultation with the Regional Committee.

4. Functions. The Industrial Area Committee shall function on the basis of and within the scope of policies approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

The Industrial Area Committees shall be responsible for:

(a) Obtaining local cooperation in effectuating the policies and program approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(b) Obtaining the cooperation of local management and labor in the solution, on a local basis, of all manpower problems relating primarily to management, labor, or management and labor, such solutions to be within the framework of the policies and program approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission;

(c) Facilitating the work of the War Manpower Commission in effecting the orderly transfer of needed workers to essential activities;

(d) Hearing complaints of individual workers or employers, or groups of workers or employers, concerning any section or failure to act by local representatives of governmental agencies which are carrying out any part of the program of the War Manpower Commission. The Committee shall make recommendations to the Industrial Area War Manpower Director concerning such cases.

RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE

I. Schedule of Meetings.

II. Committee Member Attendance at Meetings.

Members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee or their alternates shall consider themselves obligated to attend all regular Committee meetings and shall so arrange their personal affairs.

1 Dated 9 April 1943.
III. Agenda for Committee Meetings.

It is understood that meetings of the Management-Labor Policy Committee will be confined to an orderly program of subjects of which all Committee members have advance notice where possible. Preparation of the agenda shall be governed by the following rules:

(a) No subjects other than those that originate under Executive Order No. 9139 or Executive Order No. 9279 and which bear directly on the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower shall be acted upon by the Committee.

(b) The order of business shall be:
   1. Unfinished business;
      Approve or amend and approve minutes of preceding meeting;
      Report of Executive Director;
      Report of other sub-committees;
      Committee action on unfinished matters.
   2. New business.

IV. Admission to Meetings.

(a) Executive sessions shall be open only to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Committee Executive Secretary and assistant, the Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission, the Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee, and the Executive Assistants to the representatives of labor, agriculture, and management unless otherwise ordered.

(b) Open sessions shall be open to those eligible to attend executive sessions, such regular attending official observers as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may see fit to designate, and such special individuals as are invited from time to time through the Executive Secretary.

V. Transmittal of Resolutions and Recommendations.

All resolutions and recommendations shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in accordance with Section 8 of Administrative Order No. 4 which reads as follows:

".01 All decisions of the Committee, participated in by alternate members, shall be reached by unanimous agreement.

.02 When the Committee, in which alternate members are participating, fails to reach unanimous agreement the question shall be referred to a meeting of the members of the Committee.

.03 Unanimous decisions of the Management-Labor Policy Committee shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission as 'Policy Decisions' of the Committee.

.04 Where the members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee fail to reach unanimous agreement, the Chairman of the Committee shall report that fact to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and shall transmit to him such reports as individual members or groups of members wish to make. Such reports shall be signed by the members agreeing to them."
APPENDIX VII

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING MANPOWER MOBILISATION
ADOPTED BY THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE

The basic statements adopted by the Committee on 6 November 1943, 2 May 1944, and 6 September 1944, which summarised the positive proposals of the Committee in achieving voluntary manpower mobilisation, have been summarised in Chapter II, but warrant full publication as they reflect the constant view of the Committee on this basic question.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE IN THE
WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION AND DECLARATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF LABOR, AGRICULTURE AND MANAGEMENT

On July 20, 1943, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission requested that the Management-Labor Policy Committee study the principles of National War Service Legislation by way of preparation should such legislation become necessary to the successful prosecution of the war.

The Committee, composed of equal numbers representing labor, agriculture and industrial management, expressed unanimous opposition to such legislation but consented to proceed with the study and at the same time explore all other possible ways and means by which the war manpower needs may be met.

The Committee has proceeded with these studies as agreed. The members of the Committee desire now to submit to the Chairman their recommendations as to a program by which they believe the war manpower problem can be solved without National War Service Legislation.

Statement

The War Manpower Commission has done much to coordinate manpower matters. It has sought to enlist the full, voluntary, cooperative forces of labor, agriculture and management through the national Management-Labor Policy Committee and the regional and area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees. It has decentralized its administration in an effort to provide maximum latitude for the local solutions of manpower problems. Much progress has been made but it is evident that more is needed. The Committee recognizes that:

1. Manpower still is being wasted through ineffective usages in some quarters through excessively high turnover in others, and through restrictive practices in others.

2. Large numbers of workers who should do so have not yet transferred into work necessary in time of war.

3. Vast unused manpower resources of longer hours of work, improved performance of workers, and employable women are still available.

Some groups construe these conditions to mean that the voluntary system is failing and that National War Service Legislation is necessary. Members of this Committee disagree with such conclusions.
The members of this Committee believe that the people of this nation are unsurpassed in initiative, resourcefulness, and the will to do when their course is clear. They recognize that under the American form of government with full play of initiative in the free enterprise system, the people of this country have established the greatest productive machine in history. They are opposed to National War Service Legislation in the unanimous belief that compulsion in any form, whether by law or by administrative order, does not go to the heart of the problem. They believe the need goes beyond that which can be secured by compulsion.

They are convinced that:

1. The American people will provide greater output under a voluntary system than under one of compulsion and regimentation.
2. The present critical manpower situations are results of dislocation, mal-distribution of contracts, and ineffective manpower utilization rather than of inadequate over-all supply of labor.
3. The solution depends upon leadership, coordinated and understood plans, and efficient administration, not upon broadened control and regulation.
4. Fully effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower will be achieved:
   (a) When all agencies of government concerned with procurement, production and manpower are administered under a coordinated and well understood arrangement in which government defines the war needs, enunciates the fundamental policies or "rules of the game", confines itself to a minimum of control and administrative detail, and provides the maximum of real assistance to those who must do the work, namely, the people of this nation in each community;
   (b) When all of the people understand their personal obligations as related to the war needs; and know where and when to apply their services in such manner as best to aid in the war effort.

These viewpoints are not new. They have long been urged by the Committee. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission has demonstrated that he holds similar views. The need then is to secure full support by all administrative agencies of government and the enlightened, complete, voluntary cooperation of the nation's people.

Program

The War Manpower Commission has had widespread and varied experiences with locally developed manpower programs under decentralized administration, and with controls of one form or another in various critical situations. In the opinion of the Committee, out of these experiences has emerged a practical approach that is basic to the solution of any critical war manpower problem whether it be local or national in character.

The elements of this approach constitute a basic outline of the program this Committee believes should be used to solve the war manpower needs. These elements are:

1. The facts as to manpower needs and available supply must be determined as accurately as is humanly possible. The War Manpower Commission must make these determinations in close cooperation with management and labor of any given area.
2. The relative urgency for products and services must be determined in each local area by the agencies of government responsible for procurement and pro-
duction. Such determinations must be made as close to the source as possible by local representatives of those agencies acting together in close cooperation with the local representative of the War Manpower Commission within the framework of national policy.

3. The relative needs of employers for workers must be determined in each area. Such determinations must be made by local representatives of the War Manpower Commission in close cooperation with local representatives of procurement and production agencies of government with the counsel and advice of the Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

4. The causes for failure to meet and maintain required employment levels in individual employing establishments must be identified, and wherever possible removed. To accomplish this the War Manpower Commission must secure and coordinate the full and cooperative efforts of employers, workers, the community and other government agencies.

5. The flow of available manpower must be guided to the points where it will contribute most to the war effort. In accordance with plans formulated with local Management-Labor War Manpower Committees, the War Manpower Commission must guide this flow of workers in any given area.

6. The volume of production allocated to or retained in any given area must be balanced with the ability to supply the necessary manpower. The coordinated agencies of government responsible for procurement, production and manpower should make such allocations.

7. All of these actions must be based on the initial conceptions that the agencies of government are to serve the people by informing them what has to be done, when and where it must be done, and that the people of the nation are the ones to determine how it shall be done.

Recommendations to Government

In the opinion of the Committee, this program and other considerations require the agencies of government to take several related actions as promptly as possible. The Management-Labor Policy Committee therefore recommends to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission:

I. That the Office of War Mobilization be called upon:

(a) To conduct continuing reappraisal of the national production requirements as related to the total manpower resources of the nation in such manner as to make clear to the people the program required.

(b) To intensify and accelerate its reappraisal of the organization and functions of governmental agencies responsible for the administration of procurement, production, and manpower matters to the end that:

(1) overlapping of agencies and jurisdictional interferences are finally removed as promptly as possible;

(2) over-all plans and basic related policies are formulated at but one point of appropriate jurisdiction in such manner as to permit decentralized administration of manpower programs developed locally by the people of each community; and

(3) needless administrative burdens and controls are removed as promptly as possible.

II. That the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission require review of the Selective Service System's regulations and procedures with such revisions as are necessary fully to establish the principles that—
LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION IN THE U.S.A.

(a) The first duty of a physically fit man in the military age group is to serve in the armed forces when needed, unless his service in a vital civilian activity is more necessary to war production or preservation of the basic civilian economy.

(b) Selective Service withdrawals from a state, county, or community shall be gauged and timed with the ability to effect replacements in activities necessary to war production or preservation of the basic civilian economy.

III. That the chairman of the War Manpower Commission recommend to the appropriate executive authority that a more comprehensive and effective review of the administrative agencies in the Federal Government be required to the end that:

(a) Those remaining persons in government service who can be released are made available to essential industries including agriculture.

(b) The volume of government forms, reports and investigations are curtailed so that the tremendous numbers of personnel now engaged in preparing and reviewing such material can be transferred to useful work.

IV. That the War and Navy Departments be urged to continue their searching examinations of their manpower usages of enlisted and civilian personnel; and that in the process they expedite the return to war production of those in the armed services who are over age or qualified only for limited service, and have special skills in essential activities.

V. That the governors of the states be called upon to initiate through existing agencies, publicity programs calculated to stimulate maximum community action in connection with production and manpower problems to the end that:

(a) The requirements and obligations incidental thereto be thoroughly understood by the people in each community;

(b) The facilities and sources of potential manpower supply be recorded and reported accurately; and

(c) The major responsibility for solutions of production and manpower problems be placed in the hands of those best qualified to handle such responsibility, namely the appropriate local representatives of government, labor, agriculture and management who are in the community and are closest to its problems.

Declaration

The representatives of labor, agriculture, and management recognize the grave responsibility that rests upon them and those they represent to supply the effort required to produce and deliver the materials of war. They understand that the people must rise to the occasion by developing and imposing such of their own solutions for performance and self-discipline within each community as the necessities of war require.

Therefore, as the representatives of labor, agriculture, and industrial management, the members of the War Manpower Commission's Management-Labor Policy Committee mutually declare and pledge that:

1. They will devote themselves whole-heartedly to promoting the production of the goods, the food, and the services required by the war.

2. They will strive vigorously and exhaust every possibility to solve the nation's manpower problems through voluntary, cooperative action in every industry and every area.

3. They will call upon local management, labor and agriculture to attack man-
power and production problems, community by community and plant by plant, in cooperation with the appropriate agencies.

4. They will attack vigorously the basic causes of excessive turnover in essential activities through:

(a) Cooperation with the communities and the state and federal governments in providing suitable housing, transportation, shopping, child care, and other necessary facilities and services.

(b) Provision and expansion of sound, adequate and satisfactory wage, hour and other conditions of employment.

(c) Active participation in the local development and enforcement of employment stabilization and control programs.

5. They will take all possible steps to assure the maximum utilization of manpower engaged in war activities through:

(a) Reduction of absenteeism to the lowest possible level.

(b) Maintenance of regularized production schedules as far as possible consistent with strategic requirements.

(c) Continued efforts to eliminate manpower hoarding and restrictive practices which preclude the highest possible per man-hour output.

(d) Improvement of performance by adoption of appropriate measures designed to increase the effective per man-hour output of workers.

(e) Upgrading workers in such manner as to make full use of their highest skills that are needed in the war effort.

(f) Continued development within each plant or establishment of systems of training and improvement of the skills of workers.

(g) Adoption of such maximum daily and weekly hours of work as may be required to meet production schedules and as are consistent with good health and sustained performance.

6. They will take all possible steps to assure the maximum utilization of potential manpower reserves not now engaged in necessary war activities in each community, through:

(a) Continued and accelerated recruitment of women to augment the labor force and to replace, wherever practicable, men who are needed elsewhere.

(b) Encouraging and facilitating the transfer of workers into essential war and locally needed activities.

(c) Enlisting every possible source of new labor in manpower shortage areas.

November 6, 1943.

For Labor: For Agriculture: For Management:

H. W. Fraser Albert S. Goss R. Conrad Cooper

William Green Edward A. O'Neal Frederick C. Crawford

Philip Murray James G. Patton Eric A. Johnston

RESOLUTION: MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE¹

The members of the Management-Labor Policy Committee reaffirm their conviction that the nation's manpower needs can best be met under manpower programs voluntarily developed and adopted by the representatives of agriculture, labor, and management.

¹ Dated 2 May 1944.
The Committee recognizes the ever-increasing demands of the armed services for more manpower and for greater production. To meet these demands will require the most efficient mobilization and utilization of the nation's manpower resources.

The Committee is convinced that if the manpower program resources presently available are fully utilized the critical labor needs of the nation can be met under the present voluntary local approach.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee therefore makes the following recommendations to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission:

1. That he call upon all Regional and Area Directors to take a fresh look at the manpower programs in effect in their respective areas to determine whether any additional measures might be taken to make the voluntary plan more effective.

2. That Regional and Area Directors be requested to review with their Management-Labor Committees their present manpower programs, in the light of new conditions, and to give special attention to means by which their present programs may be strengthened through voluntary adoption or extension of controlled referral plans and other proven methods to furnish essential activities with an adequate supply of male workers.

3. That employment Stabilization Regulation No. 7 be amended so that controlled referral plans providing for the guided placement of all male workers may be put into effect in any area as needed at the option of the Regional Manpower Director, after consultation with the Management-Labor War Manpower Committees.

The Management-Labor Policy Committee calls upon all representatives of management, labor, and agriculture on Regional and Area Manpower Committees to work in closest cooperation with the Regional and Area Manpower Directors to make certain that nothing is left undone to meet the exacting requirements of the critical months ahead.

The test of the voluntary system will be the capacity of management, labor, and agriculture to strengthen and extend existing community programs so as to meet these urgent needs.

STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT-LABOR POLICY COMMITTEE IN THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION

Throughout the period of its existence the Management-Labor Policy Committee has sponsored efforts by the War Manpower Commission to solve the manpower problem through voluntary cooperative efforts of the people in each local area or community. As stated in its report of November 6, 1943, the Committee believes that:

"All of these actions must be based on the initial conceptions that the agencies of government are to serve the people by informing them what has to be done, when and where it must be done, and that the people of the nation are the ones to determine how it shall be done."

The Committee observes with satisfaction the general acceptance of its recommendations in favor of such an approach by the War Manpower Commission. The progress of our armed forces, dependent as they are on material supply, attests the overall effectiveness of this approach.

On August 4, 1944, the Director of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes, issued a manpower directive, and a statement which said in part:
"Several days ago I was advised by the procurement agencies that a shortage was developing in the production of certain vital war materials."

"For the few programs in which production is now critically short and urgently needed, the facts warrant courageous action quickly to get for the Army and Navy these heavy guns and ammunitions, bombs, radar equipment, trucks, tanks, construction equipment, tires, and tentage fabric for housing the troops making the rapid advances which our services are making all over the world."

"These are some of the items which are required by an expanding army on a vigorous offensive. These shortages do not tell the whole story but they are the critical ones which demand the immediate attention of government and the people."

"There is a public psychology in this country that the end of the war is near at hand. No man knows when the war will end. We must produce until the last shot is fired."

"People want to leave their jobs in war plants in order to get back to civilian business. If the present exodus from war plants continues, it is going to interfere seriously with the possibility of an early end of the war."

Thus, in that directive and the related statement, Mr. Byrnes, representing government, took action to tell the people of the nation "what has to be done and when and where it must be done."

The members of the War Manpower Commission's Management-Labor Policy Committee urge the full forces of labor, agriculture, and management to meet the needs of the situation at the earliest possible date. To that end, the Committee makes the following recommendations as to "how it shall be done."

I. War Mobilization

Members of the Committee are aware that certain apprehensions have arisen in labor, agriculture, and management over references to sanctions and enforcement in the August 4, 1944 directive of the Office of War Mobilization. The Committee notes that the directive is accompanied by such statements as the following:

"The responsibility for manning our war plants is clear and unmistakable and it rests with the communities. The communities must meet the responsibility if we are to be able to finish the war without enacting a Universal Service Law. Those at home must work as hard as those abroad are fighting. I will arrange for instructions to the local committees to enlist the aid of all citizens and workers in not only those war industries, but in civilian industries as well, to meet their own local needs quickly."

Although the use of sanctions to enforce compliance is included in the directive, the Committee is informed that:

(a) Teamwork and voluntary cooperative efforts are the objectives sought in the directive of August 4, 1944.
(b) The Director of War Mobilization has no intention to discard the voluntary system and substitute one of compulsion.
(c) The inclusion of sanctions is intended only to insure that the voluntary and cooperative efforts of the vast majority will not be dissipated by the few who refuse to cooperate.
(d) Even if sanctions are applicable under the directive, they are not to be applied except as a last resort if, when, and where all efforts at persuasion have failed, and even then only after careful review by the Chairman.

Nevertheless, it is an established fact that misgivings over the possible use of sanctions exist in the minds of responsible leaders in labor, agriculture, and management. Unless such misunderstanding is corrected it will react to the detriment of the manpower program. Therefore, the Committee recommends to the Chairman that he request the Office of War Mobilization to clarify the situation and, thereby remove this impediment.

II. War Manpower Commission

Members of the Committee are convinced that a substantial contribution can be made to the solution of the remaining critical manpower problems if it is made clear to all those responsible for their solution that it is the continued purpose of the War Manpower Commission to place its chief reliance on their voluntary cooperative efforts to see that the job is done.

The Committee realizes that a critical manpower shortage in a given area or a given vital war industry is a national problem, and therefore that certain basic national policies are necessary in the common interests. In any "critically short" and "urgently needed" production program the national interest requires the removal of any obstacles to the meeting of the urgent needs of our fighters.

At the same time in order to allay whatever fears may exist in the minds of people in labor, agriculture, and management that war manpower controls might be continued after the period of their wartime necessity has passed, the Committee recommends to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission that prompt action be taken:

(a) by the Executive Director and his administrative staff to remove all policies, programs, regulations, orders, and procedures not now necessary to meet the war manpower requirements;

(b) by all Regional and Area Directors and Management-Labor War Manpower Committees to remove all regional and area programs and procedures not now necessary to meet the war manpower requirements of the respective regions and areas; and

(c) by the Chairman to inform the public that such simplification plans are underway.

In the opinion of the Committee those actions are needed at this time in order to remove interferences, to correct the growing misapprehension as to duration of controls, and thereby to intensify local initiative and voluntary efforts to meet the critical war manpower needs.

III. Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees

Members of all Management-Labor War Manpower Committees now face the most critical manpower problems in the period of their association with the War Manpower Commission. As the designated representatives of labor, agriculture, and management, their immediate responsibility is to bring about in each region and area such local initiative and voluntary cooperative effort as may be required to:

(a) Recruit the necessary manpower for vital war production plants now behind schedule in the area or region.
(b) Retain on the job the manpower necessary to maintain production schedules of vital war production plants now up to schedule in the area or region.

(c) Recruit for transfer the quota of manpower required for vital war production in other areas or regions.

(d) Prepare for the resumption of civilian production in areas or regions where available manpower is not needed for vital war production.

Specifically, the Committee recommends to all Regional and Area Management-Labor War Manpower Committees that they:

(a) Cooperate fully with the Regional and Area Directors in their endeavors to meet the needs of the situation.

(b) Exert their maximum of initiative and cooperative efforts to develop ways and means particularly adaptable to the specific problems of the individual area or region.

(c) Acquaint themselves, through close contact and joint meetings with the respective Production Urgency and Manpower Priorities Committees, with the precise needs of the area or region.

(d) Call upon employers, employees, and their representatives in less essential activities in the area or region, to carry out vigorously programs of their own making designed to bring about the voluntary transfer of the necessary workers, and to meet the continuing needs of the local situation.

IV. To the Represented Organizations of Labor, Agriculture, and Management

The members of the Committee from the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Railway Labor Unions, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers, recommend to those organizations that they take action through their respective agencies to:

(a) Acquaint those they represent with the critical needs of the situation.

(b) Urge those they represent to exert every possible effort to meet the needs of the situation through voluntary cooperative efforts.

(c) Make clear to those they represent that a solution of the problem is necessary to an early military victory, the return to civilian life of those in the armed services, and the resumption of normal civilian life for all people of the nation.

The members of the Committee are well aware that sacrifice and unselfish service will be required before that objective will be reached, but as the Director of War Mobilization has said:

"We have the enemy on the ropes; he is dazed and his knees are buckling. This is no time to take a holiday and give him time to recover. It is time to finish the job. We cannot let down our men in the armed services."

September 6, 1944.

For Labor:
H. W. Fraser
William Green
Philip Murray

For Agriculture:
Albert S. Goss
Edward A. O'Neal
James G. Patton

For Management:
R. Conrad Cooper
Frederick C. Crawford
Eric A. Johnston
APPENDIX VIII

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER RELATING TO LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The Chairman of the War Production Board, on 10 June 1944, issued General Administrative Order No. 2-160 outlining the rules for the establishment and functions of Labor Advisory Committees. This text, referred to in Chapter X, is given in full since it constitutes the formal establishment within the War Production Board of the Committees concerned with labour problems in individual industries.

LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Section 1. Purpose.

.01 It is the purpose of this order to prescribe the rules governing the establishment and use of Labor Advisory Committees.

Section 2. Policy.

.01 It is the policy of the War Production Board, through the medium of Labor Advisory Committees, to secure the assistance of labor in the solution of production problems and to promote maximum cooperation between the Government and labor in the formulation and execution of official programs.

Section 3. Responsibility of War Production Board Officers.

.01 The Vice Chairman for Labor Production and the Vice Chairman for Manpower Requirements shall, in consultation with the appropriate other Vice Chairmen, jointly establish the plans, policies, and general methods to guide the industry divisions in discharging their functions with regard to the use of Labor Advisory Committees.

.02 There is hereby established in the Office of Labor Production an Office of Labor Advisory Committees, the functions of which shall be exercised by a representative of the Office of Labor Production and a representative of the Office of Manpower Requirements. The Office of Labor Advisory Committees shall assist in establishing policies to govern activities of Labor Advisory Committees and in servicing Committee operations.

Section 4. Functions of Labor Advisory Committees.

.01 Labor Advisory Committees shall perform the following functions:

1. Discuss problems affecting the industry represented by the Committee which are pertinent to the War Production Board program at meetings duly called in accordance with this order;

2. Furnish information, render assistance, and make reports and recommendations to the appropriate officers of the War Production Board; and

\[^{1}\] Dated 10 June 1944.
3. Review and make recommendations on proposed War Production Board orders and programs as provided in Section 5 of this order.

Section 5. Clearance of Orders and Programs.

.01 Whenever any proposed War Production Board order or program would, in the judgment of the Vice Chairman for Labor Production or the Vice Chairman for Manpower Requirements, result in a substantial curtailment, expansion, or other change in the rate of operations of an industry affecting labor, such Vice Chairman may recommend to the director of the industry division sponsoring the proposal consultation with the appropriate Labor Advisory Committee. After concurrence by the division director, the appropriate division labor assistant shall make arrangements for consultation with such Labor Advisory Committee as soon as practicable in the development of the order or program.

Section 6. Formation of New Labor Advisory Committees.

.01 Any division labor assistant of an industry division may propose the establishment of a Labor Advisory Committee by submitting to the Office of Labor Advisory Committees, after approval by the division director, a memorandum setting forth recommendations with regard to:

1. The purposes for which the Labor Advisory Committee is to be established;
2. The proposed composition of the Committee; and
3. The date and time of the first meeting of the Committee and the Government representatives to be notified of the meeting.

.02 The Office of Labor Advisory Committees shall review the recommendation of the division labor assistant for the establishment of a Labor Advisory Committee and, if it agrees, shall establish the composition of the Committee and state its approval in writing setting forth the name and address, union affiliation, and position held, if any, of each Committee member.

.03 The Office of Labor Advisory Committee shall advise the appropriate Vice Chairman, the Office of Industry Advisory Committees, the Vice Chairman for Labor Production, the Vice Chairman for Manpower Requirements, and the appropriate division directors as to the establishment of each Committee.

.04 The Office of Labor Advisory Committees is authorized to fill vacancies occurring on existing Committees.

.05 The appropriate division director shall appoint all Government presiding officers of Labor Advisory Committees.

Section 7. Meetings of Labor Advisory Committees.

.01 Meetings of Labor Advisory Committees may be called at the request of the Government presiding officer or the Office of Labor Advisory Committees, with the approval of the division director. Members of a Labor Advisory Committee who wish to suggest a meeting shall address their request to the appropriate division labor assistant or Government presiding officer. Such request shall be accompanied by a proposed agenda showing the purpose of the meeting.

.02 The division labor assistant of the appropriate industry division (or the Government presiding officer acting for him) shall inform the Office of Labor Advisory Committees of proposed meetings and shall furnish a carefully considered agenda and the list of persons to whom invitations shall be extended.

.03 The Office of Labor Advisory Committees shall make all necessary arrangements for holding meetings, including sending invitations and notices,
etc. A copy of the agenda shall be sent to each Committee member together with the notice of the meetings.

04 All regular meetings of a Committee shall be held in Washington under the supervision of the Government presiding officer, except that a Committee may be authorized by the Government presiding officer to meet outside of Washington, without the Government presiding officer present, if the purpose of the meeting is solely to formulate a report requested by the Government presiding officer. The Office of Labor Advisory Committees shall be responsible for keeping minutes of each meeting, and shall determine the form and distribution of such minutes.

Section 8. General.

01 The Government presiding officer may appoint special sub-committees of a Labor Advisory Committee in order to deal with technical or special problems of concern to labor, or with problems affecting only a segment of the industry represented by the Committee.

02 A Labor Advisory Committee shall not take any action as a Committee except in accordance with the provision of this order. Any action beyond the scope of this order shall be deemed to be action taken by the individuals making up the Committee in their private capacity.

03 All publicity in connection with meetings shall be released through the Division of Information.

04 The War Production Board will not pay compensation to or any expenses of Committee members.

05 The term "division labor assistant" as used in this order means the Assistant Director for Labor or other official designated to perform labor production and/or manpower requirement functions in the particular industry division in accordance with the provisions of General Administrative Orders 2-112 and 2-113.

Section 9. Effective Date.

01 This order is effective June 10, 1944.

Donald M. Nelson, Chairman.
APPENDIX IX

TYPICAL BY-LAWS OF AN AREA COUNCIL OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

The following text of a set of by-laws to govern an area council of labor-management committees, referred to in Chapter XIV, is given as a typical example of the functions and purposes of such councils.

BY-LAWS SUBMITTED BY THE TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR APPROVAL BY THE MEMBERS OF THE AREA COUNCIL OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES FOR METROPOLITAN NEW YORK

Section I. Name: The name of this organization shall be the "Area Council of Labor-Management Committees for Metropolitan New York".

Section II. Purpose: The purpose of this organization shall be to aid in the effective prosecution of the war and to study and make proposals relating to re-conversion and post-war problems. To these ends, it will —

1. seek to increase the effectiveness of existing plant Labor-Management Committees;
2. in cooperation with other agencies, assist Management and Labor in establishing Committees in plants where they do not yet exist;
3. find solutions by joint effort and action for those community-wide problems affecting production and labor utilization which cannot be solved by individual plant Committee action;
4. engage in such other activities involving joint action by Labor and Management as shall be deemed appropriate.

Section III. Membership: All joint Labor-Management War Production Drive Committees in the Metropolitan New York area, will be eligible for membership in the Council. Each member Committee shall have two delegates to the Council. These delegates must be members of, and will be selected by, the top Labor-Management Committee of their respective plants. One of them must be from the Labor half and the other from the Management half of their Committee.

Section IV. Meetings: General membership meetings of the Council shall be held quarterly and special meetings called when deemed necessary by a majority vote of the Executive Board. A quorum shall be necessary only when financial matters are to be considered. Representation from twenty-five per cent. of the member plants of the Council shall constitute a quorum and a majority vote shall be necessary to carry or defeat a motion.

Section V. Officers: The officers of the Council will be a Chairman, a Co-Chairman, a Secretary and a Treasurer. The Chairman shall be the nominee receiving the highest number of votes of the Executive Board. Should the Chairman be a Management representative, then the Co-Chairman shall be the Labor representative receiving the highest number of votes and vice versa. The tenure of
office shall be for one year. No one officer may hold a particular office for more than two successive terms. All officers must be delegates to the Council. Two of the officers must be Labor delegates and the other two must be Management delegates. All of the officers must be delegates of Labor-Management Committees from different plants. The duties of the officers will be the usual ones of their respective offices. The Co-Chairman will act in all capacities in the absence of the Chairman. The Chairman will preside at meetings of both the Council and the Executive Board and the Secretary will keep the minutes of both the Council and the Executive Board.

Section VI. Executive Board: The Executive Board of the Council will consist of fourteen members elected from the delegates at large, seven of whom must be Labor delegates and seven Management delegates. The four officers shall be elected by the Executive Board in the manner prescribed in Section V of these By-Laws. All members of the Executive Board must be delegates of Labor-Management Committees. The tenure of office for Executive Board members will be one year. The Executive Board will meet the first and third Tuesdays of each month and on the call of the Chairman and/or the Co-Chairman. A quorum for meetings of the Executive Board will carry on the functions of the Council between meetings of the Council. A minimum of eight members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Board.

Section VII. Elections: Elections of Board members will be held at the last quarterly meeting in November. One month prior to the election meeting the Executive Board will appoint a Nominating Committee to prepare a slate of nominations. This Nominating Committee shall prepare a list of eighteen names, nine representing Labor and nine Management, to which nominations may be added from the floor at the election meeting. Candidates for the Executive Board must be delegates to the Council at the time of their election. At the election meeting, delegates will vote for nine Management and nine Labor delegates to the Executive Board. Provision shall be made on the ballots for writing in names of additional candidates nominated from the floor. The Executive Board will consist of the seven Labor and seven Management representatives receiving the largest number of votes respectively, and four alternates, two from Management and two from Labor receiving the next largest number of votes respectively. The alternates are to serve on the Executive Board only in the event of a permanent vacancy, so that the membership of the Executive Board shall be not less nor more than seven members each from Management and Labor.

Section VIII. Vacancies: All vacancies occurring on the Executive Board will be filled at the next regular meeting of the Council following the occasion of the vacancy in the manner prescribed in Sections VI and VII of these By-Laws. All vacancies occurring among the officers will be filled at the next meeting of the Executive Board in the manner prescribed in Section V of these By-Laws. All members of the Executive Board must be notified in advance of the meeting date in the event of any vacancy to be filled. Delegates and officers elected to fill such vacancies will hold office for the balance of the unexpired term. In the event of more than two vacancies among the Labor or Management members of the Executive Board, temporary appropriate appointments will be made by a majority vote of the full remaining membership of the Executive Board. Permanent appointments to such vacancies will be made at the next regular meeting of the Council following the occasion of the vacancy, by ratification of the appointment or the holding of an election as prescribed in Section VII of the By-Laws.
Section IX. Finances: (Please see attached report of Budget Sub-Committee. It is suggested that the Executive Board be authorized to administer the funds of the Council in accordance with the report of the Budget Sub-Committee and the By-Laws of the Council as approved by the membership; and to submit financial reports at the regular quarterly meetings).

Section X. Amendments: A proposed amendment to these By-Laws may be submitted by any delegate at a regular Council meeting. The proposed amendment will be adopted or rejected by majority vote at the next regular Council meeting. Notice of the proposed amendment must be included in the notice of the meeting at which action will be taken on said amendment.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

At the time of the preparation of this study, little information was available for public reference concerning wartime experience in the United States of methods for ensuring the participation of labour and management representatives in manpower and production organisation. It is not possible, therefore, to give a bibliography of source material or secondary histories, but references to such published or quotable material as has been used are given in footnotes.

Since completion of the study, however, a number of publications bearing directly on the subject have been released. While these could not be taken into account in the text, it may be useful to call attention to the most recently published official history: Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945. Volume I: Program and Administration. This volume, published by the Bureau of Demobilization of the Civilian Production Administration of the United States in the series “Historical Reports on War Administration”, contains, in addition to a complete account of the War Production Board, an invaluable list of official records and historical reports, and provides an authoritative guide to the history and sources of many of the developments dealt with somewhat summarily in the International Labour Office study. The student who wishes for greater detail on many of the questions raised is therefore referred to the above-mentioned volume. Similar published histories are unfortunately not yet available for the other war agencies, although manuscript material may now be consulted in Washington.
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The Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 7, Part 4

About 89 pages

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Reports prepared for the Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Montreal, 1947); part 4 contains the proceedings of the Conference and the resolutions adopted.
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