


► Statistical analysis of employment and conditions of work of migrants in Italy

Labour migration policy review

Vallì Corbanese and Gianni Rosas



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International Labour Organization

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► Table of contents

► 1	Socio-demographic characteristics of migrants	1
► 2	The employment situation of migrant workers	5
2.1	Employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates	8
► 3	Quality and working conditions of migrants	13
3.1	Migrants' sectors of activity and employment status	13
3.2	Occupational mobility	22
3.3	The pay gap	24
	References	29

► 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of migrants

In 2020, the incidence of the foreign population over the total number of residents in Italy was 8.7 per cent (about five million foreigners, of which 3.4 million were from non-EU countries).¹ In the same year, the number of foreigners per thousand inhabitants was 5.4, in line with the European average (5 per 1,000) but below other European countries, such as Ireland (16), the Netherlands (14), Austria (13), Spain (11) and Germany (10.5).²

Although entry flows have been decreasing for years³ — also, due to the containment measures due to the Covid-19 pandemic — the relative weight of foreigners aged between 25 and 55 in the total population increased by about five percentage points in the period 2009-2020 (from 11 per cent in 2009 to 16 per cent), approaching the percentage recorded by other European countries such as Germany (17 per cent), France (15 per cent) and the United Kingdom (16 per cent).⁴ The increase is even more evident in the female component, where the share of foreigners in the total population in the 25-55 age group has risen from 11 per cent to 18 per cent. It is due to the sum of migration for work, particularly relevant in the care and family services sector, and for family reasons. In 2021, around 51 per cent of total new entries of non-EU nationals were for family reasons (24 per cent at EU level), while entries for work in the same year accounted for 21 per cent of the total (more than double the 10 per cent of labour entries recorded in 2015), but still below the EU average which recorded labour reasons for 45.2 per cent of total new entries in the same year.⁵

Over the period 2009-2020, the presence of migrants in the total economically active population doubled from 7.9 to 13 per cent for women and from 9.1 to 16.7 per cent for men (Figure 1).

The most represented nationality of foreigners is the Romanian one (about 1.76 million residents or 2.8 per cent of the total population aged 25-55), followed by the Albanian (421,000 or 1.4 per cent) and the Moroccan (414,000 or 1.2 per cent). Most migrants reside in the central and northern regions (11.1 per cent). In the southern regions, they represent about 4.2 per cent of the total number of residents⁶.

¹ Ministry of labour and social policies, *XII Rapporto annuale. Gli stranieri nel mercato del lavoro in Italia* (2022).

² Eurostat, migration, and migrant population statistics (online code: migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz)


³ According to elaborations carried out by ISTAT on Ministry of the Interior data, the number of non-EU citizens entering Italy has been decreasing since 2012 (264,000 in 2012 and about 177,000 in 2019). In 2020, the year of the Covid-19 pandemic, the number of entries of non-EU citizens was approximately 106,000. ISTAT, “[Popolazione e società. Stranieri](#)”, Noi Italia (2022).

⁴ Elaboration based on data from the European Labour Force Survey. Respondents under 25 and those over 55 were excluded from the analysis to avoid distortions in comparing foreigners and Italians.

⁵ ISTAT, “Cittadini non comunitari in Italia. Anni 2021-2022”, Statistiche Report (22 October 2022). For data on entries by type of EU permit, see EUROSTAT; first permits by reason, age, sex and citizenship (online code: migr_resfas). It is worth noting that there are discrepancies between the data provided by Eurostat and Istat regarding new entries by type of permit. According to Eurostat, in 2021, 44% of the entries in Italy were for family reasons, and 18.5% were for work purposes.

⁶ ISTAT, “Popolazione e società. Stranieri”.


► Figure 1. Percentage of economically active foreign citizens (25–55) by gender



Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2009–2020).

The presence of migrant workers in the Italian labour market has changed the demographic structure of the active labour force, as foreigners are more concentrated in the 20–40 age bracket, while Italians are mainly in the 30–45 age bracket. In 2021, 62 per cent of foreign residents in Italy were under 35 years of age, while 55 per cent of Italians were over 35 (Figure 2). The same applies to new entrants: in 2021, around 70 per cent of foreigners entering Italy were under 35.⁷

► Figure 2. National and foreign population age structure, 2021



Followed...

⁷ Eurostat, Immigration by age group, sex, and citizenship [online code: MIGR_IMM1CTZ]; First permits by reason, age, sex, and citizenship [online code: MIGR_RESFAS].

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Source: Elaboration based on Eurostat data Immigration by age group, sex, and citizenship [online code MIGR_IMM1CTZ], 2021.

The age difference between migrants and nationals decreased between 2009 and 2020 (from 2.5 to 1.6 years). This process of relative convergence is due to a general increase in the average age of the active labour force, which affected Italians and foreigners.

Migrants generally have lower educational qualifications than nationals (Table 1), and the differences have remained unchanged over time. The percentage of Italians with a university degree in 2020 was 18.1 per cent, while among migrants, it was around 8-9 per cent, with the sole exception of migrants from Latin America (15 per cent).

► **Table 1. Educational qualifications of nationals and migrants**

Geographical origin	Middle-school certificate or lower	High-school diploma	University degree
Italy	37,2	44,6	18,1
Africa and Middle-East	64,2	26,3	9,5
Asia	65,9	25,5	8,7
Latin America	39,0	46,0	15,0
Eastern Europe	32,3	58,7	9,0

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2009–2020).

Comparative surveys based on Eurostat data also report that in Italy, as in other southern European countries (e.g. Greece and Spain), migrants are generally less educated than nationals, whereas, in central and northern European countries, migrants have a similar, if not higher, education than nationals.⁸


⁸ Valli Corbanese, and Gianni Rosas, *Lavoro dignitoso e inclusione sociale delle vittime di sfruttamento lavorativo. Un'analisi comparativa* (ILO, 2020)..

► 2 The employment situation of migrant workers

The leading labour market indicators for individuals of working age (15-64) revealed an advantage of foreign men in terms of activity and employment rates compared to nationals in 2021 (about nine and five percentage points, respectively), while foreign women had a disadvantage compared to nationals in employment rates (4.5 percentage points).

The differences between nationals and foreigners were mainly found in unemployment rates (Figure 3). For foreigners, these rates were higher than for nationals, both for men (3.6 percentage points) and especially for women (7.7 percentage points). At the European level, there was a slight advantage for foreign men in activity rates compared to nationals (80.8 and 78.5 per cent, respectively), but with lower employment rates (71.5 and 73.5 per cent, respectively) and significantly higher unemployment rates (11.5 and 6.4 per cent, respectively). In Europe, foreign women are disadvantaged not only in comparison with their male counterparts (with activity and employment rates 18-19 percentage points lower) but also in comparison with European women in both activity (61.3 and 69.2 per cent, respectively) and employment rates (64.5 and 52 per cent, respectively), but especially in unemployment rates (15.2 and 6.8 per cent).

► **Figure 3. Activity, employment and unemployment rates, Italians, and foreigners, by gender (15-64), 2021**



Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2021).

In Italy, the employment of foreigners of adult age (25-55) — which accounts for 11.5 per cent of total employment — generated an added value of €144 billion in 2020 (equal to 9 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product — GDP), more than three times the figure recorded in 1998 (added value of €31 billion equal to 2.3 per cent of GDP).⁹ The economic sectors where migrant workers are concentrated, namely agriculture, tourism, and construction, contribute the highest value added to the GDP. Agriculture has the highest contribution of 17.9 per cent, followed by tourism with 16.9 per cent and construction with 16.3 per cent.

The positive impact of Migration in Italy is recognised by the analyses contained in the Economic and Financial Document 2023. The sensitivity analysis on the baseline scenario, which analyses the trend of the debt-to-GDP ratio over the long term, shows that an increase in net migration (equal to 33 per cent of the projected 213,000 average annual units) would lead to a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio of about 30 percentage points in 2070. This effect is due to the demographic structure of migrants (younger than nationals), which in turn increases the resident population of working age and, thus, the job offer.¹⁰

Studies analysing the impact of international migration on the macroeconomic variables of destination countries show the positive effect of the first on the latter. In the medium term (five years), GDP grows by one per cent as migrants' entries increase by one percentage point of total employment. Two-thirds of the impact is due to increased productivity, and one-third to increased employment. Complementarity between the work done by migrants and nationals led to these results. When migrants enter the labour market, national workers move to new occupations that require more language and communication skills, thus generating positive effects on specialisation. Consequently, the impact of migration on the employment and wages of national workers at the aggregate level is limited. However, there may be adverse effects for groups of workers.¹¹

Aggregated labour market indicators do not capture the profound differences that exist not only between migrants and nationals but also between migrants according to gender, age, geographical area, and country of origin. An ILO study on the school-to-work transition of young foreigners in Italy¹², indicates that young people 15-29 represent 19.7 per cent of the total number of foreigners resident in Italy, come mainly from countries outside the European Union (75.8 per cent of the total) and have, on average, a low level of education (59.8 per cent have completed only primary education). Compared to young Italians, foreigners are more active in the labour market (with differences of about 11 percentage points) and more employable (with employment rates 12 and 5 percentage points higher for young people from EU and non-EU countries, respectively, than Italians). However, there are significant gender differences, especially among young foreigners from non-EU countries: the employment gap between young non-EU women is about 22 percentage points.

Young foreigners are predominantly employed in the manufacturing sector, accommodation and food services, agriculture, construction, and personal services. This indicates a high concentration of their employment status in these industries. The most common type of contract is fixed-term (four out of ten young foreigners have fixed-term contracts, compared to 20 per cent of foreign adults). In 70 per cent of cases, the contract duration is less than 12 months. Nine out of ten young people from non-EU countries are trapped in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, resulting in a higher exposure to in-work poverty (25.6 per cent) than their Italian peers (22.7 per cent) and young people from other EU countries (21 per cent). In 2019, the highest unemployment rate (24

⁹ Eurostat, Employment by sex, age, and citizenship (online code: LFSA_EGANP). For historical data on the contribution of foreigners to GDP, see Francesca Mazzolari, and Luca Paolazzi, *Immigrati: da emergenza a opportunità. Dimensione, effetti economici e politiche* (Roma: Centro Studi Confindustria, 2016); for 2020 data, see Fondazione Leone Moressa, *XII Rapporto sull'economia dell'immigrazione* (Mestre, 2022).

¹⁰ Ministry of Economy and Finance, Economic and Financial Document 2023. Section I Stability Programme, Deliberated by the Council of Ministers on 11 April 2023, pp. 125, Chart IV.6.

¹¹ IMF, "The economic effects of global migration". In *World economic outlook. The great lockdown* (2021): chapter 4.

¹² Gianni Rosas, and Gianluigi Nico, *La transizione dei giovani stranieri nel mercato del lavoro italiano* (ILO, 2020). Data refer to 2019.

per cent) was recorded among young people from non-EU countries, while that of young people from other EU countries was the lowest (16.5 per cent) — almost 4.5 percentage points lower than the rate recorded by young Italians (21.9 per cent). Finally, inactivity was prevalent among young foreigners from non-EU countries (32.9 per cent compared to 8.3 per cent of Italians), partly due to their greater involvement in unpaid family and care activities.

The data clearly show the higher difficulties young foreigners (15-29) face in getting a decent job than nationals. Although the proportion of foreign young people who had a decent job in 2019 was higher than that of Italian young people (24 per cent among young people from other EU countries and 26 per cent among non-EU young people, compared to 21 per cent of Italians), the latter complete the transition earlier (around the age of 26), while for foreigners the transition is completed around the age of 27-28. On average, the transition for young foreigners lasts more than 46 months (35 months for Italians). Young men are more likely than young women to complete their school-to-work transition: the former are 1.5 times more likely to obtain a stable or satisfactory job, with young women from non-EU countries particularly penalised (with a probability of transition to a decent job twice as low as their male counterparts).¹³

Labour market data for young people 15-29 indicate a considerable disadvantage for the new generations compared to nationals and first-generation foreigners (Table 2). The employment gap of the second generation is about 20 percentage points compared to first-generation migrants and 9.4 percentage points compared to nationals. Compared to the European average, second-generation young people in Italy are less likely to be active in the labour market (51.9 per cent and 30.6 per cent, respectively) and to be employed (45.4 per cent and 23.2 per cent), while the unemployment rate is about twice as high (12.6 per cent and 24.2 per cent).

► **Table 2. Activity, employment, and unemployment rates for national, first and second generations (15-29), 2022**

	Nazionali	First generation	Second generation
Activity			
European Union	55.4	60.5	51.9
Italy	39.8	53.0	30.6
Employment			
European Union	49.6	51.6	45.4
Italy	32.6	43.6	23.2
Unemployment			
European Union	10.5	14.6	12.6
Italy	18.0	17.8	24.2

Source: Elaborations on Eurostat data, Activity, employment, and unemployment rates by migration status (online code LFSA_ARGANEDM; LFSA_ERGANEDM; LFSA_URGANEDM).

The differences in Italy's aggregate data are due, in part, to gender gaps, with second-generation young women disadvantaged compared to men (in general), but also compared to young Italians and first-generation young women (Figure 4). The only difference relates to the unemployment rate, which affects one quarter (25 per cent) of the second-generation male labour force.

¹³ Gianni Rosas, and Gianluigi Nico, *La transizione dei giovani stranieri nel mercato del lavoro italiano*.

► **Figure 4. Activity, employment and unemployment rates by gender and migration status, 2022**



Source: Elaborations on Eurostat data, activity, employment, and unemployment rates by migration status (online code LFSA_ARGANEDM; LFSA_ERGANEDM; LFSA_URGANEDM).

2.1 Employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates¹⁴

Table 3 reflects the employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates of migrant and national workers. It shows that male migrants from Africa and the Middle East have a lower probability of being employed by about six percentage points compared to nationals. Additionally, their unemployment rate is about twice as high as that of Italian workers. Among migrant women, there are similar differences to men in terms of employment and unemployment, with women from Africa and Asia disadvantaged in terms of employment compared to Italians (by more than 26 and 12 percentage points, respectively).

Inactivity is a concern, especially among women from Africa and the Middle East (56 per cent). Inactivity among Asian women is also high (49 per cent). Still, data derives from the aggregation of population groups with high activity rates (e.g. Filipino women have an activity rate of 91.7 per cent) and components where women are poorly integrated in the labour market (e.g. Indian and Bangladeshi women have inactivity rates of around 80 per cent, while among Moroccan women inactivity is approximately 70 per cent).¹⁵ Latin American and Eastern European women show higher employment rates than Italian women.

¹⁴ In the following comparison between foreigners and Italians, respondents under 25 and those over 55 were excluded from the analysis.

¹⁵ ISTAT, "Stranieri e naturalizzati nel mondo del lavoro", Statistiche focus (3 February 2023).

► **Table 3. Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates (nationals and migrants) by gender**

	Men			Women		
	Employed	Unem- ployed	Inactive	Employed	Unem- ployed	Inactive
Italy	80.0	7.5	12.5	57.8	7.0	35.2
Africa and Middle-East	73.6	14.7	11.7	31.5	12.6	55.9
Asia	84.8	7.1	8.1	45.6	5.3	49.1
Latin America	78.6	11.8	9.6	56.8	12.0	31.2
Eastern Europe	79.5	10.9	9.6	57.5	11.2	31.2

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force surveys data (2020).

The duration of unemployment and the chances of finding a job again after losing it also differ between migrants and nationals. One element that partially explains the minor differences in employment probabilities is the high circularity of migrants between employment and unemployment. Since foreign workers mainly enter the secondary labour market,¹⁶ where residual formal rigidities are associated with a high degree of de facto flexibility, they are likelier to lose their jobs. Still, when unemployed, they can find a job more quickly than Italians while remaining in the lowest strata of the employment structure. Among those who were unemployed in the previous year, migrants have a ten-percentage point advantage over nationals in the probability of being employed in the current year. Among those who were employed in the previous year, migrants had a four-percentage point disadvantage in being employed the following year.

Trends in employment, unemployment and inactivity rates over time indicate a general worsening of foreigners' employment opportunities due to the economic and financial crisis that started in 2008 and continued in the following years. Between 2009 and 2020, for example, the unemployment rate among migrants from Africa and the Middle East increased by three percentage points (from 10 to 13 per cent). Similar increases were also registered in the Latin American and East European population groups (in both cases, the unemployment rate rose from 9 to 11 per cent) and in inactivity rates, which increased by three percentage points for migrants from Africa and the Middle East (from 28 to 31 per cent) and by two percentage points for foreigners from Latin America (from 21 to 23 per cent).

Comparing it with Italian workers is helpful to determine if the deterioration affected only foreigners or the entire labour force. A comparison between nationals and foreigners allows us to determine whether worsening labour market trends affected only foreign workers or the whole labour force. Figure 5 displays the employment, activity, and unemployment rates of Italians and foreigners, disaggregated by gender. If the ratios are equal to 1, then Italians and foreigners have identical rates. Ratios above 1 indicate higher rates for foreigners, whereas values between 0 and 1 indicate higher rates for Italians.

¹⁶ The definition of the secondary labour market refers to the dual structure of the labour market, i.e. the segmentation between a primary-secure sector and an under-protected and/or precarious secondary industry. On the relationship between Immigration and the labour market, we refer to the analysis of Michael J. Piore, *Birds of passage. Migrant labour and industrial societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

► **Figure 5. employment rates, unemployment rates and inactivity rates among migrant and national, by gender**




Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2009–2020).

The ratio between the employment rates of migrants and nationals has remained stable among men. At the same time, among women, there is an increasing disadvantage for migrant women, which started around 2015 and continues until 2020. In contrast, unemployment rates are higher among foreigners, but with some degree of convergence for men up to 2018. It's worth noting that migrant women face a significantly higher increase in penalty rates for inactivity compared to nationals: the ratio was close to unity in 2009 when inactivity rates were 38 per cent for Italians and 40 per cent for foreigners and then increased systematically from 2015 onwards. In the last year of observation, the inactivity rate for foreign women was 45 per cent. In comparison, that of Italians had fallen to 31 per cent.

The increase in inactivity rates among foreign women is probably due to unpaid care and family responsibilities that affect migrants to a higher degree due to the absence of family members and supporting social infrastructure. Another element that may explain the low labour market participation of migrant women is their family migration history. Figure 6 shows the probability of being employed during the interview among migrant women, depending on the temporal distance between their migration and their partner.¹⁷

¹⁷ This analysis only considers migrant women living with a migrant partner.

► **Figure 6. Employment probability of migrant women according to the duration of family separation**

Note: Negative values indicate for “male-led migration” the number of years elapsed between the migration of the husband/partner and that of the woman; positive values measure the number of years elapsed between the migration of the woman and that of the husband/partner (“female-led migration”).


Source: Elaboration based ISTAT quarterly labour force surveys data (2009–2020).

Negative values on the horizontal axis indicate cases where the foreign woman arrived in Italy after her partner (male-led migration), while positive values record cases where the foreign woman emigrated before her partner (female-led migration). The trend in the probability of being employed shows an apparent discontinuity between women who emigrated later (negative values on the horizontal axis) and those who arrived earlier (positive values on the same axis). Employment rates are meagre among women who emigrated to be reunited with their partner and increase linearly from around 10 to 20 per cent as the duration of family separation decreases. On the other hand, foreign women who emigrated before their partner have higher employment rates than Italian women.¹⁸

Figure 7 shows the differences, by gender, in the probability of being employed between migrants and nationals, depending on the educational qualification attained. Positive values indicate an advantage of migrants over nationals, while negative values indicate a disadvantage. Less educated foreign workers — men and women — have an advantage of about four percentage points over Italians in terms of employment probability. More educated migrants, on the other hand, are less likely to be employed than Italians with the same qualifications. This penalty grows as the educational qualification increases. It is particularly significant among women. High school graduates face a 9-percentage point penalty, which increase to 20 pp for university graduates.

¹⁸ Due to the low number of first-migrant women, trends in the probability of being employed could be more stable among women who migrated before their partner/husband.

► **Figure 7. Differences in employment chances between nationals (reference category) and migrants according to educational qualification, in percentage, by gender**



Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2020).

The low return on foreign qualification in the Italian labour market is because migrants only rarely request and obtain the recognition of their qualifications. Approximately 71.7 per cent of foreigners do not consider it necessary to have their qualifications recognised, with rates ranging from 77.8 per cent for those with no more than a secondary school diploma to 45.7 per cent of foreigners with a university degree. Among the latter, one-third (30.4 per cent) do not request recognition due to the high cost or complexity of the procedure.¹⁹

¹⁹ ISTAT, "Stranieri e naturalizzati nel mondo del lavoro".

► 3 Quality and working conditions of migrants

3.1 Migrants' sectors of activity and employment status

The high employability of migrants, especially those less educated, is mainly attributable to the significant demand for flexible, low-skilled, and low-paid work from companies and households. According to Excelsior estimates on the expected entries of foreign workers in 2022,²⁰ the highest percentages concerned tourism (over 167,500 entries, or 18 per cent of the total entries of foreign workers); business support services (mainly cleaning companies, with 135,600 entries, 14.7 per cent of the total); personal services (116,200 entries, 12.6 per cent of the total); construction (94,600 entries, or 10.2 per cent); and trade (about 85,500 entries, 9.3 per cent of the total). These sectors are characterised by a high turnover of workers and predominantly fixed-term contracts.

► **Table 4. Presence of foreign and Italian workers by economic sector and gender, in percentage**

	Uomini			Donne		
	Nazionali	Migranti	Diff.	Nazionali	Migranti	Diff.
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries	4.3	8.6	4.2	2.4	2.8	0.5
Industry	27.0	28.9	1.9	13.2	10.3	-2.8
Construction	10.0	20.3	10.2	1.2	0.5	-0.7
Trade	14.7	10.9	-3.8	15.6	7.1	-8.5
Hotels and restaurants	4.3	8.2	3.9	6.6	13.5	6.9
Transport and storage	6.1	7.9	1.8	2.4	1.3	-1.0
Information and Communication Services	3.2	0.5	-2.7	1.9	0.4	-1.5
Financial and insurance activities	2.9	0.2	-2.7	3.5	0.4	-3.2
Real estate activities, business services	10.1	5.7	-4.3	13.6	9.6	-4.0
Public administration and defence	7.5	0.2	-7.3	5.0	0.4	-4.7
Education, health, and other social services	6.7	2.0	-4.7	27.6	11.1	-16.4
Other collective and personal services	3.2	6.8	3.6	7.3	42.7	35.5

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2020).

This demand for labour has led to a high concentration of foreign workers in specific sectors, resulting in a true ethnicisation of professions. Migration networks, in turn, contribute to occupational segmentation thanks to the mechanisms of information dissemination, referral and support between relatives and compatriots. The workforce is often divided into occupational niches where individuals of specific nationalities tend to dominate. For instance, Filipinas are

²⁰ Unioncamere, and ANPAL, *Lavoratori immigrati. I fabbisogni professionali e formativi. Indagine 2022* (Rome: Unioncamere, 2023): 27. The data indicate that in 2022, 39 per cent of the expected entries of foreign personnel concern the replacement of outgoing personnel (a share up by almost five percentage points compared to the previous year), while 11 per cent are recruitments of new figures not previously present in the company's workforce.

commonly seen working in the domestic service sector. At the same time, Sikh Indians are often found in the zootechnical activities of the Valpadana area. Similarly, Ukrainians are known to excel in elderly care, and Albanians and Romanians are frequently employed in the construction industry.²¹

Despite the increasing number of migrants in the Italian labour market, they are often segregated in specific market areas and exposed to a higher risk of being trapped in precarious, low-paying jobs with low-skill requirements.²² Moreover, the substantial exclusion from public employment²³ — also reinforced by the non-recognition of professional qualifications and educational credentials — skews foreign employment towards jobs in the private sector.

The overall distribution of migrant workers by economic sector indicates that 40 per cent of migrants are employed in the care and assistance industry. This percentage rises to 65 per cent among migrant women.²⁴ This figure shows that Italy has the second highest concentration of migrants in the care sector, following Denmark.

Male migrants are mainly concentrated in the agricultural sector (+ 4.2 percentage points compared to Italians), in the construction sector (+10.2 percentage points) and in the hotel and restaurant sector (+3.9 percentage points). The segregation of migrants is even more evident among women workers. Foreign women are more numerous in the hotel and restaurant sector (+6.9 percentage points) and, above all, in the domestic and personal care sector. The share of migrant women employed in the care sector is 42.7 per cent of the total. This share is 7.3 per cent among Italians, a difference of no less than 35.5 percentage points. Those employed in the sector come mainly from Romania (27.6 per cent), Ukraine (12 per cent) and the Philippines (7.9 per cent). Compared to Italians employed in this sector, they work more often as cleaners (9.7 per cent compared to 43.6 per cent) and as personal assistants in health services (3.6 per cent compared to 28.2 per cent).

The vertical occupational segmentation of migrants in Italy is confirmed by the data on the classification of occupations (Figure 8): less than 3 per cent of managerial, professional, and technical positions are held by migrant workers compared to 30 per cent of low-skilled positions.²⁵


²¹ Maurizio Ambrosini, *Sociologia delle migrazioni*, 3rd ed. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2020).

²² Maurizio Ambrosini, *Sociologia delle migrazioni*.

²³ During the health pandemic, public employment access limitations were also enforced. ASGI (the Association for immigration legal studies) has widely highlighted these restrictions. ASGI has extensively underscored the reiteration of competition rules that exclude third-country nationals. See ASGI, "[Covid-19: esclusi centinaia di medici e infermieri stranieri dai concorsi](#)" (9 November 2020), and "[L'ASGI chiede alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri il rispetto della normativa in materia di accesso degli stranieri ai concorsi pubblici](#)" (11 August 2014).

²⁴ ILO, *The migrant pay gap. Understanding wage differences between migrants and nationals* (2020): 61, Figure 14.

²⁵ ILO, *The migrant pay gap*: 157, Chart A-7.

► **Figure 8. Occupational classification of migrant workers by qualification**

Note: High qualification: occupations ISCO-08 categories 1–3; Medium qualification: occupations ISCO-08 categories 4–6; Low qualification: occupations ISCO-08 categories 7–8; No qualification: occupations ISCO-08 category 9.

Source: Eurostat, Employment by reason for discrimination in the current job, sex, age, citizenship, and occupation (online code: LFSO_21DISC03), and ILO, *The migrant pay gap. Understanding wage differences between migrants and nationals* (2020): 157, Chart A-7.

The segmentation of migrant workers into the lower occupational groups is also confirmed by the 2022 estimates of the occupational needs of the Italian labour market: almost two-thirds (57.9 per cent) of the demand for migrant labour is concentrated in the low-skilled categories, while two-thirds of the demand for domestic workers (59 per cent) is focused on the medium-high categories (Table 5).²⁶

► **Table 5. Planned entry of workers by qualification and nationality, 2022**


	Migrant worker	National workers
High qualification	11.3	22.2
Average qualification	30.7	36.8
Low qualification	32.9	27.4
Unqualified	25.0	13.4

Source: Unioncamere, and ANPAL, *Lavoratori immigrati. I fabbisogni professionali e formativi, Indagine 2022* (Rome: Unioncamere, 2023): 29, table 7.

²⁶ Unioncamere, and ANPAL, *Lavoratori immigrati. I fabbisogni professionali e formativi. Indagine 2022*: 29, Chart 7.

According to medium-term employment projections, approximately 3.7 million workers will be required from 2023 to 2027. In addition, 2.7 million workers will be needed to replace retiring domestic workers. At the same time, almost 1 million will be necessary to support the country's economic growth.²⁷ Besides health and social services, trade and tourism are the sectors with the highest needs (Figure 9). Characterised by low productivity, high employee turnover and low wages, the latter sectors also have a high incidence of migrant labour.

► **Figure 9. Total needs 2023–2027, top ten economic sectors**



Source: Unioncamere, and ANPAL, *Previsioni dei fabbisogni occupazionali e professionali in Italia a medio termine, 2023–2027* (Rome: Unioncamere, 2022): 86, tabella 2.

The share of self-employment in total employment in Italy is relatively high. As of today, the number of persons carrying out an activity that is related to forms of self-employment is about one-third of the total workforce. According to data from the Union of Chambers of Commerce, at the end of 2022, approximately 650,000 active enterprises were run by foreigners (10.7 per cent of the total). The number of enterprises led by foreign-born persons grew by 8.7 per cent (54 thousand units) between 2020 and 2022, against an average total growth of 2.3 per cent, compared to a decline in enterprises created by Italians of 130 thousand units.²⁸

The most widespread legal form of enterprise among foreigners is a sole proprietorship, which accounts for 71 per cent of all foreign business owners. Foreign entrepreneurship is mainly oriented towards sectors with relatively low barriers to entry, which do not require high skills and significant investments (construction, trade, catering, business services). The market in which


²⁷ Unioncamere, and ANPAL, *Previsioni dei fabbisogni occupazionali e professionali in Italia a medio termine, 2023–2027* (Rome: Unioncamere, 2022).

²⁸ Unioncamere. Press release, “Stranieri: 54mila imprese in più in due anni (+8,7%)” (March 2023).

migrants operate is highly competitive, with competition often based on price rather than quality. These factors may make migrants' businesses more prone to failure than those of nationals. Among self-employed respondents one year before the survey, immigrants have a four percentage points higher risk of unemployment than Italians in the survey year.

Figure 10 shows the differences between migrants and nationals in avoiding low-skilled manual occupations.²⁹ It shows a high and stable stratification between Italians and foreigners over time, particularly among female workers. Foreign workers from Africa and the Middle East have a disadvantage of about 31 percentage points in avoiding low-skilled occupations. Even migrants from Eastern Europe — despite representing, in many respects, the least disadvantaged migrant group in the Italian labour market — have a disadvantage of 19 percentage points compared to Italians. Among women, the disadvantages are even more significant, given their over-representation in care and domestic work. Female migrants from Asia, for example, have a disadvantage of as much as 40 percentage points in avoiding low-skilled jobs compared to Italians. The disadvantage among female workers from Eastern Europe is around 30 percentage points.

► **Figure 10. Differences in the chances of avoiding low-skilled jobs (immigrants versus nationals) by educational qualification**



Note: Estimates are monitored for gender, education level and region of residence.

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2009–2020).

The risk of entrapment in the secondary labour market is also influenced by the methods migrants use to find work. While the social ties of migratory networks increase the chances of finding employment and reduce settlement difficulties, networks between fellow compatriots penalise job quality, as these interpersonal ties mainly branch out into the less qualified areas

²⁹ These are the occupations that social stratification studies include in the urban working class (EGP V-VI-VII of the reported social class scheme in Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe, and Lucienne Portocarero, "Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European societies: England, France and Sweden", *The British journal of sociology* 30(4) (1979): 415–441.

of the labour market. Analyses of data on the status and social integration of foreign nationals show that contacts within the ethnic group are particularly effective in finding work and reducing the time it takes to find employment, at the cost of a greater risk of being trapped in low-skilled jobs.³⁰ Conversely, although less widespread, social contacts with nationals reduce the risk of occupational downgrading.³¹

The high demand for low-skilled labour is the basis for a downward levelling of the foreign labour force which is reflected in a decline of internal heterogeneity in the occupational levels of this population group, especially in educational attainment. The disadvantage faced by migrants in avoiding low-skilled occupations is generally higher. The penalisation of migrants for avoiding low-skilled occupations is usually higher, as shown in Table 6.

► **Table 6. Differences in the probability of avoiding low-skilled jobs between national and migrant workers by gender and educational qualification**

Geographical origin	Men		
	Middle-school certificate or lower	High-school diploma	University degree
Africa and Middle-East	-0.24	-0.28	-0.30
Asia	-0.20	-0.39	-0.37
Latin America	-0.12	-0.20	-0.18
Eastern Europe	-0.10	-0.21	-0.28
Italy average	0.70	0.87	0.99
Geographical origin	Women		
	Middle-school certificate or lower	High-school diploma	University degree
Africa and Middle-East	-0.26	-0.30	-0.36
Asia	-0.17	-0.54	-0.41
Latin America	-0.20	-0.31	-0.29
Eastern Europe	-0.16	-0.37	-0.31
Italy average	0.67	0.93	0.99

Note: Estimates are monitored by gender, education level and region of residence.

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2020). Linear probability models with robust standard errors.

Among male graduates from Africa, for example, the disadvantage in avoiding a low-skilled job is 30 pp higher than for Italian graduates. Among Asian graduates, this disadvantage rises to 37 percentage points. Among foreign female graduates, there are similar disadvantages, ranging from 29 per cent for Latin Americans to 41 per cent for Asians. The disadvantage of migrants is, on the other hand, lower among those with medium-low educational qualifications: among

³⁰ ISTAT, *Vita e percorsi di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia* (2018).


³¹ Ivana Fellini, and Raffaele Guetto, "A U-shaped pattern of immigrants' occupational careers? A comparative analysis of Italy, Spain, and France", *International migration review* 53(1) (2019): 26–58.

men, the disadvantage of foreign workers varies from 24 percentage points for Africans to 10 percentage points for Eastern Europeans; among women, on the other hand, the disadvantage in avoiding low-skilled jobs is 26 percentage points among those from Africa and the Middle East and 16 percentage points among migrants from Eastern Europe.

The problem of over-qualification of the foreign labour force is more evident when considering the high proportion of foreign women graduates employed in the collective and personal services sector. Comparative data confirm the relevance of the over-qualification of the most educated foreigners. According to Eurostat data, in 2021 in Italy, the share of over-qualified workers was 46.9 per cent among foreigners from other European countries, 67.1 per cent among non-EU foreigners and 19.1 per cent among Italians. Contrary to what happens in Central and Northern European countries, where there is a demand for skilled labour that also reaches migrants, in Italy, needs are generated mainly in the lower segments of the occupational structure, thus fuelling a process that pushes most migrants into low-skilled jobs, regardless of their level of education and qualification.

The percentage of foreign workers who believe they are overqualified for their jobs is almost double that of Italians (19.2 per cent and 9.8 per cent, respectively). The disparity is even more noticeable regarding women and graduates (as shown in Figure 11). Non-Italians are likelier to feel that they perform low-skilled jobs than Italians — with the percentage being more than double. On the other hand, for graduates, the rate is almost four times higher.

► **Figure 11. Employed persons who consider themselves overqualified job by gender, age group and level of education (2021)**



Source: ISTAT, "Stranieri e naturalizzati nel mondo del lavoro," Statistiche Focus (3 February 2023).

In the same year, however, migrant workers' level of satisfaction with their jobs was higher in Italy than the European average for EU and non-EU workers (Table 7). The workers with the lowest satisfaction rates were migrants from non-EU countries, with similar values for men and women. The only relevant data is that workers from other European countries employed in unskilled occupations (ISCO-08 category 9) have a satisfaction rate twice lower than the average recorded in Italy. In contrast, for non-EU workers, the difference is minimal (2.4 per cent and 3 per cent).

► Table 7. Percentages of EU and non-EU workers by level of job satisfaction, by gender

	EU27			Extra EU		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
	Total					
EU27	40.2	38.5	5.6	38.4	39.3	6.5
Italy	53.0	42.4	1.5	48.7	46.3	2.4
	Men					
EU27	39.7	39.9	5.0	38.3	39.4	6.1
Italy	52.7	42.9	1.4	48.5	46.0	2.4
	Women					
EU27	40.8	37.9	6.4	38.6	39.0	7.2
Italy	53.2	41.8	1.7	49.1	46.6	2.3
	Unskilled occupations					
EU27	30.0	42.7	8.9	32.3	44.8	7.7
Italy	43.7	50.6	3.7	39.7	54.8	3.0

Source: Eurostat, Employment by job satisfaction, sex, age, citizenship and occupation (online code LFSO_21JSAT03).

It has been observed that migrants are often segmented based on their occupation and type of employment contract. The share of foreign workers employed on fixed-term contracts varies between 14.9 per cent recorded among those from Latin America and 18.7 per cent among migrants from Africa and the Middle East, while among Italians, the share of those employed on fixed-term contracts is 12.8 per cent; significant gender differences also emerge (Table 8). Among Italians, the share of fixed-term workers is generally higher among women. At the same time, among migrants, there are higher rates among men.

A similar disadvantage in accessing stable, permanent employment is found in other EU countries, especially in Belgium (with 16.8 per cent and 9.4 per cent of foreigners employed on fixed-term contracts among nationals), Greece (22.4 per cent and 9.6 per cent, respectively) and Spain (37 per cent and 23.6 per cent, respectively).³²

The disadvantage of foreigners is further confirmed by the data on employment relationships initiated in 2021. Compared to the previous year, permanent contracts increased only among Italian workers (+12.3 per cent), while for non-EU foreigners' permanent contracts decreased (-13 per cent), fixed-term contracts increased (+18.4 per cent) and apprenticeships (+43.1 per cent).³³

Among migrants, the share of female part-time workers is also higher (43.6 per cent), of whom more than one-third (31.1 per cent) are in involuntary part-time employment. Among Italian women, on the other hand, the share of part-time workers is 32.5 per cent, and the incidence of involuntary part-time is 15.7 per cent.

³² Eurostat, Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees, by sex, age, and citizenship, 2021 (online code: LFS_A_ETPGAN)

³³ Ministry of labour and social policies, *XII Rapporto annuale*: 47.

► **Table 8. Percentages of fixed-term and permanent workers by gender and geographical origin**

Geographical origin	Men	
	Fixed-term contract	Open-ended contract
Italy	10.8	89.2
Africa and Middle-East	19.0	81.0
Asia	16.7	83.3
Latin America	15.6	84.4
Eastern Europe	20.7	79.3
Geographical origin	Women	
	Fixed-term contract	Open-ended contract
Italy	14.8	85.2
Africa and Middle-East	18.5	81.5
Asia	9.9	90.1
Latin America	14.6	85.4
Eastern Europe	17.8	82.2

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2020).

In general, there are few statistics on the characteristics of informal workers in Italy. However, available data show a relationship between informal employment and migration status (migrant workers have higher irregularity rates than national workers) and between irregularity and age group (irregularity affects young workers more than adults). The latest data released by the National Institute of Statistics in 2016 shows an irregularity rate of 8.8 per cent among Italian workers, 22.2 per cent for immigrants from other EU countries and 19.1 per cent for workers from non-EU countries. Data by sector reveal that one in two domestic workers is informal (51.7 per cent), while in the agricultural industry, one in four workers is informal (24.4 per cent) and in the construction and tourism sectors, the figure is almost one in seven (14.8 and 15.3 per cent, respectively).³⁴

The prevalence of low-skilled work among migrants increases the risk of accidents. In 2021, accidents for foreign workers amounted to over 102,000 (18.2 per cent of the total). Of these, more than 80 thousand involved foreigners from non-EU countries, while accidents for foreigners from EU countries amounted to more than 21 thousand.³⁵

Between 2020 and 2021, accidents among foreigners increased by about three per cent. Still, among non-EU workers, the increase was 7.3 per cent, while accidents among Italian workers decreased by 2.3 per cent. There were no significant differences in accident fatalities between nationals and migrants. In both cases, the weight of fatal accidents in the total number of accidents was 0.2 per cent. 61.8 per cent of foreign accidents involved male workers, mainly because they are in less skilled and more dangerous occupations. Most of the accidents concerned workers employed in manufacturing, which is valid for Italians (86.9 per cent) and immigrants (93.3 per cent).

³⁴ See data referred to 2020 in ISTAT, "[Occupazione regolare e irregolare per branca di attività e popolazione](#)" (consulted on 10 June 2023).

³⁵ National institute for insurance against accidents at work (INAIL), *Tabelle nazionali con cadenza semestrale*, tabella B1.3 pp. 12 (available on [INAIL OpenData](#)).


3.2 Occupational mobility

Migrants' more significant risk of being trapped in the lower-skilled strata of the labour market also influences the dynamic aspects of their employment status, i.e. their chances of improvement and career advancement. Figure 12 shows the differences between nationals and migrants in the probability of being employed, avoiding low-skilled jobs and net monthly income according to the length of stay in Italy. A value of 0 indicates the average for Italians; negative values indicate a disadvantage for migrants; values above 1 indicate an advantage for migrants.

Regarding the chances of being employed, after an initial disadvantage, where migrants have fewer chances of being hired than nationals, a quick recovery is observed, confirming the high employability of foreign workers, especially men. After the sixth year of residence, migrants' disadvantage becomes a slight advantage.

The results are different when considering the probability of avoiding a low-skilled job. Although a timid reduction in disadvantage is also observed for this indicator, the penalisation of migrants persists over time, for both men and women, even among those who have been residents in Italy for more than 20 years. It is interesting to note that income disparities decrease over time. The disadvantage experienced by migrants goes from €500 (net) per month to €150 (pay gaps will be analysed later). It appears that migrants are primarily trapped in lower-paying jobs, as indicated by the central quadrant of the graph. However, they seem to have some level of mobility in terms of occupation at the margins as they move towards slightly better-paying jobs within the lower-skilled segment of the labour market.

► **Figure 12. Differences between nationals and migrants in the possibility of being employed, avoidance of unskilled jobs and average monthly income by years of residence in Italy**




Note: Estimates are monitored by gender, education, and region of residence.

Source: Elaboration based on ISTAT quarterly labour force survey data (2009–2020).

Data on the social integration of foreign citizens also confirm that the employment mobility of migrants is much lower than for nationals.³⁶ Among the foreign workers who joined the working class once they arrived in Italy, 89.8 per cent remained “immobile”, and only six per cent moved into the traditional petty bourgeoisie, which includes self-employed trade and craft work. On the other hand, Italians in the working class had higher rates of social mobility: 65.3 per cent of them continued to do manual work. In comparison, 14.9 per cent moved into the petty bourgeoisie and 13.5 per cent into the white-collar middle class. However, one should differentiate stable manual jobs from unstable and irregular ones. In that case, specific mobility of migrants emerges, with a three-percentage point advantage over Italians in the probability of moving from unstable to stable and protected positions. This data further confirms that, while foreign workers are penalised in the transitions leading to the middle and upper classes because they have a greater risk of being trapped (and immobile) in the lower strata of the secondary labour market, they also experience forms of social mobility “at the margins”, i.e. from unstable and low-paid manual labour to stable and better-paid work.

The effect of occupational segregation and immobility can also be observed from data on the net fiscal impact of migrants in Italy, estimated by European Commission research.³⁷ The net fiscal contribution of non-EU migrants in Italy becomes positive at around 24 years of age. (Figure 13). Then, it settles around €5,000 for individuals between the ages of 25 and 64, with no progression, demonstrating the low occupational mobility of migrant workers. After the age of 65, the contribution becomes negative again. In other EU countries (e.g. France, Spain, and Portugal), on the contrary, the net contribution becomes positive in the 25-34 age group and progresses upwards as age increases and due to occupational mobility until reaching a peak around the 45-54 age group.³⁸

► **Figure 13. Net fiscal impact of non-EU migrants in Italy**



Source: Alain Bélanger et al., *Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020): 70.

³⁶ ISTAT, *Vita e percorsi di integrazione degli immigrati*.

³⁷ Alain Bélanger, et al., *Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).


³⁸ See charts concerning France (p.62), Spain (p. 76) and Portugal (p. 92) in Alain Bélanger, et al., *Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU*.

3.3 The pay gap

In 2015, the pay gap of migrant workers in Italy stood at 29.6 per cent — almost three percentage points higher than in the previous two years, placing Italy fourth among the 20 countries with the highest pay gap worldwide and third among European countries (Figure 14).³⁹

Female migrant workers face a double disadvantage due to the sum of the gender pay gap on top of the migrant-national pay gap. The gender pay gap of female migrant workers is 12 percentage points, compared to 10 percentage points among national workers. The pay gap between female and male migrant workers is partly because female migrant workers are over-represented in the care economy, which also suffers from a wage penalty of about six percentage points compared to the rest of the economy.⁴⁰ In Italy, only 9.1 per cent of all migrant men work in the care economy, compared to 65.8 per cent of all migrant women.

► **Figure 14. Pay gap between nationals and migrants (hourly pay), Italy and EU countries, percentage**



Source: ILO, *The migrant pay gap*: 94, tabella 9.

The pay gap between national and migrant workers makes migrants more likely to be trapped in low-paid work. The share of migrants in low-paid jobs (less than three-quarters of the average hourly wage) in Italy is 43.8 per cent (41.3 per cent among migrant men and 43.8 per cent for women), five times higher than the national average in 2018 (8.5 per cent and 7 per cent among men and 10.2 per cent among women).⁴¹

³⁹ ILO, *The migrant pay gap*. Wage differences are measured in terms of average hourly wages.


⁴⁰ ILO, *The migrant pay gap*: 80, Figure 24.

⁴¹ Eurostat: Low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees (excluding apprentices) by sex (online code: EARN_SES_PUB1S) and ILO, *The migrant pay gap*: 102, Chart 10.

Several factors, including education and the type of occupation performed, can cause wage differences between migrants and nationals. Foreign workers are often paid less because they are frequently hired for low-skilled jobs. Once the differences related to gender, age, education level and employment status (hours worked, type of contract, occupational classification, and economic sector) are factored in, the pay gap between nationals and migrants declines to 20.3 per cent.

The part of the pay gap that remains “unexplained” — i.e. not due to statistically observable factors — amounts to 31 per cent.⁴² This places Italy among the five European countries with the highest unexplained wage differentials (Figure 15).

► **Figure 15. Percentage of unexplained wage difference between migrants and nationals**



Source: ILO. *The migrant pay gap*: 94, tabella 9.

⁴² ILO, *The migrant pay gap*: 94, Chart 9.

In the absence of experimental data, it is difficult to attribute this residual difference to specific penalty mechanisms. In general, this part of the pay gap can be interpreted by reference to discriminatory practices against foreign workers and a horizontal occupational segmentation of foreigners compared to nationals.⁴³

The latest available data on subjective perceptions of discrimination in 2021 indicate that in Italy, about five per cent of foreign workers feel discriminated against in the workplace (Table 9), compared to six per cent recorded at the European level. This percentage is similar to that recorded in Germany (five per cent) and Spain (4.6 per cent) but lower than the discrimination perceived by migrant workers in the Netherlands (11.8 per cent), Austria (7.4 per cent) and France (7.2 per cent).

► **Table 9. Percentage of workers who feel they are discriminated against in Italy**

Origin	Total	Men	Women
EU27 foreigners	4.9	4.6	5.2
Extra-EU foreigners	5.3	5.8	4.6

Source: Eurostat, Ad hoc module on the employment situation of migrants, 2021 (online code: LFSO_21DISC03).

The highest rates of perceived discrimination among migrants in Italy are found among men from non-EU countries and women workers from other European countries. The leading cause of discrimination is foreign origin (82 per cent among EU workers and 80.7 per cent among non-EU workers). Among non-EU workers, however, there is also discrimination based on gender (7.1 per cent of all workers who consider themselves discriminated against) and age (3.6 per cent).

Migrants' low quality of work and higher risk of precarious employment are also associated with a higher risk of poverty. In 2021, poverty among households composed exclusively of foreigners was six times higher than that recorded among Italian households (30.6 per cent and 5.7 per cent, respectively) and higher than in 2020 (Table 10). This is followed by households with at least one foreign resident (26.3 per cent) and mixed families (17 per cent).

Absolute poverty reached 46.4 per cent in households composed only of foreigners with a reference person seeking employment, compared to 17.3 per cent of Italian households. In the same year, the percentage of foreign households living in absolute poverty was six times higher than that of Italian households, where the reference person was employed (24.7 per cent and 4.2 per cent, respectively). Among households of foreign workers employed in low-skilled positions, poverty rose to over 31 per cent (7.9 per cent for Italian-only households).⁴⁴

⁴³ Horizontal occupational segmentation refers to the jobs performed by foreigners and nationals within the same occupational category. ILO, *The migrant pay gap*.

⁴⁴ Ministry of labour and social policies, *XII Rapporto annuale*.

► **Table 10. Incidence of absolute poverty by citizenship**

Geographical origin	2020	2021
Households of Italians only	6.0	5.7
Mixed households	22.2	17.0
Foreign-only households	26.7	30.6
Households with foreigners	25.3	26.3
Total households	7.7	7.5

Source: ISTAT, Household expenditure survey, 2020–2021.

► References

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