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Competence (84, 822, 823,-666)

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Keywords: Competence
Total judgments found: 108

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  • Judgment 4809


    137th Session, 2024
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant seeks a contractual redefinition of his employment relationship and the setting aside of the decision not to renew his last contract.

    Consideration 2

    Extract:

    The Organization submits that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint because the complainant, who held external collaboration contracts for most of the period in question, was not an official of the Office.
    This challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction – which, in the form in which it is presented, relates to the substance of the dispute – is irrelevant in this case.
    It is true that, under the Tribunal’s case law, where an external collaboration contract confers jurisdiction for settling disputes concerning its performance on another judicial authority or – as is more often the case – on an arbitral body, the Tribunal cannot hear such a dispute, even where it concerns precisely the redefinition of the contract in question as a contract appointing an official (see, in particular, Judgments 4652, considerations 16 to 20 and 22, and 2888, considerations 5 and 6).
    However, plainly this case law does not apply when that contract grants jurisdiction to the Tribunal to hear disputes relating to its performance, as permitted under Article II, paragraph 4, of the Tribunal’s Statute (see Judgments 4652, consideration 21, and 2888, consideration 7). In this case, the external collaboration contracts concluded by the ILO and the complainant all included a provision in paragraph 12 specifically conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear “[a]ny dispute arising out of [their] application or interpretation”. The Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute relating to their possible redefinition.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2888, 4652

    Keywords:

    arbitration; competence; external collaborator; non official; ratione personae;



  • Judgment 4733


    136th Session, 2023
    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who was serving on a National Project Personnel contract with the FAO Representation in Malawi, contends that the FAO breached his right to due process and disregarded its own rules and regulations, and that he was subject to unequal treatment.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; non official; ratione personae; summary procedure;

    Considerations 3-4

    Extract:

    Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall [...] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The Tribunal is therefore not competent to hear complaints filed by individuals who do not have the status of an official of an organization recognizing its jurisdiction (see Judgment 3049, consideration 4).
    In his complaint, the complainant provides a copy of his NPP contract, which included general conditions as well as a specific clause on his legal status. In this clause it was clearly indicated that the complainant was retained to work as “an independent contractor” and not as “an official of [the] FAO”. Although certain other clauses in the contract were not incompatible with the existence of an employer-employee relationship (especially those referring to specific provisions of the FAO Administrative Manual), they cannot be construed as negating the clear indication in the specific clause on the complainant’s legal status. He is not an official and cannot invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3049

    Keywords:

    competence; non official; ratione personae;



  • Judgment 4652


    136th Session, 2023
    Green Climate Fund
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to pay him compensation equal to the difference between his remuneration as a consultant and the value of the salary and benefits received by staff members performing similar functions.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; consultant; non official; ratione personae;

    Considerations 8, 11-21

    Extract:

    The Tribunal is aware that in many States there is an ongoing debate as to whether the existence of an employment relationship can or should be recognised in certain situations where, although such a relationship is not expressly provided for in the contract, other factors support a conclusion that the person concerned is, in fact, an employee and must be treated as such.
    […]
    The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is established and defined by its Statute. It is bound to exercise the jurisdiction so conferred. Centrally, it is to hear complaints of officials having regard to the terms of Article II. Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall [...] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not therefore extend to complaints filed by individuals who do not have the status of an official in the defendant organisations (see Judgment 3049, consideration 4).
    Although the determination of that status does not depend exclusively on the wording of the contract or the staff regulations and the Tribunal may need to rely on other documents (see, for example, Judgment 3359, consideration 13), in the present case each contract contains a very clear definition of the relationship between the parties.
    In Clause G-19 it is clearly indicated that the contract “creates an independent contractor relationship” and that nothing contained in it “shall be construed as establishing or creating between the Fund and the Consultant a relationship of employer and employee [...]”. Although certain other clauses in these contracts are not incompatible with the existence of an employer-employee relationship, they cannot be construed as negating the clear indication in Clause G-19 as to the legal status of the complainant.
    Whilst the complainant argues that offering the contracts to him as an “independent consultant” was an abuse of power, because they were offered in those terms for an ulterior purpose, namely, to disguise the true nature of the employer-employee relationship which was intended to be created, there is nothing in the file to suggest that the terms of the contracts did not reflect the parties’ true intentions.
    There is no basis on which the complainant can claim that he should be retroactively assigned a different contractual status, given that he had freely signed both contracts (see, for example, Judgments 2734, consideration 1, 2415, consideration 4, and 2308, consideration 17).
    Moreover, it is noteworthy that Clause G-21 provides specifically that any dispute not resolved amicably shall be finally settled by arbitration. The Tribunal has already had occasion to rule that it has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute relating to a contract concluded with an independent contractor or collaborator which contains such an arbitration clause (see Judgment 2888, consideration 5, and the case law cited therein).
    In Judgment 2888, consideration 6, the Tribunal further explained that […]
    These considerations apply, in the same way, to the present case.
    The existence of an arbitration clause in some contracts has been treated by the Tribunal as evidencing an agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see Judgments 3705, consideration 4, 2688, consideration 5, 2017, consideration 2a, and 1938, consideration 4).
    It is obvious that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract of an official would be contrary to the Statute of the Tribunal and the basis on which organisations recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Indeed, if a person is or was an official of an organisation which has recognized the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, that person has a right to commence and maintain proceedings alleging non-observance of the terms of appointment or of the staff regulations and can do so notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration clause in a contract between that person and the organisation concerned.
    The inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract of a non-official is not unlawful in itself. In this case, as noted above, the arbitration clause specifically provides for arbitration by a single arbitrator in the Republic of Korea.
    The Tribunal notes that there appears to be no time limit in the contract for the submission of the dispute to arbitration and the complainant may, if he so wishes, advance all his arguments before the arbitrator.
    The Tribunal would be competent to hear disputes concerning the execution of a contract of a non-official where the contract itself provides for the Tribunal’s competence, as provided for by Article II, paragraph 4, of its Statute (see Judgments 967 and 803).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 803, 967, 1938, 2017, 2308, 2415, 2688, 2734, 2888, 3049, 3359, 3705

    Keywords:

    arbitration; competence; non official; ratione personae;



  • Judgment 4646


    135th Session, 2023
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who was employed under a series of Special Service Agreements, submits that she was requested without a valid reason to stop working immediately and that WHO did not grant her request for conciliation and amicable settlement.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; ratione personae; special service agreement; summary procedure;

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    The complainant states in the complaint form that she filed the complaint in her capacity as a former official. However, according to the express terms of the SSA under which she was employed, the complainant did not have the status of a WHO official. As the complainant cannot be considered as an official or former official of WHO and is not covered by WHO’s Staff Rules and Regulations, she has no access to this Tribunal (see Judgments 3705, consideration 4, 3551, consideration 3, and 3049, consideration 4).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3049, 3551, 3705

    Keywords:

    competence; former official; ratione personae; special service agreement;



  • Judgment 4589


    135th Session, 2023
    Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant contests the recruitment process for the position of Staff Council Coordinator and her non-selection for that position.

    Considerations 6-8

    Extract:

    [T]he complainant submits, by reference to consideration 12 of Judgment 3125, that the Appeal Board committed an error of law by unlawfully restricting its competence while examining her internal appeal. The Tribunal stated, in the referenced consideration, that the internal appeal body involved in that case was wrong to define its own competence by reference to the case law which defines the Tribunal’s own power of review of discretionary decisions. In consideration 14 of Judgment 3125, the Tribunal set aside the selection process solely because the internal appeal body had so restricted its competence. That however is not the end of the matter. The Tribunal’s case law also has it that where an organization’s rules restrict an appeal body’s power to review a discretionary decision, the rules, rather than the foregoing principle, apply (see, for example, Judgment 3077, consideration 3).
    Importantly for the purpose of this case, however, the case law further has it that, notwithstanding that an Appeal Board wrongfully defines its competence to review a selection decision by reference to the Tribunal’s limited power of review, the report of the Board would not be vitiated if it is found that it in fact considered the submissions and materials the parties provided (see, for example, Judgment 4010, consideration 7). Accordingly, in consideration 2 of Judgment 3590, the Tribunal stated that by noting that the candidates had been treated equally, the Appeal Board recognized that the appointing authority enjoyed wide discretion to appoint the person whom it considered to be the most qualified for the post advertised from a shortlist of candidates, all of whom met the requirements specified by the vacancy notice. The Tribunal also stated that this self-restraint on the part of the appeal body is completely justified to the extent that, when conducted correctly, a competition and selection procedure calls for a complex assessment of multiple criteria that relate as much to the candidates’ personalities and qualities as to the organization’s particular interests. It further stated that without compromising the objective assessment of these criteria, the appeal body cannot be vested in every circumstance with the same power of review that must be granted to the bodies responsible for selecting candidates, but that this does not relieve the appeal body of its duty to examine the competition file closely and to provide plausible reasons for its recommendation within the limits of its power of review.
    In the present case, the Appeal Board examined the competition file, although it did not disclose it to the complainant.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3077, 3125, 3590, 4010

    Keywords:

    competence; internal appeals body;



  • Judgment 4582


    135th Session, 2023
    Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant seeks the reclassification of her employment contracts. She also claims that she was the victim of harassment and seeks compensation for the injury she alleges to have suffered.

    Consideration 2

    Extract:

    The Organisation challenges the Tribunal’s competence to hear the complaint. However, the Tribunal recalls that, under Article II, paragraph 6(a), of its Statute, the Tribunal is open to any official, “even if her or his employment has ceased”. The challenge to the Tribunal’s competence will therefore be dismissed.

    Keywords:

    competence; former official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint;



  • Judgment 4526


    134th Session, 2022
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to terminate his contract for misconduct.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; non official; ratione personae; unops;

    Consideration 8

    Extract:

    The Tribunal recently concluded in Judgment 3551, consistent with more recent case law, that a person in a situation broadly analogous to that of the complainant could not avail himself of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as he was not an official of the defendant organisation. Not only was the existence of an arbitration clause viewed as relevant in Judgment 3551 in determining the status of the complainant, the existence of such a clause has, in a number of cases concerning individuals on contract, been treated as evidencing an agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 1938, consideration 4, 2017, consideration 2(a), 2688, consideration 5, 2888, consideration 5, and 3705, consideration 4).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1938, 2017, 2688, 2888, 3551, 3705

    Keywords:

    competence; non official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint;



  • Judgment 4486


    133rd Session, 2022
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the composition of the Munich Staff Committee and of the Central Staff Committee.

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    With regard to his standing as an alleged member of the MSC [Munich Staff Committee] and the CSC [Central Staff Committee], as rightly pointed out by the IAC and endorsed by the President, at the time of the appeal, the complainant was not a member of the MSC because he had resigned from it, regardless of the purpose underlying his resignation. He was not a member of the CSC either. Pursuant to Article 2 of the then Election Regulations, “[t]he local section [that is to say the MSC] shall appoint the Munich members of the [CSC]”. Therefore, his election to the MSC did not automatically mean that he was also elected to the CSC. On the contrary, a separate appointment is a prerequisite according to the above provision. The complainant did not produce any evidence that the MSC appointed him as a member of the CSC. Thus, his claims as a staff representative of either the MSC or the CSC, including claims for declaring the composition of the MSC and the CSC void, for recognising his mandate to represent in the CSC the category C employees and for accessing the tools of communication for Staff Committee’s members, are irreceivable ratione personae. Accordingly, his allegation that the denial of his participation in the CSC activities constitutes a violation of the prohibition of non-discrimination and of equal treatment is not receivable either.

    Keywords:

    competence; internal appeals body; member of an internal body; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint; staff representative;



  • Judgment 4458


    133rd Session, 2022
    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant seeks the setting aside of the information circular which, according to her, announced the closure of the UNESCO Commissary.

    Consideration 6

    Extract:

    [T]he contested measure affects the complainant not in her capacity as a former official of UNESCO, but in her – legally distinct – capacity as a member of the Commissary. The complainant herself makes this clear in her complaint by submitting that the decision to end the Commissary’s activity “directly breaches [her] entitlements as a member of the Commissary”, and the nature of the arguments raised in her submissions confirms that she intends to file a complaint with the Tribunal in that capacity.
    However, the opportunity to use the services of the Commissary, which was merely a facility offered to UNESCO staff members – and indeed to other categories of persons [...] – was not covered by the provisions of the complainant’s employment contract when she retired nor by the provisions of the Organization’s Staff Regulations [...].

    Keywords:

    competence; facilities; locus standi; ratione materiae; status of complainant;



  • Judgment 4358


    131st Session, 2021
    International Criminal Court
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to place him on the shortlist for a position.

    Consideration 2

    Extract:

    Article II of the Tribunal’s Statute recognises that officials whose employment has ceased can access the Tribunal (Article II, paragraph 6(a)), a circumstance which might, for example, involve the enforcement of rights which had arisen during the currency of their employment (see, for example, Judgment 4219, consideration 17). However it is nonetheless necessary, to render a complaint receivable, for a complainant to be seeking to vindicate non-observance of her or his terms of appointment or Staff Regulations as are applicable (Article II, paragraph 5, of the Tribunal’s Statute). Ordinarily, as is the case in the present proceedings, a person who has ceased to be a member of the staff of an international organisation has no subsisting terms of appointment nor are there ordinarily any applicable Staff Regulations and none applying to former staff members are pointed to in these proceedings.
    Accordingly the complaint must be dismissed as irreceivable as the Tribunal has no competence to hear it (see, for example, Judgments 3774, consideration 1, and 3709, consideration 4).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3709, 3774, 4219

    Keywords:

    competence; former official; ratione personae;

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; former official; ratione personae;



  • Judgment 4219


    129th Session, 2020
    ITER International Fusion Energy Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who had been seconded to the ITER Organization, challenges the decision to end his secondment and the failure to investigate his harassment allegations.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint allowed; harassment; ratione personae; secondment;

    Consideration 17

    Extract:

    [T]he Tribunal has recognised that former officials can seek redress in the Tribunal when, inter alia, the former official is seeking to enforce rights which had arisen during the currency of her or his employment with the international organisation concerned (see, for example, Judgments 3505, consideration 3, and 3915, consideration 3).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3505, 3915

    Keywords:

    competence; former official; ratione materiae; ratione personae;

    Consideration 7

    Extract:

    In relation to the challenge to the impugned decision, insofar as the Director-General concluded the complainant had no right of appeal, the following comment can be made. There can be no doubt that there is no general right of appeal available to staff of international organisations deriving, at least impliedly, from their terms of appointment to challenge decisions with which they are aggrieved irrespective of the provisions of applicable staff rules or regulations. However, even if the staff rules or regulations do not provide for an appeal, they cannot preclude the initiation of proceedings in the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgment 2312, consideration 3).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2312

    Keywords:

    competence; right of appeal;

    Consideration 12

    Extract:

    The Tribunal now turns directly to the question of whether the complainant was an official for the purposes of the Tribunal’s Statute. In relation to seconded staff, it has been said by the Tribunal that “[a]s a general rule, the effect of secondment is to suspend the contractual relationship between the releasing agency and the employee, who retains the right to return to the releasing agency upon expiry of the secondment term without having to seek other employment. During secondment, [she or]he is subject to the staff regulations and rules of the receiving agency” (see Judgment 2184, consideration 4). Ultimately, of course, the status of a seconded employee has to be assessed having regard to the specific arrangements in place concerning the secondment. One case where a seconded employee was not viewed as an official or employee of the receiving organisation is Judgment 3247. Additionally, as the Tribunal observed in Judgment 2918, consideration 11, “[s]econdment is, in essence, a tripartite agreement which, ordinarily, involves an agreement between the person seconded and the receiving organisation, at least as to some matters”. In that case the applicability of the Staff Regulations depended on whether an individual had concluded an employment contract with the organisation and the Tribunal found the seconded staff had not. Additionally in that judgment reference was made to Judgment 703, which established that secondment does not necessarily preclude the person concerned from becoming a staff member of the organisation to which she or he is seconded.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 703, 2184, 2918, 3247

    Keywords:

    competence; official; ratione personae; secondment; staff member;



  • Judgment 4104


    127th Session, 2019
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to deny her request for the issuance of a fixed-term project-based contract for a member of her team.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    administrative decision; competence; complaint dismissed; impugned decision; ratione materiae;



  • Judgment 3551


    120th Session, 2015
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: As the complaint is clearly irreceivable, it is summarily dismissed.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    "The Tribunal clearly has no jurisdiction to hear this complaint. Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall […] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The complainant stated in the complaint form that he filed the complaint in his capacity as a former official. However, according the express terms of the SSA under which he was employed, the complainant did not have the status of a WHO official. As the complainant cannot be considered as an official or former official of WHO and is not covered by WHO’s Staff Rules and Regulations, he has no access to this Tribunal (see Judgments 1034, under 3, and 3049, under 4)."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1034, 3049

    Keywords:

    competence; non official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint; special service agreement; staff regulations and rules; status of complainant;



  • Judgment 3494


    120th Session, 2015
    European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her candidature for a position in Eurocontrol.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    appointment; candidate; competence; complaint allowed; decision quashed; delegated authority;



  • Judgment 3423


    119th Session, 2015
    Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The Tribunal found that the impugned implied decision was flawed.

    Consideration 9(b)

    Extract:

    It is true that the two successive appeals thus lodged by the complainants were not submitted to the authorities competent to hear them. But consistent precedent has it that, although rules of procedure should ordinarily be strictly complied with, they must not set traps for staff members who are defending their rights and therefore they must not be construed with too much formalism. Consequently, an appeal submitted to the wrong authority is not irreceivable on that account and it is for that authority, in such circumstances, to forward it to the one which is competent, within the organisation, to hear it (see, for example, Judgments 1832, under 6, 2882, under 6, or 3027, under 7).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1832, 2882, 3027

    Keywords:

    competence; internal appeal; internal appeals body;



  • Judgment 3414


    119th Session, 2015
    International Atomic Energy Agency
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant unsuccessfully challenges the decision to remove his name from an e-mail distribution list on the ground that he had been released from his regular duties to work as President of the Staff Council.

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    "[I]t has long been recognised that all officials of international organisations have a right to associate and an implied contractual term in the appointment of each that the relevant organisation will not infringe that right (see, for example, Judgment 496, consideration 6). Moreover the principle of freedom of association is infringed if a person is subject to detriment or disability because of her or his activities within a staff association or the Staff Council (see, for example, Judgments 2704, consideration 6, and 3084, consideration 19). In the present case the complainant does contend he is being discriminated against and this has arisen by virtue of him occupying the office of President of the Staff Council. This plea is sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is, of course, another question whether this plea can be made on the facts. But the Tribunal is competent to hear the complaint and rejects the IAEA’s contention that it is not."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 496, 2704, 3084

    Keywords:

    competence; freedom of association;



  • Judgment 3291


    116th Session, 2014
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The Tribunal dismisses fifty-six similar complaints on the grounds that they are directed against general and not individual decisions.

    Judgment keywords

    Reference(s)

    Organization rules reference: Articles 77,80, 81 and 83 of the Service Regulations; Circular No. 82; Decisions CA/D 32/08, 27/08, 14/08, 13/09, 28/09, 22/09, 7/10

    Keywords:

    advisory opinion; competence; complaint dismissed; decision; effect; general decision; general principle; individual decision; internal appeal; internal appeals body; joinder; procedure before the tribunal; receivability of the complaint; same cause of action; same purpose;



  • Judgment 3106


    113th Session, 2012
    United Nations Industrial Development Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Consideration 7

    Extract:

    The principle of freedom of association "precludes interference by an organisation in the affairs of its staff union or the organs of its staff union (see Judgment 2100, under 15). A staff union must be free to conduct its own affairs, to regulate its own activities and, also, to regulate the conduct of its members in relation to those affairs and activities. Thus, it was said in Judgment 274, under 22, that “[t]here could be no true freedom of association if the disapproval of the Director General, whether justified or not, of what was said [in an open letter issued in connection with a staff union referendum] could lead to disciplinary measures”. Further, an organisation must remain neutral when differences of opinion emerge within a staff union: it must not favour one group or one point of view over another. To do so would be to diminish the right of a staff union to conduct its own affairs and to regulate its own activities. Nor does an organisation have any legitimate interest in the actions of staff members in their dealings with their staff union and/or other staff union members with respect to the affairs and activities of the union. Thus, it was said in Judgment 274, under 22, that “[a] staff member’s conduct of [his] private life is not the concern of the Director-General [unless it] brings the Organization into disrepute”, and that trade union activities “likewise constitute an area that is ‘prima facie’ outside the Director- General’s jurisdiction”, although “there may be exceptional cases”."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 274, 2100

    Keywords:

    breach; competence; conduct; difference; disciplinary measure; executive head; freedom of association; organisation's duties; organisation's interest; organisation's reputation; outside activity; right; staff union; staff union activity;



  • Judgment 3053


    112th Session, 2012
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence; complaint dismissed; internal appeals body;

    Consideration 7

    Extract:

    "Ordinarily, if an internal appeals body wrongly declines jurisdiction, the decision to that effect will be set aside and remitted for further consideration in accordance with the relevant internal appeal procedures."

    Keywords:

    case sent back to organisation; competence; internal appeal; internal appeals body; refusal;



  • Judgment 3049


    111th Session, 2011
    World Intellectual Property Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    The Tribunal's jurisdiction does not extend to complaints filed by individuals who do not have the status of an official in the defendant organisations.
    "The Tribunal clearly has no jurisdiction to hear this complaint. Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, '[t]he Tribunal shall [...] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials and of provisions of the Staff Regulations of any [...] international organization meeting the standards set out in the Annex hereto which has addressed to the Director-General a declaration recognizing, in accordance with its Constitution or internal administrative rules, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal'. As the complainant cannot be considered as an official of [the Organization] and is not covered by [the latter's] Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, in particular the provisions governing the internal appeal process, she has no access to this Tribunal."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article II, paragraph 5, of the Statute

    Keywords:

    competence; competence of tribunal; iloat; iloat statute; non official; staff regulations and rules; status of complainant;

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Last updated: 12.04.2024 ^ top