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Late filing (748,-666)

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Keywords: Late filing
Total judgments found: 13

  • Judgment 4325


    130th Session, 2020
    International Cocoa Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant impugns a decision that was taken when the ICCO had not yet recognised the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    competence of tribunal; complaint dismissed; late filing; summary procedure;

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    Under Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, the Tribunal may hear a complaint only when the international organisation concerned has addressed a declaration recognising the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to the ILO’s Director-General and that declaration has been approved by the ILO’s Governing Body. Although, as stated in consideration 2 above, these requirements have been met in this case, the decision impugned by the complainant was taken when the ICCO had not yet recognised the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, which, moreover, it did not do until well after the expiry of the “ninety days after the complainant was notified of the decision impugned” in which complaints must be filed pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal.

    Keywords:

    competence of tribunal; late filing;



  • Judgment 4272


    129th Session, 2020
    ITER International Fusion Energy Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant impugns the decision whereby the Director-General of the ITER Organization dismissed him.

    Considerations 3-4

    Extract:

    Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal provides that “[t]o be receivable, a complaint must [...] have been filed within ninety days after the complainant was notified of the decision impugned”.
    In this case, the ninety-day period provided for in Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute ended on Wednesday, 16 October 2019. Accordingly, the complaint filed on 17 October 2019 is time-barred.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute

    Keywords:

    late filing;

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    complaint dismissed; late filing; summary procedure;



  • Judgment 4270


    129th Session, 2020
    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainants, former officials of the World Food Programme whose employment was terminated as a result of the abolition of their posts, allege that they performed functions of a higher level than those of the posts they occupied, and claim compensation as well as reinstatement.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    The complainants are not impugning an express administrative decision concerning them. Instead, they rely on Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Tribunal’s Statute, which permits a complainant to have recourse to the Tribunal “[w]here the Administration fails to take a decision upon any claim of an official within sixty days from the notification of the claim to it”. However, the same paragraph sets forth a deadline for filing a complaint with the Tribunal. Once the sixty-day period allowed for the taking of the decision by the Administration has expired, the complaint must be filed within the following ninety days. As the Tribunal clarified in Judgments 456 and 2901,
    “the purpose of [the] provisions [of Article VII, paragraph 3, of its Statute] is twofold. Their first aim is to enable an official to defend [her or his] interests by going to the Tribunal when the Administration has failed to take a decision. Their second aim is to prevent a dispute from dragging on indefinitely, which would undermine the necessary stability of the parties’ legal relations. It follows from these twin purposes that, if the Administration fails to take a decision on a claim within sixty days, the person submitting it not only can, but must refer the matter to the Tribunal within the following ninety days, i.e. within 150 days of [her or his] claim being received by the organisation, otherwise his or her complaint will be irreceivable.”

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute
    ILOAT Judgment(s): 456, 2901

    Keywords:

    direct appeal to tribunal; late filing;

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    complaint dismissed; direct appeal to tribunal; late filing; receivability of the complaint; summary procedure;



  • Judgment 4161


    128th Session, 2019
    World Intellectual Property Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the validity of a settlement agreement.

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    Contrary to the complainant’s arguments, the Tribunal’s case law in principle accepts notification by email (see Judgment 2966, consideration 8, and the case law cited therein). There is no reason to distinguish between emails sent to the staff member’s work address when he is employed and those sent to his private address once he has left the organisation. The Tribunal further considers that since the complainant had chosen his counsel’s office as his address for notification purposes, which the parties do not dispute, any notification made to that address is valid.
    The decision’s notification to both the complainant and his counsel by both email and registered letter, and also the wording of the email, confused the complainant and led to an exchange of emails with the Deputy Director General concerning the start of the time limit for filing a complaint with the Tribunal. It is true that the Deputy Director General alerted the complainant to the terms of Article VII of the Statute of the Tribunal and advised him to consult his counsel about how to calculate the time limit. However, he did not inform him clearly of the date to take into account. The fact that the email stated that it contained only an advance copy of the decision and that the paper copy would be sent by registered post, and the failure of the email to indicate that the time limit would start to run on the date on which the email was received, could have misled the complainant and caused him to believe that the time limit only started to run on the date when the paper copy of the decision was received (for a similar case, see Judgment 3704, considerations 7 and 8). In this case, it is hence the later date that must be considered as the date on which the time limit for filing a complaint to the Tribunal started to run.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII of the Statute
    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2966, 3704

    Keywords:

    email; late filing; notification; receivability of the complaint;

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    The complainant’s counsel – whose office the complainant had chosen as his address for notification purposes [...] – was notified of the paper copy of the decision on 14 September 2015. The time limit for filing the complaint hence expired on 13 December 2015. However, as that was a Sunday, the complaint could still be filed the next day (see Judgments 517, 2250, consideration 8, and 3034, consideration 14), as indeed occurred.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 517, 2250, 3034

    Keywords:

    late filing; receivability of the complaint; sunday;



  • Judgment 3651


    122nd Session, 2016
    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to confirm his appointment upon the expiry of his probationary period.

    Consideration 5

    Extract:

    In Judgment 3311, considerations 5 and 6, the Tribunal reiterated that the time limits for internal appeal procedures serve the important purposes of ensuring that disputes are dealt with in a timely way and the rights of parties are known to be settled at a particular point of time. The Tribunal relevantly rationalized this approach in the following terms: time limits are an objective matter of fact and strict adherence to them is necessary, otherwise the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions potentially adversely affecting the staff of international organisations would be put at risk. Flexibility about time limits should not intrude into the Tribunal’s decision-making even if it might be thought to be equitable or fair in a particular case to allow some flexibility. To do otherwise would “impair the necessary stability of the parties’ legal relations” (see Judgment 2722, consideration 3). However, there are some exceptions to this general approach, which have been expressed in the Tribunal’s case law.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute
    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2722, 3311

    Keywords:

    internal remedies exhausted; late appeal; late filing; receivability of the complaint; time bar;



  • Judgment 3445


    119th Session, 2015
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complaints are dismissed as time-barred and irreceivable.

    Consideration 7

    Extract:

    "The Tribunal notes that as the complaints were filed with the Tribunal beyond the ninety-day time limit provided in Article VII of the Statute, the complaints are time-barred and irreceivable."

    Keywords:

    late filing; receivability of the complaint; time bar;



  • Judgment 3418


    119th Session, 2015
    World Intellectual Property Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The Tribunal recognized the moral injury caused to the complainant and determined the amount of compensation.

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    "Before addressing the issues raised by the complainant in her brief, it is necessary to address a challenge by WIPO to the receivability of the complaint. [...] WIPO contends that the complaint is not receivable. It does so on a basis that is raised in other cases in this session and which has been raised in the past. The Tribunal’s response to the argument has been consistent. While the completed complaint form was filed on 13 April 2012, the brief was not filed until 17 July 2012. This occurred in circumstances where the Registrar exercised a power to enable the complainant to “correct” the complaint under Article 6(2) of the Tribunal’s Rules. Article 14 of the Rules also appears to have been engaged. WIPO argues that this is an impermissible use of the power conferred on the Registrar by Article 6 and, in the result, the completed complaint (complaint form and brief) was filed out of time. However, the exercise of the power conferred by Article 6(2) in similar circumstances has been sanctioned by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence (see Judgment 1500, considerations 1 and 2). Whether it is desirable for a Registrar to routinely use the power in this way is another question. WIPO’s challenge to receivability is rejected."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1500

    Keywords:

    correction of complaint; late filing; receivability of the complaint;



  • Judgment 3254


    116th Session, 2014
    International Atomic Energy Agency
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complaint was considered irreceivable on the ground that it was time-barred.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    complaint dismissed; late filing; receivability of the complaint; time limit;



  • Judgment 3241


    115th Session, 2013
    European Southern Observatory
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges her performance reviews for 2008 and 2009.

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    case sent back to organisation; complaint allowed; late filing; performance report;



  • Judgment 3132


    113th Session, 2012
    International Atomic Energy Agency
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    As the Tribunal held in Judgment 456, under 2, the purpose of Article VII, paragraph 3, of its Statute is twofold. Firstly, it enables an official to defend his or her interests by going to the Tribunal when the Administrative has failed to take a decision. Secondly, it prevents a dispute from dragging on indefinitely and from coming before the Tribunal at a time when the material have altered or can no longer be determined with certainty. This would undermine the necessary stability of the parties' legal relations, which is the very justification for a time bar. As pointed out in Judgment 2901, under 8, it follows from the twin purposes that, if the Administrative fails to take a decision on a claim within sixty days, the person submitting it not only can, but must refer the matter to the Tribunal within the following ninety days, i.e. within 150 days of his or her claim being received by the organisation, otherwise his or her complaint will be irreceivable. In the present case, the 150 days mentionned above expired at the latest in mid to late June 2008. The complainant did not receive any response to her claim within sixty days of her sending the letter of 12 January 2008; this is not in dispute. Therefore, she had a further ninety days to refer the matter to the Tribunal on the basis of an implied decision rejecting her grievances. In some cases, even a response received subsequently can be considered as nullifying and replacing the implied decision. However, neither letters from the Agency responding to the complainant can be considered as an administrative decision which would nullify and replace the implied decision rejecting her grievances outlined in her letter of 12 January 2008. It is clear that they did not contain any expression of will on the part of the Agency to allow the complainant to use the internal mechanisms she chose not to use at the time she left the service of the Agency. Instead, the first letter limited itself to informing her that she had far exceeded the time limit for bringing formal grievances against the Agency and the second letter merely stated that the information contained in the first letter was still valid. That being so, the 150-day time limit mentionned above has expired and the complaint must be considered irreceivable and therefore be dismissed.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 456, 2901

    Keywords:

    direct appeal to tribunal; late filing; time bar;

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    complaint dismissed; late filing; receivability of the complaint;



  • Judgment 3116


    113th Session, 2012
    European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Judgment keywords

    Keywords:

    complaint dismissed; late filing;

    Consideration 6

    Extract:

    The complainant submitted his complaint by sending a scanned complaint form to the Tribunal via an e-mail of 11 May 2010, with only sections 1, 2, 3 and 5 filled in. One of the essential sections, section 4, had been left blank. He submitted a completed version of the form on 18 May 2010.
    "It should be recalled that Article 6(1)(a) of the Rules of the Tribunal sets out the requirements of form for filing a complaint: the complainant should fill in and sign the complaint form prescribed in the Schedule of those Rules. The complainant’s requests to the Tribunal that he be allowed to correct retroactively the incomplete initial complaint form, sent on 11 May 2010, and consequently that the completed revision of it, sent on 18 May, be accepted as having been filed on 11 May, are denied. Indeed, the entries in the initial complaint form did not suffice to identify the relief the complainant was claiming. Therefore, one of the essential requirements of form set out in Article 6(1) was not met and the complaint could not be registered as filed on 11 May 2010. Moreover, this case does not fall within the purview of the thirty-day time limit prescribed by Article 6(2) of the Rules for correction of complaints. [...] Consequently, the document filed on [11 May 2010] cannot be considered a complaint, as it did not contain the claims which are essential elements of a complaint. The complaint form, properly filled in, was filed on 18 May 2010, i.e. six days after the expiration of the ninety-day time limit. Therefore, the complaint must be considered irreceivable."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Rules

    Keywords:

    complaint form; correction of complaint; formal requirements; late filing; receivability of the complaint; time bar; time limit;



  • Judgment 3034


    111th Session, 2011
    European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Consideration 14

    Extract:

    It must be emphasised in this respect that [...] the conditions governing the receivability of complaints before the Tribunal are governed exclusively by the provisions of its own Statute. As was recently recalled in Judgment 2863, which was delivered in a case also concerning Eurocontrol, an rganisation which has recognised the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may not depart from the rules which it has thus accepted. Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal states that, “[t]o be receivable, a complaint must […] have been filed within ninety days after the complainant was notified of the decision impugned or, in the case of a decision affecting a class of officials, after the decision was published”. It is therefore unlawful for Article 93 of the Staff Regulations to set a different time limit for filing a complaint by specifying that that limit is three months instead of ninety days. Moreover the Tribunal’s case law indicates that the time limit laid down in the above-mentioned Article VII, paragraph 2, starts to run on the day after, and not on the day on which, the impugned decision is taken (see, for example, Judgment 2244, under 5).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2244

    Keywords:

    iloat statute; late filing; receivability of the complaint;

    Consideration 14

    Extract:

    [The] period for filing a complaint expired on 28 December 2008. However, as that was a Sunday, the complaints of the persons concerned could still be filed on the following day (see Judgments 306, 517 and 2250, under 8).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 306, 517, 2250

    Keywords:

    late filing; sunday; time limit;

    Consideration 13

    Extract:

    [I]n accordance with the principles governing the burden of proof when determining the receivability of complaints, it is up to the organisation which intends to rely on late submission to establish the date on which the impugned decisions were notified (see Judgments 723, under 4, or 2494, under 4). Since the Agency has failed to produce any acknowledgement of receipt or other document attesting to the date on which the decisions in question were notified, it has not furnished proof of the alleged late submission.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 723, 2494

    Keywords:

    burden of proof; final decision; late filing; notification; time bar;



  • Judgment 2901


    108th Session, 2010
    International Telecommunication Union
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR

    Consideration 10

    Extract:

    "The Tribunal's case law [...] allow[s] a complaint against an implied rejection to be deemed receivable, notwithstanding the expiry of the time limit for filing a complaint, if a particular step taken by an organisation, such as sending a dilatory reply to the complainant, might give that person good reason to infer that his or her claim is still under consideration (see Judgment 941, under 6)."

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 941

    Keywords:

    absence of final decision; good faith; implied decision; internal appeal; late appeal; late filing; receivability of the complaint; time bar; time limit;


 
Last updated: 23.10.2020 ^ top