Interpretation (237,-666)
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Keywords: Interpretation
Total judgments found: 195
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Judgment 4796
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to deduct from the amount of the education allowance paid in respect of his child the remuneration received by the latter during an internship.
Consideration 3
Extract:
[I]t is appropriate to recall the basic rules of statutory interpretation defined by the Tribunal’s case law. These state that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example, Judgments 4639, consideration 3, 4506, consideration 5, 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, and 3744, consideration 8).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3744, 4031, 4066, 4506, 4639
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Considerations 3-7 & 10
Extract:
[T]his dispute essentially revolves around the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of Article 71(9) of the Service Regulations [of the EPO].
[...]
[T]he Tribunal considers it apparent from the provision in question – even though the wording could undoubtedly be better – that the two particular kinds of allowance mentioned are not exhaustive and that allowances other than scholarships and grants, which are only referred to because they are the most common forms of educational assistance, could also give rise to such a deduction. The way in which the words “scholarships” and “grants” appear in the text, being placed in brackets and separated by a comma, rather than by a conjunction such as “or” or “and”, supports this interpretation. This is further confirmed by the fact that Article 71(9) refers to the “deduction [...] of any allowance received from other sources for the child’s education (scholarships, grants)” [...].
In addition, when called upon to rule on complaints challenging the lawfulness of Article 71 of the Service Regulations, the Tribunal stated, in Judgment 2870, consideration 12, that “[p]rovision is also made in Article 71(9) for the deduction of allowances from other sources (e.g. scholarships) payable in respect of the child’s education” [...]. While not entirely addressing the matter at hand in the present case, the wording used by the Tribunal in that sentence was already leading towards the above interpretation.
However, the Tribunal also considers that [...] internship payments made to the child of an employee during an internship carried out with an employer as part of her or his studies [...] do not constitute an allowance received for the child’s education within the meaning of Article 71(9) and cannot, therefore, be lawfully deducted from the amount of the education allowance.
The reference made in that provision to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” must be understood as an allowance the purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure involved in the child’s studies, which, once again, is confirmed by the reference in the text, quoted above, to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” [...].
But that is not the purpose of internship payments made by employers to students or pupils carrying out an internship with them as part of their studies. Such payments are principally intended as remuneration for the services provided by the intern to the employer. Even though [...] such payments can certainly not be regarded as a salary, they are still, by their very nature, a form of remuneration made to the child, and not a contribution to the cost of her or his education.
It is true that internship payments can sometimes include a contribution from the employer towards the expenses incurred by the child or by her or his family in connection with the internship. Even on this assumption, however, that is not their essential purpose, which is still to remunerate the intern as described above, and such a contribution cannot, in any event, be regarded as a payment “for the child’s education” within the meaning of the aforementioned Article 71(9).
[...]
The aforementioned Article 71(9) does not provide, in letter or in spirit, that any allowance which derives from a source other than the Office and which could potentially be set towards those costs can be deducted from the amount of the education allowance. It only permits the deduction of those allowances the specific purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure connected with the child’s studies, which, as already stated, is not the case with internship payments.
[...]
It follows from the[se] considerations that [...] the EPO was wrong to deduct the amount of the internship payments made to the complainant’s son from the amount of the education allowance paid to the complainant and that, in making such a deduction, the EPO breached the aforementioned provisions of Article 71 of the Service Regulations [...]
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2870
Keywords:
education expenses; interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4741
137th Session, 2024
European Southern Observatory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract.
Considerations 11-12
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal already recalled in Judgment 1734, consideration 3, with regard to Staff Rule VI 1.02, the very provision on which this dispute turns, emphasising the following:
“VI 1.02 is quite plain. An internal appeal being ruled out, [the complainant] should have thought of filing a complaint against non-renewal. If he could not understand the article on his own, he was free to get advice.”
It follows that, under Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, since the complainant did not file her complaint within 90 days of the Organisation’s decision not to renew or extend her fixed-term contract, it is also irreceivable from that standpoint. The Tribunal has recalled on many occasions that, “[w]ith respect to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute, the Tribunal’s case law requires strict adherence to the ninety-day time limit on the grounds that time limits are an objective matter of fact and that strict adherence is necessary for the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions” (see Judgments 4354, consideration 7, 3947, consideration 5, and 3559, consideration 3).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1734, 3559, 3947, 4354
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; non-renewal of contract; ratione temporis; receivability of the complaint; time limit;
Judgment 4681
136th Session, 2023
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the ICC’s decision to reject her request to pay her the education grant in respect of her son for the school year 2018-2019.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; education expenses; interpretation;
Consideration 5
Extract:
The basic principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the Tribunal’s case law, as the Tribunal confirmed, for example, in Judgments 4145, consideration 4, and 4477, consideration 4:
“The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Moreover, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3701, consideration 4:
“Where the language of the text is clear and unambiguous, the words must be given effect without looking outside of the text to determine the meaning.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3701, 3734, 4145, 4477
Keywords:
interpretation;
Judgment 4680
136th Session, 2023
ITER International Fusion Energy Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of dismissal with forfeiture of an indemnity for loss of job.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The question of interpretation which arises […] is whether Article 23.2(g) obliges the Director-General to notify the staff member of the specific disciplinary measure she or he then intends to impose, or it is sufficient to repeat, as happened in this case, that a disciplinary measure of those listed will be imposed. The provision is ambiguous. One meaning is that the words “notify the staff member [...] that a disciplinary measure among those listed in Article 23.3 of these Regulations will be imposed” requires notification of what disciplinary measure will be imposed, with the words “among those listed in Article 23.3” identifying the four measures from which one can be chosen and nominated. The other meaning is that it is sufficient to repeat that an unidentified disciplinary measure of those listed in Article 23.3 will be imposed. In Judgment 4639, consideration 3, the Tribunal stated: […]
It would obviously favour the staff member to treat Article 23.2(g) as requiring disclosure of the specific disciplinary measure which will be imposed (subject, of course, to the procedures in Article 23 itself) in order to arm her or him with information relevant to the question of whether to request that a Disciplinary Board examine her or his case. It would usually be the case that the staff member would be far more inclined to seek such an examination if dismissal was in contemplation rather than, for example, a written censure. As was noted in one of the Tribunal’s earlier reported cases, Judgment 203, consideration 2, the imposition of the disciplinary sanction of discharge or summary dismissal could cause serious harm to the staff member and her or his family. This interpretation, namely that the specific disciplinary measure proposed must be notified pursuant to Article 23.2(g), would also give rise to a fairer and more balanced procedure. It would be fairer because it would give the concerned staff member an opportunity to argue before the Disciplinary Board that the specific disciplinary measure in contemplation was disproportionate, or otherwise inappropriate, as well as giving the Disciplinary Board an opportunity to review what is in contemplation in formulating the recommendation required by Annex VII(2)(c) of the Staff Regulations.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4639
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; interpretation; notification;
Judgment 4676
136th Session, 2023
European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges EMBL’s refusal to guarantee that the survivor’s pension to which his wife will be entitled at the time of his death will be at least 35 per cent of his last salary; to award him a children’s allowance for each of his wife’s three children from her previous marriages; and to verify that his current pension was properly calculated.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation that the Tribunal follows are also well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 4393, consideration 4, 4178, consideration 10, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 4178, 4393
Keywords:
interpretation;
Judgment 4639
135th Session, 2023
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the refusal to convert three days of statutory leave into days of sick leave.
Consideration 3
Extract:
Under the Tribunal’s case law, it is a basic rule of interpretation that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and that words must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example, Judgments 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, or 3744, consideration 8).
Should an ambiguity remain in the relevant provision after this method of construction is applied, the regulations or rules of an international organisation must in principle be construed in favour of the interests of its staff and not those of the organisation itself (see, for example, Judgments 3539, consideration 8, 3355, consideration 16, 2396, consideration 3(a), 2276, consideration 4, or 1755, consideration 12).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1755, 2276, 2396, 3355, 3539, 3744, 4031, 4066
Keywords:
interpretation;
Judgment 4580
135th Session, 2023
International Bureau of Weights and Measures
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenge the increase in their contributions to the Pension and Provident Fund such as it appears on their payslips for January 2021.
Consideration 7
Extract:
[I]t should be borne in mind that, under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, for the purposes of interpreting – and hence applying – a treaty, account should be taken of “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. The shared intention of the States parties to the Metre Convention to dispense with the rule concerning the renewal of half the CIPM might thus allow the new practice adopted by the General Conference to be recognised as lawful, even though it breaches the letter of certain provisions of the Regulations.
Keywords:
interpretation;
Judgment 4555
134th Session, 2022
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to pay him the additional installation allowance in respect of his second child following his transfer to The Hague.
Consideration 9
Extract:
The Tribunal’s reasoning in Judgment 1820 bears out the general principle of interpretation in the case law stated, for example, in consideration 5(b) of Judgment 2258, that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a way that their true meaning is preserved, taking into account, inter alia, the actual letter of the provision, its origin, its aim and its place within the legal framework of an organisation, and without necessarily dwelling on inaccurate or inappropriate terms (see also Judgment 1456, under 16).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1456, 1820, 2258
Keywords:
interpretation;
Judgment 4519
134th Session, 2022
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to suspend her without pay.
Consideration 6
Extract:
ITU argues in its submissions that the reference to the duration of the investigation in the aforementioned Staff Rule 10.1.3(a) should be interpreted flexibly, since the intention behind that provision is to allow the organisation to continue a staff member’s suspension until the end of any disciplinary proceedings initiated as a result of the investigation itself.
However, it is well established in the case law that where the wording of a provision is clear, the Tribunal will not engage in any constructive interpretation of this kind (see, for example, Judgments 1125, consideration 4, or 3358, consideration 5). The reference to the duration of the investigation in Staff Rule 10.1.3(a) is unambiguous. Furthermore, the Tribunal considers that, contrary to what ITU submits, there may be a rationale behind the limitation of the length of the suspension to that of the investigation that explains the content of the provision in question. Indeed, the main aim of suspending a staff member suspected of misconduct is often to prevent her or him taking any steps to destroy evidence or place witnesses under pressure. However, the issue of preserving the evidence no longer exists in the same way once the investigation is over. Lastly, while the Tribunal is aware of the difficulty that the return to duty of a staff member after her or his provisional suspension may cause in some cases, it is not the Tribunal’s role to palliate any defects in a provision, it being for the competent authorities of ITU to remedy them if need be.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1125, 3358
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; suspension;
Judgment 4516
134th Session, 2022
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to investigate his allegations of harassment.
Consideration 7
Extract:
[P]aragraph 15 [of Service Order No. 19/08] contains the word “must”. Often provisions conferring a power use the word “must” or “shall” or, alternatively, “may”. Ordinarily the word “must” is, in such a context, construed as imposing a duty on the repository of the power to exercise the power. Ordinarily the word “may” is construed as creating a discretion in the repository of the power whether to exercise the power. Occasionally, the context in which either word is used might result in a construction of the provision conferring the power which is at odds with its ordinary meaning.
In the present case, the context in which the word “must” is used is consistent with its ordinary meaning.
Keywords:
interpretation; patere legem;
Judgment 4497
134th Session, 2022
European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to summarily dismiss him for serious misconduct.
Consideration 7
Extract:
Two things can be noted about [Staff Rule 2 5.04]. The first is that it mandates consultation with the JADB before a disciplinary measure is taken (other than a written warning or reprimand) subject to a proviso. The proviso is that if the Director General is of the opinion that the staff member’s conduct is a particularly serious misconduct, the staff member can be dismissed without notice and without consulting the JADB. The word “particularly” signifies that the conduct in question has to be more than serious misconduct. That is to say, it needs to be serious misconduct but of a higher order of seriousness.
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; interpretation; misconduct;
Judgment 4393
131st Session, 2021
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the reduction in his total net remuneration following his promotion to a higher grade arguing that it constitutes a breach of Article 49(13) of the Service Regulations.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 4178, consideration 10, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734, 4178
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4321
130th Session, 2020
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. As the Tribunal reiterated in Judgment 4178, consideration 10:
“The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4320
130th Session, 2020
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to reject her application for a vacant post on the grounds that, as the holder of a fixed-term contract, she was not eligible to participate in the competition process.
Consideration 8
Extract:
[W]ell-established principles of statutory interpretation [were] recently reiterated by the Tribunal in Judgment 4178, consideration 10. The Tribunal stated:
“The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, ‘[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734, 4178
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4191
128th Session, 2019
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of his application for payment of an expatriation allowance.
Consideration 3
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal has explained the rationale and context for the grant of the expatriation allowance, and given guidance as to the interpretation of the terms “permanently resident” for the purpose of Article 72(1)(b), in [...] Judgment 2865, under 4(b) [...].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2865
Keywords:
expatriation allowance; interpretation; residence;
Consideration 6
Extract:
The issue is whether, if in [the] three-year period there is service which is not to be counted, the consequence is that the expatriation allowance is payable, or whether that service is ignored when identifying the end point of the three-year period counting backwards. The answer does not clearly emerge from the text, but does from a consideration of the purpose of the provision and the rationale for the benefit. The provision is intended to compensate employees who have left their permanent home in one country to take up employment in another (see Judgment 2925, under 3). That purpose is best served by the latter approach to the meaning of the provision, rather than by the former approach, which would reward a person who has mainly resided in the duty country, even for decades, but had for a period within the three years, perhaps extremely briefly, been, for example, employed by an international organisation.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2925
Keywords:
expatriation allowance; interpretation;
Judgment 4189
128th Session, 2019
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her application for payment of an expatriation allowance.
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal has explained the rationale and context for the grant of the expatriation allowance, and has given guidance as to the interpretation of the terms “permanently resident” for the purpose of Article 72(1)(b), in the following statements in Judgment 2865, under 4(b) [...].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2865
Keywords:
expatriation allowance; interpretation; residence;
Judgment 4188
128th Session, 2019
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her application for payment of an expatriation allowance.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The issue is whether, if in [the] three-year period there is service which is not to be counted, the consequence is that the expatriation allowance is payable, or whether that service is ignored when identifying, looking backwards, the end point of the three-year period. The answer does not clearly emerge from the text, but does from a consideration of the purpose of the provision and the rationale for the benefit. The provision is intended to compensate employees who have left their permanent home in one country to take up employment in another (see Judgment 2925, under 3). That purpose is best served by the latter approach to the meaning of the provision, rather than by the former approach, which would reward a person who has mainly resided in the duty country, even for decades, but had for a period within the three years, perhaps extremely briefly, been, for example, employed by an international organisation.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2925
Keywords:
expatriation allowance; interpretation;
Judgment 4178
128th Session, 2019
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to grant him a promotion in the 2014 professional promotion exercise.
Consideration 10
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”. The meaning of the phrase “are expected to” read in the context of the complete text of the provision simply conveys to the Regional Directors what they are to do at that point in the process. The provision instructs the Regional Directors to do two things. First, the Regional Directors are to rank the reviewed candidates in order of priority. Second, the Regional Directors are to endorse the recommendation of “no more than” 50% of the candidates reviewed at the second level. The obvious and ordinary meaning of this provision does not allow for any deviation from the specified upper limit of the allotted quota by the Regional Directors.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4162
128th Session, 2019
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the final decision on her claim for compensation for a service-incurred injury or illness.
Consideration 23
Extract:
It is [...] observed that the obvious and ordinary meaning of “sustained” in the context of a decision is to uphold or affirm the earlier decision. The ordinary meaning of “sustained” does not include a decision that alters the prior decision. However, the same provision provides that if “the Director-General alters his original decision in favour of the claimant” the Organization bears the identified costs. The language of the provision is clear and unambiguous. If the drafter of the provision had intended that the claimant would bear the identified costs in the event that the original decision was altered to her or his detriment it would have been explicitly stated.
Keywords:
costs; interpretation;
Judgment 4145
128th Session, 2019
European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to transfer one of his subordinates to another team.
Consideration 4
Extract:
The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Additionally, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3310, 3734
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
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