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Time limit (108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 433, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 781,-666)

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Keywords: Time limit
Total judgments found: 307

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  • Judgment 4221


    129th Session, 2020
    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her request for reclassification of her post.

    Consideration 8

    Extract:

    [C]onsistent principle has it that a complainant must comply with the time limits and the procedures, as set out in the organisation’s internal rules and regulations (see, for example, Judgment 3947, consideration 4, and the case law cited therein).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3947

    Keywords:

    internal remedies exhausted; receivability of the complaint; time limit;



  • Judgment 4210


    129th Session, 2020
    United Nations Industrial Development Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to dismiss as irreceivable his claim for compensation for injury or illness attributable to service.

    Consideration 7

    Extract:

    It is to be recalled that Article 12 of Appendix D provides that claims for compensation shall be submitted within four months of, relevantly, the “onset of the illness”. The language of the Article is, in this respect, clear as is the purpose of the time limit as discussed in Judgment 3949 in the quotation set out above. There is no warrant for reading into the provision a qualification of the type advanced by the complainant. It is clear from the evidence that the complainant was aware or believed that the illness from which he suffered which led him to take sick leave in June 2015 was work-related. There is no reason to doubt that the ABCC was correct in concluding that the onset of the illness was, at the latest, June 2015. The related argument that a too narrow construction of the expression “onset of the illness” would give rise to arbitrary decision-making is unfounded. Ultimately whether the time limit has been met will depend on the facts of any particular case and it has to be borne in mind that there is an overriding discretion invested in the Director-General by Article 12 itself to accept for consideration a claim lodged out of time in exceptional circumstances.

    Keywords:

    service-incurred; time limit;



  • Judgment 4118


    127th Session, 2019
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the findings of the Medical Committee according to which his invalidity is not of occupational origin.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    Even if the Tribunal were to accept to regard the claims in question as being directed against the [...] decision of 12 July 2007, they would still be irreceivable, since they would be time-barred. Indeed, it has been established that the complainant did not impugn the said decision before the Tribunal within the period of ninety days provided for in Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute. The decision therefore became final, and the complainant could no longer seek to challenge it in his request of 30 April 2015, almost eight years later. As a result, on this issue, the implied decision of the President of the Office to reject that request must be considered as purely confirmatory of the earlier decision of 12 July 2007. As such, it could not set off a new time limit for an appeal by the complainant (see, for example, Judgments 698, consideration 7, 1304, consideration 5, 2449, consideration 9, or 3002, consideration 12).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 698, 1304, 2449, 3002

    Keywords:

    confirmatory decision; implied decision; new time limit; receivability of the complaint; time bar; time limit;



  • Judgment 4103


    127th Session, 2019
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to grant him mission status during the first six months of his assignment to a field post.

    Consideration 1

    Extract:

    [A] complaint will not be receivable unless the impugned decision is a final decision and the complainant has exhausted all the internal means of redress. This means that a complaint will not be receivable if the underlying internal appeal was not filed within the applicable time limits. As the Tribunal has consistently stated, the strict adherence to time limits is essential to have finality and certainty in relation to the legal effect of decisions. When an applicable time limit to challenge a decision has passed, the organisation is entitled to proceed on the basis that the decision is fully and legally effective (see Judgment 3758, under 10 and 11, and the case law cited therein).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3758

    Keywords:

    failure to exhaust internal remedies; internal appeal; internal remedies exhausted; late appeal; receivability of the complaint; time limit;



  • Judgment 4087


    127th Session, 2019
    World Intellectual Property Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the validity of a competition procedure in which he took part and the lawfulness of the ensuing appointment.

    Consideration 2

    Extract:

    [...] It should be recalled that the date of filing of complaints and briefs before the Tribunal is, in principle, the date on which they are sent and not the date on which they are received by the Registry (see, for example, Judgment 3566, consideration 3). The file contains a delivery receipt showing that the reply was deposited at the International Labour Office, secretariat of the International Labour Organization, where the Tribunal is based, on 15 June 2015. As the reply was thus sent on that date at the latest, that is within the prescribed time limit, which expired that evening, the complainant is wrong to claim that it was filed late (see Judgment 3648, consideration 2).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3566, 3648

    Keywords:

    complaint; date of filing; time bar; time limit;



  • Judgment 4059


    127th Session, 2019
    International Organization for Migration
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to affiliate her to the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund.

    Consideration 2

    Extract:

    The complainant does not dispute the grounds on which the finding of irreceivability was made. However, she asks the Tribunal to consider her complaint as an “exceptional case”. The relevant case law of the Tribunal consistently states:
    “Under Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Tribunal’s Statute, a complaint will not be receivable unless the impugned decision is a final decision and the complainant has exhausted all the internal means of redress. This means that a complaint will not be receivable ‘if the underlying internal appeal was not filed within the applicable time limits’ [...].”
    (Judgment 3758, under 10; see also Judgment 3687, under 9, and the cases cited therein.)
    In Judgment 3758, under 11, the Tribunal added:
    “As the Tribunal has consistently stated, the strict adherence to time limits is essential to have finality and certainty in relation to the legal effect of decisions. ‘When an applicable time limit to challenge a decision has passed, the organisation is entitled to proceed on the basis that the decision is fully and legally effective.’ (See Judgment 3439, under 4.)”
    However, the case law also recognizes that there are exceptions to the requirement of the strict adherence to the applicable time limits. In Judgment 3687, under 10, the Tribunal stated:
    “[I]n very limited circumstances an exception may be made to the rule of strict adherence to the relevant time limit. The circumstances identified in the case law are: ‘where the complainant has been prevented by vis major from learning of the impugned decision in good time or where the organisation, by misleading the complainant or concealing some paper from him or her so as to do him or her harm, has deprived that person of the possibility of exercising his or her right of appeal, in breach of the principle of good faith’ (see Judgment 3405, under 17; citations omitted); and ‘where some new and unforeseeable fact of decisive importance has occurred since the decision was taken, or where [the staff member concerned by that decision] is relying on facts or evidence of decisive importance of which he or she was not and could not have been aware before the decision was taken’ (see Judgment 3140, under 4; citations omitted).”
    (See also Judgment 3758, under 12.)

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3140, 3405, 3439, 3687, 3758

    Keywords:

    delay; exception; receivability of the complaint; time limit;



  • Judgment 4055


    126th Session, 2018
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to reject his request for the payment of an education allowance for his daughter.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    The complaint is clearly irreceivable. As the President’s final decision [...] was not impugned before the Tribunal within the time limit established by Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, its lawfulness became immune from challenge. In these circumstances, the EPO rightly rejected the complainant’s request to reopen the case. It follows that the complaint is clearly irreceivable and must be summarily dismissed in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 7 of the Rules of the Tribunal.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article 7 of the Rules; Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute

    Keywords:

    time limit;



  • Judgment 4039


    126th Session, 2018
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who alleges that he is the victim of institutional harassment and discrimination, seeks redress for the injury he considers he has suffered.

    Considerations 10-16

    Extract:

    [T]he Tribunal draws attention to the fact that the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation is taken at the Organization’s discretion. However, once an investigation is opened, it must be conducted expeditiously without the suspect having to suffer the consequences of the investigators’ possible lack of time. An international organisation has an obligation to initiate the investigation in a timely manner and the corollary obligation of ensuring that the internal body responsible for investigating and reporting on the allegations has the necessary resources to carry out that responsibility (see, in this connection, Judgment 3347, under 14).
    In these circumstances the duration of the investigation – more than 21 months – is inordinate, as is the period of 12 months between the date on which the complainant was first interviewed and the date on which he was notified of the findings of the investigation. [...]
    With regard to the length of the investigation in particular, the Tribunal pointed out in Judgment 3295, under 7, that an organisation must investigate allegations of misconduct in a timely manner both in the interests of the person being investigated and the organisation. These interests include, among other things, safeguarding the reputations of both parties and ensuring that evidence is not lost. Consequently it must be found that the delay in conducting the investigation caused the complainant moral injury which must be redressed (see, in this connection, Judgment 3064, under 11).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3064, 3295, 3347

    Keywords:

    inquiry; investigation; moral injury; opening of an investigation; time limit;



  • Judgment 4038


    126th Session, 2018
    International Labour Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who alleges that he is the victim of institutional harassment and discrimination, seeks redress for the injury he considers he has suffered.

    Considerations 11-18

    Extract:

    [T]he Tribunal draws attention to the fact that the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation is taken at the Organization’s discretion. However, once an investigation is opened, it must be conducted expeditiously without the suspect having to suffer the consequences of the investigators’ possible lack of time. An international organisation has an obligation to initiate the investigation in a timely manner and the corollary obligation of ensuring that the internal body responsible for investigating and reporting on the allegations has the necessary resources to carry out that responsibility (see, in this connection, Judgment 3347, under 14).
    In these circumstances, the duration of the investigation – more than 21 months – is inordinate, as is the period of 12 months between the date on which the complainant was first interviewed and the date on which he was notified of the outcome of the investigation.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3064, 3295, 3347

    Keywords:

    inquiry; investigation; moral injury; time limit;



  • Judgment 4035


    126th Session, 2018
    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant accuses her former supervisor of moral harassment.

    Consideration 11

    Extract:

    [T]he complainant’s contention that in this case UNESCO breached the time limits prescribed in the provisions governing the appeals procedure and that in general the procedure was excessively long is well founded.
    The evidence shows that rather than being held, as paragraph 14 of its Statutes stipulates, “not later than two months after [receipt of the Administration’s] reply”, the Appeals Board’s hearing was not held until 17 March 2016, though the reply had been submitted on 11 September 2014, over a year and a half earlier. Moreover, paragraph 19 of those Statutes provides that the Appeals Board’s report must be forwarded to the Director-General and a copy sent to the official “as soon as possible”, but the report was not in fact issued until 30 June 2016 and was forwarded only on 7 July, more than three and a half months after the hearing, which does not seem consistent with the requirement stipulated in paragraph 19. Lastly, as stated above, the Director-General’s final decision was taken on 16 January 2017, more than six months after the Appeals Board delivered its report, whereas paragraph 20 of the Statutes provides that the Director-General “shall make a decision thereon as soon as possible”.
    It is true that, as UNESCO rightly points out, the delays identified above were partly attributable to the complainant, who, amongst other things, requested extensions of time limits for filing her own submissions, and that they can also be explained by the unusual complexity of the case. It should likewise be borne in mind that the Director-General’s final decision was preceded by discussions with the complainant aimed at reaching a settlement, which obviously delayed its adoption.
    Nevertheless, the Organization was obliged, in accordance with the principle tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti, to adhere more strictly to the procedural time limits laid down in the Statutes of the Appeals Board. Its failure to do so added unduly to the total length of the internal appeal procedure, three and a half years in all, which is indisputably too long. Moral injury was thereby caused to the complainant, for which she legitimately claims redress (see, for similar cases, Judgment 3688, under 11, and aforementioned Judgment 3935, under 16).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3688, 3935

    Keywords:

    internal procedure; patere legem; time limit;



  • Judgment 3965


    125th Session, 2018
    European Patent Organisation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant contends that the EPO did not properly address or investigate his claim of harassment.

    Consideration 9

    Extract:

    The President’s decision, communicated by the letter of 13 October 2009, was based on the Ombudsman’s comments, which did not comply with Article 11 of Circular No. 286, and the decision itself did not correspond to what Article 12 of the Circular required. Most importantly, the decision of 13 October 2009 did not clearly reject the complainant’s harassment complaint or determine any other course of action on it. The complainant was therefore not only deprived of his right to have his complaint dealt with in accordance with the applicable rules, but was also misled as to the possibilities of challenging a decision. Accordingly, the decision of 13 October 2009 must be set aside. As this decision was ambiguous and misleading, the filing of the internal appeal on 19 April 2010 comes within the scope of the exceptions that the Tribunal has established for accepting a late internal appeal (see, for example, Judgments 1466, consideration 5, 2722, consideration 3, and 3406, consideration 13). To the extent that the IAC’s majority opinion and the impugned decision of the President were based on the argument that the appeal was irreceivable, they are tainted with an error of law and the impugned decision of 14 February 2012 will therefore be set aside.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1466, 2722, 3406

    Keywords:

    exception; internal appeal; time bar; time limit;



  • Judgment 3949


    125th Session, 2018
    United Nations Industrial Development Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to dismiss as irreceivable his claims for compensation for injury or illness attributable to service.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    The Tribunal has accepted that it is not always necessary for there to be strict compliance with the requirements of Circular AC.75 (see, for example, Judgments 3668, consideration 13, and 3004, consideration 5). This is appropriate having regard to the purpose and object of Appendix D, namely to provide benefits to staff members whose work has negatively impacted on their health including, in the most extreme case, causing the death of the staff member. Nonetheless, those requirements, and in particular the time limit derived from Appendix D itself, exist for a purpose. They enable the Organization to be made aware, in a timely way and with some detail, that a claim is being made and therefore its liability, potentially, is being enlivened. The time limit serves several purposes. One is that it enables an investigation to be made about the cause of the death, injury or illness and to examine whether it is work-related at a point in time when the facts are not stale. Medical opinions can be obtained at a time proximate to the time of alleged causation and, if relevant, information can be obtained from those who may have observed an event or events said to have caused the death, injury or illness when memories are fresh. Another is that it enables an organization and, if relevant, its insurance broker to monitor over time potential financial and related liability arising from claims that might succeed.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3004, 3668

    Keywords:

    service-incurred; time limit;



  • Judgment 3947


    125th Session, 2018
    International Organization for Migration
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to terminate his fixed-term contract.

    Consideration 4

    Extract:

    Regarding Article VII, paragraph 1,[of the Tribunal's Statute] consistent principle has it that a complainant must comply with the time limits and the procedures, as set out in the organisation’s internal rules and regulations. The following was stated, for example, in Judgment 1653, consideration 6: “According to Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Tribunal’s Statute, a complaint ‘shall not be receivable unless the decision impugned is a final decision and the person concerned has exhausted such other means of resisting it as are open to him under the applicable Staff Regulations’. So where the staff regulations lay down a procedure for internal appeal it must be duly followed: there must be compliance not only with the set time limits but also with any rules of procedure in the regulations or implementing rules.”
    In the same vein, it was stated in Judgment 1469, consideration 16, that to satisfy the requirement in Article VII, paragraph 1, that internal means of redress must be exhausted, the complainant must not only follow the prescribed internal procedure for appeal, but she or he must follow it properly and in particular observe any time limit that may be set for the purpose of that procedure.
    It has also been stated that a staff member of an international organisation cannot of her or his own initiative evade the requirement that internal remedies must be exhausted prior to lodging a complaint with the Tribunal. Accordingly, the following was relevantly stated in Judgment 3458, consideration 7: “It is firm case law that a staff member is not allowed on his or her own initiative to evade the requirement that internal means of redress must be exhausted before a complaint is filed before the Tribunal (see Judgments 3190, under 9, and 2811, under 10 and 11, and the case law cited therein).”
    There are limited exceptions to the requirement in Article VII, paragraph 1. The following was relevantly stated in Judgment 3714, consideration 12:
    “The Tribunal has established through its case law that exceptions to the requirement of Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute that internal remedies be exhausted will be made only in very limited circumstances, namely where staff regulations provide that the decision in question is not such as to be subject to the internal appeal procedure; where for specific reasons connected with the personal status of the complainant she or he does not have access to the internal appeal body; where there is an inordinate and inexcusable delay in the internal appeal procedure; or, lastly, where the parties have mutually agreed to forgo this requirement that internal means of redress must have been exhausted (see, in particular, Judgments 2912, consideration 6, 3397, consideration 1, and 3505, consideration 1). Moreover, the complainant bears the burden of proving that the above conditions are satisfied [...].”

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 1469, 1653, 3458, 3714

    Keywords:

    exception; internal remedies exhausted; receivability of the complaint; time limit;

    Consideration 5

    Extract:

    With respect to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute, the Tribunal’s case law requires strict adherence to the ninety-day time limit on the grounds that time limits are an objective matter of fact and that strict adherence is necessary for the efficacy of the whole system of administrative and judicial review of decisions. It was relevantly stated in Judgment 3559, consideration 3, that:
    “Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal’s Statute provides that “[t]o be receivable, a complaint must [...] have been filed within ninety days after the complainant was notified of the decision impugned”. It is not within the competence of the Tribunal to extend this period of time set forth by the Statute. As the Tribunal has repeatedly stated, this time limit is an objective matter of fact and the Tribunal will not entertain a complaint filed after it has expired. Any other conclusion, even if founded on considerations of equity would impair the necessary stability of the parties’ legal relations, which is the very justification for the time bar. The ninety-day period begins to run on the day following the date of notification of the impugned decision. Where the ninetieth day falls on a public holiday, the period is extended until the next business day (see Judgments 2250, under 8, 3393, under 1, and 3467, under 2).”

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3559

    Keywords:

    receivability of the complaint; time bar; time limit;



  • Judgment 3936


    125th Session, 2018
    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who held the grade P-5 post of Head of UNESCO’s National Office in Kinshasa, challenges the decision to transfer her to Paris.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Tribunal provides that a complaint is not receivable unless the decision impugned is a final decision and the person concerned has exhausted such other means of redress as are open to her or him under the applicable staff regulations. In accordance with the Tribunal’s case law, to satisfy this requirement a complainant must not only follow the prescribed internal procedure for appeal but must follow it properly and in particular observe any time limit that may be set for the purpose of that procedure (see, for example, Judgment 3296, under 10).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute
    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3296

    Keywords:

    internal appeal; receivability of the complaint; time limit;



  • Judgment 3935


    125th Session, 2018
    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant accuses his former supervisor of moral harassment.

    Consideration 16

    Extract:

    [T]he complainant’s contention that in this case UNESCO breached the time limits prescribed in the provisions governing the appeals procedure is well founded. [...]
    It is true that, as UNESCO rightly points out, the failure to observe the aforementioned provisions of the Statutes of the Appeals Board did not seriously infringe the complainant’s rights, and the delays, some of which are attributable to the complainant, can partly be explained by the unusual complexity of the case. It should also be borne in mind that the Director-General’s final decision was preceded by discussions with the complainant aimed at reaching a settlement, which obviously delayed its adoption.
    Nevertheless, the Organization was obliged, in accordance with the principle tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti, to adhere more strictly to the procedural time limits laid down in the Statutes of the Appeals Board. Its failure to do so caused the complainant moral injury, for which he legitimately claims redress (see, for similar cases, Judgments 3579, under 4, and 3688, under 11).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3579, 3688

    Keywords:

    delay in internal procedure; moral injury; organisation's duties; patere legem; time limit;



  • Judgment 3926


    125th Session, 2018
    European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant, who was recruited on 15 May 2000 as a student air traffic controller, challenges the application of provisions adopted after his recruitment.

    Consideration 3

    Extract:

    Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Tribunal provides that a complaint is not receivable unless the decision impugned is a final decision and the person concerned has exhausted such other means of redress as are open to her or him under the applicable staff regulations. In accordance with the Tribunal’s case law, to satisfy this requirement the complainant must not only follow the prescribed internal procedure for appeal but must follow it properly and in particular observe any time limit that may be set for the purpose of that procedure (see, in particular, Judgments 3296, under 10, and 3870, under 1).

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute
    ILOAT Judgment(s): 3296, 3870

    Keywords:

    internal remedies exhausted; time limit;



  • Judgment 3918


    125th Session, 2018
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to terminate his continuing appointment pursuant to the abolition of his post.

    Consideration 6

    Extract:

    [H]aving established a procedural rule about the time the reassignment process should take, WHO was bound to comply with it (see, for example, Judgment 2170, consideration 14), whatever, in practical terms, might be thought to have been positive elements accruing to the complainant. There is no reason to doubt that the length of time taken did cause additional stress and anxiety to the complainant. For this, the complainant is entitled to moral damages assessed in the sum of 15,000 United States dollars.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2170

    Keywords:

    moral injury; patere legem; reassignment; time limit;



  • Judgment 3917


    125th Session, 2018
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to terminate his continuing appointment pursuant to the abolition of his post.

    Consideration 10

    Extract:

    WHO implicitly extended the reassignment period. Even though there is no established time limit within which a decision on reassignment must be taken following the end of the reassignment period, the Organization cannot wait more than three months before informing the person concerned of the decision. By doing so in this case, WHO failed to observe the time limit for the complainant’s reassignment pursuant to the Staff Rules and thus violated the principle of tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti (see, for example, Judgment 2170, under 14). The complainant is therefore entitled to compensation for moral injury.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2170

    Keywords:

    patere legem; reassignment; time limit;



  • Judgment 3916


    125th Session, 2018
    World Health Organization
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to terminate his fixed-term appointment pursuant to the abolition of his post.

    Consideration 5

    Extract:

    Staff Rule 1050.6 states that “[t]he reassignment period will end within six months from its commencement”. In this case, the complainant was notified of the abolition of his post on 17 January 2012 and the decision stating that the reassignment process had been unsuccessful was issued on 30 August 2012, seven and a half months later. Thus, the Organization implicitly extended the reassignment period. It cannot reasonably contend that this period ended on 18 July 2012, given that the complainant was not informed of the termination of his appointment until 30 August 2012. The Tribunal therefore considers that WHO failed to observe the time limit for the complainant’s reassignment pursuant to the Staff Rules and thus violated the principle of tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti (see, for example, Judgment 2170, under 14). The complainant is therefore entitled to compensation for moral injury.

    Reference(s)

    ILOAT Judgment(s): 2170

    Keywords:

    moral injury; patere legem; reassignment; time limit;



  • Judgment 3903


    125th Session, 2018
    International Criminal Court
    Extracts: EN, FR
    Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
    Summary: The complainant challenges the termination of his fixed-term appointment.

    Considerations 6 and 17

    Extract:

    [I]n the circumstances as the complainant understood them to be, he did not request a review of the 16 June decision to terminate his appointment within the thirty-day time limit. Although the Tribunal has consistently stressed the requirement of strict adherence to the time limits with respect to the filing of an internal appeal, there are exceptions to this requirement. In Judgment 3687, consideration 10, the Tribunal stated: “The case law also recognizes that in very limited circumstances an exception may be made to the rule of strict adherence to the relevant time limit. The circumstances identified in the case law are: ‘where the complainant has been prevented by vis major from learning of the impugned decision in good time or where the organisation, by misleading the complainant or concealing some paper from him or her so as to do him or her harm, has deprived that person of the possibility of exercising his or her right of appeal, in breach of the principle of good faith’ (see Judgment 3405, under 17; citations omitted); and ‘where some new and unforeseeable fact of decisive importance has occurred since the decision was taken, or where [the staff member concerned by that decision] is relying on facts or evidence of decisive importance of which he or she was not and could not have been aware before the decision was taken’ (see Judgment 3140, under 4; citations omitted).”
    [...]
    The way in which the decision to terminate the complainant’s appointment was, in the letter, merged with the decision to abolish his position, the misleading content of the letter coupled with the vague and confusing language of the notification of the termination of the appointment was a breach of the ICC’s duty to act in good faith. In these circumstances, an exception to the rule of the strict adherence to the time limit for bringing an internal appeal challenging the decision provided for in Staff Rule 111.1(b) was correctly made by the Appeals Board. It follows that the complaint is receivable before the Tribunal.

    Keywords:

    exception; good faith; time limit;

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Last updated: 23.10.2020 ^ top