

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PAPERS

Discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities
in access to employment in the Netherlands

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Foreword

The following study by Prof. F. Bovenkerk et al. has been elaborated under the auspices of the Migration for Employment Programme of the ILO. It deals with a subject, unequal treatment or discrimination, that many migrants face personally. Equal treatment is a value found in many of the world's cultures. Equality before the law is a mainstay of the European-North American political culture. It is generally acknowledged, however, that equality before the law, while necessary, does not by itself suffice for people of different origin and status to enjoy equal opportunity in practice. There is also much circumstantial or soft evidence that migrant workers are discriminated against even where they are not subject to administrative restrictions on their free choice of employment and even where the legislation has clearly put them on a par with nationals.¹

Irrefutable evidence is difficult to come by. Yet it is indispensable where doubts about discrimination persist and where governmental or non-governmental authorities want to obtain hard data regarding the impact of legislation, of educational measures, of support in the form of training given to migrants that is designed to put them in the same starting blocks as nationals, or of measures of "positive action", i.e. of attempts to advantage disadvantaged individuals or groups.

The ILO, which has launched a project to combat discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities in the world of work, asked Prof. Bovenkerk to elaborate a rigorous research methodology aimed at discrimination at the moment of job search and engagement in private or

¹ See, for example, R. Zegers de Beijl: *Discrimination of migrant workers in Western Europe*, ILO, Geneva, 1990; C. Raskin: *De facto discrimination, immigrant workers and ethnic minorities: a Canadian overview*, ILO, Geneva, 1993; H. Werner: *Integration of foreign workers into the labour market - France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden*, ILO, Geneva, 1993; G. Rutherglen: *Protecting aliens, immigrants, and ethnic minorities from discrimination in employment: the experience in the United States*, ILO, Geneva, 1993.

public enterprises.¹ This methodology was then to be applied in several western European countries.

The Government of the Netherlands, concerned as it was about the integration of migrant workers and ethnic minorities on its soil, was so gracious and courageous to finance - through the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice - the carrying out of a study testing the existence or absence of discrimination by Dutch employers when foreigners or ethnic minority members respond to their job offers.

¹ See F. Bovenkerk: *A manual for international comparative research on discrimination on the grounds of "race" and ethnic origin*, ILO, Geneva, 1992.

The results confirm the fears my colleague, Roger Zegers de Beijl who oversees this work on discrimination, and I had. But they also give some small comfort with regard to the impact of "positive action" measures and, therefore, underline the need - in the Netherlands and elsewhere - to pursue with measures of this kind.

Geneva, Switzerland

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1. Introduction

In the Netherlands, immigrants constitute at least 8.7 per cent of the total potential labour force (Central Bureau of Statistics, CBS, 1991). Their position on the Dutch labour market differs widely from that of the indigenous population. While the unemployment rate among the native Dutch population is 8 per cent, this rate is 23 per cent among immigrants. For the largest minority groups, that is for Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and people from the Netherlands Antilles, this percentage is even higher: the unemployment rate is 44 per cent among Moroccans, 36 per cent among Turks, and 30 per cent among Surinamese and people from the Netherlands Antilles (CBS, 1991). Furthermore, long-term unemployment is more common among immigrants than among native Dutch: 75 per cent of the unemployed Turks and Moroccans are considered to be long-term unemployed. For Surinamese and people from the Netherlands Antilles this is 66 per cent and for the indigenous population 50 per cent (Wolff and Penninx, 1994). Finally, those who are employed are mainly concentrated in the unskilled and low-paid sectors of the labour market and are under-represented in middle and higher positions.

How can this unfavourable position of immigrants on the Dutch labour market be explained? Three factors are important: the functioning of the labour market, characteristics of the immigrants and, last but not least, rejection by employers. These three factors merit further explanation. The first reason is a historical one. Immigrants (especially Turks and Moroccans) came to the Netherlands as temporary workers in the fifties and sixties, when there was a high demand for unskilled labour and an abundance of work. At the end of the seventies, there were important changes in the labour market. On the one hand the labour supply increased: as a result of the baby boom following the Second World War there was an increasing number of young native Dutch men in the labour market and, furthermore, the number of native Dutch women looking for work increased. On the other hand, the labour demand decreased as a result of automation and restructuring. Unskilled labour disappeared for a great part, especially in those sectors where most of the immigrants were employed (the textile and metal industries). As a result, most of the workers who became unemployed were migrant workers. The position of Surinamese and people from the Netherlands Antilles was slightly better than that of Turks and Moroccans. While the latter worked only in industry and handicrafts, the former also worked in the service, administrative and science sectors. After 1983, the employment situation and the economy recovered, but the unemployment rate among immigrants increased. As a result of the voluminous supply of labour, a higher educational level was required for the same type of work. People who were highly qualified were employed in low-qualification jobs. The immigrants were less educated and had less work experience than the indigenous population. Consequently, they lost out in the competition for low-qualification jobs.

The second reason for the disadvantageous position of immigrants is their unfavourable starting position on the Dutch labour market. Immigrants are, on average, less educated than the native Dutch and have less varied work experience. This may account for their high unemployment rate. However, not all differences can be explained by educational disadvantages; the unemployment rate for immigrants with a high education is more than twice the rate for native Dutch men (CBS, 1991). Cultural differences, in particular regarding language, also play a role: extensive knowledge of the Dutch language is required for most jobs. However, Surinamese and people from the Netherlands Antilles, who speak Dutch fluently, and Moroccans and Turks who have been in the Netherlands for a very long time also suffer from a high unemployment rate.

Finally, the disadvantageous position of immigrants in the labour market may be caused by indirect and direct discrimination. Indirect discrimination consists of rules or practices which are not intrinsically discriminatory but which have detrimental consequences for immigrants. An example is the psychological tests, often used in selection procedures. These tests are based on native Dutch situations and require a perfect command of, and feeling for, the Dutch

language. Immigrants receive lower scores on these tests than native Dutch candidates (Choenni and Van der Zwan, 1988). Another example of indirect discrimination is that recruitment for low-qualification jobs occurs largely in an informal way (Wolff and Penninx, 1994). Employers frequently look for personnel within their own business or amongst their own family and acquaintances. They usually only know native Dutch people but not immigrants, as a result of which immigrants are disadvantaged by this "mouth-to-mouth" recruitment.

Prejudice towards immigrants, as well as negative stereotypes, can result in direct discrimination. Employers prefer "their own sort" and see migrants as culturally different and unable to fit in the team. They think that immigrants are lazy and unreliable. According to personnel managers, direct discrimination is the most important reason for the high unemployment rate among immigrants (Veenman, 1991). Discrimination plays a role in hiring, firing and promotion of personnel (Verweij et al. 1990; Van Beek, 1993; Niesing and Veenman, 1993; Hooghiemstra et al., 1990; see also Zegers de Beijl, 1990). Furthermore, discrimination and unfavourable treatment of immigrants are more likely to occur when employers have more choice in hiring someone.

The Dutch government has invested much money, manpower and effort in public policy to integrate the new immigrant groups and to reduce their unfavourable position in the labour market. Courses have been opened where immigrants learn Dutch. Extra efforts (e.g. through reducing the number of pupils per group) have been put into basic education. Special vocational training programmes have been established for the not so young. At the same time the public as well as the private sectors of employment have been opened up by way of offering financial stimuli to employers who hire immigrants. The Netherlands government complies with international rules and regulations (among them ILO Conventions) by way of introducing anti-discrimination legislation and, recently, even a specific statute that seeks to influence the ethnic composition of the work force of large corporations and governmental institutions ("Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen"). Employers' organizations and trade unions have agreed to use their utmost endeavours to hire 60,000 members of ethnic minorities ("STAR-akkoord"). Positive action plans have become popular in the Netherlands. However, ethnic minorities seem to have advanced very little despite all these efforts. How can this unfortunate situation be explained? Do people in power positions in the labour market put obstacles in the way of achieving these goals by denying equal access to minority job applicants? What use is it to educate immigrants and devise rules and policies to open up vacancies if managers and personnel workers discriminate in practice?

The occurrence of discrimination against ethnic minorities in access to employment is explored in this study, which is part of the International Labour Office (ILO) project "Combating discrimination against (im)migrant workers and ethnic minorities in the world of work". The present study covers the Netherlands' contribution to the first activity of the overall project.

The occurrence of discrimination against ethnic minorities in hiring procedures on the Dutch labour market was explored by using situation tests, in which the discriminatory behaviour of employers could be studied directly. Pairs of equally qualified minority and majority applicants apply simultaneously for the same advertised job vacancies. The extent to which the majority applicant was treated more favourably than his/her paired partner provides a direct index of discrimination (Bovenkerk, 1992).

Most of the research on the occurrence of discrimination does not study this behaviour directly but infers it from observing its preconditions or its consequences. For example, employers and personnel managers have often been interviewed about their recruitment, promotion and firing practices as related to discrimination. A disadvantage of this method is that not many people will be frank about their discriminatory behaviour. Interviews with the victims of discrimination have often been used to show the existence of discrimination, but these results cannot claim to be representative of the real extent of discrimination. If a job applicant is told that the advertised position has already been filled, or that another applicant has been hired who is more qualified, he will not know if this is true or whether he has been treated

unfavourably. Situation testing provides a technique that avoids the unsystematic and subjective quality of the private actor's account and provides clear and direct evidence of discrimination.

The situation tests included both audit testing (application is done by actual test persons) and correspondence testing (application is done by means of letters). Audit testing was used to determine the occurrence of discrimination against low-educated first generation immigrants (Moroccan men). Furthermore, we have tried to differentiate between the various job sectors in the resulting material. The methodology and results are described in chapters 2 and 3. To determine the occurrence of discrimination against college-educated second generation immigrants (Surinamese black men), correspondence testing was used. The influence of the size of firms, public and private sectors, job type and positive action policy on the rate of discrimination was also investigated in this experiment, which will be described in chapter 3. To find out whether minority males were subjected to discrimination more than minority females, and whether the rate of discrimination varied by educational level or by ethnic group, extra experiments were carried out. Discrimination was tested against low-educated Surinamese men, Surinamese women and Moroccan women and against college-educated Surinamese women. Because these experiments were not included in the international comparative research, the methodology and results are described in a separate chapter 6.

Finally, a remark must be made on the terminology used in this study. Most of the times when we use the word "employer", we actually mean the person engaged in selecting new personnel, who need not to be the same as the employer.

We would like to thank everyone who helped us to perform this study, in particular Dr. Wim Jansen, who was so kind to help us with the statistical analysis of the test results.

2. Audit testing

2.1. Introduction

The ethnic group against whom discrimination was tested at the level of semi-skilled work was the Moroccan group. This is one of the largest ethnic groups in the Netherlands (approximately 140,000 people) and a group of relative newcomers. Most Moroccans came as labour migrants ("gastarbeiders" in Dutch) to the Netherlands in the sixties. As a result of the general economic growth in this period there was a shortage of labour supply. Consequently, the Dutch government recruited labour in other countries with high unemployment rates, such as Morocco and Turkey. The workers arrived alone and their stay was thought to be temporary. However, many stayed and in the early eighties many sent for their families. Attitude investigations among the Dutch have shown that the Moroccan group occupies one of the lowest status positions on the ethnic status ladder (Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987). Although the general level of education of most Moroccans is low, there is now a sizeable proportion of second generation men with sufficient training and education to qualify for semi-skilled work.

2.2. Methodology

2.2.1. Auditor selection

How did we select suitable testing persons? University professors, minority affairs offices, student organizations and the school for the performing arts were asked to look for male Dutch and Moroccan college students between the ages 20-25, willing to participate in a study of discrimination in the labour market. Respondents were screened by telephone and those who met the job requirements (i.e. male student between 20-25 years old) were invited for an initial interview. A role playing exercise, in which the auditors acted as job seekers applying for a semi-skilled job, was part of the selection procedure. The research staff evaluated each Moroccan and Dutch student. Major selection criteria were conventional appearance (average weight, average height, conventional dress and hair, and conventional dialect), credibility as semi-skilled job seeker, improvisation ability, an attitude which was neither shy nor too eager to demonstrate discrimination, and time to participate in the study. The Moroccan auditors also had to speak Dutch fluently. In the end, two Moroccan and two Dutch students were selected who resembled each other in terms of all of the objective characteristics listed above, as well as in subjective characteristics such as overall demeanour, openness, enthusiasm and communicative abilities. They were thus considered to be interchangeable. During the research period, each Dutch tester worked with each Moroccan tester and vice versa, resulting in four different pairs of testers.

The Moroccan testers were born in the Netherlands and had the Dutch nationality. They had many Dutch friends and seemed fully integrated in Dutch society. Although they knew discrimination against ethnic minorities existed, they had never encountered discrimination or unfavourable treatment themselves.

A third Moroccan and a third Dutch student were selected during the research period to serve as a stand-in for the other testers in case this was needed.

2.2.2. Auditor training

Before "going into the field" the testers were trained over a period of a few days in order to make them as similar as possible. On the first day, the research strategy was explained. All auditors received a paper containing information about application procedures (how to behave during an interview, what questions are normally asked) as well as information about the type

of semi-skilled jobs that were going to be tested and the required level of education. After they had read this thoroughly, two more instruction days followed. During these days, several mock interviews were held with the auditors, who were videotaped so that they were also able to observe each other and offer criticism on their partners. After each interview the tape was shown to the other auditors and the answers, demeanour and overall presentation of the "applicant" were discussed in order to make the auditors not only the best applicants, but also similar applicants. They learned to match their responses and demeanour to different questions and in different situations. Next, the auditors were taught to record the conversation with the employer on a standardized form after each stage of the application procedure. On the last training day, the auditors practised making telephone calls to mock employers using standard opening sentences and had one real audit experience before the actual research started.

2.2.3. Selecting test situations

Before audit testing was started, the supply and demand of labour in the metropolitan West of the Netherlands ("Randstad" area) were investigated. In job sectors experiencing a short supply and high demand of labour, employers have no choice but to hire everyone. If the demand is low, there will not be enough job vacancies to allow testing. Therefore, only those sectors with labour in large supply and in high demand were chosen as suitable for audit testing, as this equilibrium provides the most favourable situation for testing the occurrence of discrimination. The service sector and the retail trade answered these conditions best, and job vacancies were therefore mainly selected from these sectors. Typical examples of jobs in the service sector include posts as waiter, bartender and kitchen/restaurant help in restaurants, hotels or bars, or assistant worker in a cafeteria or snack bar. Jobs in the retail trade included shop assistant or salesman in grocery stores, supermarkets and bookshops, shoe stores, flower shops or furniture shops. Furthermore, job advertisements for occupations such as receptionist, driver, electrician and clerical worker were tested whenever they appeared in the newspapers. A large supply of labour is available for these jobs, but the demand for this type of labour is low. Consequently, only a few of such vacancies appeared in the newspapers.

2.2.4. Methods used for finding vacancies

The vacancies were mainly found through newspaper advertisements. This option turned out to be the most productive, least expensive and simplest method of selecting vacancies. The possibility of applying through temporary employment services was considered but found unsuitable. In order to be registered by these agencies, one has to show one's passport, fiscal number, diplomas, references, curriculum vitae, photograph, and bank account number. As the qualifications of the auditors were fictitious, this was impossible to do.

The Employment Exchange provided other difficulties, as the vacancies there are anonymous. To find out the address of the employer, one has to be registered with the local staff. One's name, date of birth and qualifications are recorded and then kept on file for half a year. It would arouse suspicion to provide a different name and different qualifications each time tests were to be held. Nevertheless, newspaper advertisements from employment agencies and the Employment Exchange were included in the sample.

Obtaining jobs through direct application would have been a possibility in spring, when a lot of restaurants and pubs are in need of temporary personnel for the summer season. However, the audits were conducted in winter time, when there were hardly any vacancies (compared with other seasons). The chance that neither applicant would find work through this channel was too big.

Therefore, random samples of advertisements for job vacancies were drawn twice a week from several national newspapers ("*Telegraaf*", "*Algemeen Dagblad*" and "*De Volkskrant*"), a regional newspaper ("*Utrechts Nieuwsblad*"), a local newspaper ("*Stadsblad*") and a paper from the Employment Exchange ("*Banenkrant*"). The selected vacancies included both full-time and part-time jobs, as well as permanent and temporary appointments. In keeping with the research plan, the jobs selected were located in the "Randstad" area, the metropolitan West of

the Netherlands, mostly in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. Large concentrations of Moroccan immigrants live in this region, and the labour demand is relatively high. Only the private sector was tested, as there were no vacancies for semi-skilled jobs in the public sector.

2.2.5. The fictitious biographies of the testers

Twice a week the testers came to the research location to conduct telephone sessions, to contact potential employers. Prior to each test, the supervisor drew up fictitious biographies for each tester and for each job in accordance with the advertised job requirements. In order to create the highest probability of being hired, the testers were given the best possible qualifications, that is, the required age and education and two or three years of occupational experience in a comparable job.

Semi-skilled jobs were defined as jobs requiring at least primary school and secondary modern school or technical school. Sometimes one or two years of supplementary education in the

particular occupational sector was required¹. The age of the testers varied between 19-25 years, in keeping with the age required for the job.

If the job was located in a town different from the one in which the testers lived, one tester always mentioned a fictitious address in the town of the company while his partner gave his own address and telephone number, saying that he would move to the city of the company within one week. This, he would say, was also the reason for applying for the particular job. The tester providing the fictitious address stated, as a reason for his application, that he had just completed military service and was currently unemployed. He could be reached at his parents' (i.e. his own) telephone number because his own telephone line was not yet installed.

The testers were made identifiable as Moroccan by using a typical Moroccan name, Mustafa El Mansouri. The Dutch testers used a typical Dutch name, Jan de Wit. The Moroccans were

¹ It is difficult to translate the different types of schools into another language. We tried to find a comparable school type closest to the Dutch in the British system.

Consequently, the Dutch "MAVO" was compared to the secondary modern school in England, the Dutch "LBO" system ("lager beroepsonderwijs", such as "lagere detailhandel school" or "lagere technische school") was compared to the English technical school. A system of supplementary education after secondary modern or technical school is provided in the Netherlands. These courses consist of one day of classes and four days of work in the particular job sector each week. We could not find a comparable British school type for this type of supplementary education ("leerlingstelsel"), which bears close resemblance to the German system of "dual" vocational training.

presented as being born in Morocco. They had come to the Netherlands at an early age and had completed the whole of their education in the Netherlands.

2.2.6. Recording the applications

The biographies were presented to the testers on standard forms, which also included additional information such as the name of the tester and his partner, the date of the audit, the name of the newspaper from which the advertisement was drawn, the order of testers calling, the job tested and the name, address and type of the company. Finally, the form provided a space in which the auditors were to record the results of the telephone calls, including the reaction of the employer. A telephone session included as many audits as available vacancies.

The forms were copied and taken home by the auditors. As soon as an employer phoned them at home, they recorded this on the form and contacted the supervisor, who scheduled the interviews.

Directly after each personal interview the auditors completed another standardized form, providing details of the employer's response through various questions and giving some indications of how the employer had treated the auditor. There was close and frequent contact between the supervisor and the auditors during the entire research period.


2.2.7. The application procedure

2.2.7.1. Stages of the application procedure

The application procedure for semi-skilled jobs basically consists of three stages (see figure 1):

- 1) The first step in the application procedure for advertised semi-skilled jobs was applying by telephone. The respective calls were made at intervals of approximately 15 minutes, with Moroccan and Dutch auditors alternating in making the first call. The ethnic identity of the Moroccan applicant was indicated primarily by using a typical Moroccan name: Mustafa El Mansouri. Two possibilities existed: the application could either be denied (the tester was told that "the job had just been taken" or that "the person to whom you have to speak is not here at the moment, please call back") or accepted (the tester was briefly interviewed by telephone, the employer would usually ask for and make a note of the tester's work experience,

Figure 1. Stages in the application procedure



age, address and telephone number, level of education and reason for application). If both testers were denied an application, the procedure was terminated and the result was not counted as a usable observation. If both testers were briefly interviewed by telephone (that is, the application was accepted), they proceeded to the second stage: the interview. If unequal treatment occurred in the first stage, that is if the application was denied to one tester while accepted from the other, the application procedure was terminated.

- 2) After being interviewed briefly by telephone, the testers were either invited for a personal interview, denied an interview ("Sorry, you are too young") or were told that the employer would call back after a selection was made. Once again, if unequal treatment occurred and only one tester was invited for an interview, the application procedure was terminated and the interview was cancelled by the one who had been invited. This was done to minimize the inconvenience to employers and real applicants.
- 3) If both test persons were invited for an interview, they would actually go to this interview. In this final stage, the testers were either offered a job or were rejected. Whenever the testers were offered a job they would turn it down immediately, saying that they had already accepted another job in the meantime.

2.2.7.2. Problems in the third stage

A note has to be made concerning the third stage: it was not always possible for the testers to go to an interview. This was due to the following circumstances. The telephone sessions were held only one afternoon a week for each team. In some sessions none of the applications resulted in a second step (an invitation for a personal interview), while other sessions resulted in, for example, six invitations for personal interviews. The employer usually held interviews on the same day or the day after. He always had the choice of many candidates, so it was rarely possible to make another appointment. The interviews took place in different cities or suburbs and the time to travel to the location of the interview and return to the research location was, on average, four hours. Consequently, the test persons could not go to all of the interviews. On other occasions they did actually go to the interview, but found that there was nobody there to interview them or even that the shop or restaurant was closed. Interviews were sometimes also rendered impossible because the test persons were ill or had school obligations. After some time, we managed to find two extra testers, who served as a stand-in as much as possible. This solved part of the problem, but even then it was not possible for the testers to go to all interviews. Not only because the stand-ins could not always be reached in time, but also because in some cases the chance of their identity being revealed was too big. This was the case, for example, if the test persons were expected to prove their ability on the spot (such as selling, filleting fish, boning meat), if specific knowledge was required (about furniture, curtain material, tropical fish species), or if they had to show their diplomas. In these cases it would be too difficult for the test persons to sustain their role during the interview and the result would, in all probability, be that neither of them would be offered the job. In a few cases the testers were actually almost "caught": for example, the employer happened to know the owner of the

shop where the tester had supposedly worked and asked for names of the manager and other employers. The testers always acted very persuasive in such situations and tried to answer all questions as well as possible. An example:

The Dutch tester said that he had worked in a certain shop in Utrecht. The employer in Rotterdam, then said:

"What a coincidence, I happen to know this shop quite good! How long did you work there?"

"For two years"

"I can't remember the name of the employer right now, what is his name?"

"I forgot his name"

"You worked there for two years and forgot his name?"

"Well, it is something like Ba., Ba... Ba."

"You mean Van Tuffelen?"

"Yes, that's him!!"

"And what is the name of the manager?"

"..Mister Smit?" (this was a guess)

"Mmm, that might be, yes, do you mind if I call them now, to make some inquiries?"

"No problem"

"What is the telephone number?"

"Eh.. 538.. I do not know it by heart. Whenever I was ill I had to dial a special number and not the number of the shop, but I can give it to you after the interview"

"OK, fine, you can go now"

Mothers and house-mates all participated. However, mistakes could not always be avoided:

An employer phoned the tester at his parents' house. He had applied for a job as a shop assistant and had said that he was 18 years old. The mother of the tester:

"No, Peter is not home at the moment"

"Do you know where he is?"

"No, Peter is 24 and grown up, he does not have to tell me where he goes any more."

"The boy is 24?"

"Yes, and he does not live at home any more, he studies at the university in and is only here during the weekends"

"But I thought he worked in a supermarket"

At this moment, the Dutch tester came home and tried to save the situation as well as possible:

"My mother meant my brother Peter. He is 24 and studies, my name is actually Peter-Jan. She always mixes us up."

The entire stream of pretensions and excuses was the most difficult part of the research for the testers. Although of little comfort, we felt comforted by the fact that, in reality, 15-20 per cent of all real applicants commit fraud on their curriculum vitae (Duynstee, 1993); they falsify their diplomas, say they have worked for a company that just went bankrupt or keep the fact that they were fired a secret. None of these applicants are prosecuted. They are simply eliminated from the application procedure and can try again in another company.

2.2.8. Measuring discrimination

If the majority tester is invited for an interview but the minority tester is not, this may be the result of systematic behaviour as well as of random factors. The employer may be prejudiced against minority workers and may prefer to hire a majority applicant. If this is the case, he will systematically treat minority applicants differently from the majority applicants, for example by only inviting the majority tester. Unfavourable treatment as a result of these systematic reasons is interpreted as discrimination. However, there may be other reasons. Perhaps the employer felt tired or was in a bad mood at the time of the minority tester's application, or the employer simply preferred the majority tester's voice or the majority tester lived in his favourite neighbourhood. All of these random factors may have been the reason for unfavourable

treatment of the minority tester, and should not be interpreted as discrimination. It is to be assumed, however, that random unfavourable treatment of the minority tester and of the majority tester occurs equally and therefore can be cancelled out by subtracting the cases of unfavourable treatment of the majority tester from unfavourable treatment of the minority tester. This would leave us a means of measuring unfavourable treatment resulting from systematic behaviour and thus would pinpoint discrimination.

To reduce the effect of random factors, a double check was often carried out in those cases where unequal treatment occurred in the first stage of the application procedure. Consider the case, for example, where the first application is accepted and the second denied. Because there were many real applicants also applying for the vacancy, the second tester could really be too late for applying for the job. This was then checked by the first tester, who made a second telephone call using a different name.

Another form of double check was the Moroccan calling with a Moroccan name and, after that, the same Moroccan calling with a Dutch name. The answers made by the employers were often dramatically different and clearly related to the name of the tester rather than anything else. For example, when the Moroccan tester called using the name Mustafa El Mansouri, the employer would say: "Sorry, but the job has already been taken", but when the very same person called ten minutes later, posing as Jan de Wit: "Do you have any experience? Please come for an interview". In such cases, there was absolutely no doubt that the discriminatory behaviour of the employer was based on the ethnic background of the tester.

2.2.9. Unequal treatment and equal but different treatment

In this study, cases of disparate treatment were divided into two types:

- 1) **Unequal treatment.** Disparate treatment was called unequal treatment when one tester was rejected whereas the other was accepted at one of the three stages of the application process. In other words, while one tester was eliminated from competition for the job, the other, paired tester proceeded to a further stage. Some examples of unequal treatment are given below:
 - one applicant was told that the job had already been taken, while his partner was briefly interviewed by telephone concerning experience, age, etc. (one tester proceeded to the first stage, while the other was eliminated from competition beforehand);
 - both testers were interviewed by telephone (both applications accepted), but only one of the testers was granted an interview (one tester proceeded to the second stage, while the other was eliminated from competition after the first stage);
 - both testers were invited for a personal interview, but only one of them was offered the job (one tester proceeded to the third stage, while the other was eliminated from competition after the second stage)¹.

¹ It should be noted that the international comparative research design (Bovenkerk, 1992) is not consequent here. It says that there are three stages in every application procedure, comparable with figure 1 in this study, but that unequal treatment can only occur in two stages, which

All instances of this sort are summarized in table 2 and together form the "hard" evidence of discrimination.

- 2) **Equal but different treatment.** In some cases the treatment was equal in terms of stages completed but nevertheless different for the Moroccan and the Dutch tester. For example: one applicant was interviewed seriously for one hour by two people, while only a few personal notes were taken from the other in five minutes. As both testers received an interview and neither was offered a job (and both therefore were eliminated in the same stage), this was counted as equal treatment. It was obvious, however, that there was a difference in treatment and that the first applicant was taken more seriously. Another example was when both testers were offered a job but the conditions were different: the minority tester was offered a low-status cleaning job in the company, while the majority tester was offered a job as a receptionist in the same company. This case was comparable with a case which the Urban Institute in Washington (D.C.) once recorded in tests it carried out in the United States: a white and a black applicant applied for a job as car salesman. The white applicant was offered a job in new car sales while the black applicant was told that the only job they had available was in used car sales (Fix et al., 1993).

Although the evidence of discrimination in these instances is less "hard" than the difference between acceptance and rejection (unequal treatment), it is important in practice. Equal but different treatment does not deny one the opportunity to compete for the job, but may be clearly discouraging for the applicant. All the evidence of this sort is summarized in table 3 and supports the findings summarized in table 2 because it points in the same direction.

Tables 2 and 3, containing the results of unequal treatment and equal but different treatment, respectively, can be added together to provide table 4 in which both forms of disparate treatment are taken into consideration.

The rate of cumulative net discrimination shown in table 2, which contains the results of unequal treatment, can be seen as the minimum rate of discrimination that occurs against the Moroccan applicants. This table will henceforth be referred to as the minimum table. On the other hand, the rate of net discrimination in table 4, which contains the results of both unequal treatment and equal but different treatment, can be seen as the maximum rate of discrimination that occurs against the Moroccan applicants. This table will be referred to as the maximum table.

2.2.10. Validity check

are the second and the third stage. We think that it is defendable to include unequal treatment which occurs in the first stage, because most of the times unequal treatment occurs in this stage (the Moroccan is told that the job has already been taken, while the Dutch tester is briefly interviewed by telephone).

The tests were carried out by four testers: two Moroccan and two Dutch testers. Each Moroccan tester worked with each Dutch tester in a team, and vice versa, so that four pairs of testers were available. In order to exclude all differences between the testers, with the exception of ethnic background, the testers were carefully selected and trained to behave in a similar manner. A validity check was carried out to verify whether this matching had been successful. If one pair of testers was to perform systematically better than others, the tests would have been biased and thus worthless. The four pairs of testers carried out a total of 150 tests. In the remaining 25 tests one of the two stand-ins was used. These tests were not checked for their validity. In 57 of the 150 cases, the Moroccan was treated less favourably compared with his Dutch counterpart and in three cases the opposite occurred, resulting in 54 cases (36 per cent) of net-disparate treatment in favour of the Dutch tester. Ideally, each team should have encountered a net-disparate treatment in favour of the Dutch tester in 36 per cent of all tests carried out by them. In figure 2a the total number of tests carried out by each team is shown. A and B represent the Dutch testers and C and D the Moroccan testers. In figure 2b the expected number of cases of disparate treatment are given for each team (36 per cent of the total number of tests carried out by each team). In figure 2c the observed number of cases of net-disparate treatment in favour of the Dutch tester are shown.

A chi²-test was run to find out whether the distribution shown was biased by the performance of one or more teams. This would have been the case if the value of chi² was be greater than 3.84 for the divergence between the expected (E) and obtained (O) results to be significant at the 5 percent level with the number of degrees of freedom df=1. Thus, $\text{chi}^2 = \frac{\sum (O-E)^2}{E} = \frac{(8-5.4)^2}{5.4} + \frac{(19-22.32)^2}{22.32} + \frac{(15-16.2)^2}{16.2} + \frac{(12-10.08)^2}{10.08} = 2.20$. This value is not significant and therefore the tests are not biased.

2.2.11. Statistical analysis of test results

When may we conclude whether ethnic minorities have been discriminated against? In other words, what is the minimum required net discrimination rate to reject the null

Figure 2a. Total number of tests carried out by each team

	A	B
C	15	45
D	62	28

Figure 2b. Expected number of cases of disparate treatment for each team

	A	B
C	5.40	16.20
D	22.32	10.08

Figure 2c. Observed number of cases of net-disparate treatment in favour of Dutch tester for each team

	A	B
C	8	15
D	19	12

hypothesis of no discrimination? The minimum required net discrimination rate is dependent on the sample size (N) and the significance level (").

In the international comparative research design (Bovenkerk, 1992), the sample size N was calculated on the basis of certain expectations. The sample size is dependent on the minimum required rate of net discrimination and the significance level. Since the manual stipulates a minimum required net discrimination rate of 15 per cent to be observed in order to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent significance level (i.e. the percentage of net discrimination observed is due to pure chance in less than 5 out of hundred tests), then the sample size should be at least 170, according to the following equation: $\%N = 1.96 F / .15F$, (N being the number of observations, 1.96 being the z-value at a significance level of 5 per cent for a normal distribution and F being the standard unit of the normal distribution). Thus, when the sample size is 170, the minimum required net discrimination rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination (and thus to conclude that discrimination has been practised) at the 5 per cent level, is 15 per cent (see also Bovenkerk, 1992).

Naturally, the minimum required net discrimination rate changes with a different N-value. When N increases (that is when the total number of observations becomes more than 170), the minimum net discrimination rate, which is required to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level, decreases. At the same time, when N decreases, the required minimum scores will go up under the condition that the significance level stays at 5 per cent.

In our audit experiment, the total number of usable observations was 175. In this experiment therefore, the minimum required net discrimination rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level is less than 15 per cent. To calculate the exact critical rate, we use the equation, used in the international comparative research design: $\%N = 1.96F / CRF$ (CR being the critical rate, N being the number of usable observations, F being the standard unit of the normal distribution and 1.96 being the z-value at the 5 per cent level for a normal distribution). As a result, $CR = 1.96F / F\%N = 1.96 / \%175 = 14.8$ per cent. Thus, with a sample size of 175 observations, we should at least find a net discrimination rate of 14.8 per cent in order to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level. In other

words, only when we observe a net discrimination rate in our experiment higher than the critical rate of 14.8 per cent, has discrimination been proven to exist.

3. Results

Between December 1993 and April 1994 a total of 277 valid audits were completed. Audits were labelled invalid if one or both auditors could not make contact with the employer or if mistakes were made by the auditors. Of the 277 valid audits, 175 were usable for the calculation of net discrimination against Moroccans. In the remaining 102 cases both auditors' applications were denied, probably because they were too late with their application and the jobs had already been taken.

The results can be divided into unequal treatment and equal but different treatment (see section 2.2.9). The results of the former will first be discussed for each different stage of the application procedure. The results are summarized in table 2. The net discrimination found here can be seen as the minimum rate of discrimination encountered by Moroccan applicants. Secondly the results which can be labelled as differential treatment but with equal outcome, will be discussed and summarized in table 3. This table supports the evidence of discrimination found in table 2. Finally, the results will be put together in table 4. The net discrimination found here can be seen as the maximum rate of discrimination occurring against Moroccan applicants. To find out if the rate of discrimination in one job sector is higher than in the other, the results of audit testing were summarized separately for the service sector and the retail trade in table 6. As was shown in section 2.2.10, the test results were not biased by the performance of the individual applicants during the tests.

3.1. Unequal treatment

3.1.1. Results of the first stage: application by telephone

During the first stage, equal treatment (when both applications were accepted and both testers were interviewed briefly by telephone) occurred in 130 cases (74 per cent) of the (usable) audits. In two cases (1.1 per cent) unequal treatment against the majority (Dutch) tester occurred. While the Moroccan tester was questioned about his age, work experience, education and holiday plans and was told (in one case) to send his curriculum vitae and photograph, the Dutch tester was told: "You are a bit late, aren't you? The job has already been taken!", and in the other case he was given a wrong telephone number to call. The opposite, however, occurred much more often. In 43 cases (24.6 per cent) of the

Table 1. Interviews obtained in 175 audits

	Number of interviews	% of usable audits
Dutch tester	94	53.7
Moroccan tester	50	28.6

175 audits the Moroccan tester was treated unequally during the first stage compared with his paired Dutch tester. Some examples of employers' responses:

To Moroccan tester: "Sorry, but the job has already been taken."

To Dutch tester: "We haven't found someone yet, if you are interested, you should come along for an interview."

To Moroccan tester: "You are too late, the vacancy was in the newspaper last Thursday and Friday, and last Thursday we already made our choice."

To Dutch tester: "What is your age, work experience and address? A few applicants have already been selected for an interview, but if this does not result in anything, I will call you."

To Moroccan tester: "Hi, Mustafa, brother! It is a shame, but you are too late! Thanks for calling!"

To Dutch tester: "Can you tell me something about yourself? [...], sounds good, you can come for an interview."

To Moroccan tester: "Sorry, the person to whom you have to speak is not in at the moment."

To Dutch tester:(same person) "What is your experience...? We will call you after we have made the selection."

Double check:

To Moroccan tester:(same person) "No, the person to whom you have to speak is in a meeting the whole afternoon, call us after the weekend."

To Dutch tester:(same person) "What is your experience....? We will call you after a preliminary selection has been made"

Subtracting the unequal treatment against the Moroccan tester from the unequal treatment against the Dutch tester results in a net discrimination of 23.4 per cent against the Moroccan in the first stage of the application procedure. **This means that in one of every four job applications the Moroccan tester was denied the chance to proceed with the actual application, while the Dutch tester was treated as a serious candidate. In practice this means that, even if the Moroccan applicant has the most outstanding qualifications, is born in the Netherlands, speaks Dutch fluently and might be a much better candidate than all other applicants, he won't be given a chance to apply for no other reason than that his name is of foreign origin.** In all cases in which unequal treatment had occurred during the first stage (45), the application procedure was terminated. In all other cases (130), in which the treatment had been equal during the first stage, the applicants proceeded to the second stage and tried to obtain an interview.

3.1.2. Results of the second stage: interview stage

The 130 cases in which the treatment had been equal during the first stage (both were briefly interviewed by telephone) resulted in 48 cases where both applicants were invited, 14 cases

where both were asked to fill in an application form,¹ two cases where only the Moroccan was invited and 17 cases where only the Dutch was invited. In other words, unequal treatment occurred once again, mostly in favour of the Dutch applicant². In 49 of the 130 cases, neither applicant was invited for an interview. The auditors were seldom rejected during the telephone call, but were simply never called back by the employer.

The following incidents are illustrative of unequal treatment during the second stage:

An advertisement for a salesman in a solarium shop appeared in the local newspaper. The Moroccan tester called the shop but was asked to call back because it was too busy at that moment. Only after four calls was the employer able to talk to him. She was obviously irritated by his persistence, but asked for his age and work experience. The auditor was judged too young and to have insufficient experience. He also did not have the required experience with skin allergies and skin diseases. The equally qualified Dutch tester was given a chance to talk to the employer immediately and was invited for an interview after a short conversation about his age, experience and education. Nothing was said about experience with skin allergies or skin diseases.

An advertisement in the newspaper asked for a shop assistant in a well-known men's clothing store. Both testers were interviewed about their age, experience and education. The Dutch applicant was then invited for an interview at the end of the following week, while the Moroccan tester was told: "I have already invited a few applicants and I want to complete the procedure with them first. If none of them are judged eligible, I will call you this week. If not, you will not be selected." The employer never called back.

A cleaning company asked for an office worker. Both auditors telephoned and, after being interviewed briefly about age, education and experience, both were told that they would be called if the company wished to pursue their application. The Dutch tester was called a few days later and invited for an interview. The Moroccan received a letter saying: "We considered your application carefully, but unfortunately we must inform you that you were not selected for an interview."

A meats and sausages company advertised in the newspaper for an experienced help. Both testers were asked their age and whether they had any experience with boning meat. Both said they had never boned meat, but were willing to learn. To the Dutch tester the employer said: "It is not really necessary that you are able to bone meat, you will get internal training. It is more important to fit in the team and your age (20) is a preference. You can come for an interview." To the Moroccan tester the answer was: "Sorry, but it is very important that you have experience in boning meat and making sausages. We really need someone who is able to do this!"

The cumulative net discrimination against the Moroccan after two stages in the application procedure is 32 per cent (56:175 x 100).

3.1.3. Results of the third stage: job offer

¹ Application forms were not filled in because copies of diplomas and references were required.

² Twice a job was offered immediately over the telephone; once to the Dutch tester and once to the Moroccan tester. This was counted as an invitation for an interview.

The intention was that if both testers were invited for a personal interview, they would go to the company and try to get the job. However, in practice this was often impossible due to various reasons, as mentioned above in section 2.2.7. In 20 of the 48 cases the testers actually went for an interview. In 12 cases (60 per cent), neither was offered the job, and in the remaining eight cases (40 per cent) the job offer was made to the Dutch tester. In the twenty interviews realized, the Moroccan was never offered a job.

The interviews varied from a brief interview of ten minutes to lengthy interviews of an hour. The testers were often questioned extensively about their education and the courses they had followed, experience, references, military service, hobbies, private matters (relationships, family), former salary and supplements, expected salary, neighbourhood, reason of application, reason of leaving former job, transport and future plans. An example of unequal treatment at the job offering stage follows:

A vacancy for a shop assistant in a men's clothing store was advertised in the local newspaper. Both auditors were invited for an interview. The Moroccan tester had an interview of ten minutes with the employer standing behind the desk. The tester was asked a few brief questions about his former job and his education. A few days later he was rejected. The Dutch tester went for an interview one hour later. The interview was held in a separate room with two people for 50 minutes. The questions were much more serious and diverse and information was given about the company, the various proceedings and salary. The next day the Dutch tester was called and offered the job.

3.1.4. Results of the total application procedure

In the total application procedure a cumulative net discrimination of 61 cases was found. This means that in 36.6 per cent of all audits the Dutch tester advanced further in the application procedure than the Moroccan tester. **In other words, when a young Moroccan man applies for a semi-skilled job for which an equally qualified Dutch applicant is also competing, the equally qualified Dutch applicant is almost twice as likely to advance in the application procedure as is the Moroccan applicant.** Since a net discrimination percentage of 36.6 per cent is far more than the 14.8 per cent required to reject the null hypothesis at the significance level of 5 per cent¹, **the conclusion can be drawn that discrimination against low-educated**

¹ The net-discrimination rate of 36.6% is significant even at the 1 per cent level (N=175).

first generation immigrants¹ (Moroccan men) occurs frequently in hiring procedures on the Dutch labour market.

In the cases where neither was invited (49) or neither was offered the job (12) or both were invited but neither went for an interview (29), the occurrence of discrimination was not determined. However, this does not mean discrimination would have been absent in these cases. The employers had so many candidates that they did not have to make a choice between Dutch and Moroccan testers. If they would have had to do so, chances are the employers would then have preferred the Dutch tester somewhere along the line - the results obtained in the overall testing procedure point in this direction. In other words, the total incidence of unfavourable treatment may well be much higher.

3.1.5. Interpreting the results

The results of the audit testing can easily be misinterpreted. The results indicate that in at least 36.6 per cent of all applications employers have preferred Dutch applicants to equally qualified Moroccan applicants. This is a measure of discrimination. It is a common mistake to think that in the remaining 63.4 per cent the Moroccan will get a job and that therefore the chances of the Moroccan group in the labour market are not that bad after all. However, it is important to realize that we examined the question: "In how many cases out of 175 applications does the Moroccan applicant encounter discrimination?", which is different from the question: "How many jobs will have been offered to the Moroccan applicant after 175 applications?"

To answer this question, we have to find out how many job applications finally resulted in a job offer. This requires a different method of analysing the results, on the following lines.

The total number of job offers obtained by the testers should first be calculated. Unfortunately, this was impossible to do because the invitations for an interview were not always followed by an actual personal interview (for example, if only one tester was invited, the application procedure was terminated and the tester concerned would cancel the interview). Instead, the number of invitations for an interview obtained by the testers were calculated. In order to get a job, obtaining an interview is an important step; the more interviews one can get the more chances one has for a job offer. From the results of the third stage of the application procedure one can roughly infer the chance of getting a job offer for the Dutch and the Moroccan tester. Therefore, if one would know the number of interviews the testers obtained in total, one could speculate on the number of job offers that would have been made to the Moroccan and the Dutch tester.

¹ **The testers were presented as second generation**

immigrants, who had completed the whole of their education in

the Netherlands. Nonetheless, we refer to Moroccan men as

first generation immigrants, because the group of Moroccans as

a whole is, in contrast to the group of Surinamese, a group of

relative newcomers; most Moroccan men are first generation

immigrants.

To calculate the number of interviews obtained by the Moroccan and Dutch tester, the results of the first stage of the application procedure has to be examined carefully. In this stage, the applicants were told that the job had already been taken (application denied) or were briefly interviewed by telephone (application accepted). When unequal treatment occurred, that is if one was interviewed by telephone and the other was denied a chance to apply, the application procedure was terminated. Table 2 shows the results of the first stage. The category "Only Dutch application accepted" includes 43 cases. This means that in 43 cases the Dutch applicant was interviewed briefly by telephone while the Moroccan was told that the job had already been taken. In these cases the Dutch applicant sometimes obtained an invitation for a personal interview, but sometimes not. The table does not mention this because it was not important; the case was counted as unequal treatment.

This matters, however, when one wants to determine how many invitations for an interview the applicants were able to obtain. These results were: of the 43 cases in which only the Dutch application was accepted, 29 resulted in an invitation for an interview, while in 14 cases the Dutch tester was not invited. The category "Only Moroccan application accepted" included two cases, but neither of these resulted in an invitation for an interview.

Now we look at the second stage: out of the 130 cases in which both applications were accepted, 48 cases resulted in both testers being invited for an interview, in 17 cases only the Dutch applicant was invited and in two cases only the Moroccan. This means that, in total, the Dutch tester was able to obtain an invitation for an interview $29 + 48 + 17 = 94$ times (53.7 per cent of all audits) and the Moroccan tester $0 + 48 + 2 = 50$ times (28.6 per cent of all audits). In other words, **the Dutch applicant had almost twice as much chance of obtaining an interview when applying for semi-skilled jobs as an equally qualified Moroccan applicant.**

The results of the third stage of the application procedure show that, of the 20 interviews the Moroccan went to, he was never offered a job, while the Dutch tester was offered a job in 40 per cent of the 20 interviews. Suppose the Dutch tester would have received a job offer in 40 per cent of all 94 interviews he obtained. Then he would have been offered 38 jobs. The Moroccan would never have been offered a job, despite the 50 interviews he was able to obtain.

Of course, this is all speculative and the number of interviews actually followed up is too small to draw firm conclusions about the percentage of jobs offered to both testers. Nevertheless it gives a clear indication of the real situation in the labour market for the Moroccan group.

3.2. Equal but different treatment

In table 2 results are seen as unfavourable treatment if one tester advances to a further stage in the application procedure while the application process is terminated for the matched tester. The treatment is considered equal if both testers reach the same stage in the procedure. In some cases treatment was equal but nevertheless different. Incidents of this form of unfavourable treatment were collected as anecdotes during the research and support the findings of the minimum table. Examples follow:

An advertisement for a shop assistant in a pet shop appeared in the newspaper. The Moroccan tester called first and was told: "Actually, you are too late. We have our eye on two candidates, and it is almost certain that they are going to be hired. So it is rather pointless, but if you really want me to I can place your name on a list". In other words, the employer pretended to give the Moroccan tester a chance but was rather discouraging. To the Dutch tester she said: "What is your work experience? What is the name of the shop where you worked? Can you start directly? Have you completed military service? We have invited a few candidates, but if we are not pleased with them we will call you."

The Employment Exchange office had vacancies for bartenders on a cruise ship. Both testers were briefly interviewed about education, experience and their understanding of

Table 2. Results of audit testing: minimum rate of discrimination of Moroccan male applicants compared with Dutch male applicants

<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>	
Valid applications	277
Neither application accepted	102
Usable applications	175
Both applications accepted	130
Only Dutch application accepted	43
Only Moroccan application accepted	2
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester	41
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester in % (41:175x100)	23.4%
<i>2. Invitations for interviews:</i>	
Both applications accepted	130
Neither invited	49
Both invited	48
Only Dutch tester invited	17
Only Moroccan tester invited	2
Written application required	14
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester	15
Cumulative net discrimination after two stages	56
Cumulative net discrimination in % (56:175x100)	32%
<i>3. Job offers:</i>	
Both invited for interview	48
Actually went for interview	20
No job offer	12
Job offer only to Dutch tester	8
Job offer only to Moroccan tester	0
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester	8
Cumulative net discrimination after three stages	64
Cumulative net discrimination in % (64:175x100)	36.6%

modern languages. They both had to write an application letter with a curriculum vitae and a photograph. Neither of them wrote the letter, but the Dutch applicant was called two weeks later and again after two months to inform him that there was a new vacancy for this job. The Moroccan was never called.

A local grocery shop advertised in the local newspaper for a shop assistant. The Moroccan and Dutch tester applied and were invited for an interview. The Moroccan was told, on arrival, that they had hired somebody the day before and that he could leave again. The employer went on with her work and also talked to somebody else while saying this. The Dutch tester was given a warm reception and was interviewed for 15 minutes by the same woman. She gave a lot of information about the shop and hinted that he stood a good chance. He was, however, not offered the job.

Table 3. Results of audit testing: equal but different treatment

Number of usable audits	175
Equal treatment, but Moroccan tester favoured	2
Equal treatment, but Dutch tester favoured	8
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester	6
Net discrimination against Moroccan tester in % (6:175x100)	3.4%

A vacancy for a shop assistant in a tools shop was advertised in the newspaper. The Dutch applicant had to come for an interview the same afternoon. He said: "Sorry, but it is not possible for me to come today because I am moving at the moment." "Oh, well, then forget it!" the man answered. The Moroccan tester was also invited for an interview the same afternoon. When he said he could not come that day, he was allowed to come the day after.

A sports centre advertised for a bartender. The Dutch tester was interviewed briefly by telephone and was promised to be called back, while the Moroccan was told that he had to write a letter of application.

A furniture store asked for a shop assistant. The Moroccan tester had to tell them his age and working experience and was told that they would contact him. The Dutch person was asked all sorts of questions for about 15 minutes, such as: "What was your exact position in your former job? What activities did that entail? What was your selling strategy, how many colleagues did you have and what was your salary?" He was told "You will be put on a list and you will be very likely be invited." Neither was invited.

In eight cases the Moroccan tester was treated equally but differently than his Dutch counterpart, while in two cases the Dutch tester was treated equally but differently compared with his Moroccan partner.

3.3. Maximum rate of discrimination

If the cases of unequal treatment (table 2) and the cases of equal but different treatment (table 3) are added together, the total number of cases in which unfavourable treatment against the Moroccan tester occurred is 76 (68 + 8), and against the Dutch tester it is 6 (4 + 2) (see table 4). This results in a maximum cumulative net discrimination of 70 cases or 40 per cent against the Moroccan tester. Since the critical rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level is 14.8 per cent (see section 2.2.11), discrimination has been proven to exist¹.

¹ A net-discrimination rate of 40% is significant even at the 1 per cent level (N=175).

Table 4. Results of audit testing; maximum rate of discrimination

Usable audits	175
Equal treatment	93
Equal treatment, but Moroccan tester favoured	2
Equal treatment, but Dutch tester favoured	8
Dutch tester treated unequally	4
Moroccan tester treated unequally	68
Cumulative net discrimination against Moroccan tester	70
Cumulative net discrimination against Moroccan tester in % (70:175x100)	40%

3.4. Job sectors

The job vacancies which were audited were mainly concentrated in the service sector and the retail trade (table 5). For these two main sectors, the degree of discrimination was calculated separately in order to find out whether firms in one sector were more likely to discriminate than firms in the other. Table 6 shows the results of audit testing for the service sector and the retail trade. The net discrimination consists of cases in which unequal treatment occurred. Equal but different treatment is not taken into consideration in these tables and the table is therefore comparable to table 2.

For the service sector a cumulative net discrimination of 32.4 per cent against the Moroccan applicant was measured, while for the retail trade this was 45.4 per cent. A χ^2 test was used to check whether the percentage of net discrimination found in the service sector differed significantly from the percentage of net discrimination found in the retail trade. The difference between the service sector and the retail trade should be significant at the 5 per cent level to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. This meant that the value of χ^2 should at least be 3.84 with degrees of freedom $df=1$, in order to conclude that there is a significant difference between the service sector and the retail trade. The χ^2 test shows that the difference in the rate of discrimination between the two sectors is not significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=2.69$, $df=1$) and therefore the conclusion can be drawn that Moroccan people do not encounter significantly more discrimination in the retail trade than in the service sector.

3.5. Conclusion

This part of the study tested the occurrence of discrimination in hiring procedures for semi-skilled jobs. Pairs of Moroccan and Dutch applicants applied simultaneously for jobs such as waiter, restaurant help and shop assistant. Even though the applicants were equally qualified, the Moroccan applicant encountered a significant incidence of discrimination. When both applicants applied for a job, the Moroccan was treated less favourably than his Dutch counterpart in at least 36.6 per cent of the cases. **This means that in one out of three applications the Dutch applicant advanced further in the application procedure than the equally qualified Moroccan applicant.** Unequal treatment occurred in each of the three stages of the application procedure, that is the telephone stage, the interview stage and the job offering stage. But most employers who discriminated did so during the

Table 5. Job sectors and occupations

Sector (occupation)	Audits	% of usable audits
Services (waiter, bartender, kitchen help)	68	38.8
Retail trade (shop assistant)	77	44.0
Office work (clerical worker)	3	1.7
Transportation (driver)	4	2.3
Technical (electrician)	4	2.3
Temporary employment agencies (waiter)	5	2.9
Other (order, porter, receptionist, telephone salesman)	14	8.0
Total	175	100

Table 6. Results of audit testing in the service sector and the retail trade

	Service	Retail
<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>		
Usable applications	68	77
Both applications accepted	49	56
Only Dutch application accepted	17	21
Only Moroccan application accepted	2	0
Net discrimination against Moroccan applicant	15	21
Net discrimination against Moroccan applicant in %	22%	27.3%
<i>2. Invitations for interviews:</i>		
Both applications accepted	49	56
Neither invited	26	15
Both invited	15	24
Only Dutch applicant invited	5	10
Only Moroccan applicant invited	0	2
Written application required	3	3
Net discrimination against Moroccan applicant	5	8
Cumulative net discrimination after two stages	20	29
Cumulative net discrimination in %	29.4%	37.6%
<i>3. Job offers:</i>		
Both invited for interview	15	24
Actually went to interview	7	10
No job offer	5	4
Job offer only to Dutch applicant	2	6
Job offer only to Moroccan applicant	0	0
Net discrimination against Moroccan applicant	2	6
Cumulative net discrimination after three stages	22	35
Cumulative net discrimination in %	32.4%	45.4%

telephone stage: in 23.4 per cent of the applications the Moroccan tester was rejected at that moment. While the Dutch applicant was allowed to indicate his skills and abilities to the employer, the Moroccan applicant was told that the job had already been taken. **In practice, this means that in one out of every four applications the Moroccan applicant is not even given a chance to apply, even though he might have outstanding qualifications.**

When other forms of unfavourable treatment, such as negative comments to the Moroccan applicant or a longer and more serious interview for the Dutch candidate, are also taken into account the Moroccan applicant encountered discrimination in at least 40 per cent of the cases. The rate of discrimination was not higher for positions in the retail trade than for positions in the service sector (45.4 per cent versus 32.4 per cent) as this difference was not significant at the 5 per cent level.

The high rate of discrimination encountered by the Moroccan applicant forms a serious impediment to his chances of getting a job. This is illustrated by the difference in the number of interviews both applicants were able to obtain: while the Dutch applicant received invitations for an interview in 53.7 per cent of the cases, the Moroccan applicant received invitations for an interview in only 28.6 per cent of the cases. Of course, an interview does not necessarily result in a job offer, but the more interviews one is invited to, the more chance one has of getting a job. **The findings of the third stage - in which the Dutch applicant was offered a job 40 per cent of the times he was invited for an interview and the Moroccan applicant never - strongly suggest that the possibility of actually getting a job is very low for Moroccan applicants.**

4. Correspondence testing

4.1. Introduction

Correspondence testing was used to measure the rate of discrimination against male Surinamese applying for jobs requiring a college education. This method entails sending two different but equivalent letters, one for a Dutch applicant and one for a Surinamese applicant, to the same vacancies and examining the employer's response.

The Surinamese group is a well-established, second generation group of black immigrants in the Netherlands and nowadays many Surinamese people have completed a college education.

There has been a gradual increase in migration from the former Dutch colony Surinam to the Netherlands since the end of the last century. The pursuit of social mobility (education), labour migration, as well as migration as a result of the political situation in Surinam, are important influences in this context. Between 1880 and 1950 the migrants were primarily members of the Surinamese elite, who were well educated and had often worked as civil servant or government official. Because of the strong orientation towards Dutch society, these migrants had no difficulties in adapting and integrating into Dutch society. Between 1950 and 1975 other groups of Surinamese migrated to the Netherlands to seek education or employment. Since 1970 many low-educated Surinamese, who were not extensively oriented towards Dutch society, came to the Netherlands in a period of economic stagnation. The period 1974-1986 was characterized by the inflow of Surinamese immigrants for political reasons and by family reunion of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands. To date, a total of approximately 210,000 Surinamese people have migrated to the Netherlands, making it one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands.

4.2. Methodology

4.2.1. Selecting test situations

Before beginning the correspondence tests, the Employment Exchange was asked to provide a list of possible job sectors that could be used. For the same reasons as explained in section 2.2.3, it was important that labour be in large supply and in high demand in these sectors. Another important condition was that a college education was required for these jobs. The following jobs were considered suitable:

- Teacher for both primary and secondary school;
- Laboratory assistant;
- Administrator/financial manager;
- Personnel manager.

During the research period, we found that there was a very plentiful supply of labour; it was not uncommon for "our" fictitious applicants to have to compete with 200 real applicants for the job.

We included temporary jobs as well as permanent jobs and full-time as well as part-time jobs in the sample. Both the private and the public sectors were tested. Vacancies for which a positive action programme was in force were also included. The companies tested were mainly concentrated in the "Randstad" area, in keeping with the research plan. However, because of the scarcity of vacancies during the research period, several companies elsewhere in the country were also tested.

4.2.2. Channels used to find vacancies

Every week a random sample of advertisements for job vacancies was drawn from several national and regional newspapers, such as the *"De Telegraaf"*, *"Algemeen Dagblad"*, *"Trouw"*, *"De Volkskrant"*, *"Utrechts Nieuwsblad"* and *"Intermediair"*.

4.2.3. Fictitious letters and curriculum vitae

For each job type two different but equivalent standard letters were constructed. The letters had a different layout, were typed in a different typeface and put in a different envelope. The standard letters, typefaces and envelopes were used alternately for the Surinamese and the Dutch applicant and consisted of a two-page curriculum vitae and a covering letter.

As the competition with real applicants was high, the testers had to be extremely well-qualified for the employment sought. Therefore the applicants were made perfectly fitting for the vacancy. They always had completed the required education, required age (between 23-28), several years of work experience in a comparable type of company and experience with whatever was asked for in the vacancy (computer programmes, special type of teaching, special activities). We tried to keep the letters as standardized as possible, but slight modifications in qualifications had to be made for each vacancy in order to qualify.

Qualifications were closely matched between each pair of letters for the Surinamese and Dutch applicant. Both were given the same age, same type of education at Dutch schools of comparable quality and the same number of years of work experience in closely-related companies. Both were given approximately the same personal characteristics, hobbies and voluntary work in comparable fields. As a reason for application, the applicants would state that they were going to move to the city in which the company was located, that their present employment was only temporary, that they were ready for a new step in their career or that they wanted to work part-time instead of full-time (if the job was part-time).

The Surinamese applicant was made identifiable by his typical Surinamese name, Errol Rozenblad, and his place of birth: Paramaribo (Surinam). He had completed the whole of his education in the Netherlands. The Dutch applicant was given a typical Dutch name: Paul van Bergen. Both applicants used an actual address and telephone number in similar socio-economic areas in Utrecht. The letters were always mailed simultaneously the same day in the same mailbox.

The following letters are two examples of equivalent application letters. The first pair of letters (1A and 1B) is for a job as primary school teacher and the second pair of letters (2A and 2B) for a job as a personnel manager.

Letter 1A : primary school teacher

Further to your advertisement in ... of ..., I would inform you that I wish to be considered for the position of teacher at your school. This position is closely related to my work experience and interests, and I am of the opinion that I am able to meet the stated requirements.

Following my college education for primary school teacher at the.... in..., I worked as a teacher at various (Catholic) schools. However, the appointments were always of a temporary nature and I am therefore currently looking for a new position. I have experience with teaching children of all ages.

I am very fascinated with children, especially those in the upper school. Teaching gives me a great fulfilment. In my opinion the education of children by means of arts, sports and cultural activities is very important. Therefore I always try to organize as many of such activities as I can. I also attach great value to a good atmosphere in my class and at school, in order that children can feel safe and at ease.

During my work I experienced that it is important for teachers to have a clear and unified approach to school policy and to promote this as well as possible. A good understanding between the teachers is a prerequisite for this. I think that I will be able make a good contribution to the atmosphere at school with my enthusiasm and inventiveness.

I also find it important for parents to cooperate and assist and feel involved with the school. I am used to cooperating with parents from different cultural and educational backgrounds. As a result, I am able to recognize and cope with the different habits and behavioral patterns of children.

Finally, I would inform you that I am Roman-Catholic and am eager to contribute to the Catholic identity of the school. For any further information, I would refer you to the enclosed curriculum vitae. I would be happy to attend an interview at any time convenient to you.

Letter 1B: Primary school teacher

Further to your advertisement of ... in the ..., which I read with great enthusiasm, I would like to apply for the advertised post of teacher.

I am qualified as primary school teacher and have several years of work experience. After finishing my studies, I first worked as a teacher at a primary school, where I taught children between the ages of 6-12 years. Following this appointment, I also taught children of 4-6 years old at a Catholic school in Amsterdam.

Apart from teaching, I was also very creative and enthusiastic in organizing a variety of indoor and outdoor (extra-curricular) activities. I learned to take the different backgrounds and needs of children into account and I can easily adapt myself to their perception.

I have experienced that proper communication and a good working atmosphere among the teachers is very important in order to work with an integrated teaching programme and to achieve a good division of tasks. Due to my flexible attitude and team spirit, I am able to function very well in a team. During consultations and meetings I can work in a clear and efficient manner.

I find good contacts between parents and teachers to be very important to me. I have learnt to maintain effective contacts with various groups of parents.

I am looking for a job in which I can put my knowledge and experience into practice. The position you are offering can provide the opportunity to do so. For further information concerning my education and work experience, I would refer you to my curriculum vitae, which I have enclosed for your convenience. I hope you will allow me the opportunity to discuss these details further in a personal interview.

Letter 2A: personnel manager

Further to your advertisement in the... of..., I would like to submit my application for the position of personnel manager. The position advertised follows closely on the experience I have already gained in previous appointments and, furthermore, I am capable of meeting the stated requirements.

After completing my college education at the College of Social Studies (Personnel Management), I worked for a few years in the personnel department of and as personnel official at ... in My activities included personnel administration, advising and supporting management concerning personnel and employment policy, co-developing and implementing this employment policy, supervising organizational changes and introducing and selecting new employees. In this context, I acted as consultant/point of information for the employees. I enjoyed working here very much but I am ready for a new step in my career.

I have good communicative skills and a good spoken and written command of Dutch, English and German. I can function well both in a group and individually. I am able to respond to every situation with a high degree of flexibility, and during the past years I have learnt to cope with work-related stress. Furthermore, I aim for a high degree of accuracy in my work.

Based on my experience, training and personal abilities I think I am well-qualified for this job. For further information I would refer you to my curriculum vitae. I would be happy to attend an interview at any time convenient to you.

Letter 2B: personnel manager

With reference to your advertisement in the ... of ... for the post of personnel manager, I would like to submit my application for this vacancy. I believe I meet the desired profile and requirements.

My college education in Personnel Management, together with my work experience, form a good basis on which to perform the function in question. After my studies, I worked as an assistant personnel manager at Following this, I worked as a personnel official at I find my work very interesting but because I am planning to move to ... I am looking for another job in the vicinity of this town.

My tasks as a personnel manager included the following: supporting and advising management on the implementation of personnel tasks, further developing and adapting personnel policy, carrying out personnel administration, selecting and introducing new employees and advising employees on personnel matters such as education and working conditions.

During my studies and work, I demonstrated the following abilities: communication skills, dealing with stress and being inventive, flexible and enthusiastic. Furthermore, I can work in a team as well as individually. I have extensive knowledge of English and German, both written and spoken.

For further information concerning my education and experience, I would refer you to the enclosed curriculum vitae. I hope I will be able to discuss my qualifications during a personal interview.

4.2.4. The application procedure

After the letters of application had been written, the applicants were either invited for an interview, rejected immediately or kept on file in case no suitable candidate was found. If the applicants were invited for an interview by letter, a letter was written immediately or a telephone call was made by the supervisor saying that he had already been offered another job. This was done to minimize the inconvenience for the employer and the real applicants. In many cases the employer called the telephone number included in the letter of application to invite the applicant. The telephone numbers were actual numbers of people who had been instructed to inform the caller that the applicant was not at home at the moment and to make a note of the telephone call. The supervisor, posturing as the applicant, would then call back to the employer to say that he had already taken another job.

In other words, the application procedure was terminated after an invitation had been obtained. It was not possible to have the test persons go to the interview, because the jobs for which we applied were highly-skilled jobs. It would have been very difficult to find two equally qualified persons able to play the role of these high-qualified candidates. Moreover, the applicants were often asked to bring their diplomas with them. We are aware that, if the total application procedure had been followed, the net discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant may well have been much higher.

In a small number of cases the employers became suspicious and verified the credentials of the applicants. In one case this led to an immediate exclusion from the application procedure, but in other cases the supervisor, posturing as the applicant, convinced the employer that he really had worked in the company mentioned in the letter and that he must have spoken to someone from another department. As it is forbidden by the Personal Registration Act ("Wet Persoonsregistratie") to give any information about an employee without his permission, this type of problem did not occur very often.

4.2.5. Measuring discrimination

For reasons explained in section 2.2.8, the cases of unfavourable treatment of the Dutch applicant were subtracted from the cases of unfavourable treatment of the Surinamese applicant in order to cancel out any random factors. This leaves a measure of unfavourable treatment resulting from systematic behaviour and hence of discrimination.

The cases of disparate treatment were once again divided into two types: unequal treatment and equal but different treatment. If both applicants were invited, this was seen as equal treatment. The cases in which both applicants were rejected immediately rendered no information about discrimination in hiring and were therefore not used in calculating the results. Unequal treatment was said to occur if one applicant received an invitation for an interview while the other was rejected. In other words, if one applicant advanced to a further stage in the application procedure while the other was excluded from the competition. The results of unequal treatment are summarized in table 7. Examples of employer's responses are given in section 5.1.

Equal stage but different treatment was said to occur if one applicant was rejected immediately while the other was kept on file in case none of the selected candidates was found suitable, i. e. if the other was not rejected until the application procedure had been terminated. Equal but different treatment was also said to occur if the employer rejected both applicants but one was provided with an alternative vacancy in the same or a different company. In these cases the evidence of discrimination is less "hard" than in cases where one tester is invited while the other is not (unequal treatment). However, this difference in treatment is important in practice and supports the findings in table 7. The results of equal but different treatment are summarized in table 8. In this table equal treatment was said to occur if both letters were kept on file or if both applicants received another vacancy to which they could apply.

Table 9 shows the total results of both unequal treatment and equal but different treatment. The rate of discrimination shown in table 7, which contains the results of unequal treatment, can be seen as a minimum rate of discrimination occurring against college-educated Surinamese applicants. On the other hand, the rate of discrimination in table 9, which contains the results of both unequal treatment and equal but different treatment, can be seen as the maximum rate of discrimination occurring against Surinamese applicants.

4.2.6. Validity check

It is important to know whether one standard letter received more positive responses than the other. This would be the case if the contents or layout of one letter was considerably better or more attractive than that of the other. To check this, a simple validity check was used. In total there were 89 cases of disparate reply (in 62 cases only the Dutch applicant was invited or kept on file and in 27 cases this was true for the Surinamese applicant). In 51 cases of disparate treatment, the Courier typeface was used and in 38 cases the Times typeface.

The null hypothesis is that the typeface is not responsible for the disparate treatment. The chance of a positive reply is then 0.5 for each typeface. Ideally, the 89 cases of disparate treatment should consist of 44 letters with the courier typeface and 44 letters with the Times typeface (mean value = 44). To calculate the deviation for which the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 percent level, the standard deviation of the binomial curve $F = \sqrt{npq}$ is used, in which p and q are the chances of positive replies to the Courier typeface and the Times typeface. Thus $F = \sqrt{89 \times 0.5 \times 0.5} = 4.7$. If the null hypothesis is correct at the 5 percent level, the deviation from the mean value should not be more than $\pm 1.96F$ in a normal distribution. In other words, one typeface should not have more or less than $44 \pm 9 =$ more than 53 or less than 35 positive responses out of 89 cases. As the positive responses to the different typefaces were respectively 51 and 36, the conclusion can be drawn that the disparate treatment was not due to the typeface.

4.2.7. Statistical analysis of test results

The total number of usable observations (N) used in the correspondence testing experiment is 157 (table 7), when only those letters are judged usable where one or both applicants are invited for an interview, and 182 (table 9) when also those letters are judged usable where one or both applicants are kept on file or sent a new vacancy. For these N-values we have to calculate the minimum net discrimination rate, which is required to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level (see section 2.2.11). In other words, when may we conclude that discrimination occurs against college-educated Surinamese applicants in hiring procedures?

According to the following equation: $\%N = 1.96F / CRF$ (N being the total number of usable observations, F being the standard unit of the normal distribution, 1.96 being the z-value at the 5 per cent significance level for a normal distribution and CR being the critical net discrimination rate), we conclude that for N= 157, the minimum required net discrimination rate to conclude that discrimination has been practised at a significance level of 5 per cent, $CR = 1.96F / \%NF = 1.96 / \%157 = 15.6$ per cent. For N= 182, the critical net discrimination rate at the 5 per cent level is $1.96F / \%NF = 1.96 / \%182 = 14.5$ per cent (see section 2.2.11). If the net discrimination observed in this experiment is more than these critical rates, then the conclusion can be drawn that discrimination against ethnic minorities in hiring procedures occurs at the highly-skilled level.

A χ^2 test was used to find out whether there was a significant difference between the public and private sector, between small and large companies, between the different job types and between companies with or without a positive action programme. To be significant at the 5 per cent level, the value of χ^2 for the difference in net discrimination must be greater than 3.84 with the number of degrees of freedom $df=1$ and greater than 4.605 with $df=2$. Only then can we conclude that there is a significant difference in the occurrence of discrimination between the different types of jobs and companies as distinguished above.

5. Results

A total of 299 pairs of letters were written between October 1993 and June 1994. Nine pairs of letters received no response and were thus counted as invalid. In 133 applications of the remaining 290 valid applications, neither applicant was invited. These results were not used for the calculation of the results in first instance (table 7; section 5.1.). However, in 25 cases of these 133 applications, neither was invited but the applicants were not rejected immediately: one or both applicants were kept on file or provided with an alternative vacancy. In section 5.2 and table 8, these cases are examined more closely. The results are then combined in one table (9).

Section 5.4 summarizes the results for the public and private sector separately, section 5.5 for small and large companies, section 5.6 for different job types and section 5.7 for companies with a positive action programme and companies without these programmes. The difference in treatment was not due to any difference between the two matched letters, as was shown by the validity check.

5.1. Unequal treatment

Equal treatment, that is if both applicants were invited for an interview, occurred in 50 per cent (79:157x100) of the usable tests (table 7). In 34 per cent (53:157x100), unequal

Table 7. Results of correspondence testing: minimum rate of discrimination

Valid applications	290
Neither invited	133
Usable applications	157
Both invited	79
Only Dutch applicant invited	53
Only Surinamese applicant invited	25
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	28
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant in % (28:157x100)	17.8%

treatment against the Surinamese applicant occurred (only the Dutch applicant was invited while the Surinamese applicant was rejected). The opposite, that is unequal treatment against the Dutch applicant, occurred in only 16 per cent of the usable audits (25:157x100). Here, the Surinamese applicant was invited while the Dutch applicant was rejected. Subtracting the unequal treatment against the Dutch tester from the unequal treatment against the Surinamese applicant results in a net discrimination of 17.8 per cent (28:157x100) against the Surinamese. This percentage can be seen as a minimum rate of discrimination against Surinamese applicants. **In practice this means that when a Surinamese man applies for a job requiring a college education for which an equally qualified Dutch applicant is also competing, there is at least a one in five chance that the Surinamese applicant will be unable to advance as far in the application procedure as an equally qualified Dutch applicant.** Since a net discrimination rate of 17.8 per cent is more than the 15.6 per cent required to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level (see section 4.2.7.), **the conclusion can be drawn that recruitment discrimination against college-educated Surinamese applicants occurs on the Dutch labour market.** The following employers' responses are illustrative:

Both applicants had applied for a position as personnel manager in the public sector. Reply to the Surinamese applicant:

Further to your application, we would inform you that although you were an interesting candidate, unfortunately you were not selected. We wish you good luck with your other applications.

Reply to the Dutch applicant:

*Further to your application of Saturday... we invite you to our office in.. on...
If you are unable to attend, would you please inform us in advance?*

Both applicants applied for a position as administrator in the private sector. The Surinamese applicant received the following letter on February 18th:

Thank you for your application for the position of administrator in our company. However, we must inform you that this vacancy has already been filled.

The Dutch applicant received the following letter on February 17th:

Further to your letter, we invite you for an interview on the 25th of February. [...].

5.2. Equal but different treatment

The 133 cases in which neither applicant was invited for an interview were examined more closely. In 108 instances both applicants were rejected immediately. In the remaining 25 applications, some sort of positive response was made to one or both applicants. For example, they were kept on file or an alternative vacancy was sent to the applicants. These results are shown in table 8. Equal treatment occurred in 14 of the 25 cases; both were kept on file in case none of the selected candidates was found suitable in 13 cases, while in one case both were

sent a new vacancy for which they could apply. Equal stage but different treatment occurred in 11 cases; in nine cases the Surinamese was unfavourably treated in comparison with the equally qualified Dutch applicant (the Dutch applicant was kept on file while the Surinamese was rejected, or the Dutch applicant was sent a new vacancy while the Surinamese was not) and in two cases the opposite occurred (the Surinamese was kept on file while the Dutch applicant was rejected). In other words, these findings corroborate the findings of table 7, in which results were analysed in terms of acceptance and rejection.

The following letters are examples of a case in which neither applicant was invited but both were kept on file. The first letter is from an employer who advertised a vacancy for the position of laboratory assistant in a hospital. The second letter was received from a school which had advertised a vacancy for the position of schoolteacher. In these cases both applicants received the same response:

1. We would hereby inform you that we received 117 applications in response to our vacancy. We made a selection from these applications and invited a number of candidates for an interview. You were not selected initially, but, depending on the results, we may contact you at a later stage of the procedure.

2. Thank you for your application. You were not chosen in the first selection. A number of candidates will proceed to a further stage in the application procedure. We will terminate the procedure at the end of May. If this leads to a positive result, no other candidates will be invited for an interview. Until then your application will be kept on file.

The following letters are examples of a case in which the Dutch applicant is kept on file and the Surinamese is rejected. The applicants applied for a position as personnel manager. The response to the Surinamese candidate was as follows:

We would hereby confirm receiving your letter in which you applied for the position of personnel manager. We regret to inform you that we will not continue your application. After having studied your letter carefully, we have decided to continue the procedure with other candidates whom we considered to be more eligible, according to their background and experience. We trust that you will understand our decision.

The response to the Dutch candidate was different:

Your letter was discussed by the selection committee and compared with other applications. We divided the letters into three categories. We will invite one group of candidates (8) for personal interviews. A second category of candidates received a letter of rejection today. You were placed in the third category, consisting of candidates whom we wish to hold in reserve. We will inform you as soon as possible about the further procedure.

Table 8. Results of correspondence testing: equal but different treatment

Neither invited	133
Both rejected immediately	108
Both rejected but positive response	25
Both kept on file	13
Only Dutch applicant kept on file, Surinamese applicant rejected	8
Only Surinamese kept on file, Dutch applicant rejected	2
Both sent new vacancy	1
Only Dutch applicant sent new vacancy	1
Only Surinamese applicant sent new vacancy	0
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	7

In response to the application for the position of financial manager in a municipality, both applicants received a letter in which they were rejected. The letters were identical. However, only the letter to the Dutch applicant contained an extra page with a copy of a vacancy announcement for the position of financial manager in a different municipality, as well as the following text:

This vacancy will soon be published in the newspaper. I was requested to send you this vacancy when returning your letter of application. If you are interested in this vacancy, you are requested to apply within 10 days to the address mentioned in the vacancy.

The vacancy stated that "especially women, ethnic minorities and handicapped people are requested to apply. Preference is given to them, provided they meet the requirements." However, no vacancy announcement had been sent to the Surinamese applicant.

5.3. The maximum rate of discrimination

If the results of equal but different treatment (table 8) and those of unequal treatment (table 7) are both taken into consideration, the rate of discrimination against the Surinamese applicant becomes slightly higher (see table 9) than if only unequal treatment is measured. While the Dutch applicant was favoured over the Surinamese in 34 per cent (62:182x100) of the cases, the Surinamese was favoured over the Dutch applicant in 15 per cent, resulting in a cumulative net discrimination of 19.2 per cent against the Surinamese applicant. Since the critical rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level is 14.5 per cent in this case (see section 4.2.7.), discrimination against college-educated Surinamese applicants in hiring procedures has been proven to occur¹. The net discrimination found here can be seen as a maximum rate of discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant in the first stage of the application procedure. If the total application procedure had been followed (including the job offer stage), the net discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant might well have been much higher.

¹ The net-discrimination percentage of 19.2% is

significant even at the 1 per cent level (N=182).

Table 9. Results of correspondence testing: maximum rate of discrimination

Valid applications	290
Both rejected immediately	108
Usable applications	182
<i>Equal treatment</i>	93
Both invited	79
Both kept in file	13
Both sent new vacancy	1
<i>Dutch applicant favoured</i>	62
Only Dutch applicant invited	53
Only Dutch applicant kept on file	8
Only Dutch applicant sent new vacancy	1
<i>Surinamese favoured</i>	27
Only Surinamese applicant invited	25
Only Surinamese applicant kept on file	2
Only Surinamese applicant sent new vacancy	0
Cumulative net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	35
Cumulative net discrimination in % (35:182x100)	19.2%

5.4. Private and public sector

Companies in both the private and the public sector were tested. To find out which sector was more prone to discrimination, the results of the correspondence testing were calculated separately. All companies belonging to the semi-public sector, that is companies which are not run by but funded by the government, were counted as belonging to the public sector. The companies selected from the semi-public sector consisted mainly of denominational primary schools, such as Roman-Catholic and Protestant schools, Montessori schools and schools for children with a learning disability, which are run by a special organization but are heavily dependent on government funding. As is shown in table 10, there is a considerable difference in the rate of discrimination against the Surinamese applicant between the two sectors; while the percentage of net discrimination in the public sector is 13.7 per cent, the percentage of net discrimination in the private sector is 31 per cent. The difference between the public and the private sector was significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=6.875$, $df=1$), **indicating that firms in the private sector are much more likely to discriminate than those in the public sector.** The results are based on the results of table 9, showing the maximum rate of discrimination. In other words, "equal treatment" in this table was said to occur if both applicants were invited, kept on file or sent a new vacancy. The Dutch applicant was considered to have been favoured if he was the only one who had been invited, kept on file or sent a new vacancy; and the Surinamese was considered to have been favoured if he was the only one who had been invited, kept on file or sent a new vacancy.

Table 10. Results of correspondence testing for private and public sector

	Private	Public
Valid applications	93	197
Both rejected immediately	35	73
Usable applications	58	124
Equal treatment	24	69
Dutch applicant favoured	26	36
Surinamese applicant favoured	8	19
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	18	17
Net discrimination in %	31.0%	13.7%

Table 11. Results of correspondence testing based on company size

Company size	<100	100-499	>500
Valid applications	31	29	33
Both rejected immediately	16	7	12
Usable applications	15	22	21
Equal treatment	7	7	10
Dutch applicant favoured	6	11	9
Surinamese applicant favoured	2	4	2
Net discrimination against Surinamese	4	7	7
Net discrimination in %	26.7%	31.8%	33.3%

Table 12. Results of correspondence testing for different job types

Job type	LAB.AS T.	FIN.MA N.	TEACH.	PER.M AN.
Valid applications	24	83	133	50
Both rejected immediately	7	30	57	14
Usable applications	17	53	76	36
Equal treatment	4	25	49	15
Dutch applicant favoured	6	20	20	16
Surinamese applicant favoured	7	8	7	5
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant		12	13	11
Net discrimination in %	-6%	22.6%	17.3%	30.5%

5.5. Company size

As most employers in the public sector were organizations with fewer than 100 employees (most of them were primary schools), the analysis of company size as a variable in explaining the occurrence of discrimination was only carried out for private sector companies. The sample of companies obtained from the private sector showed considerable variation in company size, ranging from seven employees to more than 4,000 employees. To find out whether there were differences in responses to applicants based on company size, the results were calculated separately. The companies were divided into three categories: small companies (<100 employees), middle-sized companies (100-499 employees) and large companies (>500 employees). If the size of the company was not mentioned in the vacancy, the company was telephoned and asked how many employees were employed. As shown in table 11, there are slight differences in the responses to the applicants based on company size. Larger firms appear to be somewhat more likely to discriminate than small firms. However, this difference was not statistically significant ($\chi^2=0.5$, $df=2$) at the 5 per cent level.

5.6. Occupation

Four different occupations were examined: financial manager (FIN.MAN), personnel manager (PER.MAN), teacher (TEACH) and laboratory assistant (LAB.AST). Table 12 shows the rate of discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant for each different job type. Discrimination against the Surinamese applicant was found to occur in each job type, with the exception of laboratory assistant. The different results for the job of laboratory assistant may have been caused by a very high demand for this type of worker. While the average unemployment rate among college graduates is 4 per cent, the unemployment rate among laboratory school graduates is only 2.2 per cent (*Volkskrant*, 24 August 1994). However, if this had been the case, we would have found more cases of equal treatment. We were unable to find another satisfying explanation for the different results of laboratory assistant. It is important to note that the total number of usable observations (17) for this job type is too small to draw any valid conclusions. Also important to note is that the results for laboratory assistant (-6 per cent) reduce the overall net discrimination rate of 18 per cent. The difference in the rate of discrimination for the remaining three job types (TEACH, PER.MAN. and FIN.MAN.) is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=4.4$, $df=2$).

5.7. Positive action programmes

"Positive action" implies the preferential treatment of disadvantaged groups such as women, handicapped people and ethnic minorities if they are equally qualified compared with non-handicapped men of the majority population. In the public sector it is quite common to have a positive action programme, but not in the private sector. If such a programme is in force, this is mentioned in the vacancy as follows: "Handicapped people, ethnic minorities and women are preferred, providing they are equally qualified" or "Ethnic minorities and women are particularly requested to apply for the job".

Vacancies for which a positive action programme was in force were calculated separately from those for which this was not the case in order to see if these programmes would make any difference in the rate of discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant (table 13). As the aim of positive action programmes is to favour the minority applicants whenever they are equally qualified, we should expect to find discrimination against the Dutch applicant for the vacancies with a positive action programme in force. A total of 21 vacancies with a positive action programme were tested, of which 17 were counted usable. In the remaining four, both applicants were rejected immediately. Two vacancies were advertised by companies in the private sector and the remaining 15 vacancies by companies in the public sector. Once again, in this table the results were based on the results of table 9, showing the maximum rate of discrimination.

Table 13 shows the results for vacancies from employers with a positive action programme and for those without. In the former group, the Dutch applicant was favoured over the Surinamese in 17.6 per cent ($3:17 \times 100$) of the cases and the Surinamese was favoured over the Dutch applicant in exactly the same rate, 17.6 per cent. In other words, for the vacancies from employers with a positive action programme, the net discrimination against the Surinamese was 0 per cent. For vacancies from employers without a positive action programme, the net discrimination against the Surinamese was 21 per cent. This difference proved to be significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=4.53$; $df=1$). **This means that, instead of preferential treatment for the minority applicants, positive action programmes actually seem to provide equal chances to all applicants. Employers with such a programme do not seem to favour Surinamese over Dutch applicants, but at least the rate of net discrimination is reduced to zero.**

5.8. Conclusion

Correspondence testing was used to find out whether college-educated Surinamese men are treated unfavourably when applying for highly-skilled jobs. Two different but equivalent letters were sent simultaneously to apply for the same vacancies. One letter was signed by a Dutch (fictitious) applicant and the other by a Surinamese (fictitious) applicant. We found that discrimination against the Surinamese applicant occurred in 17.8 per cent of the job applications. This figure became 19.2 per cent when more subtle forms of unfavourable treatment were also taken into account, such as cases in which only one applicant was kept on file or provided with another vacancy for which to apply. As both figures (17.8 per cent and 19.2 per cent) proved to be significant at the 5 percent level, **the conclusion can be drawn that male second generation immigrants (Surinamese) encounter discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin when applying for jobs requiring a college education. In one out of five applications they will be rejected immediately.** If the total application procedure had been followed, including the job offer stage, the net discrimination encountered by the Surinamese applicant might well have been much higher. **Thus, even immigrants who have received a college education and speak Dutch fluently are at a disadvantage: equal access to employment is denied to them. Education and language courses will therefore not be enough to end the disadvantaged position of ethnic minorities on the Dutch labour market.**

Table 13. Results of correspondence testing: vacancies with and without positive action

	Pos. action	No pos. action
Valid applications	21	269
Both rejected immediately	4	104
Usable applications	17	165
Equal treatment	11	82
Dutch applicant favoured	3	59
Surinamese applicant favoured	3	24
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	0	35
Net discrimination in %	0%	21%

Certain segments of the labour market were found to be more susceptible to discrimination than others. For example, **firms in the private sector were substantially more likely to discriminate than firms in the public sector** (31 per cent versus 14 per cent) ($\chi^2=6.875$; $df=2$). There were no significant differences in responses to applicants based on company size: middle-sized firms (100-499 employees) and large firms (>500 employees) were somewhat more likely to discriminate than small firms (<100 employees) (respectively 32 per cent, 33 per cent versus 27 per cent). However, as this difference was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level ($\chi^2=0.5$; $df=2$), the differences should be interpreted as essentially zero.

Discrimination was observed for all job types examined, except for the job of laboratory assistant, where the rate of net discrimination was minus 6 per cent. The results for the job of laboratory assistant may have been caused by a very high demand for this type of worker. While the average unemployment rate among college graduates is 4 per cent, the unemployment rate among laboratory school graduates is only 2.2 per cent (*Volkskrant*, 24 August 1994). However, if this had been the case, we would have found more cases of equal treatment. We were unable to find another satisfying explanation for the deviating results of laboratory assistant. It is important to note that the total number of usable observations (17) for this job type is too small to draw any valid conclusions. Also important to note is that the results for laboratory assistant (-6 per cent) reduce the overall net discrimination rate of 18 per cent. The differences in the rate of discrimination observed for the positions of teacher, personnel manager and financial manager did not differ significantly at the 5 percent level ($\chi^2=4.4$; $df=2$). The rate of discrimination encountered in firms whose vacancies stated that "when equally qualified, ethnic minorities are given preferential treatment" was zero, while this was significantly higher (21 per cent) in firms where no positive action programme was in force. This means that positive action programmes do not result in preferential treatment for the minority applicants but do seem to result in equal opportunities for both minority and non-minority applicants in hiring procedures.

6. Extra experiments

6.1. Introduction

6.1.1. Job level or ethnic group?

In chapter 3 the rate of discrimination against the Moroccan group with a low educational level was measured using the audit testing method and in chapter 5 against the Surinamese group with a college education, using correspondence testing. The results of the two experiments differed considerably: while the Moroccan group with a low educational level was unfavourably treated in 36.6 per cent of the cases, the Surinamese group with a college education was unfavourably treated in 19.2 per cent of the cases. What could be the reason for this difference? Does the older established ethnic minority group (Surinamese) encounter less discrimination than the group of relative newcomers (Moroccans) or do immigrants with a high educational level encounter less discrimination than immigrants with a low educational level?

The influence of the variables "education" and "ethnic group" on the rate of discrimination could not be determined on the basis of the experiments performed. An extra experiment was therefore performed: the rate of discrimination against male Surinamese with a low educational level was measured using the audit testing method. The results of this experiment, described in section 6.3.1, were compared with the results of the audit testing with low-educated Moroccan applicants to answer the question as to whether the Moroccan group encounters more discrimination than the Surinamese group. The results of this experiment were also compared with the results of the correspondence testing with college-educated Surinamese applicants to find out whether Surinamese encounter more or less discrimination when applying for semi-skilled jobs than when applying for jobs requiring a college education.

6.1.2. Gender and ethnic group

To investigate the rate of discrimination against minority women applying for jobs, all of the experiments mentioned above were repeated with female applicants. In other words, two audit testing experiments were carried out, one exploring the occurrence of discrimination against low-educated Moroccan women and the other against low-educated Surinamese women. In both experiments the group of minority women was compared with a group of Dutch women. The main results are described in sections 6.3.2. and 6.3.3. of this chapter. Correspondence testing was used to measure the rate of discrimination against college-educated Surinamese women. The main results are summarized in section 6.3.4 of this chapter.

6.2. Methodology

6.2.1. Audit experiments: Surinamese men, Surinamese women and Moroccan women

Discrimination was tested against Surinamese men, Surinamese women and Moroccan women, using the audit testing method as described in chapter 2. The testers applied for the same type of semi-skilled jobs (mainly in the retail trade and in the service sector) and their qualifications were the same as the qualifications of the Moroccan and Dutch men in the audit experiment. The Surinamese men and women and the Moroccan women were all presented as being born in Surinam and Morocco, respectively. They had come to the Netherlands at an early age and had completed the whole of their education in the Netherlands. However, there were some important differences with the audit experiment as described in chapter 2:

- To identify the Surinamese tester as such, he/she not only used a Surinamese name (Stanley or Gladys Leeftang), but also a slight Surinamese accent. The reason for this was that many Surinamese names are Dutch or English names and are not recognizable as Surinamese for most people. In the correspondence testing method this was not a problem as, in case of doubt, the Surinamese tester could be identified by his or her place of birth: Paramaribo (Surinam).
- Only the first and second stage of the application procedure were tested. The testers did not go for a personal interview when invited. This was done to save time and money, as well as to avoid the most difficult and least controllable step in the application procedure.
- The total number of observations (N) was less than 170 in all experiments: in the audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Surinamese men, the number of observations was 102; in the audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Moroccan women, this number was 92; and in the audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Surinamese women, the number of observations was 100. As a consequence, the minimum net discrimination rate, which was required to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at a 5 per cent significance level, was no longer 15 per cent. The critical rate for these experiments was found with the following equation: $\%N = 1.96F/CR$ and thus $CR = 1.96F/\%NF$ (N being the total number of usable observations, 1.96 being the z-value for a normal distribution at a significance level of 5 per cent, F being the standard unit of the normal distribution and CR being the critical net discrimination rate) (see also section 2.2.11).

The audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Surinamese men therefore had a minimum required net discrimination rate of $1.96F/\%NF = 1.96/\%102 = 19.4$ per cent. The critical rate for the audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Moroccan women was $1.96F/\%NF = 1.96/\%92 = 20.4$ per cent and for the audit experiment where discrimination was tested against Surinamese women this was $1.96F/\%NF = 1.96/\%100 = 19.6$ per cent. Only if a net discrimination rate higher than the critical net discrimination rate would be observed in our experiments, could the null hypothesis be rejected and the conclusion could be drawn that discrimination had been practised.

6.2.2. Correspondence testing: Surinamese women

Discrimination was tested against college educated Surinamese women, using the correspondence testing method, as described in chapter 4. Pairs of equivalent letters were sent simultaneously to the same vacancies for jobs requiring a college education. One was sent by a fictitious Surinamese woman, whose name was Gladys Leeftang and whose place of birth was Paramaribo (Surinam) and the other was sent by a fictitious female Dutch applicant, whose name was Annemieke van Dalen.

The job sectors chosen differed from the job sectors tested in the correspondence testing with Surinamese men (section 4.2.1). This was due to practical reasons, namely that vacancies were

not in abundance during the period of research. All suitable vacancies for positions as primary school teacher, personnel manager, administrator and laboratory assistant were needed for the experiment with Surinamese men in order to obtain the 175 usable observations. Instead, vacancies for positions as secondary school teacher, ergotherapist and social worker were used. The demand for labour in these sectors was high (many vacancies appeared in the newspaper), while the supply of labour for these job types was moderate to high (the number of applicants for one vacancy was between 30 and 50 on average for the jobs of secondary school teacher and ergotherapist and more than 100 on average for social worker).

Furthermore, the total number of usable observations (N) differed in this experiment from the total number of usable observations in the correspondence testing experiment for Surinamese men (see chapter 4). Therefore, the minimum required net discrimination rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination had to be recalculated for this experiment. According to the equation $\%N = 1.96F/CRF$ (N being the total number of usable observations, 1.96 being the z -value for a normal distribution at a significance level of 5 per cent, F being the standard unit of the normal distribution and CR being the critical net discrimination rate) (see also section 2.2.11.), the critical net discrimination rate (CR) for this experiment is $1.96F/\%NF = 1.96/\%78 = 22.2$ per cent. This means that if one finds a net discrimination rate which is higher than 22.2 per cent, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level and conclude that college-educated Surinamese women are discriminated against, when applying for jobs requiring a college education.

A χ^2 test was used to find out whether there was a significant difference in the rate of discrimination observed between Surinamese and Moroccans, between males and females and between the semi skill level and the high skill level. To be significant at the 5 per cent level, the value of χ^2 for the difference in net discrimination must be greater than 3.84 with the number of degrees of freedom $df=1$. Only then can we conclude that there is a significant difference between the groups tested.

6. 3. Results

6.3.1. Audit testing: Surinamese men

Between April and June 1994, a total of 128 valid audits were completed by three pairs of testers. Of the 128 valid audits, 102 were usable for the calculation of the results. In the remaining 26 cases, we assume that the job had already been taken.

Table 14. Results of audit testing: minimum rate of discrimination Surinamese male applicants versus Dutch male applicants

<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>	
Valid applications	128
Neither application accepted	26
Usable applications	102
Both applications accepted	66
Only Dutch application accepted	35
Only Surinamese application accepted	1
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	34
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant in % (34:102x100)	34%
<i>2. Interviews:</i>	
Both applications accepted	66
Neither invited	18
Both invited	32
Only Dutch applicant invited	10
Only Surinamese applicant invited	3
Written application required	3
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	7
Cumulative net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	41
Cumulative net discrimination in % (41:102x100)	40%

In one of every three job applications the Surinamese tester was rejected immediately with the excuse that the job had already been taken. In all these cases the Dutch tester, who phoned ten minutes later, was treated as a serious candidate and often invited for an interview.

In total, the net discrimination against the Surinamese applicants was 41 (40 per cent) after two stages. **This means that in 40 per cent of all vacancies tested, the Dutch tester advanced further in the application procedure than the equally qualified Surinamese tester.** This number could have been higher if the third stage of the application procedure had been included. Since the percentage of net discrimination (40 per cent) is far more than the minimum required net discrimination rate (19.4 per cent) in this experiment, the null- hypothesis of no discrimination can be rejected at the 5 per cent level ¹. **Therefore we can conclude that discrimination against low-educated Surinamese immigrants frequently occurs in hiring procedures.** The results are summarized in table 14.

In the audit testing with Surinamese applicants there was only one case of equal but different treatment, which was in favour of the Dutch applicant:

A hotel asked for a night watchman. The Dutch tester was told that the activities included greeting customers and working behind the desk as a receptionist. He was expected to wear a suit. To the Surinamese tester, they stated that he would have to do a large amount of cleaning work, such as ironing, washing, making beds, etc. "Would this be a problem?" they asked. Both were invited for an interview.

¹ A net-discrimination rate of 40% is significant even at the 1 per cent level (with N=102).

If this case of equal but different treatment is added to the results of unequal treatment shown in table 14, the maximum net discrimination against the Surinamese becomes 41 per cent.

What do the results mean in practice? How many audits resulted in invitations for personal interviews for each tester? The 35 cases of the category "Only Dutch application accepted" under the heading "Application by telephone" can be divided into two categories:
 -the application by telephone resulted in an invitation for a personal interview (20 cases)
 -the application by telephone did not result in a personal interview (15 cases).
 The only case in the category "Only Surinamese application accepted" did not result in a personal interview.

The 66 cases where both applications were accepted, resulted in 32 cases where both testers were invited, ten cases where only the Dutch applicant was invited and three cases where only the Surinamese applicant was invited. Thus, the Dutch tester obtained 20 + 32 ("Both invited") + 10 ("Only Dutch applicant invited") = 62 interviews. The Surinamese tester obtained 0 + 32 ("Both invited") + 3 ("Only Surinamese invited") = 35 interviews. In other words, in 61 per cent of all audits the Dutch tester obtained an invitation for a personal interview while the Surinamese tester obtained an invitation in only 34 per cent of all audits (table 15). **These findings suggest that the discriminatory behaviour of employers seriously reduces the chance for low-educated Surinamese applicants to find employment at the semi-skilled level.**

The vacancies were once again heavily concentrated in the service sector and the retail trade (table 16). The degree of unequal treatment against Surinamese applicants was calculated separately for both sectors. The results are summarized in table 17. In the service sector there is a cumulative net discrimination against the Surinamese of 34.4 per cent. On the other hand, in the retail trade the cumulative net discrimination against the Surinamese is 55 per cent. However, this difference was not significant at the 5 percent level ($\chi^2=3.48$; $df=1$).

6.3.2. Audit testing: Moroccan women

Between March and April 1994, 106 valid audits were carried out at the semi-skilled level by three pairs of Moroccan and Dutch women. Of these audits, 92 were usable for the calculation of the results. In the remaining 14 cases the applicants were too late to apply and the vacancy was already filled by other candidates.

Table 18 shows the number of cases in which unequal treatment occurred. The cumulative net discrimination against the female Moroccan applicant after two stages is 34.8 per cent

Table 15. Number of interviews obtained

Number of interviews	number	% of audits
Dutch tester	62	61%
Surinamese tester	35	34%

Table 16. Job sectors and occupations

Sector (occupation)	audits	% of usable audits
Services (waiter, bartender, kitchen help)	58	56.9%
Retail trade (shop assistant)	34	33.3%
Office work (clerical worker)	1	1.0%
Transportation (driver)	0	-
Technical (electrician)	1	1.0%
Temporary employment agencies (waiter)	4	3.9%
Other (security, receptionist)	4	3.9%
Total	102	100%

Table 17. Results of audit testing for service sector and retail trade

	Service	Retail
<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>		
Usable applications	58	34
Both applications accepted	36	21
Only Dutch applications accepted	21	13
Only Surinamese application accepted	1	0
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	20	13
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant in %	34.4%	38%
<i>2. Interviews:</i>		
Both applications accepted	36	21
Neither invited	12	4
Both invited	19	8
Only Dutch applicant invited	2	7
Only Surinamese applicant invited	2	1
Written application required	1	1
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	0	6
Cumulative net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	20	19
Cumulative net discrimination in %	34.4%	55.8%

in the application procedure. Since the critical rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level is 20.4 per cent, discrimination has been shown to exist¹.

Thus, in one of every three applications the female Dutch applicant was considered preferable to the equally qualified female Moroccan tester somewhere in the application procedure. This number might have been much higher if the third stage had been included, that is the stage in which a job offer is made to one of the testers. In more than one of every four applications (27.2 per cent) the Moroccan tester was denied a chance to apply beforehand ("Sorry, but the job has already been taken"), while the Dutch tester was briefly interviewed by telephone about her work experience and education.

6.3.3. Audit testing: Surinamese women

Between April and June 1994, 115 valid audits were carried out at the semi-skilled level by two Dutch women and two Surinamese women. Fifteen audits were not usable because the job had already been taken when the applicants telephoned. The remaining 100 audits were counted as usable.

The results (table 19) show a considerable rate of discrimination against Surinamese women applying for semi-skilled jobs. **In at least 36 per cent of all applications, the female Dutch applicant was preferred to the equally qualified female Surinamese applicant.** This number might have been much higher if the third stage had been included, that is the stage in which a job offer is made to one of the testers. Most of the times discrimination occurred in the first stage of the application procedure; **in more than one out of four applications (28 per cent) the Surinamese female applicant was rejected immediately, after communicating her name, while the equally qualified Dutch female applicant was treated as a serious candidate.** Since the critical rate to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination at the 5 per cent level is 19.6 per cent in this experiment (with N=100), discrimination against female Surinamese applicants at the semi-skilled level has been demonstrated to occur².

6.3.4. Correspondence testing: Surinamese women

Between February and July 1994, 116 pairs of equivalent letters were sent simultaneously in response to vacancies for jobs requiring a college education. One was sent by a fictitious Dutch woman and the other by a fictitious Surinamese woman, whose ethnic background was made identifiable by her typical Surinamese name (Gladys Leeflang) and her place of birth, Paramaribo. In 38 cases both applicants were rejected immediately and these were therefore not usable for the calculation of the results (table 20). In 52 cases both applicants were invited, in 18 cases only the Dutch applicant was invited and in eight cases only the Surinamese was invited. Therefore, the net discrimination against the Surinamese female applicant was 12.8 per cent. As the critical rate to reject the null-hypothesis at the 5 per cent level in this experiment (with N=78) was 22.2 per cent, the net discrimination rate observed in this experiment (12.8 per cent) was not sufficient to conclude that discrimination had been practised.

¹ A net-discrimination rate of 32% is significant even at the 1 per cent level (with N=92).

² A net-discrimination of 36% is significant even at the 1 per cent level if N=100.

Table 18. Results of audit testing: Moroccan women compared with Dutch women

<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>	
Valid applications	106
Both applications rejected	14
Usable applications	92
Both applications accepted	61
Only Dutch application accepted	28
Only Moroccan application accepted	3
Net discrimination against Moroccan	25
Net discrimination against Moroccan in % (25:92x100)	27.2%
<i>2. Interviews:</i>	
Both applications accepted	61
Neither invited	15
Both invited	30
Only Dutch applicant invited	10
Only Moroccan applicant invited	3
Written application required	3
Net discrimination against Moroccan applicant	7
Cumulative net discrimination against Moroccan	32
Cumulative net discrimination in % (32:92x100)	34.8%

Therefore, on the basis of these results one can not conclude that Surinamese female applicants encounter discrimination when applying for jobs requiring a college education. However, we must be aware that if the total application procedure had been followed (that is, including the job offer stage) the total percentage of net discrimination might have been higher.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter described the results of four extra experiments. First, discrimination was tested against Surinamese male applicants, applying for jobs at the semi-skilled level. The results were compared with the results of the audit experiment (chapter 3) where discrimination was tested against Moroccan men applying for semi-skilled jobs and to the results of the correspondence experiment (chapter 5) where discrimination was tested against Surinamese men applying for jobs requiring a college education. Since Moroccan men had encountered discrimination in 37 per cent (minimum rate) of their applications for semi-skilled jobs and Surinamese men only in 18 per cent (minimum rate) of their applications for jobs requiring a college education, we have asked ourselves the following question: does the older established ethnic minority group (Surinamese) encounter less discrimination than the group of relative newcomers (Moroccans) or do immigrants with a high educational level encounter less discrimination than immigrants with a low educational level?

Table 19. Results of audit testing for Surinamese women compared with Dutch women

<i>1. Application by telephone:</i>	
Valid applications	115
Both applications rejected	15
Usable applications	100
Both applications accepted	70
Only Dutch application accepted	29
Only Surinamese application accepted	1
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	28
Net discrimination in % (28:100x100)	28%
<i>2. Interviews:</i>	
Both applications accepted	70
Neither invited	14
Both invited	41
Only Dutch applicant invited	10
Only Surinamese applicant invited	2
Written application required	3
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	8
Cumulative net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	36
Cumulative net discrimination in % (36:100x100)	36%

Table 20. Results of correspondence testing: Surinamese women compared with Dutch women

Valid applications	116
Neither invited	38
Usable applications	78
Both invited	52
Only Dutch applicant invited	18
Only Surinamese applicant invited	8
Net discrimination against Surinamese applicant	10
Net discrimination in % (10:78x100)	12.8%

It was found that Surinamese men encountered discrimination in 40 per cent of their applications for semi-skilled jobs. **This means that in 40 per cent of all vacancies tested, the Dutch tester advanced further in the application procedure than the equally qualified Surinamese tester.** No significant difference was found between the retail trade and the service sector. In one of every three job applications the Surinamese tester was rejected immediately with the excuse that the job had already been taken. In all these cases the Dutch tester, who phoned ten minutes later, was treated as a serious candidate and often invited for an interview. Since the percentage of net discrimination (40 per cent) is far more than the minimum required net discrimination rate (19.4 per cent) in this experiment, the null-hypothesis

of no discrimination can be rejected at the 5 per cent level¹. **Therefore we can conclude that discrimination against low-educated Surinamese immigrants frequently occurs in hiring procedures.** The percentage of net discrimination against Surinamese men was even slightly higher than the percentage of net discrimination against Moroccan men after two stages of the application procedure (32 per cent). However, this difference was not significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=1.9$; $df=1$) and therefore **we can conclude that the rate of discrimination against minority men at the level of semi-skilled jobs does not differ by ethnic group. The older established group of Surinamese encounters discrimination in the same degree as the group of relative newcomers. This means that discrimination is not just an isolated problem of one group only but is a general characteristic of how the labour market functions with respect to immigrants.**

While Surinamese male applicants encountered discrimination in 40 per cent of their applications for jobs at the semi-skilled level, they encountered discrimination in 18 per cent of their applications for jobs requiring a college education. The difference was significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=6.74$; $df=1$)² and therefore **we can conclude that the higher their educational level, the less discrimination they encounter. As a result, education seems to be important to reduce exposure to discrimination and thus improve the position of ethnic minorities in the labour market.** On the other hand, discrimination is still substantial at the higher skill level. Also, it is important to note that at the semi-skilled level only the private sector was tested, as semi-skilled jobs did not appear to be offered in the public sector at all, while at the higher skill level both the private and the public sector were tested. The rate of discrimination found in the private sector was twice as high as in the public sector (31 per cent versus 14 per cent). If we compare vacancies in the private sector only, then the difference between discrimination at the semi-skilled level and at the highly-skilled level becomes much smaller (40 per cent versus 31 per cent). In other words, in the private sector the rate of discrimination against ethnic minorities is not very much reduced by the educational level of job applicants.

Two audit testing experiments were carried out to examine the occurrence of discrimination against Moroccan women and Surinamese women when applying for semi-skilled jobs. One correspondence testing experiment was carried out to find out whether Surinamese women encounter discrimination when applying for jobs requiring a college education.

The experiments with minority women at the semi-skilled level showed that **discrimination was by no means confined to males.** Surinamese female applicants encountered discrimination in 36 per cent and Moroccan female applicants in 35 per cent of their applications for jobs at the semi-skilled level. In more than one out of four applications the minority female applicant was rejected immediately, after communicating her name, while the equally qualified Dutch female applicant was treated as a serious candidate. **There was a striking similarity between the rate of discrimination encountered by minority men and by minority women (32 per cent versus 35 per cent for Moroccans and 40 per cent versus 36 per cent for Surinamese).** **In other words, Surinamese and Moroccan immigrants, both males and females, encounter discrimination in more than one out of every three applications for semi-skilled jobs.** It should be noted that in this study only discrimination based on ethnic background was studied; Surinamese and Moroccan women were compared with Dutch women. Other studies have shown that, in hiring procedures, women are treated less favourably than men (Riach and Rich,

¹ A net-discrimination rate of 40% is significant even at the 1 per cent level (with $N=102$).

² The difference was significant even at the 1 per cent level.

1987). Therefore, it could be argued that minority women face a double disadvantage: not only do they experience sex discrimination but also ethnic discrimination.

Surinamese female applicants encountered a net discrimination rate of 13 per cent, when applying for jobs requiring a college education. This percentage was not significant at the 5 per cent level and **therefore we can not conclude that Surinamese college-educated women are discriminated against when applying for jobs.** It is important to note, however, that college-educated Surinamese women applied for different occupations than the college-educated Surinamese men. The low level of net discrimination encountered by Surinamese women may therefore be due to the fact that less discrimination occurs in these job sectors, but also to the fact that the demand was very high for these job types and the supply of labour was presumably less than for the job types used to test discrimination against Surinamese men.

Based on these findings we can conclude that Surinamese women applying for jobs requiring a college education are far less likely to encounter discrimination than Surinamese women applying for jobs at the semi-skilled level (13 per cent versus 36 per cent). The difference between the two educational levels was significant at the 5 per cent level ($\chi^2=8.8$; $df=1$)¹. **Once again, education seems to be an important factor in reducing exposure to discrimination and thus to improve the unfavourable position of ethnic minorities in the labour market.**

7. Summary

The main objective of this study was to explore the occurrence of discrimination against ethnic minorities in access to employment in the Netherlands. It is one case in a series that seeks to determine whether discrimination in the labour market exists in Western Europe, the United States and other industrialized countries. As such it will serve to understand the global process of social disadvantage due to "race" or ethnic background.

But the Netherlands also makes for an interesting case by itself. In no other European country has so much effort, manpower and money been invested in public policy to integrate the new immigrant groups, and few other host populations have publicly demonstrated so much anti-prejudice ethos as the Dutch have. Good intentions notwithstanding, immigrant groups targeted as recipients of special minorities' policies have been demonstrated to suffer from substantial social disadvantage. Their position in the labour market is especially worrying as the rates of unemployment of Surinamese, Antillians, Turks and Moroccans (and others as well but these are the largest groups) amount to roughly four times the national Dutch average. Those employed are still highly concentrated in the low-skilled and least desirable jobs.

The Dutch government has opened extra language courses where immigrants can learn Dutch. It has also made extra efforts to improve their educational level. Rules and policies have been devised to open up vacancies for immigrants. Why have these employment policies for minorities been less than successful? A possible explanation is that minority applicants are denied equal access to employment by people in power positions in the labour market, such as personnel managers and employers.

In this study the occurrence of discrimination was tested against two ethnic groups: a group of relative newcomers (Moroccans) and an older established ethnic minority (Surinamese). It was also tested at two levels of skill and education: Moroccan male applicants applied for semi-skilled jobs and Surinamese male applicants for jobs requiring a college education.

¹ This value was significant even at the 1 per cent

Discrimination was studied by using the method of situation testing. Two individuals (testers) apply for the same advertised vacancy. Both are equally well qualified for the job, but they differ in one respect: one is black or has a clear foreign background, the other is white and native. If the first tester is rejected where the second tester is accepted, we count this as an instance of discrimination. One such case, of course, makes for little evidence but hundreds of observations (as in this study) when they systematically point into the same direction, allow a convincing conclusion.

As hundreds of vacancies had been randomly chosen at the appropriate educational level within the metropolitan West of Holland, it was possible to differentiate the levels of discrimination between job sector, company size, occupational type, the public and the private job sector, vacancies with a positive action programme and vacancies without.

Discrimination against Moroccan men was tested at the semi-skilled level by using the audit testing method. This means that application is done by actual test persons, who are equally well qualified and trained to behave as similar as possible. The application procedure basically consists of three stages, where unequal treatment may occur. For example, one applicant may be rejected immediately ("Sorry, the job has just been taken"), while the other is briefly interviewed by telephone, concerning work experience and education. Secondly, one applicant may be rejected during the telephone call after he has been briefly interviewed by the employer ("Sorry, you are too young") while the other is invited for a personal interview and, thirdly, one may be offered a job while the other is denied the job.

Most of the time unequal treatment occurred in the first stage of the procedure; **in one of every four (23.4 per cent) job applications the Moroccan tester was denied a chance to apply beforehand ("Sorry, but the job has already been taken"), while the Dutch applicant was treated as a serious candidate. In practice this means that even if the Moroccan applicant has the most outstanding qualifications, is born in Holland, speaks Dutch fluently and might be a much better candidate than all other applicants, he won't be given a chance to apply for no other reason than that he is Moroccan.** The following example is illustrative:

To Moroccan tester: "Hi, Mustafa, brother! It is a shame, but you are too late! Thanks for calling!"

To Dutch tester: "Can you tell me something about yourself? [...], sounds good, you can come for an interview."

Some employers, who did not reject the Moroccan immediately, had to find another excuse to exclude him from the application procedure:

A meats and sausages company advertised in the newspaper for an experienced help. Both testers were asked their age and whether they had any experience with boning meat. Both said they had never boned meat, but were willing to learn. To the Dutch tester the employer said: "It is not really necessary that you are able to bone meat, you will get internal training. It is more important to fit in the team and your age (20) is a preference. You can come for an interview." To the Moroccan tester the answer was: "Sorry, but it is very important that you have experience in boning meat and making sausages. We really need someone who is able to do this!"

In total (that is, when the cases of unequal treatment in every stage of the application procedure are counted together), first generation immigrants (Moroccans) were likely to encounter discrimination in at least 37 per cent of their applications for semi-skilled jobs. **This means that when a young Moroccan man applies for a semi-skilled job for which an equally qualified Dutch applicant is also competing, there is at least a one in three chance that the Moroccan applicant will be unable to advance as far in the application procedure as an equally qualified Dutch applicant.** Thus, despite anti-discrimination laws, the results show a disturbingly high level of discrimination against ethnic minorities in hiring procedures.

The high rate of discrimination encountered by the Moroccan applicant forms a serious impediment to their chances of getting a job. This is illustrated by the difference in the number of interviews both applicants were able to obtain: while the Dutch applicant received invitations for an interview in 53.7 per cent of the cases, the Moroccan applicant received invitations for an interview in only 28.6 per cent of the cases. Of course, an interview does not necessarily result in a job offer, but the more interviews one is invited to, the more chance one has of getting a job. **The findings of the third stage, in which the Dutch applicant was offered a job in 40 per cent of the occasions he was invited for an interview and the Moroccan applicant never, strongly suggest that the possibility of actually getting a job is almost zero for the Moroccan applicant.**

As there were no suitable semi-skilled job vacancies available in the public sector, only the private sector was tested. There were no significant differences in the rate of discrimination observed for the main job sectors tested, that is the retail trade and the service sector.

Discrimination against Surinamese men applying for jobs requiring a college education was tested by using the correspondence testing method. This means that application is done by means of equivalent letters. In this experiment, only the first stage of the application procedure was tested; unequal treatment was said to occur when one applicant was invited for an interview while the other was rejected. Second generation immigrants (Surinamese) encountered discrimination in 18 per cent of their applications for jobs requiring a college education. **In other words, in one of every five job applications a college-educated Surinamese applicant will be unable to advance as far in the application procedure as an equally qualified Dutch applicant. This means that education alone will not help to end the disadvantageous position of immigrants in the labour market. The private sector was substantially more likely to discriminate than the public sector (31 per cent vs. 14 per cent).** Small firms were somewhat less likely to discriminate than large firms, but this difference was not significant. Among three of the four occupations examined (teacher, personnel manager and financial manager), no significant variation was observed in the rate of discrimination encountered. An exception was the position of laboratory assistant, for which a net discrimination rate of 6 per cent against the *Dutch* applicant was observed.

Finally, firms for which a positive action programme for ethnic minorities was in force were not likely to discriminate against either minority applicants, or against Dutch applicants. If positive action would be really effective, we would expect a net negative discrimination rate against minority applicants. In fact, the rate of discrimination observed was 0 per cent, while this was 21 per cent for firms without a positive action programme. **In other words, positive action programmes do not result in preferential treatment for the minority applicant but seem to be an effective instrument for reducing discrimination in hiring procedures.**

So far we have answered all the questions asked in the standard international study design, but we did more. As we found a substantial difference in the degree of discrimination encountered by Moroccan applicants applying for semi-skilled jobs and by Surinamese applicants applying for jobs requiring a college education (37 per cent versus 18 per cent), we asked ourselves what we really found: a difference of discrimination by ethnic group (Moroccan versus Surinamese) or a difference by level of required education (semi-skilled level versus college education)? As an extra check we have tested discrimination at the semi-skilled level also for Surinamese men (see table 21 for a complete overview of all test results).

We expected the rate of discrimination observed to be higher against the Moroccan group than against the Surinamese group, when applying for semi-skilled jobs, as the Moroccan group occupies one of the lowest status positions on the ethnic status ladder as measured by public opinion polls. This expectation proved wrong, as Surinamese applicants encountered discrimination at even a slightly higher rate than Moroccan applicants (40 per cent vs. 32 per

cent¹ for men), but this difference was not significant and therefore should be interpreted as zero. **Therefore we can conclude that the rate of discrimination against minority men at the level of semi-skilled jobs does not differ by ethnic group. The older established group of Surinamese encounters discrimination to the same degree as the group of relative newcomers (Moroccans). This means that discrimination is not just an isolated problem of one group only but is a general characteristic of how the labour market functions with respect to immigrants.**

As regards the Surinamese group, it was found that the higher their educational level, the less discrimination they encounter. Surinamese male applicants encountered discrimination in 40 per cent of their applications for semi-skilled jobs, and only in 18 per cent of their applications for jobs requiring a college education. This difference was

¹ In the audit experiment with the Surinamese men applying for jobs at the semi-skill level, only two stages of the application procedure had been followed. Therefore, the percentage of net-discrimination against Surinamese applicants at the semi-skill level (40 per cent) was compared with the percentage of net-discrimination against Moroccan applicants at the semi-skill level after two stages of the application procedure (32 per cent).

Table 21. Overview of test results

Group	Skill level	Method	N	Min. rate required	Net discrimination rate found
Moroccan men	semi-skilled	audits	175	14.8%	36.6% (min.) ¹
Moroccan men	semi-skilled	audits	175	14.8%	40.0% (max.)
Surinamese men	highly skilled	corresp.	157	15.6%	17.8% (min.)
Surinamese men	highly skilled	corresp.	182	14.5%	19.2% (max.)
Surinamese men	semi-skilled	audits	102	19.4%	40.0% (min.)
Moroccan women	semi-skilled	audits	92	20.4%	34.8% (min.)
Surinamese women	semi-skilled	audits	100	19.6%	36.0% (min.)
Surinamese women	highly skilled	corresp.	78	22.2%	12.8% (min.)

statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. **Thus, while the educational level of the applicants seems to explain the difference in discrimination, the ethnic background does not. This may be interpreted as an encouraging finding as education seems to help in diminishing exposure to discrimination.** However, it is important to note that at the semi-skilled level only the private sector was tested, as semi-skilled jobs did not appear to be offered in the public sector at all, while highly-skilled jobs were tested in the private and the public sector. The rate of discrimination found in the private sector was twice as high as in the public sector (31 per cent versus 14 per cent). If we compare vacancies in the private sector only, then the difference in the occurrence of discrimination between the semi-skilled level and the highly-skilled level becomes much smaller (40 per cent versus 31 per cent).

In order to bring the gender differential into the research a further series of extra tests was carried out on women. Discrimination was tested against Surinamese women at both skill levels and against Moroccan women at the semi-skilled level. The responses that female minority testers encountered were compared with the responses that female Dutch testers encountered. The audit experiments with minority women showed that ethnic discrimination

¹ Only in this experiment had all three stages of the application procedure been carried out. In all other experiments mentioned here, the last stage (the job offer stage) of the procedure had not been included. Therefore, for a proper comparison between the experiments one should use the percentage of net discrimination against the Moroccan applicants after two stages of the application procedure (i.e., not including the third "job offer" stage), which was 32 per cent.

was by no means confined to males. Indeed, **there was a striking similarity between the rate of discrimination encountered by minority men and minority women when applying for semi-skilled jobs. Moroccan women encountered discrimination in 35 per cent of their job applications and Surinamese women in 36 per cent. All results of testing at the semi-skilled job level taken together suggest a broad and undifferentiated denial of access to jobs to *all* immigrants whether they are male or female and originating from former colonies or from Morocco.** However, the social consequences for women may differ. Minority women were only compared with Dutch women in this study. As other studies have shown that, in hiring procedures, women are generally treated unfavourably compared with men (Riach and Rich, 1987), it could be argued that minority women face a double disadvantage: not only are they discriminated against on the basis of ethnic origin, but also on the basis of sex.

At the level of college education, the rate of discrimination encountered by Surinamese women was only 13 per cent, which was not significant at the 5 percent level. This finding may, of course, represent a real low level of discrimination against college-educated Surinamese women, but it runs against all other test results and requires specific explanation. The variation may also have been caused by the difference in the supply and demand ratios for the jobs that we have tested. Surinamese women applied for different occupations than Surinamese men. The job types used to test discrimination against Surinamese men (especially financial manager and personnel manager) were characterized by a moderate demand and a very high supply; 200 applicants for a vacancy was no exception. The job types used to test discrimination against Surinamese women (especially teacher secondary school and ergotherapist) were higher in demand (there were more vacancies in the newspaper), but moderately in supply; the number of applicants for one vacancy varied between 30 and 50 people. The variation may, of course, also have been caused by a real low level of discrimination in these job sectors.

All these findings show that recruitment discrimination occurs to a considerable degree throughout the labour market. The social policy question underlying our study, "Does discrimination explain the disadvantaged position of ethnic minorities on the Dutch labour market?", can now firmly be answered in the affirmative. Moroccans as well as Surinamese, both men and women, encounter discrimination in access to employment. Discrimination occurs when applying for jobs at the semi-skilled level and at the level of college education, in small companies and in large firms and in the private sector as well as in the public sector. Positive action programmes do not seem to result in preferential treatment for the minority applicant but they do appear to be an effective instrument for eliminating discrimination in hiring procedures, i.e. to bring about equal treatment and opportunities for migrant workers and ethnic minorities in access to the world of work. **The conclusion can be drawn that the unfavourable position of ethnic minorities on the Dutch labour market is not only due to their low educational level and language problems, but is, for a substantial part, caused by discriminatory behaviour on the part of employers in hiring procedures.**

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