

Bonded labour in agriculture: a rapid assessment in Punjab and North West Frontier Province, Pakistan

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Special Action Programme to
Combat Forced Labour

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**Bonded Labour in Agriculture: a Rapid Assessment in
Punjab and North West Frontier Province, Pakistan**

by

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Foreword

In June 1998 the International Labour Conference adopted a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up that obligates member States to respect, promote and realize freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.¹ The *InFocus Programme on Promoting the Declaration* is responsible for the reporting processes and technical cooperation activities associated with the Declaration; and it carries out awareness raising, advocacy and knowledge functions – of which this Working Paper is an example. Working Papers are meant to stimulate discussion of the questions covered by the Declaration. They express the views of the author, which are not necessarily those of the ILO.

This Working Paper is one of a series of Rapid Assessments of bonded labour in Pakistan, each of which examines a different economic sector. The aim of these studies is to inform the implementation of the Government of Pakistan's National Policy and Plan of Action for the Abolition of Bonded Labour, adopted in 2001. The research was conducted under the guidance of the Bonded Labour Research Forum (BLRF), a distinguished group of Pakistani research and development specialists, convened by the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis with the support of the ILO. The Rapid Assessments were undertaken by independent Pakistani researchers, who were selected by the BLRF for their competence and experience in the different sectors. Dr G. M. Arif, of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) in Islamabad, is the author of this paper on bonded labour in the agriculture sector in Punjab and North West Frontier Province.² It should be read in conjunction with a companion paper that covers Sindh and Balochistan provinces.³

The research programme was overseen by Caroline O'Reilly of the *Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL)* of the Declaration Programme in Geneva. Ali Khan worked as Research Coordinator for the duration of the research process, based at the ILO in Islamabad.

SAP-FL is providing on-going technical assistance to support the Ministry of Labour and its partners to implement the National Policy and Plan of Action, so as to bring about the effective eradication of bonded labour in Pakistan.

March 2004

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¹The text of the Declaration is available on the following web site: <http://www.ilo.org/declaration>

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³ See Declaration Working Paper No. 26: Bonded labour in agriculture: a rapid assessment in Sindh and Balochistan, Pakistan.

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Glossary

<i>Aabiana</i>	Irrigation water charges
<i>Barani</i>	Rain-fed area (non-irrigated)
<i>Batai</i>	Sharecropping, usually on 50-50 basis
<i>Choopa</i>	Fixing seed plants in wet land manually
<i>Hatup</i>	This system emerged about 10-15 years ago. In the <i>hatup</i> system a sharecropper known as a <i>hatain</i> receives between one-fifth and one-eighth of the share of the produce.
<i>Jagirs</i>	Lands from which the revenue was assigned to a <i>mansabdar</i> (the holder of a <i>mansab</i> , rank providing civil or military service to the King). <i>Jagirs</i> were temporary and non-transferable
<i>Khalisa</i>	During the Mughal era, revenue was collected from <i>khalisa</i> land for the King's treasury
<i>Killi</i>	Cutting extra parts of tobacco plants
<i>Malik</i>	The term used for landlords in some districts
<i>Merasi</i>	A caste
<i>Musali</i>	A caste
<i>Muzaria</i>	Term for tenant, in some districts
<i>Panchsamiya</i>	Agriculture produce is divided into five parts: two-fifths for the landlord and three-fifths for the sharecropper.
<i>Patwari</i>	An official who maintains the land record
<i>Peshgi</i>	Advance
<i>Rahak</i>	A servant in DG Khan district; a tenant in Rahim Yar Khan district.
<i>Seeri</i>	Partner or shareholder in some business or work. In agriculture, <i>seeri</i> means the person who shares the work of landlord in the cultivation process. A <i>seeri</i> usually takes some loan from a landlord and becomes his servant. Also known as <i>authri</i> and <i>kama</i> .
<i>Zamin</i>	A person who gives economic surety for others
<i>Zamindar</i>	In some districts, the term used for landlords; in others, for tenants

Chapter One: INTRODUCTION

Agriculture is the centre of economic activity in Pakistan, generating about a quarter of the GDP and 45 percent of total employment. The rural population's dependence on agriculture is well established: more than two-thirds of the rural workforce is employed in this sector. Since the early 1990s, poverty has risen sharply in rural as well as urban areas, although the increase has consistently been higher in rural areas. Nevertheless, the recent Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) identified agriculture as one of the major drivers of growth (GOP, 2001; 2002)⁵.

The performance of Pakistan's agricultural sector has been inadequate due to a host of factors (Khan, 1981). Control and use of the land is perhaps the most important factor affecting the allocation of resources and distribution of incomes. In rural Pakistan, land is the principal form of wealth; class structures and relations are reflected in the land tenure system. Pakistan inherited a system that was characterized by a highly differentiated structure of land interests. A small number of landowners own most of the land that is given to tenants for cultivation on a sharecropping basis. At the time of independence, this landlord-tenant system was dominant in most areas of Sindh and in some parts of Punjab. The other system, owner-operator, existed mostly in Punjab.

Significant changes have occurred in the agrarian structure since the 1960s. Large owners have taken back sharecropped land for their own cultivation, using their own family and hired labour. Even today, however, landless tenants and agricultural workers constitute a large section of the rural population.

Although legislation has been passed over the past 50 years to improve the position of tenants, problems remain with the sharecropping system in Pakistan. On the positive side, the payment of land revenue, water rates and seed costs are no longer the responsibility of the tenants. Nevertheless, changes in tenancy laws since the 1950s have favoured the landlords in terms of the fixation of produce shares and the formula for the division of the cost of modern agriculture inputs (Naqvi et al., 1989). Even those rights laid down in tenancy acts are in reality not given to tenants.

Bonded labour is generally alleged to exist in agriculture. Some recent studies have identified agriculture as a major location for debt bondage of sharecroppers, particularly in Sindh (Ercelawn and Nauman, 2001), and this may be the case for other areas of the country as well. The Constitution of Pakistan prohibits all forms of forced labour. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1992 declares illegal all arrangements that impose restrictions on labour or services as a condition for loans and advances (*peshgi*). This study is designed to examine the magnitude and nature of bonded labour in the agriculture sector, focusing on two provinces of the country, Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Another study examines the bonded labour in agriculture in two other provinces, Sindh and Balochistan⁶.

This report has nine chapters. Chapter Two provides a brief review of literature concerning bonded labour in agriculture, while methodology is discussed in Chapter Three. Agrarian structure in Punjab and NWFP is given in Chapter Four, followed by a discussion on tenancy arrangements in Chapter Five. Data on the rural labour force with reference to agriculture are presented in Chapter Six. The following section shows the existence of bondedness in the agriculture sector. Causes of bondedness are discussed in Chapter Eight, followed by some suggestions for future research in the final chapter.

⁵ Oil and gas, Small and Medium Enterprises and information technology are the three other drivers of growth identified in the IPRSP.

⁶ Working Paper No. 26: Bonded labour in agriculture: a rapid assessment in Sindh and Balochistan, Pakistan.

Chapter Two: A BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Because of absolute poverty and the lack of alternative resources, it is common for sharecroppers to get advances and loans from their landlords in emergencies like sickness, death and marriages. Loans are also obtained to meet the expenditures on agricultural inputs. One common observation is that landlords consider it their right to extract labour from tenants and their families until the debt is paid-off. The landlord supports the sharecroppers financially, who, as the debt mounts, become more and more obligated to the landlord. The poor maintenance of records of borrowing and accounts further complicates this matter. The sharecroppers, because of illiteracy and powerlessness, do not have access to accounts held by the landlords nor can they challenge them. Landlords may not maintain accounts fairly, wrong entries are made, and payments to sharecroppers are delayed (Asian Development Bank, 2002).

The literature also reveals cases where sharecroppers are not allowed to move freely, to take decisions independently, to send their children to school, and, sometimes, to meet their relatives. The possibility that some landlords do not allow family members of their bonded tenants to do wage labour elsewhere cannot be ruled out (Asian Development Bank, 2002).

Under tenancy acts, the responsibilities of both landlord and sharecropper in terms of the respective burden of cost and sharing of output are clearly defined (Bakhsh, 1960; Khan, 1980). Although most sharecroppers consider the system of sharing costs and incomes to be unfair, the major issue is that even those rights laid down in the tenancy acts are not given them. For example, provision of irrigation water is the responsibility of the landlord but, in these days of water shortage in many parts of the country, sharecroppers are pushed to bear at least some of the cost of irrigation through tube wells. In some places, landlords who own tractors charge sharecroppers at the market rates for the use of their tractors, which places a heavy burden on the sharecroppers (Naqvi et al., 1989).

According to present tenancy law, it is mandatory to enter the names of permanent tenants in the Record of Rights and that of other tenants in the Field Book. Record-keeping is the function of the land revenue staff and the formats for the records should provide a clear and complete picture for each parcel of land, including ownership and tenancy details. However, land revenue officials do not follow prescribed record-keeping requirements. The names of tenants are seldom entered in the records. Field and records inspection by supervisory officers are infrequent and incomplete. In matters concerning tenants and landlords, the revenue officials tend to favour the landlord.

Chapter Three: METHODOLOGY

This report has used two data sources. First, to put the study in its proper context, agriculture censuses carried out in 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000 have been used to track changes in land ownership and tenurial pattern. Labour force surveys and the 1998 population census have also been used to determine the share of the rural workforce in agriculture. Second, a rapid assessment, based on interviews with community members, officials and others, was carried out in selected districts of Punjab and NWFP. Rapid assessment is a commonly used method for obtaining information on the socio-economic characteristics of communities. It is predicated on the notion that local people have a wealth of knowledge (Christiaensen et al., 2001). For this study, the rapid assessment was carried out in six districts of Punjab and one district in NWFP. Tenants, landowners and casual and permanent hired workers were directly interviewed in a few purposively selected locations of these districts. Some key informants including *patwaris*, revenue officials and lawyers were also interviewed.

Site selection

Rural Punjab has commonly been divided into five zones: cotton/wheat, low intensity, mixed, rice/wheat and *barani* (rainfed).⁷ Our main interest was in southern Punjab – that is, the cotton/wheat zone with some parts in the low intensity zone. For comparison, two more zones (rice/wheat and *barani*) were also selected for rapid assessment. First, let us take the case of southern Punjab. Data collected on tenurial status and debt from the 2000 Agriculture Census for Punjab is presented in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, which reveals that tenancy is more common in Bahawalnagar than in other districts. In this district, about three-quarters of the total tenant households are sharecroppers. Indebtedness is also substantial. In addition to Bahawalnagar from the cotton/wheat zone, Rahim Yar Khan was selected for comparison. D. G. Khan and Rajanpur districts in southern Punjab, located in the low intensity zone, were also included in the sample.

By following the same procedure in other zones of Punjab district, Attock was selected from the *barani* area. In central Punjab, rice/wheat zone, Hafizabad was chosen because of the relatively high incidence of tenancy (for location of the selected districts in Punjab, see MAP 1).

According to the zonal classification of rural areas, the whole NWFP except D.I. Khan, has the same cropping pattern. However, due to better irrigation facilities, agriculture is extensive in some districts of the province like Mardan, Swabi, Charsada and Peshawar. The 2000 Agriculture Census shows that these are the districts where tenancy is relatively more common. In Swabi and Charsada districts, approximately one-third of the total farm area was cultivated in 2000 by tenants. This percentage was much lower in Mardan and Peshawar districts (Appendix Tables 1 and 2). In Swabi, 57 percent of tenants were sharecroppers. Although only one-fifth of the total tenant households were in debt in 2000, the debt was obtained mainly from non-institutional sources. Based on these statistics, the rapid assessment was carried out in Swabi district.

Sample

The qualitative research was carried out in the seven districts identified in the last section. The main tool for this research was in-depth interviews with sharecroppers and their family members, particularly women. Where necessary, the services of female assistants were hired for this purpose. Landlords were also interviewed to get their opinion about the tenancy arrangements and bondedness. In each district, three to four key informants including *patwaris*, lawyers, retired officials and academicians were also interviewed. Total numbers of interviews carried out in each district are reported in Table 1.

⁷ In fact, no separate zonal classification has been done for rural Punjab. Rather, the zonal classification of rural Pakistan as a whole is on the basis of cropping patterns. There are two main cropping seasons: Kharif and Rabi. Cotton, rice, maize, sorghum and sugarcane are Kharif crops, while wheat, oilseeds, grains and barely are Rabi crops. Classification of rural areas into agro-climatic zones is based primarily on the Kharif crops, because wheat is the dominant crop in the Rabi season in virtually all areas of the country. One major division is between the areas suited to rice and areas suited to cotton. There are four distinct cotton or rice zones: cotton/wheat Punjab, cotton/wheat Sindh, rice/other crops Sindh and rice/wheat Punjab (Appendix Table 1). Mixed zone refers to the area surrounding Faisalabad, where no single crop dominates. *Barani* areas (Rawalpindi Division) are considered as a separate zone. The low intensity zone of Punjab is located on the left bank of the Indus in Punjab, which has less developed irrigation facilities and, thus, low cropping intensities. NWFP (excluding D. I. Khan which is included in low intensity zone) and Balochistan are classified as two separate zones. In spite of the fact that different districts of NWFP and Balochistan are agro-climatically heterogeneous, they are not disaggregated because they contribute a small percentage of total wheat production (Pickney, 1989; Arif and Ahmed, 2001).

Map 1. Sites of field-work in Punjab




Table 1 **Number of sharecroppers, labourers, landlords and key informants interviewed during the fieldwork**

Province/ district	Total number of interviews				Villages visited
	Share- croppers	Landless Labourers	Landlords	Key informants	
Punjab					
D. G. Khan	8	5	4	4	4
Rajanpur	8	5	4	3	4
Bahawalnagar	6	5	4	3	2
Rahim Yar Khan	10	8	7	4	5
Hafizabad	8	5	5	3	5
Attock	10	6	5	4	6
NWFP					
Swabi	8	5	5	3	3

Methods of rapid assessment

During fieldwork, the required information was gathered through a semi-structured questionnaire prepared separately for tenants, their families, landless agriculture workers and landlords. Focus group discussions were also organized in some localities. Local officials were interviewed, particularly about their understanding of the issues of bonded labour in agriculture and record-keeping. During fieldwork, the following information was gathered:

- Tenancy arrangements
- Landlord/tenant share in different inputs
- Extent and nature of forced labour
- Restrictions on wage labour
- Work on the land of landlord with payment
- Work on the land of landlord without payment
- Debt and bonded labour
- Debt inherited from parents
- Debt payment
- Maintenance of accounts by the landlord
- Access to records
- Help from the landlord (health, education and dispute resolution)
- Finding a good landlord/tenant
- Tenancy records with the local administration

Chapter Four: AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN PUNJAB AND NWFP

Land-tenure systems⁸

The land-tenure system defines the social and political structures of a society; and determines the course of economic development and the distribution of income and wealth. At present, three variants of private or individual tenure exist in Pakistan (Naqvi et al., 1989). The simplest variant is peasant proprietorship where individually owned small parcels of land are cultivated by family labour. Under the second variant, the landlord-tenant system, land is cultivated by sharecropping tenants. The third variant of the capitalist tenure takes two basic forms. The first is the fixed-rent tenancy, while in its more advanced

⁸ The review presented in this section is based on Khan (1981); Naqvi et. al. (1989); and Hussain (1988).

form the landowner operates land with the help of wage-labourers (Khan, 1981; Hussain, 1988; Naqvi et al. 1989).

To understand the agrarian structure in Pakistan, a brief historical review is appropriate. The land-tenure system of Pakistan has its origin in the British rule in India. There is an interesting debate in the literature about the nature of the pre-British land system, during Mughal rule in India. During the pre-British period, a farmer's position was that of a state tenant, paying rent to his landlord (Khan, 1981). Chiefs were designated as *zamindars* with power to get the King's share in total produce from the peasants. *Zamindars* were landlords, not landowners, and the peasants were attached to the land. Agricultural lands were divided into *khalisa* and *jagirs*. For the King's treasury, revenue was collected from *khalisa*. *Jagirs* were lands from which the revenue was assigned to a *mansabdar* (the holder of a *mansab*, the rank providing civil or military service to the King). *Jagirs* were temporary and non-transferable.

The origin of the agrarian system of British India was in the permanent settlement of Bengal in 1873 (Khan, 1981). In Punjab, the British granted land mainly to those families who had supported them in a significant way. Most of the land was divided into private estates among landowners, whose sharecropping tenants usually cultivated it in small parcels. The land-tenure system in the NWFP was similar to that in other provinces, in that much of the land was owned by non-cultivating, absentee landlords and cultivated by sharecropping tenants. The rural society was thus afflicted with a great divide between landowners and their tenants (Naqvi et al., 1989).

At the time of independence in 1947, the *zamindars* were of two categories. The first group consisted of those paying no tax to the state, because most *jagirs* were granted to them by the British. The second group of *zamindars* paid part of the produce as revenue to the state. Land-ownership was highly concentrated in most areas of Punjab and NWFP.

After the creation of Pakistan, the first tenancy reforms were undertaken in the 1950s in Punjab as well as NWFP to improve the terms of contract between the landlord and the tenant. *Jagirs* were abolished.⁹ The occupancy tenants were given the status of full owners. Greater security of tenure was provided to tenants-at-will. Non-statutory cesses and levies were also prohibited. The Punjab Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights Act of 1950 was also passed to prevent large-scale eviction of tenants. Such legislation reflects the government's awareness of the problem of land-tenure and the nature of its solution.

The 1972 land reforms accepted private ownership of land as the basic institution, fixing the ceiling on ownership with reference to the individual and not the family: 150 acres irrigated or 300 acres without irrigation. The 1977 land reforms further reduced the ceiling on the individual holding to 100 acres irrigated and 200 acres without irrigation. These reforms, particularly those of 1972, made significant changes in the tenancy laws. A landlord could no longer evict a tenant without producing substantial evidence of the latter's failure to meet tenancy conditions. The landlord was made responsible for land revenue, water rates, and the cost of seed. The tenant, however, would have to share, on a 50-50 basis, the cost of fertilizers and pesticides.

In spite of legislation, the position of the tenant has deteriorated over the last three decades. Tenants' bargaining position has weakened because of the concentration of land among some households in the

⁹ It should be emphasized that the abolition of *jagirs* did not always reduce the size of ownership of large estates. Nominally, it meant that the erstwhile *jagirdars* were required to pay land revenue to the State. Thus, in effect, the *zamindari* system remained intact. There was still no ceiling on the area one could own as long as the owner paid his legal dues (land revenue and water rate) to the provincial government (Naqvi et al. 1989).

village and also because of the increasing reliance by self-cultivating landlords on the use of casual and permanent wage labour.¹⁰ Tenants are not generally given their rights as laid down in tenancy acts.

Land ownership

A complete and accurate picture of the distribution of ownership holding by size is almost impossible to construct from the record of land rights or by asking the owners. However, agriculture censuses do provide useful information about land ownership. Although the first census, based on record data, was completed in 1960, a few studies estimate ownership in 1947, when land ownership was highly concentrated. Owners of holdings of over 100 acres constituted less than one percent of all landowners in Punjab and NWFP, but they owned nearly one-quarter of the land. Landowners with over 500 acres owned about 10 percent of all land in these two provinces. In 1947, an estimated 58 percent of the cultivated area in Punjab and NWFP was farmed by sharecroppers, who were also required to provide *begar* to the *zamindar* on demand (Naqvi et al., 1989).

Before presenting the more recent figures of land ownership, it seems appropriate to report data on landlessness in Punjab and NWFP (Table 2). Between 1990-2000, the share of the landless households in total rural households of Punjab and NWFP remained unchanged, around two-thirds in Punjab and one-half in NWFP.¹¹ About three-fourths of rural households in Hafizabad district were landless in 2000 while the corresponding percentage in Bahawalnagar was 67 per cent. A similar proportion of rural households, 66 percent, own no land in Swabi (NWFP). In three other districts of Punjab (Attock, D. G. Khan and Rahim Yar Khan), 52-58 percent of rural households were landless in 2000. In the study areas, thus, a large proportion of the rural population did not own agricultural land (Table 3).

Although land concentration in large holdings (150 plus acres), declined in Punjab from 16 percent in 1972 to 9 percent in 2000, inequalities in the ownership of land continued (Table 4). In 2000, owners of holdings of over 150 acres accounted for only 0.12 percent of the total owner households (Table 5). Holdings of 50 acres or more were owned in 2000 by 1.1 percent of households, and accounted for over 21 percent of the total area. If holdings of 25 acres or more are considered, 4.3 per cent of the households owned nearly 36 percent all agricultural land in Punjab. In NWFP, a relatively large proportion of total area was in holdings of over 150 acres (15 percent in 2000). This percentage fluctuated substantially between the 1972 and 2000 period.

District-wise analysis presented in Appendix Tables 3 and 4 shows higher inequalities in landholdings in Bahawalnagar, Attock and Rajanpur districts. In Bahawalnagar and Attock, for example, the proportion of area in ownership holdings of over 150 acres was 18 and 14 percent, respectively. Only a few households own these large holdings. It appears that, although there is a variation in inequalities in the ownership of land, about one-fifth to one-third of the area in the selected districts of Punjab is held in 50+ acre plots. However, district Swabi in NWFP shows little land concentration in large holdings; only three percent of area was in ownership holdings of over 150 acres.

¹⁰ Land concentration has actually declined over the period 1980 –2000 (for detail see the next section). But, a small number of households still own large land-holdings. Land reforms have had little redistributive effect. Because of high prices of agricultural land, it is uncommon in rural Pakistan for tenants to buy land. However, the migration of Pakistani workers to the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s did enable many landless households to buy agriculture land with remittances (Gilani, et al., 1981; Arif, 1995).

¹¹ In fact, Table 2 shows that landlessness in both Punjab and NWFP has slightly decreased between 1990 and 2000. A close look at the agriculture census data reveals that this decline is probably due to land distribution, which has generated new households with small land ownership. In other words the decline in percentage of landless households does not necessarily imply the transfer of land to landless households.

As mentioned above, land reforms introduced in 1972 and 1977 lowered the landholding ceiling. But it appears from these statistics that these reforms have had little re-distributive effect in rural areas. Owners of large holdings escaped from these reforms by transferring land to their family members.

Table 2: Proportion of landless households (%) in rural areas of Punjab and NWFP

Year	Punjab	NWFP
1990	69	52
2000	67	51

Source: Agriculture Censuses, 1990 and 2000.

Note: Proportion of landless households refers to ratio of households without ownership of land to total rural households as reported in the Agriculture censuses.

Table 3: Landless household (%) in selected districts

District	% landless
Attock	53
Hafizabad	73
D. G. Khan	54
Rajanpur	52
Bahawalnagar	67
R. Y. Khan	58
Swabi	66

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census

Table 4: Distribution of area by size of landholding and province (%)

Size (acres)	Punjab				NWFP			
	2000	1990	1980	1972	2000	1990	1980	1972
Less than 5.0	18	13	9	8	26	22	15	13
5.0 to under 7.5	12	10	8	19	10	11	9	20
7.5 to under 12.5	16	15	13		12	15	13	
12.5 to under 25.0	18	20	20	19	10	16	15	15
25.0 to under 50.0	15	16	17	18	12	13	12	14
50.0 to under 150	12	16	19	20	15	13	16	16
150.0 and above	9	11	13	16	15	11	21	20

Source: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Agriculture Census.

Table 5: Distribution of owner households by size of holding and province, 2000 (%)

Size (acres)	Punjab			NWFP		
	2000	1990	1980	2000	1990	1980
1 – 5	61.40	53.13	40.99	80.99	71.71	66.60
5 – 7.5	14.61	15.73	16.16	8.41	11.50	12.42
7.5 – 12.5	12.09	14.21	17.20	5.89	8.86	10.66
12.5 – 25	7.65	10.90	15.97	2.75	5.01	6.43
25 – 50	3.17	4.18	6.53	1.31	2.02	2.36
50 – 150	0.96	1.59	2.71	0.55	0.78	1.28
150 and above	0.12	0.26	0.43	0.10	0.11	0.25

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

Access to land

Changes in patterns of land tenure between 1972 and 2000 for Punjab and NWFP (see Appendix Table 5) show a dramatic decline in tenancy and a corresponding increase in owner-cultivation. In Punjab, farm area managed by landless tenants declined from 26 percent in 1972 to 11 percent in 2000. Owner-cultivation increased from 39 percent in 1972 to 69 percent in 2000, mainly through eviction of tenants. The proportion of owner-cum-tenant farm area in Punjab declined from 36 percent in 1972 to only 19 percent in 2000.¹² The trends in NWFP are similar. Owner-operated area increased from only 38 percent in 1972 to 76 percent in 2000, while a significant decline was observed in area operated by tenants or owner-tenants.

Appendix Table 6 shows data on operated area by tenure.¹³ In Punjab, area under sharecropping decreased from 37 percent in 1972 to only 15 percent in 2000, while an increase was observed in area operated by owners. Lease tenancy has been less common in Punjab and, during the last three decades, no real change could be observed. Rather, there is a clear tendency towards self-cultivation. The situation of tenancy under sharecropping in NWFP is similar to that in Punjab. However, in NWFP, a decline was observed in tenancy on fixed rent (lease) as well.

Incidence of sharecropping has declined in all seven districts during the last inter-censal period, 1990-2000, with the exception of Attock. This decline was particularly high in Rajanpur district, from 19 percent in 1990 to only nine percent in 2000 (Table 6). It was observed during the fieldwork that owners in Rajanpur prefer to get their land cultivated under lease. The prevalence of sharecropping is highest in Attock, Hafizabad and Bahawalnagar.

Table 6: Farm area (%) by tenure for selected districts, 1990 and 2000.

District	Census year	Owner-operated	Sharecropped	Leased	Others	All
D. G. Khan	1990	80.5	16.6	2.8	0.1	100
	2000	86.1	10.0	3.9	-	100
Rajanpur	1990	65.2	19.4	12.1	3.3	100
	2000	75.0	8.7	14.6	1.7	100
Bahawalnagar	1990	61.9	27.6	10.0	0.5	100
	2000	70.0	21.4	8.3	0.3	100
R. Yar Khan	1990	70.9	19.5	8.5	1.1	100
	2000	81.3	13.1	4.1	1.5	100
Hafizabad	1990	-	-	-	-	-
	2000	72.2	20.9	6.8	0.1	100
Attock	1990	77.8	20.6	1.4	0.2	100
	2000	76.1	21.9	1.9	0.1	100
Swabi	1990	61.6	24.2	14.0	0.2	100
	2000	59.3	23.7	16.0	1.0	100

Source: 1990 and 2000 Agriculture Census

¹² Owner-cum-tenant category refers to those small landowners who also cultivate some land of other owners on a sharecropping basis.

¹³ There is a need to explain the difference between the farm and operated area as shown in Appendix Tables 5 and 6 respectively. "Farm area" includes the total arable and non-arable land. "Operated" or "cultivated" area is that farm area, which was sown at least once during the census year, i.e., 1999-2000, or year before. It is the sum of area sown and current fallow.

Chapter Five: TENANCY ARRANGEMENTS

This section presents tenancy arrangements as witnessed in the sampled area. But, it is first useful to review briefly tenancy reforms. The 1950 tenancy act and the subsequent land reforms, particularly in 1972, made the following changes in the tenancy laws:

- (a) A landlord may not evict a tenant without producing substantial evidence before the revenue courts that the latter has failed to meet any or all of the specified conditions under which he held tenure.
- (b) A tenant has no responsibility for land revenue, water rate and the cost of seed. However, he shares, on a 50:50 basis, the cost of fertilizers and pesticides.
- (c) The *batai* system, with the principle of payment for land rental in kind, has been kept intact. The payment to be made in cash by the tenants, as recommended by the earlier commissions, was not accepted.
- (d) A tenant has the first right of preemption purchase of the land he cultivates if the landlord decides to sell it.

To what extent do existing tenancy arrangements in practice comply with the laws and rules set in land reforms? During the field visits considerable information was collected on different types of tenancy arrangements. Several intensive meetings were held with local landowners and their tenants. Considerable change was noted in the last few decades in tenancy arrangements, particularly since the 1970s when, following Bhutto's land reforms, many landowners shifted from sharecropping to self-cultivation. More recently, a number of new sharecropping systems have emerged. Not only do tenancy arrangements vary within provinces, but also within districts.

Southern Punjab

As reported earlier, the fieldwork in southern Punjab was carried out in four districts: D. G. Khan, Rajanpur, Bahawalnagar and Rahim Yar Khan. In D. G. Khan and Rajanpur districts, a landlord is known as *goda*, while the tenant is given the name of *muzaria*. Three systems of sharecropping exist in these two districts. The first is the one-third system, where the produce is divided into a one-third share for the landowner and two-thirds share for the sharecropper. The cost of inputs is entirely borne by the tenant. The second system is the *panchsamiya* where the produce is divided into two-fifths for the landlord and three-fifths for the sharecropper. The landlord makes a small contribution towards inputs, mainly in seed. The third is the 50-50 system where output is divided equally between the landowner and his sharecropper. The tenant bears the cost of land preparation while the costs of inputs are shared equally by landlord and tenant. The landlord is usually responsible for the payment of irrigation water charges (*aabiana*). These systems have been in place for a long time and were once widespread, but their incidence has decreased considerably, and they now cover an estimated 15-20 percent of the cultivated land. The names of these three types of tenants appear in the revenue record.

In more than 50 percent of farms located in D. G. Khan and Rajanpur districts, the prevalent tenancy arrangement is the *hatup*' system. This system emerged 10-15 years ago and has four minor variations based on the share received by the worker. In the *hatup* system a sharecropper known as a *hatain* receives between one-fifth and one-eighth of the share of the produce. The *hatain* is contracted to cultivate one crop for one season, using his own labour and that of his family members. In the case of tobacco farming, which is common in Jampur tehsil of Rajanpur district, the *hatain* is contracted for four and a half months and receives one-fifth of the value of the produce. The *hatain* has no share in the cost. This system therefore represents a complete reversal of the older system where the sharecroppers' share of the output is large (two-thirds) and inputs are borne mainly by the tenant.

In the *hatup* system the land is tilled and prepared by the landlord. Following this, the contract of the *hatain* starts and he has a number of clearly defined tasks as part of this contract. The amount of land given to the *hatain* is dependent on the size of his family. The maximum land given is usually between 3.5 and four acres for a family of four to five. The *hatain's* tasks in raising tobacco include *choopa* (fixing seed plants in wet land manually); *godhi* (digging land manually); spraying pesticides; *killi* (cutting extra parts of tobacco plants) four to five times, and watering from tubewells owned by the landlord. At harvest, the landlord pays the *hatain*, if he cuts the tobacco, four-fifths of the cutting cost prevailing in the area. If other labour is used for cutting, the landlord pays four-fifths and the *hatain* pays one-fifth to workers who cut the crop. In labour surplus areas, however, the *hatain* and landlord equally share the cutting cost.

The crop is then stored. At the time the customer visits the landlord to purchase the crop, both landlord and *hatain* mutually agree on the price. Once the price is fixed, the *hatain* and the landlord clear their own accounts and the contract is finished. Therefore, while the *hatain* is a sharecropper in name and function he is not a sharecropper legally since his name does not appear in the revenue records as a sharecropper and his contract is limited to only one crop.

For cotton, the *hatain's* share in produce varies between one-sixth and one-eighth, depending mainly on the use of machinery for pesticide sprays. The greater the use of machinery, the smaller the *hatain's* share. Cotton-picking plays an important role in share-fixing. Usually a female cotton picker receives Rs.2 per kilo. The *hatain* bears the picking cost according to his share in the produce. In some areas, however, the *hatain* is made responsible for cotton-picking, in return for which he gets a one-fifth share of the produce.

Some landlords prefer to have only one crop of tobacco per year, while others take two crops: tobacco as well as cotton. But the contract between *hatain* and landlord is usually for one crop. It can be renewed for the next crop and we met a few *hatains* who have been working with the same landlord for four to five years.

In two other districts of Southern Punjab, Bahawalnager and Rahim Yar Khan, tenancy arrangements are similar to those found in D. G. Khan/Rajanpur. However, there are some minor differences. In summer, irrigation costs are paid by the landowner in Rahim Yar Khan and Bahawalnagar, but in winter, when irrigation through tubewell is common, cost is shared equally by the tenant and landowner. In Rahim Yar Khan, the tenant is also responsible for tractor-loading sugarcane for sugar mills. But the *hatup* system is less common in Bahawalnagar and Rahim Yar Khan. The *hatup* system is against the tenancy legislation in two ways. First, the worker is contracted for only one season and he has to make a new contract for the next crop. Second, his name does not appear in the revenue record: he has no legal rights. In southern Punjab, the tenant is obliged in winter to share the irrigation cost while the tenancy laws clearly make the landlord responsible for water charges.

Central Punjab (Hafizabad)

In Hafizabad district, a *muzaria* is the person who cultivates the agricultural land of a landlord on a sharecropping basis. As in D.G. Khan and Rajanpur districts, three systems of sharecropping exist in Hafizabad. First, under the 50-50 system, only irrigation expenses are borne by the landlord, whereas the tenant is responsible for ploughing, sowing, and provision of seed, fertilizer and pesticides. Agriculture produce is divided equally between the tenant and landlord. In central Punjab, Hafizabad is probably the only district where the landowner receives 50 percent of the output but does not bear the input cost equally. In nearby districts, Sheikhpura and Gujranwala, according to some key informants, landlords share equally the cost of all inputs, except ploughing and labour which are the responsibility of the tenant.

In some parts of Hafizabad district, landlords and tenants share the cost of inputs equally, but the tenant gets only one-third of the total produce. This share can be further reduced even as low as one-eighth. In this situation, the tenant does not share the cost of inputs and he is allowed by the landowner to have a few animals on his land. However, it is important to note that sharecropping in Hafizabad district has declined significantly and land is mostly cultivated by the landowner with the help of casual and permanent hired workers. Landless tenants in Hafizabad are at disadvantage. The tenancy act makes the landlord responsible for water charges and sharing 50 percent cost of inputs. But, in fact, the landlord does not share the cost of inputs and takes a 50 percent share of the produce.

North Punjab (Attock)

Fieldwork in Attock, a *barani* area, was carried out in one of its *tehsil* where the landlord is known as *malik* or *khan* while the tenant is called *zamindar*. Tenancy arrangements are quite strange here, with *maliks* and *zamindars* telling totally different stories. We met a *malik* who informed us that he shared equally inputs/outputs with his *zamindar*. But none of the *zamindars* contacted during the fieldwork confirmed it. Rather, they were unanimous in saying that, in the whole area, the full cost of all inputs are born by the *zamindar* with the *malik* taking 50 percent of the output. One *malik* said that only two *maliks* share equally the cost of inputs. The common practice is that the *malik* takes 50 percent share in output without giving any cost of input. We were also told that there are a few landlords who give *zamindars* a two-thirds share in output because these are *zamindars* who bear all costs of production.

It is interesting to report that tenants in Attock district know their rights. They informed us during the field visit that during the PPP government in the 1970s, the *malik* used to bear one-half the cost of all inputs. But since 1977, situation has worsened for *zamindars*. In the *barani* area where yield depends on rain, the burden of inputs on tenants is a real matter of concern. Tenants in Attock are aware of their legal rights, but are still unable to get them from their landlords. In fact, tenants are not in a position to bargain with landlords. Many tenants in the area have built their houses on land owned by local *maliks* or *khans*. They are under the continuous threat of eviction.

NWFP (Swabi)

Sharecropping is more equitable in NWFP than in different districts of Punjab. Landowners bear the cost of inputs equally. Tobacco cultivation, as reported earlier, is a very labour-intensive crop. In Rajanpur district, the *hatian* is given one-fifth share of the crop for his labour. But in Swabi district, the sharecropper is given one-third share in total output, without bearing responsibility for any input costs. Tobacco cultivation in Swabi is more mechanized. Tobacco companies purchase tobacco from local farmers who have to follow the prescribed procedure for its harvesting, storage and preparation in *bhattis*. All these steps are costly. Tenants are well informed in Swabi about their share in these costs. Tobacco companies purchase tobacco only from approved farmers, based on a written agreement. Landlords as well as tenants have no complaints about these companies.

It appears from the above review of tenancy arrangements in the sampled areas that tenants' rights, as laid down in the tenancy acts, are not honoured. For example, the act or law makes the landlord responsible for water rates and seed. The landlord also has to share on a 50-50 basis the cost of inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides. However, in practice, the cost of seed is the responsibility of tenants who also share irrigation costs, particularly from tubewells in *Kharif* season. In some areas, for example, in Attock and Hafizabad, the tenant bears the full cost of all inputs.

Technological changes over time may have brought about changes in tenancy arrangements. For example, water shortages have increased irrigation through tubewells in several parts of the country. It has become common for tenants to share this cost because landlords have made it part of the tenancy contract. Tractors are now commonly used for tillage, which has increased the production cost for tenants who are

responsible for ploughing. But landlords have not taken the responsibility of sharing the tillage cost. It is fully borne by tenants.

The present analysis shows clearly that full implementation of tenancy rules would benefit tenants economically as well as socially, while definitely improving conditions of sharecroppers. Technological change may not be used as an excuse for non-implementation of tenancy rules. However, there is one practical issue: given the large variations in tenancy arrangements between, and even within districts, seem to make implementation of tenancy laws more difficult.

Chapter Six: RURAL LABOUR FORCE AND AGRICULTURE

Rural labour force

To understand bonded labour in agriculture, it is important to review labour systems in rural areas. For this purpose, four different sources have been used to examine the chief characteristics of the labour force in agriculture in Punjab and NWFP. Pakistani labour force surveys provide excellent data on labour agricultural force participation at the province level. For district level data, the 1998 population census has been used. The 2000 Agriculture Census is used for examining the use of family and non-family labour. All the above sources have been supplemented by data gathered during the fieldwork.

There are substantial differences between men and women in terms of their participation in the labour force. According to the latest labour force survey, more than 70 percent of the male population was in the labour force in 1999-2000, while the corresponding rate for females was only 14 percent. The remaining 86 percent of the female population was either involved in housekeeping activities, studies or was not available for work (Appendix Table 7). Between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 there was no major change in labour force participation rates for both males and females. However, male participation declined from 77 percent in 1984-85 to about 70 percent in 1999-2000. Female participation in the labour force, on the other hand, increased from 8 percent in 1984-85 to 13 percent in 1993-94. This jump is partly due to changes in the definition of labour force introduced in 1990-91.

There are two major differences between Punjab and NWFP in terms of labour force participation in rural areas. In Punjab, 75 percent of males were economically active in 1999-2000, while the corresponding rate was only 60 percent in NWFP. Second, there is a large gender gap between the two provinces. Approximately one-fifth females were active in rural Punjab, compared to only 13 percent in NWFP.

Based on the participation rates discussed above, the total labour force in 1999-2000 was 39.4 million: 27.7 million in rural areas and 11.7 million in urban areas. Appendix Table 8 shows that 18.5 million of the labour force was in rural Punjab, while 3.8 million was in NWFP. In Punjab, two-thirds of the total rural employed labour force was engaged in agriculture. Community/personal service, trade, construction and manufacturing were other important sectors of employment in Punjab. In rural NWFP, agriculture was relatively less important although more than half of the labour force was still employed in this sector. The other important sectors in rural NWFP were services, trade and construction (Appendix Table 9).

District-wise data from the 1998 population census reveal that agriculture was the main economic activity of the rural labour force in the seven selected districts. However, dependency of the rural population on the agriculture sector was much higher in southern Punjab than in central or northern Punjab (Table 7).

Table 7: Proportion of rural labour force employed in agriculture in selected districts, 1998

District	% employed in agriculture
D. G. Khan	76.10
Rajanpur	83.47
Bahawalnagar	69.23
R. Y. Khan	65.04
Hafizabad	47.81
Attock	42.13
Swabi	59.06

Source: 1998 Population Census.

Data on employment status show that a remarkable change took place in self-employment, the share of which declined by almost seven percentage points: from 49.1 percent in 1973 to 42.2 percent in 1999-2000. This decline was observed in both rural and urban areas. The steadily declining availability of cultivated land per household may have contributed in no small measure to the decline in self-employment in agriculture. It has been discussed earlier that farm area managed by tenants and owner-cum-tenants has declined over time. The share of 'unpaid family helper' also declined from 24.1 percent in 1973 to 21.4 percent in 1999-2000. During this period, an increase was observed in the "employee" category in rural areas: in rural Punjab 29 percent of the employed labour force was in the employee category and 31 percent in rural NWFP.

Agricultural labour systems in the sample districts

Small and marginal farm households generally use family labour only. On large farms, the relative importance of family labour declines owing to (i) the need to supervise work done by hired labour, (ii) considerations of social status, and (iii) alternative employment opportunities for family members by virtue of their better education. Therefore, large farmers usually hire labourers to cultivate their land and perform domestic duties. According to the 2000 Agriculture Census, in the sampled districts, on average two to three family members are engaged in agriculture. The use of family labour marginally increases as the size of farm increases. Apparently this contradicts the statement above that the relative importance of family labour is less in large farms. The agriculture census data do not provide information about the nature of family labour use in large farms. It is likely that large farms mainly use family labour for supervision. The actual farm work is carried out by hired labour (Appendix Table 10).

Two types of agricultural labour systems exist in the sample districts: casual, and permanent.¹⁴ Approximately 50 percent of farms use casual labour (Table 8). It is common in all tenurial statuses. However, the prevalence of casual labour is higher in owner-cultivated and owner-tenant operated large farms. Casual labour is extensively used in all districts (Table 9). These workers are mobile and may negotiate wages according to labour supply and demand. Mode of payment is generally on a daily-wage or contract basis. These labourers are used generally in peak seasons. Casual workers may take *peshgi* (advance) but it does not usually lead to bondedness because the amount of *peshgi* is kept low, to be adjusted when the work is over. For example, sugarcane cutters in southern Punjab work in groups for about three months at the rate of Rs. 6 per 40 kilogram of sugarcane. They get advances that are adjusted at the time of final payment. They usually are not bound for further work. Thus, casual labourers have relative freedom compared to permanent workers, who depend heavily on landlords.

Permanent workers, on the other hand, may be bonded. Table 8 shows the use of permanent labour by size of farm. As expected, large farms (owner-operated as well as owner-tenant operated), use

¹⁴ Casual labour means labour employed occasionally on daily wages basis for specific agricultural work. Permanent hired labour means persons who work on the farm on a full-time basis and are employed for longer periods. They get wages in cash or kind on a fixed period basis, i.e. monthly, quarterly, yearly, etc.

permanent labour extensively. For example, 51 percent of owner-operated 100-150 acre farms reported the use of permanent labour in Punjab in 2000. Use of permanent labour was substantially higher in Hafizabad and Bahawalnagar districts compared to other districts in Punjab (Table 9).

This information has been supplemented by household level data at the district level, presented in Appendix Table 10. In Hafizabad, 90 percent of households with over 100 acres of land reported the use of permanent hired labour. Average number of these workers per reporting household was 4.2 for 100-150 acre farms. It almost doubled to 8.1 workers per reporting household in farms over 150 acres. The situation in D. G. Khan, Bahawalnagar and Rahim Yar Khan was similar to the situation in Hafizabad. It can be argued that self-cultivation by large landowners has generated a class of permanent rural agriculture workers.¹⁵

The main characteristic of permanent farm labourers is that they are not mobile and are restricted to the same employer for the duration of the contract. Generally, families who have large landholdings employ permanent farm labourers. These labourers perform various farm activities and domestic work. (In general family members of the permanent labourers are not obliged to work for the landlord.) They are paid either on a monthly or yearly basis depending on the initial contract. Most permanent labourers are required to stay at the employer's house and are provided with two meals a day. Some people become permanent labourers to pay off loans that they have previously taken from the landlord. Some labour systems found in the sampled area are reviewed below.

Table 8: Farms (%) reporting use of permanent and casual labour, by tenure and size of farm, 2000 (Punjab only)

Size of farm (acres)	Owner		Owner-cum-tenant		Tenant	
	Permanent	Casual	Permanent	Casual	Permanent	Casual
< 1.0	0.8	29.7	8.4	43.7	0.7	30.8
1.0-2.5	1.1	37.4	0.9	40.9	0.7	38.1
2.5 – 5.0	2.0	42.3	1.5	44.3	1.1	43.9
5.0 – 7.5	3.9	46.4	2.8	47.5	1.4	46.2
7.5 – 12.5	7.2	50.3	5.4	51.6	2.9	52.0
12.5 – 25.0	13.7	54.9	9.1	55.8	5.5	51.6
25.0 – 50.0	22.2	55.7	23.6	64.9	10.3	54.8
50.0 – 100.0	34.0	59.6	40.0	68.3	19.6	59.3
100.0 – 150.0	50.8	67.4	43.6	70.4	31.5	69.2
150+	65.5	73.0	56.5	73.3	30.7	64.5
All sizes of farms	4.4	42.6	7.2	51.2	2.5	45.6

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

Table 9: Farms (%) reporting use of permanent and casual labour, by tenure and district, 2000

District	Owner		Owner-cum-tenant		Tenant	
	Permanent	Casual	Permanent	Casual	Permanent	Casual
D. G. Khan	2.3	35.3	2.7	47.7	0.7	43.6
Rajanpur	1.7	32.8	0.8	60.4	0.3	53.9
Bahawalnagar	7.1	52.3	9.7	54.8	2.5	45.2
Rahim Yar Khan	3.1	38.2	7.8	59.1	1.9	48.8
Hafizabad	12.0	64.6	15.1	69.0	2.6	63.2
Attock	1.7	42.0	0.7	43.6	0.8	36.2

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

¹⁵ The agriculture census data can be used for determining the magnitude of permanent labour in the agriculture sector.

Rahak system in D. G. Khan

In D. G. Khan and Rajanpur district, there is a system of permanent labour known as *rahak*.¹⁶ This system appears to be quite common amongst self-cultivators. *Rahak* is the term used for the servant employed by the landowner. The *rahak* has no share in produce but is given a monthly salary (usually ranging between Rs.1200 – 1800). Most of the interviewed landowners stated that the *hatain* system was preferable to the *rahak* system as the latter has little element of incentive apart from a fixed salary. The *hatup* system ties crop production to the amount the *hatain* receives at the end of the contract.

The *rahak* system also involves *peshgi* – usually a cash advance of two months pay and some wheat for consumption. The *rahak* contract is made solely with an individual and not with the entire family. Theoretically, the *rahak* can also terminate his contract at anytime but this rarely occurs as there are few alternative employment opportunities. It is worth repeating that, under the *hatup* system, contract with *hatain* includes all his adult family members.

The landowners interviewed, many of who were young, well-educated and had well-maintained farms, admitted to exploiting labour in the sense that, if the *rahak* deserved Rs.1000 for work undertaken, they would settle for Rs.500 because of the lack of other sources of income. Furthermore, they stated that child labour was not uncommon on their farms, as parents would ask for their children to be employed in some capacity, even for as little as Rs.200 a month. The children usually look after livestock for a meagre wage but parents remain appreciative of the fact that the child is kept away from vagrancy.

Seeri (authori or kama) system in Hafizabad

In Hafizabad, there is a system of permanent labour known as *seeri*. In local language, *seeri* means partner or shareholder in some business or work. In agriculture, *seeri* means the person who shares the work of the landlord in the cultivation process. *Seeri*, *authori* and *kama* mean the same in Hafizabad district. The common practice is that a *seeri* takes a loan from a landlord and becomes his servant. In return the landlord pays a fixed amount, which is 20 *maunds* per annum of wheat and 20 *maunds* of rice.¹⁷ This is usually paid on a semi-annual basis. A *seeri* is then bound to work solely for his landlord. The agreement between *seeri* and landlord is for six months (or one crop). After six months the *seeri* can change landlord by repaying his loan. But it is usually not possible for the *seeri* to pay his loan even during his whole life time. However, he can change his landlord by having a contract with a new landlord who is willing to take over his loan. This practice is very common in Hafizabad as well as in Bahawalnagar.

If the landlord hires a *seeri*, a *zamin* (security) takes the responsibility that the *seeri* will not run away. If it happens, *zamin* is responsible for the loan. The *zamin* is normally a relative of the *seeri* or any other *seeri* of the same landlord. Most *seeris* have inherited loans from their parents. They are thus bound to work for the landlord until the loan is repaid. Most *seeris* belong to low castes like *Merasi*, *Musali* (Christians).

Permanent labour in Attock

It is common among big landlords in Attock to cultivate land with the help of permanent labourers who have the status of employees. They are usually paid in kind, 25 *maunds* for six months labour. However, they are not bound by any loan. In other words, a loan is not part of their contract as is the case under the *seeri* system in Hafizabad.

¹⁶ *Rahak* in Rahim Khan district is the term used for the tenant.

¹⁷ One maund is equal to 40 kilograms.

Major causes of becoming permanent workers

The causes of becoming a long-term farm labourer are mostly economic, and sometimes social. Economic causes include landlessness, poverty, inability to work for a livelihood and inadequate size of landholding to support a family. Expenditures on social occasions such as marriage, death and feasts also lead to debts. Often, farm labourers borrow from their employers to pay for food and the performance of household rituals. Whether they are obliged to pay interest on these loans depends on the lender. Without exception, they are not allowed to leave the lender's employment until the debts are repaid. Such loans often increase and labourers cannot afford to pay them off. The result is a bonded relationship. The causes of becoming permanent farm labourers are summarised below:

- Most labourers are landless
- Most are illiterate, unaware and do not have skills for off-farm activities. They have no alternative to providing labour for a landlord
- Most are indebted (to their employer) and this has forced them to work as permanent farm labourers
- Many are working under hereditary labour relationships. They are working for the landlord because their parents (fathers) were also working there, and are likely to have inherited some loan
- Landlords are powerful and labourers fear eviction from their houses if they do not work for them
- Labourers are often fatalist and think that they are born for servitude
- There is a lack of internal and external interventions that could prevent exploitation.

Tenancy versus casual or permanent labour

The last two sections clearly indicate a shift from sharecropping to self-cultivation. Landowners extensively use hired casual and permanent labour for cultivation. Gazdar et al. (2002) recently raised an important question: from the point of view of poverty and rural livelihoods, is access to land under conditions of tenancy better than the alternative of working as casual wage labourers? Seasonality of the casual rural labour market and few alternative job opportunities for both men and women may lead to high unemployment. This is what is happening with piece-rate workers, e.g., cotton pickers (mainly females) and sugarcane cutters (mainly males), at least in southern Punjab. Thus access to land under sharecropping seems to be less uncertain, particularly with regard to food security. Gazdar et al. (2002) also show arguments, given in the theoretical literature, that sharecroppers might not be better off than casual labour, because tenants are usually in a weak position. Landlords can bargain down any advantages to the tenant to the point where the tenant's well-being is equivalent to what it would be under the next best alternative. Thus, landless tenants' conditions may be worse, or at least no better, than of the casual wage labourers.

Based on the rapid assessment, it is hard to say whether tenants (sharecroppers) are economically better off than casual or permanent wage labourers. However, it was found that the economic and social condition of casual and permanent labourers is worse than sharecroppers farming under the 50-50 system. For example, in D. G. Khan, traditional sharecroppers (50-50 system) were fairly well off. In one of its *mauza*, in the last 10 years almost 50% of tenants had purchased some land. Many of these tenants appear to have emerged as new landowners by using income obtained through remittances from the Gulf. The traditional tenant is much more closely tied to the land, has greater legal rights and, as such, is much more difficult to remove from the land. Compared to these traditional tenants, sharecroppers in other *batai* systems have no legal rights and a much looser relationship with the land. It is hard for them to make substantial improvements in their socio-economic status.

However, sharecropping is on the decline with serious implications for the economic and social well-being of the rural population. With few alternative job opportunities, many former tenants have apparently opted to work as casual or permanent workers for the local landowner. In this system, the

landowner has the advantage. In fact, the position of the landlord has become stronger over recent decades: he no longer feels any moral or social obligation towards these workers.

No doubt the landlord-tenant system is oppressive in Pakistan. It does however contain some elements of security for tenant households. Implementation of tenancy rules can improve the landlord-tenant system, especially to the benefit of tenants.

Finally, it should be noted that about one-third of the rural workforce is occupied in non-agricultural activities such as trade, craft, construction and services. Job opportunities in the non-farm rural sector are probably better for landless households. Arif et al. (2000) show that the incidence of poverty among the non-agriculture wage employees was much lower than among the agricultural labourers. Households engaged in non-farm occupations occupy an intermediate position between farmers and agricultural labourers. Arif et al. suggest that the non-farm sector can no longer be viewed as a residual category. Their findings are similar to the results of Sen (1996) concerning the rural non-farm sector in Bangladesh. It is difficult to claim that non-farm employment in rural Pakistan is a route out of poverty; but at least for the land-poor group, a shift from farm to non-farm activities would most likely be poverty-reducing.

Chapter Seven: DOES BONDED LABOUR EXIST IN AGRICULTURE?

The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1992 has laid down a fairly precise definition of bonded labour which may be summarized as follows: a bonded labourer is a person who has pledged to work for his creditor, against nominal wages in cash or kind, till the creditor declares that the loan is repaid. During the period of bondage, the labourer does not have the freedom to seek other employment or other means of livelihood or to move from one place to another. In other words, bonded labour is pledged to work for a pittance to redeem debts, which he may not even have himself incurred.

Unfortunately, no authentic survey has been carried out so far to estimate the number of bonded labourers in the country. Identification of bondedness is a difficult task because of its invisibility. An assessment of the significance of bonded labour in agriculture was made in the seven districts covered in this study. This chapter is divided into five sub-sections covering different aspects of bondage and forced labour.

Debt bondage in Hafizabad and Bahawalnagar

It is common among tenants to take a loan from their landlords to meet their needs. These loans are usually adjusted at the time of harvesting. So, not all cases of debt strictly constitute bondage. Out of the seven districts selected for the rapid assessment, debt bondage was found in Hafizabad (central Punjab) and Bahawalnagar (south Punjab) districts. The *seeri* system in Hafizabad without doubt constitutes bondage. *Seeris* are invariably indebted to their employers, some of them to the level of Rs.150,000. The *seeri* system is common in many villages in Hafizabad although has probably not spread to surrounding districts.

Local landlords prefer their land to be cultivated by *seeris*, as wages to 'free labourers' are higher. In addition to agriculture work, *seeris* also take care of livestock owned by landlords. Landlords prefer to hire *seeris* from their own village who are easier to manage and control and, as they are not allowed to leave the village, whose services are available round the clock. *Seeris* working for a long period of time are even more beneficial for landlords. Many landlords claimed that they cannot give heavy work to *seeris* because they run away. Landlords also complained that some *seeris* are involved in stealing fertilizer and even livestock. Although beating *seeris* is not common, landlords consider it rightful if they do not work properly or attempt to run away. Some cases of runaways were found in district Hafizabad.

It was also observed that local landlords give incentives to unemployed persons to become *seeris*. The landlord meets the economic needs of these persons through credit, which obliges them to work for the landlord. *Seeris* are illiterate, and their children do not attend school. *Seeris* invariably express unhappiness with their situation. They want to be out of this bondedness but it is impossible for them to accumulate sufficient resources to repay their loans.

In many cases, the loan for which *seeris* are bonded was not taken by them but by their parents. We met one person who became a *seeri* at the age of 12, when his father asked him to work against the loan he had taken from the landlord a few years earlier.

We heard about only a few cases of freedom from bondage through repayment of the loan. In one family, four brothers were bonded to a landlord. One of them was freed because his loan was shifted to the other three brothers. He has opened a shop in the village, with the goal to earn enough money to free his brothers. The situation of servants (men only) who obtained advances from landlords in Bahawalnagar was similar to that of *seeris* in Hafizabad, with one exception. In Bahawalnagar, its incidence was relatively low and workers were mainly migrants. The movement of bonded labour between the agriculture sector and the brick kiln industry was also common in Bahawalnagar. Families of migrant workers are not usually involved in the contract, either in agriculture or in the brick kiln industry. While in agriculture, the worker stays at least for one season. If he leaves the landlord, all his debt is paid off by the brick kiln owner. We are not sure how widespread this phenomenon is, even within Bahawalnagar.

A reported event highlights the seriousness of bonded labour. In Daharamwal Village, District Hafizabad, two years ago a local landlord locked up his two *seeris*, who had run away from his land and were caught in Karachi. They were beaten badly after their return from Karachi. A relative of these *seeris* approached the Lahore high court. The court released the *seeris*. After release, they were again beaten by the landlord. They have now moved to Karachi permanently with their families and no one knows where they are.

Seeris are very keen to get out of bondage but they have no resources to repay their loans. A few cases were reported, where a *seeri* obtained some money by marrying off his daughter just to repay the loan. In one village of *tehsil* Pindi Bhattian in district Hafizabad, we met a *seeri* who was making arrangements to marry off his daughter against some money to come out of debt bondage.

It might be interesting to mention the newspaper report about selling kidneys to repay loans from landlords. It is a tradition amongst the Muslim Sheikh tribe in district Sargodha to pay at least Rs.50, 000 to the family of a girl to get her hand in marriage. A worker has to borrow the money from the landlord. The loan usually continues increasing because of interest. The worker and his family serve as slaves of the landlord till they are able to pay back the loan, which however, is usually possible only when another landlord arranges payment of the dues. It is just a change of owner for the poor worker. So many of the Sultanpur inhabitants have sold a kidney to clear their debts (Nazli, 2002).

But, it is important to state here that the prevalence of debt bondage is quite insignificant in NWFP (Swabi). The principal reason for lack of bonded labour is the pattern of social organization in Swabi district whereby landowners and tenants belong to same tribe. In the tribal system, each household is socially important, irrespective of its economic status. Migration, both internal and external, is common in NWFP. The tribal system and reliance on non-agriculture sources certainly prevents bondedness in NWFP. However, the *sardari* system, which prevailed in some parts of NWFP, creates its own pattern of bondedness as it offers no occupational choices apart from agriculture. As fieldwork was not carried out in these districts, it is difficult to give any precise information. However, it is likely that in the *Sardari* system the total land of a village is owned by *sardars*. Landless households have no choice but to work for these *sardars*.

Forced labour in Attock

Because of the social and economic dependence of the sharecropper on the landlord, the wage received by the tenant for labour on the landlord's farm is, in many cases, less than the market wage. This is in line with recent findings of Hussain (2003). We found in Attock cases of tenants' labour being virtually unpaid, the tenant receiving only a meal and a cup of tea in the afternoon for his day-long labour on the landlord's farm or house. These tenants are sharecroppers. In addition to working on the sharecropped part, they are obliged to work as unpaid labour on their landlord's farm or house. According to tenants whom we met during fieldwork, it is obligatory for a tenant (male only) to be home at all time, ready to report for work if the landlord calls him. He is not allowed to do any other work except land cultivation (sharecropping) and is bound to do free labour for the landlord almost daily. If the tenant is unable to work for the landlord for illness or another reason, he is bound to send another person to do his part of work. One tenant informed us that he recently hired a labourer for two days to work on the landlord's land because he was sick himself.

The question is to what extent this system in Attock can be seen as forced labour, if it is understood to be part of the contract between the landlord and tenant. It is true that tenants understand that they have to do unpaid labour for landlords. But it is also true that they accept this condition because of lack of alternative earning opportunities. Invariably all tenants we met told us that they wanted to get rid of this forced labour.

It appears that the prevailing land-tenure system in Attock is coercive. On the one hand, the landlord does not contribute towards input costs. On the other hand, tenants are forced to provide unpaid labour on a regular basis. Tenants are under a double burden: they do not get a fair share of the crop they cultivate, nor are they paid for their labour.

Attock is a *barani* area, depending mainly on rain for cultivation. In some places, tenants are obliged to take land on fixed rent (i.e., tenants cannot opt for sharecropping). Tenants are always uncertain about the recovery of rent they have to pay to the landlord if they do not get adequate rain. More importantly, these fixed-rent tenants are also obliged to provide free labour, one family member to work on the landlord's farm without wages, upon demand.

Peshgi in D. G. Khan and Rajanpur

Under the *hatup* system, in D. G. Khan and Rajanpur districts, every contract (all of which are verbal contracts and are made with the entire family) made with the *hatain* involves an advance, or *peshgi*, that the landlord gives at the rate of Rs. 1600-2000 per acre of land rented out to the *hatain* and his family. This advance is used for consumption purposes by the *hatain* and his family. Once the advance has been taken, the *hatain* cannot stop work on the cultivation of that crop without penalties being incurred. The landowners interviewed stated that those *hatain* that abandon a crop before it is harvested have their wages cut. This cut is in their share in the crop. This was confirmed by the *hatains*. Normally, *hatains* are able to pay off the debt (or advance) at the end of the season.

Hatains are divided into those who are local (from the village where the landowner's land is situated) and migrants (not from the village but usually from within the district). Those who come from outside the village are provided living quarters and electricity, but no food. This group appears to move from place to place (usually within the district) in search of work. Generally, the landowners show a preference for local *hatains*. Landowners also stated that they would provide free medical cover and some wheat to care the consumption needs of the *hatain*. It is unclear whether this is part of the verbal contract or simply passed off as the 'magnanimity' (*hamdardi*) of the landowner. However, the claim of free medical cover or any form of free help was not endorsed by the *hatains* in Rajanpur.

One big landlord in D. G. Khan has given about one and a half million rupees in loans to his 36 tenants for a variety of reasons. He said that when a tenant is in need and he has money, it simply cannot be refused. Politics is one reason for giving this loan to these tenants: this landlord has good relations with his tenants who always support him in local bodies or general election. Tenants apparently did not report doing any extra labour for the landlord.

Eviction from land and “degree”

Conflicts between landlords and tenants were reported in all districts. In some cases, the parties went to court to resolve the conflict. These conflicts mainly relate to the distribution of agricultural produce and tenant evictions from land. Some of the evictions are motivated by the landlords’ desire to self-cultivate the land, or to change tenants.

In D. G. Khan and Attock, the issue of tenant eviction from the land, in particular, seems to be important. In Attock, several recent cases of land eviction were quite destructive for tenants. Uncultivated land was given to landless persons for cultivation without paying any rent or share in produce to the landlord for some years. This land required large investment to make it cultivable and the expectation was that these tenants, because of their investment, would continue tenancy for a long time. Instead, they were evicted so that the land could be given to other tenants, or because the landlord wants to cultivate himself. So the tenant loses all his investment.

Some cases of so-called ‘degree’ have also been reported in Attock. In one case, the landlord went to court for ‘degree’, meaning the tenant did not give the landlord his share in the crop. At the time of produce distribution between landlord and tenant, no written statement is prepared. Generally, a tenant has no record that he has given the due share to his landlord. The court accepted the landlord’s plea and the tenant had to sell his livestock and other property to compensate the landlord. So ‘degree’ is a threat to tenants. However, we met one tenant in Attock who gets written receipts from his landlord that he has received his crop share.

Bad maintenance of accounts in Rahim Yar Khan

In Rahim Yar Khan district, it was found that landlords do not maintain accounts fairly, and payments to tenants are delayed. All tenants agreed that account registers are kept but did not consider the entries to be correct. Some pointed out that due to illiteracy they could not challenge the accounts and, in any case, they had no proof that would stand in a court of law. We also found some extreme cases where the landlord had not settled accounts with tenants for 20 years. Tenants consider it as an exploitative and coercive way to keep them tied to the landlord.

Chapter Eight: ROOT CAUSES OF FORCED LABOUR

The previous section discussed briefly the main causes of forced labour or debt bondage. The common observation is that the chronic and growing debt that the tenant or worker incurs while working in the agriculture sector is the main reason for bondage. Studies in India also found that the deficit budget (meaning excess of household expenditure over income) plays a role. However, our argument is that the bondage mechanism is not through or because of debt but because of the lack of alternative employment opportunities in rural areas. The major problem is the increasing alienation of small and marginal farmers from the land and the consequent increase in the number of agricultural labourers. To a large extent, this increase is natural given the large increase in population during the last 30 years. However, the fact is that the economic condition of agriculture labourers is very poor. The substantial reason for this is the failure of the economic system and the administration to ensure that rural workers are paid the minimum wage.

With respect to the poor economic conditions of sharecroppers leading to forced labour, the root cause is the violation of tenancy legislation. In fact, there are large variations in tenancy arrangements across the country. The most disturbing situation is when the landlord takes half the produce without sharing any input costs. In Attock, we made some calculations with a tenant about the costs involved in wheat production. It was found that, even if he has a good wheat crop, very little will be left for his family after giving 50 percent share to the landlord and adjusting for loan repayment.

It is not uncommon for rural landless families to build a house on land given by the landlord. These families are not legal owners of their houses even though they have been living there for generations. The continuous threat of eviction also leads to the practice of forced labour.

Chapter Nine: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

On the basis of the present analysis drawn from a rapid assessment in only seven districts of the country, it is hard to conclude that bonded labour is commonly used in the agriculture sector. No doubt the incidence of indebtedness among tenants as well as agricultural workers is high, but debt is not always associated with bondage.

This rapid assessment has focused particularly on southern Punjab where the reliance on agriculture is relatively high and the incidence of poverty, according to several recent studies, is also high (Malik, 1993; Arif and Ahmed 2001). However, the worst excesses of forced labour were found in Hafizabad and Attock districts, located in central and northern Punjab, respectively. These findings should be used cautiously, because they are based on a very small sample covering only a few localities.

During the rapid assessment, debt bondage was found in only a few areas. Magnitude of debt bondage is still unknown. *Hatains* in D. G. Khan/Rajanpur and *seeris* in Hafizabad and Bahawalnagar are apparently under debt bondage, although the nature of their debt and labour arrangements differs across the districts. Southern and central Punjab may be focused on to determine the magnitude of debt bondage. In central Punjab, districts surrounding Hafizabad may also be included in future research.

Our findings regarding the practice of unpaid labour in Attock are similar to Hussain's work done in 1978 and the recent work of Gazdar et al. (2002). Thus, the issue is well known. However, it is not clear whether the use of unpaid labour is limited to just one tehsil of Attock where all the studies have been carried out, or if this practice is common in other areas of the district or even in surrounding districts. The answer may be determined by commissioning a study on forced labour covering Attock and other districts such as Mianwali, Bhakkar, and Muzaffgarh.

Southern Punjab is close to Sindh province. The exploitation of tenants through bad maintenance of accounts or their delayed clearance seems to be common in these two regions, famous for cotton and sugarcane production. This issue may also be researched in southern Punjab.

Appendix Table 1: Tenancy arrangements and indebtedness in Punjab, 2000.

Districts	Tenant household as % of all farm households	% of tenant households under debt	% share of non-formal loans in total loans
Zone 1: Rice Wheat Punjab			
Sialkot	3.48	27.82	80.51
Gujrat	2.18	4.88	100.00
Gujranwala	8.09	42.98	98.05
Sheikhupura	19.10	23.56	89.48
Narowal	4.86	9.41	49.45
Lahore	8.82	4.74	93.42
Kasur	9.29	14.52	70.63
Okara	22.28	21.07	93.32
Hafizabad	19.43	35.85	95.02
Mandi Bahhau Din	5.09	26.31	75.87
Zone 2: Mixed Punjab			
Faisalabad	7.73	13.76	85.83
Toba tek Singh	14.07	14.81	94.20
Jhang	12.36	11.87	88.97
Sargodha	13.18	13.12	98.48
Khushab	8.80	2.33	77.5
Zone 3: Cotton Wheat Punjab			
Multan	4.87	22.63	69.89
Lodhran	11.82	28.07	81.45
Vehari	12.94	17.36	78.21
Sahiwal	14.77	9.31	61.07
Pak Pattan	18.19	30.02	85.49
Khaniwal	14.92	17.68	83.79
Bahawal pur	11.19	26.47	74.81
Bahawal Nagar	20.50	29.04	89.25
Rahim Yar Khan	8.67	29.15	92.90
Chistian	4.89	27.72	100.00
Zone 4: Low Intensity Punjab			
Mianwali	10.17	13.34	84.08
D.G. Khan	4.77	20.90	65.64
Rajan Pur	17.72	26.03	84.83
Layyah	14.07	32.67	92.70
Muzafar Ghar	6.31	26.39	87.47
Bhakkar	16.26	14.84	89.54
Zone 5: Barani Punjab			
Rawalpindi	2.64	7.137	100.00
Attock	11.72	7.85	97.56
Jhelum	2.49	6.86	100.00
Chakwal	2.18	4.16	100.00

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

Appendix Table 2: Tenancy arrangements and indebtedness in NWFP, 2000

Districts	Tenant households as % of total farm households	% tenant households in debt	% share of non-formal loans in total loans
Swat	15.39	41.40	9.80
Upper Dir	10.93	76.90	97.74
Lower Dir	3.91	58.71	100.00
Peshawar	13.69	16.49	66.25
Kohat	5.04	8.79	100.00
Karak	2.52	65.80	94.49
Mansehra	9.66	18.06	99.44
Abbotabad	1.62	24.34	100.00
Kohistan	2.14	7.10	100.00
Mardan	23.85	24.77	95.82
Bannu	8.66	17.43	100.00
Nowshera	3.29	25.59	100.00
Charsadda	27.81	9.10	100.00
Swabi	25.81	21.02	96.26
Hangu	3.60	2.77	100.00
Tank	6.59	64.28	95.77
Laki Marwat	8.79	30.56	99.76
Hazara	2.61	11.25	97.70
Haripur	3.89	4.22	82.50
Battagram	33.52	6.46	97.17
Malakand	11.49	41.20	99.50
Shanaglapar	12.07	10.67	100.00
Buner	27.59	38.30	100.00
Chitral	0.88	53.05	90.80

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

Appendix Table 3: Distribution of land holding by size and district (%)

Year/district	1-5.0 acres	5.0 to 7.5 acres	7.5 to 12.5 acres	12.5 to 25.0 acres	25.0 to 50.0 acres	50.0 to 150 acres	150 and above
D. G. Khan							
1980	6	5	10	17	19	21	22
1990	10	8	13	15	14	17	23
2000	17	11	14	14	22	16	8
Rajan Pur							
1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	7	6	11	15	19	24	18
2000	13	10	18	17	11	20	12
R. Y. Khan							
1980	8	8	12	20	17	18	16
1990	14	10	14	19	16	17	11
2000	20	12	15	18	18	11	7
B. Nagar							
1980	4	6	11	24	22	20	14
1990	7	9	12	23	18	18	14
2000	9	10	15	19	16	13	18
Hafizabad							
1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2000	11	12	18	20	21	12	5
Attock							
1980	7	6	12	15	16	20	23
1990	10	8	12	16	14	17	24
2000	14	9	14	15	19	15	14
Swabi							
1980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	28	13	16	19	7	12	4
2000	56	13	12	11	3	4	3

Source: 1980, 1990, 2000 Agriculture census.

Appendix Table 4: Distribution of owner household by land holding size and district, 2000 (%)

	Attock	Hafizabad	D.G. Khan	Rajanpur	B. Nagar	R.Y Khan
1 – 5 acres	59.07	42.41	62.47	51.98	41.85	66.56
5 – 7.5	13.37	21.80	14.11	15.91	20.36	12.82
7.5 – 12.5	12.36	18.91	10.75	19.09	17.78	9.62
12.5 – 25	8.60	10.33	5.99	9.05	13.05	6.67
25 – 50	4.96	5.18	4.95	2.76	5.36	3.32
50 – 150	1.36	1.28	1.58	1.00	1.44	0.92
150 – and above	0.29	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.15	0.08

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

Appendix Table 5: Total farm area by tenure and province (%)

Province/tenure	1972	1980	1990	2000
Punjab				
Owner	39	50	61	69
Owner-tenant	36	31	24	19
Tenant	26	19	14	11
All area	100	100	100	100
NWFP				
Owner	38	58	73	76
Owner-Tenant	40	27	15	14
Tenant	22	15	12	10
All area	100	100	100	100

Source: 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Agriculture Census.

Appendix Table 6: Operated area by tenure and province (%)

Province/tenure	1972	1980	1990	2000
Punjab				
Owner operator	54.6	64.0	72.1	77.5
Sharecropped	36.8	28.3	19.2	14.5
Leased	7.9	7.0	8.2	7.6
Others	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
NWFP				
Owner operator	56.7	70.8	80.2	82.9
Sharecropped	35.9	25.0	15.2	12.9
Leased	5.0	3.8	4.1	3.9
Others	2.4	0.4	0.5	0.3
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Agriculture Census.

Appendix Table 7: Sex Specific Labour Force Participation Rates by Province and Rural-urban Areas (%)

Province/Rural/urban	1993-94		1996-97		1997-98		1999-200	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Pakistan	69.1	13.3	70.0	13.6	70.5	13.9	70.4	13.7
Rural	71.0	16.0	71.8	16.3	73.4	17.4	73.1	16.1
Urban	64.7	7.2	66.5	8.4	65.2	7.4	65.0	8.8
Province								
Punjab	69.8	17.1	71.3	17.5	72.7	18.2	72.7	16.8
Rural	71.3	20.3	73.1	20.8	75.2	22.4	74.8	19.0
Urban	65.9	9.0	67.4	10.5	67.7	9.6	68.2	11.8
Sindh	68.7	5.7	69.4	6.2	68.8	6.2	67.0	6.9
Rural	73.7	6.4	72.7	6.9	76.5	8.2	73.9	10.2
Urban	63.4	5.0	66.1	5.5	62.3	4.6	60.4	3.9
NWFP	66.5	10.6	65.4	9.4	63.8	9.6	65.4	12.1
Rural	67.2	11.6	65.9	10.2	64.4	10.5	60.0	13.1
Urban	62.7	4.5	63.1	5.7	61.0	5.2	62.8	7.4
Balochistan	69.5	4.3	68.9	4.6	69.4	6.2	69.0	5.1
Rural	70.8	4.6	71.0	4.7	71.5	6.9	71.1	5.1
Urban	61.8	2.4	60.6	3.8	59.9	2.9	59.1	5.0

Source: Labour Force Survey, 1993-94, 1996-97 1997-98, 1999-2000.

Appendix Table 8: Civilian Labour Force by rural and urban areas, 1999-2000 (million)

Province	Total labour force	Rural labour force	Urban labour force
Pakistan	39.40	27.72	11.68
Punjab	25.79	18.47	7.32
Sindh	7.68	4.25	3.43
NWFP	4.53	3.81	0.72
Balochistan	1.40	1.19	0.21

Source: 1999-2000 Labour Force Survey

Appendix Table 9: Distribution of rural employed population (10 years and above) by major industry and occupational group, 1999-2000 (%)

Industry	Pakistan Rural	NWFP Rural	Punjab Rural
Agriculture/Forestry	65.8	54.1	66.5
Mining	0.1	0.3	-
Manufacturing	6.5	6.3	7.7
Electricity, Gas and water	0.4	0.5	0.2
Construction	5.6	9.3	5.2
Trade	8.0	11.2	7.9
Transport	3.9	6.0	3.4
Financing/business services	0.2	0.3	0.2
Community/personal services	9.6	12.0	8.9
	100	100	100

Source: 1999-2000 Labour Force Survey

Appendix Table 10: Use of family and non-family labour by farm size and district

Farm size (acres)	% households reporting use of permanent hired labour	Average number of hired workers per reporting household	Average number of family workers engaged in agriculture
<i>D. G. Khan</i>			
All	2.24	2.30	2.94
<1	0.22	3.93	1.83
1-2.5	0.43	1.49	2.38
2.5 – 5	1.16	1.63	2.92
5 – 7.5	1.63	1.40	3.03
7.5 – 12.5	2.64	1.74	3.32
12.5 – 25	6.23	2.27	3.94
25 – 50	6.22	2.16	5.08
50 – 100	23.88	3.21	5.16
100 – 150	30.10	2.81	3.64
150 and above	82.17	5.20	4.19
<i>Rajanpur</i>			
All	1.39	2.96	3.27
<1	0.35	1.00	2.50
1-2.5	0.42	1.45	2.58
2.5 – 5	0.32	1.93	2.97
5 – 7.5	0.99	2.25	3.35
7.5 – 12.5	0.82	1.87	3.63
12.5 – 25	2.86	2.65	4.19
25 – 50	7.39	3.51	4.59
50 – 100	15.11	3.38	4.60
100 – 150	24.47	4.88	5.23
150 and above	34.32	6.12	3.06
<i>Bahawalnagar</i>			
All	6.63	1.88	2.50
<1	1.49	1.75	1.46
1-2.5	0.53	3.18	1.90
2.5 – 5	1.20	1.63	2.21
5 – 7.5	3.21	1.64	2.53
7.5 – 12.5	6.16	1.45	2.70
12.5 – 25	11.03	1.49	2.97
25 – 50	30.90	1.76	3.35
50 – 100	49.01	2.86	3.53
100 – 150	67.06	3.92	2.37
150 and above	72.35	8.15	3.72

Continued Appendix Table 10

Continued Appendix Table 10

Farm size (acres)	% households reporting use of permanent hired labour	Average number of hired workers per reporting household	Average number of family workers engaged in agriculture
<i>Rahim Yar Khan</i>			
All	3.34	2.25	2.92
<1	0.74	2.37	2.17
1-2.5	1.16	2.28	2.58
2.5 – 5	1.42	1.65	5.07
5 – 7.5	2.25	1.81	3.14
7.5 – 12.5	3.46	1.34	3.30
12.5 – 25	6.04	1.39	3.60
25 – 50	22.34	2.28	4.19
50 – 100	42.80	3.84	3.72
100 – 150	60.91	3.51	5.27
150 and above	66.09	7.84	4.11
<i>Hafizabad</i>			
All	10.64	1.61	2.28
<1	0.77	1.00	1.69
1-2.5	0.60	1.0	1.54
2.5 – 5	2.09	1.33	2.00
5 – 7.5	7.19	1.24	2.21
7.5 – 12.5	9.86	1.17	2.53
12.5 – 25	2.13	1.22	3.12
25 – 50	53.17	1.80	3.18
50 – 100	68.49	3.02	2.96
100 – 150	90.38	4.17	3.58
150 and above	90.48	8.08	3.45
<i>Attock</i>			
All	1.50	2.25	2.72
<1	0.37	1.00	1.64
1-2.5	0.72	1.74	2.17
2.5 – 5	0.54	1.32	2.65
5 – 7.5	0.51	1.06	2.98
7.5 – 12.5	0.79	2.87	3.17
12.5 – 25	2.39	2.18	3.42
25 – 50	4.85	2.08	3.65
50 – 100	21.77	2.21	3.28
100 – 150	29.00	2.95	3.67
150 and above	51.38	4.44	2.41

Continued Appendix Table 10

Continued Appendix Table 10

Farm size (acres)	% households reporting use of permanent hired labour	Average number of hired workers per reporting household	Average number of family workers engaged in agriculture
Swabi			
All	1.64	2.67	2.36
<1	1.68	1.63	1.94
1-2.5	0.60	1.76	2.18
2.5 – 5	1.35	2.02	2.53
5 – 7.5	2.62	3.01	3.09
7.5 – 12.5	4.39	2.97	3.15
12.5 – 25	18.50	5.07	5.04
25 – 50	20.00	2.93	4.47
50 – 100	18.75	5.67	3.16
100 – 150	0	0	2.50
150 and above	7.69	8.00	2.27

Source: 2000 Agriculture Census.

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