Independent evaluation of the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North-Africa: 2010-2013

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Evaluation Office
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Volume II

Case studies and supporting data available online on:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACI</td>
<td>Areas of critical importance</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Agencia Española para la Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo [Spanish Agency for Cooperation and International Development]</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>ANETI</td>
<td>Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi et le Travail Indépendant [National Agency for Employment and Independent Work] (Tunisia)</td>
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<td>ANGEM</td>
<td>Agence nationale de gestion du microcrédit</td>
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<td>ANSEJ</td>
<td>l’Agence nationale de soutien à l'emploi des jeunes</td>
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<td>ATFP</td>
<td>Agence Tunisienne de Formation Professionnelle [Tunisian Professional Training Agency]</td>
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<td>CDT</td>
<td>Confédération Démocratique du Travail [Democratic Confederation of Labour] (Morocco)</td>
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<td>CEACR</td>
<td>Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations</td>
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<td>CENAFFIF</td>
<td>Centre National de Formation de Formateurs et de l’Ingénierie de Formation [The National Centre for Training of Trainers and Training Engineering] (Tunisia)</td>
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<td>CESCR</td>
<td>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>CGEA</td>
<td>Confédération Générale des Entreprises Algériennes [General Confederation of Algerian Enterprises]</td>
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<td>CGEM</td>
<td>Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc [General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises]</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CNAM</td>
<td>Chambre Nationale de l’Artisanat et des Métiers</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPO</td>
<td>Country programme outcome</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organizations</td>
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<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chief technical advisors</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DDPD</td>
<td>Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011)</td>
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<td>DEPART</td>
<td>Développement Économique et Plan d’Action Régionale en créant d’emplois décents pour les jeunes en Tunisie</td>
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<td>DJEP</td>
<td>Decent Jobs for Egyptian Youth Programme</td>
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<td>DWA</td>
<td>Decent Work Agenda</td>
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<td>DWCP</td>
<td>Decent Work Country Programme</td>
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<td>DWT</td>
<td>Decent Work Team</td>
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<td>ECESR</td>
<td>Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights</td>
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<td>EDLC</td>
<td>Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress</td>
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<td>EFE</td>
<td>Eritrean Federation of Employers</td>
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<td>EFITU</td>
<td>Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
<td>Egyptian pound</td>
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ESSS  École supérieure de la sécurité sociale
ETUF  Egyptian Trade Union Federation
EVAL  Evaluation Office (ILO)
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization
FEI  Federation of Egyptian Industries
FNTT  Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs des Transports (Algeria)
FPRW  Fundamental principles and right at work
GB  Governing Body (ILO)
GDP  Gross domestic product
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation)
HLE  High-level evaluation
HQ  Headquarters
IEC  International evaluation consultant
ILC  International Labour Conference
ILO  International Labour Organization/International Labour Office
EVAL  External Evaluation Unit (ILO)
ILS  International labour standards
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IPRS  Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
IPRSP  Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IRAM  Improving the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant workers’ rights in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt
JP  Joint programme
LED  Local economic development
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
MDG-F  Millennium Development Goals Fund
MFPE  Ministère de la Formation Professionnelle et de l’Emploi (Tunisia)
MoE  Ministry of Education
MoL  Ministry of Labour
MoMM  Ministry of Manpower and Migration
MoP  Ministry of Planning
MoU  Memorandum of understanding
MSME  Mico, small and medium enterprises
NCEW  National Confederation of Eritrean Workers
NEC  National evaluation consultant
NEP  National employment policies
NORMES  International Labour Standards Department
NPC  National project coordinator
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>National Pension Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Steering Committee (tripartite)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>National Wage Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSH</td>
<td>Occupational safety and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;B</td>
<td>Programme and budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARE</td>
<td>Plan d’Actions Régional pour l’Emploi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Post-harvest centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNESC</td>
<td>Pacte National Économique et Social de Croissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Programme support income</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>Person with disability</td>
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<td>RB</td>
<td>Regular Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-based management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBSA</td>
<td>Regular Budget Supplementary Account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBTC</td>
<td>Regular Budget Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAF</td>
<td>Regional Office for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBEF</td>
<td>Sudanese Business and Employers Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sudanese pound</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEO</td>
<td>Senior Evaluation Officer (ILO EVAL)</td>
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<td>SEP</td>
<td>Salvation Economic Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>Senior Management Team</td>
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<td>SPCF</td>
<td>United Nations Strategic Partnership Cooperation Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Strategic Policy Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWTUF</td>
<td>Sudan Workers’ Trade Union Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCLG</td>
<td>United Cities and Local Authorities</td>
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<td>UGTT</td>
<td>Union générale tunisienne de travail</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIC</td>
<td>United Nations Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>UTICA</td>
<td>Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNG</td>
<td>Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (Association of Netherlands Municipalities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFCL</td>
<td>Worst forms of child labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>XBTC</td>
<td>Extra-budget technical cooperation</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of Francisco L. Guzman, Senior Evaluation Officer; Joseph Schechla, international consultant; Doha Abdelhamid, national evaluation consultant (Egypt); Samia Satti, national evaluation consultant (Sudan); Feriel Laalai, national consultant (Tunisia); Mini Thakur and Brajesh Pandey, international evaluators; and a team of research assistants composed of Arunima Wanchoo, Natasha Hazarika and Dustin Robertson, who provided valuable research and data-analysis support.

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The draft report of the evaluation benefited from helpful and constructive suggestions from numerous stakeholders.

Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the Evaluation Office.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of the evaluation

This high-level evaluation (HLE) is the first cluster evaluation of the ILO’s decent work strategies and activities in the North African subregion. The evaluation assesses the Office’s support to the governments and social partners in Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia in their efforts to address decent work deficits. This has involved the evaluation of subregional strategic priorities, country strategies and “roadmaps,” technical cooperation (TC) projects and technical assistance (TA) activities carried out during 2010–13. The overarching question of the evaluation is whether ILO strategies and actions have effectively supported national constituents’ priorities and efforts to fill decent work gaps.

Operational approach

Within the Arab Spring context, ILO was strategically positioned with a mandate and services that were expected to be in high demand. This, in turn, required the Decent Work Team/Country Office and Country Office (DWT/CO-Cairo) and the Country Office in Algeria (CO-Algiers) to be adequately resourced and flexible, and the Regional Office-Africa and HQ to be sufficiently responsive to resource gaps emerging during the exponential growth of opportunities and operations. These could not be met effectively with the same level of resources available to these offices before the uprisings. It also demanded agility and flexibility at both COs and other operational levels.

ILO’s interventions have responded to decent work deficits by facilitating entrepreneurship programmes, policy formulation to realize international labour standards (ILS) and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW), and strengthening social dialogue. Unfortunately, the subregion’s demands exceeded most efforts, but the relevance of ILO strategies and activities in the subregion is beyond question.

The aftermath of the uprisings in North Africa required urgent assistance from the ILO, and presented new opportunities for work both at national and local levels. These new opportunities focused on activities to provide informal work in both urban and rural areas. Such action is still the norm for many economies in the subregion. Thus, ILO’s strategies and programmes are in line with the future country programme outcomes (CPOs) concentrating on rural and informal employment envisaged during the Programme and Budger (P&B) for 2016–17, including also the areas of critical importance (ACIs) for 2014–15.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Relevance
In the absence of fully-fledged Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCPs)—which, in some cases, were stalled at the draft stage just before the dramatic political unrest—the ILO developed nonbinding roadmaps. These provided strategic direction and ensured the relevance and coherence of programme and project activities, and corresponding CPOs that had emerged since 2011. The evaluation team found these activities eminently relevant to national priorities, despite the subregion’s high political and institutional instability.

Moreover, the evaluation found that these roadmaps and related CPOs are relevant to ILO’s mandate, P&B outcomes and Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015. They have resonated with the priorities and concerns articulated in governments’ national schemes and programmes for development, as well as with the social partners’ priorities. That is to say, the priorities of decent work and the need for employment, social protection and social dialogue have either been constant or in higher demand throughout the period and that complete DWCP frameworks are still a priority. However, to be effective, the technical capacity of the International Labour Office (ILO) and its partners across the subregion needs to be addressed, in particular, in the areas of migration, human trafficking and social protection.

Despite ILO’s efforts to develop timely strategies/roadmaps for North African countries undergoing transition, some of the key national constituents interviewed, e.g. UN country team (UNCT) members, important donors, United Nations (UN) partners and a few ILO staff, had not heard of them. This highlights the fact that these strategies served an immediate and interim need in transitional countries without full DWCPs, and that partner institutions experienced high turnover during the period. However, two issues need immediate attention: (i) unevenness of tripartite participation in the development of existing strategies/roadmaps; and (ii) the importance of internal and external communication in effectively achieving the strategic objectives in the strategies/roadmaps. The strategies/roadmaps still have relevance, particularly as they are aligned with current P&B outcomes, CPOs and national priorities.

Coherence and value added
ILO’s two greatest comparative advantages are its tripartite approach and normative ILS framework. Applying these advantages more vigorously and conveying them more publicly is advisable, especially in light of increased synergies with other UN agencies and joint programmes (JPs), and with partners that lack these quintessential assets. Nonetheless, it is evident from the surveys conducted that, in North Africa, ILO projects and TA activities have contributed to a better understanding of the ILO’s standards, paving the way for more work needed to apply and realize FPRW.

The evaluation found a need for more systematic design and implementation approaches based on country situation analysis, risk assessments and proper baselines to ensure greater coherence and effectiveness of donor support. Some external observers have perceived weak coherence in ILO operations, in part, because of insufficient information about ILO’s work, as well as insufficient—or insufficiently clear—representation. The decision by the Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) to assign the managerial responsibility of projects in North Africa (except Algeria) to the CO-Cairo and retain “political” representation for the Maghreb with the CO-Algiers, although well-intended may have further exacerbated this perception.
ILO is aware of the capacity and organizational gaps that hinder the chances of greater coherence, synergies and value added among its activities in the subregion. Greater coherence was the subject of considerable deliberation within ILO in North Africa, and decisions taken at its February 2014 retreat indicate a commitment to addressing this issue.

**Effectiveness**

The ILO interventions were not as effective as envisaged at their inception, largely because of: weak tripartite involvement; low capacity in labour administration entities; cumbersome administrative procedures; internal resource limitations; inefficiencies in financial and administrative support at headquarters (HQ); the tenuous political atmosphere within the countries; and ILO’s security concerns to work in crisis situations. This was aggravated by the fact that some of the TC and TA activities are overly ambitious and of very short duration, limiting the possibility of achieving all of the intended results.

Moreover, the effectiveness of the Office’s interventions has been hindered by inadequate communication and cooperation between concerned ILO Offices in the region, which created confusion among constituents of their roles and responsibilities, and diminished representation at the UNCT level. Limited country presence has caused ILO to miss out on important opportunities, commensurate with its mandate (i.e. employment projects being carried out by UNDP and other multi-agency development programmes).

That is not to suggest that Office personnel and project staff in North Africa have not been diligent. All staff members working in technical, programming, project management, administration or support-related positions have shown tremendous energy, competence and selfless dedication to their jobs. They have earned a reputation as being extremely effective, and committed employees and public servants. Nonetheless, some staff and their expertise have been underutilized, notably where technical specialists could be more involved in programming to ensure ILS, FPRW and gender issues are integrated across all projects.

**Efficiency**

In general, ILO DWT/CO-Cairo has demonstrated tremendous efficiency, especially in light of the understaffing of administrative and operational functions, which have seen programme and project personnel assuming multiple tasks. The sudden growth in programmes and many political and socio-economic shifts, called for agile and resourceful management, which has engendered mutual appreciation and organizational solidarity among ILO colleagues across the region. Despite the shortage of capacity, ILO was able to make significant contributions in policy and legislative reform though the impact of these achievements will depend on future support and the required capacity. The signing of the Social Contract in Tunisia and the design of comprehensive national employment policies (NEPs) in Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia, are good examples of the effectiveness of ILO’s technical advisory services. Noteworthy are studies commissioned by the CO-Algiers on *Job and growth – Challenges, perspectives and policies*, and *L’économie informelle en Algérie - estimations, tendances, politiques*. The evaluation team finds that ILO North Africa has largely achieved its defined outcomes, within the exceptional constraints of the period and the unstable environment.

One consistent factor that impeded project efficiency was the frequent political changes and reappointment of ministers. The country case studies point out how political and institutional instability affected the efficient implementation of programmes and projects, and challenged the achievement of expected results. The HLE notes how tripartite coordination platforms, such as steering committees that have been instituted in some projects, is a good practice worth replicating in...
all projects to facilitate greater programme implementation efficiency, effectiveness and impact, as well as relevance and coherence.

Anticipated management changes in DWT/CO-Cairo and CO-Algiers during this evaluation could be the occasion to rededicate ILO resources to meeting strategic priorities. Additional technical capacities in areas such as social protection, social dialogue, migration and human trafficking are needed to manage the expanding DWT/CO-Cairo, and tackle the subregion’s decent work deficits.

**Impact**

The corresponding commitments and efforts of governments and the social partners will ultimately determine the results and impact of ILO’s strategies and actions. For most projects under this review, sustaining the momentum beyond the often too short project duration remains a challenge to achieving meaningful impact.

The evaluation team observed ILO staff’s intense involvement in advisory services, applying knowledge products/tools, capacity building, and project management. However, some of these activities appeared dispersed and lacking strategic direction, which led to duplication of effort, minimization of synergies among projects and across agencies. This classic inter-agency vulnerability could hinder any prospect of impact, and may also undermine the sustainability of results achieved.

The results and impacts of ILO actions were difficult to gauge due to a lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data at project and programme levels, both within the ILO and among national implementation partners. This evaluation was able to confirm findings from various other project and programme evaluation reports which attribute these gaps to: (i) low evaluability of projects’ logical frameworks; and (ii) inappropriate or nonexistent M&E frameworks at project, country and subregional levels. However, this has been remedied for projects executed in the second biennium under review.

**Sustainability**

Finally, the low capacity of many government institutions, the high turnover of personnel, insufficient political will and commitment by governments, and the need for greater ownership of results by the social partners ultimately hamper sustainability. Moreover, the short-term duration of some projects, and limited focus and capacity of the ILO and the government for programming, follow-up and consolidation of results may undermine the prospect of sustainability. The HLE did not find explicit sustainability strategies in most of the operations reviewed. In some cases, tactical decisions were made to ensure results and their sustainability. This is particularly common in capacity-building activities geared toward ministries’ permanent staff, apparently in order to circumvent continuous government shuffles and ensure the sustainability of inputs.

In addition to fully engaging national constituents, some activities involve civil society organizations (CSOs), which builds civic engagement in the project period, but also may run the risk of limiting sustainability due to CSOs’ limited financial and human resources and capacities. Nonetheless, their role as task implementers and in national steering committees/project advisory committees has aided the ILO’s programme sustainability and project achievements, advancing tripartism and enhancing local project ownership.
Overall performance

The overall assessment of the evaluation criteria shows that relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency all rated close to or in the higher end of ‘somewhat satisfactory’ range. Impact and sustainability did not fare as well and scored closer to the range of ‘somewhat unsatisfactory’. The overall composite falls close to ‘somewhat satisfactory’. This score is qualified within the context of the numerous constraints cited above.

Figure 1. Overall performance scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Coherence</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability and Impact</th>
<th>Composite Score</th>
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Note: The scoring uses a six-point scale where 1=very unsatisfactory, 2=unsatisfactory, 3=somewhat unsatisfactory, 4=somewhat satisfactory, 5=satisfactory, 6=very satisfactory. The graph represents composite scores provided by evaluation team members on the basis of ILO-staff’s assessments, constituents’ feedback, and their own assessments derived documents review, interviews and country case studies.
Lessons learned

1. ILO’s unique potential and competence ensures constituents’ continued engagement in programming and project planning, and delivery. In theory, this is the way to build ownership and improved implementation. However, this work is tremendously labour intensive requiring a specific set of technical skills, close collaboration between specialists, and enhanced capacities on results-based management (RBM) project design.

2. The Strategy for North Africa acknowledges the importance of social protection as one of its three pillars, but the ILO has not been able to deliver accordingly. Lessons from case studies indicate the importance and potential results of a dedicated social protection project in all countries, supported by appropriate specialists on DWTs. All countries need support to improve social protection as an integral and indispensable part of the ILO development assistance package.

3. Subregional and regional initiatives need to be under regular periodic review in order to ensure continued relevance to country-specific needs and risk analysis that take into account existing capacities at country and subregional levels to support proper implementation.

4. Since ILO training and knowledge products in the subregion are popular and effective, it would be judicious to invest in methods and assets to ensure the exchange of knowledge, maintenance and recording of evaluation, and timely follow-up. Among the knowledge products needed and demanded across the region are ILO studies and policy advice on informal and rural employment. Also needed is more information on ILO standards and their operationalization, which should, where possible, be available in Arabic.

5. The present division of roles and functions between CO-Cairo and CO-Algiers is, at first sight, difficult to imagine in practice. The segregation of political representations (assumed in Algiers), and technical and administrative responsibilities (assumed in Cairo) has created a false dichotomy that has posed further constraints to complementary subregional operations. In taking such decisions, HQ and regional office (RO) levels could have improved operation outcomes by ensuring all affected organizational units were sufficiently informed, involved in the rationale, and assigned clear roles and responsibilities.

6. ILO’s rapid response to new opportunities created a need for stronger administrative and programming capacities. This sudden increase in the volume of DWT/CO-Cairo-managed operations also signalled additional CO-level needs for programme support resources commensurate with the volume of the Office’s TC portfolio for the North Africa subregion.

7. Better communications with UNCT, national constituents, social partners and selected media would make ILO’s work better known and enhance its relevance at country level.

8. The ambiguities in ILO’s representational roles and functions have resulted in insufficient internal and external coordination which has had a negative effect on the relevance and coherence of ILO’s operations in the subregion, and on the external perceptions, which might have caused a loss of opportunities for programming and service delivery.
Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** A fully-developed DWCP remains a goal and priority for most stakeholders. ILO programmes and projects in the subregion should evolve from crisis response mode to more sustainable interventions based on sound social dialogue and tripartite involvement throughout the programme/project cycle.

**Recommendation 2:** ILO’s North Africa operations should involve DWT specialists more in the programming and project cycle from inception through to evaluation.

**Recommendation 3:** ILO should establish a subregional, Arabic-enabled knowledge-sharing platform to promote greater collaboration among DWT specialists, COs, project staff and tripartite constituents throughout the subregion.

**Recommendation 4:** Establishing and maintaining a training database would provide an essential tool to track, monitor, develop and report on capacity-building activities. Such a database would form part of a wider knowledge system designed and maintained with the participation of CTAs, DWTs and management to ensure user-friendly access to training materials.

**Recommendation 5:** To operate in and on crisis situations, ILO needs to take into account three key issues affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations in the subregion: (i) skill needs for addressing subregional priority areas; (ii) unrealistic start-ups and implementation timeframe programmes and projects operating in crisis situations; and (iii) training, systems and equipment to operate in a wider range of logistical and security environments.

**Recommendation 6:** Capacity and resources should be commensurate with the volume of the TC portfolio. In the case of the North Africa subregion, the disparity between capacity and the volume of the subregional programme and TC risks hampering the achievement of the outcomes of the ILO strategy for North Africa.

**Recommendation 7:** The DWT/CO-Cairo needs to work with national coordinators and CO-Algiers to assist them in developing a communications strategy for the UNCT, national constituents and the general public.

**Recommendation 8:** ILO must address representation dilemmas in non-resident countries in the subregion. This HLE has shown that ILO should be better represented in UNCT, senior management teams (SMTs) and project coordination meetings, especially with designated international staff representing the ILO at important coordination meetings.
1. INTRODUCTION

This High-level Evaluation (HLE) report summarizes the review of documentation, field verification visits and on-line stakeholder survey assessing ILO’s decent work strategies, programmes and activities in North Africa during the 2010–11 and 2012–13 biennia. At its essence, this evaluation aims to find out: (a) what the ILO's strategies and actions intend in respect of support to Member State’s realization of the Decent Work Agenda (DWA); (b) what actually has been done; (c) whether the achievements have been consistent with what the ILO intended to do in support of its Member States; and (d) what have been the main contributions to the achievements and impediments in the realization of the objectives stated in the ILO strategies.

The evaluation offers the lessons embodied in these findings and recommendations to the Governing Body (GB).

The evaluation particularly assesses the degree of relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency in delivering results, building sustainable partnerships, and establishing synergies and harmonization within those efforts.

Specifically the evaluation covers the following issues:

1. strategic positioning of the ILO programme in each of countries within the subregion;
2. the role and effectiveness of the ILO programme in promoting decent work and addressing the deficits in light of the Arab Spring;
3. synergies and alignment of ILO country programme priority outcomes to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and national priorities;
4. evidence of the direct and indirect use of ILO’s contributions and support at national level (outcomes);
5. the outcomes of ILO’s organizational arrangements to deliver the ILO’s programme in the countries selected for this evaluation;
6. evidence of longer term impacts; and
7. lessons learned and good practices that would help develop innovative thinking and responses framed within the reality of the new regional context.

1.1. Evaluation criteria and questions

In addressing these issues, the HLE poses the following key evaluation criteria, based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines.

1. To what extent is ILO strategy and action relevant to global and national policy dialogue addressing its country programme outcomes?
2. To what extent is ILO strategy and action coherent and complementary, and do they promote synergies with other strategic outcomes, national constituents’ and partners' priorities, to support realization of country programme outcomes (CPOs) and national policy objectives?
3. How effective is ILO strategy and action in helping Member States’ realize their decent
work policy objectives?

4. To what extent does ILO strategy and action as operationalized lend itself to **efficient** implementation?

5. What **impact** have ILO strategy and action had on policy, legal frameworks and awareness regarding respective CPOs and linkages to ILO Programme and Budget (P&B) outcomes and national priorities?

6. To what extent is ILO strategy and action designed and implemented to maximize the **sustainability** of their results?

### 1.2. Conceptual framework

Within the evaluation criteria and the core evaluative questions cited above, this evaluation seeks to establish the integrity and alignment among: (1) the P&B outcomes and targets that ILO has set for the periods 2010–11 and 2012–13; (2) the subregional priorities as set out in the ILO *Strategy for North Africa*; (3) the specific ILO CPOs; (4) the UNDAF for the individual countries; and (5) the individual countries’ development policy objectives.

The evaluation attempts also to determine the extent to which ILO’s results-based management (RBM) framework for each country links CPOs with the ILO’s 19 P&B outcomes and contributes to their realization. By so doing, the evaluation simultaneously identifies the linkages among ILO’s country-specific performance, and region-wide strategies and activities, and the implementation of the global priorities set forth in the 1998 Declaration and the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.

The evaluation framework also takes into consideration the effective implementation of core ILO conventions and labour governance instruments, since their application can improve the efficiency of labour markets, support economic and job recovery, reduce gender inequalities, ensure social justice and the “continuous improvement of living conditions”.¹ The international labour standards (ILS) also support victims of crises, whether in times of economic crisis or social unrest. Moreover, the evaluation questions enquire how the norms have affected programme implementation insofar as they constitute a comparative advantage for ILO vis-à-vis donors and other development partners, how tripartite constituents relate to them, and how ILS have been integrated into the delivery of Regular Budget Technical Cooperation (RBTC) and Extra-budgetary Technical Cooperation (XBTC).

Assessing the ILO programme outputs in the subregion takes into consideration the two-track approach of short-term crisis response interventions and medium-to-long-term interventions. This is keeping in mind that each short-term intervention could become a medium-term or long-term intervention, if the need still exists after the end of a crisis.

These subregional priorities are the subject of a short-term response strategy (one to two years) for those countries undergoing a transition process. ILO efforts to pursue this strategy should ensure continuity and sustainability, and guarantee that the initial interventions are coherent with a country’s medium- to long-term development strategy. For countries that are not in need of short-term (crisis) interventions, the evaluation will consider the medium- to long-term interventions.

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¹ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 11.
Specifically, this means that short-term (crisis) response interventions were intended to dominate the work for 2011–12 in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The evaluation also reviews longer term interventions in the other countries, as well as the transition period in newly independent South Sudan and the instability that befell the country in late 2013.

The evaluation explores the strategic response of ILO offices and programmes, including the development of CPOs, decent work country strategies, if any, and/or roadmaps for recovery during the two biennia of the review period. It aims to determine the extent to which these programming and planning instruments relate to the P&B outcomes of each biennium. The evaluation team has relied on planning instruments, implementation plans and implementation reports, in order to establish the operable CPOs in each country.

Finally, this HLE is rooted in the ILO’s RBM system at global level in the P&B cycles for 2010–11 and 2012–13 within the Strategic Policy Framework 2010–15. The P&B system is critically important to the evaluation, because it provides the basis for outcome-based planning, implementation management and reporting tools developed by the programme staff of the Country Offices (COs) to document what the ILO has intended to do, and what it ultimately has done in supporting its Member States’ constituents in realizing respective CPOs and simultaneous linkages to ILO P&B outcomes and national priorities. That is, the strategies and indicators related to the respective CPOs and their linkages to ILO P&B outcomes and national priorities provide the strategic evaluation framework against which to assess the various actions taken.

This evaluation takes place amid a period of rapid growth in ILO’s operations, in response to changing circumstances in the North African countries, and increased donor efforts to prioritize employment and decent work in the context of popular rebellion and political change. Against this backdrop, the evaluation team has assessed the performance of the ILO as an organization in supporting the countries of the subregion with the appropriate strategic interventions. These include interventions to address some of the principal challenges that have given rise to popular demands for decent work and social protection that have underlain many dramatic events and developments during the two biennia under review.

At its essence, this evaluation aims to identify lessons for the GB on: (a) what the ILO’s strategies and actions intend to accomplish in their support to Member States’ realization of the DWA; (b) what actually has been done; (c) whether what has been achieved has been consistent with what the ILO intended to do in support of its Member States; and (d) what have been the main contributions to the achievements and impediments in the realization of the objectives stated in ILO strategies.

### 1.3. Evaluation methodology

The HLE has been participatory and has sought to assess ILO’s support to national efforts addressing decent-work gaps in consultation with the ILO personnel and stakeholders in the countries under review. It especially focuses on poverty reduction, social dialogue and youth unemployment, social protection, meaningful participation (social dialogue), gender inequalities and other issues that have emerged as national priorities after the uprisings of 2011. It seeks to determine how the ILO has

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applied innovative thinking and responded to the global and cross-regional decent job creation imperative in the North African subregion, in light of specific challenges of the new regional context. In so doing, the evaluation identifies examples of new approaches by government, national institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and newly emerging social formations aimed at reducing unemployment and expanding decent work through interventions in skill acquisition and career development to youth and women’s entrepreneurship programmes across both rural and urban contexts.

This evaluation also adheres to the basic principles of the ILO Evaluation Office (EVAL) protocol for high-level evaluations of DWAs. Thus, it follows EVAL’s guidance Protocol 2: High-level Evaluation Protocol for DWCP Evaluation, particularly with respect to context, planning, implementation, analysis and reporting.

Lessons learned and recommendations presented at the end of this HLE report aim to contribute to the development of innovative solutions to the employment crisis and related issues in North African countries.

1.4. Data sources and collection methods

The evaluation team has applied a four-pronged data-collection approach consistent with ILO EVAL’s guidance for high-level outcome evaluations (HLEs). Figure 4, below, illustrates how the evaluation rests on: (1) a desk review of relevant documents; (2) cases studies of individual countries; (3) field validation in the form of interviews, focus groups and site visits; and (4) electronically-conducted surveys using Internet survey tools. This four-pronged approach gathers facts at both national and subregional levels.

Figure 2. Four-pronged approach

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1.4.1. Analytical approaches

This evaluation's primary focus is at a high, strategic level. It has neither sought to carry out, nor be a replacement for project-specific evaluations currently in operation or already evaluated. Rather, the HLE is tasked to generate insights into ILO’s organizational-level performance within the context of the Strategic Policy Framework and Programme and Budget outcomes and indicators following the High-Level Evaluation Protocol for Outcome Strategy Evaluation.

The HLE team has gathered facts in a step-by-step fashion, taking up the evaluation criteria in the process. The line of inquiry has proceeded from general to specific, moving from theoretical to practical.

1.4.2. Country case studies

ILO has selected the evaluation countries based on: (1) the existence of an ILO Decent Work Country Strategy or roadmap; (2) the size of their TC portfolio; (3) ILO’s presence in countries supported by the DWT/CO-Cairo, which supports Egypt, Eritrea, South Sudan, and also provides technical backstopping to CO-Algeria, which also supports Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (Figure 3). However, this period also has seen a shift in the roles and responsibilities between the two COs, which is discussed below.

Note: Red indicates location of Member States in the North African region: Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Tunisia

The evaluation team conducted field work in Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia; and documentary country case studies for Eritrea, Libya, Morocco and South Sudan. The information obtained from field visits and documentary case studies was complemented with online surveys covering all countries.

Country case studies, undertaken as desk studies, are based on a synthesis review of past independent evaluations and progress reports. In the cases of Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia, expert national
evaluation consultants (NECs) conducted these studies based on: (1) a careful reading of the relevant literature to collect data and analysis on the trends and gaps during the evaluation period; and (2) local knowledge of the institutional situation of the country and decent work conditions and dynamics. An international evaluation consultant provided the composite, subregion-wide study and final report, in close coordination with EVAL.

Numerous types of documents have provided data for the evaluation as listed below:

(a) The ILO's RBM system provided one of the foundational datasets. The Strategic Policy Framework 2010–2015 and the Programme and Budgets (P&B) 2010-11 and 2012-13 which set outcomes and indicators for the Global Outcomes the Director-General’s Implementation Reports (2010–2011 and 2012–2013), reporting progress against the respective P&B criteria.

(b) The global reports produced as part of the follow-up to the 1998 Declaration,5 which identify global and national gaps and challenges in the realization of respective CPOs and linkages to ILO P&B outcomes and national priorities.

(c) Annual reviews that ILO issues on the basis of annual reports (ARs) provided by Member States under the follow-up to the 1998 Declaration. These are particularly relevant for those case studies that involve countries that have not ratified the conventions implicated by technical cooperation (TC) activities. These annual reports are required from Member States that have not ratified at least one of the conventions associated with each of the four fundamental principle subject areas; however, that condition does not apply to any of the countries in the HLE for the North African region.

(d) Documentation of the ILO's supervisory bodies in respect of the application of ratified and not yet ratified ILO conventions and recommendations.

(e) Financial information in respect of resources applied the achievement of P&B global outcomes supported by CPOs. This was relevant at a global level, as well as in connection with national case studies.

(f) Strategic, thematic and project evaluations relevant to respective CPOs and linkages to ILO P&B outcomes and national priorities.6

The national case studies have drawn on these data sources, assessing the composite of technical cooperation activities—including specific projects and extra-budget technical cooperation (XBTC) that have taken place, or are taking place in the country—as they relate to the CPOs, P&B outcomes and national priorities in that country.

Those HLE North African countries without a significant volume of ILO activity are the subject of a separate desk review conducted by a subcontractor outside the subregion. These desk-based country


case studies cover Eritrea, Libya, Morocco and South Sudan. Each follows the same framework and evaluation criteria as the other North African country case studies.

1.4.3. Field verification

The Senior Evaluation Officer (SEO) and the International Evaluation Consultant (IEC) conducted field visits to Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia, and Sudan with the participation of National Evaluation Consultants (NECs) who conducted in-depth reviews in their respective countries. Each NEC conducted field verification through interviews, focus groups, consultations and selected site visits, as appropriate. This effort has enabled them to verify and elucidate the desk-study findings. Since this evaluation follows the High-level evaluation protocol for outcome strategy evaluation, the investigation at the country level supported findings and recommendations relative to ILO policies and strategy, not individual project performance, or general country developments, except insofar as these relate to the broader ILO strategy and action. National consultants in Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia have undertaken steps to link information on CPOs to both decent work country strategies and P&B strategies, in order to observe how the operationalization of high-level strategies meets the OECD/DAC criteria (see section 1.1. Evaluation questions and criteria above). This analysis reflects, in turn, on the strategies themselves, which for these countries, involves three steps.

1. Identifying documented gaps and achievements. The gaps relate to the country’s requests for TC and/or TA in DWA/DWCP, ARs, GRs and/or Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), etc. ILO provided this information in a working document called Country profiles in AR, GR and IR reports.

2. Profiling ILO’s support actually or potentially relevant to the achievement of CPOs and strategic objectives. This included actual actions, as well as possible actions. (Possible actions were included in order to evaluate efficiency, coherence and sustainability.)

3. Investigating the relationship between the results of steps 1 and 2 in light of the OECD/DAC criteria.
In this HLE for North Africa, the evaluation team complemented the desk reviews and case studies with selected country visits. These visits enabled cooperation and coordination with the ILO DWT and COs, NECs and constituents. They also helped identify any gaps in documentation, other information needed, provided a chance to address administrative issues, as well as allowed for personal meetings with the parties concerned. The simultaneous field visits of the SEO provided advice and guidance, and maintained quality control.

1.5. Internet surveys

The interviews, focus groups and consultations of the field verification preceded a wider Internet-based survey, which supplemented the document reviews and interviewing data collection methods. The evaluation team collected these data through online SurveyMonkey technology. When meeting with respondents, the NECs and IEC invited them to participate in the online survey.

The consultations and the desk reviews informed the design and content of the survey questionnaires. The evaluation team adapted current model HLE questionnaires to the subregional context. They adapted the model questionnaires to the HLE objectives for the following various categories of respondents:
• DWTs/specialists;
• chief technical advisers (CTAs)/national project coordinators (NPCs) and programme officers (POs);
• United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs)/donors;
• national tripartite constituents (translated into standard Arabic).

The questionnaires pose evaluation questions to which the respondents replied with simple selections from a six-step scale. The form also provided a field to allow for textual input, if the respondent chose to comment further. The collection of responses enabled the team to establish a numerical basis for rating and ranking strategic outcomes and perceptions, as well as to collect any additional analysis offered in the narrative fields. Gaps in responses to certain questions or insufficient responses from a certain respondent category, or the emergence of a particular contradiction in information, meant that the evaluation team sometimes had to return to some respondents for further information or clarification.

1.6. Limitations

As in any such survey, the online evaluation tools ran the risk of small or self-biased responses to Internet-based surveys. However, in practice, the participation in the survey was ample to triangulate and validate findings. The responses largely validated the analysis from the desk reviews and the field verification mission interviews.

Another risk arises also from not being able to identify or contact relevant key informants in visited case study countries. Some countries had experienced frequent turnover of strategic personnel during the period (e.g. Egypt has had seven Ministers of Manpower and Migration). Also, there was a great possibility that some of the current officials might not possess the empirical knowledge to address the evaluation criteria over the whole of the two biennia. Resources, including time and labour, available to the evaluation team limited the depth of country-level investigations, obliging the team to limit the inquiry strictly to matters that could contribute to findings relevant to high-level strategies.

1.7. Report layout

The current HLE report follows a standard format, addressing in section 2 the temporal and geographical context in which the team conducted the evaluation. The contextual discussion provides a short description of main socio-economic challenges confronting ILO’s operations in the North African subregion, and the challenges these have presented in promoting and implementing the DWA. It explores the macroeconomic environment, the employment issues (especially facing women and youth), social dialogue and tripartism and social protection. It also examines FPRW and the norms and standards, in particular the exercise of the freedom of association, and the ratification status and implementation findings of the compliance mechanisms for the countries of the subregion. This last section of the HLE context reviews the status of ratification of ILO conventions, with special reference to the core conventions, as well as the North African states’ reporting status as well as reference to CEACR observations and responses related to the review period, if any.
Section 3 focuses on the ILO in North Africa, starting with a review of the strategic frameworks applicable to North African states during 2010–13, including the ILO Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015, roadmaps, and other high-level strategies and plans. On the implementation side, this section lays out the resources and organizational structures at ILO’s disposal to support these strategies and related actions. This section also assesses United Nations (UN) coordination in the region, with some specific examples from the country studies, giving particular attention to ILO’s value added in this context. A review of the ILO’s TC portfolio during the evaluation period follows, with an assessment of achievements and gaps, opportunities seized and missed by country, and a final review of achievements, shortfalls and challenges for ILO North Africa, 2011–13.

Section 4 gives way to the team’s presentation of key findings according to the principal evaluation criteria (as explained above):

- **relevance** of ILO efforts to national priorities and programmes, intended country programme/priority outcomes and national constituents’ priorities;
- **coherence** of ILO efforts with the work of other UN agencies, ILO’s social protection floor (SPF) concept and outcome-based work plans (OBWs), assessing also if the current CPOs are logically aligned with the respective P&B outcomes;
- **effectiveness** of ILO’s actions to reach/contribute to national and P&B outcomes;
- **efficiency** of ILO’s organizational effectiveness with respect to time and other resources in facilitating the implementation of ILO’s strategies and programmes at country level;
- the **impacts** (immediate and long term) of ILO’s technical support and interventions; and the **sustainability** of results achieved.

Section 5 provides a summary of findings, lessons learned and recommendations. Section 6 presents the Office’s response to the findings and recommendations.
2. CONTEXT

Like many developing countries, most states of the North Africa subregion have increasingly become integrated into the world economy over the past two decades, partly out of the aspiration to emulate the earlier emergence of other economies and markets (e.g. the East Asian countries). It is also partly because the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank Group and Regional Development Bank) have conditioned international assistance for economic and development assistance on states’ economic liberalization and structural adjustments. The standard adjustment to the economic crises has prescribed short- to medium-term austerity measures, tighter taxations regimes and rescinded subsidies, leading to longer term policies of trade liberalization, privatization and deregulation.

However, in North Africa, as in much of the developing world, the result has been increased market volatility and a deflationary bias. Rather, output and employment have had to be kept below their potential levels, as the imperatives of attracting foreign capital investment, price stability and fiscal restraint have come to define sound and prudent macroeconomic policy. Ensuing financial and currency crises elsewhere have shown that abrupt market disruption can be subject to capricious swings in perception and confidence. The North African region also faced tremendous uncertainties in this context, testing investor confidence.

The social movements in the littoral states of the subregion have been a natural reaction to the decent work deficit and the denial of other human rights. Significantly, within this period, more global development actors have accepted that economic growth is not a sufficient indicator for development, unless sufficiently combined with distributive justice and other decent work criteria.

2.1. North Africa: Decent work deficits and opportunities

2.1.1. Economic panorama

Over the past decade, three externally-generated crises have hit North Africa (the world food crisis, global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis), and the subregion is now living a fourth. The Arab Spring was internally generated, resulting from people’s accumulated indignation at North African governments’ failure to adequately respect, protect and fulfil the labour and human rights of affected groups, and safeguard them from the impacts of earlier shocks and miscarried national governance.

Since government policies have not radically changed as a result of the internal shifts over 2010–13, North African countries are now more sensitive to external shocks, as the multiple crises continue to

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7 An often-heard analogy with Singapore reflects the objective to transform and economy from a human- and natural-resource-poor base to a highly productive and skilled workforce. See, for example, D.J. Kirk: The “Singapore of the Middle East: The role and attractiveness of the Singapore model and TIMSS on education policy and borrowing in the Kingdom of Bahrain”, in A.W. Wiseman, N.H. Alromi, S. Alshumrani (eds.): Education for a knowledge society in Arabian Gulf countries (international perspectives on education and society (Bingley, UK, Emerald Group Publishing, 2014), Vol. 24, pp. 127–49.


pose a threat to the region’s recovery and future growth. Domestic factors and practices (as outlined below) have contributed to these vulnerabilities.

The ILO and its partners accompanied the region’s political and economic situation, which has affected living conditions in many palpable ways, illustrated by statistical findings in ILO studies, reports and programming documents:

- inadequate educational systems;
- insufficient/inefficient social-protection systems;
- low productivity in public- and private-sector jobs;
- high proportion of young people in the population;
- rural divestment, debt and dispossession of small-scale farmers;
- a growing number and proportion of informal-economy workers;
- high unemployment rates, especially for youth and young women;  \(^{11}\)
- 13.4 million (≈15 per cent) of all children in the Arab States are labourers;  \(^{12}\)
- weak social dialogue, freedom of association and collective bargaining rights;
- exclusion and substantive discrimination against women in labour markets;
- 70–60 per cent of young working men and women are without contract (Egypt);  \(^{13}\)
- problems of governance, particularly in response to public needs, few opportunities for meaningful participation, non-transparent resource mis-management (especially of overseas development assistance (ODA), and large debts and debt-service priorities at the expense of public services;
- women earn less than men in similar employment (17 per cent less in Tunisia, 24 per cent less in Egypt, where informal working women earn 50 per cent less);  \(^{14}\)
- significant population officially living under the national poverty line (1990–2004): 22.6 per cent in Algeria, 19 per cent in Morocco, 16.7 per cent in Egypt, 14.2 per cent in Jordan and 7.6 per cent in Tunisia;  \(^{15}\)
- high levels of working poverty at the US$2 a day level (at around 40 per cent in Egypt, and 44.1 in Sudan).  \(^{16}\)


\(^{11}\) In 2010, the unemployment rate among the 15–24-year age group reached 29.4 per cent in Tunisia, 24.8 per cent in Egypt and 17.6 per cent in Morocco. Statistical update on Arab States and Territories and North African countries, ILO, Department of Statistics, www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/presentation/wcms_156325.pdf [accessed 13 October 2014]. In Egypt, the unemployment rate of young women reached 55 per cent. ILO estimates for 2011. ILO: Improving governance of labour migration and protection of migrant workers’ rights in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt, project document (Geneva, October 2012).

\(^{12}\) “An estimated 13.4 million, or about 15 per cent of all children in the (Arab) region are child laborers,” Countries dashboard, global interactive map on ILO website, ilo.org/ipec/Regionsandcountries/lang--en/index.htm [accessed 13 October 2014].

\(^{13}\) ILO: Challenges in MENA: An ILO inter-regional response: creating opportunities for people while empowering and protecting the most vulnerable (Geneva, undated), p. 6.

\(^{14}\) ILO: The way forward after the revolution – decent work for women in Egypt and Tunisia, project document (Geneva), p. 3.

\(^{15}\) Challenges in MENA, op. cit.

In the North Africa subregion, the economies of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are the most diversified with leading sectors in tourism, agriculture, industry. However, the political transition in the period has destabilized the Egyptian and Tunisian economies, especially affecting tourism and manufacturing, resulting in unemployment and depleted currency reserves. The separation of South Sudan as an independent state also disrupted the region’s oil-dependent economics, particularly as disputes over territory (e.g. Abyei) and distribution arrangements led to a downturn in revenues and development hopes. Libya has remained in political transition, where constituencies and legal frameworks remained underdeveloped, despite the country’s economic potential.

Across the subregion, policy adjustments to macroeconomic trends have been slow to develop the necessary synergy between global and national policy levels, whereas governments often have treated these two types of policies in isolation from one another. Meanwhile, governments have largely relegated social policy to an add-on to the old set of policy prescriptions. Institutional remnants of this add-on approach are still seen in the fact that the ILO’s government counterpart in several North African countries is the ministry for social affairs, or its equivalent, where unemployment and social protection are not yet integrated within their essentially economic dimensions, and corresponding institutions.

Historically, the principal market in the subregion had been guided, and its industry protected by the state, financed mainly by internal government borrowing. As markets have become increasingly private-sector led, the states’ industries became exposed to superior competition, and their financing increasingly depended on foreign borrowing. The evenly distributed, public sector-led economy of old became subject to a highly uneven economy led by the private sector and an increasing privately owned “public” sector.

In this context, the popular (informal) sector remains uncounted and under-evaluated. Informal work in urban and rural contexts remains the norm for wide swaths of the subregion’s economies. Thus, the area of critical importance (ACI) focusing on rural and informal employment is highly relevant today, as it has already been for decades.

### 2.1.2. Economic “growth”

Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in North Africa turned negative in 2011 in the face of the popular rebellions and abrupt regime changes. In the case of Libya, this led to a near collapse of economic activity, and growth decelerated in all countries in the region, except Morocco. Economic growth in Egypt dropped from 5.1 per cent in 2010 to 1.8 per cent in 2011 and remained low at 2.0 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, Sudan registered negative economic growth (-11.2 per cent) in 2012, following the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Nevertheless, regional economic growth in North Africa collectively (not including South Sudan and Eritrea) reached a record high of 9.8 per cent in 2012, although mainly on the back of the rebound in Libya. Growth in Tunisia also became positive in 2012, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected growth there to accelerate.\(^\text{17}\)

The period covered by this North Africa strategy evaluation coincides with the global recognition that “economic growth” is an insufficient measure of development, emphasizing the importance of decent work and other distributive justice criteria.18

2.1.3. Capital flight: Financial and human

Capital flight—both financial and human—has soared in the period preceding this review, as well as during the subregion’s ensuing economic conditions. The region has long endured the highest rate of capital flight of any region, considering the range of resource-based, state-led and balanced economies.19 The increasingly state-enabled private-sector preferences across North Africa have accompanied a gradual disengagement of national industrial capital. Economies have evolved more towards commerce, and investing and divesting, amid industrial production that struggles to compete effectively with imports.

Consequently, the concentration of income among national investors produces high-saving ratios, but has diminished investments that stimulate growth and aggregate demand, as well increased the tendency of capital flight. The Tunisian businessman has become an emblem of such capital flight during the evaluation period. A kind of migration of capital has seen some 1,200 Tunisian companies leaving the country since the 14 January 2011 Revolution, in some cases actually abandoning their projects in Tunisia. Many businessmen seem to have found refuge in other countries (Arab Maghrib and Europe), with tourism, industry and services as the most divested sectors.20

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18 Human development report 2011, op. cit.

In the first three months of the uprisings in North Africa, an estimated $30 billion left the region, primarily divesting from infrastructure projects in Egypt, energy products in Libya, and tourism in Tunisia. An estimated $5 billion left Egypt in 2012. By July 2013, the Egyptian pound had lost more than 12 per cent of its value, while Egypt’s foreign currency reserves dropped from $36 billion in January 2011 to $14.4 billion in April 2013. In addition, the budget deficit continued to increase from 10.8 per cent of GDP in 2012, 11.5 per cent in 2013, and reached 14.4 per cent in 2014.

Human migration has siphoned off a proportion of the potential North African workforce, particularly young people. Egypt is the North African country with the highest number of migrants abroad, with 3.7 million (4.4 per cent of the total resident population in Egypt), as of 2010. Libyan emigrants residing abroad numbered 61,521 (1 per cent of the total resident population in Libya) at the beginning of the evaluation period. In 2011, 3.2 million Moroccans were residing abroad (9 per cent of the total resident population), with women forming a significant segment (45 per cent). Women from other North African countries make up smaller proportions of emigrants (Algeria 31.3 per cent, Egypt 27.9 per cent and Tunisia 32.4 per cent).

Libya clearly has been the main destination country for intra-regional migrants, drawn from neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, as well as from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as a result of the development of the oil sector. In Libya, foreign labour represented around 25 per cent of its labour force before the revolution, with 2.5 million migrant workers. Prior to this evaluation period, 83,600 Tunisians (2008) and 120,000 Moroccans (2007) were residing in Libya. As a result of the 2011 conflict in Libya, thousands of refugees, Libyans and sub-Saharan migrant workers fled into Egypt and Tunisia, in addition to the Egyptian and Tunisian nationals residing in Libya at the time.

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23 Abram Online http://english.ahram.org.eg/ (08 July 2013).
27 World Bank: “Migration and remittances fact book 2011”, op. cit. Figures as of 2005, with a slightly higher proportion in France (47.6 per cent), United Kingdom (47.6 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (70 per cent). See: H. Boubakri: “Femmes et migrations en Tunisie”, in CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes, 2011/17 (2011), cadmus.cui.eu/handle/1814/15614 [accessed 16 October 2014].
Over the last few years, Morocco and Tunisia have also experienced increased arrivals of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, as have other countries in North Africa. Initially, in transit, waiting for opportunities to reach Europe, an increasing number of these migrants have stayed on in the region and, to a large extent, have ended up working in the informal economy. As origin, transit and destination countries in the current social, economic and political context, North African states are facing unprecedented responsibilities for the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant workers.

By 2010, most countries were experiencing a severe brain drain, with about one million Arab experts and specialists living in developed countries. The rate of return was extremely low, largely due to greater opportunities in technical and scientific fields in the West, as well as an absence of job opportunities, wars and political turmoil at home.32

At the beginning of this evaluation period (2010), governments of the region gave low priority to scientific education and innovation.33 The spending on scientific research from 2005 to 2010, for example, was about 0.3 per cent of GDP in most countries (except for Tunisia, at 1.25 per cent and Morocco, at 0.7 per cent).34 However, since the uprisings, Egypt’s national budget for scientific research rose from 0.23 of GDP to 1 per cent in 2012. Science budgets for Algeria and Morocco have both reached 1 per cent of GDP.35 Not only does this increase bode well for future innovation through enhanced technology, but also the regional trend coincides with signs of reversing the brain drain, with more graduates choosing to stay and more individuals returning from abroad, including young professionals and entrepreneurs, not least as a consequence of the world recession and eurozone crisis.36

2.1.4. Forced displacement

Displacements, both forcibly and economically driven, have plagued the subregion. In addition to the protracted displacements of the 40-year civil war in Sudan, displacement has also beset Sudan and South Sudan during this evaluation period as a consequence of armed conflict. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently registers 1,873,300 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan,37 and 401,433 in South Sudan.38 Chronic political and inter-tribal hostilities in Darfur continued throughout the review period, with renewed conflict causing some 300,000 people to be newly displaced in Sudan during the first six months of 2014 (i.e. at the time of the HLE field validation visit).39

33 K. Ghazal: “Arab communities are repellent for scientific skills”, in al-Hayat (28 April 2010).
38 “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – South Sudan”, www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html [accessed 16 October 2014].
39 “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Sudan,” op. cit.
Between 300,000 and 350,000 South Sudanese still live in Sudan and are at risk of statelessness. The “Four Freedoms” agreement signed between Sudan and South Sudan on 27 September 2012, which allows citizens of both States to enjoy freedom of residence, movement, economic activity and property ownership, has yet to be fully implemented.\(^40\)

In December 2013, heavy fighting broke out in South Sudan between government and opposition forces, including in areas near the border with Sudan in oil-producing Unity and Upper Nile states. Besides the great number of resulting civilian casualties, the fighting seriously damaged oil facilities, disrupting the flow of oil to Sudan. The conflicting parties signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, brokered by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), on 23 January 2014; however, sporadic fighting has continued.

In the midst of these processes of dispossession by administrative and military (or paramilitary) means, as well as the economic migrants from within North Africa and others crossing the subregion, the corollary of human trafficking and bonded labour prevails in various degrees in each of the countries. The Northern Tier countries also serve as transit routes for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers to reach Europe, Israel and Persian Gulf states, perceived as economies that offer greater livelihood opportunities.

### 2.1.5. Carbon economies

Algeria, Libya and South Sudan are the subregion’s countries most endowed with fossil-fuel resources. However, economic stability depends upon these countries’ diversification beyond the oil and gas sectors, with employment generation to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of new job seekers entering the labour force every year. In Algeria, the national strategic option is to revitalize the process intended to diversify the economy, starting with the non-oil sector, while deepening the reforms needed for the structural transformation of the economy.\(^41\)

Substantial revenue from the energy sector, coupled with a small population, gives Libya one of the highest per capita GDPS in Africa (around $73 billion) but, generally, the government in Tripoli has not used its significant financial resources to develop national infrastructure or the economy, leaving many citizens unemployed, poor and/or reliant on government hand-outs. The economy displays the classical features of an oil-rich economy: lack of economic diversification and significant reliance on immigrant labour. The unemployment rate is as high as 30 per cent and predominately affects Libyan youth and women.\(^42\)

South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil exports directly and indirectly accounting for almost the totality of its exports, and for around 80 per cent of GDP. In 2010, the GDP per capita of South Sudan was equivalent to $1,505, while the preliminary estimates for 2011 indicate a GDP per capita of $1,858, which is much higher than its East African neighbours, mainly due to oil

\(^{40}\) Ibid.


production. However, the sudden suspension of oil production in January 2012 reduced GDP per capita to about $785.\textsuperscript{43}

On current reserve estimates, oil production in South Sudan is expected to reduce steadily in future years and become negligible by 2035. Thus, the diversification of the economy and the creation of sources of livelihoods are matters for urgent development.

In the infamous case of Egypt, its oil and gas extraction has been crippled by disruption due to the non-payment to foreign concessions and the national Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG) scandal.\textsuperscript{44} The country now finds itself in a double bind with reduced fuel production for domestic use, and the inability to deliver on an illicit export contract.

Algeria also faces a looming post-petroleum challenge, although, for the first time in three years, Algeria opened a new set of potential oil and gas fields to international bidders in January 2014.\textsuperscript{45} Industry analysts note that Algeria’s oil and gas production peaked in 2007, having dropped by 24 per cent (628,000 barrels – bbls) per day within the evaluation period.\textsuperscript{46}

2.1.6. Rural employment and livelihoods

A large proportion of national populations in the region live outside the cities characterizing the rural dimension of decent work in the subregion. These populations remain the least likely beneficiaries of formal employment and social development. Some 50 per cent of Egyptians live in rural areas, and 80 per cent of people in Sudan rely on access to natural resources for their livelihoods. Central to the demands of the Tunisian uprising in 2010–11 has been the relative neglect of development and investment in the country’s interior, where the uprising began.

While agriculture has been the backbone of South Sudan’s economy, the estimated value added by agriculture, forestry and fisheries accounted for 36 per cent of non-oil GDP in 2010. This economic activity remains at subsistence level due to several limiting factors such as insecure land tenure, poor social organization and lack of basic infrastructure.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{43} World Bank: \textit{South Sudan overview}, \url{www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview} [accessed 17 October 2014].

\textsuperscript{44} Under the Husni Mubarak regime, Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG) assumed the sole right to sell Egypt’s gas to Israel. Through Israeli and Egyptian intelligence agents, that company undersold the strategic resource to Israel at a loss to Egypt of more than $11 billion. See: C. Swisher: \textit{Egypt’s lost power} (Al Jazeera, 2014), \url{webapps.aljazeera.net/aje/custom/2014/egyptlostpower/index.html} [accessed 17 October 2014].


\textsuperscript{47} For example: (1) The need for improved agricultural inputs and techniques such as seeds and fertilizers, storage facilities and advisory services, and irrigation development; (2) the difficulties for farmers in accessing markets due to the poor road network, lack of other transport modes and nuisance taxes and charges, including bribes; (3) the lack of a critical mass of farmer and rural producer associations as a means of entering the market place with the aim of minimizing the cost of inputs, accessing loan finance at affordable rates and influencing farm-gate prices; and (4) uncertainties related to land tenure and property rights, and thus access to land. ADB: “Development of agriculture in South Sudan”, in \textit{Infrastructure action plan: A program for sustained strong economic growth}, Chapter 6 (African Development Bank, 2013), p. 121.
The cancellation of protected tenure contracts for many farmers and the dispossession of agricultural land under previous regimes have afflicted a generation of Egypt’s rural citizens through a single act of legislation.\textsuperscript{48} Implementation measures, together with burdensome indebtedness, have contributed to the loss of livelihoods, displacement and rural-to-urban migration for millions.\textsuperscript{49}

2.1.7. Employment

The youth population in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the largest in the world, and that human resource presents a special opportunity for employers to benefit from young energy and talent. While youth employment is a principle P&B outcome and CPO in all North African countries, it is also the main focus of the ILO Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015 and a constant priority of all individuals and institutions participating in this HLE. However, despite this immense potential, 87 per cent of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the region believe that the biggest challenge is the limited supply of candidates with the right skills.\textsuperscript{50} North African countries face the highest youth unemployment rate in the world, reaching more than 29 per cent in 2013.\textsuperscript{51}

The risk of unemployment in the region is not limited to any particular group. Despite the disadvantaged position of youth, their share in total unemployment has been (slowly) decreasing. One out of three persons of working age was between 15 and 24 years old, but this proportion had dropped

\textsuperscript{48} Law 96 of 1992, amending the Owners and Tenants Law.

\textsuperscript{49} By 2006, Egypt’s Ministry of Agriculture counted the number of tenants dispossessed under Law 96 at approximately 904,000 (30 per cent of farmers in Egypt). Those tenants and their families totalled approximately 5.3 million people who had lost their sole source of income. K. Saber: “Agrarian policy, legislation and violations of Human Rights in Egypt: Land privatization and farmers evictions in Egyptian countryside,” Dialogues, proposals, stories for global citizenship (website) (2006), base.d-p-h.info/en/fiches/dph/fiche-dph-6922.html [accessed 17 October 2014]. That number is estimated to be much higher, although no census of dispossessed farmers has followed the 2006 count.


to 28 per cent, in 2012, and it is projected to fall further to one out of four persons in 2015 (see Figure 4 below).  

The female labour force participation rate in North Africa shows an increasing trend, but is still less than a third of the male participation rate. This explains why men constitute the large majority of jobseekers in North Africa, despite the disadvantaged unemployment rates of women. In other words, even though young workers and women face additional barriers in accessing work, the creation of decent work opportunities is important for all workers: women, youth and adult men.

**Figure 5. Share of unemployment among women and youth 1991–2012 (percentage)**

Informality of labour has also grown over recent years to represent 34 per cent of GDP in Egypt and 30 per cent in Tunisia. Typically, besides offering little or no social protection, the informal sector is characterized by low-quality, low-productivity work and low wages. In addition, informal workers, in general, but especially women, lack essential skills, representation and knowledge of their employment rights. The majority of women in Sudan’s vast informal sector are heads of households, having been displaced by decades of conflict. They find themselves in an underemployment trap; with little chance of finding more secure employment in the formal economy, facing special vulnerability for their consequent lack of social protection.

In the subregion, unemployment, underemployment, informality of employment and decent-work deficits have triggered both social unrest and current political transformation processes and represent important factors in determining migration dynamics that especially affect youth, women and rural workers. Women in the North African region endured an unemployment rate of 41 per cent in 2011.

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53 Ibid.
54 ILO: “The way forward after the revolution – decent work for women in Egypt and Tunisia”, op. cit., p. 3.
In Egypt, the unemployment rate of young women reached 55 per cent.\(^{57}\) Job creation in the public sector, as well as the private sector in those countries was very limited, and has become even more limited in the second HLE biennium, largely for the reasons explained above.

Tunisia created around 45,000 jobs in 2011, while more than 700,000 people remained unemployed. Prior to the economic and financial crises, the moderately positive economic growth occurring mainly in sectors with low labour intensity has not improved labour market performance.\(^{58}\) The majority of opportunities created were low-productivity jobs, often in the informal economy. In all these countries, the informal sector has often been the job seeker’s last resort, even for highly educated young people. Nonetheless, North African economies have seen little success at generating jobs matching highly educated youth qualifications and/or employers’ qualifications. Labour out-migration constitutes a coping strategy.

Although entrepreneurship can provide a way towards job creation, female entrepreneurship is quite uncommon in the case of small businesses, but especially for larger businesses. Women represent 17 per cent of entrepreneurs in Egypt, and only 13 per cent in Tunisia. In Sudan and South Sudan, where female illiteracy rates are high and primary school completion hovers around 35 per cent, the level of education severely limits job seeking for the majority of women.

### 2.2. Social dialogue and tripartism

Out of both economic and political necessity, the period has witnessed several historic advances in social dialogue and tripartism across the subregion. The ILO entry points for building social dialogue in the subregion have been: (1) legislative reform; (2) the development of national employment strategies; (3) social pacts and charters; and (4) the indispensable convergence to establish a minimum wage. In the cases of Algeria, Egypt, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia, the tripartite constituents had drafted DWCPs, which up to the writing of this evaluation have remained unsigned. Nevertheless, this indicates a firm predisposition towards social dialogue.

Algeria’s *Pacte National Économique et Social de Croissance* (PNESC – Economic and Social Growth Pact)\(^{59}\) has been the subject of negotiation among the government, the *Union générale des travailleurs Algériens* (UGTA – General Union of Algerian Workers) and the *Agence Nationale de l’Emploi* (ANEM – National Employment Agency). A tripartite committee monitors the commitments under the PNESC. On 23 February 2013, the Algerian government, nine employers’ associations and the UGTA signed the Pact as a 5-year plan to implement the concept of decent work and FPRW, and a draft DWCP. However, no CO-Algeria or ILO Geneva evaluation was available to assess the implementation of the previous Pact of 2006 upon its expiry in 2011, nor the new Pact.

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\(^{57}\) ILO estimates 2011.


The current draft of Algeria’s would-be DWCP 2011–14 includes commitments (under CPO2: “Social Protection”) to establish an École Supérieure de la Sécurité Sociale (Social Security Graduate School – ÉSSS) and diffuse the Algerian experience through the regional functions of the Institut National du Travail (National Institute of Work – INT), and to create an active Decent Work Observatory. Further subjects of tripartite dialogue include the ongoing debate over the repealing of Article 87a of the Labour Code, freezing wages.

ILO efforts in Egypt have culminated in a bipartite agreement on strengthening social dialogue in the export free zone of Port Said signed by the Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC) and the Port Said Investors’ Association in March 2014. Thanks to support from CO-Cairo, the agreement is in line with the conventions ratified by Egypt, particularly Convention No. 87 on freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, and Convent No. 98 on the rights to organize and collective bargaining.

All stakeholders consider the Port Said agreement to be a turning point in favour of much-needed social dialogue, as well as a good practice for the independent trade union movement. As a result, ILO-Cairo has received three requests to replicate the experience in the Red Sea and Alexandria regions, and in the tourism sector.

The Egyptian Ministry of Planning (MoP) coordinates with Egypt’s Social Justice Committee (SJC) and National Wage Council (NWC) on the subject of minimum wage standards and their financial implications. ILO reportedly has been very supportive of this process by providing three workshops on minimum wages. Inclusion of the tripartite constituency in the study of minimum wage in Egypt has led to greater understanding of the advantages, options and implications of setting a fair minimum wage.

The South Sudanese economy was plagued with high inflation in the first 12 months of independence, reaching 80 per cent during the year, but price increases were expected to moderate toward the end of 2012 at 17 per cent. Amid limited local food production and a high reliance on imported foods, coupled with the depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound (SSP) and closure of the northern border with Sudan, prices continued to climb. Meanwhile, the Government of South Sudan adopted “austerity measures,” cutting expenditures by around 30 per cent. In September 2012, an agreement between Juba and Khartoum on the mechanism to market oil raised the hope that oil production may resume early 2013. However, the agreement stalled until mid-March 2013. Then internal conflict erupted at the end of 2013.

Austerity reduced net salaries of many public sector workers and employees. Public workers went on strike, reinstating at least some of the allowances at issue. In the private sector, tripartism proved constructive. Two strikes at the main mobile company, Vivacell, also ensured that the workers’

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61 Which the IMF imposed to block wage increases for 20 years in Algeria. Heralded as historic, the 23 February 2014 tripartite meeting agreeing on the postponement has not led to the final abolition of Article 87a; however, following a Central Bank of Algeria calculation that the state budget budget could not cover the cost of wage rises.

62 Mainly by reducing government consumption, fund transfers to the federated states, development budgets and a 50 per cent reduction in housing allowance.

63 Particularly at the country’s universities, especially the main University of Juba.
demands were taken seriously by the employer and the government. In 2013, the Minister of Public Service promised to establish a committee to look into workers’ demands, and negotiations ensued with support from senior officials from the South Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation (SSWTUF).

The First Labour Law of South Sudan (GoSS) was also developed in 2013, following tripartite consultations facilitated by ILO. To date, GoSS and the social partners have endorsed the bill.

The Government of Sudan officially recognizes the important role of both employers’ and workers’ organizations to promote tripartite social dialogue. Sudan has made important strides in applying the principle of tripartite social dialogue. Among the examples is the Sudan tripartite delegation’s participation in the international and regional (Arab and African) labour conferences, and the drafting and amendment of all labour legislation by committees composed of the three constituent parties. Furthermore, tripartite dialogue has proved effective in the Supreme Council to determine wages and collective agreements, as well as in training, workshops and special committees to study various issues of decent work. This tripartite cooperation has enabled a high degree of coordination and harmony among the constituents on national and international issues, and allowed for a reasonable amount of stability in labour relations and social peace in the workplace.

Importantly, the Sudanese Businessmen and Employers’ Federation (SBEF), convening the private-sector employers and entrepreneurs, seeks to “create a good atmosphere between the labourers and the businessmen, or among businessmen themselves, or between the businessmen and the State authorities, so as to push forward the economic-growth wheel.” SBEF members are involved in government negotiations on labour standards, domestic laws and social issues. They lend great weight to social dialogue. SBEF holds the position that social dialogue and tripartism are important values in the promotion of social development. This sentiment was expressed by all the institutions consulted in the country.

The SBEF is quite active, and has formulated an Action Plan to be signed by the SBEF, the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation and the GoS. The Action Plan includes activities such as training and awareness raising, as well as studies and analysis on the economic and labour markets. The SBEF is about to establish an “Entrepreneurship Institute” in partnership with the Ministry of Investment to promote private investment in Sudan.

The Sudanese Workers’ Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) is currently negotiating social dialogue and social protection, which includes representation on a Wage Council (set up in 1992). It comprises a 14-member body of three workers’ representatives, three representatives from the government (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour – MoL – and Ministry of Cabinet Affairs), three employers’ representatives and five experts. They meet bi-monthly and regularly discuss wages, inflation and consumer prices indices, among other related issues.

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64 The Ministry of Labour report and proposed paper on decent work report (2009), unpublished.

65 This section is adapted from Sudan Ministry of Labour: Decent work proposal paper (2009), and UNDP-ILO technical paper: C. Bacrot: Social protection in Sudan, Thematic/Policy Paper (Geneva, UNDP and ILO, November 2013).

One of the successful recommendations of this Council, in November 2012, was to increase the minimum wage. Constituents ultimately agreed on a standard in April 2014. However, lack of funding of the National Pension Fund (NPF) makes the government the sole institution in a position to finance this increase by injecting additional resources to the Fund. Tripartite solutions remain to be found.

The ILO does not implement a social dialogue-specific project in Sudan. However, this experience stands as an example of the potential of tripartism in resolving development challenges beyond the context of specific ILO projects.

In Tunisia, the ILO has supported high-level tripartite dialogue through a discrete project as a building block of the political transition. The start of 2013 was most encouraging with the signing of the Tunisian Social Contract by the Government of Tunisia and the leaders of the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (General Union of Tunisian Workers – UGTT) and Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts – UTICA). The UGTT and UTICA have played a prominent role in the national political process that culminated with the adoption of the new Tunisian Constitution. Their ability to forge a strong partnership and to channel the aspirations of Tunisian social forces within a constructive dialogue is widely seen as central to this historical achievement in social dialogue.

As one UTICA respondent put it, social dialogue and the Social Contract are “the cherry on the cake”. However, the work ahead will now be harder, after its acceptance by successive governments, as the Social Contract’s implementation remains the subject of planning during 2014 and beyond.

As the political crisis in Tunisia deepened in 2013, UGTT and UTICA were joined by the Bar Association and the Tunisian League for Human Rights to form the “Quartet” that has been called upon to mediate the national political dialogue. On 26 January 2014, the Constituent Assembly adopted the new Constitution by a 200–12 vote, with four abstentions. That new Constitution reflects a wide national consensus and advances in key political, civil, and economic and social rights. It enshrines key labour rights, including the freedom of association (art. 35), unionization and the right to strike (art. 36), the freedom of demonstration (art. 37), and the right to decent work at an equitable wage (art. 40).

2.3. Social protection

While government efforts since 2010 have prioritized debt servicing and achieving fiscal balances, employment and social protection have become a secondary priority. In other words, finance continues to benefit at the expense of labour. Globally, governments in this period have acted as a banker of last resort to avoid the collapse of the financial system, but, despite stimulus plans and some labour-market

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67 425 Sudanese pounds (SDG) (US$74)
68 Promoting social dialogue and enhancing labour governance, UN/12/01M/NOR.
69 Whose acronym is the same as the name of an ancient city located between Carthage in the south and Hippo Diarrhytus (now Bizerte) in the north, near the outflow of the Medjerda River into the Mediterranean Sea. It is traditionally considered to be the first colony founded by the Phoenicians in North Africa.
policies in the first phase of the crisis (2008–09), governments have generally failed to serve as an employer of last resort.\(^1\)

Across the subregion, the distribution of the GDP in social sectors clearly indicates the low priority accorded to social-sector development, and this applies in the period preceding the onset of multiple crises, when certain states enjoyed more favourable balance of payments and greater self-determination over domestic policies.

An overview of the social protection mechanisms actually indicates that most countries maintain multiple social protection systems, at least in form (see below).

**Table 1: Overview of national social security systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of policy areas (branches) covered by at least one programme</th>
<th>Social security policy areas covered by at least one programme</th>
<th>Sickness (cash)</th>
<th>Maternity (cash)</th>
<th>Old age</th>
<th>Employment injury</th>
<th>Invalidity</th>
<th>Survivors</th>
<th>Family allowances</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comprehensive scope of legal coverage</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Semi-comprehensive scope</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Very limited scope of legal coverage</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Comprehensive scope of legal coverage</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

● At least one programme anchored in national legislation.
● Legislation not yet implemented.
▲ Limited provision (e.g. labour code only).
▲ Only benefit in kind (e.g. medical benefit).
… Not available.


Despite the existence of various social protection schemes, this overview does not imply that the substance of those systems, whether social services, health care or cash transfers, is sufficient to sustain beneficiaries at a dignified standard. Notably also, of seven standard social protection schemes, all North African states with available data showed that they have reduced subsidies on basic commodities throughout the evaluation period. These subsidies are undergoing further cuts in the current biennium (2014–15).

Although not as common as subsidy reform, other consolidation policies are being discussed and implemented across North Africa. For instance, increasing consumption taxes through higher Value Added Tax (VAT) rates and/or fewer tax exemptions, as well as containing the public sector wage bill and/or reducing the operating costs of public institutions, are being considered in the countries that have published information. Some North African governments are also discussing reforms to their pension systems, such as Tunisia, which is focusing on strengthening financial sustainability. Other countries are not following that wisdom.

Despite, or consequent to the Arab Spring, the subregion is considering an average of three austerity measures per country, mostly adjustments to the wage bill, subsidy programmes and tax regimes (see table below). The reduction or removal of subsidies is by far the most frequently applied measure. Governments typically provide substantial energy and food-price subsidies to their populations, offering relief from high and inflating commodity prices, or to share the wealth from natural-resource endowments (mainly oil and gas products). However, these, too, are being rescinded.

As such, policy discussions generally focus on eliminating or reducing these subsidies and replacing them with targeted safety nets. The fact that the subregion does not have well-developed social protection systems implies that governments should consider this reform with caution. By using good practice examples, after discussions with IMF staff in 2010 on streamlining subsidies to wheat, cooking oil, fuel and transport, Tunisia’s government almost doubled its food and energy subsidies to offset higher international prices and respond to civil protests.

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73 In Egypt, for example, non-subsidy programmes are small and fragmented, and do not have a significant impact on poverty and inequality because of their low coverage, high leakage, and limited benefit levels. The World Bank estimates that only 15 per cent of the poorest income quintile benefits from non-subsidy social safety nets (SSNs) (compared to a global average of 41%) and that their benefits only make up 10 per cent of beneficiaries’ welfare. The World Bank defines SSNs as non-contributory transfers targeted to the poor or vulnerable. They include income support, temporary employment programmes (workfare), and services that build human capital and expand access to finance among the poor and vulnerable, “Joint Submission to The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” on the occasion of the review of Egypt’s 4th periodic report at the 51st Session, November 2013, p. 19.
### Table 2: Social protection schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reducing subsidies</th>
<th>Wage bill cuts/caps</th>
<th>Increasing consumption taxes</th>
<th>Pension reform</th>
<th>Rationalizing &amp; targeting safety nets</th>
<th>Health reform</th>
<th>Labour reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

… = data not available.
– = data not applicable.


Amid this subregional trend of social protection reductions, ILO lacks a social protection specialist on the North Africa DWCT and operates no specific social protection project in the subregion. However, ILO Algeria-CO has supported the establishment of a fully functional École supérieure de la sécurité sociale (ESSS), providing university-level education on social security conforming to the Master’s degree, doctorate norms, will serve Algerian students, as well as students from other Francophone African and Arab countries. This institution promises to become increasingly important in building capacity in the Maghreb region on social protection policies.

Egypt’s social insurance system provides safety nets in the form of old-age, disability, survivors, sickness, maternity, work injury, and unemployment benefits to workers and their dependents. However, official data show that the number of insured had decreased overall from 19 million in 2004–05 to 16.7 million in 2010–11, despite interim population increases.

In its review of Egypt in 2013, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) observed that the state had omitted to fulfil its treaty obligations to ensure social security under Article 10 of International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The CESCR found an inconsistency in the level of coverage among employees in public and private sectors. Egypt has 5.5 million public sector workers who pay 19.1 billion Egyptian pounds (EGP) ($2.65 billion) in annual contributions, while the 17.9 million who work in public companies and private sector pay only EGP13.6 billion ($1.897 billion) in subscriptions. This indicates that a high percentage of workers in certain sectors are either not insured, or insured at a nominal salary, in order to reduce the amount of contribution by the employers. The Committee found that system unsustainable.

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Coverage within the private sector is also inconsistent. For example, only 57.6 per cent of workers in the private sector within establishments do not enjoy social insurance, compared to 87.7 per cent of workers in the private sector outside formal establishments. In addition, labour relations in the private sector have suffered, whereas Egyptian employers dismissed almost half a million workers from their jobs just before they reached retirement age, thus removing them from the insurance system.76

Notably, the majority of workers in Egypt are employed in informal small businesses, or are self-employed in agriculture, and are excluded from social insurance systems. Law No. 112 of 1980 concerning insurance of workers in the unregulated private sector is “suspended,” consequently excluding the majority of workers in Egypt from social security coverage.

One social security scheme in Egypt is pensions for those who did not pay social insurance contributions during their employment. Pensions benefit around 1.2 million people, whose disbursed value is around EGP1.4 billion. This puts the individual/family share of social security at EGP97 per month (around $14). In light of high inflation levels in the country, those benefiting from such pensions cannot pay for their basic needs. The World Bank estimates that only 15 per cent of the poorest income quintile benefits from non-subsidy social protection schemes (compared to a global average of 41 per cent), and that their benefits only make up 10 per cent of welfare beneficiaries.77

Eritrea’s social protection system is limited. A nominal social security scheme has been in place since 2004, but it is restricted to public sector employees in the form of a pension. Constituents report that support is needed to have both short-term and long-term expansions of social security coverage throughout the country. In the short term, employment-related security, beyond the public service, is urgently required. Eritreans also face a lack of health and unemployment benefits, and need technical support to plan and roll out such programmes.78 Meanwhile, the North African region has no social protection specialist, or related project for Eritrea.

During the period under review, the IMF and World Bank pressed Morocco to cut spending and reform subsidies, and its taxation and pension systems. These demands are linked to a two-year, $6.2 billion precautionary credit line to which the IMF agreed in 2012.79 However, the IMF made no recommendation for reducing State subsidies to the palace,80 or those on food monopolies (milk products, oils and sugar) controlled by companies belonging to the king.81

77 ECESR at al. “Joint Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the occasion of the review of Egypt’s 4th periodic report at the 31st session” (Cairo, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, November 2013).
78 Interview with constituents from the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare and Employers Federation for Eritrea, 16 June 2014.
In Sudan, where authorities adopted a reform programme centred on fiscal adjustment in June 2012, the government was set to increase VAT from 15 per cent to 17 per cent. These measures coincided with a shrinking economy and the loss of much oil revenue to South Sudan.

Sudan has had a long institutional history; most administrations and social organizations, as well as the country’s social policy framework, were created a long time ago. However, some social policies and programmes for social development and cohesion are currently not implemented, due to the lack of funding and political interventions that prioritize defence and security services, amounting to 75 per cent of the National Budget.

Social protection in Sudan falls under the remit of the ministries in charge of social development: Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (MoWSS), Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education (MoE) and the MoL and Human Resources (MoLHR). However, in Sudan, the Ministry of Finance intervenes in social development and is involved in most decisions regarding the financing of social programmes. The Ministry of Finance is represented on the Board of the Social Security Fund and is also active in development initiatives implemented by the international organizations, such as the Community Development Fund. The financiers of social protection in Sudan are mainly the Ministry of Finance and the Zakat Chamber. Other public institutions struggle to increase their revenues and develop new sources and channels to finance their development. The social protection programmes are fragmented due to too many players involved without an efficient coordination mechanism to ensure coherence and efficiency of basic service delivery. The social support programme is unique, however, whereby all the institutions are involved in one unique package coordinated by the Poverty Reduction Centre, located in the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security.

In addition to the private schemes, as of today, only 5 per cent of Sudan’s population working in the private sector is covered by social security systems from private insurance companies. About 12 private insurance companies operate in Sudan. However, they do not cover the population working in the informal economy.

Tunisia has seen an actual increase in social security coverage from 97 per cent of the population in 2009, to 98 per cent in 2014, particularly focusing on precarious workers in the agricultural sector, the fishing industry, the civil service and the informal sector. It includes the long-term consolidation of the pension plan. It is also providing technical expertise to assist in the reform of the pension system. Significantly, ILO has provided expertise, knowledge products and social dialogue to support consideration of a policy to extend maternity benefits to women workers in Tunisia.

2.4. Status of ILO convention ratifications

Four of the eight countries included in this evaluation have ratified all eight fundamental conventions; the other four have ratified seven out of the eight. However, the application of these conventions has been uneven and subject to various observations by the CEACR.

[accessed 17 October 2014]. At the World Bank Civil Society Forum panel “Assessing IMF Advice on Subsidy Policy in the Middle East,” sponsored by New American Foundation and Arab NGO Network for Development, 12 October 2013, Deputy Division Chief of IMF's Middle East and Central Asia, Carlo Sdralevich, declined to respond to the question on IMF consideration of direct and indirect subsidies to the royal house.

See Bacrot C: “Social Protection in Sudan” (Geneva, UNDP and ILO Thematic/ Policy Paper), (November 2013).
In the case of Algeria, the Committee has drawn the government’s attention to the incompatibility with the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) sections 32, 33, 34 and 38 of Act No. 84-10 of 11 February 1984 concerning civil service, as amended and supplemented by Act No. 86-11 of 19 August 1986 and by Act No. 06-15 of 14 November 2006. Under this legislation it is possible to require individuals who have completed a course of higher education or training to perform a period of civil service ranging from one to four years before being able to exercise an occupation or obtain employment. The government indicated that civil service is a statutory period of work performed for a public administration, body or enterprise in local communities by persons to whom such an obligation applies. It represents an individual’s contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of the country.

Table 3: Number of ILO conventions ratified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Fundamental Convention ratified</th>
<th>Governance conventions (Priority)</th>
<th>Technical conventions</th>
<th>Total conventions ratified as of June 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8 of 8</td>
<td>3 of 4</td>
<td>48 of 177</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8 of 8</td>
<td>3 of 4</td>
<td>53 of 177</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>7 of 8</td>
<td>0 of 4</td>
<td>0 of 177</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>8 of 8</td>
<td>2 of 4</td>
<td>19 of 177</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7 of 8</td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
<td>51 of 177</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>7 of 8</td>
<td>0 of 4</td>
<td>0 of 177</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7 of 8</td>
<td>2 of 4</td>
<td>5 of 177</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8 of 8</td>
<td>3 of 4</td>
<td>50 of 177</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 25th UN Human Rights Council session (2014), 24 countries called on Egypt and Sudan to confront the exploitation of migrants trafficked through the Sinai. This coincided with a European Parliament resolution pointing out to Eritrea, Egypt, Israel and Sudan their responsibilities and legal obligations to prevent, suppress and punish the ongoing human trafficking crimes across the Sinai.

In its timely review of Libya, CEACR observed that the government prohibits trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, but does not address the trafficking of children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The Committee also observed that the prohibition of kidnapping does not appear to address the sale or purchase of a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation, nor address the transport of a trafficked child. Referring to the observation regarding absence of a comprehensive law in Libya to address trafficking, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDaW) has also urged the Government of Libya to take the necessary measures to ensure that a comprehensive prohibition against all forms of trafficking of persons under 18 years of age, including for sexual exploitation purposes, is legislated in the near future.

The Committee also requested that children in Libya between 14 and 18 years of age, who are exploited in the production of pornography or pornographic performances, be treated as victims, rather

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than offenders. Noting an absence of legislative provisions specifically prohibiting the involvement of children in such activity, the Committee strongly requested the Government of Libya to take the necessary measures and provide a copy of such legislation, once adopted. Similarly, the Committee also requested the government to take urgent steps to prohibit procuring or offering a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs, through appropriate legislative reforms. Other important CEACR observations concerning Worst Forms of Child Labour (WFCL) urged Libya to:

- Identify and periodically review the list of hazardous work through the impending promulgation of the new Labour Code;
- Provide information on the role, functions and activities of the Childhood Welfare Department in monitoring WFCL; and
- Provide information on the effective and time-bound measures taken toward combating and preventing the trafficking of people below 18 years, with particular attention to migrant children.

In 2011, CEACR noted problems in the scope of application and compulsory schooling in Morocco. The Committee encouraged the Government of Morocco to continue efforts to increase school enrolment and completion rates, and to reduce the rate of repeating school years and of school drop-outs, particularly for children under 15 years of age. This was with a view to preventing them from working to the deprivation of their rights to education and their loss of development opportunities in the informal economy. On the issue of children in domestic work, the Committee observed that the Government of Morocco had long referred to domestic work legislation, specifically listing prohibited types of hazardous work in the domestic work sector. The Committee urged Morocco in 2012 urgently to honour that commitment. The Committee also requested the government to take the necessary measures to conclude its reported survey on the situation of young girls engaged in domestic work in Casablanca, and to provide ILO with a copy of the findings with its next report.

Other unanswered requests since 2012 include CEACR’s urging that the Government of Morocco take immediate and effective measures to ensure implementation of the National Strategy to Prevent and Combat the Sexual Exploitation of Children and to provide information on progress in its next report. Additionally, CEACR noted the urgency of repealing or amending the dhāhir (King’s decree) of 1938, in order to end forced labour, and cease and repeal forced-labour prison sentences for expressing political views.

In this evaluation period, CEACR’s observations recognize the nexus between rights to decent work and other process rights. Across the subregion, noncompliant national governments have not yet replied.

In 2012 and 2013, among other observations on Eritrea’s implementation of standards on equality and discrimination, CEACR found unequal remuneration for work of equal value. The Committee called on the government to take concrete steps to amend the Labour Proclamation, so as to give full legislative expression to the non-discrimination principle under the Convention, and also provide copies of any collective agreements, expressly providing for equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, and information on the coverage of such collective agreements in economic

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85 Equality and Discrimination (C100 and C111).
sectors and for workers concerned. CEACR also asked the government to ensure that the new Civil Service Proclamation prohibits discrimination on all the grounds set out in Article 1(1) (a) of the Convention, including “national extraction” and “social origin.”

Concerning discrimination on the basis of race, colour or national extraction (C111), the Committee urged the Government of Libya to take immediate steps to examine the situation of alleged racial and ethnic discrimination against foreign workers originating from sub-Saharan Africa, and to report on the findings. The Committee also asked the government to provide information on measures taken to prevent and eliminate such discrimination and promote a culture of tolerance and respect between Libyan citizens and workers from other African countries.

Citing an absence of national policy on equality, the Committee urged the government to develop explicit corresponding policy, conforming to the provisions of the Convention. The Committee noted that the new Labour Code was in the process of validation, which, it was hoped, would address these outstanding compliance issues.

In 2013, one notable observation addressed the right of workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organizations. The Committee expressed the hope that the Civil Servants’ Code would be adopted shortly, so that all public servants would have the right to organize, in accordance with the Convention, and requested the Libya to provide a copy of the Code as soon as it has been adopted.

ILO interventions at country level resonate well with the priorities identified by the constituent partners in the regional strategy. The ILO activities show a reasonable balance between the need for “upstream” and “project-level” work. This includes supporting policy development and showcasing pilot initiatives aimed at economic development and creating decent work opportunities for women and men in rural areas. At the same time, some of the pressing areas of concern, such as trafficking, anti-independent union discrimination (as reflected in CEACR observations and cases), reducing gender gaps in wages, and better application of ILS do not find explicit reflection in the draft DWCPs and projects, but evaluation, including the online surveys, recognized the importance of the norms and compliance observations to project implementation and TC/TA.

In the course of the HLE period, three North African countries ratified 18 ILO Conventions. Morocco ratified eight technical conventions. South Sudan ratified all seven fundamental conventions (omitting C87). Tunisia ratified three conventions in 2014, including two technical conventions (C151 and C158), and one governance standard (C144).

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86 C162, C163, C164, C166, C176, C183, C188 and MLC.
3. THE ILO IN NORTH AFRICA

Despite the North African subregion’s progressive human-development indicators in recent years, challenges mainly relating to inequality and exclusion remain entrenched. Gender discrimination, wide geographical discrepancies in economic development within countries, and unequal access to services and education are just some of these challenges.

Increasing inequality and exclusion were indeed among the driving forces behind the demonstrations in the streets of all countries in the subregion. Limited freedom, lack of social justice, undemocratic regimes, weak civil society, and opaque decision-making processes afflict entire societies. Many of these deficiencies are related to the labour market and the limited access to, and availability of decent work. Therefore, ILO has been addressing labour market issues through the provision of decent jobs, which consequently helps fulfil the aspirations of people and provide the ground for democratic and stable societies.

During the HLE period, ILO maintained two COs, one in Algeria (Algiers), and one in Egypt (Cairo), which also houses the DWT. In addition, the Organization has maintained project offices in Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia, each of which maintain “non-resident” status among UN specialized organizations.

The CO-Algiers was not active during 2008–10, following a violent incident that also impacted all UN operations. ILO was able to resume its activities in 2011. Since then, the office has largely implemented projects relating to enterprise promotion using ILO tools, and to training labour administration, supporting national institutions, such as the National Employment Services, and upgrading the social security database. In 2011, the DWCP drafting process elicited constituent dissatisfaction over inadequate consultation and consent in identifying priorities.

The profiles of the project office(s) in Tunisia has emerged within this HLE period, reflecting the heightened priority of Tunisia and related issues that arose long before the December 2010 uprising, but which ILO programming and donor priorities had previously not addressed. However, the increased donor and development agency attention to the region saw a tremendous increase in ILO project and programme activity across the region, especially in the DWT/CO-Cairo. Strategic guidance for this growth took the form of regional and country-specific planning instruments.

3.1. Strategic frameworks: North Africa strategy, roadmaps, etc.

ILO has devised an intra-regional approach with linked objectives. The ILO’s supplemental Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015 addresses the special challenges encountered and foreseen in the region in order to face the gravity of the decent-work deficit in North Africa, where unemployment,

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87 A car bomb explosion on 11 December 2007 partially collapsed the United Nations building and “levelled” the UNHCR. The United Nations building housed the offices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Population Fund (UNFPA).[9] The collapsed section mainly housed the UNDP. See “December 11 2007 Algiers bombings”, 11 UN workers among 26 killed in Algeria blasts”, CBC News, 2007-12-11.
underemployment and informal work have remained the highest in the world. That high-level strategy embodies the dual purpose of: (1) providing decent work opportunities; while (2) empowering and protecting the most vulnerable.

The Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015 emphasizes socio-economic approaches to urgently address the post-conflict situations, with a special need for employment generation for refugees, returnees and women in economies struggling to recover. In North Africa, this has also meant targeting rural and informal workers, while engaging in much needed social dialogue, involving CSOs, youth organizations, independent labour formations, employers’ associations, human rights’ organizations and women’s groups, taking special note of new social actors emerging in this period. These “new” ILO programme stakeholders include emerging urban and rural workers’ associations, youth movements, popular committees and cooperatives, all pursuing their own DWAs.

However, it is not always possible to operationalize this all-embracing dynamism without additional means and capacity for ILO’s wider outreach and management of the various inputs, and without compromising the longstanding tripartism with traditional ILO constituents. This Strategy, along with the roadmaps for Egypt and Tunisia, serve more as public statements of ILO’s position than a new development prescription distinct from the established and integrated P&B outcomes or tripartism.

In order to contribute to social justice, socio-economic development and stability in the reform process in North Africa, this evaluation uses evaluation criteria to assess ILO’s pursuit of its Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015 with the following immediate objectives.

1. Creating opportunities for young women and men in the most vulnerable sectors seeks to provide employment through the increased use of local resources, labour-intensive infrastructure investment, environment protection-related public works and the creation of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) providing job opportunities for youth, women, and populations affected by displacement and conflict, and other disadvantaged groups.

2. Empowering social partners and other stakeholders through social dialogue to pursue improvement in governance through a bottom-up approach with enhanced social dialogue, and “strengthened” civil society and communities. At the same time, the programme also pursues a complementary top-to-bottom approach by supporting the state to apply and enforce ILS, especially ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98 concerning Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining.

3. Extending and improving social protection, including social security and conditions of work, especially for the most vulnerable, sets out to enhance the capacity to reduce


vulnerability and adapt the concept of a universal SPF by building on existing structures of social protection and increasing them in size and scope.\textsuperscript{90}

These immediate objectives were consistent with existing P&B outcomes for the concurrent 2010–11 biennium in that they reflected the broad strategic objectives of employment, social protection and social dialogue. By making ILS the framework for supporting social dialogue toward improved governance and state compliance, the Strategy aligned also with the strategic objective of FPRW. Hence, the \textit{Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015} essentially repackaged the existing P&B outcomes to reflect a sense of urgency and strategic opening.

The ILO North Africa Strategy also provides a broad framework in the absence of more specific DWCPs and other policy instruments that remained as works in progress.

In Egypt, a tripartite DWCP for 2010–2013 had already been drafted prior to the 25 January 2011 uprising. Its priorities were: youth employment (to be addressed through labour market policies, employment creation through MSMEs, skills enhancement and sectoral work in tourism and textiles); social protection (with a special focus on wages); and social dialogue (with an emphasis on the institutional setting and capacity building, and priority attached to freedom of association and collective bargaining). Despite subsequent developments and adjustments, these priorities remain, with emphasis on different elements and some new elements included in the projects that emerged throughout this review period. However, the strategic alignment among the P&B outcomes, draft DWCP, current CPOs and the ILO’s higher \textit{Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015} show full alignment.

Tripartite consultations in Egypt had also culminated in December 2010 with a draft National Youth Employment Action Plan (YENAP).\textsuperscript{91} However, the government did not formally operationalize it within the five-year national development plan (NDP), and this essential function is likely to be postponed until the new government resumes the issue starting the 2014/15 fiscal year.

However, cooperation between the ILO and the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MoMM) resulted in the adoption of the \textit{Roadmap for Recovery and Decent Work for Egypt}, following consultations in March–April 2011. The \textit{Roadmap} preserved some of the features of YENAP, in particular developing a “Jobs Pact for Youth and Value Chain Growth Coalition for Youth Employment” and “Regional Action Plans for Youth Employment.” However, these features and the \textit{Roadmap} are supplementary to the tripartite agreements already achieved. Social constituents reported that ILO and the Government of Egypt negotiated this plan bilaterally, thus, the \textit{Roadmap} did not arise from tripartism. Respondents among ILO staff also explained the challenge of bringing all parties together in that very fluid context in the preparation of a quick response instrument.

The signing of the roadmap followed by one week the then Egyptian Minister of Manpower’s “Declaration on the Freedom of Association in Egypt”, \textsuperscript{92} in which he invoked both Egypt’s

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
constitutional provisions and international obligations to operationalize “the full and perfect [complete] acknowledgement of the right of all workers, to establish and form their own associations, and to join unions of their choice.” He further pledged full independence and autonomy of trade unions, their right to form their own federations, to join international federations and to operate free from the supervision of MoMM.

Until 2011, Egyptian authorities had prohibited the forming of unions and syndicates in the agricultural sector, among others. However, following the Declaration on Freedom of Association, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation supported some farmers to coordinate their organizing efforts. On 30 April 2011, the Union of Egyptian Farmers (UEF) and its branch syndicates—considered illegal since their 1983 founding—were officially recognized by Decree No. 1332/2. Subsequently, the Union of Egyptian Small Farmers’ Syndicates, the Falahy Misr Union and the Falahin General Syndicate formed in 2011, along with many sporadic cooperative-style “agricultural committees” across the country.

The Declaration, Decree No. 1332/2 and the accompanying simplified procedures enabled the formal establishment of the emerging Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) and the Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC). These federations constituted themselves as free workers’ organizations, independent from the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the only workers’ federation that the previous regime had recognized. Some 300 new unions—some say more than 1,000, including agricultural committees—are now affiliated to independent workers’ organizations and federations in Egypt.

In collaboration with ROAF, DWT/CO-Cairo developed a post-conflict strategy to guide support to Libya in its transitional period. The DWA is at the centre of ILO’s post-conflict strategy, whose immediate objectives are to:

- Provide fast track support to the interim government for socio-economic stabilization, recovery, and sustainable development;
- Promote the DWA as a key instrument for post-conflict recovery and peace building within the UN, key development partners, and transitional government policy and technical cooperation agendas;
- Undertake seed activities that position the DWA at the centre of policy and TC initiatives, including participating in the Libya Coordinated Needs Assessment (LCNA) that will materialize through a joint post-conflict needs assessment.

In the longer term, ILO considers providing specific assistance in the following five areas:

1. **International labour standards:** Reviewing Libya’s existing labour legislation with the aim of drafting a new labour law in line with ILS.
2. **Employment:** Identification of key indicators of the labour market (KILM), in order to benchmark active labour market measures. The strategy will also include improving the match between labour market demand and supply, as well as the intermediation by public and private employment services.
3. **Skills development:** Support in bridging the gap in youth skills in order to boost employability and increase access to employment opportunities. Capacity building in labour administration and labour market analysis will also be provided to Ministry of Labour staff.
4. **Social dialogue:** Provide capacity building in social dialogue for newly emerging trade
unions in Libya. The ILO also intends to have consultations with new employers’ organizations to identify areas of support in order to build a solid ground for social dialogue.

5. **Occupational safety and health (OSH):** Awareness and advocacy with constituents on OSH issues.

The priorities and gap areas identified by the social partners have guided ILO activities in Morocco. Although Morocco has no DWCP, constituents commonly expressed the need for ILO’s technical support consistent with—if not explicitly citing—the ILO’s *Strategy for North Africa*. The social partners in Morocco requested the ILO to provide assistance in various fields, including ILS, employment, OSH and social dialogue. The decent work priorities of Morocco are reflected also in the country’s UNDAF for the period 2012–2016.

By the time South Sudan joined the ILO as its 184th member on 29 April 2012, ILO had contributed to the *The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013* (SSDP), which emphasized the relation between poverty, macro-economy and peace. It laid out key priorities as determined through consultations with South Sudanese constituents. Given the fragility and instability of the overall political, economic and security environment, the ILO has taken “a flexible and lean approach” in South Sudan, adapting the DWCP framework in conjunction with other key international and national policy instruments, including the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDF), the UNDAF and the UN Peace-building Plan.

For the Republic of the Sudan, the evaluation period marked a turning point that underscored the continuing complexity of the national development context. The first biennium saw the final two years of implementing the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was a period of relative macroeconomic stability that, with the country’s considerable natural resources, had brought new opportunities to increase broad-based economic growth and access to social services.

The concurrent UNDAF for Sudan (2009–12) rested on four main pillars: (1) peace-building, with a focus on individuals and communities directly affected by conflict; (2) governance and the rule of law, including people-centred institutions and processes of democratic governance and public administration, wider access to justice and decentralization; (3) livelihoods and productive sectors, including the creation of sustainable income generation opportunities for the people of Sudan with particular attention to youth, women and conflict-affected vulnerable groups; and (4) basic services, encompassing education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation and HIV/AIDS prevention. That plan embodied a mix of humanitarian and development programming of the UN organizations in the country. However, their general orientation toward shorter, humanitarian interventions has dominated most international agencies’ strategies, while conflicts continued sporadically and at varying levels in the Abyei, Blue Nile State, Darfur region and South Kordofan (Nuba Mountains).

The ILO Sudan’s CPOs only tangentially addressed the militarized context with a special target of employment-relevant training for ex-combatants, returnees and persons with disabilities (PWDs) (CPO SDN102). Nonetheless, ILO projects and activities were relevant to post-conflict programming, in particular through two projects: SUD/11/03M/UND “Early Reintegration Support to Returnees in South Sudan” and SUD/012/02/UN Peace-building Fund “Empowering Women for Peace and Recovery.”

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Tunisian constituents and ILO had also drafted a DWCP for the first biennium and beyond.\(^{94}\) That draft emphasized P&B outcomes 1, 2, 4, 6, 11 and 12, corresponding with the priorities of generating decent work (employment), social protection systems and social dialogue. These objectives were reflected also in the concurrent UNDAF for Tunisia (2007–2011), which especially addressed inequality and disparities in life quality, focusing on youth and adolescents, and meeting the challenges of globalization.

Following two high-level ILO missions to Tunisia in early 2011 and discussions with the Tunisian delegation to the International Labour Conference (ILC), ILO developed a *Roadmap for Recovery and Decent Work in Tunisia* in March 2011. That roadmap prioritized: (1) developing the labour market with advisory services and TA; (2) emergency employment and job creation, especially to employ the many returnees from jobs in Libya; (3) improvement in wages and wage policy; (4) social protection, emphasizing persons with special needs, workplace safety and health, as well as establishing a SPF; (5) labour standards through legislative reform and ratification of conventions 144, 151, 154, 181 and 183; and (6) urgent and multifaceted support for social dialogue.

Tunisia’s roadmap reflects the specific demands of each of the tripartite constituents, as well as the findings of an important study by the International Labour Institute (ILI) published in 2011.\(^{95}\) It set out to establish an ILO presence in the country by August 2011, and foresaw the adoption of a DWCP by the end of the year. The latter goal has been deferred, but not dismissed.

In several countries in the subregion, the situation has changed with every week. Social unrest (strikes, protests, sit-ins) were often controlled, sometimes violent, but always pressing the authorities to accelerate reforms. The authorities’ first concern has been to maintain stability and social cohesion, often amid various types of polarization, and to continue building on the advances made toward democracy, and economic and social development. The many challenges and popular demands have called upon the social partners to play a greater role in effecting needed change, including the recognition and development of independent labour movements. Demonstrating the assertion of that greater role, tripartite constituents in Tunisia closed 2013 by agreeing upon an exemplary Social Contract, comprised of five principles for recovery through decent work:

I. Economic Growth and Regional Development  
II. Employment policies and vocational training  
III. Professional relations and the decent work  
IV. Social welfare  
V. Institutionalization of social dialogue.

Amid these dynamics, ILO activities in the subregion have focused largely on the issues of employment, social protection, social dialogue and labour administration, as well as the over-arching approach of social dialogue, inevitably aligned with the P&B outcomes of the two biennia. These strategic openings, together with increasing demands for decent work, posed an opportunity to break from “business as usual” and foster more efficient and fairer economic growth, as highlighted in the


3.2. Country-level plans/framework/policies/legislation of concern to the ILO

Complicating ILO delivery since 2011 has been the transitional nature of constituents and leaderships, especially transitional and interim governments. Nonetheless, employment and decent work issues have been central to the political stakes and economic dimensions of recovery. Governments managing popular demands during the period have generally taken action on economic and social rights, including announcements to undertake measures such as:

- providing modest grants to unemployed graduates in exchange for part-time work and part-time requalification;
- training jobseekers and creating jobs in strategic sectors; and
- ratifying international labour and human rights treaties.

In the current HLE period, the new constitutions of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the Interim Constitution of Sudan, enshrine freedoms of association and expression. However, none of these new constitutions have institutionalized social dialogue. Legislation in Tunisia is in draft to establish an Institute of National Dialogue to implement the Social Contract.

3.2.1. Egypt’s programmes

Over the past two decades, real wages in Egypt have either declined or remained unchanged, while labour supply continued to outgrow labour demand. In 2010, the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) sued the government for a suitable minimum wage, in line with inflation rates and price increases. The NWC then set the minimum monthly wage at EGP400 (US$56) in late 2010 although it was too low to meet the cost of living. In July 2011, the newly elected government announced a minimum wage increase to EGP684 (US$95) for permanent government employees. Article 14 of the 2012 Constitution provided for a national minimum wage, conditioned on productivity, contrary to the 2010 court’s decision, finding the need to provide for inflation and other factors. The Shura Council was reviewing a draft law on minimum wage before the Constitutional Court dissolved the legislature in mid-2014, but that draft was similarly criticized.

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97 Exposé écrit présenté conjointement par France Libertés – Fondation Danielle Mitterrand, organisation non gouvernementale dotée du statut consultatif spécial, le Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples, organisation non gouvernementale sur la liste (Written statement submitted by France Libertés – Fondation Danielle Mitterrand, a nongovernmental organization with special consultative status, the Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples, a nongovernment organization on the list), A/HRC/20/NGO/81, 15 June 2012.
The Government of Egypt did not have an announced programme for labour issues and national development reform until the third year of transition. This was despite many calls by intellectuals and civil society, and amid six Cabinet of Ministers shuffles over the course of the same period. Finally, on 12 September 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers announced the “Government Programme for economic and social equity during the transition period” in an attempt to address the demands of the popular uprising; i.e. “bread, dignity, freedom and social justice.” The 9-page document comprises five operative sections, each one addressing labour issues, employment and social protection. The programme remains valid to date.

3.2.2. Eritrea’s priorities

The Government of the State of Eritrea has negotiated with the UN a Strategic Partnership Cooperation Framework (SPCF) for 2013–16 prioritizing five strategic areas for intervention and cooperation. Those areas are: (1) basic social services; (2) national capacity development; (3) food security and sustainable livelihoods; (4) environmental sustainability; and (5) gender equity and advancement of women. The SPCF lays out eight intended outcomes derived from the strategic priority areas, including social protection and enhanced livelihoods.100

3.2.3. Libya’s prospectus

The post-conflict government in Libya (MoP) has laid out 10 priority areas, including to “revive the national and local economy and set the stage for a new national economic policy.” These include measures to:

- provide care and support to injured revolutionaries, families of martyrs, missing persons, and those affected by the conflict;
- provide support to the combatants and facilitate their integration into civil life;
- reinforce national and domestic security as well as maintain the country’s unity;
- return to normality and ensure a dignified life for all Libyan citizens;
- implement the commitment to achieving democracy, transparency, rule of law, respect for human rights, and provide support to CSOs;
- revive the national and local economy, and set the stage for a new national economic policy;
- assess, preserve, and develop Libyan investments and assets, whether in Libya or abroad.
- achieve transitional justice and national reconciliation;

100 SPCF Outcome 1: Access and utilization of quality and integrated health and nutrition services improved among the general population with particular emphasis on children under five, youth, women and other vulnerable groups.
SPCF Outcome 2: Children, including refugees have equitable access to quality basic education in the hard to reach areas of Anseba, Gash-Barka, Southern Red Sea (SRS), Northern Red Sea (NRS) and Debub.
SPCF Outcome 3: Strengthened protection and participation of vulnerable children, adolescents, young people, women, and people with special needs, including refugees, from the impact of poverty, harmful practices, exploitation and injuries in high prevalence areas.
SPCF Outcome 4: Selected government institutions have the capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver services to all.
SPCF Outcome 5: Strengthened national and sectoral disaster risk management.
SPCF Outcome 6: Poor and vulnerable households have improved access to, and utilization of quality food and enhanced livelihoods opportunities.
SPCF Outcome 7: Eritrea is on track toward the achievement of MDG targets for environmental sustainability (MDG 7).
SPCF Outcome 8: National institutions have gender responsive sector plans and policies and promote empowerment of women.
prepare for the election and convening of a National Congress;
• develop a future vision for Libya in the economic, social and service sectors.

Based on the broader development objectives and the identified priority areas, ministries have developed their own sectoral plans. The UNCT’s Strategic Framework 2013–2014 in Libya also commits to support the government in six key areas:
• social services (health, education and social protection);
• economic recovery (construction and development of the national economy and support the implementation of policies based on a sustainable development strategy);
• support for democratic governance through the establishment of governmental institutions that can contribute to sustainable development;
• transitional justice (support to facilitate the development of a strategy of transitional justice);
• culture and tourism (to preserve the national heritage and culture);
• infrastructure and housing.

3.2.4. Sudan's Strategies

Currently, Sudan is implementing the comprehensive National Strategic Plan (2007–2031). The comprehensive strategy implicitly includes four strategic objectives contained in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and the objective of full and productive employment and decent work. Mainly, it aims to achieve several goals, among them: (1) to achieve and increase a balanced development; (2) spread the culture of dialogue and freedom of expression, applying the values of justice and equality before the law and to ensure that human rights as set out in national and international conventions; and (3) promote the optimal use of human resources in the framework of the institutional and social justice to achieve good governance. The key strategic objectives of plan, strategy and vision for the 25-year plan include: the sustainability of peace, national sovereignty and national reconciliation; Sudanese citizenship and identity; good governance and the rule of law; sustainable development; poverty and achieving the MDGs; institution and capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, extending knowledge of informatics, and development of mechanisms for scientific research.101

The current government plans arise from a process begun with the CPA, signed in 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). That development put an end to the civil war and opened unprecedented opportunities for peace, development and the pursuit of prosperity. The CPA and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC) in 2005 provided the frameworks for the alignment of resources toward broad-based, sustained development and poverty reduction. The Constitution and the CPA recognized that the realization of the MDGs was a prerequisite for achieving socioeconomic stability in the country. In 2006, a Strategic Advisory Council was established to develop the 25-year development plan, resulting in the National Strategic Plan (2007–2031), which included strong references and commitments to the MDGs as the medium-term development targets for Sudan and prerequisites for achieving stability.102

101 This section is adapted from Sudan Ministry of Labour: Decent work proposal paper (2009), pp. 15–16.
An Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) complemented existing planning and budgeting instruments, including the 3-Year Salvation Economic Program (SEP) for 2012–2014 and the current 5-year Development Plan (2012–2016), by strengthening the prioritization of actions and targeting poverty. The SEP is an emergency plan to deal with the adjustment to new political and economic realities following the referendum affirming the secession of South Sudan. The IPRSP was intended to fine tune the preparation and implementation of the SEP and a new 5-year Plan, and provide a foundation for the full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

Sudan’s current 5-year Development Plan (2012–2016) serves as a growth-oriented strategy focusing primarily on sustainable development and poverty reduction in the medium term. These planning processes and instruments are organically aligned with the ILO DWA in Sudan, guaranteeing rights at work, extending social protection and promoting social dialogue.

### 3.2.5. Morocco’s developments

The Moroccan demand for reform has gained ground during the Arab Spring. Amid protests in 2011 demanding more powers devolve to the elected government and an independent justice system, the King promised comprehensive constitutional reforms in March 2011. A national referendum on 1 July 2011 affirmed several constitutional amendments, ensuring that the prime minister be democratically elected (rather than royally appointed) with expanded power, and providing for the eventual development of local government.

Forced labour and sex trafficking form the highest decent work priorities in Morocco, which is a source, destination and transit country for migrant and trafficked men, women and children. Adults and children from Morocco are exploited for forced labour and forced prostitution in the Middle East and Europe. Morocco continues to lack a single comprehensive anti-trafficking law.

Child labour is also a major concern for Morocco, where working children are estimated at around 500,000 (8 per cent) in 2007. Some Moroccan boys are forced to work as apprentices in the artisan and construction industries, and in mechanic shops without contracts, fair pay, social protection and enjoyment of a bundle of human rights. Also, some Moroccan girls recruited to work as maids become victims of forced labour and discrimination.\(^\text{103}\)

The Government of Morocco has established three interdepartmental committees and two ad hoc committees in the framework of the implementation of the new immigration policy during the period. The formulation and implementation of the policy involves coordination between the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Ministry of Justice and Liberties and the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training (MEVT). These new measures follow much international criticism for abuses, especially by Moroccan security personnel. Despite these new policy pronouncements, the abuses reportedly still continue and demonstrate the continuing need for implementing the relevant norms.\(^\text{104}\)

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\(^\text{104}\) Abused and expelled: Ill-Treatment of sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco, Human Rights Watch, 10 February 2014, [www.hrw.org/node/122535](http://www.hrw.org/node/122535) [accessed 18 October 2014]; Morocco's new migration policy masks continued abuses, IRIN,
Meanwhile, decent work priorities are reflected in Morocco’s UNDAF for the period 2012–2016. The plan’s objectives address FPRW, in particular, democratic governance sensitive to gender that will support particular objectives of the Government's Equality Agenda 2010–2015 and the capacity building of civil society, which promises to enhance social dialogue. The UNDAF seeks wider access to quality social services and sustainable livelihoods for food security and socio-economic well being for all. This pursuit involves improving competitiveness and developing productive activities essential to wealth creation, and developing decent, sustainable and qualified work (skills development, modernization of enterprises, and establishment of appropriate financing mechanisms for small and medium enterprises – SMEs). Social protection support seeks to reduce vulnerability and inequality, through support for policies/strategies and programmes for economic and social development.

3.2.6. Tunisia’s strategies

The UNDAF for Tunisia (2012–16) is the result of an ongoing and widely consultative process, which was used to analyse how the UN system could more effectively contribute to the implementation of national priorities and development needs of Tunisia. This plan is the result of the analysis of the situation in the Common Country Assessment (CCA), which inspired the current Five-Year Development Plan and the Presidential Programme objectives. These also refer to the MDGs, which the government approved and adopted. The CCA-UNDAF roadmap for 2015–19 notes that "Despite the growth recorded during the last 20 years (average 5%), Tunisia still faces the problem of unemployment, which has become structural (14.7% in 2009, 13.3% in 2011), following the ILO’s methodology, which Tunisia has newly adopted.”

3.3. Organizational structure

LO’s DWT for North Africa and its CO for Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan is based in Cairo, and administers project offices located in five countries of the region. The ILO DWT/CO-Cairo provides technical assistance and capacity building to the governments, and workers’ and employers’ organizations on all issues concerning the world of work. It also provides technical support to TC operations in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. ILO CO-Algiers supports operations and projects for Algeria, as well as maintains political representation for ILO in Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Both COs report to the ROA in Addis Ababa.

Currently, the DWT is composed of specialists reporting technically to relevant departments at ILO HQ, and administratively to the CO-Cairo director. The specializations currently offering technical backstopping to the North African subregion during the two biennia are as follows: Small Enterprise Development; Skills Development and Employability; Workers’ Activities (interfacing with the Bureau for Workers’ Activities – (ACTRAV) at HQ; Employers’ Activities (interfacing with the Bureau for Employers’ Activities – (ACTEMP) at HQ; and ILS. Three approved DWT teams remain vacant: Labour Administration and OSH; Employment; and Social Security.


In this context, the COs’ activities in Cairo and Algiers have increased considerably during the period. ILO had no project activities in the Maghreb countries in 2010. However, four projects began in Morocco (two) and in Tunisia (two) in 2012. Two multi-country projects began in the Maghreb countries in 2011, and 2012 and 2013. New projects linked Egypt and Maghreb countries, with management responsibility for TC projects assigned to CO-Cairo. Four projects in Sudan and South Sudan started in 2012. However, no new project activity has begun in Eritrea and Libya throughout the period, except for Libya's inclusion in “Improving the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant workers’ rights in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt.” ILO-Cairo’s DWT has provided limited assistance to constituents in Eritrea through RBTC activities.

In the case of Egypt, ILO-Cairo was managing a portfolio of one or two projects amounting to approximately $2 million in the programming per year before the evaluation period. In 2011, that volume increased to seven new projects totalling over $26.4 million, with an annual budget of some $9 million. At the end of the 2013, ILO-Cairo was managing 12 projects for Egypt alone with combined project budgets of over $44 million.

The TC teams also grew in line with the new activities, while ILO staff were stationed in Tunisia for the first time in 2012, and Cairo’s staff increased with 13 new national and international project managers (CTAs/NPCs) and additional technical back stoppers. This rapid and exponential growth in staff, with its increased demand on office infrastructure and administration, has especially affected CO-Cairo. Both ILO-Algiers and ILO-Cairo will face further transition periods when country directors change in 2014. The combination of these circumstances makes this HLE exceptionally timely and potentially useful for the new management coming on board.

The DWT/CO-Cairo began this evaluation period with 19 Regular Budget (RB) staff and 3–4 project staff. By 2013, the team grew to 69 TC staff, but the number of RB staff remained at 19. Human resources and general office management are strained without increased RB support.

An international senior administrator position has also been created, using Programme Support Income (PSI) and Regular Budget Supplementary Account (RBSA) funding to ensure additional support to this unit, as well as to the programming and M&E functions of the office.

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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Regional projects</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
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Note: (1) For 2010, the IRIS central tracking system erased all financial information and there was no backup at the CO level. Project officers are contracted for the term of the projects and leave on project completion without an institutional tracking system; and (2) all the above figures are approximations that were extracted directly from projects without validation.

Source: ILO DWT/CO-Cairo. 2014. 2013 Annual report (Cairo) and ILO Algeria project documents.

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106 A new Country Director assumed his post in April 2014.
These conditions and responses, the burgeoning responsibilities and the managerial restructuring required to make do without commensurate RB resources, indicate a great deal of resilience on the part of ILO offices, in particular, DWT/CO-Cairo. This period involved COs struggling to expand, reorganize and reform in order to adapt their core capacities to unprecedented increases in donor allocations, constituents’ demands and opportunities posed during these last two biennia. This would be considered a good-practice model, had ROAF and HQ responded with the necessary agility and support for these growing needs in the subregion. Numerous accounts suggest that ROAF and HQ were operating at a rhythm different from, and out of tempo with ILO North Africa, where changes were taking place rapidly.

3.3.1. Outputs

The period covered by the evaluation involves two P&B cycles for 2010–11 and 2012–13. Assessing the ILO programme outputs in the subregion should take into consideration the two-track approach of short-term crisis response interventions and medium-to-long-term interventions. This is keeping in mind that each short-term intervention could become a medium-term or long-term intervention, if the need still exists after the phasing out of a crisis. ILO efforts in pursuit of this strategy should enable the medium- to long-term strategy to ensure continuity and sustainability and to guarantee that the initial interventions be well placed in the developmental context.

Specifically, this means that short-term (crisis) response interventions were intended to dominate the work for 2011–12 in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The instability that befell newly independent South Sudan in late 2013 also has hampered longer term interventions.

3.3.2. ILO activities in collaboration with other UN agencies/regional bodies

ILO collaboration has had a positive effect on other UN, regional and bilateral development efforts in the subregion, especially contributing its comparative advantage of ILS and tripartism. In Egypt, a World Bank initiative dubbed the “Development Marketplace” evolved in late 2011, and was officially launched in June 2013. This is a worldwide initiative that is meant to stimulate economic growth through developing local enterprises, especially in agriculture and handicrafts. In the beginning, the intention was to focus on Upper Egypt governorates, plausibly based on poverty indices. The CO helped the World Bank seek wider coverage, causing a snowball effect in al-Minya, Aswan, Port Said and the Red Sea where the CO has a project presence, contacts, achievements and expertise. ILO’s implementation came with the strong ownership and engagement of local directorates.

The CO-Cairo partnered with German International Development Agency (GIZ) in conducting a major conference on “Active Labour Market Policies,” convening about 100 persons from various Egyptian ministries and the Social Fund for Development (SFD). Thereafter, an Egypt Youth Employment Forum was established on 24 March 2013, adopting the conference recommendations. MoMM’s first undersecretaries are currently requesting a Career Guidance Project to sustain the impact.

Another form of cooperation between CO-Cairo and GIZ came in the form of the development of national employment policies (NEPs). This rapidly resulted in the development of a journal called
Shoghlan (or “big job for us” or “our job,” in Egyptian slang), the production of which is CO-Cairo’s responsibility. It serves as a valuable tool for job seekers and employers, informing on how to write an effective curriculum vitae (CV), rights and duties of employers and employees, etc. These efforts culminated, among other outcomes, in ILO and GIZ holding a job fair, convening donors and employers to broker jobs for youth on 25 June 2014. Based on the Decent Jobs for Egypt's Young People (DJEP) success story, ILO CO-Cairo embarked on cooperation with the European Union (EU) to bring €10–15 million to replicate activities (capacity building, job clubs, public employment services–PESs, etc.) in three other governorates, where ILO interventions had not yet been applied.

The ILO CO-Cairo is under current discussions with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to partner a new value-chain project in the handicrafts sector. The CO has managed to arrange with the governor of Sharm El Sheikh a free-of-charge marketing outlet for products in the local tourist promenade. IOM may deliver equipment and a revolving fund. The CO-Cairo will offer TA under the project, which foresees collaboration with the Masr al-Khair NGO, in order to disburse funding for handicrafts projects.

Although regional strategies are not a regular frame of reference for ILO North Africa programming, one example of regional level RB activity reflects regional scope. Notably, ILO has contributed a technical guide to monitoring MDG employment indicators in the African context, and provided capacity building to national staff through best practices on collecting, analysing and disseminating pertinent data. Accordingly, ILO organized a subregional tripartite workshop to discuss the development of the reporting system.

These examples of collaboration demonstrate synergies, whereby ILO provides its comparative advantage to ensure optimum impact and sustainability. They constitute opportunities seized within the evaluation period, including those intended to deliver future benefits.

The HLE has found that the level of satisfaction among UNCT partners and donors is uneven across the region, with lower estimations of UNCT participation, integration and visibility in non-resident countries. However, donors interviewed seem generally well informed about ILO’s progress and constraints, registering generally high satisfaction with ILO services in the subregion. Donors and UNCT response to the HLE survey to rate ILO strategies and activities was ‘relevant’ and ‘highly relevant’, as well as ‘effective’ or ‘highly effective’ in Egypt and Tunisia without distinction or exception as to the type of assistance (training, publications, field-demonstrative work, policy support or project design).

One additional comment from the survey questionnaires to UNCT and donors is noteworthy. Although it is specific to one office, the voluntary comment is telling:

“The ILO office in Cairo is highly reputed and respected in Egypt and is known for its strong technical support to Egypt’s development. The strength of the organization is reflected in the implementation of the DJEP project in Egypt. The strong technical national and international team on the ground, as well as the tools and consultants that are brought in to support the project, are highly appreciated and recognized by our agency and national partners; the donor agency is involved and recognized in all the events pertaining to the project (involvement of the ambassador, logo on all printed and communication material, etc.; (3) keen to
partner with national and international partners whenever possible; (4) synergizes with the donor agency's other investments in the country. A subsidiary agreement was signed with [Social Fund for Development], identifying the technical and financial inputs in 11 key areas of cooperation to be funded by the ILO and another project funded by our agency. This is a role-model agreement that we hope to use in other countries.”
4. KEY FINDINGS ON EVALUATION CRITERIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE QUESTIONS IN THE EVALUATION

4.1. Strategic alignment

The ILO’s strategy for North Africa covers a four-year period, starting in 2011 and ending in 2015. It has been operating in two phases: (1) a short-term response strategy (one to two years) for those countries undergoing a transition process in order to support this transition, and also to soften the negative short-term impacts on the labour market situation in these countries; and (2) a medium- to long-term strategy to ensure sustainability and proper embedding of the DWA in the subregion. For all short-term interventions, emphasis has been on initiatives that feed into the medium- to long-term strategy to ensure continuity and sustainability, and to guarantee that the initial interventions will be well placed in the developmental context. For countries that are not in need of short-term interventions, immediate emphasis has been given to medium- to long-term interventions. In concrete terms, it means that crisis response interventions have dominated the work in Egypt and Tunisia while the other countries have entered into longer term interventions.

Figure 6. Strategic alignment of the ILO country programmes

The CPOs are aligned to the country programme strategies and/or roadmaps which reflect national priorities and UN programme frameworks and build on the main outcomes of the ILO’s North Africa strategy. They also contribute to the achievement of the Office’s P&Bs covered in this evaluation. ILO’s programmes in the subregion draw on the expertise and knowledge that have been developed, and aim to meet gaps that have been clearly identified in the strategies defined by Member States, social partners, UN and regional actors.

4.2. Relevance

The ILO projects and activities during the HLE period of the two biennia (2010–11 and 2012–13) have focused on areas of principal concern with relevance to the ILO mandate, P&B outcomes and Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015, as well as CPOs. All of these have resonated with the priorities and concerns of governments’ national schemes and programmes for development, despite the dramatic political shifts of the period. That is to say that, while government institutions often lacked the desired capacity and continuity, the priorities of decent work, and the needs for employment, social protection and social dialogue remained constant throughout the period.
While ILO reiterated these priorities in its *Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015*, as well as in greater detail in country-specific roadmaps, those instruments are not mentioned in current reporting. Nor does ILO have a mechanism for reporting against these strategy instruments. However, these documents have helped channel the more-complex P&B outcomes in a more reader-friendly format for constituents, project partners, the general public and donors.

Shortly after the release of these planning instruments in the middle of the first biennium, ILO experienced a surge in donor interest and support for its programmes and specific projects in the subregion. However close the tripartite constituents came to developing DWCPs at the beginning of that biennium, none has been concluded to date. Thus, no DWCP has supplanted these programming references.

While the CPOs and higher strategies address the subregion’s changes with a sense of urgency, other priorities remain constant. Migration and its cohort, human trafficking, are extremely important issues across every country of the subregion. Migration and decent work, including working conditions, labour administration, social protection and social dialogue are all urgent subjects in need of development assistance, as well as employment for women and youth. These are reflected in the P&B outcomes for each biennium. However, in ILO’s North Africa programming, 2010–13, nine, out of 26 projects (35 per cent), focused on youth employment. None sought explicitly to improve social protection, and barely two promoted social dialogue.

ILO interventions have met, at least in part, the subregion’s common deficit of decent work efforts by governments to facilitate entrepreneurship, formulate appropriate policy, enforce ILS and norms, or build the necessary cultural of citizenship participation to uphold social dialogue. It could be said that, in any region, the effort exerted is never sufficient, but the relevance of ILO strategies and activities in the subregion is not in question.

### 4.2.1. What has worked

Independent project evaluations show that projects have established reasonable relevance to the ILO mandate and the constituent partners’ priorities. Programming adhered to the national context and development goals. The selected CPOs were relevant to the country and regional needs, and each of the outcomes was strategically aligned to relevant P&B indicators.

The DWT support for Egypt has been highly relevant, with direct links to 10 of the 19 global P&B outcomes. The projects and activities also are well aligned with the UNDAF framework. In the challenging environment of two uprisings, the CO-Egypt responded by the largest projects’ portfolio ever during the review period. Focus was given to employment (10 projects, representing 71 per cent of the total number of projects) aligned with the government priorities at the national and local levels in all countries included in this evaluation.

ILO CO-Egypt has found it relevant to exercise an entry point in the development of national employment strategy, which has also served as an entry point to tripartism and social dialogue in addressing this national priority. However, as relevant as this approach is, and still can be, the period has been wrought with instability with the frequent changes of government that have seen seven ministers of MoMM in the past three years and weak national institutions.
Although Egypt had a National Council for Wages in place well before this evaluation period, it aims to have not been effectively enforced. In light of the need to adjust the minimum wage, in consultation with the Finance Minister in 2011, the ILO held a minimum wage clinic, imparting to constituents the importance, means and impact of minimum wage. In September 2013, the new interim government proposed to increase the minimum wage for public sector workers (effective as of January 2014).107 Among three workshops within the period on wages, ILO recruited minimum wage experts in December 2013 to help unify the current civil service wage system, from a situation where each ministry had a separate formula.

“The way forward after the revolution—decent work for women in Egypt and Tunisia” project108 is highly relevant in addressing the severe deficit in decent work for women, deepened as a result of the economic downturn. The project objectives are in line with the draft DWA and Roadmaps in Egypt and Tunisia (mainly, social dialogue, skills building, and employment for youth and women), and linked to P&B outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18. The project inception phase confirmed the relevance of its strategy and logical framework. Only minor changes were introduced during implementation.

The project “Pro-poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt”109 was highly relevant in the context of a Millennium Development Goals Fund (MDG-F) project designed and implemented jointly by UN organizations, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the lead agency, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), ILO and UN Women “Delivering as One UN”. The joint project is highly relevant to both UN priorities and national country priorities, especially the Government of Egypt’s orientation to prioritize investment and development programmes in Upper Egypt. The project aligns also with National Priorities 3 and 4: Improve income levels and care for limited income citizens, and improve the standard of living of citizens and upgrade services. The joint project is geared to beneficiaries’ needs and was designed to address identified gaps in previous projects, in cooperation with implementing agencies and stakeholders as verified by baseline investigations. The project also serves three MDGs, in line with UNDAF, as well as the ACI of ensuring decent work in rural areas. However, the initial strategy for the value chain was incomplete and the pro-poor approach continues to be unclear.

The “Transition to Employment—Career Guidance for Youth and Job Creation” project110 has demonstrated relevance to country needs and national policy of youth employment. Among the lessons learnt was how more exposure to international experiences has affected target groups positively. However, this has to be coupled with increased national potential, so advocacy at government level is much needed to boost youth employment and active labour market policies at country level.

In Eritrea, ILO pursued its CPO ERI106: “Accessibility of people with disabilities to skills and employment opportunities is improved” and Outcome 02 – Skills Development: Indicator: 2.3. “Number of member states that, with ILO support, make relevant training more readily accessible to people with disabilities.”

108 RAF/12/01/FIN), 1 June 2012–31 July 2015.
110 EGY/08/01/IT, 01 October 2008–31 December 2012.
Regional projects were also found to be relevant to the concerns of CEACR. Projects carried out solely in Morocco, for example, confirmed ILO’s relevance to ILS issues such as child labour, gender equality in the world of work, including gender-based violence, and labour administration and inspection. These issues also conformed to the development objectives of the Strategy for North Africa, namely “contribution to social justice, socio economic development and stability in the reform process in North Africa”.

ILO project and RB interventions in South Sudan were eminently relevant to the process of establishing the new state and its institutions in support of employment, decent work and policy formulation. Notably, ILO provided indispensable assistant for South Sudan to set up its MoL.

The ILO’s decent work programme framework for South Sudan involved providing relevant to the established government priorities, identified constituent needs, and the social and development priorities of the people of South Sudan. The ILO priorities of assisting the new state in legislation, policy and strengthening governance and judicial functions were well aligned with the UNDAF. The identified priorities directly link to 10 out of 19 global P&B outcomes, bringing the elimination of child labour, ILS, strengthening constituents, employment, skills and enterprise promotion to the forefront of ILO activities in South Sudan in the coming years.

Among the specific projects undertaken so far, “Stabilisation and Early Reintegration Support for Returnees in South Sudan” aligned with government and stakeholder priorities both at national and state levels. The programme logic and rationale driving the programme design aligned directly with the desired outcomes of the United Nations Peace-building Fund (UNPBF). The programme design incorporated lessons learned from previous programming such as the MDG-F-funded youth employment initiatives, and prior needs assessments, including the IOM village and markets assessments. These data informed targeted activities in the substantive and geographical areas of intervention.

The ILO’s International Institute for Labour Studies’ 2011 report has been hailed by other countries in the region as good practice that supports national policy dialogue and formulation, and provides a path for increased relevance and effectiveness of the Office’s work in the region. Constituents interviewed for this evaluation strongly encourage ILO to upscale this type of subregional study as the basis for developing relevant and effective programmes in the region, especially as the Office moves toward programmes and activities that address the ACIs presented in the 2014–15 P&B.

ILO Tunisia has supported high-level tripartite dialogue as a building block of the political transition. Within two years, and in the context of an important ILO social dialogue project, the government and leaders of the UGTT and UTICA signed the Tunisian Social Contract. This is one measure of how UGTT and UTICA have figured prominently in the national political process, culminating also in the new Tunisian Constitution. UGTT’s and UTICA’s ability to forge a strong partnership and channel the aspirations of Tunisian social forces within a constructive dialogue is widely seen as central to this historical achievement and a model for the subregion.

4.2.2. What could have worked better

In many cases of ILO services, the commitment from the national government was not clear or consistent. This may be due to a combination of factors, ranging from political will, and institutional and budget capacities to the blurring of mandates and jurisdictions between social affairs and labour ministries.\footnote{In 2013, for example, both ministries were represented in the ILC.}

While most projects in the North Africa portfolio were based on substantial needs analysis, objectives and targets were often over-ambitious. This was aggravated by the fact that some of the projects were of very short duration, which already cast doubt, as to whether they would achieve all intended results. Some constituents also observed an overall lack of strategy in ILO’s interventions in the country. For example, the emphasis on strengthening MSME sector is a punctual intervention but it does not adequately address the larger unemployment issues, especially high levels of unemployment among educated youth. Most projects were unable to address all the gaps identified at the beginning of the project, due to unstable political situations, and/or inability to scale up or upstream the project achievements to have policy and/or nationwide effects.

The political situation in the country severely affected factories in the industrial zones, where workers and their increasing demands threatened commitments for the delivery of orders. Industrial relations suffered, and social dialogue and collective bargaining need much more effort until they reach acceptable levels. Despite the mistaken perception by some that ILO’s role in the country was in support of strike actions,\footnote{Expressed in a meeting with FEI, 22 April 2014).} workers, in particular, wondered how and why the ILO office did not apply the ILS framework to intervene, or monitor the dramatic repression of labour actions, such as the violent repression of the Cargill Co. strike in late 2013.

The project “Creating opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan” did not fit the relevance criterion as well. Given the context of the socio-economic challenges facing South Sudan, the approaches to employment creation and opportunities for youth could have been more strategic. South Sudan’s economy highly depends on depleting oil resources, limited domestic production, virtually no manufacturing and industrial activity, and a great reliance on imports. The project evaluation identified the need for more focus on, and support for economic growth and diversification of the economic base for employment creation in the medium to long term.

The joint programme (JP) approach for providing livelihood opportunities can be called at best a “quick-fix” solution, and could only pacify energetic youth in the short term. Evaluations also argued that the concept of “youth” should not be considered as a static phenomenon. Solutions to the problems of youth should not be addressed only in the context of the current generation because they have more inter-generational relevance.

Constituents in Algeria and other countries noted that it would be more relevant for Algeria to have been integrated into the “Improving the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant workers’ rights in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt” (IRAM) project. However, the donor (Swiss Development Corporation – SDC) did not take a strategic interest in extending the scope to Algeria, which: (1) was counterintuitive to the project’s regional objectives; and (2) deepened ambiguities about
the role of the CO-Algiers “political” oversight of such a project carried out in two other countries of its geographical region. The IRAM project also omits Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan, for reasons particular to the donor.

4.2.3. What needs to be done

The HLE team found CPOs on youth employment general relevant, addressing informality and improving social protection. However, whereas employment figures are declining, constituents observed that ILO analysis and knowledge products must go deeper to investigate what makes people leave the formal sector and enter the informal economy. Some constituents referred to the need for an ILO assessment of the implementation of the 2009 *Pacte National Économique et Social pour la Croissance* (National Economic and Social Pact for Growth) and its renewed version negotiated in 2013.

The relevance of programming and activities relating to one core ILO principle, namely, freedom of association needs to be further addressed. While the CO-Algiers has cooperated closely with government and the *Union générale des travailleurs Algériens* (General Union of Algerian Workers – UGTA), it has not found a mode of operation that relates to the independent labour movement in the country. The HLE team was unable to find the relevance of ILO activities to several important workers’ organizations.

Although social protection is high on the government agenda, the DWT backstopping in the CO on that subject is nonexistent due to an unfilled vacancy, and the lack of capacity at ROAF or ILO HQ to provide needed support for programming or project implementation.

ILO programming indicates that social dialogue remains a cross-cutting theme and effort across all projects. However, with the end of the ILO Social Dialogue project in Egypt, the HLE team notes the relevance of renewing or extending this line of international cooperation with donor support for dedicated projects. This need arises from the high relevance of social dialogue to the social partners and previous ILO-related gains.

It is also relevant to engage employers outside the industrial sector in social dialogue, for example those representing banking and insurance, construction, tourism and commerce, which have been organizing during the evaluation period. Meanwhile, the new unions and federations include National Federation for Workers (NFW), Egyptian Democratic Labour Union (EDLU) and the EDLC. The ILO in Egypt has remained open to cooperation also with these new formations not affiliated with the previous regime. However, in practice, these formations have not yet emerged as full partners. Independent workers reported that, although their representatives sometimes participated in ILO-organized training and conferences, they were not consulted on programming and had little knowledge of the ILOs activities in the country. In conversations with the ILO staff, this shortcoming does not seem to emerge from any lack of will on the ILO’s part, but from the need for greater capacity and resources (e.g. time) to be more consultative and inclusive.

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114 In particular, “Promotion de l’emploi décent en Algérie par le développement de micro et petites entreprises pour les jeunes” (Promotion of decent employment in Algeria through the development of micro and enterprises for youth).

115 “Promoting the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Social Dialogue in Egypt” project (2008–11).
Some suggested that the need for improvement in working conditions throughout Egypt calls for a Better Work Programme, particularly in industrial zones. However, mindful of the needs, the ILO and constituents did include some features of Better Work (BW) in the “Export Industries Promoting Workers Rights and Competitiveness in Egypt Export Industries” project. This activity is very relevant, as the MoMM inspection system suffers from operational deficiencies and lacks basic infrastructure (vehicles, information systems, databases, etc.) and technical staff (labour and OSH).

The needed reform of Egypt’s Labour Code posed another opportunity for ILO expertise, while that has remained in draft form since early 2011. Employers reportedly were uninterested in engaging in this law reform until June 2013; however, that opening remains and have emerged again as a priority of the new executive branch of government, albeit without a legislative counterpart to date. To meet these opportunities, the ILO CO for Egypt proposed a Tripartite Committee in early 2013, which has proved to be a complicated prospect with questions and contention about the representation of workers and the commitments of shifting governments.

ILO constituents in Eritrea still need support to assess the existing national policies, programmes and specific activities in support of the inclusion of PWDs in skill-development initiatives, employment programmes and self-employment opportunities with the involvement of PWDs’ families and organizations.

The ILO also has made a commitment to provide support to Eritrean constituents on the design and implementation of policies and programmes for PWDs and their families. This support would be in line with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and relevant ILO instruments. In addition, Eritrea has requested capacity building in compliance with the ILO Maritime Labour Convention (2006), which came into force in August of 2013, and in advance of Eritrea’s ratification. The Office has responded with TA, which is scheduled for 2014.

In Eritrea, ILO has much relevance to achieve in its assistance to the country in becoming compliant with ILS. In particular, the situation of forced labour and exploitation of its migrant nationals abroad raise the level of urgency for ILO’s regional and country-specific decent work programming with particular support to Eritrea, in order to meet its state obligations as regards migrants. This assistance should cover adherence to provisions of ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105, as well as general principles and peremptory norms of international law, consistent with CPOs ERI825: “Ratification and application of international labour standards” and ERI826: “Strengthened capacity of member States to ratify and apply international labour standards and to fulfil their reporting obligations.”

Efforts to promote adherence to the ILS and norms are particularly relevant across the subregion. The International Labour Standards Department (NORMES) specialist has her work cut out in countries that have ratified and otherwise committed to most of the ILS and human rights treaties, but exert insufficient effort to implementing them. For instance, where the Government of Egypt actually denies the existence of child labour and trafficking within its territory, ILO’s guardianship role in supporting the state to meet its obligations is highly relevant and needs far more effort.

In 2012, the CEACR encouraged the Moroccan government to extend efforts to increase school enrolment and completion rates, and to reduce the rate of repeating school years and of school drop-outs, particularly for children under the age of 15, with a view to preventing them from working on
their own account and in the informal economy. Since this concern has appeared very recently in the CEACR comments, this infers scope for future ILO projects on child labour.

As regards ILO programming and project implementation, UGT has reported that it still “needs to see the big picture” of the CO for Tunisia. While the Social Contract is indeed a significant achievement, UGT reports that its first priority remains the DWCP, but the 2010 draft has not evolved significantly and two essential axes are still missing: (1) social security and social protection; and (2) supporting constituents address the effects of globalization on decent work.

Joint development requires a suitable mobilization framework and accountability among agencies and stakeholders. A formula for ILO to explore may be a platform bringing together the various public services and social partners for annual or quarterly consultations, for the design and improvement of the coherence of the work at the planning stage of current projects in Tunisia.

"Employability," in the project context, means facing employment as the main problem of Tunisia in the short and medium term. Challenges relate to the devaluation of diplomas issued by institutions in conditions that do not meet the standards required for the exercise of the corresponding profession (e.g. qualified teachers, suitable premises, libraries, computers, and other educational equipment and pedagogical tools). Low employability is a consequence of these factors, which also discourages public and private investment in the country.

Considering this, the unemployment rate is relatively high, especially for those with tertiary education in certain economic sectors. The observed differences between the objectives and achievements of projects can be attributed, in part, to the absence of the ministries of education and higher education in ILO processes in the country. This situation underscores the relevance of ILO’s ongoing support for analyses of the labour market, and of the transition from school to work, etc., through several projects and as a part of RBTC.

Particularly relevant is the participation of the CO-Cairo in the “Human security through inclusive socio-economic development in Upper Egypt” project. Starting in 2013, it began in the third year in which Egypt effectively has had no local political structures, since the popular uprising deposed the ruling National Democratic Party, which held over 90 per cent of local council seats, and where neither of the new Constitutions has provided for local government. The project supports citizen participation in “social forums” to arrive at a regional development plan for al-Minya Governorate, focusing on rural areas, and providing skills and job placement with tripartism. The relevance of this project presupposes upstream impact and sustainability by providing an unprecedented indigenous example of citizen engagement in public life, and a model for the Ministry of Local Development and the MoP to appreciate the distinction between “local administration” (without local authority and coming under the close control of the president) and “local government,” a difference which has yet to evolve in both domestic thinking and practice.

As in the case of highly centralized governance in Egypt, Tunisia’s lack of local government with sufficient capacity and authority to function effectively can become an obstacle to project outcomes. For example, the joint project “Engaging Tunisian Youth to Achieve the MDGs” (involving the Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO, ILO, IOM, UNDP and UNIDO), as well as its complement project DEPART, has sought to align employment strategies of the private and public sector in support of the youth labour market. The joint project covers three regions (Gafsa, Greater Tunis/Ariana and Le...
Kef), and ensures that unemployed youth, with or without diplomas, have the necessary skills and better access to decent jobs and job creation. The joint project, scheduled for 2008–12, was extended to May 2013, and “Développement Économique et Plan d’Action Régionale en créant d’emplois décents pour les jeunes en Tunisie” (DEPART) has run from January 2013 through to June 2014. The DEPART project’s national counterparts are the Ministry for Vocational Training and Employment, as well as the social constituents.

The “Programme d’appui au développement des zones défavorisées” (Development support programme in deprived areas) also pursues local economic development (LED) planning and implementation with citizen participation. Its national counterpart from the government’s side includes the Ministry of Local Development.

These projects are very relevant. However, the funders are different, the government counterparts are different, plus the latter project is housed in separate premises from the rest of ILO staff and is backstopped by HQ. Even though these projects operate in the same domain and even in the same regions, they have different government counterparts, funders and backstopping arrangements, so the synergy among them is not sufficient. Nonetheless, since the ILO Tunisia programme grew, by the end of 2012, monthly ILO staff meetings, with CO-Cairo coordination, have sought to share information, identify common issues and solutions in a systematic manner, and undertake joint activities regularly.

Here, relevance and coherence are interlinked. The projects are independently discovering that the absence of a functioning local government representing the local people obstructs the desired outcomes. Here also, economy and local democracy potentially coincide, as long as that mechanism exists with sufficient local decision-making power to implement both the process and the resulting plan. On that point alone, greater synergy should be an explicit goal. It is encouraging that the DEPART funder (the Netherlands) also may contribute its valuable experience in local development through the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG). The potential synergy of wider and more integrated coordination between local economic development (LED/Plan d’Actions Régional pour l’Emploi (Regional Plan of Action for Employment – PARE), and support for local participatory government would be organic and could yield exemplary results.
4.3. Coherence

In general, ILO’s North Africa operations have been coherent in their country and subregional contexts, relating to the UNDAF, national priorities, ILO Strategy for North Africa, P&B outcomes and national CPOs. The greatest concern, including among ILO staff, is to maximize the coherence and synergies that bring about complementary results and economies of implementation efforts.

Moreover, in the pursuit of strategic coherence, the ILO experience has been one of complementarity among North African countries, especially where the language, history and cultures, as well as pressures for rapid change, are analogous. However, each country context has its own specificity. A seamless strategy across all countries in the subregion may be elusive. Some countries tend to be open to learning from other neighbours and are likely to benefit from lessons already learnt. Partners in other countries tend to demonstrate less openness, either because of population size, self-perceived weight, or uniqueness of governing system, and are less likely to turn to other models from the subregion.

Notably, the security orientation of the state and, now, parts of the Government of Egypt have variously eschewed the actions of foreign and international organizations operating in Egyptian territory. The latest manifestation is an Egyptian Intelligence Service ban on international exchange and capacity building, forbidding any public employee from participating in training conducted by an extraterritorial or foreign partner.116

While it is rarely useful to generalize, respondents have observed that Moroccan partners tend to identify and seek counterparts in Europe more often than in the subregion. Also, highly centralized

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116 "جهاز سيادى يرصد قيام جهات أجنبية بجمع معلومات عن قيادات بالمحافظات" (Sovereign Institutions Monitor Foreign Parties Gathering Data about Governorate Leadership), *al-Ahram*, (13 July 2014), [gate.ahram.org.eg/News/514469.aspx](http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/514469.aspx) [accessed 18 October 2014].
systems in Egypt and Tunisia require distinct approaches. They also face common but different challenges affecting everything from ILS to minimum wage issues. These hazards are different from those in the federated system of Sudan.

4.3.1. What has worked

At the higher strategic level, youth employment efforts are wholly consistent with the P&B outcomes of each biennium and harmonize with the public pronouncements of ILO management, donors and governments. The promise of youth employment also helps to rehabilitate the degraded public impression of much of the private sector, which—unfairly stereotypical or otherwise—is seen in the public eye as vested in the failed regimes and insufficiently interested in domestic social development (see Context above and HLE Tunisia country case study). Also at the global level, youth employment priorities coincide with multilateral priorities expressed in previous significant and reiterated General Assembly resolutions.117

ILO Egypt’s Human Security project supports community events aimed to create social cohesion and cohesion among the project parts, especially through a Steering Committee. The project management committee engages all parties. It promises to bring “new blood,” a participatory culture and the private sector into the social forums. These emphasize women’s skills building and youth employment through career counselling, loans, training in agricultural production near project centres (not relying only on IOM), and engaging local CSOs.

In the Human Security project, ILO manages skills enhancement, IOM implements the part developing local counselling centres, placement and market links (which is also traditionally ILO’s expertise). UNIDO, as the lead agency, handles the agribusiness component. UN Habitat manages (participatory) urban planning. UN Women determines selection of women participants in skill-building activities and administers vocational loans. Within this project, coordinating many UN agencies is a long tricky and sophisticated process, made of many small parts, rather than operating under one big blue umbrella.

The project “The way forward after the revolution: decent work for women in Egypt and Tunisia”118 is adopting an integrated strategy and seeking coherence at different levels, with other ILO projects, joint and synergized activities with the employment projects (e.g. in Aswan-Egypt with the AUS-Aid funded project on trade unions with the social dialogue project in Tunisia).

The Way Forward project is also seeking integration along its four immediate objectives and with diverse partners: (i) the work of women in the “informal sector” is a priority for the downstream as well as the upstream interventions; (ii) the activities in the field are presented and discussed at the national level (examples include: participation of the project beneficiaries in a meeting on a related subject co-organized by ILO workers and the enterprise specialists; validation of the study on the situation of women working in the aromatic and medicinal herbs sector in a national workshop); and (iii) regular sharing of experiences between partners working in the same geographical area, or among partners in Egypt and in Tunisia.


118 RAF/12/01/FIN, 1 June 2012–31 July 2015.
While building capacities to represent the needs of women entrepreneurs and working women, complemented with the Conducive Environment project, The Way Forward builds the capacities of NGO networks promoting women’s economic empowerment, gender units of the ministries of labour in both countries, as well as the women entrepreneur’s branch within UTICA. Achievements of synergy and coherence are remarkable, if not sufficiently recognized.

ILO in North Africa is adopting integrated approaches, making use of various ILO instruments and training curricula. For example, the implementation agreement with Centre d’Emploi et de Ressources Francophones (CEFD) combines the gender approach (training on Gender Links to Value Chain Analysis), with the promotion of cooperatives (creation of two cooperatives and training beneficiaries on “My Coop”), and building of women business skills (“Get Ahead” training), in addition to the provision of other direct services and legal assistance (support in marketing for Bedouin women, etc.). The project is giving particular attention to developing models of intervention in aromatic and medicinal herb production that can be scaled up and replicated to help inform policy development.

Integration of the project's components in Egypt and Tunisia has provided opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences between the two countries. This is observed on the one hand through the cooperation with the social partners in Tunisia during the first year of implementation, and, on the other hand, through the grassroots-level interventions in Egypt.

The good synergy achieved between social dialogue (Tunisia) and the regional IRAM project is also edifying. Project managers explained how the project coincided with North African labour organizations’ outreach to sub-Saharan African counterparts. This was motivated largely by their common interest in addressing the discrimination and working conditions that their compatriots face in the European labour market and workplace. This relationship also suggests the need for practical solidarity in supporting the human rights of migrants and, especially migrant workers, in the northern tier countries of Africa destined for European shores. This form of pan-African solidarity is not yet evident.

The early phase of the IRAM project within this evaluation period has concentrated on assessing the legal framework affecting migrants and migrant workers in North Africa (except in Algeria, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan, where the project does not cover). However, current conscientious and visionary project management, in this context, is likely to generate valuable policy lessons beyond those anticipated. This project aligns with the recent Moroccan policy reform noted in the Context section above.

The understanding and coverage on ILS and decent work are gradually improving across the region. Programming this area is relatively well financed in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, with three major projects (totalling $19 million) generating ILS awareness, capacity building and compliance. Notably, the 2013 inclusion of Egypt on the CEACR shortlist has received much national media coverage. In Eritrea, constituents have reportedly achieved greater appreciation of ILS during the review period, although this is attributed more to participation in the ILC. Greater programming resources are needed for ILO to accompany governments, including Eritrea, towards operationalizing the obligations related to ILS, not least by developing the capacity of the social partners and civil society to do their part in upholding the norms.
4.3.2. What could have worked better

The coherence of ILO’s messaging is weaker than its actual performance in the field. ILO should be able to take every opportunity to make its contributions better known to the public. In this review period, representational, public relations and public education opportunities to demonstrate the relevance, coherence, effectiveness and impact of ILO’s work have been lost. Cooperation with UN Information Centre (UNIC) and the media is valued within ILO and the public; however, present efforts need more capacity, resources and time to enhance ILO’s profile, as an organization of the UN family.

With regard to coherence, ILO projects and programming on employment tend to focus on local actors, as a matter of course, through SMEs. This coincides with the tendency of state policies and international financial institutions to focus on large enterprises and infrastructure projects that only indirectly support entrepreneurship, leaving the small enterprises’ support to other external development organizations such as ILO. This central government bias may underestimate ILO’s knowledge-based contributions to the policy realm. Without governments sufficiently scaling up ILO projects as public programmes, states’ relative neglect of small producers relegates international actors, including ILO, to the task of filling the development gaps.

While some states have provided funds in the form of loans for new graduate entrepreneurs (e.g. Algeria and Sudan), these are not nearly sufficient, and do not constitute actual coherence with global ILO P&B outcomes and objectives. It is unfair and unrealistic to expect ILO to deliver in order to fill the yawning gap between states’ development promises and actual needs across the subregional states, unless national governments and donors respond accordingly.

In Algeria, for example, constituents have pointed out that, while the government is focusing on providing support (subsidized loans) to educated youth who wish to start their own businesses, ILO has largely focused on micro-enterprises, which do not have high potential for absorbing unemployed youth. Respondents advised also that ILO programming had not adhered sufficiently to employers’ needs or priorities, nor had it consulted sufficiently with the social constituents in the period. The need for greater coherence is evidenced also by UGTA reports seeking programming information directly from ILO HQ, as members were not able to obtain sufficient advice or responses from the CO.

Again, in Algeria, ILO’s accord de siege requires that the CO channel all work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Several respondents affirmed to the HLE team that ILO programme coordination needed to transfer outside of government. They reported that ILO Algeria actually has promoted and maintained government-centred coordination, which inherently impedes achievement. This issue of coherence and programming integrity also supplements the findings on ILO’s effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

Programming and project implementation have not sufficiently enabled coherence in the form of ILO’s integration of ILS in the country. Ensuring greater integrity of the norms in project implementation remains a challenge, particularly in the local political environment, affecting also the CO. This is manifest in the impediments to independent labour in the country, where UGTA remains the CO’s sole worker’s constituency. This shortcoming is particularly evident in light of the many labour actions by other, independent Algerian labour associations over the period. These actors find no representation in
ILO programming, as officially they remain unrecognized, independent unions. Neither ILO HQ nor the ILO CO-Algiers has reconciled this contradiction in operating principles.

It is significant that the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH) and five other structures in the country have formed labour collectives during the period under review, but ILO does not relate to them. Apparently, this is not as a priority concern for the current tripartite partners as is the wider principal of independent labour, freedom of association and coherence of ILO services. It also raises questions as to tripartite priorities, as expressed in the PNESC, to share the Algerian experience across Maghreb countries and eventually make Algeria’s INT regional.

Concerning internal ILO coherence, various respondents have pointed out that the ILO-CO in Algeria has rarely benefited from HQ expertise. From the social partners’ perspective, the ILO has also not played the role of catalyst. This is despite the apparent training potential in the region for regional coherence, south-south relations and, especially, the exchange of experience across the *Union du Maghreb arabe* (UMA).

Particularly salient in the case of ILO Algeria, is the lack of a clear division of labour between ILO HQ and the field. In Algiers, this is notable in the absence of a corresponding flow chart or organizational chart. Programming responsibilities between the two subregional offices (Algiers and Cairo) also seems to have lacked harmonization and clear lines between respective roles. ILO DWT/CO-Cairo visits to Algiers have been very rare in the period (e.g. only three times in 2013). Interviewees indicated that ILO Algeria rarely drew on RBTC of specialists based in ILO Cairo, and rarely coordinated with other ILO offices.

Notable to all in the HLE team, among tripartite partners and even donors has been the confusing division of roles and functions between ILO Algeria and ILO Cairo as subregional offices. This has sometimes led to misunderstandings and tensions that have come to characterize the relationship between the offices over time.

It is understood that the Algiers office’s operations were effectively suspended for three years following the bombing of UN offices in 2007. However, since the beginning of this HLE period, capacities and the project portfolio were building at a faster rate in the DWT/CO-Cairo office. As comparable growth took place in ILO Tunisia, where no office presence predates 2012, ILO’s subregional structure would have made Algiers the logical hub for ILO Tunisian programming, administration, coordination and backstopping. In reality, however, several factors led to Cairo’s emergence as the technical and administrative backstopping centre for programming across the entire North African subregion apart from Algeria. Among these factors were personal management style, the economy of relying on a single DWT in the subregion, and capacity that arose from the relatively high level of effort made possible with the respective Cairo-managed project portfolios.

In an apparent attempt at compromise, the ROAF issued a decision over a period of consultations in September–November 2012 that ultimately divided responsibilities between the Algiers and Cairo offices, with Cairo bearing technical and administrative responsibility over projects in all countries in the North African subregion, except Algeria. However, ILO Algiers retained responsibility for political representation of ILO operations in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.\(^{119}\) While that division of roles and

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\(^{119}\) ROAF: *Operational modalities for technical cooperation in North Africa* (Addis Ababa, 16 November 2012).
responsibilities is *prima facie* inoperable, it led to even further ambiguities, greater confusion and tension. This has been evident in some of the coherence problems and impediments to programming, seemingly duplication and/or shortcomings in representation and coordination among offices, and complications in project delivery.

Coherence, as well as other evaluation criteria, consequently suffered, but might have been lost further, were it not for the tremendous dedication, extra effort and, often, uncompensated labour of the ILO staff working under certain constraints, including the RB zero-growth policy. The increased travel demands on the director of ILO-Cairo, without the assistance of a deputy, project staff carrying out cumbersome administrative tasks, and programme staff assuming multiple reporting obligations, and burgeoning human resources, finance and infrastructure (e.g. information technology – IT), are examples of the additional level of effort required, without additional human resources.

As observed, the ILO Algeria officer who attended the UNCT, Senior Management Team (SMT) and Project Coordination meetings did not report back to the ILO colleagues in ILO Tunisia. Assigning an ILO Tunisia staff member to represent the organization at UNCT and donor meetings is also not ideal. A further question of propriety lies in the prospect of a national staff member being assigned to that task, where a national coordinator/representative would not convey the same measure of neutrality as other international UN staff and donors.

In Tunisia, ILO’s status remains legally and institutionally ambiguous. Operating without an *accord de siege*, ILO pays taxes on procurements and other expenditures in Tunisia, also affecting economic efficiency. It has had to set up autonomous accounting and finance systems outside of the UNDP system. Only the ILO vehicles are exempt from taxation, as they enter the country under the UNDP’s accord. However, because of this status ambiguity, ILO offices exhibit no logo, and international staff do not have diplomatic plates for their vehicles.

Clearly, ILO Tunisia, Sudan and, likely also, Morocco operations would benefit from a regular international representative at all meetings involving UNCT and donor coordination. This function would embody and ensure the needed programme-wide perspective at country level and neutrality. In the case of Sudan, a Cairo-based DWT specialist has occasionally attended UNCT and project coordination meetings in Khartoum, when available.

Reportedly, the message from the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) in Khartoum has been received as ambiguous and/or ambivalent in the sense that, on certain occasions, the ILO national coordinator’s presence has been encouraged at all UNCT meetings. On other occasions, the UNRC has called for the “highest level of representation” at project coordination meetings. The consequent inconsistency of ILO Sudan representation, especially at project coordination sessions with donors, has left one international UN agency representative to report that, in those meetings with donors, “ILO has received no praise, no complaints and no notice”.

The principle of “out of sight, out of mind” applies where ILO is not a resident agency. This has resulted in at least two particularly important missed opportunities for ILO Sudan. One lost opportunity emerged at the end of this evaluation period with the “Creation of Job Opportunities for Youth through Labour-intensive Work Opportunities,” a two-year (March 2014–February 2016) UNDP project with

120 “Creation of Job Opportunities for Youth through Labour-intensive Work Opportunities” Project Document, UNDP, 2014?
the Ministry of Human Resources Development and Labour (MoHRDL), funded by the India-Brazil-South Africa for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation Fund (IBSA Fund). Notably, this project design and implementation omit any mention of the applicable ILS framework, ILO’s comparative advantage, and raises questions about the normative integrity of the project’s intended and actual outcomes.

The HLE team notes, however, ILO-Cairo’s efforts to ensure continued ILO presence in Sudan, even when TC funding was no longer available. Ultimately, ILO-Cairo requested and secured core funding to extend the only national officer in the country. Unless TC funding is forthcoming, this crucial position is at risk, especially as donor funding in Sudan is volatile, owing to governmental politics and donor responses. This complicates the challenge, while underscoring the need for ILO to seize programming opportunities in Sudan, in the interest of the best possible outcomes.

The other notable missed opportunity due to ILO’s lack of coherence with UNCT and other local development actors in Sudan is the “Developing Darfur: A Development and Reconstruction Strategy Development.” ILO has not signed on to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), reportedly because ILO HQ maintains a policy of non-engagement in environments with a security level of three or above. This has led to ILO-Cairo’s unwillingness and/or inability to deliver on this important opportunity. One UNCT respondent told the HLE team that, despite its relevance and high quality of project performance, in the UNCT context, “if ILO is not able to scale up, it becomes more of a liability than an asset.”

As some ILO CTAs pointed out, “joint programming and delivering as one is costly.” This is understood, in that the level of effort to coordinate, identify and realize synergies is great and often not directly attributable to project outcomes. In fact, much collegial effort may be required, in order to determine and obtain approval for adjustments that are aimed at greater coherence and synergy, although the additional time and other resources needed have not been budgeted.

Many CO staffers are multifunctional, for example the programming unit is also undertaking the evaluation function. The evaluation function is managed by the RO, which delegates evaluation tasks.

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121 The $1,350,000 project is aligned with UNDAF Outcome 1: “People in Sudan with special attention to youth, women and needy populations have improved opportunities for decent work and sustainable livelihoods and are better protected from external shocks, thereby reducing poverty,” as well as UNDP’s Country Programme Action Plan Output 1.1: “Policy Frameworks for Economic Reintegration, social safety nets and employment creation developed.” ILO is not an implementing partner in this project, despite its relevance and coherence to the ILO Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015, and alignment with ILO Sudan’s CPOs SDN100—“Create decent employment for women and men especially for young women and men through improving employability, sustainable enterprise development and labour market policies”, and SDN101—“National skills development policy that raises productivity of men and women in the informal economy as well as provides skills to boost the growth of formal economy and decent work is developed and implemented.”

122 The programme involves several likely opportunities for ILO, particularly in supporting 2.4. Livelihoods, 2.5. Traditional/Rural Livelihoods and Natural Resource Management, 2.8. Natural Resource Management (supporting 2.8.3. Trade and Artisans). According to the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), Qatar has committed $165 million of support as part of a total programme financial obligation of $2.65 billion in development funds to Darfur that will be delivered to meet both social and infrastructural needs over the next six years. The six-year plan totals $7,245,000,000, with the Government of Sudan having committed $2,650,000,000 to the DDPD. Most UN specialized organizations have signed on to the MoU to take part in the DDPD.

123 Interview on 5 May 2014.

124 Interview on 29 April 2014.
The result has seen the programming staff managing increasingly more of the M&E function. This is not appropriate due to need for independence.

Given the sudden surge of North Africa programming, the level of risk to ILO’s reputation and credibility (managerial, programmatic and financial) significantly increased for the DWT/CO-Cairo and CO-Algiers, and the ILO as a whole. This should have prompted a careful risk assessment both at the DWT/CO and higher organizational level through subregional programme audits and external financial audits of projects as necessary.

### 4.3.3. What needs to be done

In the pursuit of tripartism, all ILO operations face a common challenge to uphold that model, and greater tripartite diligence is always needed. In all countries that the HLE team visited (Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia), the social partners observed that much of ILO programming had been conducted in direct consultation with government partners and the social partners—both employers’ and workers’ associations—were consulted rather as an addendum to plans and projects already drafted.

This observation relates also to the urgent need for, and proven utility of social dialogue as both a methodology of operation and project priority. This is also a unique ILO comparative advantage. In Egypt, the three-year project to implement the FPRW Declaration, originally due to end in 2011, but continued to June 2014, was both relevant and enabled the needed coherence of tripartism. Likewise, in Tunisia, the social dialogue project (2012–14) has realized great progress in establishing coherent efforts among the tripartite constituents. That is notwithstanding the fact that UGTT and UTICA respondents testified that the ILO projects, in general, did not result from the same high level of their participation in design and planning, or implementation. Both UGTT and UTICA advised that ILO integrated social dialogue more synergistically across projects and, in particular, engaged more formally and systematically in tripartite consultation at the programming stage. The responses testify to the utility of ILO’s methods.

In all country cases, the need for more upstream coordination is indicated, as all constituents and ILO personnel found a general lack of intra-governmental coherence. Some of the disintegration within and among governing institutions is endemic, and is neither due to ILO’s shortcomings, nor unique to the HLE’s tumultuous timeframe. However, in the 2010–13 period, these features increased, and ILO staff faced the challenge of encouraging cross-institutional coherence by making extra efforts to meet and consult with concerned government bodies as much as feasible.

The last of these challenges to programming coherence is common, and particularly evident in the more complex operations of Cairo and Tunisia. For different reasons, each ILO operation has suffered from a lack of regular meetings of programme staff. One constituent observer in Tunisia reflected that the ILO Tunisia offices are like “a kitchen with too many chefs.” Cairo staff seemed to agree that more regular staff meetings are in order, as well as the inclusion of the DWT in the early programming stages. This in-house lesson seems to have been learnt and addressed in the February 2014 ILO staff retreat in

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Cairo. There, the decision emerged to formalize the induction of all new ILO staff and to conduct regular technical coordination meetings, including:

1. each specialist facilitating meetings on a quarterly basis, with the projects that they backstop/have components under their responsibility; and
2. overall ILO/Cairo TC meetings with all project managers and specialists every six months to consider synergies, cross-sectoral collaboration, common challenges and solutions.\(^{127}\)

That same retreat reported a decision to “appoint a coordinator/leader/[focal point] for Tunisia.” Internal and external coherence requires this function, especially in order to ensure coherence and coordination with the UNCT, donors and constituents. The new UNRC noted that he had little sense of what ILO Tunisia was doing in the country. Despite the HLE meeting with the UNRC, it remains uncertain how and to what degree of diligence the UNRC pursued this information. However, he stated that he had not seen an office organizational chart, or a matrix of ILO’s ongoing and pipeline projects in Tunisia. Such an office-wide image would best be conveyed by an international ILO officer not bound to a particular project.

At the same time, the search for coherence and synergies could be realized most conveniently through projects supporting youth employment. ILO project managers referred to youth employment as a “door opener,”\(^{128}\) in the sense that the universal demand for youth employment, especially in this evaluation period, appeals to all constituents. It also promises to diffuse social pressures for local labour, and pressure on the private sector and authorities to deliver benefits and project/programme results, which the domestic sectors are unable to achieve on their own devices.

The focus on youth employment reflects a global trend and awareness of its importance, especially given the particular circumstances of the North African region. However, without the commensurate project support for the other strategy components, it can only partially achieve the social development sought if the long-working, preceding generations remain under protected.

While the relevance and coherence of youth employment efforts is not doubted, it is useful to portray youth employment as one of three programme pillars of equal importance, rather than a priority above and apart from the others in the ILO *Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015*. Thus, in design as in practice, youth employment complements social protection and social dialogue, and is also ILO’s comparative advantage in development.

In addition to the hard lessons learned—and prospective partnerships to follow—from the ILO’s projects towards regional development in the regions of Gafsa, Ariana and Le Kef, coherence remains elusive. Tripartism apparently is deferred, in some cases, presumably for project expediency, as in the example of Le Kef’s local employer’s association regional strategic-development plan that omitted recognition of the producers, i.e. workers and their well-being. However, that plan was concluded in cooperation with other partners before the start-up of ILO’s “Développement Economique et Plan d’Action Régional pour la Création d’Emplois Décents pour les Jeunes en Tunisie” (TUN/12/03M/NET) in that region.

\(^{127}\) “General procedures” in *ILO Cairo Retreat Follow-Up Report, February 2014* (ILO-Cairo, 2014).

\(^{128}\) Ibid.
ILO projects that seek to support regional development plans with local participation face a serious and perhaps unanticipated challenge in North African countries where central governments have not allowed local government to fully emerge. That is not to suggest that local inhabitants and communities have no aptitude for exercising full citizenship at the local level, rather, the available structures do not always enable its full expression. Therefore, the complement to such programmes and projects logically calls for partnerships that also build participatory local government with sufficient representation and consequent local authority to contribute, adopt and assume such development plans.

The tripartism methodology is supposed to ensure coherence as an ILO competitive advantage in the development field. However, maintaining this advantage is costly in terms of labour and effort for both ILO officers and constituents. Even in the most promising environments, no party is completely satisfied with the level of tripartism achieved. Local respondents in Tunisia, for example, report that there was no UGTT or CSO involvement in projects, even in Gafsa, Ariana or Seliana, where ILO projects could have benefited from those social constituents’ networks and partners. The revolution, they point out, has made such opportunity for synergy even more relevant. In Tunisia, the Ministre de développement local (MoDL) did not engage with UGTT, before, during or after the revolution. The lack of MoDL’s participation in social dialogue may have led to this shortcoming. This relates to the need for a broader platform of national and international development partners for planning, as recommended in the Tunisia case study and under Relevance above.

This is clearly a new horizon for ILO programming that is not reflected in project documents, available evaluations or explicit plans. However, collaboration with, and support for local government (not merely administration as an extension of the executive branch) as a needed partner will probably emerge as a project implementation finding when these projects become due for evaluation, and when ILO and government consider adjustments needed for LED-implementation success.

One of the obvious opportunities for partnership to overcome this ILO programming challenge is the above-referenced link with VNG and/or other partners in developing local government with municipalities in the subregion. In this connection also, we refer to the United Cities and Local Authorities (UCLG), as already evidenced in its 2013 advice and experience for MENA local authorities to implement the “right to the city”.¹²⁹ Until now, ILO and other UNCT project partners (except for UNESCO headquarters)¹³⁰ have not yet joined the right to the city discourse, but will probably benefit from it in the future.

Significantly, however, ILO Egypt currently carries out a potentially ground-breaking project in Upper Egypt (al-Minya Governorate) that promises to yield valuable lessons for regional development planning, coherence in the Delivering as One UN framework, and remedying the hitherto lack of local citizenship for participants in Egypt. This project requires particular attention as a model for possible replication in North Africa programming. The three-year “Human security through inclusive socio-economic development in Upper Egypt” project (EGY/12/03M/HSF, 1 June 2013–31 May 2016) involves the collaboration of four UN agencies and IOM in delivering and implementing a regional


development plan for rural al-Minya. The UNIDO-led project has ILO providing job-placement support through central government employment offices. The division of tasks among the collaborating agencies is not ideal, with IOM assigned to providing skills training, where ILO has the comparative advantage. However, the prospect of Delivering as One UN (plus IOM) promises to be a very rich experience.

That project, like its Tunis counterparts, involves wider social dialogue than classic tripartism to include local residents, rural workers, youth groups, women’s organizations, and microfinance and physical development of NGOs. The project’s “social forums” bringing these social actors together take place during the current more than three-year absence of local councils, since the disbanding of the dominant National Democratic Party in 2011, and in the absence of the provision of “local government” in either of the ensuing constitutions. The project is notable both for its relevance in filling a centuries-old governance void in Egypt, and in encouraging the Ministry of Local Development and the MoP to think outside of the pre-revolutionary box. They can envision, through local example, what municipalities across other regions learned long ago, i.e. how local self-determination within a unified state builds full citizenship and consolidates the state through the local exercise of rights, responsibilities and economic solidarity. This is emerging as a labour-intensive and very rich lesson among the specialized agencies of the UN and local actors, which promises unprecedented outcomes. Because of the rural focus on the Human Security project, it aligns also with the ACIs in the current P&B cycle (e.g. rural employment).

In Tunisia, ILO carried out three workshops for inspectors during the HLE period in Tunisia. However, reportedly, these did not cover ILS. This omission advances the UGTT and UNCT claim that more information—including public information—is needed to demonstrate ILO’s accomplishments and potential in the field. This information needs to be consistent with the social demands of the subregion in the evaluation period. Except for the case of ILO’s collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the IRAM project, other UNCT members in Tunisia report that they are insufficiently aware of ILO’s role, added value and achievements. They have even less understanding of the Organization’s vital contributions to upholding ILS. However, workers across the subregion who participate in and follow ILO processes in Geneva report only positive consequences of ILO compliance mechanisms. However, local press and/or the wider civil society have not covered these processes and findings adequately.

4.4. Efficiency

In general, ILO in North Africa has demonstrated tremendous efficiency, especially in light of the understaffing in administrative and other functions. The HLE observes that the achievement of cost and time efficiency, and the efficient use/leveraging of human resources have strained ILO’s staff reserves during the period under review. Although this situation is unchanged, it has been much appreciated among ILO colleagues, and engendered a collective sense of accomplishment and organizational solidarity across the region.

4.4.1. What has worked

In Algeria, the national-level stakeholders showed good participation and ownership of projects and TC, contributing to the overall results. However, there were some delays that may be attributed to insufficient financial commitment and to unrealistic planning of the project activities, goals and concrete outcomes. The greatest impediment to efficiency appears to be the national political environment, contributing significantly to the delays. Respondents identified standard procedures for project and tripartite activities that have to be coordinated with the Ministry of Social Affairs as a continuing impediment to efficient operation.

However, the pace of implementation has increased significantly in order to compensate for the initial delays. For instance, ILO compensated for lost time in the start-up “The way forward after the revolution – decent work for women in Egypt and Tunisia” by involving NGOs in project through implementation agreements and purchase orders.

132 RAF/12/01/FIN, 1 June 2012–31 July 2015. The project’s official start date (June 2012) was pushed back, awaiting the recruitment of the CTA (January 2013).
Donor awareness of project progress and participation in project activities can provide leverage to ILO in resolving political and capacity challenges to project implementation. For example, the Ambassadors of Finland and the Netherlands in Tunisia have shown full commitment to the project and has participated in the project activities, inviting the project partners, and actively participating in project events. In Egypt, meetings were organized with some of the project's partners in the ILO CO on the occasion of the visit of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representative in April 2013. The Embassies of Canada and the United States in Cairo appeared very involved and aware of successes and challenges of the projects funded by their respective governments.

The project “Improving governance of labour migration and protection of migrant workers’ rights in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt” also has been remarkably efficient. Although experiencing start-up delays, its achievements have been significant for the few months of implementation. This is without having any Egypt-based full-time staff devoted to the project, and without a migration specialist for the entire Africa region.

The projects carried out in Morocco capitalized on existing partnerships between the MoL and national NGOs, in addition to new organizations at the regional and community level such as community-based organizations, schools and parent associations. This led to the creation of a network of synergies. Therefore, the strategies were very efficient in implementation. However, it is noted that the duration of projects often needed to be extended, on account of the long time needed to set them up, identify partners and build capacities prior to project implementation. Also, it has been noted that the existence of coordination platforms, management tools, and M&E methods have enhanced programme efficiency.

4.4.2. What could have worked better

Some of the projects encountered challenges in securing sufficient resources. The gap experienced by managers between the expected date of commencement of project activities and approval of funds exerted undue pressure on ILO implementers to deliver. In some cases, resource utilization was satisfactory, while, in case of one international project, funds remained underutilized, largely as a result of internal coordination problems.

In the case of regional projects to promote youth employment in Morocco and Tunisia, ILO carried out activities using an efficient results-based approach. However, they experienced some delays in pilot projects, especially because of slow budget allocations. According to the mid-term internal evaluation of the project “Promoting good labour market governance and fundamental rights at work in Morocco” (Phase 2), efficiency problems were observed also in communication and cooperation between government and international bodies.

In Egypt, many ILO CO staff has over-worked throughout an expanded, unforeseen and unprecedented project portfolio increase during the exceptionally challenging review period. Sufficient evidence supports the finding that cost efficiency could be improved, while noting some projects are over-staffed, whereas others are under-staffed.

133 RAF/12/07/SDC, 1 December 2012–30 November 2015.
There is no regional database to capture information on capacity-building activities, or on monitoring outcomes and follow-up. This is despite training and capacity-building objectives with significant project investments. Therefore, a country-wide or cross-regional assessment of efficiency, duplication or effectiveness of these activities is not possible.

In certain projects such as “Transition to Employment: Career Guidance for Youth and Job Creation,” a longer period of time was needed to see concrete results, as the change of behaviour and attitudes is predictably long in coming, given the national context and transition environment. The questions about the slow pace of results and the limited scope of such projects underscores the point that the other concurrent objectives of the regional and country-specific strategies are vital, especially the urgent and simultaneous need for social protection and social dialogue, among others (e.g. human trafficking, labour administration).

The rate of efficiency in the “Combating Worst Forms of Child Labour by Reinforcing Policy Response and Promoting Sustainable Livelihoods and Educational Opportunities in Egypt” project has been low due to issues of collaboration. It involves many active partners in cooperation at the local level (e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture and the MoE). However, implementing various components could have been improved, had ILO fully managed that World Food Programme (WFP)-led project.

One consistent factor that impeded project efficiency across the region has been the frequent political changes and reappointment of ministers. Egypt’s “Dahshur World Heritage Site Mobilization for Cultural Heritage for Community Development” project has been similarly affected. In its initial stage, implementation was efficient. The UNDP leadership was positive, proposing a framework of regular information exchange that worked well. The capacity-building services to tour guides from the neighbourhood ensured sustainability and efficiency to the concerned community. However, the 25 January 2011 revolution led to the change of three consecutive ministers within the life of the JP, and the high turnover in management also reduced efficiency.

As far as multi-country projects are concerned, efficiency on the use of financial resources is rather difficult to assess. Evaluators of these programmes cited lack of access to all the relevant financial information to be able to carry out a proper analysis on the use of funds. This indicates that financial monitoring was either centralized or not maintained in a format that could facilitate analysis, evaluation and learning.

The pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness is hampered by the lack of a common and coherent vision shared among officials in various ministries concerned with employment. The Tunisian national case study points out the need for the creation of a "collective work space". Rather than public institutions continuing to perceive themselves as independent institutions, the premise lies with the need for a mechanism and process to convene different actors so that mentalities, discourses, practices, institutions and empirical knowledge interact. Meeting this challenge involves greater and more diligent application of social dialogue concepts and methods. It also involves the creation of an

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134 EGY/11/07/EGY, 01 May 2012–30 April 2014.
137 “Regional Component – Promouvoir l'emploi productif et le travail décent des jeunes en Maroc et Tunisie” (RAF/11/51M/SPA AECID) and “Promouvoir l'emploi productif et le travail décent des jeunes en Maroc et Tunisie” (RAF/11/52M/SPA AECID).
environment in which multiple institutions become effectively "embedded" in a coherent system. With this vision, the administrative organization is not only a subsystem, but becomes a constitutive element of society that interacts productively with its surroundings and counterparts. As long as such a mechanism and process does not exist, the demands of the popular uprisings for the democratization of all social institutions cannot be realized.

4.4.3. What needs to be done

ILO COs have gained better visibility as a consequence of the dramatic events and developments across the subregion during of the review period. This is due to the crisis context, as well as ILO’s relevance to work both in and on it. However, measuring and messaging outputs and outcomes remains a subject for improvement in ILO’s public relations, both among tripartite constituents and wider publics.

ILO should keep a close watch out for further synergies with a wider range of tripartite actors, including those operating in support of local government. Experience has already proved the relevance of such collaboration and institutional development in achieving successful LED.

ILO needs to be more present across the subregion to ensure its message reaches its various audiences. Its efficiency accomplishments remain largely unsung.

Figure 9: Efficiency ratings

1= Highly Unsatisfactory, 2= Unsatisfactory, 3= Somewhat Unsatisfactory, 4= Somewhat Satisfactory, 5= Satisfactory, 6=Highly satisfactory
4.5. Effectiveness

In North Africa, ILO has found some projects challenged in achieving optimum effectiveness due to the security situation and compliance with UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) alerts, hindering ILO staff movement. During the HLE period, electoral processes, civic unrest, changing executive and branch personnel, and security measures have interfered the most with the effectiveness of ILO projects of both local and upstream nature. However, some donors in Egypt felt that ILO must reassume project activities once security issues are resolved and areas outside metropolitan centres are cleared by UNDSS and bilateral aid partners.

4.5.1. What has worked

Given the political situation and constant government shuffles that took place, on average, every six months during the review period, the mitigation strategy for ILO offices has been to lean more towards realizing results at the grassroots level. This has proved effective, until political stability returns. This approach reflects also the general experience across the region; whereby, central government institutions remained unstable and local government has yet to emerge, and social constituents and popular initiatives are the locus of the most effective governance reforms in form and function.

In the case of “Pro-poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt—Salasel,” ILO delivered all planned activities within the allotted two years (although ILO started one year later than other partner organizations). On the operational and national level, the design of the project has managed to bring UN agencies together for more synergies in implementation, jointly implementing activities, and engaging the national counterparts to an unprecedented degree. Evidence shows that farmers have increased production as a result of the Salasel JP, which has generated credibility and increased global efficiency from the perspective of the farmers, the Post-harvest Centre (PHC) and farmers’ associations.

“Dahshur World Heritage Site Mobilization for Cultural Heritage for Community Development” has demonstrated that the tourism development component was the most effective (a vulnerable sector in Egypt), as it generated the interest of the national counterpart, the Tourism Development Authority (TDA). The TDA committed funds for the implementation of the solutions and recommendations proposed by UNWTO. Other national counterparts were less effective, as they could not cope with the dramatic decrease in their budgets, in addition to other organizational problems. This was particularly obvious with the Antiquity Services, taking an inordinately long time to make decisions.

The JP “Pro-poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt” demonstrates effective shared operational responsibilities, including all relevant agencies involved in decision-making and implementation, while including the national counterparts and beneficiaries. Seeking to empower champions and innovators has been a realistic and effective strategy.

139 EGY/08/50M/UND, 28 April 2009–30 April 2013.
Participating farmers’ certification in accordance with GlobalGAP\textsuperscript{141} has generated credibility and tended to open national and international markets through the project.\textsuperscript{142} Women-related activities via Misr El Khair were another indication of effectiveness in increasing “women’s self-confidence” as entrepreneurs. However, this has not evolved to the stage of “Gender Equity at Work” certification, as UN Women and Social Accountability International (SAI) have developed and applied to projects elsewhere.

In notable cases, NGOs operating in the field indicated that the ILO activities directly benefited people on the ground. They reported that, in certain JPs, the ILO’s collaborative base is not limited to national-level tripartite constituents, but is predisposed to involve a wider base of social partners.

The effectiveness of ILO interventions in Sudan arises from TA in the form of training and workshops. For instance, the ILO partnership framework with the MoWSS included cooperation and coordination for implementing a project for the empowerment of rural women\textsuperscript{143} and for activities aimed at capacity building and training for small-farmer and small-producer income generation and marketing.\textsuperscript{144}

In addition, ILO Sudan’s effective contribution is noted in a project to develop and implement a much needed National Youth Strategy. The project aims to create jobs for young people in Sudan and to train young people and implement a strategy eventually to train 5,000 young men and women. It has already resulted in a JP to create jobs for young people in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and North Kordofan.

ILO’s effectiveness appears from its development of seven thematic papers on employment-related topics and key dimensions of employment in Sudan, contributing to employment policy formulation. As a result, a series of technical roundtables have been conducted to discuss and adopt the thematic papers. ILO held a capacity development workshop on the methodology for the formulation of a national employment policy with participants from multiple line ministries, social partners and civil society. Finally, a presidential committee prepared a roadmap towards the formulation of Sudan’s National Employment Policy, which has been convened and chaired by the Presidential Advisor and Minister of Labour.

Despite many constraints comprising the political environment, unfilled specialist positions, the overburden of many administrative functions without sufficient RB resources and insufficiently responsive support from HQ and ROAF, the HLE team finds that ILO North Africa largely has achieved its defined outcomes. Its tools, training methods and manuals are highly popular and appreciated among constituents. ILO North Africa can take credit for having adapted and translated into Arabic some dozen modules on enterprise, skills and employment, as well as three modules for workers, employers and on social dialogue, and nine modules on ILS.

\textsuperscript{141} NGO that sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe. See: www.globalgap.org/uk_en/.

\textsuperscript{142} A total of 52 farmers were certified as producing according to GlobalGAP option 2, as were 40 tomato farmers in Luxor and 12 farmers in Beni Suef. The PHCs at Beni Soliman and Bayhoo obtained ISO 22000 certification.

\textsuperscript{143} “Empowering Women for Peace and Recovery”, SUD/012/02/UN PBF.

\textsuperscript{144} “Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan Joint Programme” November 2009–31 August 2012, led by UNIDO, and in partnership with other UN agencies: IOM, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNV and UNOPS.
4.5.2. What could have worked better

The presence of a national employment policy, with an embedded youth, women and vulnerable groups component, may have proved more effective in, and earlier catalyzed the implementation of ILO projects. Not one North African state has a single comprehensive employment policy document, but they usually have a combination of laws and policy documents. These are not always in harmony, nor are they consistently compliant with ILS. That fact only underscores the relevance of ILO’s contributions and advice on key documents and current reforms as an effective partner of the whole state, including government and other relevant institutions, people and land. Financial audits, robust policy analysis, further assessments of project evaluations, adequate administrative staff and mechanisms, and corresponding resources are needed to sustain the growth in, and demand for ILO operations.

ILO project interventions were not as effective as intended, due to the weak structure of labour administration (e.g. poor or non-existent baseline data), the weak institutional capacity of constituents (especially government institutions), and the tenuous political atmosphere. Given the fact that the bulk of ILO North Africa’s project portfolio evolved in 2011 and 2012, most projects could only partially meet their objectives, in financial terms and, more importantly, in terms of fulfilling their scope and ambition during the evaluation period. Before the political changes in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as subtly in Morocco, the space for decent work improvements was much narrower. Project scope also tended to be narrower and of too short duration. Therefore, it would be premature to describe the longer term ILO objectives as unmet. That said, the future potential for programming calls for longer-term commitments that build on current strategies, as well build on a stabilizing environment.

ILO experienced procedural delays in obtaining HQ approvals for budget and resources in some cases. Project managers experienced long lapses in the expected project commencement also due to recruitment processes that only could follow ILO administrative conditions. This resulted in greater pressure on implementers to deliver on time and within the available resources. Project evaluation reports, as well as constituents and ILO officials reiterated these delays, which were also observed in the interviews.

In order to be effective, some projects needed extended time and/or additional funds. For example, it was indicated that in the implementation of “Transition to Employment: Career Guidance for Youth and Job Creation” more funds are needed to support the national institutions so that they can grasp the changes that the project offers.

In the case of ROAF’s regional projects, however, observers noted a dearth of professional training expertise (e.g. on child labour). This indicates areas of potential improvement; however, the HLE team was not able to investigate sufficiently to deliver a firm assessment of this aspect of the ROAF operation.

In considering ILO effectiveness, the HLE team notes that the North Africa DWT is short of at least three specialists. The DWT positions on employment, social protection and labour administration have been vacant through the review period. The general understaffing and overwork of DWT/CO-Cairo have affected procurement procedures, financial management and effective delivery rates at project

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145 EGY/11/07/EGY, 01 May 2012–30 April 2014.
level. Moreover, the volume of technical backstopping to Egypt, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia has greatly strained office capacities during the review period, and the shortage of specialists and other staff in the subregion’s other ILO offices has encumbered results.

Upstream, at the level of policy and legal reform, ILO has partly achieved its intended objectives. These are longer term developments and have been constrained in most countries due to political instability and some government institutions’ lack of capacity. Nevertheless, effectiveness can be measured in the ongoing processes and achievements towards improved law and policy in several areas within most of the countries of the region. The DWT and CO-Cairo project teams have helped build on a set of legislation and policy documents with tripartite constituents in Egypt to develop a youth employment National Action Plan (NAP), draft legislation on public service employment and a freedom of association bill. A draft labour code is ready for parliamentary deliberations upon completion of the upcoming elections.

Table 5: Policies and laws supported by ILO technical assistance in North Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft Labour Code (ongoing)</td>
<td>CGEM Social Pact</td>
<td>Action Plans for Youth Employment in three states</td>
<td>Social Contract, signed by the Prime Minister, chairpersons of UGTT and UTICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Map for Cooperatives</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudan Vocational Training (VT) Policy (near final)</td>
<td>National Employment Policy (ongoing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the area of social dialogue, ILO has been partially effective, albeit while realizing some significant milestones in the period. No party is ever completely satisfied with the level of consultation; one or other of the social partners may feel unequally served. However, despite, or perhaps because of the political environment, ILO has proved that social dialogue is a very effective device for social development. The tremendous success achieved in the Tunisia Social Contract stands as an indicator of effectiveness, particularly where a specific ILO project is funded to support the process. However, in other countries, the process remains slower and has yet to arrive at such a level. In all country cases, however, the tripartite spirit prevails in ILO programming, while the actual practice still has to be more diligent to meet ideal targets.
In the area of social protection, ILO has not been effective in achieving the objectives in its *Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015*. This part of the subregion’s strategic tripod (with employment and social dialogue) remains unsupported by a specific project, a donor, or a DWT specialist to integrate social protection into existing projects and or knowledge products.

### 4.5.3. What needs to be done

Some projects seem to have been carried out without the benefit of proper project management tools, which complicates this assessment of effectiveness. In the important case of “Promoting Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Social Dialogue,”¹⁴⁶ project documents for the years 2012 and 2013 showed that the project had not managed to implement a proper M&E plan for needs assessment, pre- and post-activities assessment (baseline), or impact assessment by the time of this review. Therefore, the HLE team finds the available data inconclusive for the determination of effectiveness. These tools are standard for ILO projects and should be applied without exception.

No doubt, ILO staff spare no effort to apply social dialogue and tripartite principles. However, respondents emphasised the need for earlier engagement of social partners in the planning stages of national and regional strategy formulation and project design, as well as implementation. However challenging it may be to sustain in practice, social partners’ expressed the need for ILO offices to fully engage them at the conception stage of programming cycles. The earlier the involvement, the more the partners assume ownership of projects and take on responsibility for their outcomes. Finding mechanisms for meeting those expectations should form a priority for current and new ILO management and decent work specialists operating in the North African subregion.

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¹⁴⁶ EGY/07/03/USA, 01 April 2008–30 June 2014.
Table 7: ILO technical manuals produced, adapted and translated in North Africa, 2010–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise, skills and employment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guide for the Formulation of National Employment Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know About Business (online programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GET Ahead for Women in Enterprise (GET Ahead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) – trial version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate your Business Idea (GYB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start Your Business Manual (SYB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Economic Development (LED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Coop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Enterprise Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial Skills for Agribusiness (ESAB), including technical modules on: Compost Production, Packaging Agro-food Products, Green House Nurseries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start Your Waste Recycling Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Skills for Artists and Artisans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers, employers, social dialogue:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Putting Your Message to Work” Toolkit (freedom of association and collective bargaining for trade unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Bargaining Techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution and Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector for C.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International labour standards:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training of Judges on International Labour Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Law Guide for Domestic Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification of Companies and of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competencies for Employer Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of all International Labour Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO Digest on the Informal Economy: Compiling the Experience of other Countries through the ILO Supervisory Bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Effectiveness score

1= Highly Unsatisfactory, 2= Unsatisfactory, 3= Somewhat Unsatisfactory, 4= Somewhat Satisfactory, 5= Satisfactory, 6=Highly satisfactory
4.6. Results/impact

Impacts are defined by the OECD/DAC as "Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended." The evaluation team used this definition to guide the analysis of impacts of ILO programme results. Interpreted literally this focus on the long term could mean that any changes during a project implementation period, commonly two-three years, would not be considered to be a kind of impact. The evaluation team found this to be a problem in projects aimed at reducing forced or child labour by direct action (removal) activities without improving legal framework and intra-sectoral efforts to address underpinning issues such as: education, decent job creation, social protection, etc. However, with a huge proportion of ILO programming in conflict (South Sudan and Sudan) and high vulnerability (Eritrea, South Sudan) areas the evaluation team felt that it would be unrealistic to effectively assess long term impact. The evaluation team decided to drop 'long-term' from the very definition of impact and focused the analysis on shorter term (perhaps not as long lasting) results/impacts which would actually be better off being called outcomes.

The implementation of ILO country programme and strategies in North Africa illustrates how external factors can limit results and impact, delivering at least two lessons: (1) the selection and prioritization of projects supporting job creation and decent work have not sufficiently analysed the conditions necessary for, feasibility of, and constraints on the opportunities; and, more specifically, (2) local partners, including donors and other implementers on the ground, do not share the normative framework of ILO to apply tripartism and ILS as a standard method of operation, hence diminishing synergies and impacts. This latter factor has contributed to lopsided outcomes of ILO work in North Africa.

Figure 11: DWT/CO-Cairo outputs 2013

- **3,010** sustainable jobs generated
  - Through enterprise and cooperative creation and development, training for employment schemes.

- **7,173** persons trained for self or wage employment
  - Including on entrepreneurship, vocational and technical training and apprenticeship contracts; with a focus on youth, women and marginalized persons.

- **5,772** persons placed in employment
  - By supported public employment service centres, job fairs.

Source: Excerpt from ILO Cairo Office report for 2013.
4.6.1. What has worked

In Egypt, capacity-building activities were geared to MoMM permanent staff members, in order to circumvent continuous government shuffles and ensure the sustainability of inputs. In addition, credit offered for the support of entrepreneurial talent was another vehicle that ILO projects used. Job fairs, youth groups and women’s clubs are working modalities for job placement. The ILO sustains and tracks these outcomes through cooperation with the various national constituents. Few projects were initiated without baseline studies, but some required re-programming or re-phasing upon the eruption of the revolutions. A set of projects and TC that pursue behavioural changes (such as the career-guidance projects and social dialogue) necessitate longer durations than originally planned in order to implement objectives, especially given the several delayed starts.

Although Algeria registered no results for the biennium 2010–11, some of the key outcomes reported in Algeria during the second biennium of the HLE involve partners assuming ownership and applying ILO tools and techniques. Notably, enterprise promotion among women and vulnerable groups has shown significant results through the adoption and use of ILO tools. Notably, l’Agence nationale de gestion du microcrédit (ANGEM) which provided training with ILO’s “GET AHEAD” as a pilot experience in literacy centres, targeting women in rural areas, women with low incomes and uneducated women. Also, La Chambre Nationale de l’Artisanat et des Métiers (CNAM) utilized ILO-developed Gérez Mieux votre Entreprise (GERME) toolkits to assist artisans in the development of their enterprises.

ILO also has been able to advance the social security agenda by supporting the generation and dissemination of internationally comparable social security statistics made available through the ILO’s social security enquiry, as well through the ILO World Social Security Report. These data primarily serve as inputs for national policy formulation. ILO Algeria took the opportunity to contribute to this important policy process in December 2013 by sponsoring a group of experts to reinforce the capacity of social security by developing training for future use in schools and universities. Algeria’s decision to establish the ESSS shows commitment and promises enduring results from ILO inputs.

ILO has also contributed to strengthening employers’ organizations across the region. In Algeria, the Confédération Générale des Entreprises Algériennes (CGEA) has adopted a new strategy with ILO’s assistance to enhance its visibility in the regions and improve dialogue and service coordination between local offices and its headquarters. The CGEA was able to expand its membership base as well as geographical outreach (16 new offices), and now has a presence in 34 out of 48 districts. ILO has also seized opportunities to support Egypt’s Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI) through its transformation into a more independent organization with greater capacity to represent and serve industry beyond the capital. ILO’s work to support UTICA in Tunisia has also come at a time when the association is seeking to restructure, become more capable and ensure meaningful and institutionalized participation of women entrepreneurs.

Although ILO has not carried out project activities in Eritrea, the country has shown observable impact from ILO TC and participation in the ILC. It is reported that the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW) has sound knowledge of the trade union rights provided for in Convention Nos. 87 and 98 as a result of training. ILO training enabled NCEW’s activists to gain a better knowledge of the content and objectives of the ILO Declarations on FPRW and Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.
Education sector reforms have put in place a system to report and analyse employment indicators related to MDG 1b. “Government institutions responsible for MDG reporting”; the Sudan Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare (MoLHW) and constituents duly assessed MDG progress in November 2011, reporting on data sources, availability and trends analysis.  

The projects implemented solely in Morocco were successful at capacity building and institutionalizing national policies and programmes. The project “Combating Child Labour” created an enabling national environment for direct action against the worst forms of child labour in rural areas. Training carried out by the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) strengthened the capacities of national project partners, particularly the MoL, the Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale (MEN) and the National Steering Committee (NSC). Since these partners have different expertise, the effectiveness, relevance and impact of their training lies in their acquisition of skills that allow them to conduct their respective activities with a common format.

During the HLE period, Morocco’s tripartite NSC adopted a roadmap as an agreed response to overcome the high incidence of child labour in the Moroccan textile and garment sector. The “Action programme on improving competitiveness in the textile and clothing sectors through decent work” has strengthened partners significantly, raised community mobilization, and enhanced monitoring through baseline studies, problem analysis, report writing and financial record keeping.

In addition to the results and impact of project-based training during the HLE period in Sudan, the long-term impact of ILO interventions there derives from TA in the form of dialogue, workshops and knowledge products from previous periods. This is in addition to training in Turin that has had an enduring impact on some participants interviewed by the HLE team. The cumulative impact and depth of these experiences can be credited in large part to the development of an effective tripartite process, and agreement on a national minimum wage in April 2014.

These results affirm the immediate objectives set out in the subregional strategy of ILO for North Africa aimed at “creating opportunities for young women and men and the most vulnerable, empowering social partners and other stakeholders through social dialogue, extending and improving social protection especially for the most vulnerable.” Employment-focused programmes as well as organizations’ adoption of entrepreneurship and business creation as a business model fulfil the objective of creating opportunities for young women and men in the ILO’s subregional strategy for North Africa. Adoption of several national tripartite plans of action and one social contract also affirm the utility of the tripartite approach through social dialogue. However, this has not yet resulted in a DWCP for any of the countries in the region.

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4.6.2. What could have worked better

The reported outputs of ILO operations in the subregion (cited in the figure above) are laudable. However, the number of people trained, placed and qualified is dwarfed by the needs identified in the context covered above, particularly with respect to the employment challenge of annual entrants into the workforce. However, many of ILO activities are actually designed to be “demonstrative,” in order to provide examples and experience in partnership with constituents to exemplify how sizable programmes of placement, training or entrepreneurship can be rolled out efficiently and effectively.

The impact of the dedicated social dialogue project in Egypt\textsuperscript{149} has not yet been evaluated. However, efforts to achieve its desired results were hampered due to the challenges of the unstable environment and political interventions in the project’s operations, especially in the pre-revolution period. The project methodology involved awareness raising and training, although the initial plan was to form a pool of well-trained individuals to carry on future reforms. As for all ILO training in the region, a training database would be an indispensable tool to track efforts and carry out necessary follow-up.

The lessons learned from this project are significant. The project originally started in 2008, was suspended for several months in 2010, and then restarted in 2011 with the same objectives and strategy. Given the new project context, a proper inception phase should have adapted the project strategy to the changing environment. The project’s capacity-building component, comprising some 90 per cent of activities, did not pave the way to institutionalizing social dialogue. The content of training and awareness-raising activities did not correspond to the target group’s priorities and basic needs. In almost all of the training, participants assessed contents as too general and superficial.

4.6.3. What needs to be done

Considering the methods and desired results of ILO programming, external factors reveal the importance of ILO’s stewardship role in accompanying the state to develop its policies and institutions so as to meet state obligations to implement ILS. This stewardship role involves ILO accompanying state institutions in the task of achieving integrated development in the countries of its operation. While contributing to good governance is not the stated central objective of ILO’s P&B outcomes, subregional strategy or national roadmaps, improved governance is indispensable to ensure project ownership and programme results, and impact across the region.

The creation and maintenance of a training database for North Africa would aid the tracking and evaluation of outcomes from the major investment in ILO programming. Such a tool also would help avoid duplication and assist in matching content to participants’ needs and backgrounds. The findings from training participants’ feedback suggest also that greater coordination is needed among service providers to avoid redundancy and enable more strategically designed training interventions.

The figure below shows donor responses to survey question: Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: “In 2010–2013, ILO has made progress toward implementation of the immediate objectives of ILO Strategy for North Africa 2011–2015, namely: employment creation, social dialogue and social protection.”

\textsuperscript{149} “Promoting Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Social Dialogue” EGY/07/03/USA, 01 July 2008–30 June 2014.
4.7. Sustainability

Results are most durable in cases where the development partners assume ownership of the project and take on responsibility for its outcomes. In strengthening regional governance, the PARE showed strong ownership at local and regional levels. However, commitment at central level to the process in Tunisia and Egypt remains reticent. Such intended advances in institutional culture will take more time, but the decentralized and rural focus of ILO programming is likely to proffer operational examples that will affect policies and institutional development positively in the longer run.

Ownership is a key to sustainability. It results in resource mobilization, participation and accountability that normally would lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness. Assessing the results achieved vis-à-vis objectives requires consideration of many external circumstances. Sustainability will ultimately be determined by the commitment and efforts made by the government and greater ownership of the projects’ results by the social partners. The prospect of sustainability may be undermined by the short-term duration of some projects, their limited focus, and the capacity of the ILO and the government to follow-up and consolidate results.

4.7.1. What has worked

The “Promoting Worker Rights and Competitiveness in Egyptian Export Industries” project150 foresees all interventions to be sustainable, as all the training activities with the stakeholders will have a training of trainers component. All stakeholders, including MoMM, will have their own qualified trainers, factories will have some qualified staff to train workers, and the management team on labour standards and human resources management will have the necessary qualified and equipped staff, and facilities to improve competitiveness.

In Egypt’s “Dahshur World Heritage Site Mobilization for Cultural Heritage for Community Development,” the project contributed to better working conditions for the inspectors, and the association created by the beneficiaries of the heritage-awareness course should contribute to the sustainability of improved management patterns of the Dahshur site. Therefore, these efforts have contributed to the development of the Dahshur region in the long run, when tourism is expected to rebound. The local community was engaged heavily in the JP’s design and implementation, which

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150 EGY/11/06/USA, 1 October 2011–30 September 2016.
should enhance wider knowledge transfer, ownership and sustainability. CO-Cairo adopted a LED approach, which resulted in the establishment of a sustained legal entity in the form of an NGO to serve five villages, which should operate beyond the life of the JP. The handover of the JP’s studies is also an asset towards sustainability.

In the case of “Pro-poor Horticulture Value Chains in Upper Egypt,” all project interventions were conducted with national and local partners; therefore, raising the probability of institutionalizing results. ILO devised an exit strategy to sustain activities. Correspondingly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MoALP) has hired some of the project-trained agronomists. While a more strategic plan for the improvement of extension services is still needed, the private sector is contemplating its options to support—and, thus, sustain—this service through mobile phone technology. To ensure effectiveness and sustainability, the project would have benefited from a broader pro-poor approach and a longer implementation period.

The practice of forming NSCs and project advisory committees has proved effective in aiding the sustainability of ILO project achievements, institutionalizing tripartism and enhancing the sense of project ownership. However, the increasing engagement of CSOs may run the risk of limiting sustainability, because of their dependence on external funding and susceptibility to programme shifts in response to changing donor priorities. The low capacity of many government institutions and the rapid turnover of their personnel, especially at the higher management and policy level, also threaten to undermine sustainability.

In numerous ILO projects in the region, many beneficiaries have started their own businesses, and others are emulating them. Where projects managed to leave material assets behind, such as locally customized greenhouses, this successful experiment has turned the problem of land fragmentation into a more profitable business, enabling and encouraging small farmers to invest in such technologies. However, the use and dissemination of the results by governmental partners is key to long-term impact.

4.7.2. What could have worked better

In South Sudan, the events of late 2013 rendered ILO programme sustainability moot. However promising ILO’s contribution was to the development of the new state and its institutions, especially the MoL, Public Service and Human Resource (MLPSHR). The HLE team was not able to conduct a field verification mission there and does not have enough information to confirm project and RBTC sustainability. The final evaluation of the project “Creating opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan” noted that many of the interventions, and particularly those with a high dependence on government engagement, were not receiving adequate local budgetary and institutional support. Other observations pointed to a high participant dropout rate and the lack of independent community-based initiatives to emulate the successful practices demonstrated by the JP-supported groups.

In the project “Stabilisation and Early Reintegration Support for Returnees in South Sudan,” the government’s capacity for taking up of skills training activities is considerably limited. However, it is noted also that the relevant line ministries have an increased awareness of the importance of such programmes.

The sustainability of knowledge generated and the potential for greater coherence and synergies are regularly undermined with the rapid turnover of expatriate staff in the UNCT and related partner organizations. Notable was the case of IOM staff in Sudan who had no information about a JP carried out with ILO just a year ago. However, the continuity of national staff in UNDP and UNRC offices, as in Tunisia, showed themselves to be pillars of essential institutional memory. ILO staff stability and longevity in the field are also assets to programme sustainability.

4.7.3. What needs to be done

The overall sustainability of ILO’s operations in North Africa depends on sustainability strategies that are based on tripartite commitments to sustain and develop further the results achieved. Formal transfer of the results to tripartite constituents could promote greater ownership of results and immediate impacts.

Figure 12: Impact and sustainability score

![Impact and sustainability score graph](image)

1= Highly Unsatisfactory, 2= Unsatisfactory, 3= Somewhat Unsatisfactory, 4= Somewhat Satisfactory, 5= Satisfactory, 6=Highly satisfactory

4.8. Overall performance

The overall assessment of the evaluation criteria shows that relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency all rated close to or in the higher end of ‘somewhat satisfactory’ range. Impact and sustainability did not fare as well and scored closer to the range of ‘somewhat unsatisfactory’. The overall composite falls close to ‘somewhat satisfactory’. This score is qualified within the context of the numerous constraints cited above.
Figure 3: Overall performance

1= Highly Unsatisfactory, 2= Unsatisfactory, 3= Somewhat Unsatisfactory, 4= Somewhat Satisfactory, 5= Satisfactory, 6= Highly satisfactory
5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary

The P&B outcomes and Strategy for North Africa emphasizing gender discrimination concerns and women’s empowerment through access to productive employment, decent work and income opportunities (P&B outcomes 1 and 17) are reflected in two principal approaches, involving micro-credit schemes and women’s training for entrepreneurship. While these strategies are better than doing nothing, they remain limited in their scope and impact. This does not diminish the relevance of such interventions, but rather underscores the need to upstream the impacts to affect policy-level outcomes.\footnote{Nilüfer Çağatay: \textit{Gender and poverty}, UNDP Social development and Poverty Elimination Branch, 1998, \url{www.undp.org/poverty/publications/wkpaper/wp5/wp5-nilufer.PDF} [accessed 20 October 2014].}

The project-based operations of ILO North Africa reflect an imbalanced collection of donor-supported activities that ILO staff has implemented with the additional task of creating synergies. ILO North Africa has largely accomplished this within its various constraints. However, most projects so far were unable to meet all the objectives identified at inception, due to the unstable political situation, short duration of the projects and the extra burden of multi-tasking within the zero-growth administrative budget, despite the subregion’s generation of considerably greater PSI than before this HLE period.

The HLE team has found reasonable deviations from the initial project description due to political difficulties encountered during implementation beyond the ILO’s control. However, it is difficult to find any deviation from the set strategies and country-specific roadmaps, although CPOs have shifted according to project opportunities.

Through its desk reviews, field verification missions, interviews and online surveys, the HLE team has found a high degree of relevance of ILO operations, as well as internal and wider coherence with the national contexts and UNCT partners. However, this message has not sufficiently reached the ears of the wider public, and ILO still has a public relations task to carry out, so that the relevance and effectiveness of its work becomes better known and appreciated.

The ILO interventions were not as effective as envisioned at project inception, largely because of circumstantial issues such as the structure of labour administration, administrative procedures affecting timely access to resources, budget constraints, inefficiencies in HQ administration, weaknesses in government capacity and the tenuous political atmosphere. Also some delays may be attributed to insufficient commitment, challenges encountered in securing sufficient resources and unrealistic planning of the project activities, goals and concrete outcomes.

Findings note that the ILO is aware of the capacity gaps and has planned measures such as focused workshops to address them. Greater coherence was the subject of considerable deliberation within ILO North Africa, and decisions taken at its February 2014 retreat indicate a commitment to involve the DWTs more in programming and regular staff meetings.
Some external observers have perceived weak coherence in ILO operations, in part, because of insufficient information about ILO’s work, as well as insufficient—or insufficently clear—representation. ROAF’s parcelling of management responsibilities between Algiers and Cairo has exacerbated this impression and its reality. Lack of cooperation between COs in Algiers and Cairo has become legend, as has the lack of representation and back reporting from UNCT, and related coordination functions. For many reasons, ILO Tunisia and ILO Sudan need an international staff representative to ensure internal, programme-wide and external coordination.

The lack of sufficient representation has caused ILO to miss important opportunities, affecting relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness and, ultimately, impact. Notable has been ILO’s incapacity and/or unwillingness to operate in crisis situations. This observation may seem counterintuitive in this context, since North Africa has undergone serial crises throughout the current evaluation period. Nonetheless, irregular representation in UNCT, SMT and project-coordination meetings in Sudan, and ILO’s reticence to operate in crisis situations have kept it out of the largest development programme ever in Darfur. ILO also has missed out on project opportunities within its specialization, in favour of an employment project of UNDP, which suffers from the lack of ILOs depth, tripartism and normative framework.

That is not to suggest that ILO North Africa personnel have not been diligent. Every DWT member, programming staff, project manager, administrator and support staff member has shown tremendous energy, competence and selfless dedication to their job. They have earned a reputation as extremely effective and committed workers. However, some staff and their expertise have been underutilized, notably where decent work specialists could have been more involved in programming and ILS. Inputs need greater effort and integrity across all projects.

The management in the two COs (Algiers and Cairo) is changing in 2014. The new management phase—and this HLE—could be the occasion to rededicate ILO resources to meeting the need for more staff in the additional functions where this overview finds them wanting. As noted, more management capacity is needed to run the swelling Egypt CO operation, and the subregion’s obvious needs and priorities call for additional decent work specialization in the field of social protection, social dialogue and migration/trafficking.

ILO’s two greatest comparative advantages in the subregion—and elsewhere—are its tripartite approach and normative ILS framework. Both need to be applied more diligently, especially in light of increased synergies and JPs with partners lacking these quintessential assets. Nonetheless, the North Africa projects have contributed to the better understanding and, therefore, application of ILO standards. The projects definitely have helped to improve processes and practices, as exhibited through the manner in which the national offices carried out the projects’ activities. Perhaps one of the most noticable ILO impacts is the change in attitudes toward ownership of practices and standards. Constituents appear to understand better that they are responsible for the outcomes of the project and on-going awareness. However, the ILO tripartite constituents in North Africa would benefit from further clarification of issues dealing with worker empowerment, protection and opportunities through issues included in the projects’ activities.

As a UN Charter-based specialized organization, ILO should operate in the field fully cognizant of its guardianship role in relation to states’ fulfilment of ILS and their treaty obligations. The political
culture in the North African subregion has not yet embodied sufficiently the principles of public service and accountability, and ILO has a distinctive role to play in upholding the norms.

The corresponding commitment and effort made by the government and the social partners ultimately will determine the effectiveness and sustainability of the projects. For most projects in this review, sustaining the momentum beyond the often too short project period remains a challenge. ILO’s intensive involvement in the projects to provide advisory services, knowledge products/tools, capacity building, and project management, has been required in order to give adequate momentum to the projects’ objectives. However, it also leads to a high level of dependence on the ILO by the constituents. The prospect of sustainability also may be undermined by the short duration of some projects, and the limited capacity of the ILO and its constituents to ensure follow-up and the consolidation of results.

ILO’s programming in the field shows a fairly balanced focus on both urban and rural employment, women and youth. However, with ILO’s programmatic focus on employment, programmers and donors would be remiss to neglect the social protection and social dialogue priorities that precede and transcend the upcoming generation. In the particular circumstances of urban and, especially, neglected rural workers who feed and clothe society across the subregion. These workers have faced crushing farmers’ indebtedness, land dispossession, natural resource privatization, rescinded subsidies, and overbearing competition with small producers from military, monarchic and extraterritorial corporations; the remedial upstream impacts and policy reforms remain as urgent as youthful entrepreneurship.

The policy synergies among projects that promote regional development plans deserve special strategic consideration, especially in the majority of North African countries where local government is nonexistent. In this regard, ILO has a much greater potential knowledge- and experience-based advisory role to play with donors and host governments to ensure that democracy demands are realized nationally and locally. The overwhelming attention to reconstituting North Africa’s central government institutions so far has overshadowed the critical importance of local democracy in the transitional period of this HLE. In light of the need for further local government reform, additional dimensions of synergy and coherence are foreseeable.

### 5.2. Lessons learned and recommendations

#### 5.2.1. Strategic planning and tripartism

The ILO North Africa programme has been developed primarily in response to the economic and political crises and opportunities presented by the uprisings of 2011 and, as such, does not show tripartism consistently at all stages of the programme and project cycles.

Both social partners and ILO methodology demand greater balance in the engagement of government, and workers’ and employers’ organizations in the conceptualization, planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes and projects. These demands presuppose all parties’ interest, capacity, availability, resources and will to participate effectively. ILO does coordinate with the tripartite constituents, but cannot be the only party responsible for maintaining tripartism. All parties are supposed to be common agents and beneficiaries of economic development through decent work.
Project tools, methods and procedures need greater harmonization. In particular, all projects should have steering committees/project advisory committees comprising constituents to work on project strategies, implementation, adjustments and evaluation. All projects also should have to observe baseline and exit strategies to sustain results, and a standardized project needs assessment and RBM toolkit should to be developed for ILO operations at HQ, RO and CO.

**Lesson 1:** ILO has the unique potential and competence to ensure the engagement of constituents even more—and earlier—in programming, project work planning and efficient delivery. In theory, this is the way to build ownership and improve implementation. It is also a tremendously labour-intensive task requiring a specific set of technical skills, collaboration efforts among the specialists, and enhanced capacities on RB project designing.

### 5.2.2. Operationalizing the Strategy for North Africa

The DWT/CO-Cairo and CO-Algiers have been operating with the same level of staff resources since before the surge of extra-budgetary contributions that resulted from donors’ interest in the subregion after the uprisings. To ensure the integrity of the *Strategy for North Africa, 2011–2015*, as well as the achievement of the P&B outcomes consistent with the subregion’s operations, the two COs and the DWT would require additional technical expertise with relevant skills sets that respond to the area’s strategic focus. At present, the subregion has no specialists in social protection, social dialogue and migration, three areas of strategic importance for the subregional strategy.

The lack of resident technical expertise has been addressed through certain regional and global projects such as the subregion’s single project on migration (IRAM), which is helpful, but insufficient to address the cross-regional problems, policy deficit, protection gaps and violations common to North Africa. Reliance on ILO Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS)-Beirut to fill this gap is not practical without sufficient XBTC resources and the availability of a migration specialist. The lack of a migration specialist in the ILO Africa Region also excludes the option of support from ROAF.

Likewise, social dialogue, ILS and gender equality must be conscientiously integrated into all project design and implementation. That will require greater effort from the ILS specialist, as well as other staff, to raise and maintain greater awareness of the norms in relation to project partners, beneficiaries, donors and government counterparts. This greater focus on the norms optimizes one of ILO’s comparative advantages, and allows it to fulfil its guardianship role better with regard to states and their constituent institutions to enable them to uphold their treaty obligations under ILO conventions and other commitments to decent work. Efforts should include an analysis of discrepancies between labour conventions ratified and current labour laws, and practices in the region, as an essential country diagnostic tool in support of future programming and project activities.

ILO project implementation in support of LED and regional development has revealed the relevance and need for more competent and participatory local government. Current projects in Egypt and Tunisia exemplify this finding. It would behove ILO to programme with this lesson in mind to ensure greater coherence with other development actors in the region, including donors and municipal associations. ILO’s contribution through tripartism and ILS would enhance other development actors’ efforts—
including and beyond the UNCT—that have not yet developed the corresponding methodological and normative framework.

**Lesson 2:** The *Strategy for North Africa* acknowledges the importance of social protection as one of its three pillars, but has not been able to deliver accordingly. Lessons from Tunisia indicate the importance and potential results of a dedicated social protection project in all countries, supported with the corresponding specialization on the DWT. All countries need support to improve social protection as an integral and indispensable part of the ILO development assistance package.

**Lessons 3:** Subregional and regional initiatives always need to be relevant to country-specific needs and take into account existing capacities at country and subregional levels to support proper implementation.

ILO North Africa and HQ must increase capacity to operate in and on crisis situations. ILO staff facing crisis/conflict situations need additional training and equipment (communications, security jackets, armbands, procedures, etc.) to enable them to be more mobile and effective operating in the field. Capacity is needed to conduct proper risk analysis, in order to make informed decisions in response to programming opportunities and priorities. Greater capacity and readiness to operate in crises need to be developed, especially to contribute to the ILO’s normative framework and a longer term development approach in line with existing donor and implementation agency humanitarian and relief approaches.

### 5.2.3. Knowledge management

Both staff and constituents interviewed by the evaluation team also expressed the need for a knowledge portal for North Africa that would enhance the identity of the subregion as a functional unit (linked also with ROAS in Beirut). Among the knowledge products needed and requested across the region are studies and policy advice on informality and rural employment, as well as more information about the norms and their more practical application, ensuring as far as possible that all materials are available in Arabic.

**Lesson 4:** Since ILO training and knowledge products in the subregion are so effective and popular, it is wise to invest in methods and assets to ensure knowledge exchange and to maintain and record proper evaluation and follow-up. Among the knowledge products needed and requested across the region are ILO studies and policy advice on informality and rural employment, as well as more information about the norms and their operationalization, ensuring as far as possible that all materials are available in Arabic.

### 5.2.4. Organizational effectiveness

The present division of roles and functions between ILO Algiers and ILO Cairo is inoperable. The separation of political representations (assumed in Algiers) and technical and administrative responsibility (assumed in Cairo) constitutes a false dichotomy that has devolved into dysfunction. In order for the ILO Algiers office to assume a coordinating role across borders in the Maghreb region, it needs more staff and capacity.
Lesson 5: The present division of roles and functions between CO-Algiers and CO-Cairo is, at first sight, difficult to imagine in practice. The segregation of political representations (assumed in Algiers), and technical and administrative responsibility (assumed in Cairo) has created a false dichotomy that has posed further constraints to complementary subregional operations. While timely organizational decisions were needed to address programmatic and operational opportunities and challenges engendered by the uprisings, a more inclusive process could have helped avoid miscommunications and uncertainties, and the subsequent deterioration of organizational effectiveness and image coherence as regards the development partners. The lesson learned is that, when this type of decision is made at HQ and RO levels, all affected organizational units should be sufficiently informed, involved in the rationale and assigned clear roles and responsibilities.

On the administrative side, the ILO’s rapid response to new opportunities created a need for stronger administrative and programming units. Additional temporary staff support was employed by CO-Cairo to support RBM compliance, and ensure effective and efficient M&E of the subregional programme. This sudden increase in the volume of operations managed by the CO also highlighted the need for a deputy director in the CO-Cairo to defray some of the additional demands on the director which have been created by the expanding portfolio in the subregion. The current arrangement without a deputy is unrealistic to meet the greatly increased demands for travel, DWT coordination and management.

These unexpected staff needs would require additional programme support resources commensurate with the volume of the Office’s TC portfolio for the North Africa subregion. However, programme support funds allotted to DWT/CO-Cairo have not reflected the actual volume of the TC portfolio under their responsibility. This, coupled with the zero-growth policy for RB resources, DWT and COs (Algiers and Cairo), created a severe shortage of human resources in the CO, characterized by insufficient support for needed administrative and knowledge-management systems, and onerous financial and procurement procedures that increased labour amid insufficiently responsive HQ functions. Notably, this situation has not changed in 2014.

Lesson 6: ILO’s rapid response to new opportunities created a need for stronger administrative and programming capacities. This sudden increase in the volume of CO-Cairo-managed operations also signalled additional CO-level staff needs and programme support resources commensurate with the volume of the Office’s TC portfolio for the North Africa subregion. However, in materially and operationally, both HQ and RO support and backstopping proceeded out of pace with, and below the subregion’s current demands and needs. This can be rectified by ensuring allocations of PSI and RBSA are equitable and responsive to operational needs and strategic opportunities.

5.2.5. Visibility and relations with UN Country Teams

ILO offices should collaborate more with media and UNIC officers to enhance the visibility of COs and project achievements. ILO must have a communication strategy involving closer cooperation with UNIC, adopt a dissemination policy to share success stories, etc., and generate communication products and channels to feed the CO website.

Lesson 7: Better communications with UNCT and national constituents and social partners would make ILO’s work better known and enhance its relevance at country level.
This HLE has shown that the Sudan and Tunisia operations are least well represented in UNCTs, SMTs and project coordination meetings. This is partly due to mixed messages coming from different quarters (UNRCs, ROAF, CO-Algeria) disabling ILO representation in these key forums. ILO is carrying out sufficient activity in Tunisia to warrant, indeed require, a cross-project and representational function in the form of an ILO representative to: participate in UNCT meetings; represent the office generally; contribute to the development of a DWCP; maintain the reporting and communication channel with ILO Algiers; and ensure synergy, coherence and cross-project coordination. This should be part of an ILO effort especially to increase its engagement in Sudan.

Lesson 8: As a result of the above, ILO relevance and coherence has suffered, as well as the external perception of both. The ambiguities in ILO representational roles and function have resulted in insufficient internal and external coordination, as well as lost opportunities for ILO programming and service delivery.

5.3. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: A fully developed DWCP remains a goal and priority for most stakeholders. ILO programmes and projects in the subregion should evolve from crisis response mode to more sustainable interventions based on sound social dialogue and tripartite involvement throughout the programme/project cycle. This requires the development of operational medium- and long-term strategies/roadmaps within the DWCP framework and a subregional ILO decent work strategy that fully involve national constituents and social partners in the design and implementation of M&E processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Time implication</th>
<th>Resource implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DWT/CO-Cairo in close coordination with CO-Algiers and RO-Africa</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendation 2: ILO’s North Africa operations should involve DWT specialists more in the programming and project cycle from inception through to evaluation. This practice calls for more frequent and better integrated staff meetings for greater exchange of experience and expertise among ILO staff across the subregion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Time implication</th>
<th>Resource implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DWT/CO-Cairo, CO-Algiers</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No resource implication foreseen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendation 3: ILO should establish a subregional, Arabic-enabled knowledge-sharing platform to promote greater collaboration among DWT specialists, COs, project staff and tripartite constituents throughout the subregion. This platform would provide easier access to project implementation reports, evaluations, thematic studies, and other knowledge products through a trilingual interface (Arabic, English and French) linked to/from the ILO websites.
**Recommendation 4:** The establishment and maintenance of a training database would provide an essential tool to track, monitor, develop and report on capacity-building activities. Such a database would form part of a wider knowledge system designed and maintained with the participation of CTAs, DWTs and management to ensure user-friendly access to training materials.

**Recommendation 5:** To operate in and on crisis situations, ILO needs to take into account three key issues affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations in the subregion: (i) skill needs for addressing subregional priority areas; (ii) unrealistic start-ups and implementation timeframe for programmes and projects operating in crisis situations; and (iii) training, systems and equipment to operate in a wider range of logistical and security environments.

**Recommendation 6:** Capacity and resources should be commensurate with the volume of the TC portfolio. In the case of the North African subregion, the disparity between capacity and the volume of the subregional programme and TC risks hampering the achievement of the outcomes of the ILO strategy for North Africa. ILO should address gaps in resources and capacity in real time, instead of waiting for adjustments in the new biennium.

**Recommendation 7:** The DWT/CO-Cairo needs to work with national coordinators and CO-Algiers to assist them in developing a communications strategy for the UNCT, national constituents and the general public. This would involve adopting a dissemination policy to share success stories, etc., generating communication products and channels to feed the CO websites and fostering closer cooperation with selected media.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Time implication</th>
<th>Resource implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DWT/CO-Cairo</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>No additional resource needs foreseen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendation 8:** ILO must address representation dilemmas in non-resident countries in the subregion. This HLE has shown that ILO should be better represented in UNCT, SMTs and project coordination meetings, especially with designated international staff representing the ILO at important coordination meetings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Time implication</th>
<th>Resource implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ and RO-Africa</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Additional resources needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OFFICE’s RESPONSE

The Office acknowledges the Report of the High-Level Independent Evaluation of ILO Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North Africa, its lessons, conclusions and recommendations. These will help improve the implementation of the ILO programme in and outside North Africa. While taking careful note of its findings the Office has the following comments.

The Office intends to take into account many useful findings, conclusions and recommendations of the report as it supports the DWTs/COs and the RO in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating TC projects and DWCPs. These include:

- developing operational medium- and long-term strategies in a more participatory manner within the framework of a subregional ILO decent work strategy;
- conducting proper risk analysis particularly in countries being affected by conflict, in order to make informed and timely decisions in response to programme management and delivery;
- improving the involvement of specialists in programming and the project cycle from inception through to evaluation;
- enhancing coordination and communications with UNCT, and national constituents and social partners.

In addition the Office takes note of the following.

Recommendations 1–2:

The Office will support the design of DWCPs in North African countries within the framework of the subregional ILO Decent Work Strategy in 2015, starting with Algeria and Egypt. It recognizes that the wider political, development and decent work context in these countries is now conducive to the design of medium- to long-term planning frameworks. In the preparation of DWCPs and TC projects, the Office will ensure the full participation of relevant technical specialists, TC project staff, stakeholders and UN agencies. In 2015, the Office will support the development of DWCPs as a minimum in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

Recommendations 3–4:

The Office acknowledges the importance of a subregional knowledge-sharing platform to promote greater collaboration among staff and tripartite constituents throughout the subregion and beyond. It will work with the relevant departments at HQ to implement this recommendation. The DWT/CO-Cairo will also develop a training database to monitor, report and exchange information on its capacity-building training with the support of ROAF and relevant departments at HQ.
Recommendations 5, 6 and 8:

ROAF recognizes that it needs to be more agile in the current fluid regional situation. The Office has already adopted different approaches in managing projects, but will also investigate using scenarios and other methods to remain flexible and responsive. These recommendations will be reviewed taking into account the specific context of each country, and in line with the recommendations of the ILO field operations and structure review as well as relevant ILO guidelines.

Recommendation 7:

The Office concurs that it is important to have a good communications system, and to develop and implement communications plans in line with the global communication strategy to reach ILO’s constituents, partners and stakeholders. With the support of the global and regional communication teams, DWT/CO-Cairo and DWT/CO-Algiers will develop and implement COs’ communications plans.
Annex I. Terms of Reference

Independent evaluation of the ILO’s decent country programme strategies in North Africa

Purpose of the evaluation:
In November 2012, the ILO’s Governing Body approved EVAL’s rolling work plan for 2013 which included an independent cluster evaluation of the ILO’s decent work country strategies supported by the DWT/CO-Cairo and CO-Algiers in North Africa. The evaluation will focus on the existing roadmaps and country programme strategies for the countries supported by these two offices, namely: Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia. The evaluation will seek to assess whether the ILO’s programmes are effectively serving as instruments to achieve the Decent Work Agenda in these countries and extract lessons that would lead to: (i) improved country programme planning and implementation; (ii) improve its organizational effectiveness, (iii) account for results, (iv) strengthening synergies among the ILO’s technical advice and technical cooperation activities; and (v) apply lessons in future programmes and projects, and (vi) identify approaches to better support the achievement of the areas of critical importance identified as priority by the national tripartite constituents of these countries.

Objective of the evaluation:
The evaluation will identify opportunities seized and missed the planning and implementation of the existing ILO decent work strategies and roadmaps of the countries in the Office’s North African sub region. This will be included a review of the programmes, technical assistance and advice given, and technical cooperation projects carried out during the 2010-11, and 2012-13 biennia. It will assess the degree to which current strategies, road maps, programmes and projects address the priorities and country programme outcomes identified national and regional decent work agenda and presented in the ILO’s Strategy for North Africa. The evaluation will seek to determine the extent to which ILO social partners have participated in shaping decent work country programme strategies.

The evaluation will seek to determine the extent to which ILO social partners have participated in shaping decent work country programme strategies to ensure their alignment with national priorities. The valuation will also seek to assess the degree of coherence or synergies among the different ILO programming instruments and activities, and other development partners; the effectiveness and efficiency of delivery of results and partnership building and harmonization. The analysis will be based on ILO’s performance management principles and determine the extent to which ILO activities can focus on the critical areas of interest that have emerged from these countries and the ILO’s reform process, namely: youth employment, rural poverty, with more-effective targeting of the poorest people in rural areas. This evaluation will place special focus on the enabling factors for the creation of decent work for men and women, with a special focus on the creation of decent work for youth, women, disadvantaged groups through entrepreneurship and self-employment programmes.

Background:
Economic growth in North Africa turned negative in 2011 in the face of the Arab upraise, which led to a near-collapse of economic activity in Libya, and deceleration of growth in all countries in the region except Morocco. Economic growth in Egypt dropped from 5.1 per cent in 2010 to 1.8 per cent in 2011 and remained low at 2.0 per cent in 2012, while Sudan registered negative economic growth (-11.2 per cent) in 2012 following the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Nevertheless, regional economic growth in North Africa (which does not include South Sudan) reached a record high of 9.8 per cent in
2012 on the back of the rebound in Libya. Growth in Tunisia also became positive in 2012 and is expected to accelerate further (IMF, 2012b).

The risk of unemployment in the region is not limited to any particular group. Despite the disadvantaged position of youth, their share in total unemployment has been (slowly) decreasing (Figure 1). One out of three persons of working age was aged between 15 and 24, but in 2012 this proportion had dropped to 28 per cent, and it is projected to fall to one out of four persons in 2015 (Figure 2).

The female labour force participation rate in North Africa shows an increasing trend, but is still less than a third of the male participation rate. This explains why men constitute the large majority of jobseekers in North Africa, despite the disadvantaged position of women in terms of unemployment rates. In other words, even though young workers and women face additional barriers in accessing work, the creation of decent work opportunities is important for all workers.

**Scope of the evaluation:**

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the ILO’s programme of support to Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia. This would involve the evaluation of technical cooperation projects, existing DWCPs or country strategies. The timeframe proposed for study is 2010-2013. The evaluation will focus on the ILO’s strategic positioning in the countries of the sub region, its approach to setting a Decent Work Agenda (DWA), as well as the composition, implementation and evolution of ILO strategies implement the DWA.

The evaluation will seek to analyse the implementation of the ILO’s decent work country programme strategies and ascertain what has worked, what has not work and why? An overarching question would be how can ILO strategies effectively support comprehensive reform of the institutional structures affecting decent work, especially among youth, women and disadvantaged groups to generate sufficient economic growth to absorb new job seekers, while responding to the growing demands for voice and participation?

Thoughtful consideration will be given to good practices and lessons on how to design programmes that are mindful of current economic and political structures and are implemented in a way that incentivizes young people to develop marketable skills, educators to emphasize skills development, employers to hire first-time job seekers, and parents to aid youth in taking risks in building 21st century careers and aspirations.

Table 1 below presents the projects presently being executed; the binding element among these ILO activities is that they seek to:

- Expand awareness and understanding of fundamental principles and rights at work and their linkages with democracy and sustainable development.
- Enhance the institutional capacity of independent unions and employers’ organizations to effectively exercise the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining.
- Enhance the capacity of the labour administration to promote and implement public policies, national labour legislation, and sound industrial relations.
- Improving the rights and policy environment for women.
- Providing vulnerable groups of women with skills that will increase their employability and assisting them in finding decent job opportunities.
• Employment promotion initiatives, targeting the most vulnerable segments of the labour markets, and focusing on entrepreneurship training, skills development, job placement, and active labour market programmes at local and national levels.

Specifically the evaluation will cover the following areas:

8. Strategic positioning of the ILO programme in countries included in the evaluation
9. The role and effectiveness of the ILO programme in promoting decent work as well the addressing the deficits;
10. Synergies and alignment of ILO country programme priority outcomes to MDGs and UNDAFs
11. Evidence of the direct and indirect use of ILO’s contributions and support at national level (outcomes); evidence of pathways towards longer term impact
12. The efficiency and adequacy of ILO’s organizational arrangements to deliver the ILO’s programme in the countries selected for this evaluation.
13. Lessons learned and good practices that would help develop innovative thinking and responses framed within the reality of the new regional context.

The proposed countries were selected based on: (i) the existence of an ILO Decent Work Country Strategy, (ii) the size of their TC portfolio, (iii) ILO presence, the countries selected are supported by the DWT Cairo and the CO for Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan and by the CO- Algeria which supports Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

The evaluation will assess all countries listed above; however, only Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia will be visited while the other countries will be assessed through desk review analysis, electronic interviews and surveys of national constituents, and key internal and external stakeholders. A final decision on countries to be will visited and be made in consultations with the Regional Office for Africa, the DWT/Cairo and the Country Office in Algiers.

Evaluation approach:
The evaluation will be participatory and seek to assess ILO’s support to national efforts to address decent work gaps in the countries of the ILO’s North African administrative sub region. The evaluation will assess the degree to which the ILO decent work strategies for the North Africa sub region address the three dimensions of the ILO strategy for North Africa, namely: (i) coherence and synergies among the different country operations whilst addressing specific national decent work priorities, (ii) inter-regional coherence and synergies, (iii) the optimization of benefits through a sub-regional or an inter-regional or a country level approach.

Special focus will be on ILO work to address challenges specific to the North Africa sub region, which demand innovative thinking and responses framed within the reality of the new regional sub regional context. In fact, the evaluation should identify examples of new approaches by governments, social partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aimed at unemployment, from interventions in skill acquisition and career development to youth and women-focused microfinance and entrepreneurship programmes.
Therefore, the evaluations will also assess the progress made towards the achievement of the three immediate objectives of the ILO Strategy for North Africa:

1. Creating opportunities for young women and men and the most vulnerable.

   To this end, the evaluation will assess the degree to which the programme has or will create employment opportunities for youth, women, populations affected by displacement and conflict and other disadvantaged groups through the increased use of local resources, labour intensive infrastructure investment and environment protection-related public works and creation of MSMEs.

2. Empowering social partners and other stakeholders through social dialogue.

   The evaluation will assess the degree to which the decent work programme in North Africa has or will improve governance through enhanced social dialogue, and strengthened civil society and communities and the application and enforcement of International Labour Standards, especially ILO Conventions concerning freedom of association, the right to organise, and collective bargaining.

3. Extending and improving social protection (including social security and conditions of work) especially for the most vulnerable.

   An effort will be made to determine how the ILO actions have enhanced the capacity to reduce vulnerability and adapt the concept of a universal social protection floor by building on existing structures of social protection and increasing them in size and scope.

The evaluation exercise will be guided by four core evaluative questions addressing: the relevance of the program of support to the development challenges of the countries to be included; the coherence between the definition of a programmatic focus, the integration across ILO instruments in support of program objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors; the efficiency measured both in terms of administrative costs and timeliness of execution; and the effectiveness of individual interventions and at the level of the program as a whole, with particular attention devoted to identifying immediate impacts, and the sustainability of results and the contribution of the program to the institutional development and decent work gaps identified by national constituents in the existing DWCP draft documents and national DW Strategies.

Lessons learned and recommendations will aim toward the development of innovative solutions to the decent work and employment challenges in the North African countries. The following core principles should guide the formulation of lessons and recommendations:

- Lessons and solutions should be based on localized experiences, but of regional and/or global relevance
- Focus on holistic approaches
- Emphasis on partnerships
- Explore how innovation should be leveraged
In order to answer the above questions and identify lessons, the evaluator will seek to apply a variety of evaluation techniques—desk reviews and case studies of country strategies, programme and project documents covering the planning, implementation and reporting phases, field visits, interviews with stakeholders, focus groups, surveys, informed judgement that would lead to performance scoring, ranking and rating techniques.

Conclusions and recommendations from the evaluation will be produced for each single country under review. More general recommendations that are applicable to the entire subregion will also be identified.

**Evaluation Clients:**
The principal clients for the evaluation are the ILO’s Governing Body, national constituents, ILO Management and staff, and development partners in the North Africa countries to be included in the evaluation.

**Evaluation management:**
The evaluation will be conducted by EVAL in collaboration with an evaluation team consisting of a Senior Evaluation Officer who will lead the team, an international evaluator or institution with expertise in strategy, programme and project evaluation and extensive knowledge of labour and decent work issues in North Africa, national evaluation consultants and research assistants. The Director of EVAL will provide direction and guidance throughout the evaluation process.
Annex II. Projects currently under implementation (administered by DWT/CO Cairo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TC project code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EGY/07/03M/USA Fund. Principles</td>
<td>Promoting fundamental principles and rights at work</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2 900 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/01P/WFP Child Labour</td>
<td>Joint WFP-ILO programme on combating WFCL</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2 562 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/02M/CAN DJEP</td>
<td>Decent jobs for Egypt's young people: Tackling the challenge together</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10 200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/03M/USA Conducive env.</td>
<td>Creating a Conducive Environment for the Effective Recognition and Implementation of Fundamental Principles as and Rights at work in Egypt</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6 435 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/04M/AUS DJEP</td>
<td>Creating Decent Work for young people by tackling the challenge of young people in agriculture in Aswan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2 921 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/06M/USA Export Industries</td>
<td>Promoting Workers' Rights and Competitiveness in Egypt Export Industries</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/11/07M/EGY Career Guidance</td>
<td>Career Guidance for Youth and Job Creation. This is the second phase of the career guidance project (2-year project)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>953 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY/12/02M/DAN DJEP</td>
<td>Decent Jobs for Egypt's Young People – tackling the challenge together in Qalyubia and Menoufia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 616 695</td>
</tr>
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<td>EGY/12/03M/HSF Human Security</td>
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**RECENTLY CLOSED PROJECTS**

Total: 5 201 751
### Annex III. List of interviews

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<tr>
<th>Country and organization</th>
<th>Person and title</th>
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<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>ILO CO-Algiers</em></td>
<td>Maria Crisetti, Director</td>
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<td>Constanze Schimmel, Project Coordinator</td>
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<td><strong>Government:</strong></td>
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<td><em>Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security MTESS</em></td>
<td>Abdelouahab Lemai, directeur general, CASNOS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ahmed Bourbia, DRT</td>
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<td>Fodil Zaidi, DGEI</td>
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<td>Saliha Bestani, S.D., DGEI/MTESS</td>
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<td>Ouali Bentaha, DPEI, DGEI/MTESS</td>
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<td>Malek Hamdani, D.G., CNRSS</td>
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<td>Abdelali Droua, S/ Directeur, MTESS</td>
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<td>Yasmine Kebir, S/ Directeur, MTESS</td>
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<td>Yassine Tayeb, Chef de Projet, École Supérieure de la Sécurité Sociale, MTESS</td>
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<td>Bahia Yekken, directrice, MTESS</td>
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<td><em>l’Agence Nationale de Soutien à l’Emploi des Jeunes (ANSEJ)</em></td>
<td>Sofia Bentaha, Chargée d’étude à l’ANSEJ</td>
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<td>Mounia Bouraoui, Chef de Projet, ANSEJ</td>
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<td>Mabrouk Belal, Conseiller, ANSEJ</td>
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<td><strong>Chambre National d’Artisanat et des Métiers (CNAM)</strong></td>
<td>Dalil Souami, Directeur d’information et de la Formation continue</td>
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<td><strong>Workers’ organizations:</strong></td>
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<td><em>L’Union générale des travailleurs algériens (UGTA)</em></td>
<td>Abdelmadjid Sdi Said (S-G)</td>
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<td>Seddik Berrama, Sécrétaire Fédéral Chargé des études économiques</td>
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</table>
Employers’ organizations:

Confédération Générale des Entreprises Algériennes (CGEA)  
Mahfoud Megatelli, Secretaire Général

UNCT/donors:

Office of the Resident Coordinator  
Wissam Benyettou

UNDP  
Eduardo Lopez-Mancisidor

UN Women  
Imene Hayef

UNAIDS  
Adel Zeddam

Egypt

DWT for North Africa and CO for Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea, Cairo

Yousef Qaryouti, Director, DWT/Cairo
Luca Fedi, Senior Programme & Operations Officer
Nashwa Belal, CO Programme Officer
Alia Jamal, Senior ILS Specialist
Eric Oechslin, Senior Employers’ activities specialist
Christine Hofmann, Skills Specialist

Project managers:

Rim Aljabi, Senior Technical Officer, Women Employment Project
Nagwa Ismail, National Coordinator, Career Guidance Project
Daniela Zampini, CTA, Decent Jobs for Youth (Danida)
Amir Obeid Fahim, National Coordinator, Human Security Project

Social dialogue project:

Onsi Georgious, NPC
Basma Nafady, Project Assistant, Combating Child Labour Project
Amal Mowafy, CTA, Decent Jobs for Youth (Canada)
Dahlia Hassanein Roque, Technical Officer, Decent Jobs for Youth (Australian Aid)
Badra Alawa, CTA, Decent Work for Women
Adnan Alrababh, CTA, Promoting Workers Rights and Competitiveness in Egypt Export Industries Project

Nashwa Belal, Programme Officer
Yasmine El Essawy, Programme Assistant
Gehan El Sharkawy, Sr. Programme Assistant for Tunisia & Morocco

GoE:

MoMM

H.E. Nahed al-Ashry, Minister of Manpower & Migration
Sally El Hawary, Technical Assistant to the Minister of Manpower and Migration
Se’dda Fouad Abdelrahman, First Under Secretary of Information
Mona Wahba Ally El Dein Mohamed, Under Secretary of Foreign Relations Central Department
Eman Zakaria, Under Secretary for Employment
Gamal Sorour, Under Secretary for Inspection, Health & Safety of Manpower in the Work Environment
Samia Ahmed Ayoub, Under Secretary for Vocational Training
Hana Shokr, Director of the Central Department for Administrative Reform
Kawthar Farah, Director of the Central Department for Work Relations and Group Negotiations
H.E. Ashraf El-Araby, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
Nihal el-Megharbel, Economic Advisor

MoPIC

Social partners:

ETUF
Mostafa Rostom
Abdel Fattah Ibrahim (former Chair)
Gebali Al-Maraghy, Chair

EFITU
Malek Bayoumy, President
Bassem Halaka, Secretary General
Mohamed Abd Elrahman, External Relations and Immigration

National Federation for Workers (NFW)
Ahmed Khairy, President

Egyptian Democratic Labour Union (EDLU)
Yosri Maarouf
Karam Abdelhalim Vice Chairman
Salah al-ansary
Moheb Aboud, Member of the Advisory Group, Member of the Advisory Group & Chairman of the Federation of Teachers’ Syndicate
Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC)  
Sa’ad Sha’ban, Chairman of the Egyptian Democratic Labor Union  
Hani Afifi, Secretary General  
Muhammad Munir Tawfiq, Council Member  
Magid Sabr ‘Ali, Vice President  
Ashraf Tawfik el-Laithy, Council Member  
Muhammad Muhammad ‘Uwais, Vice President  
Mohamed Mounir Tawfik, Member  
Magdy Hassan Aly, Member  

Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI)  
Dr. Tarek Zakaria Tawfik, Deputy President  
Nagui El Fayoumi, Executive Director  

UNRC  
UNRC/ UNCT  
Anita Nirody (UNRC, DO)  

Donors:  

European Union  
Eman Osman, SME Programme Team Leader  

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD), CIDA Canada  
Anna Lixi, First Secretary, Head of Social Affairs Section  
André Cadieu, Department of Labour, Department of State, Washington  

Denmark  

USA  

CSOs:  

Centre for Trade Unions and Workers’ Services (CTUWS)  
Rahma Rafaat  

Eritrea  

Government:  

Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare  
H.E. Salma Hassen  

Social Partners:  

Eritrean Federation of Employers  
Yemane Tesfay, President  

Sudan  

Project managers:  
Suzan Abdelselam, ILO Coordinator for Sudan  

Government of Sudan  
Ahmed Hussein  

Ministry of Human Resources & Labour  
Amna Mohamed Saleh Dirar  
Sulaiman Aydam al-Tahir, Undersecretary  
Mahmoud Haroun A. Elgaba, Director of Technical Assistance Department
Abdallah Eltyeb, Head of Department
Ahmed Eltayeb, Head of Department
M. Hamid Elsham, Head of Department
Salwa Mohamed Abd Alla
Mohamed Ahmed Alhadi
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Dr. Sulaiman Ahmed Hamid
Yousif El-Tayeb
Elhadi Gamer Elshafie

Head of External Relationships Department
Ichraqa As-Sayyid Mahmoud Saleh

Ministry of International Cooperation

Social Partners:

Sudanese Businessmen & Employers Federation
SWTUF

UNCT+:

UNRC

UN Women

UNDP

Tunisia

CTAs:

Jean-Louis De Bie, EU employment intensive project
Mohamed Ben Othmen, Expert dev. local
Mohamed Said Ayouni, Economiste DEL
Mohamed Chabchoub, Ingenieur Génie Civil
Lotfi Soltani, Economist Expert DEL
Jad Ben Hadj Boubaker, Expert formation
Fakhfakh Tarek, Ingenieur genie rural
Koutam Zitouni, Admin. financier
Ferdaous Wertani, Project Assistant
Jan–Marius Tillmanns, Technical Expert on LED, EU Project
Karim Toumi, NPC, LED
Paz Arancibia, CTA, Youth employment
Francesco Carella, CTA, Labour migrations
Samia Chouba, NPC, Social dialogue
Nawel Tounsi, NPC, Women empowerment
Badra Alawa, CTA-Cairo

**Government of Tunisia:**
Former Minister H.E. Khalil Azzaouia

**Ministry of Social Affairs**
H.E. Ahmed Ammar Youmouai
Feriel Ghorab, Director of International Cooperation and Foreign Relations

**Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment**
Mariem Lissari, Directrice générale de la coopération internationale

**MFPE**
Imed Turki, Chef de cabinet du MFPE
Salim al-Talbi, Observatoire National de l’Emploi et des Qualifications

**MFPE**
Mme Fazem Kellel, Directrice de l’Emploi
Contact could be provided by Jean-Louis De Bie

**Ministry of Regional Development**
Kamel Oane, directeur

**MoEFP Conciliation**
Choukri Ouali, Directeur du Contrôle

**MoEFP Inspectorate**
Khelil Ghariani, President, Social Committee
Belgacem Ayari, Secrétaire général adjoint chargé du secteur privé
Anouar ben Kaddour, Secrétaire général chargé des études.

**UGTT:**
Kacem Afaya, Secrétaire général adjoint chargé des relations arabes, internationales et de l’émigration
Samir Cheffi, Secrétaire général adjoint chargé des jeunes, des femmes et associations
Sadok al-Hadi Bin al-Haj Hussain

**UTICA**
Khelil Ghariani, President, Social Committee
Sami Silini, Director of Social Committee
Cyrine Ben Romdhane Ben Mlouka, Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs
Manal Zouali, Conciliation, Affaires Sociales
Mehdi Klay

**SOCITK**
Association pour la sauvegarde du Kef
Omar Thligene, Président
Wafa Fadhlaoui, stagière
Youssef Jaffali, Professeur
Slaheddine Aouiti, Secrétaire Générale
Ferchichi Ferchichi, stagière
Alfa Bouazza, stagière
Chokri Jbouri, stagière
Saïda Houssem, stagière
Takwa Abidi, stagière

**UNCT+:**

**UNRC**
Mounir Tabet (RC)
Aïda Robbana (Coordination Officer)
Lukas Rüst, Responsable Programme Migration et Protection
Barbara Dätwyler Scheuer, directrice de coopération
Donya Smida

**Swiss Cooperation**
Swiss Foreign Ministry
Thomas Ruegg
Netherlands Embassy
Adel Ouni
Netherlands Embassy
Mascha Baak
Embassy of Finland (Tunis)
Emilia Autio, chef de mission adjointe
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Independent evaluation of the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme Strategies and Activities in North-Africa: 2010-2013

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