Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of "Know About Business" in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine

Quick Facts

Countries: Occupied Palestinian Territories
Final Evaluation: February 2012
Mode of Evaluation: Independent
Technical Area: SMEs, Entrepreneurship
Evaluation Management: Regional Programming Service Unit, ILO ROAS
Evaluation Team: Independent Evaluator
Project Start: January 2009
Project End: July 2011
Project Code: PAL/08/01/UND, 200,000.00USD
Keywords: Enterprise development, employment generation, entrepreneurship education, vocational education and training,

Background & Context

Summary of the project purpose, logic and structure

The ILO’s entrepreneurship education programme "Know About Business" (KAB) responds to the needs of member countries that intend to introduce entrepreneurship education at secondary education, vocational education and higher education levels. KAB encourages young people to consider self-employment as a career path. Learners exposed to KAB will become aware of the role of enterprises and entrepreneurs in society and those who consider entrepreneurship as a career option will learn how to face the challenges of managing a small business.

In Occupied Palestine, there are 8 vocational training centres in the West Bank and 3 in Gaza operating under the Ministry of Labor (MoL). Secondary vocational schools, technical colleges and a technical university operate under the Ministry of Education and Higher Education.

In Palestine, the pilot project was meant to introduce KAB in English language at university and in a number of technical colleges. In grades 11 and 12 of secondary vocational schools and vocational training centres KAB was to be introduced in Arabic language.

The ILO’s youth employment initiatives fall within the broad aim of providing effective support to ILO constituents to adopt and implement employment, labor market and skills policies and development programmes that promote decent employment.

Purpose, scope and clients of the evaluation

In November 2011, a Senior Evaluator was recruited to conduct an independent final evaluation for the project, in line with ILO policies and procedures on evaluations.

The evaluation ran between November and December 2011 and included desk review of secondary data, several meetings with key project personnel and institutional counterparts in Beirut and South Lebanon, Focus Groups with the project trainees and trainers, several visits to VTCs, as well as a stakeholders’ workshop to triangulate
information received and gather comments and feedback on the draft findings.

The primary client of the evaluation are the ILO Regional Office for Arab States (Beirut), and the ILO constituents namely the MoL and the MoEHE, the Project Management, the local and national partners and UNDP. Secondary clients include other units within the ILO that may indirectly benefit from the knowledge generated by the evaluation (Employment Sector, CODEV, EVAL).

The scope of the evaluation covers all activities implemented from January 2009 to July 2011. In particular the evaluation examined if the KAB nationalisation efforts is likely to be sustained within the next round of technical support, which will be initiated under another ILO Technical Cooperation project.

**Methodology of evaluation**

The methodological approach to this evaluation had three phases:
- A desk review of secondary data provided by the ILO ROAS and the project team.
- Field interviews to collect primary data and validate information documented.
- A Stakeholders’ Workshop was held.

**Main Findings & Conclusions**

The ILO has been highly successful in introducing a relevant addition (KAB) to technical training curricula in Palestine. Following the pilot testing, both the MoL and the MoEHE have officially included KAB training into their national training curricula and have set aside the resources required for the roll-out. KAB is enjoying support from the highest levels of the Palestinian Authority.

The success of any project stands and falls with the achievement of outcome and impact indicators. While impact indicators are too early to measure, the outcome of the pilot phase has been fully achieved by the integration of KAB into the national training curricula at the Palestinian end. This also provides a good foundation for the long-term sustainability of teaching KAB in Palestine.

There is an over expectation prevailing regarding the potential immediate employment effects that KAB may generate. Although anecdotal evidence exists that new businesses have been created by KAB graduates in Palestine even during the piloting period, such business creation is clearly beyond the objectives of KAB (which is meant to raise awareness, change attitudes). A measurement of resulting employment effects therefore is not warranted. It furthermore would be too early to measure such effects because there is usually more required than a KAB training to successfully start a business.

In addition to highlighting these aspects of project operation, the evaluation also requested that after a close examination of the regional cases studies performed in Palestine, Yemen and Syria, the evaluator recommends the kinds of responses that should be promoted by the programme to have a greater effectiveness and efficiency on youth employment at a national level.

For Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, to this day, there only is anecdotal or at best scant evidence of youth starting business as a direct result of KAB training. With little evidence of immediate employment impact, comparing money spent on KAB with other types of programs that focus on immediate employment impact would most likely result lower degrees of effectiveness being observed for KAB. This, however, would not come as a surprise because job creation it is not the immediate objective of KAB training in the first place.

To which extent the degree of comparative effectiveness would change if a longer-term perspective is adopted is unclear because the KAB projects in Palestine and Yemen have not been rolled out for a sufficiently long time to be evaluated for employment impact. (And with regard to Syria, the impact assessment came a little too early.)

Whether the resulting efficiency is low would not only depend on the benefits obtained, but also on the cost of the measures compared. Here, KAB probably will score better because its cost is comparably low.

On the whole, asking whether we can increase effectiveness and efficiency of KAB with regard to youth employment at national level is probably too
technocratic, deterministic a question to ask in the complex context of creating employment in a globalized world. It essentially refers to KAB as an isolated measure. Such a technocratic, deterministic assessment would ignore that sustainable job (or, as a matter of fact, business) creation (in a context where we expect the private sector to be the main driver in job creation) usually does not come as a result of any isolated measure, but is, if anything, a result of a combination of several factors (including labor market supply and demand features, business cycles and structure of the economy, an enabling business environment, and, inter alia, entrepreneurship) and possibly complementing measures (tax exemptions, business development services, finance, etc.).

Introducing KAB at the levels of technical and vocational training in Occupied Palestine was very relevant and appropriate. Generally speaking, the more imminent labor market entry, the stronger the effect KAB seems to have on the participants. According to the impact assessment conducted for Palestine.

From this perspective, it is not so important at which level of secondary or vocational education KAB is actually being introduced. It is much more important that participants are in a situation where they feel a certain amount of urgency to think about labor market entry. If this understanding of the forces governing the degree of success of KAB participation is correct, the most important point for maximizing results from KAB would be proximity to labor market entry. KAB could therefore be usefully administered at any institution of learning as long as the timing is relatively close to graduation, and this should provide ample opportunities for developing additional (and not alternative) entry gates in future KAB projects.

The effectiveness of KAB projects in supporting national policies for employment, vocational training and small business creation have been limited to the extent that existing policies have allowed for the adoption of KAB, and KAB itself has not led to the formulation of specific policies. That being said, the experience with KAB has not gone unnoticed and had its effect on thinking at the policy level in Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. All countries have decided to nationalize KAB in specific areas of their education systems according to what they see to be the best fit.

To this date, no specific efforts have been made by the project to involve worker and employer participation. This is not necessarily a reason for concern because a pilot phase by definition should be managed more tightly in order to ensure that an adequate level of quality can be achieved during roll-out. That being said, the pilot having been successful, it is now time to involve worker and employer participation to the extent this is meaningful in achieving development outcomes.

**Recommendations**

1. ILO ROAS needs to invest more resources into the national roll-out that is following the successful piloting of KAB exercises. While roll-out is a task assigned to the national counterparts by definition, the challenges of such a roll-out (in particular quality management and monitoring and evaluation as the program grows large) entails need the continuous support of KAB or enterprise specialists.

2. At ILO ROAS, unless additional resources can be mobilized, rolling out nationalized KAB projects should be assigned a higher priority than launching new KAB projects. These roll-outs should consider any available impact assessments in more detail, independent of their quality, in order to reflect whether any adjustments to the programs are useful and what complementary measures may increase the overall success.

3. In the Arab region, growing, deepening national programs should encompass the organization of an intra-regional exchange of resources and joint learning exercises that can be supported by ILO ROAS. The (key) facilitators that have been trained in the different countries need to constitute the core of a regional pool of KAB specialists that will create a community of practice and enhance quality management of KAB across the region.
4. KAB in general (ILO Geneva, ITC Turin) needs to develop simplified, light(er) weight monitoring and evaluation tools, and these need to be consistently implemented. Recent experiences with KAB monitoring and evaluation and Palestine's impact assessment would suggest that current tools are "too heavy" to be administered in such a way by implementing partner organizations that accurate and comparable results can be ensured.

5. Occupied Palestine requires a special commitment by ILO (Geneva/ ROAS) to the extent that activities are not as easily implemented there as in other countries of the region. While the possibility to tap donor funding for this purpose should not be excluded, it is clear that this commitment first-of-all needs to be properly anticipated and translated into specific budgets. Running projects in Occupied Palestine from the location in Lebanon in the current situation entails higher cost than elsewhere.

6. It is high time (for MoL and MoEHE) to include Gaza in the KAB-related activities. Ideally this should occur within the framework of the roll-out.

7. Where this still seems difficult to implement, other organizational settings than with MoL and MoEHE can be envisaged, possibly with assistance from ILO (ROAS). Also, it is important to remember that KAB awareness training is not a substitute for start-up training. Where the promotion of start-ups is the main objective of planned activities, it should be reviewed whether there are not any start-up training providers available (in Palestine) to transfer the appropriate skills to beneficiaries in Gaza. (Generally, it would seem that such activities exist.)

8. Implementing KAB in Gaza does not imply implementing it with any target group even if prima facie opportunities seem to exist, as, for example, in the project relating to Skills Development and Employment Services for the Construction Sector in the Gaza Strip where the target group is rather unlikely to possess of the minimum qualifications required for successful KAB participation.

9. Linking KAB to other small business support mechanisms that are likely to enhance employment and business creation will enhance the ultimate likelihood of employment impact.

10. There is a particular potential for more systematically teaming up with some of the more successful employers' organizations in Palestine (e.g. specific local chambers) that should be tapped during the roll-out phase. ILO (ROAS) could assist with building these links.

11. There would be no immediate need to introduce other ILO tools for enterprise development given the abundance of programs available in Palestine. Proper linkage to such programs (organized by MoL and MoEHE) will instead be more efficient than introducing further ILO packages.

12. The likelihood that KAB alone will generate significant youth employment impact is not very high. In fact, the likelihood is low that any type of stand-alone activity will significantly enhance youth employment. Bearing this in mind, future KAB (or other entrepreneurship education) programs could more actively anticipate linking KAB measures with other enterprise development activities (ILO Geneva, ILO ROAS, other stakeholders), be they implemented by ILO or not. Cross-impact analyses would be useful to more systematically analyze any given setting (country, region, etc.) with regard to youth unemployment, and define the specific thrusts (or instrument mixes) youth employment initiatives should take in the respective settings.