An independent evaluation of the

InFocus Programme on
Crisis Response and Reconstruction

October, 2003
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## List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTRAV</td>
<td>Bureau for Employers’ Activities</td>
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<td>ACTEMP</td>
<td>Bureau for Workers’ Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Preventions and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>COMBI</td>
<td>Multi-bilateral Activities Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCFP</td>
<td>Designated Crisis Focal Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFP/CRISIS</td>
<td>InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Project Support Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Rapid Action Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBTC</td>
<td>Regular budget technical cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REIP</td>
<td>Rapid Employment Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDMT</td>
<td>UN Disaster Management Team</td>
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</table>
1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background

The evaluation of the InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction (IFP/CRISIS) is presented here in keeping with the strategy examined by the Governing Body in November 2002 (GB.285/PFA/10, ILO evaluation strategy) and with the provisions of the 2002-03 Programme and Budget adopted by the International Labour Conference. The reviews in this Biennium are intended to:

- Determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the ILO’s selected IFP programmes;
- Enable the Office, member States, and tripartite constituents to engage in systematic reflection, with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the main programmes by altering their content and, if necessary, their objectives.

As stated in its evaluation policy, the ILO is committed to ensuring the credibility and independence of its evaluations through transparent separation of evaluation responsibility from line management functions, transparency of process, and the integrity and expertise of its evaluators. In addition, evaluation is a means of promoting organizational learning and informed decision making. IFP evaluations will generate lessons for the IFP staff and managers as well as other parts of the Office on programme-wide coherence, relevance, and effectiveness to reinforce accountability and sound decision making.

In September 1999, the ILO established the IFP/CRISIS Response in recognition of the social disintegration and deterioration of employment and poverty situations that accompany crises of various types (Report of the Director General on Decent Work, ILC 87th session, 1999). Noting these common elements to most crisis situations, the ILO response has aimed to facilitate socioeconomic reintegration and poverty alleviation for those adversely affected. Increasing awareness through partnerships and advocacy of employment and social problems associated with crises, and the development of ILO constituents’ capacity to participate in monitoring, preventing and addressing adverse consequences are the core aims of the programme.

1.2 Evaluation scope and methodology

The present evaluation, carried out by the Bureau of Programming and Management, assesses the planning and organizational approach of the IFP/CRISIS, its implementation strategies and outcomes, management and overall performance for the period October 1999 to June 2003. The evaluation aims to develop a more in-depth understanding of how the programme is achieving intended outcomes and what measures may be considered to improve implementation.

The IFP/CRISIS programme was newly created within the ILO and did not build upon an existing programme unit. It is distinct from other programmes in that its mandate and approach emphasize rapid response and integrated action as much as technical competence in a particular area. Within this context, one central question for the evaluation to answer is how achievement can be planned and managed by the programme over the next few years. To answer this question, the evaluation looked at the mandate and relevance of the ILO’s role in crisis response, with particular attention to the action taken, and the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of those actions within the context of ILO’s organizational practices.

The evaluation was conducted independently and followed transparent and objective information collection from a variety of sources, with clear separation from line management. The independent evaluation team was headed by the Bureau of Programming and Management, with one external consultant fully participating in all phases of the work.
The evaluation involved an initial desk review and several interviews with IFP/CRISIS’s core staff members, management and focal points within headquarters and different field offices, members of collaborating ILO units, ILO constituents including representatives for workers, employers, and governments, and contacts in UN partnering organizations. Case studies of operations at country levels were used to trace experiences and lessons learned over the past three years. The evaluation incorporated visits to field offices in South Asia and Central America to provide feedback and document through example how CRISIS is implementing and learning at the country level.

2.0 Context: IFP/CRISIS Programme design and strategy

ILO’s comparative advantage within international crisis work lies in its long history with the following: bringing forward the basic values of ILO’s decent work principles and values, particularly within the context of spearheading employment-related interventions; reinforcing local ownership and social stability through the involvement of social partners; and its support of the core conventions. The ILO’s work in crisis preparedness and response precedes the creation of a specialized programme and operating unit.

The IFP was created to build up ILO’s crisis preparedness and capacity to respond. The creation of a centralized capacity with a crisis focus was seen as a means of strengthening ILO’s capacity to act on its mandate, particularly in delivery of more rapid, coherent, continued and reliable responses to crises. Initially, its main emphasis was to concentrate on interventions within promotion of socioeconomic reintegration of crisis-affected groups, including employment-intensive reconstruction and rehabilitation works, skills development, local economic development initiatives, and promotion of small enterprises and cooperatives. It was furthermore emphasized that, “the programme will also concern itself with data collection and macro-economic analysis, gender and other quality issues, social dialogue and reconciliation, fundamental rights and social protection.”

The ILO’s operation in crisis response is anchored in the belief that traditional emergency humanitarian assistance alone cannot address the needs of millions of dispossessed and vulnerable groups affected by crisis. There needs to be a clear strategy to move as quickly as possible away from emergency relief work and to provide what people most want: dignity and security as well as self-reliance. To this end, the IFP has been promoting a crisis response approach that focuses on socioeconomic integration of crisis-affected people through the formulation and implementation of programmes that promote job creation, income generation and social integration. However, despite this categorical focus, each year hundreds of crises could warrant ILO’s support. Therefore, a major challenge has been to narrow and make operationally straightforward decisions about when, where and how to intervene in limited but prioritized crisis response efforts.

2.1 Objectives

The newly created IFP created a series of objectives to follow, some of which have been modified slightly during the past biennium. Those used for the purposes of this evaluation are as follows:

1. To develop a coherent ILO framework and comprehensive capacity to respond speedily and in an effective manner to different crises.

2. To promote socioeconomic reintegration and poverty alleviation of crisis-affected groups – women and men - through employment intensive investment programmes, skills training, retraining, small enterprise development, local economic development, social dialogue, social safety nets and protection, as well as to mobilise an increased volume of resources for such interventions.

3. To increase awareness at the national, regional and international levels of the importance of employment, social inequalities and other social concerns in crisis situations and of the unique ILO expertise available in this area, to be in demand for advice, policies involvement in inter-agency and other activities in crisis situations and for relevant publications, guidelines and other tools.

4. To build up ILO constituents’ capacity to play a greater role in crisis monitoring, prevention and tackling of the adverse consequences.

The IFP further indicated its focus on four different types of crisis:
- Armed conflicts and their aftermath,
- Natural disasters,
- Abrupt financial and economic downturns, and
- Social movements or political transition.

2.2 Strategy

According to IFP/CRISIS’s strategy, responding to these challenges has required focusing not only on the adverse effects but also on the root causes of a crisis. Consequently, CRISIS defined its task within a wide spectrum of measures, including early warning, crisis preparedness as well as emergency response, rehabilitation and development interventions. IFP/CRISIS describes its role as a catalyst that spearheads, prepares, plans, mobilises, assesses, initially manages and evaluates ILO’s crisis response. Its focus is inter-sectoral and integrated with headquarters and field operations.

As main means of action, the IFP has emphasized four key services: knowledge development and design of tools for effective response; advocacy and resource mobilisation; capacity building of ILO staff and constituents; and country-level rapid needs assessment, with follow-up programme formulation and implementation.

Recognizing that the ILO operates in an increasingly insecure and crisis-prone world, the IFP believes that concerns for crisis prevention and preparedness should be incorporated in all ILO programmes and action. To this end, one of the internal aims of the IFP has been to mainstream crisis response sensitivity and culture in ILO’s work. This is done mainly through training, internal advocacy and by establishing and managing a network of roughly 70 designated crisis focal points at the headquarters and in the field. Table 1 provides a matrix of strategies for particular programme components.
### Table 1: Crisis programme initiatives: major sub-components and means of action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-component</th>
<th>Knowledge and tools development</th>
<th>Advocacy and resource mobilisation</th>
<th>Capacity building of the Office and constituents</th>
<th>Country needs assessment and programme formulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Warning and Prevention</strong></td>
<td>Making use of decent work indicators and others to develop a barometer to track and predict potential eruption of a crisis and alert constituents and the Office. Creating tools that would assist constituents to detect early warning signs.</td>
<td>Promoting social dialogue, social inclusion and employment as a means to prevent igniting social and political turmoil.</td>
<td>“Training of trainers” Training constituents and the Office to build capacity to detect early warning signs.</td>
<td>Making use of the designated crisis focal points world-wide to stay informed about the political/social/economical climate in crisis-prone countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis preparedness</strong></td>
<td>Develop rapid data collection/assessment methods. Mobilize and participate in research networks to throw light on pertinent research topics that are highly relevant for defining a comprehensive crisis response. Undertake topic-specific research to further refine the IFP’s approach, e.g., the study conducted on the role of the private sector in crisis response (Gujarat, India).</td>
<td>Active networking and exchanging information with international agencies, regional banks, and the donor community to keep abreast of recent developments.</td>
<td>Build capacity for crisis prevention and preparedness through training. Mainstream capacity and concerns for crisis response to all programmes in the regions and in HQ through the designated focal point system.</td>
<td>Coordinate interventions with other agencies through active participation in inter-agency sub-committees and networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency rehabilitation and development</strong></td>
<td>Develop tools and for rapids needs assessment, crisis response modules, and specialized manuals that address the role of cooperatives, and/or gender in crisis response, among others. Take stock of crisis responses in which the IFP has been involved in the form of working papers, as well as other relevant experiences and initiatives.</td>
<td>Mobilize resources (through the RAF and external sources) to ensure rapid resource availability and allocation.</td>
<td>Build capacity for crisis response through training. Mobilize the Office and constituents to participate in the crisis response efforts as this is the best form of capacity building for future response.</td>
<td>Organize and send rapid needs assessment teams to crisis affected locations and develop response projects. Participate in inter-agency fact-finding missions and preparing project proposals. Implement projects; providing technical backstopping to projects in implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Resource Base

The IFP was initially started with one director and was subsequently expanded to include six employment-related technical specialists with expertise in crisis preparedness and response. In addition to its HQ staff resources, the IFP operates a rapid action fund with 02/03 resources of $700,000. Resources from PSI financed three professionals for the period 2000 to 2003.

IFP/CISIS is situated in the employment sector and is one of two units comprising the Department for Recovery and Reconstruction. Prorated resource support from the department is indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: IFP/CISIS resources by type and biennium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Budget</th>
<th>P w/y</th>
<th>GS w/y</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Non staff</th>
<th>Total USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-01 (2002-03 USD)</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>1'448'076</td>
<td>435'000</td>
<td>1'883'076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03 (2002-03 USD)</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>1'448'076</td>
<td>300'585</td>
<td>1'748'661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05 (2002-03 USD)</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>7/00</td>
<td>1'448'076</td>
<td>220'000</td>
<td>1'668'076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBTC/Rapid Action Fund</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>639'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>700'000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XB centrally administered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1'466'200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1'489'890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Departmental costs, prorated between IFP CRISIS and EIIP.)

2.3 Implementation of the strategy

From the onset, a major challenge for the IFP has been to develop, with limited resources, a rounded ILO crisis portfolio and capacity to perform. In assessing strategy implementation, the contingent nature of crisis work should be kept in mind, recognizing that preplanning and implementing established plans cannot and should not be the narrow measure of good performance. The assessment instead considers decisions related to prioritization and choice of activities and their usefulness, given the constraints faced by the team. In this context, highly impressive work has been accomplished by a skeletal staff of experts over the short period of 30 months.

1. Tools and knowledge development

Raising awareness among global and national players of the importance of jobs and livelihoods has been approached most directly through development of training tools and knowledge development materials. Although the initial plans for establishing a research centre and full-blown research network have not yet been realized, the IFP has completed a range of documents including the following³:

³ A full list of documents is available from the IFP/CISIS web site: www.ilo.org/crisis
A series of working papers, reports, country studies and publications addressing a wide range of research issues have been developed through involvement in different research networks, and internal technical collaboration. Some forty different technical reading materials have been published in the past three years. In general, the ILO can build on this success and offer more within the area of effective response to vulnerable groups in crisis.

Two recently developed manuals have met with success among users: *ILO Generic Crisis Response Modules* (2001) and *Rapid Needs Assessment Manual* (2001). More specialised manuals on emergency employment services, gender in crisis response, local economic development in post-crisis situations, the role of cooperatives and other self-help organizations in crisis resolution and recovery, tackling employment challenges of armed conflict, and microfinance (through an ILO/SFU collaboration with UNHCR), are known and used internally and externally.

The IFP has made headway in developing new areas of programming for the ILO and international humanitarian and reconstruction networks. Socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants is one area where a concerted ILO effort to research and develop effective technical cooperation is becoming effective. Manuals on this subject are now available in three languages.

### 2. Strategic partnership and capacity building

Capacity building of ILO staff emphasizes *inter alia* a training of trainers approach, targeting different types of staff and levels of skills, with participation based on a cost-sharing scheme. IFP/CRISIS conducted two capacity building workshops on crisis response and reconstruction: an inter-regional one in Turin (Italy) in October 2000 and a sub-regional one in Kribi (Cameroon) in April 2001. In addition, a Training of Trainers workshop on crisis response was carried out for ILO Crisis Focal Points in Turin in November 2001. Additional training, including several aimed at constituents (Harare and Guinea, 2003), were funded under the ILO’s 2000/01 surplus. Crisis network meetings, crisis-related workshops and training guides were all developed with involvement of staff from field and HQ units. Awareness-raising activities aimed at raising staff and constituent understanding of ILO crisis work have also been frequent and well received.

Externally, capacity building within key partner agencies has involved raising awareness of the importance of ILO-supported decent work approaches to crisis response, reconstruction and development. This has involved participation in critical forums on crisis. Expanding and deepening ILO’s working relationships and communication networks with crises programmes of key agencies has met with mixed results; however, considerable ground work has been made in better defining ILO’s niche within wider inter-agency processes. Noteworthy achievements include the current revising of a framework agreement for agency collaboration with UNHCR, revised strategies and discussions for collaborating with UNDP’s own Bureau for Crisis Preventions and Recovery (BCPR), and regular participation in OCHA and selected sub-committees of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

At national levels, capacity building among ILO constituents was planned to involve a series of training initiatives, written crisis-context guidelines for employers, trade unions and collaboration through field structures and ACTRAV and ACTEMP. To date, the IFP has completed several specialized training courses aimed at constituents with more planned in late 2003 and a number of field offices have worked with social partners to integrate crisis preparedness and response into joint work plans and as agreed priorities for future work, some of which have been partially financed through ILO surplus funds.

### 3. Country-level crisis response initiatives
The primary work of the IFP team has been to coordinate actual ILO responses to crises at country levels. Towards this end, considerable programme resources and experts’ time have been used. During its first full two years of operation, the IFP initiated ILO crisis response work in 19 countries, although the form and scale of action differed considerably. In 2002, interventions involved an additional eight country responses. In total, these have included post-conflict initiatives in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, South Lebanon, DRC, the Great Lakes region, Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Palestine, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka. In response to natural disasters, initiatives followed in Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India, Mozambique, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Southern Africa. Finally, the IFP has supported responses to economic crises in Indonesia and Argentina.

ILO interventions over the past three years have coincided with a high number of unexpected national crises developing during the same time period. At the time of IFP formation, few imagined so many crises posing major disruptions to peoples’ work and livelihoods over such a short period. At IFP start-up, staff anticipated the need to be flexible where actual crisis response would take precedence over other programme components. In assessing whether priorities among alternatives were appropriately considered, the IFP has followed its initial strategy with consistency by placing crisis response at the forefront of its workload, while maintaining a balanced programme.

**Crisis response methods and practice**

IFP/CRISIS has established methods for effective ILO crisis response initiatives. These include criteria for determining whether and how the ILO should respond to crises, collaboration with various parts of the ILO, external partners inside and outside the UN system, national constituents, arranging adequate resources, and identifying an exit strategy for the IFP/CRISIS during initial planning stages.

The evaluation reviewed the application and evolution of these methods to assess their continued relevancy and appropriateness for guiding ILO crisis work. Seven case studies were compiled, as shown in Table 3 below (summarized in greater detail in Annex 1). Choice of case study was based on geographic distribution, period covered, and type or scale of crisis. Analysis included review of all available documentation and personal interviews with national constituents, ILO field staff and technical experts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Disaster</th>
<th>Main actions</th>
<th>Start date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela: Landslides</td>
<td>Needs assessment and formulation mission</td>
<td>April 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador: Earthquake</td>
<td>Needs assessment, rapid employment impact project, resource mobilization</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique: Floods and hurricane</td>
<td>Needs assessment and formulating and implementing a rapid employment impact project</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: Armed conflicts/economic downturn</td>
<td>Situation analysis, project formulation and resource mobilization</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India: Earthquake</td>
<td>Model programme for social and economic reconstruction</td>
<td>February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: Armed conflicts and their aftermath</td>
<td>Formulating ILO Taskforce, programme formulation mission, programme proposal and implementing QIP and resource mobilization</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina: Economic and financial crisis, social turmoil,</td>
<td>Integrating ILO responses around a comprehensive framework, linking HQ and</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
political instability | field, resource mobilization

**Summary of methods applied in case studies**

**Entry points**
Although the IFP identifies four types of crisis for intervention and entry points, the main criteria for deciding to intervene is not based on the type of crisis but rather on the degree to which the crisis or the event negatively impacts the employment situation in the country and neighbouring areas. An exception was Argentina where response focused predominantly on social protection and social dialogue. In making the final decision as to whether to intervene, IFP/CRISIS weighed various factors such as the impact of the crisis on employment, the degree of demand coming from the constituents for ILO’s intervention, the degree of ILO investments in that country, and availability of local capacity to deliver ILO’s intervention. Additionally, requests from ILO offices and the relevance and prominence of joint UN initiatives were also factors in reaching a decision.

**Response/strategy**
Once there was a decision to intervene, the IFP applied a standard set of procedures, beginning with mobilizing HQ units and field offices to map out a framework and strategy in the country, while working with field units to identify the desired form(s) of assistance, and conducting a needs assessment. The IFP/CRISIS then designed rapid employment impact projects (REIP) to be implemented immediately to fill the gap between the ILO needs assessment and the mobilization of resources.

The IFP has come to realize the importance of establishing a presence in the early stages of a crisis so they may influence the direction of reconstruction/crisis response efforts in a country, reinforce decent work and involve national constituents. What has proved equally vital is the availability of seed funds to start up small-scale initiatives that could demonstrate the validity of ILO’s approach to crisis response. This has proved essential to avoid a loss of momentum after a successful needs assessment. To this end, the IFP established a Rapid Action Fund (RAF), with a biennial sum of $700,000 from regular budget resources. Using this fund, the IFP has been able to establish a modest but comprehensive response formulation (starting from needs assessment) of small-scale projects (REIPs) and implementation while designing a larger scale project for external financing. This fund has helped bridge ILO work until external funds have arrived and has been successful in securing external funds in many of the cases examined.

A major distinction in ILO’s crisis/emergency relief response to more traditional responses is its focus on the management of vulnerabilities and the rebuilding of social and economic infrastructures. The concept advocates the introduction of risk management criteria into reconstruction and development programmes so that affected populations can enhance their preparedness as well as break the cycle of disaster and reconstruction. Projects developed using this concept are especially relevant to regions that are crisis prone. Similarly, the IFP focuses on implementing a response that leaves behind more stable social and economic infrastructures. To this end, it emphasizes working with local partners so that capacity remains on the ground, and interventions are locally tailored, relevant and owned.

**ILO internal and external collaboration**
In most cases, initial response involved participation in inter-agency missions and work on developing rapid needs assessments. Subsequent work focused in some cases on developing project proposals, either jointly with other UN partners, or independently but including other parts of the Office and working in conjunction with field structures. In several cases, government agencies and other development assistance organizations followed up work by applying ILO ideas to their own crisis response programmes. In most cases, ILO response continues to develop, with recent proposals sprouting from initiatives launched several years earlier. A rough approximation of $20 million in ILO
resources raised during the first three years, and an additional major sum for pending work in Afghanistan in 2003, with some projects in the proposal process, indicate that resource mobilisation efforts have generated funds. However, lessons learned from these initial experiences are useful in guiding how to make improvements. Review of progress through the case studies indicated that these lessons have been applied in more recent initiatives.

Most interventions were to varying degrees collaborative initiatives, with reliance on field office participation or coordination, and in many cases, co-financing of initial efforts. In addition, technical specialists in the field and headquarters units often assisted in technical missions and co-developed proposals for technical cooperation funding from major donors. Coordinating and backstopping these missions, and in some cases implementing technical cooperation interventions, was challenging to all involved. Analysis of case studies shows progress made in the IFP’s approach to collaboration through application of lessons learned and an increased appreciation - by all involved - of its facilitating role. More reliance on initial joint planning and joint funding, and increased attention to capacity-related issues are evident.

3.0 Assessment of IFP/CRISIS strategy implementation: Findings and conclusions

3.1 ILO’s role and position

Identifying a feasible approach for the ILO to work within established crisis-related networks was a major challenge at programme conception. Based on their experience, the IFP has brought the ILO closer to establishing and communicating more decisively the level and form of commitment the ILO can take among UN and national partner agencies.

ILO’s comparative advantage in crisis response

The ILO has a much-needed role to play in raising awareness among national and international actors to the importance of employment, social protection, social dialogue and fundamental rights and principles in post-crisis recovery. The promotion of employment-friendly reconstruction, protecting existing jobs and creating new ones in post-crisis situations with attention to social protection aspects is highly relevant to ILO member States.

The core of ILO’s mandate in crisis work is based on an integration of approaches that bring together ILO’s strategic competencies. The association between ILO’s crisis work and its comparative advantage, however, is based most obviously on employment-related issues. External colleagues, some field and HQ staff, as well as constituents interviewed, tend to see employment as the principal means through which all other responses can be integrated. The IFP team has supported this role, having found their initial entry point with job creation and protection.

The IFP/CRISIS work has contributed to increasing international awareness of employment as a core issue in crisis preparedness and response work. Through collaboration with different inter-agency committees, research networks and at conferences, IFP/CRISIS gave employment a voice in international crisis response interventions such as Mozambique, El Salvador, and recently in Afghanistan. However, international attention to broader decent work-related aspects of crisis response remains inadequate; despite progress, the ILO has considerable work ahead to raise global commitment to the decent work agenda in crisis situations.

The ILO’s crisis work is also credited with providing an action-oriented form of visibility at national and international levels. This visibility carries considerable potential for enhancing the image of the ILO as operationally nimble and responsive while demonstrating its clear technical competencies.
The ILO has defined a broad mandate for its crisis programme and has raised enthusiasm and expectations among national and international agencies about the form and level of commitment it was prepared to make. The ILO’s programmed approach to crisis response is justified through a growing global recognition that decent work issues belong as an integrated component of sustainable post-crisis recovery. The groundwork laid through IFP/CRISIS has contributed directly to this evolution in thinking. The ILO remains the only UN specialized agency specifically focused on decent work issues.

**Conclusions:**

The ILO’s engagement in UN inter-agency crisis-related networks promotes ILO’s visibility and acceptance as a serious partner in crisis response. Having started from a loosely defined position, over the past three years IFP/CRISIS has better identified and established an ILO niche that corresponds more to inter-agency processes and its own financial and technical resources. However, despite this success, considerable work lies ahead for the ILO to continue aligning its crisis work more squarely with prioritized needs within the decent work framework.

The ILO’s crisis work is still internally and externally seen as primarily employment-themed. While recognizing this, a reasonable step for the next programme phase would be raising appreciation of the ILO’s broader agenda by assuming additional crisis-response competencies within the ILO. Facilitating this may require moving the programme to a more cross-cutting position within the Office, that would demonstrate the integrated and field-oriented nature of ILO’s crisis programme.

**External partnerships and ILO’s advocacy role**

**Identifying what is feasible for the ILO**

Within the wider networks of global agencies specialized in crisis response, expertise and resources are largely focused on emergency relief. Towards this end, these specialized agencies have established internal structures and practices to effectively manage hundreds of crises each year. At the formation of IFP/CRISIS, a major unanswered question was how the ILO could maintain its credibility and commitment among these international partners while operating with a highly limited set of technical and financial inputs. In comparison with other UN organizations working in crisis, the ILO’s resources are very small. The degree to which the ILO has committed resources and institutionalized crisis response preparedness has meant from the start that it could not come close to fulfilling the hundreds of external opportunities for involvement in crisis work—or align our capacity with other UN programs of work. This inevitable mismatch in demand and supply has brought challenges at several levels.

At the national level, the ILO lacks local offices in many countries from which it might regularly participate in UN national disaster management teams. Even through its area offices, ILO involvement tends to require director-level participation and often ongoing commitments, each of which may involve weeks of work and specialized technical expertise. Few field offices are fully aware of the scope of commitment required, either in understanding from the early stages what will be expected or the subsequent commitment of resources necessary to craft a response.

At the global level, in solidifying its position among UN and other agency partners, the IFP/CRISIS and other parts of the ILO have had difficulty fully participating in inter-agency coordination practices that presume regular, predictable and reliable agency response covering all countries. For the ILO to become a full global partner in high-level UN multi-agency crisis response organs such as the IASC, not only would it need to commit considerably more human and financial resources, but organizationally the ILO would need to reorient its field structure to ensure country-level presence and
involvement. Given the infeasibility of both, the ILO’s approach to crisis work is becoming more appropriately balanced where less formal involvement at the global level shapes realistic expectations of what it organizationally can and should do within UN multi-agency coordinated response work.

**Building strong global and national partners.**

Externally, IFP/CRISIS has developed partnerships in the UN’s global and national networks for crisis coordination. Agency-level work with OCHA, UNOPS, UNDP, and UNHCR, collaboration has centered around each agency’s comparative advantage within a crisis context, although activities have been limited in scale for most. In addition, while not a full-fledged member of IASC, the ILO has become active in selected subcommittees, particularly in Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAP) at national levels, and subcommittee work aimed at better managing transition needs in moving from humanitarian response to longer term recovery. The ILO has also been working with the UNDP to focus international attention on resources needed for this bridging work.

The IFP has also established stronger links between ILO country-level networks and global initiatives. In particular, ILO involvement in CAP initiatives in Afghanistan, central Africa and several other countries have been learning experiences for field staff and headquarters in how to approach coordinated appeals for technical cooperation funding at the country level. Joint initiatives at the national level have resulted in closer collaboration with partners globally. Based on experience working with the ILO’s technical staff, including recent collaboration around microfinance as well as field-level activities, UNHCR seeks closer partnership to sequence its shorter term humanitarian work with the ILO’s capacities to address longer term employment-related effects.

In the eyes of some of its international partners, the ILO, and IFP/CRISIS are not considered sufficiently focused to support regular dialogue with partner agencies. It has been suggested that the IFP give greater priority to dedicated staff focal points (primarily headquarters but also where feasible at national levels) assigned for each major agency to communicate and coordinate joint work. The IFP has two staff working on advocacy, one of whom is externally funded. Moreover, the level of ILO’s political representation is often seen as inadequate by other UN agencies. In high level meetings, it is not uncommon for the head of agencies to represent the organization, such as the meetings for the IASC or high-level international donor conferences or specific major crisis countries. In recognition of the implied political and resource commitment associated with full IASC membership, the ILO’s senior management has postponed any decision to formally apply, signalling its concern to avoid raising excessive expectations for the scope and approach of ILO’s crisis programming and position externally.

There is some uncertainty remaining among partner agencies as to the level of ILO commitment to crisis work. Closer coordination between senior management and IFP/CRISIS and its partners would improve understanding of ILO’s official policy and level of commitment concerning crisis work. This same interaction is needed for individual crisis interventions as well at an early stage (flexible concretisation of mandate), particularly when political considerations are likely to circumvent more standard practices.

**Conclusions:**

IFP/CRISIS has pursued and reinforced good relationships based on ILO’s comparative advantage. Formal membership in inter-agency committees and working groups on crisis response, like the IASC, should be considered but only with serious reflection on the trade-offs to the ILO in what it would need to shut down. A balanced approach, while not fully operational, seems to be emerging. It involves an ILO commitment to a predictable but limited role within the UN community. Partnerships could be further strengthened by having focal points from other agencies seconded to the ILO for a period of time.
However, IFP/CRISIS must continue working out with field offices the means by which ILO’s limited coverage at the national level can be addressed, as well as managing risks of crowding out priority work among senior ILO field staff. This can be supported by regions reviewing their own arrangements for supporting countries without ILO offices or representation. This can also guide ILO leadership in more visibly endorsing for the international community its commitment to crisis work.

### 3.2 Implementing crisis response

The ILO’s crisis response strategy is cemented within an essential need to prioritize the choice and limit the number and scale of interventions given limited resources to only what are highly relevant and manageable by the Office. The ILO does not yet have an operationally effective process for doing this, although progress towards establishing one is evident.

#### Criteria for intervention

Recognizing the need to prioritize and focus crisis work, the IFP established selection criteria for deciding which crises justified ILO response. The IFP’s approach for targeting crises for response initiatives currently classifies crises by their type and applies criteria related to the impact on employment and other ILO concerns, country capacities, constituent demands, availability of relevant staff, likelihood of sustainable ILO-influenced effect as well as national capacity to cope and the larger UN context. In practice neither means of screening has been rigorously applied; both deserve review to make them more effective.

The term crisis has proven difficult to operationalize in ILO terms and this lack of clarity has led to confusion within the Office of what constitutes an ILO crisis, and within this, which of these should be spearheaded by IFP/CRISIS. Reviews of recent interventions show that decisions were more likely to be driven by the timing and scale of devastation, the political will of governments and concern among social partners as well as political elements.

Narrowing intervention criteria according to types of crises has implications for ILO partnerships. UNHCR, for example, responds only to cases of armed conflicts and refugees, whereas UNDP collaboration usually places emphasis on programme development for rehabilitation in all types of crises. A revisit of crisis selection by type that is linked to ILO’s partnership strategy, and a more careful look at geographic patterns and predictability of crises could be a useful means of narrowing ILO’s crisis intervention focus. However, based on experience to date, most in the ILO want to participate in determining which crises can be considered priorities and warrant a response, based on transparent application of objective criteria.

#### A crisis to whom?

Interviews and case studies have indicated that the IFP’s criteria and processes for crafting ILO crisis interventions are often not well understood, consistently applied or fully endorsed by internal and external partners.

Currently, IFP/CRISIS responds to crisis intervention requests using their own funds. Hence the decision whether they intervene or the degree to which they intervene is largely theirs, but taken in consultation with relevant HQ and field offices. In practice, given the limited number of staff, involvement has meant heroic efforts on the part of a core team to manage what is usually an overload of responsibility, and to balance pressure from external and internal parts of the Office to intervene. It has also at times resulted in decisions to intervene or not intervene that do not reflect field priorities.

The decision criteria to intervene are dependent on several issues, many of which have been identified by IFP/CRISIS. While the existing criteria remain relevant, their application is from the viewpoint of IFP/CRISIS staff. One criterion, the level and workload of the IFP/Crisis Programme at a particular
time (including the number of crises being handled and their other work responsibilities), is turning out to be a stronger limiting factor for ILO crisis work. There is a risk of preventing crisis response initiatives that others within the Office consider a priority and are prepared to support.

Geographically, the ILO will need to consider how to better use its field presence in roughly forty countries, and within a regional perspective, how it can concentrate capacity in crisis preparedness and response where demand for these capacities is greatest. This will also require a more concerted effort to secure collaboration from internal and external partners, tentative response teams identified and resource plans roughly mapped early in the process.

Because support for immediate response and subsequent follow-up will involve commitment of time and resources of field office, an informed decision of whether and how to intervene should clearly involve the field structure, if not rest with the field. Also evident is the need for additional initial appraisal of a broader ILO capacity to respond both initially and longer term. Finally, although the political dimension of crisis response decisions cannot be avoided, these decisions can be more effectively managed through improved transparency and dialogue during the planning process.

Conclusions:

The ILO’s mandate in crisis response has been strengthened through the IFP/CRISIS work, and initial progress compels the ILO to think of how to do a better job of selecting crises for ILO response. The means by which the ILO carves out a more focused crisis response programme will require clearer definition of first, what the ILO considers an appropriate crisis for response consideration and second, who within the organization is positioned to manage a particular response process. The processes for determining this should be directly related to where within the ILO there belongs a discussion of if, when and how to respond, and how the response process should involve the IFP/CRISIS group.

The means for determining who would decide whether or not to intervene are unclear. Ownership and responsibility for such decisions can be better aligned and plans, including resourcing, made consistent with these. Finally, clearer guidance is needed on what constitutes a crisis to the ILO and the IFP’s role in deciding to intervene.

Enabling rapid response

Based on feedback for this evaluation, external partners expect more progress from the ILO in institutional commitment to ensure rapid crisis response. The ILO can do more to build capacity for this but may also need to work more effectively within its own limitations.

The lead time for the ILO in deciding whether to intervene in a crisis response effort is highly variable. For example, often in cases of armed conflict, months or years may pass before conditions support on-the-ground activity. For natural disasters, the immediacy of need is usually obvious. Although the ILO’s role in crisis response concentrates on recovery that often follows an initial emergency humanitarian phase, UN multi-agency crisis networks expect participation of all agencies from the start of planning.

By international standards, crisis response must be rapid; in many cases it is expected to happen within a few days. Often, notification of key inter-agency planning meetings and missions is given only a few days in advance, rarely more than several weeks in advance. ILO’s credentials as a crisis-oriented agency will require that it have in place a rapid response capacity.

In reviewing specific case studies, the evaluation showed that the IFP achieved rapid response on a case-by-case basis, in contrast to relying on institutional practices to ensure rapid response. In many cases, either IFP/CRISIS or colleagues working under their coordination, managed what externally can be perceived as a rapid and sustained response. However, this timely participation was achieved because key individuals “happened to be nearby” or could quickly change plans; these situations are
not unknown to ILO’s partner agencies! Internally, managing the process involved a series of juggling acts across different parts of the Office. Sustaining a rapid response capacity throughout a crisis response process has been an ongoing challenge, even where field staff is located in the crisis-affected country.

The challenges to establishing a rapid response capacity involve the following:

• financing rapid response,
• ensuring quick turn around time for administrative procedures, and
• effective team-building across ILO structures to ensure that the right people become and stay involved.

To address these challenges, the Office would need to conduct a feasibility review of current business processes within the ILO. It may also require significant policy changes within the Office. Given this, it is important that the Organization consider the extent to which it wants to address this capacity.

**Financing immediate crisis response**

The RAF, currently fully financed from the ILO’s regular budget, has proven a useful means in initiating rapid responses; however, the inadequacy of resource levels requires that additional funding for this purpose be found. The IFP has already developed internal cost-sharing policies with the regions and has set more stringent guidelines on the use of its own limited funds. This has helped extend the reach of IFP staff to facilitate a larger number of crisis responses and to have more latitude in proposing and committing to initial quick responses. However, both internal and external stakeholders are firm in identifying the lack of funding for rapid response as a serious obstacle to ILO’s crisis work. Additional means of financing rapid response are badly needed as is more institutional support for mobilizing external resources.

Within regions, there are indications of interest and capacity to set up region- or sub-region-specific rapid action funds. One scenario supported from several field and HQ sources involves a set-aside of unallocated RBTC funds for unpredictable crisis response activities. The level of set-aside could be on a voluntary basis and linked to clearer guidelines on division of roles and responsibility for financing initial crisis work and any follow-up. Relatedly, to ensure that earmarked resources are only used if and when a priority crisis response is called for, organizational and regional guidelines will be needed to guide the use of the funds. In contrast, regional and technical unit plans for crisis capacity building and networking activities should be incorporated into existing budget allocation levels.

The IFP/CRISIS has also explored options for receiving reimbursement from internal partners for initial investments made in spearheading crisis response. In the case of crisis response initiatives that result in technical cooperation, a lump-sum reimbursement was considered as one possible means of replenishing the RAF. However, given current budget practices in the ILO, this option does not appear feasible. Finally, the IFP/CRISIS team also currently seeks funds for establishing extrabudgetary funding for rapid response, with one initiative jointly pursued by UNHCR, and a second being explored directly by the ILO through several donors.

**Conclusion:**

The overall levels of resources earmarked throughout the Office for crisis response can be increased to make interventions more effective; however, the amounts to be set aside for flexible response would need to fit within existing allocations. Given tight budgeting throughout the Office, the levels of funding regions and sub-regions want to earmark for unforeseen crisis response needs and capacity building can indicate the relative importance they place on crisis work. As available, the earmarking of existing funds for rapid response can be an additional means of augmenting the ILO’s capacity to respond, particularly in supporting the IFP’s initial response work. The set up of such funding mechanisms should be accompanied by appropriately firm guidelines for accessing funds.
Involving informed and qualified people

For many recent crisis responses there was considerable difficulty in finding technically qualified people who could represent the ILO in multi-agency planning meetings, participate in joint missions, and maintain presence or availability over what was usually a period of months, sometimes years. IFP/CRISIS has used its own expertise and hired known external consultants for rapid needs assessments, and has a growing roster of contacts both at national and international levels. This is considered only a second best scenario and the ILO as an organization needs more systemic solutions to link the right people to the crisis at hand.

In many of the cases examined during this evaluation, ILO challenges in mounting rapid and effective crisis responses were strongly linked to field staff not realizing what their role would be and how they should work with other parts of the ILO and international agencies. In general, field staff is unevenly informed of the constraints facing the IFP/CRISIS team. They have often expected to have support and resources quickly and easily, which cannot always be the case.

Bureaucratic practices within the ILO are also not accustomed to accommodating rapid actions, including arrangements for travel, emergency health and safety coverage for staff and consultants who are excluded in standard policies because of the high-risks of travel to locations in crisis. These issues need to be addressed both in HQ and regions, particularly for the latter in releasing funds and authorization. Finally, the ILO can do a better job of managing internal communication. The mixed messages over the intended use of the ILO’s 2000-01 surplus funds for crisis work have caused confusion over how these funds could be used and by whom. Guidance and consultation on such matters should be more detailed and timely. As well, Support Services can review their current practice to identify how their procedures can be more streamlined to accommodate rapid action.

In crises where the ILO will intervene but has no national presence, the IFP has pushed for national and international coordinators to be assigned in a country (i.e., Afghanistan) to coordinate response, including development of project proposals for donor funding. However, it has been considerably difficult to find qualified international experts who are willing to be posted to such duty stations for a prolonged period of time. To date, initial experience suggests it is not clear whether, how and when project proposal development will follow initial crisis work. It is also not clear who decides and who takes resource commitments. The ILO needs a means of having a flexible, shorter term national presence that can be phased out or redefined as needed. While these positions are envisioned to be financed by regions, reporting lines and coordination have also been linked to the IFP/CRISIS. Coordination over roles and responsibilities can be improved.

Conclusion:

IFP/CRISIS faces major challenges when staffing a rapid response effort. With their own availability becoming less certain through mounting work loads, the IFP can facilitate the establishment of expert consultant rosters and contingency plans by field and headquarters’ technical units. IFP/CRISIS can continue its work in emphasizing field ownership of response efforts and shared responsibility for coordinating national presence.

Integrating technical cooperation and exit strategies

Recent experience in crisis response work has shown that the ILO needs to give more thought to how initial-response responsibilities transition as conditions change at the country level. This applies both internally and externally.

Exit strategy
IFP/CRISIS believes in “exiting” when there is sufficient capacity in the field to hand over. In its initial strategy, IFP/CRISIS established a commitment to negotiate with the regions an exit strategy that would transfer ongoing case-specific crisis project responsibilities to the field offices. A target of one year was set for achieving this. In practice, the IFP has experienced difficulty in meeting this target. Both case study analysis and interviews with internal colleagues indicated that exit strategies have not been easy to develop, that participation of the field and technical units has sometimes been delayed, and that contingencies are rarely considered. In addition, as ILO engages in more country-level multi-agency coordination activities, there is a growing need to identify how to phase down our involvement over time.

Exit strategies in crisis response have proven less straightforward than initially envisioned and this complexity has caused confusion and at times frustration within the Office. From initial start up, exit strategies were assumed to be based on a gradual handover to regions. This approach was consistent with the ILO’s policy that country-specific technical cooperation projects be decentralized. As is sometimes the case for other technical projects, the field does not have the capacity to manage the technical aspects of projects. In a few cases, IFP/CRISIS has retained responsibility for technical backstopping, a situation that has caused some consternation among HQ technical units.

Exit strategies need to be considered before deciding to intervene and contingencies jointly discussed by ILO field offices, constituents and our UN partners. Constraints faced by the field in taking more initiative and responsibility need attention.

Managing technical cooperation

As indicated in its programme objectives, integration of technical cooperation was envisioned as a main means of action for ILO’s crisis response work. In determining its performance, IFP/CRISIS’s effectiveness is partly assessed by how much it is able to generate technical cooperation funds. However, the IFP also recognizes that the ILO’s effectiveness extends to influencing others to integrate decent work into their own reconstruction and rehabilitation project work.

CRISIS is following a two-pronged strategy for increasing impact through technical cooperation activities. The first, an “added value approach,” aims to introduce the employment component of crisis response into large projects managed by other agencies and government ministries, including reconstruction work. In some cases this has been achieved through involvement in initial design of inter-agency emergency responses; in other cases it has involved adding small amounts of technical assistance within a broader framework driven by other agencies, and participating in the CAP process to integrate ILO priorities into this process. In many cases, the ILO’s initial technical work has been self-financed. The impact of these efforts is not easily monitored and is often supported by technical specialists in ILO field offices.

The second focuses on ILO directly raising funds for technical cooperation to integrate ILO’s decent work priorities into recovery initiatives. In the latter case, the IFP relies heavily on technical units in HQ and field staff to support proposal development and to technically and administratively backstop subsequent projects. Experience to date in this strategy indicates that some additional refinement of joint planning with attention to capacities and priority themes would be worthwhile. In several cases fully-developed proposals were circulated when concept notes would have been more appropriate. In addition, there is a tendency for IFP/CRISIS proposals to concentrate on subjects linked to the technical knowledge of the staff involved. Finally, adequate attention should be given to planning project budgets that fully reflect the additional costs associated with crisis conditions.

There is opportunity to increase extrabudgetary initiatives but a sustainable growth strategy must address capacity issues, particularly in the field and simultaneously open new windows that do not pull donor agencies away from ILO’s existing work. This implies a managed growth strategy, with expectations adjusted accordingly. Also to be noted, a few UN agencies reduce agency overhead
charges to 7%; the ILO might consider innovative strategies along similar lines. While field-based crisis initiatives can be more cost-effective, additional means of capturing cost efficiencies would be needed.

The mobilisation of extra budgetary resources for IFP/CRISIS’s activities through ILO’s internal procedures has turned out to be difficult, as ILO traditional donors are not necessarily donors for crisis response. Potential to open up non-traditional ILO donors and funding exists and this is being explored collaboratively by COMBI and CRISIS. In addition, decentralized agencies need to be targeted at regional and national levels. IFP/CRISIS has established good contacts with new parts of donor organizations and has delivered good proposals.

Finally, current technical cooperation development and management approaches for crisis work within the ILO have left a small amount of technical projects under the technical direction of IFP/CRISIS. Although the projects are small in scale, these have displaced efforts from their other priority work. This also has caused confusion and frustration within those technical units having supported the technical cooperation initiatives. As a consequence, motivation for increased internal collaboration between the IFP/CRISIS experts and their colleagues in technical units is being lost. In addition, there is concern that the absence of IFP technical experts in social protection, dialogue and rights may weaken the focus of technical cooperation approaches.

In terms of technical cooperation, IFP/CRISIS plays an initial organizer role and later a facilitator role, as a means for the ILO to take action. However, it should not be heavily backstopping technical cooperation initiatives. The ILO in general needs to end the assumed rule of thumb that those who mobilize funds, manage those funds.

**Conclusions:**

The IFP has demonstrated its commitment to an integrated view of developing initial ILO crisis response. This is essential given the natural tendency of technical units and specialists to view responding to crisis-related needs in terms of what they know and do well. The technical staff can do more, however, to see that technical cooperation development encompasses a wider range of ILO technical responses.

Fundraising for crisis-related technical cooperation has not proven easy but lessons learned have brought the ILO increased insight into how to fundraise more effectively. This will involve a measured growth approach that allows for field capacity to grow accordingly. Based on feedback there is also a need to review procedures for transferring responsibility for technical backstopping to appropriate field and technical units.

**3.3 Mainstreaming crisis within the ILO**

*The IFP staff has identified and pursued mainstreaming crisis preparedness and response capacity. Constraints of internal partners and irregular financial resources have inhibited effective crisis response coordination and implementation.*

**Building up ILO field capacities**

Three years of experience in crisis work have shown that no crisis strategy can succeed without strong field coordination and field-level partnerships. At the foundation of inter-agency crisis coordination are country-level strategies and resource mobilization initiatives. The ILO field staff is in a strong position to know constituent demand, national political concerns, and the level of urgency for a quick
response. In its own strategy assessment IFP/CRISIS has pointed to the crucial role of field offices in early warning and contingency planning, where joint UN coordination is managed under the auspices of a UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT).

A constraint to internal collaboration and capacity build-up has been the absence within the field of articulated priorities and needs, particularly at regional and sub-regional levels. The introduction of a funding scheme through use of 2000/01 surplus funds for regions to respond to high-priority crises and emergencies was part of a larger effort to strengthen regional capacities and participation in the programming process. The move to give regions decisions over when, if and how to respond to crises and emergency situations through access to internal funding has helped them to identify and act on their priorities for building crisis preparedness and response. Emerging from this is the need to distinguish between definitions and roles in crises and emergency situations. The means of identifying these should integrate the voice of constituents and their priorities for capacity building. Regions serve a broader mandate than IFP/CRISIS and can indicate their crisis strategies, and within these, the role they want and need IFP/CRISIS to play. A similar approach has been taken with gender strategies linked to the ILO’s Gender Bureau and it is appearing effective.

**Focal points: Progress and challenges**

The IFP/CRISIS programme was designed to combine a small core programme team with Designated Crisis Focal Points (DFCPs) in field and technical units of the ILO that could ensure a unified multidisciplinary response. Focal point persons were intended to maintain crisis-related information and networks, and to contribute to rapid needs assessment, manuals, research as well as other roles. IFP/CRISIS trained focal points for this work. In practice, the approach has met with successes and obstacles. Within headquarters’ technical units, some DCFPs have brought technical knowledge to IFP/CRISIS-coordinated responses. Some technical units, in coordination with the DCFP, have participated in research and tools development. However, overall, only a share of DCFPs have actively worked with IFP/CRISIS. Many are constrained by existing workplan responsibilities and are unable to accommodate additional crisis work. Moreover, few even have crisis work mentioned in their job descriptions. Some are fully obligated to projects and cannot reasonably leave their current work for crisis missions.

The shortage of available technical staff time and scarcity of uncommitted funds also inhibit development of the network. In cases where collaboration has worked, DCFP feedback suggests that initial commitment of time and effort will not be sustainable if technical and field staff do not see a longer term shared objective and some form of return on investment for each partner. Incentives need to be planned and managed more effectively, including director-level attention to internal issues.

Interviews have also highlighted the unevenness within the ILO of a crisis response culture. Some have raised concerns that the ILO’s decent work strategy already stretches its capacities and that new initiatives that place ILO staff in dangerous or unstable situations are neither necessary nor desirable. In addition, some consider crisis work to be in competition with existing strategies, particularly in attracting donor attention, accessing available extrabudgetary funds and consuming limited resources for skills development and training.

In the field, DCFPs are essential to building field capacity in crisis preparedness and response. To make this approach viable at a field level, there is a need for generalists who can draw on a wider technical knowledge of ILO’s operations. This may require more supplementary training in LED, labour-intensive reconstruction, or other specializations that frequently integrate into crisis-related work. Likewise, IFP/CRISIS has not always been consistent in approaching response coordination in ways that reinforce field ownership and responsibility.

**Training and team building**

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4 *Coordination in Crisis Response and Reconstruction, ILO, October 2002.*
IFP/CRISIS has aimed to develop tools and training that make field teams and constituents more independent of the IFP in preparing and managing crisis response. The training approach has focused on developing priority capacities on key issues, concepts and technical areas. It has linked this with how to organize a response, choosing partners, working with different sections of donor institutions and conducting rapid needs assessments. Training of trainers targeted ILO field managers and programme officers as well as regular ILO field consultants working in employment or more general technical cooperation. The intent was for participants to follow up by training their colleagues, and in some cases this has happened. Feedback provided during interviews suggests that all training has been of a high calibre and incorporated an array of specialized experts. Some have suggested reconsideration of a large-scale training of trainers session that would last several weeks; this may be too ambitious for ILO staff at this time.

Although not originally planned as such, the IFP has had greater focus and activities in several sub-regions and these cases have shown substantive progress in building and maintaining local capacity to deal with crises conditions. Staff in these areas are also very appreciative of the IFP’s work and are most able to identify its successes. Under surplus funding, Africa and Asia field offices are investing in training for staff, national consultants and constituents. Africa has also benefited from two trainings specifically designed for constituents (Guinea and Harare, with plans for additional training for African trade unions).

The actions being taken by different regions suggest several underlying issues to address. First, there are notable differences in the level of importance given to building crisis preparedness and response capacity at the sub-regional and regional level. This appears directly related to the following three reasons: the competition for resources from other high priorities in the area; the perceived level of effort required to build and maintain local crisis response capacity; and the perceived likelihood of crises taking place within the area. Feedback from the field indicates a preference for shorter, more modular training approaches that allow customization of course content, optional content and lower costs of conducting the training.

**Conclusions:**

Crisis training can be more regionally planned and linked to regional priorities and strategies for crisis preparedness and response. Constituent involvement should facilitate a means of setting regional strategies. The IFP can pay greater attention to user-friendly, cost-effective design and delivery of its materials and tools. This could include the flexible bundling of components of various materials to create a customized tool to fit a particular crisis situation or regional priority.

There is a strong case for IFP/CRISIS to focus capacity building efforts on those sub-regions most interested in developing and maintaining crisis-related capacities; these also could be the most willing to invest resources in training and other efforts. Capacity building will be most effective if targeted to those wanting crisis response skills. This should also be linked to regional and sub-regional commitments and plans (reserve funds and focal points).

ILO programming units should have a plan for crisis response and capacity development. The focal person in a unit is first and foremost responsible for development of this. These plans then become a source of demand for IFP/CRISIS in its training, technical guidance and coordination with the field.

**3.4 Fine-tuning IFP/CRISIS’s role and responsibilities**

IFP/CRISIS’s initial conception as being first and foremost a catalyst for linking technical expertise available within the ILO to specific crisis situations remains valid. However, there is a need to concentrate more on this model and consider alternative means of addressing other lower priority areas of work.
The IFP/CRISIS team has drawn on their accumulated experiences and lessons learned to improve the programme’s operations. Combined with its growing specialized expertise, the team is better able to plan and position ILO’s crisis work. The IFP team has also surmounted a considerable start-up challenge of working with very limited resources to establish tools, good practices through demonstrations, internal capacity, and external networks. Fundamental work in these areas has been successfully completed. The programme now faces challenges in honing its focus and approach to better align with its resource base and added roles and responsibility for field offices. Based on feedback during interviews, areas in which the programme could consider downscaling would include:

**Early Warning Systems.** Investment in ILO’s capacity to develop crisis early warning systems has not been feasible to date. Decent work indicators are potentially one means of supporting existing crisis vulnerability profiles within UN systems at national levels. Responsibility for communicating early warning and development of strategies to support crisis prevention—particularly in facilitating the role of social partners—may best be the responsibility of the field offices, with IFP/CRISIS providing technical guidance and support in developing these.

**Training of staff.** There is a case to be made for following more field-based strategies by prioritising candidates for training and delegating more responsibility to Turin for developing training courses. Some sub-regions have expressed interest in finding local sources for training services, possibly linking to those already working with other UN agencies. To support this, different parts of the Office would like to see a more focused module approach to shorten length of training and allow more customization of training.

**Concentration on problem spots.** Given the IFP’s limited resources, efforts to provide blanket coverage to all field and headquarters units is not likely to be manageable. Instead, many have suggested prioritizing specific technical units and field offices based on their demand for developing internal capacities. Increased reliance on regional and sub-regional crisis strategies and work plans would help identify those geographical areas where investment in crisis preparedness and response would be favourably used. An initial focus on self-selected “hot spots” where demand for crisis training and technical support is strong would be one means of prioritizing IFP’s mainstreaming work.

**Research, technical tools and guidance.** Downscaling of research on crises, but continued production of practical generic guides and documentation of case studies and lessons learned.

**Internal collaboration.** The initial decision to keep IFP/CRISIS as a small unit that links to others within the Office remains valid. The alternative of building a substantial unit filled with technical staff seconded from technical units remains infeasible, given the recent downsizing of technical teams. Several technical areas where working relationships need better definition include child soldiers, adherence to core conventions in recovery work, social protection and migration, as well as social dialogue particularly to enhance participation of social partners in inter-agency crisis work.

**Performance Management**

The impact of ILO’s crisis work will ultimately be achieved in the field and successful outcomes will depend on field performance. Longer term impact monitoring and reporting will best be done by those offices directly supporting response work over an extended period. IFP/CRISIS performance can be gauged as a facilitator of this work, with more attention paid to monitoring the short-term effects of its initial work. Short-term success indicators should place emphasis on evidence of appropriateness of technical response, evidence of effectiveness, and consistency with other crisis work being done. These can emphasize positive employment effects of various ILO crisis response interventions. Successful work on this has been done in ILO’s reconstruction/recovery projects in Afghanistan and should be a more regular feature of all country/case study reports. Attention to documenting short-term impacts more routinely will also support collaboration with partners such as UNHCR.
As regions develop plans to build their own capacity for responding to crisis situations effectively, they need to monitor implementation of these plans and IFP/CRISIS their progress in supporting these plans.

Finally, the ILO’s current approach to planning and reporting crisis response performance is strongly oriented Towards post-crisis reconstruction work. The 2004-05 biennium performance target states that *four new crisis-affected member States, five crisis-affected member States and ten institutions will include the ILO’s approach to post-crisis reintegration and reconstruction in their policies and programmes*. Performance criteria should reinforce efforts to expand the forms of ILO response beyond the areas already strongly associated with ILO’s recent work.

**Conclusion:**

Experience to date supports the necessity of a clearer understanding of IFP/CRISIS’s performance path. Goals for the medium term should reflect what is feasible given available capacities, and should reinforce joint ownership and responsibility with other internal partners and constituents.
4. Recommendations

Crises are a permanent feature of today’s world. While their form, cause and effects differ, the ILO will need to contend with their debilitating impact on its member States. The short but rich experience of IFP/CRISIS since its inception has demonstrated the validity of an ILO contribution to reconstruction efforts following a crisis. Experience and knowledge has been gained and consolidated on employment and social protection in post-crisis reconstruction and rehabilitation. Likewise, much has been learned in the collaboration with UN and other specialized agencies and units in crisis response. The evaluation has noted that IFP/CRISIS had continually learned from these experiences and adapted modalities of its interventions. Nevertheless, it bears repeating some of the salient findings which will require further adaptation and possible reconsideration of present modalities.

Next steps…

Each crisis is intrinsically distinct, even within the same broad category. Lessons learned should enable the ILO to narrow and apply the criteria used on whether an ILO intervention is warranted or not. The ILO’s crisis response will need to be prioritized and targeted. The final decision to intervene should be shared with those most likely to be directly involved in managing the response. This should lead to a more pronounced role of the regions. IFP/CRISIS should continue its catalyst role by providing a centralized capacity to support effective response.

Recommendations:

- IFP/CRISIS should redefine its own criteria for determining those crises it will support. Additionally, regions should work towards defining and applying their own criteria in line with their available means to support crisis work.
- IFP/CRISIS should operate in the style of a task force, with the capacity to coordinate an ILO-wide response to a crisis. The regions must participate more directly in such responses, including in assessing the decision to intervene or not.
- The multidisciplinary characteristic of crisis response and consequent responsibilities of IFP/CRISIS need to be further highlighted.
- IFP/CRISIS should rely more on regions to indicate the appropriate form and level of capacity needed in crisis preparedness and response, integrating constituent interests and needs into the process. Regions should attach to these resources to ensure that related plans of action can be implemented.
- Regions should prioritize and support those crisis hotspots where need and interest are greatest. IFP/CRISIS can target training and other capacity building initiatives accordingly.

Crises require urgent responses. Although IFP/CRISIS has already introduced a number of procedures to facilitate rapid decisions, these need to be consolidated. More rapid action in decision-making and resource procedures is required both at headquarters and in regions.

Recommendations:

- Procedures should be revised to allow for selected staff in field and technical units to be temporarily detached in case of a crisis response.
- In regions, the feasibility of setting up voluntary contingency funds for crisis response should be assessed. These could be reserved from within existing RBTC allocations. Regions should establish clear guidelines on when and how these funds could be accessed for crisis response.
work. Procedures for deciding how to manage and finance national and international coordinators during response initiatives also should be addressed.

- In headquarters and the field, key business processes that can facilitate rapid response need review to identify means of accelerating procedures in crisis situations.

Sustained collaboration and partnership is essential in crisis response which relies heavily on swift coordination. IFP/CRISIS has built solid experience in this regard with UN and other specialized agencies. However, further strengthening of ILO’s position is warranted.

**Recommendations:**

- The commitment of the ILO in the area of crises should be clarified, preferably through an appropriate level of representation in existing coordination mechanisms.
- The ILO can reconsider placement of IFP/CRISIS to enhance visibility and facilitate more integrated recovery work around ILO’s broader decent work agenda.
- More attention should be given to ILO strategies within longer term joint-UN response efforts, particularly at the national level. Plans and contingencies for management of crisis response initiatives need to be developed at the time of deciding to intervene.

The ILO has a comparative advantage in integrating decent work principles into crisis recovery but its effectiveness is limited by inadequate external funding and unbalanced capacity growth within the ILO for backstopping crisis-related technical cooperation.

**Recommendations:**

- There is need for accelerated dialogue with donors to improve the ILO’s resource base for launching prioritized and credible crisis response. Special efforts are called for to reach out to donors with a crisis response experience.
- Fundraising for technical cooperation to support recovery initiatives should be reviewed to ensure adequate field capacities to technically and administratively backstop subsequent projects.
- More effort should be made to propose fully-costed budgets for crisis projects. These projects should be designed to ensure cost-efficiency.
- Fundraising efforts should also aim at securing extrabudgetary resources to finance rapid response.
Annex : Country Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country: Venezuela</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF resources invested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy / date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for intervention

The torrential rains and flooding that hit the coastal state of Vargas and the marginal suburbs of Caracas provoked land slides which led to the worst natural disaster in 50 years. Around 50,000 people lost their lives and another 100,000 people suffered severe damages of houses, agricultural land, and livestock. Many of the houses destroyed in the disaster were once the base for micro enterprises. Moreover, the disaster is said to have set back the tourism industry – an important economic activity in the region - for several years. The tremendous impact of the disaster on employment and people’s livelihoods urged the IFP to action.

Action taken

First, the Regional Office in Lima was contacted to discuss ILO’s potential response; (2) Venezuelan Mission in Geneva and the government of Venezuela was contacted; (3) Needs assessment mission carried out to identify immediate and long-term needs of the affected population; and (4) identified areas of ILO assistance and drafted a proposal. The assessment mission brought together a set of different institutions related to reconstruction, employment, and local development. This gave rise to an inter-institutional committee, which identified areas and proposals for employment generation during the reconstruction process. However, the programme was not put into operation due to important political changes that took place since the new administration came into office. Nevertheless, the proposals drafted by the inter-institutional committee were later submitted to the central planning and reconstruction institution.

Short term and long term effects

Some of the MDT staff were exposed to crisis response work and this served as a useful training.

Although the ILO’s involvement did not result in a crisis response operation, the experience led to important conceptual developments. Seeing the cumulative effects of multiple natural disasters on the country, a paper was produced on ‘management of vulnerabilities’. The paper discussed the importance focusing on reducing economic vulnerability by introducing criteria for risk management into reconstruction and development programmes so that affected populations can break the cycle of disaster and reconstruction. It also advocated the need to incorporate the views of the local community in the process. This paper served as a framework for the ILO’s response in El Salvador in 2002.

Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the project

Crisis response projects need to adopt a perspective of ‘management of vulnerability’, so as to break the vicious cycle of crisis and reconstruction.

Need to keep a close monitor on political developments and possible changes in governments’ priorities. Closer link with CABINET would enable this.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country: El Salvador</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of intervention</strong></td>
<td>Responding to natural disaster (earthquake of February 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start of intervention</strong></td>
<td>March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RAF resources invested</strong></td>
<td>$70,000 (2000-01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$68,000 (2002-03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilized</td>
<td>$330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy / date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background and reasons for intervention**

Two successive earthquakes hit El Salvador on 13 January and 13 February 2001. They measured 7.9 and 6.6 respectively on the Richter scale. They caused extensive destruction and loss of human life, particularly in the impoverished areas of the interior. Close to 400,000 houses were destroyed, leading to severe insecurity and job loss since 1 out of 5 houses hosted micro enterprises. The earthquake had devastating effect on the already weak economic infrastructure which had suffered from the cumulative effect of a protracted period of armed conflict (1971-91), Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and an earlier earthquake in 1986. The tremendous impact of the disaster on employment / livelihood loss urged the IFP for action.

**Action taken**

The ILO mobilized quickly in response to this emergency. The Sub regional Office (then the MDT) in Costa Rica and professionals from various ILO projects from the Central American region and HQ were contacted. The ILO also contacted the government to participate in the assessment mission. In addition, ECLA was contacted for collaboration. Discussions developed on the roles to be played by each player. As part of the rapid needs assessment and beyond, the team focused on conducting the following:

1. Measuring the impact on employment and elaborating a strategy for recovery (in coordination with Ministry of Labour and Social welfare (MLSW))
2. Estimating direct and indirect economic impacts, led by the special mission of the Economic Commission for Latin America
3. Definition of the inter-agency support strategy by the UN system in reconstruction efforts in El Salvador, under the auspices of UNDP.
4. Development of a proposal for a national strategy for reconstruction and identification of projects to be presented for the use of the Government to present to a Donor’s conference to be held in Madrid in March.

$70,000 from the RAF was allocated but this was immediately exhausted. This was used on areas that were most touched by the earthquake. Total donor resources mobilized amounted to a total of $330,000

**Partners and roles**

ILO (EMP/INVEST, LED, CRISIS and San Jose MDT) provided support / input for measuring the impact on employment; national strategy for reconstruction focusing on employment intensive employment methods, job creation for the affected population through participation in the reconstruction efforts. ILO provided the link between the MOLS and other UN agencies.

UNDP- Definition of an inter-agency support strategy by the UN system in the reconstruction efforts in El Salvador
ECLAC- leading the mission and task on estimating the direct and indirect economic impacts of the earthquake

MLSW – jointly worked on measurement of impact on employment and elaboration of a national strategy for recovery. Actively raised advocated the importance of employment in the reconstruction process. For example, the minister contacted the press to raise visibility of the initiative and hence the importance of employment in the reconstruction process.

**long term and short term effects**

The active participation of the MOLS was crucial to the success of the reconstruction process. This brought local ownership to the process as well as an opportunity for the MOLS to demonstrate its relevance in the reconstruction process.

The project had impacted the way the government deals with crisis response and preparedness. For example, legislature on law and reconstruction is being revised to accommodate earthquake safe construction methods. ILO input is still sought from UN agencies in rebuilding houses in the country.

An impact evaluation is being planned beginning of June, to be conducted by CEPAL and the MDT.

The projects’ achievements as described by partners is the following:
- Building an inroad for the MOLS to join the reconstruction discussion through job creation.
- Building the capacity of MOLS for crisis response
- Transfer of methodology to other UN agencies,
- Increase in the capacity of the MDT to deal with crisis
- Fostered HQ and region partnership.
- Staff of the MDT trained
- Transfer of methodology to partner UN agencies
- By focusing on vulnerability management5, the ILO managed to design a crisis response project that made the transition to a development project.

**Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the project**
- Regional / sub-regional capacity to provide response in crisis situation, especially the capacity to mobilize regional/ local bodies, is crucial.
- Roles of the various partners, internal and external, should be clearly defined at the outset.

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5 An approach focusing on reducing economic vulnerability by introducing criteria for risk management into reconstruction and development programmes so that affected populations can break the cycle of disaster and reconstruction. It is also achieved by local authorities improving regulatory frameworks and by small businesses adopting best practices.
Country: Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of intervention</th>
<th>Natural disaster (heavy floods and hurricane of February 2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start of intervention</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF resources invested</td>
<td>$150,000 and $10,000 from its RB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilized</td>
<td>$6.3 million donor funding was foreseen but not yet materialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy / date</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Reason for intervention**

In February 2000, heavy floods and a hurricane, which caused serious damages to the local environment and led to an estimated loss of 300,000 jobs, affected Mozambique. The scale of damage was so alarming that it prompted IFP/CRISIS to action.

**Action Taken**

In March 2000, CRISIS together with other ILO units conducted a needs assessment mission in order to prepare a project proposal, which formed the basis for ILO’s Rapid Employment Impact Project (REIP) to be carried out in the District of Chókwê.

The following immediate actions were taken:
- Identification of local vulnerable traders
- Identification of key markets that have been destroyed
- Carrying out of basic rehabilitation works of the local markets
- Facilitating small traders’ access to micro credit
- Selecting and implementing immediate reconstruction “projects” of small infrastructure and/or income generating activities, e.g. construction of markets for small traders and training of vulnerable unemployed citizens in Carpentry and Poultry Breeding
- Identification of and capacity building measures for members of the Farmer’s Associations, e.g. in using and maintaining water-pumps

In addition, CRISIS provided advocacy during the international conference for the reconstruction of Mozambique in Rome in May 2000.

**Partnership**

Administrative support has been provided by ILO Harare

ILO/ASSIST helped the MOL with the preparation of model schemes to assess the employment implications of reconstruction and development programmes

Close collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and local authorities.

Implementing the REIP activities, CRISIS could make use of logistical facilities and technical backstopping capacity of a joined ILO/UNDP/UNOPS project on Local Human Development (PDHL), which was going to be finalised at this time.
Project demonstrates ILO’s capability to respond quickly to a serious crisis, e.g. a rapid assessment mission team consisting of ILO officials and some consultants could be set up within three days.

**Short term and long term effects**

- Rehabilitation of local markets
- 3000 jobs recovered
- Consolidation of existing employment
- Capacity of MOL to assess the employment impact of the floods enhanced

**Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the project**

The quick response has been facilitated tremendously through the immediate availability of resources earmarked under the rapid action fund and the logistical support provided by another ILO project.
Reason for intervention
The earthquake in Gujarat (India) on 26 January 2001, which measured 6.8 on the Richter Scale, has resulted in serious loss of life and property. The damage left by the earthquake was so vast that the Indian government made a public appeal for assistance. There was pressure on all of the UN agencies to respond to the catastrophe in Gujarat, as the scale of damage was unprecedented, and the UNDMT (UN Disaster Management Team) and OCHA was quick to call on the international agencies for a coordinated response. In addition, the ILO had been implementing a project (recording traditional crafts) with a local trade union, SEWA, in Gujarat before the earthquake, and thus already had a presence on the ground. Through this presence, the ILO team in New Delhi could obtain precise information on scale of the damage and the immediate needs of the project beneficiaries and act swiftly. The presence on the ground enabled the ILO to design a response that used the same project infrastructure but tailored to the new post crisis reality. The strength and presence of SEWA on the spot ready for intervention provided assurance that there was capacity to respond effectively. This was instrumental in the ILO’s (IFP/CRISIS, SRO New Delhi and GENPROM) decision to intervene.

Action taken
Humanitarian assistance from UN agencies and bilateral donors flowed in which focused mainly on relief activities. The ILO the pointed out that one major impact is the loss of employment and income-earning opportunities and related social and economic distress for significant sections of the population hit by the disaster.

Jointly with the ILO Area Office in New Delhi swiftly got in touch with OCHA and the UN Disaster Mitigation team to coordinate responses. IFP/CRISIS was contacted and their response came swiftly. Within 12-14 days of the earthquake, the ILO had a local team in Kutch-Bhuj where it was most severely hit by the earthquake. With the financial and technical support of the Regional Office and IFP/CRISIS, the New Delhi Office has fielded three national consultants to conduct a rapid needs assessment of the situation in order to design a response that corresponded to ILO’s concerns and addressed people’s immediate needs. The package included a model programme for social and economic reconstruction in 10 villages in Kutch district, where an ILO project had been operating. The project was funded by the ILO and implemented by SEWA and also covered initiatives to promote labour use in reconstruction; a study of the role of the corporate sector in the disaster response, and studies of the impact of the earthquake on employment, poverty, migration, insecurity and coping mechanisms.

As part of the social and economic reconstruction in 10 villages in Kutch district, the project provided training to women so that they have better short-term work opportunities in clean-up and rebuilding of the infrastructure and housing. Trainings included masonry as well as embroidery as part of measures to create sufficient employment opportunities for the future.

The ILO had already been operating in the area before the earthquake on an initiative to record traditional embroidery skills and designs. This gave ILO a base on which to design a project. The ILO response expanded on existing activities, adding elements that would make it relevant in the post crisis context. In addition, it used the post crisis reconstruction as an opportunity to introduce changes that
are important for bringing about gender equality, for example, the project ensured that all new dwellings were registered and owned jointly by couples. The project also provided women with non-traditional skills such as construction skills.

Having a local counterpart who were aware of local needs enabled the ILO to provide services that were relevant to the community. ILO took the approach of community labour based construction, where community members got engaged in rebuilding their environment. Other agencies tended to subcontract work to private / non profit organizations and there was little focus on job creation. By using community members, the ILO project managed to stay sensitive to local realities and wishes. For example, many private operators attempted to rebuild houses in new locations, which the community members did not wish. With the insight of the local implementer, SEWA, the ILO managed to continuously evolve its operations by covering new services in demand such as fodder bank, craft and construction skills, etc.

**Partners and roles**
The following ILO units were involved in Gujarat response.

**ILO AO New Delhi:**
Coordination at the country level, liaising with UNDMT.
Provided inputs into designing the response. During implementation, it provided administrative support needed.

**IFP/CRISIS:** Coordination: Positioned the ILO and the role of employment in crisis response in the UN’s response. In addition, it provided tools for needs assessment and substantive inputs into what the ILO can bring into the crisis response that already has the cooperation of the major humanitarian agencies- UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP. Technical backstopping for the design and implementation, financial support,

**GENPROM:** Designing the project, technical backstopping for the design and implementation, financial support,

**ROAP:** financial support

ILO-New Delhi, IFP/CRISIS and GENPROM were all involved in designing the ILO’s response in Gujarat. The parties involved expressed that the partnership was marked by complementary roles and responsibilities. The roles formed naturally without any up-front discussion and agreements on implementing modalities, hand-over details. During implementation, technical backstopping was mainly provided by GENPROM and CRISIS. Staff time required for project backstopping is often overlooked when designing projects. This point was brought forward by one implementing partner who had to use a staff financed by an unrelated XB project to absorb the added work.

**External partners:** The ILO became part of the UN India Disaster Management Team, which is an inter-agency working group consisting of FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNV, WFP and WHO. UNDMT acts as a coordination point for natural disaster-related activities of the UN System and works in collaboration with the Government to support coordination of disaster management activities in the country.

As ILO’s capacity to deliver is limited, one of the strategies was to ensure that other development organizations’ reconstruction programmes incorporated a labour based approach to reconstruction. Advocacy and promotion involved in such are considerable and, the ILO could not spend time in these areas as staff resources were limited.

**Effects, long term and short term**
A study is being undertaken of the response of the corporate sector to the disaster- this is a relatively unexplored area. The study will contribute the work of the Global Compact.
Another study is being undertaken to estimate the employment impacts of the earthquake, both immediately and over the current year. This should contribute to the IFP developing a set of methodology to measure the employment impacts of natural disasters.

ILO’s skills development approach was instrumental in introducing an important gender concern for the community. Women were trained in non-traditional skills such as construction skills. The project also ensured that all new dwellings were registered and owned jointly by couples.

Involvement of SEWA was key to project’s sustainability. The project is now a part of SEWA’s portfolio

Project completed after a year. Evaluation had been conducted. Now a part of SEWA’s project profile.

Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the project

- Having a well organized and effective local counterpart was a key to success and sustainability of project.
- Respecting local people views and needs adds to relevance and suitability of the intervention. They also leave social structures in place and are therefore key elements in bridging the gap between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ initiatives.
- Reconstruction period should be used as an opportunity to challenge perceived gender “norms”
- Arrangements on project backstopping should be
- The ILO Sub-regional Office felt that the capacity to respond quickly to crisis should exist at the regional/sub-regional level. Although assistance came swiftly from IFP/CRISIS, they felt there should be a more semi permanent presence of a crisis expert who can be present at various UN agency meetings.
- The Sub regional Office expressed that financing and backstopping arrangements for crisis response should be agreed at the start so that the office can assess the staff time needed.
- ILO Sub-region would like to have practical tools that they can use at the time of crisis so that ILO response can be provided without delay. Suggestion includes checklists to use for specific crisis situations, differentiated by type of crisis.
- Partners expressed that although knowledge building is very important, the primary focus of a response should be to bring about immediate relief and assistance to the population affected. To this end, the sub-region would welcome practical interventions. Practical interventions are also important to demonstrate capacity and maintain donor interest in ILO’s work on the ground.
- The ILO is a relatively small player in the crisis response field with a limited delivery capacity. It needs to use its partnership more strategically. Trade Unions and Employers’ organizations should be used ass their presence is wide.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention</td>
<td>Post-conflict situation and natural disaster (countrywide animal infection led to economic downturn in 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of intervention</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF resources invested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Resources mobilized | $1.4 million (up to 2003)  
| | Additional euros 700,000 in the advanced stages of negotiation with a donor for second phase  
| | Additional euros 4.5 million in the negotiation phase with several donors |
| Exit strategy / date | Backstopping still managed by IFP/CRISIS due to the chronic crisis situation in Somalia and for the fact that there is no ILO Office in Somalia. |

**Background and reasons for intervention**

In 1997, a countrywide animal infection led to a downturn of the economy, which had severe implications on the employment situation.

**Actions taken**

Building on a comprehensive situation analysis, ILO officials prepared a project proposal, in collaboration with UNDP in 1998. Internal problems within the local UNDP office forced ILO to withdraw from the immediate implementation of this proposal. After these problems have been solved, the ILO was requested by Somalia Aid Coordination Body as well as the Italian government to support in the economic recovery, employment creation and decentralization process. (1) Rapid needs assessment (2) Building on the proposal from 1998, a project proposal has been prepared and submitted to the 2001 Consolidated Appeal Process.

**Partners**

In February 2002, it was agreed that ILO could provide technical expertise in Local Economic Development to complement the joint UNDP-UNHCR work in demobilisation and reintegration in Northwest Somalia. In May 2002, UNDP made an official request for secondment of an ILO expert to contribute to its programmes. Paying attention to country ownership and sustainability, nearly all activities at the local level are carried out by local contractors. In most cases, village development committees (VDC) are playing a significant role in the coordination and implementation of project activities.

**ILO** (ASIST-Africa: backstopping, EMP/INVEST and IFP/CRISIS): Employment creation and income generation. Advise to add employment value to other related programmes of UN and other agencies

**UNOPS**: Provided administrative support

**UNHCR & UNDP**: ILO provides technical expertise in LED to complement the joint UNDP-UNCHR work on demobilisation and reintegration in Northwest Somalia.

An Inter-agency Agreement has been signed with UNOPS and others are currently negotiated with UNDP and UNHCR.
**Collaboration with local NGOs**

**Short-term and long-term effects**

The project displays a local community-based approach. However, there was a concentration of activities in one area and this has contributed to wage inflation and “donor dependency syndrome”.

The project provided a basis to build up partnerships with other UN agencies, in particular UNOPS, UNHCR and UNDP as well as with local NGOs.

The Italian government agreed to fund the second phase of the project with 5.2 Million USD. In conformity with the 2003 Consolidated Appeal Process for Somalia, in which the ILO has been involved, the next phase will have a stronger focus on Local Economic Development (LED). In particular, the project will have three main components:

- Identify the most suitable and sustainable solutions to local needs by integrating economic strategies with the territorial, social and cultural context using the LED approach.
- Development of a systematic training network to train local trainers and improve both technical and managerial skills of the workers/administrators involved in community contracting and LED approaches.
- Improvement of the employability of Somali population through labour based community contracting for rehabilitation, maintenance and construction works

**Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the project**

Building up a strong presence directly in the country is essential for the implementation of the project. Partners expressed that in line with the request from the Italian government, the project could include a stronger repatriation component, as the majority of skilled people have left the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention</td>
<td>Post conflict rehabilitation of infrastructure and reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of intervention</td>
<td>July 2001 (first needs assessment mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF resources invested</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy / date</td>
<td>Program not yet in place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reason for intervention**

After 20-year civil conflict, in February 2002 the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to a ceasefire with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE) and agreed to hold peace talks. The Government has pledged far-reaching economic reforms to accompany peace efforts in order to help the country realize the full benefits which lasting stability should afford. Seeing the potential, a number of donors are establishing funds to be used for reconstruction of Sri Lanka.

The War left much of the infrastructure damaged. Moreover, vast number of ex-combatants urgently needed to be reintegrated in the work force. The government announced rehabilitation of infrastructure and job creation as priority areas for post crisis Sri Lanka. Seeing the development challenges ahead and ILO’s expertise in post conflict situations, the ILO in Sri Lanka is concentrating its efforts to obtain donor support towards job creation and reintegration of ex-combatants using ILO expertise. The ILO Office in Sri Lanka has been requesting the IFP to conduct needs assessment as well as to participate in the inter-agency fact finding missions.

**Action taken**

ILO did not take part in the first inter-agency assessment mission that took place right after the signing of the peace accord to develop a framework for UN response. The fact that ILO did not participate proved to be the factor that crippled ILO’s access to participate in further inter-agency missions. Due to the AO’s efforts, the ILO was invited to participate in two other inter-agency missions, but unfortunately, the notification on both occasions came too close to the start of the mission and the ILO was not able to send an expert / representative on time. This caused some damage on credibility of the organization, especially after the efforts made by the ILO in Sri Lanka to assure that ILO possessed the capacity to participate in the reconstruction work in Sri Lanka.

A previous mission conducted by IFP/CRISIS and IFP/SKILLS in May 2001 resulted in the formulation of a reintegration strategy for demobilized soldiers in the country. This needs to be updated and developed into a project proposal.

**Lessons learned as expressed by those involved in the initiative**

ILO’s experience in Sri Lanka raises an important question for ILO’s crisis response policy, which is who should, and on what basis, decide whether to respond to the crisis or not. This is an area that causes consternation among internal ILO partners. Similarly, some reflection is needed on when should the IFP/CRISIS’ support be sought as opposed to other technical expertise, such as skills development. The reflection also needs to take into account where the expertise lies. To this end, it has been suggested that sub-regional office needs to build its capacity to respond to crisis.
In addition, the Sri Lanka case highlights that there is a great deal of expectation for the IFP to be “on call” for crisis around the world.

Crisis response is a time intensive work and due consideration of the implication on existing work (own and others) needs to be carefully thought out before committing to engaging in crisis response initiatives.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention</td>
<td>Economic and financial crisis – social turmoil and political instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of intervention</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF resources invested</td>
<td>$160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources from ILO partners</td>
<td>$ 800,000 (Regional Office-surplus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources mobilized</td>
<td>In advanced stage of negotiation with a donor for a project of approximately 9.1 million euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy / date</td>
<td>Technical, programming and administrative Backstopping modalities to be discussed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasons for intervention**
Given the importance of the Argentinean economy and political stability to the overall stability of the region, the ILO established a task force to support the Argentinean government respond to the most urgent areas affected by the crisis and to identify alternatives to initiate an employment recovery process.

**Action Taken**
(1) Task Force called by CABINET (2) multi-disciplinary project formulation mission undertaken (3) A MOU – defining the framework for cooperation - signed between the DG and Minister of Labour and the two representatives of the social partners. (Immediate action projects formulated and executed) (4) Italian funded project is implemented, as well as surplus funded one.

**Partnership**
ILO(RO for LAC, ILO-Buenos Aires, SRO-Santiago, CABINET, IFP/CRISIS): developing / improving the social dialogue process; improving the efficiency of national provisional services, and other social protection services; employment recovery programmes

**Lessons learned**
**What worked:** There was a good division of responsibilities. Involvement of CABINET in establishing the TF was key to rapidly mobilizing various units around a comprehensive response framework, The IFP/CRISIS was then able to focus on integrating the various responses from the sectors and building a link between the HQ and field units.

It was seen by some Taskforce members to be a good example of an ILO integrated crisis response. However, some expressed that roles and responsibility of each participating unit were not entirely clear, especially once resources are mobilized for the programme. Similarly, a number of people expressed that they needed more clarity on the IFP/CRISIS’ exit strategy once the project becomes operational.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country: Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start of intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RAF resources invested (this biennium)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources mobilized</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exit strategy / date</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reason for intervention**

ILO decision to respond to the crisis in Afghanistan came mainly out of request from constituents.

**Action taken**

1. **Mobilizing internal partners and designing a concept note** ILO’s response to the Afghanistan crisis started soon after the US attacks on Al Qaeda and Taliban bases. In October 2001, the IFP/CRISIS convened a task force meeting which involved the HQ technical departments and the field structure to discuss and identify elements of a coherent ILO response. A strategy paper entitled *Jobs for Peace* was drafted and distributed at various international conferences. This paper was the concept note on which future ILO project proposals were based.

2. The IFP actively contacted OCHA, UNDP and other UN structures to demonstrate ILO’s commitment for inter-agency collaboration on the Afghanistan rehabilitation process and to discuss official cooperation arrangements.

3. The IFP/CRISIS developed proposals and submitted it to ILO’s own internal project selection process as well as to the Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People (ITAP former CAP) for consideration. First round resulted in one project being retained in the ITAP. Following improvements by the IFP, all four proposals were retained in the second round selection of the ITAP. The ITAP was then substituted by TAPA (Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan). At the request of ATA (Afghan Transitional Authority), two skills project formerly in the ITAP were merged into one and retained in the TAPA. Another project on women’s re-entry into the labour market was accorded high priority but not included in the TAPA since the ATA announced that it wanted to fund the projects with its own resources.

The IFP/CRISIS mobilized $150,000 from their RAF to launch Quick Impact Programmes to bridge the gap towards donor financing. The programme covered Establishment of Administrative Training Centres (English and Computers) within the MoLSA and MoWA; Vocational training for women (to link to the women’s re-entry project); Establishment of an Employment Services Centre within the MoLSA. The projects were designed by IFP, in consultation with the Task Force, following a mission in April 2002.

**On the ground presence**

In order to facilitate ILO involvement in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, field presence was most important. ILO experience in the first round of donor appeals sent a strong message that

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6 A new programme launched in Oslo in December 2002, developed to reflect a shared view of the Transitional Government and the UN assistance community role in addressing national priorities for the 15 months period (Jan 2003-March 2004).
Continuous field presence was crucial to keep abreast of developments in the donor/ international agency community and engage donor interest. Furthermore, the ILO is disadvantaged by other UN agencies that have had presence for some time and were able to expand their programmes quickly by using existing staff, offices and on-going projects such. Hence for ILO to be considered as a credible player to contribute the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, it was crucial to establish a presence. ROAP decided to finance a Senior ILO Coordinator for one year. ILO Pakistan assisted in the process.

The Senior Coordinator arrived in May 2002. The establishment of local presence coupled with substantial inroads made by IFP/CRISIS and ILO-Pakistan has greatly facilitated resource mobilization. It is currently in the final stages of negotiation with three major donors for projects leading to approximately $18,000,000 in total.

Role of internal partners

- **ILO AO Pakistan**: As the Liaison office for Afghanistan, the office coordinated with UN structures, WB, ADB to integrate ILO’s response in their frameworks. Provided technical inputs into the ILO’s response. Undertook missions to Kabul for the opening up of an ILO representation in the UNDP compound.

- **ILO New Delhi**: The Gender expert provided technical assistance in assessing the situation through missions, designing project documents. The office is responsible for providing technical assistance to the Office of the Senior Coordinator in Afghanistan.

- **ROAP**: Provided political direction, and financial support. Administratively responsible for Afghanistan.

- **ASIST** has been requested by the World Bank to participate in a WB- ADB fact finding mission to Afghanistan. ILO’s role was to provide inputs on labour-based technology to the WB funded infrastructure projects. This was not related to the initiative by CIRIS. They were surprised to find that there was a project proposal by ILO to build 19KM of roads as this was contrary to their approach.

- **HQ technical units**- As part of the Task Force provided technical inputs into designing a strategy for ILO response in Afghanistan. A number of units in the Employment Sector fielded missions to develop proposals (GENPROM, SFU) as well as TURIN

- **CRISIS** Set up a Task Force to discuss and coordinate ILO’s response to the reconstruction work in Afghanistan. They gathered information concerning development in Afghanistan from international agencies and ILO regional structures and informed the Task Force. The IFP also provided security information, coordinated the logistics, such as streamlining missions into Afghanistan at the request of Afghan counterparts.

Roles and responsibilities

The Task Force was open to all ILO units which possessed the capacity to design projects and provide technical assistance for Afghanistan. Members of Task Force formulated proposals based on an understanding that they would be the backstopping units once the projects received funding. The IFP’s role was to provide information on recent developments in Afghanistan so that the members could plan their interventions. Since the arrival of the Senior Coordinator, the TF members communicated directly with the coordinator in Afghanistan with out much IFP involvement. The IFP’s role shifted to one of an adviser. Currently, there are a number of projects currently held in the TAPA portfolio which were developed with heavy input from IFP/CRISIS. Once these get funding, they will become part of the sub-region’s project portfolio. The IFP is concerned over this arrangement for there my not be a reimbursement Towards their time invested. Furthermore, reflecting ILO’s decentralization policies as well as the IFP’s hand-over policies, the ILO-New Delhi office will come to play a greater role in providing technical backstopping for projects in Afghanistan. This arrangement seems not to have been made explicit at the design stage, and although there are no conflicts reported, attention must be paid so as not to overload responsibilities to the over-taking unit. A similar concern was expressed by a regional programme in Asia and the Pacific (ASIST) that too often; backstopping responsibilities are handed down without resource provisions.
The Afghanistan operation was severely hampered from the beginning by the fact that the ILO had neither a presence nor a track record in Afghanistan at the time when the Interim Administration came into power. This has been pointed out numerous times by the government and other agencies. According to the IFP, it was difficult to convince key players that the ILO was a capable and a dependable partner, especially given that there were only two staff, without own transport, with a long pipeline but with only small on-going project activities. For some time, the IFP felt that all ILO projects should be part of the Area-Based Development Programme, implemented by UNDP, however, this was slow to take any shape. Towards the end of 2002, it became clear that developing close links with a key ministry, MRRD (Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development) could lead to important opportunities. The ILO is currently implementing two projects using the surplus which with the MRRD. The ILO’s providing technical assistance to the National Emergency Employment Programme on how to generate immediate employment through infrastructure works, which is the largest programme in Afghanistan at a level of $100M per year. The ILO is also providing technical support to design the policy and strategy for a new department within the MRRD, namely the Rural Enterprise Development and promotion of Alternative Livelihoods Department.

In this respect, the ILO is providing crucial input to employment policies in Afghanistan using available resources.

**Long term and short term effects**

An initial mid-term response was designed by the Task Force based on missions, requests from Afghan constituents and these are included in the TAPA. Following the arrival of the Senior Coordinator in Afghanistan, the ILO is in a better position to respond to requests from constituents. So far, the projects that are in implementation have been financed by the surplus. It is currently in the final stages of negotiation with three major donors for projects leading to approximately $18,000,000 in total.

**Lessons learned**

IFP observes that:

“External funding source that seems to emerge are all bilateral. The Afghanistan reconstruction Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, has so far not funded any ILO projects, in spite of several proposals being part of the ITAP and TAPA, making them in effect Government projects.

Previous experience with the World Bank managed Reconstruction Trust Funds in some other crisis countries has shown them to be in practice inaccessible for the ILO, and it may be more strategic to concentrate on bilateral support rather than the Trust Fund. It should also be noted that the current trends of most bilateral donors in their development activities are Towards 1 Sector support and basket funding, very often with World Bank coordination; and 2 decentralization of approval authority from Headquarters to their embassies. Active fund-raising at the country level would seem to have the best scope for success. COMBI should be more strongly involved in such local fund-raising”.

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