

Back from the Closet: Macroeconomic Policy after the Crisis

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IZA - ILO Webinar

▶ Taking stock of the COVID-19 crisis: The impact on the
labour market and how countries have responded

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International
Labour
Organization

IZA Institute
of Labor Economics
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The Source of Trouble: Technocracy and Macroeconomics

- The battle of ideas of the 20th century yielded a “New Consensus” in macroeconomics that dominated until the crisis
- The New Consensus is centered around the concept of **market efficiency**: The system converges to the natural (long run) output through market forces: **It exists a “first best” for the economy**
- Supply-side economics: no role for aggregate demand beyond the short run
- Therefore:
 - **Structural reforms** (reduce real rigidities) to boost competitiveness, exports and potential growth
 - **No role for macroeconomic policy** in boosting growth
 - *Monetary policy* should only anchor inflation expectations
 - *Fiscal policy* should not crowd out private expenditure
 - **Monetary policy to be preferred** because it is not subject to biases and lags

This is not Ivory Tower Economics

- The Washington Consensus three pillars:
 - Labour and product markets reforms
 - Small government: Privatization/liberalization
 - Nominal targets (inflation, deficit, exchange rate)
- In the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty embeds the Consensus
 - Fiscal policy is constrained by the Stability Pact (now Fiscal Compact): Automatic stabilizers
 - Monetary Policy is limited to price stabilization (strict inflation targeting for the ECB)

The Global Financial Crisis has shaken the consensus

- Balance sheet recession: Aggregate demand was paramount:
 - Deleveraging: increase in savings by firms and households
 - Credit crunch decrease of credit supply/demand
- Liquidity injections are effective in saving the financial sector, but do not trigger the recovery: **liquidity trap**
- The liquidity trap called for **fiscal policy** to sustain aggregate demand
- Stimulus plans of 2009 (too quickly reversed afterwards)

Then came “Rethinking economics”

- Almost any old dogma is today reassessed and re-discussed
 - Multipliers and the debate on austerity
 - Fiscal (and monetary) rules
 - Public investment
 - The role of inequality
 - Reforms
 - Public debt sustainability
- The potential game changer: **the end of the natural equilibrium?**
 - Demand and supply dynamics are not independent
 - The short run cannot be neglected
 - Macroeconomic policy has an impact on long term growth

The permanent cost of austerity

Fatàs and Summers (2017) “The permanent effects of fiscal consolidations” *Journal of International Economics*


- Shocks have effects both on current and potential GDP
- Fiscal consolidation impacts both current and potential output
- Hysteresis is key
- Multipliers are large so fiscal consolidation has strong impact
- Fiscal consolidations are self defeating

Macroeconomic policy after Covid

- In March 2020 the consensus was definitely wiped out in all advanced economies (only there??)
- Policies set up a dam against the tsunami
- Massive fiscal effort to:
 - Sustain incomes (partial employment schemes, unemployment benefits etc)
 - Provide firms with liquidity (guarantees, loans deferral of payments, subsidies)
- Massive monetary effort to ensure debt sustainability
 - Bond purchases to keep rates low
 - Forward guidance: keep rates at zero as long as necessary, and accept higher inflation in the medium term

Fiscal policy: A massive effort, but...

Discretionary Fiscal Response to the COVID-19 Crisis in Selected Economies (*Percent of GDP*)
Estimates as of end-December 2020



Sources: Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic; and IMF staff estimates


Quite a Successful Dam: Eurozone

% Change 2019-2020

Real GDP

Gross wages and salaries

Employment




Source:
European
Commission
Ameco Database

Brave Americans? The US vs the EU

- Joe Biden's first 100 days: Fireworks!
 - \$1.9trillion relief package (passed): checks, expanded unemployment subsidies funding in childcare
 - \$1.8 trillion recovery package: Green transition - global coordination on corporate taxes
 - \$2 trillion package to rebalance the economy: childcare and health care, increase in top incomes tax rates. The end of trickle down

- Comparison with the EU: Do not be fooled the headlines!
- Different institutions play an important role (automatic stabilization)



Bidenenomic's real revolution

- America 2020: back to the real Keynes
 - Growth requires markets ***together with*** proactive structural and cyclical public policies
 - Cyclical support (no more short-long run dichotomy)
 - Incentives for innovation
 - Public investment
 - Correcting market excesses
 - International coordination is crucial
 - Fair taxation
 - Fair trade
 - Fairness is good for growth, not for the good conscience of the rich
 - Word of caution: There is a lot that remains to be done: the vaccines' stain

Lessons for Emerging and Developing Countries

- Fiscal space: market confidence
 - $g-r$
 - Prudent policies during upturns
 - Improve tax collection capacity
- Increase the multipliers
 - Coordination of fiscal policies with trading partners
 - Public investment and industrial policy
- Strengthen automatic stabilization

Thank You!



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