# The Effect of Flexible Loan Repayment Schedules on Youth Enterprises in Uganda


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#### **Background**

- ♦ High youth unemployment and underemployment rates
- ◆ 13.3% unemployed (relaxed definition)
- ♦ 63.2 percent underemployed/underutiliz ed
- ◆ Wage employment in public and private sectors accounts for only 24.6% of employed youth,

#### National Youth Unemployment rates (%)




Source: SWTS (UBoS, ILO, 2013)

### Background

- ❖ As a result of youth unemployment, and narrow wage sector, youth are more likely to be in self employment (micro enterprises), (74.8%)
- ❖ However, there is low investment and enterprise growth among youth business startups, and high business failure (for every business started nearly another closes down (GEM, 2004)
- ❖ Literature shows that access to micro-credit has improved however their repayment inflexibility may not provide the necessary time for investments to show a yield.
- ❖ Hence the need for our intervention (flexible loan grace period and its effect on business investment and performance

# Theory of change



Assumptions and Indicators						
TOC	Low investment and survival rates for youth start ups	Assumptions	Indicators			
Intervention / Inputs	Provide flexible loan repayment/grace period schedules	Short/No grace period barrier to investment	-Intervention (1 or 0 assignment to control and treatment)			
Outputs	Take up of flexible loans by youth enterprises	Applicants take up the loans	- Number of loans disbursed by grace period and applicant			
Intermediary outcomes	Increased access to flexible loans		<ul><li>Take up rate</li><li>Assets purchased</li></ul>			
Outcomes	Increased business investment and performance (e.g. profits, sales, number of employees, investments,	Loans are invested in businesses Conducive business environment	-Return on Investment/value of assets -Number of			

employees

business survival)


# **Evaluation Questions and Outcomes**

❖ Does increased loan grace period correlate with increase in business investment and performance

#### **Outcomes**

\* Investments, profits, number of employees, business survival

# **Evaluation Design**



#### **Data Sources**

1) Largely based on survey data

Evaluation sample

Baseline survey

Assignment (Control and Treatment)

End line survey (one year)


Measure Impact

2) To a small extent administrative data

# Sample Size

	Pre-test	Control (1 month)	Treatment 1 (+ 6 month)	Treatment 2 (+ 9 month)
Mean (monthly net profit) SD = US\$ 469	US\$ 297	US\$ 302.94	US\$ 315.06	US\$ 333.23
Expected change		+ 2%	+ 6%	+ 12%
R <sup>2</sup>			0.5	0.5
α			0.05	0.05
δ			0.02193	0.0549
n			24,299	5,475

# **Power Calculation**



# **Potential Challenges**

- ❖ Take up rate: 85% target
- \* Compliance: high, maybe on supply side
- \* Attrition: 5% no systematic
- ❖ Spillovers: not much to worry about

#### How to manage the challenges

- \* Adjust sample size to take care of these challenges
- Good monitoring checks

#### Results

#### Target audience

- Governments and policy makers,
- \* NGOs with credit components,
- Micro finance institutions
- \* Research community

#### Dissemination channels

- Workshops
- Policy briefs, research paper
- \* Targeted meetings