HEI-ILo Research Programme on
Strengthening Employment in Response to Crises

Synthesis Report and Case Studies

Volume II

Promoting Livelihood and Coping Strategies of Groups
Affected by Conflicts and Natural Disasters

International Labour Office

Geneva, October 2005
ILO
Promoting Livelihood and Coping Strategies of Groups
Affected by Conflicts and Natural Disasters
Geneva, 2005

ISBN 92-2-117964-8
Preface

This three-volume series results from a joint research programme, “Strengthening Employment in Response to Conflicts and Natural Disasters,” undertaken by the ILO Crisis Response and Reconstruction (ILO/CRISIS) unit and the Programme for the Study of International Organization(s) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI-GIIS) in Geneva, with the generous support of the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN-RUIG). This programme conducted research over two years in 14 countries affected by recent crises, aiming to better grasp the socio-economic and employment challenges of responding to crises. It examined best practices, refined approaches and identified new avenues for crisis response. The programme has produced 14 studies and three synthesis reports which are presented in this series.

Three thematic axes guided the research. Each volume of this series presents the case studies and synthesis report associated with one of the themes. Volume I discusses support for the private sector and social partners in response to crises, while Volume III deals with strengthening early warning systems.

This volume discusses ways to promote the livelihoods and coping strategies of vulnerable groups affected by conflicts and natural disasters. The first study examines the vulnerability and recovery capacity of informal businesses after the tsunami and other recent natural disasters in Indonesia. The vulnerability of youth to violence in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the topic of the second study. The third focuses on the socio-economic strategies of displaced women heads-of-household in Bogota, Colombia. Women and women-headed households are again the topic of the fourth study, which examines their vulnerability to violence in the Occupied Territories. The fifth study discusses Local Economic Development and community reconciliation in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia. Finally, transnational networks in the reconstruction of Afghanistan are the focus of the last study. A synthesis report cross-analyses the major analytical outputs and recommendations of these studies while examining the overarching theme.
Acknowledgements

The coordinators of the HEI-ILO research programme on “Decent Work in Response to Crises” wish to thank the academics and experts on crisis response worldwide who have contributed to this endeavour. This project is included within the programme of the Geneva International Academic Network (RUIG-GIAN), whose generous support has been essential, as has the collaboration of the Network’s staff. A special thanks goes to Randall Harbour of RUIG-GIAN, the driving force behind the HEI-ILO partnership and research programme.

The programme coordinators also wish to thank colleagues from the Crisis Response and Reconstruction unit at the ILO (ILO/CRISIS) and the Programme for the Study of International Organization(s) (PSIO) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (HEI). Their support and initiative in devising and managing this programme has enabled its successful completion. In addition, thanks are due to project team members and institutions for providing instrumental guidance in devising the research agenda and in the implementation of field research in the countries covered. The coordinators owe special gratitude to Luca Fedi, seconded by HEI to ILO/CRISIS, who ensured the day-to-day coordination of the project for two years.

The country case studies have benefited from the support and commitment of many local non-governmental organisations and associations. A special thanks goes to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who completed the Afghanistan case study, and to the United Nations University for the case study on Guatemala. Jeff Crisp of UNHCR was particularly helpful to the programme. The coordinators also wish to acknowledge Cedric Herrel, who edited the material in this volume, and Charles Landow, who helped in the final stages of the project.

Finally, the coordinators wish to thank the distinguished researchers and their institutions for completing the case studies and synthesis report in this volume. A full list of authors and institutions appears here:

Abu Abbas Altimen – Baghdad Economic Research Center
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Africa Peace Forum
Nadya Engler – Bisan Center for Research and Development
Patrick Gantès – Centre de Recherches Entreprises et Sociétés
Mustapha Hamoumou – international consultant
Hector E. Maletta – Universidad del Salvador
Jon McLin – international consultant
Hélène Morvan – international consultant
Ellen Perecman – international consultant
Krishna S. Pribadi – Institute for Research and Community Empowerment
Adriana Alejandra Ramírez Duplat – Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Reid Rossi – international consultant
Sharon Rusu – international consultant
Slavica Singer – University of Osijek
Lana Srzic – Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI-GIIS)
Sanaa Umari – University of Baghdad
Juan Carlos Villagran de Leon – United Nations University
Takwa Zebulon Suifon – West Africa Early Warning and Response Network

Mr. Donato Kiniger-Passigli, ILO             Dr. Daniel Warner, HEI-GIIS
# Table of contents

Preface ................................................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... v

PART 1: SYNTHESIS REPORT

1. Towards an understanding of coping strategies of vulnerable individuals and communities facing the aftermath of crises
Ellen Perecman ..................................................................................................................... 1

PART 2: CASE STUDIES

2. The vulnerability and recovery capacity of the informal sector in the face of natural disasters: A case study of natural disasters in Indonesia
Dr. Krishna S. Pribadi ........................................................................................................... 44

Hélène Morvan .................................................................................................................... 89

4. Reinventando la subsistencia: Estrategias socio-económicas de mujeres desplazadas, jefas de hogar, en Bogotá
Adriana Alejandra Ramírez Duplat .................................................................................... 144

5. Women and women-headed households vulnerability in civil violence contexts: Some lessons-learned from the Occupied Territories (OT)
Bisan Center for Research and Development .................................................................... 177

6. Territorial development, vulnerability reduction and community-reconciliation: A case study of Local Economic Development (LED) projects in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)
Slavica Singer ...................................................................................................................... 215

7. Transnational networks: Recognising a regional reality
Elca Stigter & Alessandro Monsutt .................................................................................... 267
Towards an understanding of coping strategies of vulnerable individuals and communities facing the aftermath of crises

Ellen Perecman

OCTOBER 2005
Acknowledgements

Donato Passigli-Kiniger, William Seplowitz, Adam P. Frankel, Luca Fedi, Sara Curran, Michael Watts, Albert Park, Alma Gottlieb, Marc Sommers, Beverlee Bruce, Carolyn Nordstrom, Eric Wanner, Raquel Fernandez.
# Table of contents

Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 7

2. Individual and community coping strategies ................................................................................................. 7
   2.1. Concept of “vulnerable population” .......................................................................................................... 7
   2.2. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Afghanistan case study........ 8
       Findings ...................................................................................................................................................... 9
       Selected recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 9
   2.3. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Colombia case study... 10
       Findings .................................................................................................................................................... 12
       Selected recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 14
   2.4. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: DRC case study........... 15
       Findings ................................................................................................................................................... 15
       Selected recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 17
   2.5. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Indonesia case study... 18
       Findings ................................................................................................................................................... 20
       Selected recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 23
   2.6. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Croatia case study ...... 23
       Selected recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 26
   2.7. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: West Bank and Gaza case study ........................................ 27
       Findings ................................................................................................................................................... 28
       Selected policy recommendations ............................................................................................................. 31
       Selected recommendations for strengthening programmes ................................................................. 31

3. Do the different case studies share any concerns? ............................................................................................ 34

4. A few concluding remarks and observations .................................................................................................... 36

Annexes............................................................................................................................................................. 41
1. Introduction

“You know, my handbag had all my necessities in it: my identification, my money and bank cards, my glasses and licenses. My suitcase had my favorite saris, my daily necessities and medicines, and presents and blessed religious relics for my family. I have always been considered the organized and responsible one of the family. And yet I left all these beside the road and carried home a heavy watermelon through some of the worst rioting imaginable. I will always wonder at that, at the will I had to get home, to keep walking through hell, and to carry a watermelon. How it is we all survive the unbearable…A watermelon carries its own seeds for the future. Perhaps that is what I was trying to do.”

We need not be reminded that we live in a world in which too many people have been victims of too many crises in recent years, in recent months and even in recent weeks. Crises of various kinds – armed conflicts and natural disasters – currently affect millions of people worldwide and give rise to deterioration of economic opportunity, poverty, and a failure of social safety nets.

**Purpose of this paper**

The ILO has identified three key components of a secure social safety net for those affected by crises, each of which is required before, during, and after the crisis: employment opportunities, income creation programs, and social protection. In an effort to more effectively assist in the construction of this safety net, the ILO has commissioned five case studies to help the organization think constructively about theoretical and methodological aspects of employment and related socio-economic impacts of armed conflict and natural disasters so that it can design interventions that ensure the smooth transition between relief and rehabilitation and longer term development. The mandate of the author of the case studies was to identify theoretical gaps in knowledge, assess operational, programmatic and policy activities in the field, and deliver specific recommendations for strengthening coping strategies through policies and programs that specifically target groups.

The overall purpose of this paper is to raise questions that will help further the agenda of the ILO. Specifically, it is intended to contribute to the understanding of individual and community coping mechanisms and the resilience of vulnerable populations facing the aftermath of crises in order to inform policy making and effective programmatic responses to crisis and conflict. The paper discusses issues raised in the case studies, coping strategies they identify and recommendations for how ILO might most effectively strengthen these coping strategies through employment-sensitive, equitable and socially inclusive crisis prevention, preparedness, reintegration and reconstruction processes. Based on these case studies, as well as my own secondary research, this paper offers recommendations on how to improve approaches to reintegrating vulnerable groups by “building on the opportunities and facing the challenges of crises.”

**Why is the ILO addressing socio-economic challenges people face post-crisis?**

The ILO sees employment as a critical aspect of crisis management and mitigation, and assumes an integral connection among issues related to employment opportunities, vulnerability reduction and mitigation. It seeks to understand the linkages between crises and development activities which have the greatest potential for employment generation in the aftermath of a crisis. The organization is committed to designing reconstruction and

---

development activities that provide opportunities for the restoration of livelihoods and dignity and that reduce dependency on relief. It focuses, in particular, on the need to rebuild job training programs and build sustainable capacity for self-employment and competitiveness in the labour-market in order to reduce impact of crises on vulnerable populations.

Almost three decades ago, Richard Ullman wrote: “In every sphere of policy and action, security increases as vulnerability decreases.” Ullman argued for broadening the definition of security to include dimensions other than the military, such as degradation of quality of life as a result of armed conflict or natural disaster. In so doing he gave birth to the notion of human security. Over the years, the notion of human security has come to refer to human rights and personal security, in addition to the more traditional reference to societal and community security, economic and resource security, and governance and political security.\(^\text{3}\)

2. Individual and community coping strategies

“…the first step in the initiation of any reconstruction and development process is a recognition of people’s resilience and impressive abilities to survive the hardship of conflict by employing various coping mechanisms.”

Even in the absence of policies, interventions, and support from international organizations, people manage to survive the socio-economic effects of crises. But without effective policies, interventions and support, recovery will be very slow and painful. How do vulnerable populations cope when there are no formal mechanisms in place to help them? And how effective are the mechanisms currently in place to help them? By commissioning research on local coping strategies, the ILO hoped to discover ways to strengthen the coping capacity of vulnerable populations.

2.1. Concept of “vulnerable population”

The literature indicates that vulnerable groups experience particular difficulties in overcoming obstacles associated with recovery and if their needs remain unaddressed, their potential contribution to socio-economic development may well transform into a destabilizing element posing further security challenges.

Crisis situations are likely to exacerbate the precarious position of marginal social groups, curtailing further their ability to access and/or control resources. Institutional factors placing pressure on marginal social groups are also likely to be exacerbated during crises. But pressure on marginal groups exists independently of the crises, and it is important to avoid returning to the status quo in its aftermath.

The commissioned case studies investigated 1) transnational migration as a coping strategy for Afghanis; 2) young people in the context of armed conflict in the DRC; 3) informal sector workers in the aftermath of natural and man-made environmental disaster (i.e., earthquake plus tsunami disaster, monsoon related floods, and solid waste slides) in Indonesia; 4) women in the context of armed conflict in the West Bank and Gaza; 5) the demographical, social and economic environment of LED projects in eastern Slavonia; and 6) socio-economic strategies of displaced women in Colombia. Most of the commissioned studies are based on data obtained through interviews. The West Bank/Gaza study is based primarily on focus group research and supplemented by interviews with one participant from each focus group. The Croatia paper is based on secondary sources.

The case studies fall into two categories: those in which the context is protracted and on-going conflict (West Bank/Gaza case and Congo case) and those where the context is the aftermath of an event (armed conflict in the case of Colombia and Afghanistan and natural and man-made environmental disasters in the case of Indonesia). In both categories, situations are constantly evolving. But whereas one might expect the coping strategies of those in the context of an ongoing conflict to be colored by desperation,

---

5 Ibid.
mixed perhaps with a sense of futility and a lack of faith in a positive outcome, the coping strategies of those facing the challenges of the aftermath of a crisis are more likely to be colored by optimism.

Each of the case study reports ends with a set of recommendations for strengthening the coping capacity of vulnerable individuals and communities. A proper review of these recommendations requires an appropriate yardstick. One might wish to measure the recommendations against questions like the following:

- Were the data collection methods leading to the recommendation appropriate for the research questions being addressed?
- Is the viability of the recommendation a function of the wealth—or lack thereof—of the country? Note, for example, that the DRC is among the 10 poorest countries in the world.
- Does the recommendation address the problem of an imbalance of power within the society, whether based on economic status, gender, or age?
- Does the recommendation give priority to human security or is inter-generational equity being “sacrificed to the altar of intra-generational equity?”

2.2. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Afghanistan case study

In this case study, Stigter & Monsutti describe the continuous circulation of people, money, commodities, and information that links Afghans who are spread across international frontiers. They report that in Afghanistan, where the informal economy and the black market account for a large proportion of the Afghan economy, the significant flow of capital remitted to Afghanistan plays a crucial role in the reconstruction of the country.  

7 Elca Stigter and Alessandro Monsutti, “Transnational Networks: Recognising a Regional Reality” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit).
Findings

The study found that contemporary labour migration cuts across all socio-economic classes and ethnic groups and can become a way of life. It revealed that migration to neighboring countries, and the remittances sent home, are viewed not only as a response to war and poverty, but also as an efficient livelihoods strategy for households that is likely to continue functioning as a key contribution to the economy of a country as a whole. The concept of permanent resettlement or irreversible displacement, it notes, does not take into account this multidirectional aspect of population movements and fails to recognize that this circulation of people is neither transitory nor temporary.

It is important to avoid generalizing this finding to other contexts since Stites (2001) reports that for the majority of Bosnian households in the study population, the desire to return home was central to their livelihood strategy during their period of displacement.

Importance of social networks

Although employment opportunities are irregular and often insecure in Afghanistan, most people with connections are generally able to find work through social networks. Relatives and neighbors help each other and sometimes even fund the journey. The presence of friends and relations abroad influences the ultimate destination of the migrant. Support networks of kin and community also play an important role with respect to remittances and the provision of child-care.

Distinguishing among refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and migrants

The authors point out that the cyclical nature of migration blurs the boundaries between “refugees” and “voluntary” economic migrants, calling into the question the practical wisdom of making distinctions among victims of crisis. A 2005 report of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children entitled “Youth Speak Out” provides an illustration of the pitfalls of doing so. It reports that with the exception of adolescent heads of household and young people registered as unaccompanied minors, refugee and IDP young people can only qualify for humanitarian aid if they are somehow attached to an adult.

Selected recommendations

Authors make the following policy recommendations

- Policies must recognize that Afghan migration to seek labour elsewhere is a key livelihoods strategy and will be for the foreseeable future.
- There should be a shift in policy from limiting migration to managing migration in order to avoid the negative effects of people smuggling and corruption.
- Labour migrants should benefit from refugee protection and a screening mechanism for potential refugees must be established.

12 Ruwanpura and Humphries, “Female-headship”.
13 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.

Authors make the following programme recommendation:

- A legal labour migration framework should be established and there should be an increased presence of the Afghan government in Iran in order to strengthen bilateral relations between the sending country and the receiving country.

Authors make the following implementation recommendation:

- The Afghan government must improve the transparency of its administration and ensure increased access to passports able to be obtained formally, without bribes.

2.3. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Colombia case study

In this case study, Duplat addresses three issues: 1) income generating strategies and formal and informal social safety nets used by women, and rural women in particular, who have fled to Bogota to escape political violence; 2) the direct impact of displacement on the receiving communities with respect to employment, education, housing, healthcare, public space and security; and 3) the impact of the displaced population on public institutions and their capacity to respond. Data were collected through interviews with displaced women and elites from NGOs, government and international agencies.

Women & female heads of households

Thousands of people are vulnerable to displacement regardless of class, gender, race or creed. But women are disproportionately affected because conflict increases the existing discrimination and vulnerability. Nonetheless Date-Bah warns against treating women as passive victims of conflict, which tends to lead to their exclusion from mainstream training and employment schemes.\(^\text{14}\)

Female-headed households in many countries of the developed and developing world appear to be on the rise due to globalization, neo-liberal economic strategies of financial institutions, population growth, as well as the increased attention given to women’s status and well being and policies which make it a little easier for women to remain outside marriage.

The Colombia case study tells us that in Colombia, women heads of households and children are more likely to suffer forced displacement and be subjected to poverty, constituting 51 per cent of the total displaced persons in Bogata. This condition of vulnerability is aggravated by the diminished capacity of women to provide subsistence for the home due to a lack of technical training, lack of employment opportunities and discrimination in the labour-market.

A 2005 Amnesty International report identifies female-headed households as especially vulnerable. Globally, female-headed households are reported by the World Food Programme to make up the majority of those identified as the “chronically poor”. Women and children constitute the bulk of the refugees and the internally displaced people.\(^\text{15}\) Date-Bah also notes that given the nature of modern warfare, there are no longer codes of


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
conduct including protection of women, children and other civilians and thus most of the current victims of conflict are women and children.\textsuperscript{16}

Barakat & Wardell report that as a result of widowhood and displacement, more households in Afghanistan are now headed by women, and the absence of men for long periods to fight led to women taking on new areas of responsibility. They also note that exposure to refugee camp health care facilities, and to education and vocational skills training (for some) has led to changed attitudes and aspirations.\textsuperscript{17} This study suggests that the assistance community should acknowledge that women perceive themselves as wielding considerable power, particularly within the family and in brokering peace or mobilization/de-mobilization, and that agencies focus on “the family as the building block for a peaceful and prosperous Afghan society”.

Ruwanpura & Humphries concluded that since female-headedness is not simply a temporary result of civil war, policies must not be limited to short-term subsidies, but must extend to longer-term measures to make such households self-supporting. These authors found that women who are deserted or widowed cannot rely on traditional sources of support and that the case for programme of economic assistance is strong. The economic reliance of female-headed households on children often results in child labor with damaging, often irreversible, effects.\textsuperscript{18}

The authors caution against generalizing across populations, pointing out that there are many different types of female-headed household: lone mother households within which category there are various types depending on the marital status of the female head and the legal and actual relationship with the father(s) of the children; female-headed extended households; and female-singleton households. Some female-heads are better-off while others are economically poor and vulnerable. In theory and in empirical work most attention has been on lone mothers who constitute the single largest category of female heads in most countries.

The presence of a large number of married women heads of households is taken to support feminist claims that female economic and emotional maintenance of households is often disguised behind assumptions of the relationships of authority and responsibility within households.

The concept of “de facto female-heads” should be noted in this context. De facto female-heads of households may have alcoholic spouses, who are a drain on family resources rather than contributing to the household income. A high incidence of alcoholism may be considered a symptom of societal crisis, which is aggravated by conflict conditions. Other notable factors leading to de facto female-headship are unemployement, physical disability, and mental unfitness.

\textbf{Displacement and its role in engendering socio-economic vulnerability}

IDPs are defined by the United Nations as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” Specified instances of arbitrary displacement are prohibited by the UN.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Barakat and Wardell, “Capitalizing on Capacities”.
\textsuperscript{18} Ruwanpura and Humphries, “Female-headship”.
For Duplat, the concept of displacement refers to migration within the country of origin as a result of political violence. She argues that the term ‘displaced person’ is problematic because it says very little about the previous and future circumstances of these people and reduces the ‘displaced person’ to this mobile condition. Defining people as ‘displaced persons’, she writes, “runs the risk of making these people invisible and denying that they are people who have knowledge and skills. She notes that Osario and Sure have proposed the expression “population in a situation of displacement” as an alternative to the term ‘displaced persons’. They argue that the latter captures the fact that the condition is dynamic, different for different people, and conditioned by factors like: financing of human aid, relation of people to institutions in the communities of which they become a part after they are displaced.

The Columbian government’s definition of “displaced person” is “every person who appears to have been forced to emigrate within the national territory, to abandon their homes and livelihoods because of harm to or threat to life, physical well-being, security or personal liberty due to any of the following situations caused by man: internal armed conflict, disturbances or internal tensions, general violence, massive violations of Human rights, infractions of international law, or other circumstances emanating from these situations that can affect law and order.

Here displacement is therefore tied narrowly to the concept of human rights: forced migration caused by eternal factors related to social and political conflicts of a violent nature and a systematic violation of rights that should be guaranteed by the state.

Findings

Duplat found that strengthening of social networks is the goal of most victims of displacement, who speak of constant confrontation with the local government and local residents. Where social networks have been created, it is thanks to a solidarity among other displaced people, the historically poor and family, religious community and friends. These networks become the most effective and efficient forms of aid to the displaced, assisting in providing a place to live, a first job, and building a home. The networks arise autonomously in response to the social and economic conditions of the displaced people.

She reports that displaced Colombian women take advantage of both formal and informal labour-market opportunities, demonstrating creativity, adaptive skills, and resilience under adverse economic conditions. Women who had been accustomed to moving primarily in the private circles reported being forced into the “closed spaces of the public sphere, trade and private enterprises, and self employment”. Due to the precarious labour-market in Colombia, they tend to take whatever work they can find. They find domestic work (housekeeping, laundry, caring for children, sick and old people) to be the best source of income, but report that these jobs are hard to come by, are unstable, and do not bring social security.

Duplat finds that Colombian state policies concerning displaced populations are characterized by “incoherence with respect to return...” She notes that in spite of the fact that the most pressing concerns of the displaced are finding a place to live, employment and health, these have historically been the weakest aspects of programs designed to address the problem of the displaced. Her own study revealed that 31 per cent of the women interviewed report needing business-skills training to be competitive for jobs. Duplat fails to mention any existing programs offering job skills training, yet she reports

---

that 48 per cent of women interviewed claim not to have enough information about employment programs offered by the state.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1997, Congress approved the Plan Nacional para la Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada por la Violencia (the National Plan for Integral Attention to the Population Displaced by Violence), a plan promoting medium and long term actions and measures for creating social and economic stability for displaced people. While Duplat believes that general support for economic stability will lead to the achievement of “true mechanisms of economic stability,” Date-Bah argues that policies formulated with the sole purpose of economic stabilization “run the risk of generating competition over access to scarce livelihoods.”\textsuperscript{21} Duplat notes that although Article 10 of the Plan calls for special attention to children and women, particularly, widows, head of households and orphans, Meertens’ found that in practice the only differential focus is with respect to women heads of household.

Duplat suggests that the sharp decrease in return movements between 2000 and 2002, coupled with her own finding that 85 per cent of displaced women would prefer to remain in Bogata rather than return to their original homes, indicates a need to move away from income generation projects and instead to find ways of integrating displaced women into the labour-market of the receiving communities. She therefore considers the Protocolo de Restablecimiento’s (RSS, 2001) primary focus on the return of displaced people misguided. In other contexts, however, this focus may not be misguided (as in Stites 2001, for example).\textsuperscript{22}

In the face of obstacles like a shortage of formal opportunities, discriminatory practices, and inadequate public policies, displaced women in Colombia use social networks that include other displaced people, e.g. family members, the historically poor, the religious community, and friends, as an effective and efficient coping strategy. Through these networks they find a place to live, a first job, and help building a home. Duplat describes one of the focuses of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Colombia as the development of projects intended to strengthen associations among displaced people. As such, UNHCR provides support this coping strategy of Colombian women.\textsuperscript{23}

While a government official interviewed for this case study proposed that a coherent welfare policy was needed to assist the displaced, the author does not agree. She argues that victims of displacement have a right to jobs as a means toward their own empowerment and that a welfare policy fails to acknowledge this right.

Duplat concludes that The Human Aid Society and informal networks make up for the lack and inefficiency of policies concerning displaced persons.\textsuperscript{24}

Loans and grants are integral to the process of restoring self assurance and overcoming trauma in the displaced person. As the only institutional source of credit available to poor refugees and Sudanese alike, the ILO project described in Hall made an unprecedented impact in Sudan. It reminded refugees of their own development prospects and revived their savings and banking habits. In addition, the support services provided by this project helped to develop new production techniques and upgrade existing enterprises, while the implementation of wide-ranging small-scale activities also stimulated local production and incomes. The revolving fund’s contribution to poverty alleviation in refugee affected areas encouraged the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Date-Bah, “Crises and Decent Work”.
\textsuperscript{22} Duplat, “Reinventado la subsistencia”.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
to launch a women’s programme for income generation among refugees and Sudanese women. Nevertheless because of the low purchasing power of refugees in the settlements, the overall impact of these activities was disproportionately distributed to urban areas, where social and economic conditions for income generation were generally easier.25

The displaced women interviewed for this case study expressed scepticism and disappointment with the incoming generation projects they had been involved in and an increasing reluctance to invest their incomes in these projects.

Selected recommendations

Author makes the following policy recommendations:

- Policies concerning forcibly displaced populations should acknowledge the “long term reality of displacement”, i.e., that displaced people will be there for the long term and must be integrated into the commercial and economic dynamic of the cities.
- Implicit in public policies should be the recognition that displaced people have a right to socio-economic security.

Author makes the following programme recommendations:

- Programme content must take into account emotional and physical needs of displaced women with children.
- Provide housing to displaced people in neighborhoods populated by formerly displaced people who will be more likely to accept them.
- Create credit programs for displaced women head of households, who do not generally qualify for such programs.
- Create training programs for women that are not limited to skills training for jobs typically associated with women, but that also prepare them for work in fields such as business, normally associated with men.
- Create specific training programs for indigenous Colombians that build on their unique and specific knowledge base.
- Create a mechanism for effectively disseminating information useful to displaced women, e.g., where to find existing employment programs, information about the culture of the receiving community to help them adapt.

Author makes the following implementation recommendations:

- Work closely with the receiving population to strengthen common mechanisms of protection in order to alleviate their potential envy or jealousy of the benefit being accorded to the displaced.
- Ensure that programme managers are capable of implement programs effectively.

2.4. **Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: DRC case study**

This case study investigates a single coping strategy in that it asks why young people in the DRC join armed groups. She observes that the informal economy allows Congolese to assure their survival and augment their resources as well as allowing for social and economic mobility and offering an alternative to formal education which has not adapted to the labour-market. Furthermore, while systems of formal education are biased against women/girls, the informal sector allows both boys and girls to acquire practical skills. She concludes that the experiences of these young people in the informal sector attest to their capacity to face the challenges of crisis in innovative ways and that the creation of revenue generating activities is critical to ensuring self-sufficiency among Congolese.

Morvan interviewed youth combatants and non-combatants and argues that the experience developed by Congolese youths in the informal sector attest to their capacity to respond to the crisis in innovative ways.

The study involved an assessment of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (PN-DDR), whose task is to demobilize 150,000 adult and 30,000 child combatants. The DDR programme currently involves 40 to 50 local organizations in the demobilization of child soldiers.  

**Findings**

Contrary to common perceptions of conflict-affected communities, most young people affected by armed conflict are not child soldiers. Estimates place the number of child and adolescent soldiers in the world at 300,000, which is one-tenth of one per cent of the approximately 300,000,000 young people under 25 living in countries affected by armed conflict.

In her case study, Morvan points out that youth are the majority in all armies, but that contemporary wars in Africa are distinguished by the exceptionally young age of the combatants. In the Congo, where 46.8 per cent of population is under 15, 10 per cent of combatants are under 18; in some groups up to 50 per cent are under 18. Girls join in order to find a husband thereby improving their living conditions, as well as medical benefits, transportation or access to pillaged goods. But these marriages frequently result in separation placing the economic burden back on the girls.

Morvan found that young people join armed groups as a means of improving their material conditions and social status and assuring security for themselves and those close to them. A number of factors seem to have been at play in choosing this coping strategy. First, Congolese youth have grown up in an environment that accepts xenophobia and ethnic violence as legitimate and therefore they find it perfectly acceptable to take up arms against another ethnic group. Second, young girls in particular are seeking protection against sexual violence.

Morvan’s case study reveals that the strong social control in traditional social contexts of rural societies in the Congo often drives young boys to join armed groups.

---

26 Morvan, “Etude de cas”. 


where they know they can gain power to which they would otherwise not have access and where they would gain the perception of having prestige and authority.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Girls vulnerability to sexual violence}

Morvan found that security is a particularly strong motivation for them to join armed groups. Many girls in displaced persons camps in northern Uganda traded sex for basic necessities, and girls who were unaccompanied, orphaned or heads of household faced strong pressure to exchange sex for support.\textsuperscript{28}

"Youth Speak Out" observes that without access to education or jobs, many girls thus have few alternatives to forced marriage. Inside and outside camps, many parents facing economic destitution pushed their daughters into marriage at very young ages, effectively selling them off to relieve their economic burdens. With marriage came expectations for girls as young as 12 to drop out of school and bear children. It notes that without support or livelihood alternatives, many girls are forced into prostitution. Because they bear major household responsibilities, they are often kept home while boys are sent to school. Girls are also increasingly bartered and sold as families struggle financially. They found that female youth are the targets of violence by combatants, family members, adolescent peers, teachers, community members, humanitarian actors, peacekeeping forces and law enforcement officials, both in emergencies and post-conflict.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{The DDR programme}

Morvan commends the DDR programme for its multinational character (i.e., it involves the participation of Angola, Burundi, Congo, Republic Centrafricaine, Rwanda and Uganda). But interviewees who participated in DDR training courses found the skills they learned were rarely profitable and the supplies needed to actually undertake new professions—such as seeds and farming tools—were frequently unavailable.\textsuperscript{30}

The DDR programme is a major focus of international support for the livelihood of young people affected by conflict. However, according to "Youth Speak Out", the DDR serves only a very small proportion of young people affected by conflict because the programme only benefits those young people who have participated in fighting forces. In Sierra Leone, the programme offered young people education, job and life skills training, training in family tracing and reunification, medical care and counseling. However, few of the skills training initiatives led to viable employment because programs were under-funded and "incomplete", and local markets could not sustain the large numbers of young people practicing the same trade. With some exceptions, skills training provided through the DDR programme was principally a psychosocial intervention and a step toward peace rather than an economic support mechanism.

The Woman’s Commission report also points out that in Sierra Leone girls were widely excluded from the benefits of DDR. It also indicates that young people would like to complement their primary and secondary school education with vocational training programs in order to link their education to viable employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{31}

In "Youth Speak Out", young people consistently reported continued feelings of hopelessness and profound social alienation as a result of the violence and deprivation they had experienced during and after conflict. Yet, according to that report there are no systems in place to monitor the wellbeing of young people who have been separated from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Morvan, “Etude de cas”.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.
\end{itemize}
family or caretakers. Government, United Nations and nongovernmental actors do not regularly collect data on adolescents and youth in emergencies and post-conflict, and have poor accountability mechanisms in place to ensure their protection. In post-conflict Sierra Leone and Kosovo, little was done to comprehensively assess and match youth employment and skills needs with immediate and long-term reconstruction and economic development planning. The report identifies gaps that remain in the protection and well-being of youth affected by armed conflict and their communities. But data collection systems are still not standardized or utilized to account for young people in different stages of their childhood and youth, increasing their invisibility in humanitarian and reconstruction programming. The report notes that: “At best, international and national actors have helped improve the lives of thousands of young people. At worst, they have delayed and even deterred support to young people, greatly intensifying abuses against them.”32

United Nations Consolidated Appeals (CAP) regularly solicit support for “child protection” programs, but similar requisitions for adolescents or youth are not typical. UNICEF Sierra Leone reported having a much easier time raising funds for “child protection” projects than for those characterized as “youth empowerment” programs.

Singer notes that according to a situational analysis by UNICEF and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) Department of Youth nine months after the official end of the war in the region, “There has been no official labour-market or skills survey done for Kosovo, and…there has been only limited discussion about linking economic development with useful vocational education.”33

**Sociocultural factors relating to youth vulnerability**

Morvan found that in the Congo, there is little economic opportunity for boys and girls. A patriarchal system and the system of priority to elders, tends to concentrate the best materials and the most decision making power in the hands of the elderly. Rural economy is a family economy in which unmarried men work for their families while girls depend on and submit to their families and then to in-law families.34

Such sociocultural obstacles are by no means limited to the DRC. In Afghanistan, if a family has only one son it is unlikely that he will be allowed to migrate for the purpose of finding a job and any young person must obtain parental consent, which may present an obstacle. Girls may be forced to drop out of the labour-market because of early marriage or pregnancy.35

**Selected recommendations**

Author makes the following policy recommendations:

- Activities must be ready for implementation as soon as financing is in place.
- Strict controls must be put in place to assure that finances are used for approved purposes. The plethora of actors engaged in the DDR complicates the chain of command and adds to the risk of detournement and corruption.
- Encourage the role of women in revenue generating activities.

32 Ibid.
34 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.
35 Ibid.
• Avoid moral condemnation of homosexuality at the Centres de Transit et D’Orientation, since many ex-combatants had been subjected to homosexual exploitation and would therefore find this psychologically difficult.

Author makes the following programme recommendations:

• Develop opportunities within the local economy that take advantage of experiences and skills these youth developed during the war.
• Local organizations must be granted the financing needed to put programs to work effectively.
• Prepare ex-combatants for the labour-market by designing instructional programmes that:
  o take into account the prevalence of slow learners among ex-combatants;
  o make it easy for them to take care of their family responsibilities, for example by offering short term courses or offering courses in alternating terms;
  o Lend legitimacy to apprenticing since it involves reintegrating into society through collaboration with civilians and passing of knowledge from one generation to another;
  o Train in skills they can actually use on the job in their local settings;
  o Make available supplies needed to actually undertake new professions, such as seeds and farming tools.
  o Provide support to farmers in order to revive agricultural activity.
  o Support cooperative agriculture, fishing and raising of animals to limit negative impacts on individuals.
  o Forbid “food for work” programs in favor of “cash for food” programs, which permit the introduction of revenue into local markets and limit the negative effects of food aid programs on the local food providing sector.
  o Encourage development of small business through microcredit programs.

Author makes the following implementation recommendations:

• Put the state in control of primary and emergency health care as well as primary education and reform the educational system as part of a national social project.
• Create incentives for investment by private entrepreneurs and for the hiring of qualified personnel.
• Encourage inter-community dialogue about what is needed for econ development to restore peaceful relations among different groups.  

2.5. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Indonesia case study

The case study on Indonesia is based on interviews with informal sector workers, a population particularly vulnerable to natural and man-made environmental disasters in Indonesia. The author cites Wiebe (1996) in reporting that in 1993 the informal sector accounted for 68 per cent of the total working population in Indonesia.  

The authors address the impact of crisis on workers in the informal sector in terms of three sub-sectors:

• The primary sector provides services and businesses in this sector are populated by one or few employees. It is the least lucrative of the sectors on a day to day basis;

36 Morvan, “Etude de cas”.
• The secondary sector involves production, marketing and sales of goods from home-based businesses; and
• The tertiary sector focuses on distribution. Typically, the only employees are family members and temporary help during festival periods.\(^\text{38}\)

The concept of the informal sector as a particular way of doing business came into international usage in 1972 in the ILO’s Kenya Mission Report. McLaughlin identified the main features of informal sector businesses as: use of family and unpaid labour (apprentices); reliance on manual labour rather than on sophisticated machinery and equipment; flexibility, allowing people to enter and exit economic activities in response to market demand; simple and sometimes precarious facilities; ability to improvise products from scrap materials; willingness to operate businesses at times and locations convenient to customers; and a tendency to locate in smaller markets, out of the reach of the larger firms.\(^\text{39}\) When the “Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in The Informal Sector” was adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILCS) in January 1993, it chose to define informal employers in terms of one or more of the following three criteria: small size of the establishment(s) in terms of employment, non-registration of the enterprise and non-registration of its employees.

The types of activities carried out in the informal sector vary between the urban and rural areas. Entrepreneurs in the urban areas are involved in activities geared to modern needs: vehicle repair, radio repair, watch repair, refrigerator repair, manufacture of bricks and aggregates for building construction, money changing, etc. In rural areas, the most common activities relate to: blacksmithing, leather crafts, water pump manufacture, herbal medicines, etc. Not surprisingly, earnings are much lower in the rural areas.

**Socio-economic vulnerability**

Socio-economic vulnerability is a complex and nuanced concept. The Columbia case study defines ‘vulnerability’ as the characteristic of a person or group that heightens the likely impact of a “natural or human made hazard” and influences their capacity to “anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from it.” Vulnerability, in this definition, refers to the degree to which someone’s life, livelihoods, property and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event.\(^\text{40}\)

**Interdependence of sustainability and local capacity building**

In this case study, the authors define ‘capacity’ as “means and resources which exist or are present in individuals, households, in the community and in businesses, which enable them to cope with, mitigate and recover from the economic impact of a disaster… including: physical, material and economic means, in the form of cash, land, tools, food, jobs, or access to credit; social or organizational means in the community such as good leadership, caring local and national institutions, solidarity and cooperation; and individual behavioural or motivational means (self-confidence, autonomy, resourcefulness).\(^\text{41}\) Capacity building can therefore include infrastructure development.

---

\(^{38}\) Pribadi, “Vulnerability and Recovery Capacity”.


\(^{40}\) Duplat, “Reinventando la Subsistencia”.

\(^{41}\) Pribadi, “Vulnerability and Recovery Capacity”.
Capacity mapping is a strategy for identifying and encouraging skills and economic activities that are sustainable in the face of crisis. The key is finding the optimal tools for the creation of sustainable employment opportunities. Sustainability depends crucially on “building local capacity to initiate and implement self-reliance activities.” In a situation where “emergency implementation” continues beyond the actual emergency, and where donors demand quick results, it becomes extremely difficult to establish linkages and promote the community participation needed to ensure a project’s continuity. Community and gender issues can become victims of a trade-off between accelerated implementation and sustainability. As Ullman showed, achieving security always implies a tradeoff, whether between ‘security’ and ‘liberty’; between ‘cure’ and ‘prevention’; or between international and domestic priorities.

Institutional weakness in conflict-affected countries contributes to the tendency for reintegration programs to be led by external actors. Local institutional capacity building is therefore of paramount importance to sustainability and efforts should be made from the outset to make national actors and conflict-affected groups feel a sense of ownership of the project.

**Findings**

The findings of this case study indicate that a lack of early alert and preparedness mechanisms was reported to result in increased vulnerability. In spite of this, the study observes that some Indonesians have reverted to their pre-disaster activities and rebuilt their properties without any consideration of preparedness for future risks. The author notes that because of their early warning system, primary and secondary production sector in East Jakarta had time to take preparatory measures like relocating stock and heavy tools and equipment to safer areas. In flood-prone areas, vulnerability of the informal sector in East Jakarta is greater when businesses operate out of private homes as they cease to function when there is a flood.

The study reports that informal sector actors adapt quickly to new livelihood opportunities by identifying new niches for their business activity and refers to the informal sector as “a crucial actor in post-disaster recovery”. Rural youth working in the informal sector tend to migrate to urban areas where the earning potential is greater. In doing so, they exacerbate existing pressures on social services which lead to delinquency and shanty suburban areas. One might interpret the decision to work in the informal sector as a coping strategy in itself.

The primary sector was found to be least affected by the crisis. Workers in this sector tend to return to same livelihoods undeterred by the loss of equipment and depressed market demand. They were also found to sometimes shift temporarily to secondary or tertiary sector jobs until they accumulate enough income to return to their primary sector businesses. Where homes have been destroyed, they relocate to camps or homes of relatives. They depend on government, NGO or family support. On average workers in this sector resumed livelihoods in the primary sector 1-2 months post-crisis. The paper argues that interventions should take advantage of the fact that this sector has the capacity to meet the most immediate needs of the affected community in terms of essential goods and

---

42 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
44 Date-Bah, “Crises and Decent Work”.
45 Pribadi, “Vulnerability and Recovery Capacity”.
46 Ibid.
services and that assistance should be provided to the sector in meeting the needs of the community. 47

Because the secondary sector is highly dependent on availability of informal credit and grants, in the absence of such assistance, businesses in this sector recover activities on a reduced scale an average of 2-3 months after disaster. The author speculates that were such assistance available, recovery of activities could be achieved within 10 days of the disaster.

Author argue that secondary sector businesses are more vulnerable to crisis than those in other subsectors and bear the heaviest burden of the recovery because they provide essentials, tend to be more home-based, and involve more equipment and infrastructure. 48

Community saving programs are a preemptive coping strategy when early warning systems are in place, as in East Jakarta. They support households and businesses in need and also provide assistance on a rotating basis to those seeking support for investment purposes. Low interest loans for use in pursuing alternative livelihoods are available through community associations and commercial vendors in East Jakarta, while interest-free loans are commonly offered by friends and relatives in East Jakarta and Leuwigajah. In Leuwigajah, however, these loans are not very popular as residents are generally not willing to pursue alternative livelihoods as a coping strategy. Local government safety nets are the preferred coping mechanism for residents of Leuwigajah. In the absence of community based savings and loan programs, as in Banda Aceh, harnessing the “energy to claim back their lives” is the most common coping strategy. 49

The study found that government programs designed to support the informal sector focus on emergency relief and long term reconstruction and improvement rather than disaster-related economic recovery, which is only addressed on an ad-hoc basis. NGO programs were found to focus directly on livelihood in disaster prone areas in innovative and contextualized ways. The study also found that limited financial resources make it difficult for people to move to locations that are less vulnerable to flooding and that it costs less for them to pay the costs of preparing for and recovering from a flood than to move. 50

**Banda Aceh: Government programmes**

The Proyek Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan (P2KP), a rehabilitation project created in association with the Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme, supported communities in the aftermath of the tsunami in Banda Aceh.

The Disaster Impact Mitigation Project fulfilled the immediate minimum basic needs of the affected communities. Now in its second phase (through December 2006), it is working to rehabilitate and restore social and economic public services and infrastructures, settle land and property rights disputes and also provide psychological assistance. Its third phase will involve reconstruction of homes and large infrastructures.

Both are programmes of National Planning Board. 51

**Banda Aceh: Non-Government programmes**

A programme called Economic Rehabilitation in Post-Tsunami Aceh is designed to revitalize economic activities and re-engage tsunami survivors in economic activity in the

---

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
most affected districts of the municipality by assisting micro and small enterprises, the resettlement of IDPs and construction of shelters.\footnote{52}

**East Jakarta: Government programmes**

The *Assistantship of Street Vendors Programme*, established by the Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises Subsection of the Municipality of East Jakarta, fosters the development and formalization of businesses. The programme includes activities such as assistantship and counselling, developing vendors cooperatives (principally for the purpose of safety nets), facilitating access to commercial loans. The programme also offers basic equipment and provides commercial sites for street vendor activities; rehabilitates, renovates and cleans commercial areas; and organizes “competitions” between street vendors on cleanliness, aesthetic and health criteria.

An infrastructure programme aimed at protecting East Jakarta from annual floods through the construction of a canal to be completed in 2011 is being implemented by the Department of Regional Infrastructure and Settlement (Kimpraswil) in cooperation with the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta.\footnote{53}

**East Jakarta: Non-Government programmes**

Several INGO and NGO programs address the impact of the floods in East Jakarta through work-for-food and food-for-training (FFT) activities and provision of maternal and child health. Area Development Programs (ADP) seek to improve access to education, primary health services, basic infrastructure and training for micro-entrepreneurship as well as facilitate sustainability through fostering community organization and self-help associations.\footnote{54}

**Leuwigajah: Government programme**

The Environmental Management Section, Technical Execution Unit, and Sanitary Management Section of the local authority run a programme to improve the waste management system, as well as to relocate and improve the living conditions of victims in the area. The Bandung District Authority assists the persons who lost their homes by providing food assistance and offering counselling, training and assistance for community preparedness. The *Urban Poverty Alleviation Project* (P2KP,) implemented by East Batujajar villagers’ organization (Merpati), provides micro-credit loans to community groups and individuals in East Jakarta.\footnote{55}

**Leuwigajah: Non-Government programme**

An NGO-run community-based city waste management programme involving 50 pilot projects, training and assistance offers alternatives to urban waste management, and seeks to reduce and mitigate environmental damage. This programme also works with communities to generate new livelihood opportunities in the waste recycling sector, by offering training on composting techniques and the production of consumption goods from scrap materials found at the local level.\footnote{56}

\footnote{52} Ibid.  
\footnote{53} Ibid.  
\footnote{54} Ibid.  
\footnote{55} Ibid.  
\footnote{56} Ibid.
Selected recommendations

Author makes the following policy relevant recommendations:

- International agencies should only provide assistance in forms that cannot be provided by the informal sector.
- Policies should foster mechanisms for preparedness, mitigation, and early warning.

Author makes the following programmatic recommendations:

- Substantial external assistance to informal sector businesses offering informal credit and grants immediately post crisis is a crucial element for a steady and prompt post-disaster recovery.
- Reconstruction programs should offer cash for short term work and use local materials and contractors from the informal sector to the extent possible to boost market demand so that workers in this sector can accumulate savings in order to re-launch activity or engage in alternative livelihood opportunities.
- Primary sector support should focus on providing basic vocational skills to informal operators who wish to move to non-home-based tertiary activities.
- Business recovery support for all three sectors should include loans or grants to aid in the reinvestment needs of the informal sector; basic business development assistance, and programs to foster entrepreneurship, initiatives and innovation.
- Support should focus on secondary sector’s production stage of operation.
- Construction techniques and urban development programs need to integrate risk assessments; reconstruction programs should consider houses as crucial assets for the home-based sector, not just as shelters.

Author makes the following implementation recommendations:

- Assistance to commercial distribution services in order to expedite restoration of local distribution lines of goods and services.
- Informal sector operators should be advised to integrate disaster risk in their business plans; savings schemes should be promoted as way to increase capacity to recover; encourage social networking, skills training, counseling and information programs.

2.6. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: Croatia case study

Singer used secondary sources and elite interviews to assess the ability of Local Economic Development (LED) projects in eastern Slavonia -- mainly UNDP, UNOPS and ILO-led projects -- to address the challenges of war-affected communities. She notes the lack, scarcity and unreliability of some social and economic indicators in the course of their research.

57 Ibid.
58 Singer, “Territorial Development”.
Collaboration as a strategy for consensus building and for achieving cultural sensitivity

Barakat & Wardell note that patterns observed both in Afghanistan and in conflict situations elsewhere suggest that when peace comes, the rapid increase in the number of international actors can have a serious negative impact. They urge co-ordination on a broad range of issues if these effects are to be avoided, stressing that interventions designed to assist [a group] “need to work with them, not for them.”

In theory, involvement in decision making of a range of stakeholders - including representatives of vulnerable groups - increases dialogue and cooperation on issues, facilitates the identification of contentious areas, the sharing of knowledge and skills at all levels, and the communication of information among all partners in the development process. The result should be socially sustainable economic models for local economic development. However, in practice the outcome can be less than ideal if there are unequal power relationships and corruption at play.

Collaboration can be a mechanism for obviating redundancy and avoiding ‘re-invention of the wheel’, and building on existing foundations increases efficiency. Barakat & Wardell point to an example of new ideas being used to harness and develop existing structures. They note that significant numbers of women have traditionally been employed in the areas of health, education and civil service in Afghanistan even under the Taliban. They recommend building on the broad acceptability that exists for women working in these sectors.

In a related vein, Hall points to the importance of coordination among aid agencies, noting that the refugee organizations and aid organizations implementing projects on the ground often fail to communicate about changes in funding and patterns of assistance.

Singer suggests that because the infrastructure for coordination among LEDs and between LEDs and reconciliation programs does not exist in war torn areas, LEDs are unlikely to be successful or in post-conflict environments. Nonetheless, the data presented seem to suggest evidence of some success on the part of LED training programs insofar as more people have been found to be unemployed for less than a year since 2003. And while the author reports a growing number of unemployed persons with longer unemployment as “the most striking and disturbing issue,” the data on which they draw may be interpreted to suggest that the population is becoming increasingly more educated both academically and vocationally.

The finding that the percentage of the population working in agriculture has declined steadily suggests either that specifically agricultural training programs are needed to prepare people to work in agriculture or that there is no interest in this.

Routes to achieving sustainability

Hall stresses the need for a sustainable institutional base to secure and continue activities once a project has been terminated. Immediate vs. long term interventions are also routes to sustainable programs and sustained sources of income.

According to the ILO Crisis Response Manual, “long term programs, which are designed to stabilize the framework conditions for recovery, often have a weak or even

59 Barakat and Wardell, “Capitalizing on Capacities”.
60 Ibid.
61 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
62 Singer, “Territorial Development”.
63 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.

negative impact at the local level, as they tend to emphasize aggregate levels of growth, but do not reflect the problems of under-performing regions and their difficulties in stimulating new employment opportunities. Hall (2003) observes that in rural areas immediate and direct income generating interventions, such as mat or soap production programs, have an important role to play. This observation supports the argument of Khagram et al that sustainability is most often achieved by actions that address immediate challenges while focusing on longer-term goals through a series of intermediate range actions.

The ILO recognizes that relief and development are often required in tandem. Hall suggests that there is a need to come up with an approach which is neither characterized as “humanitarian” nor “development” but rather sui generis. This is precisely the approach taken in two projects discussed in the West Bank/Gaza case study. In one, a school uniform sewing project culminated in the distribution of the uniforms to the poor in the community. In another, villagers cut off from markets by security closures, bought olive oil produced in the West Bank and distributed it as part of food aid among recipients in other areas.

Social dialogue & participatory recovery strategies

Singer supports the ILO’s mission to promote social dialogue & participatory recovery strategies. However, while she believes that limiting LEDs to economic stakeholders is not optimal, it would be difficult to bring different stakeholders to a consensus in an environment like Eastern Slovenia with no civil society institutions and many competing political interest groups, an environment in which mutual trust is certainly “slow to build and quick to destroy.”

Transparency and accountability

The repeated calls for increased transparency and accountability in this case study beg the question of an imbalance in power and political corruption. Note, for example, the recommendation for concentration of limited financial and human resources in a single LED program, presumably for ease of oversight, and the compunction to recommend that needs assessment should be the only basis for deciding where that LED programme should be located.

The study concludes that the success of financial assistance programs depends on entrepreneurial skills of target population and therefore financial resources alone are insufficient without technical assistance. While they commend the UNOPS/UNDP/ILO program’s financial guarantees, they are critical of their inflexible interest rates. It also suggests that LED programs should be created within the first 3 months post conflict in order to rebuild the community’s self-confidence and self-respect and avoid the growth of a culture of dependency that aid programs risk promoting.

65 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
66 Clark, Khagram and Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security”.
67 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
68 Singer, “Territorial Development”.
69 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
70 Singer, “Territorial Development”.

**Selected recommendations**

Author makes the following policy relevant recommendations:

- A policy of equal accountability of all local stakeholders to both LED and reconciliation programs should be adopted, and needs assessment information should be shared openly in order to promote trust among stakeholders.
- A policy of providing technical assistance tailored to specific concerns about micro enterprises and SMEs to local banks and financial institutions should be adopted.
- A policy of sharing project evaluations with all stakeholders should be adopted so that the evaluation can serve as the basis for dialogue among implementers, donors and beneficiaries, as well as policy makers on international, national and regional level.

Author makes the following programmatic recommendations:

- Create a precise and in-depth mapping of local stakeholders and their interactions so they can all be called to participate in the process.
- Diversify the content of LED projects so that they complement the content of reconciliation programs and build linkages among different constituencies (e.g., students, farmers) that have been divided by the conflict. LEDs might diversify their activities to include, for example, offering loans, investing in infrastructures of common economic interest, establishing a competition for proposals for business ideas/plans, and providing entrepreneurship training and business development services. In addition, LED projects might focus on core activities targeting adults, while reconciliation efforts might focus on young people.
- Benchmarks need to be identified to evaluate progress toward intended goals of LED projects and reconciliation programs. If interaction between local economic development processes and reconciliation processes is sought in order to reduce socio-economic vulnerability of individuals and communities in a specific region, then the number of loans disbursed will not be a meaningful indicator of progress towards that goal.
- Create programs that will provide youth with the equivalent of primary education as well as vocational and skills training linked to demands on the job market.

Author makes the following implementation recommendations:

- In order to make the process of local economic development and reconciliation more effective and efficient, the implementation of any LED programme should be based on the following operational principles:
  - Transparency in
    - selection of implementers (open call)
    - selection of beneficiaries
    - the implementation of the programmes
  - On-going dialogue among sub-programmes during the programme’s life as a means of facilitating the reconciliation process
  - Introduce regular and periodic opportunities to review progress and apply lessons learned up to that point to future phases of activities.\(^{71}\)

---

\(^{71}\) Ibid.
2.7. Selected findings and recommendations from case studies: West Bank and Gaza case study

This study investigated the coping strategies of women and female heads of households through focus groups and interviews. It notes that 56 per cent of informal laborers are women and that many poor people see the informal labour-markets as one of their only options in spite of the fact that informal labour-markets are “... mainly confined to a series of survivalist activities with limited financial returns.”

Both this study and the Congo case study highlight the extent to which women are accorded a low status in patriarchal social systems and that, as a result, women are more vulnerable in the context of crises. Palestinian women point to the expectation that women will play a crucial role in supporting their families when men are absent, incapacitated or unable to find employment; and in caring for the injured, traumatized, and depressed.

**Defining head of household**

The notion ‘head of household’ is fraught with problems that complicate the development of a universally applicable definition and the lack of standardization in the definition hinders comparative analysis. In the Columbia case study, Duplat points out that ‘head of household’ is a conceptually difficult term because it refers to whoever is identified as the head of household by other members of the household regardless of whether he/she is really the decision maker and regardless of his/her financial contribution to the household. She notes that a man is typically considered the head of household whenever he is present in the household, even though the women may be the breadwinner.

Ruwandanura & Humphries also caution that statistics on female heads of household are likely to reflect a low estimate of the reality. They note that “emotional maintenance” of households is often “disguised behind assumptions of the relationships of authority and responsibility within households.” They point out that the households in their study would not have appeared as female-headed in many census enumerations or household surveys that did not probe behind the physical composition of household units.

**Poverty and crisis**

In support of her assumption that crisis breed poverty, the author of this case study points to a World Bank report estimating that GDP is 23 per cent lower than in 1999 and concluding that the “real GDP per capita is some 35 per cent below its pre-intifada level (World Bank 2004, p. xiv).” The poverty-conflict nexus has been the object of intense debate surrounding arguments by Paul Collier and Anne Anlin Cheng.

Collier argues that where development fails, countries can become trapped in a vicious circle in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war. According to Cheng’s concept of "racial melancholia", social denigration and loss is incorporated as a constituent element of one’s psychic existence and one holds on to,

---

73 Ibid.
74 Duplat, “Reinventando la subsistencia”.
75 Ruwanpura and Humphries, “Female-headship”.
grieves over, and cherishes what has been forcibly renounced. Racial melancholia offers a way of thinking about the social marginalization suffered by vulnerable populations.

Findings

The coping strategies reported by the Palestinian women fall into five categories: those with a potential impact on health, those with a potential impact on education, those with a potential psychosocial impact; and other:

- Potential impact on health:
  - cutting down or eliminating meat and fruit from the diet;
  - reducing consumption to basic needs;
  - disconnecting utilities.
- Potential impact on education:
  - Taking children out of school and - or for the purpose of - putting them to work.
- Potential psychosocial impact:
  - reduce social visits;
  - assume debt;
  - rely on charity and aid;
  - sale of women’s gold and assets;
  - reducing consumption to basic needs;
  - disconnecting the telephone.
- Other:
  - subsistence farming;
  - try to find a job.

Many people eliminate routine medical care or care that is not perceived as critical, such as dental and gynecological care and supporters of extremist groups are sometimes drawn by the social services that these groups offer.

Poverty was reported to prevent Palestinian women from socializing in a culture that emphasizes hospitality as a virtue and the assumption of debt as a coping strategy seen to increase social tensions. Social tension is also reported to be exacerbated by bringing numerous family members and families under one roof. Some women interviewed challenge social customs by leaving their husbands when they can no longer provide for them in a society that is not very accepting of divorced women no matter what the causes of the divorce.

Temporary coping measures implemented by families proved unsustainable as the conflict continued. It is noteworthy that coping mechanisms reported were largely confined to households or families rather than taking the form of collective efforts as seen in the Indonesian case study, where community saving schemes are found to used as a preemptive coping strategy.

Focus group participants indicated a need for training in entrepreneurial, technical, marketing and business skills to support their projects. The case study interprets published data to indicate that the crisis in the region accounts for its low employment (p.20), in spite of the fact that the table (p.22) on “New entrants into the labour force: 1995-2002” shows employment growth improving from 2000-2002.

---

77 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., and Prihadi, “Vulnerability and Recovery Capacity”.
81 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
Palestinian women interviewed also expressed a need for programmes offering low or no-interest loans and programmes assisting in the procurement of raw materials at discounted prices. The women commended organizations such as UNRWA, Asala, and Faten for providing a source of credit without requiring sponsors, and for treating beneficiaries with respect. But they criticized the organizations for failing to allow a significant grace period after receiving the loan, for charging high interest rates, and for not being understanding when projects failed.

**Social networks and the notion of community**

Women take advantage of support from organizations providing credit as well as from relatives and friends, and donations of supplies such as trees from the Ministry of Agriculture. The study notes that security measures taken by Israel have reduced access to personal support networks of family and friends for women, as well as resources and services.

Thus, the individual’s ability to cope with the impact of a crisis depends to some extent on whether the individual has the support of his or her community either informally or in the form of infrastructure. How might individual coping strategies be linked to community strategies? And what exactly do we mean when we speak of “community” anyway? It seems to me that what Kai Erikson refers to as ‘communality’ is actually what we have in mind. Erikson describes communality as “the network of human interrelationships that are the underpinnings of a neighborhood, a region, or a district, and that connotes reliance upon and responsibility for persons in a collective sense.” He argues that when communication between individuals, on the one hand, and the community (as embodied by administrative powers and market forces) on the other, is compromised, the trust people need to achieve resilience is destroyed.

**Sociocultural factors impeding employment progress for women**

The West Bank-Gaza case study supports existing evidence in the literature that Middle Eastern women are prone to be marginalized and vulnerable in many aspects of society. It notes that during conflict, “social restrictions coupled with the political ones further distance [women] from resources and services, and isolate them from networks of support.” Women do not own as many assets as men; they earn lower wages, are subject to social restrictions that limit their movement, association, and actions, and are excluded from many decision-making processes at all levels of society.

Palestinian women interviewed for the case study expressed the desire to work on the condition that the work was socially acceptable in their communities. Acceptable opportunities are therefore limited. In a sociocultural context which does not easily support Palestinian women running their own business, there are social pressures for women not to venture too far away from the home for work or even household shopping out of concern for safety as well as honor.

Muslim women are burdened by proscriptions on their activities, especially when these proscriptions limit their income earning opportunities. Ruwanpura & Humphries provides a contrasting case in the situation of Sinhala female heads of households who can be expected to benefit from the Sinhalese relatively woman-friendly legal code and relaxed social attitudes as well as their majority status in the country as a whole. These authors

---

82 Ibid.
84 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
85 Ibid.
report that Ethnic women in Sri Lanka illustrate the problem of having to choose between retaining respectability and merit in the eyes of kin and community and entering the labour force and that employment often wins out. Ruwanpura is also quick to point out that the presence of fewer sociocultural restrictions does not necessarily mean that more female-heads can enter the formal labour-market, since this does not free them from responsibilities such as childcare.

**Psychosocial impact of crisis**

Evidence presented in this case study is taken to suggest that the long-term pressures of poverty, coupled with the tensions of the political situation in the region, leads to psychological stress and isolation that increases the vulnerability of women and precipitates concomitant social problems within the larger population. Women are reported to experience shame; children suffer symptoms of post-traumatic stress; and unemployed men show an increased incidence of depression as they find themselves ineffectual as providers for their families. Parents suffer anxiety over their inability to adequately care for their children or protect them from violence and humiliation. Sadly, the case study notes that it is socially unacceptable for Palestinians to seek formal psychological support.

Ruwanpura points out the complex relationship between conflict and non-conflict factors that shape outcomes in the livelihood options and coping strategies of a group. In the Indonesia case study, where, from a psychological point of view, informal sector workers are described as “ready to reinvest and re-launch”, this “energy to claim back their lives” is considered “the best asset for the local economic recovery.” But, the trauma of crisis can also impede efforts to earn a livelihood post crisis. (“Youth Speak Out”, 2005).

**Impact of crisis on education**

As a byproduct of this study’s attention to the relationship between poverty and crisis, the study also speaks to the impact of crisis on youth. Its findings suggest that education suffers when poverty compels parents to take their children out of school to save on the cost of school supplies, transportation, and fees; or to work in the home, family business, or in the local market. “Youth Speak Out” makes a similar claim. The Global Survey on Education in Emergencies (Women’s Commission, with UNHCR, UNICEF and UNESCO) confirmed that attention to adolescent and youth education in emergencies is severely lacking.

Often the increased economic burden of education during a crisis leads to interruption of education. The study finds that Palestinian students from the West Bank-Gaza often pay for lodging near their universities to avoid being kept from class by closures and that parents choose among their children which to take out of school or refuse university, often choosing the daughter. The study also reports that Palestinian parents often prefer to keep young women from attending school out of fear “for their safety and honor.” They worry about the difficulties and danger of traveling to their schools and are reluctant to expose their daughters to lengthy and humiliating waits at checkpoints, long walks through isolated areas circumventing checkpoints, and the possibility that they may be stuck far from home by security closures. These concerns are also a factor in the

86 Ruwanpura and Humphries, “Female-headship”.
87 Ruwanpura, “Survival Strategies”.
88 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
90 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.

---

86 Ruwanpura and Humphries, “Female-headship”.
87 Ruwanpura, “Survival Strategies”.
88 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
90 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.

---
decision by many parents not to allow female university students to reside away from home.\textsuperscript{91}

The findings reported in “Youth Speak Out” suggest that international cooperation is needed to solve the problem of educating children affected by crises. During the refugee crisis of 1999, Albanian Kosovars were invite to take refuge in camps and urban areas in Albania, but the government did not allow all young people immediate access to public education. Fearing overcrowding, the Albanian government delayed entry into secondary school, and mandated that a summer school programme be set up for refugee adolescents seeking to enter secondary school in the fall. This policy decision left many young people idle.\textsuperscript{92}

To compromise a young person’s education, is to compromise his or her prospects of finding jobs and other means of economic support. For the young people interviewed in “Youth Speak Out”, education holds such significance that its absence or disruption generates feelings of hopelessness, uncertainty and abandonment, as well as physical and economic insecurity.\textsuperscript{93}

We learn from “Youth Speak Out”, that in the Achol Pii refugee settlement in northern Uganda, each teacher served a class of 110 children in their primary school. Everywhere paper, pens and books were lacking. Many teachers had been killed or had taken other jobs for their own economic survival. Those who remained, according to the young people, were often unsupportive and poorly qualified.\textsuperscript{94} In the Congo, primary school registration dropped between 1990 and 1999 from 54 to 35 per cent and lack of security led to the closing of numerous educational facilities.\textsuperscript{95}

**Selected policy recommendations**

Author makes the following policy relevant recommendations:

- Encourage programmes to promote change in social and cultural attitudes toward women and provide them with social protection.
- Prevent programmes designed to increase female participation in the labour force from increasing the burden of responsibility on women.

Author makes the following programmatic recommendation:

- Create a centralized national data collection and management effort to which local and international organizations contribute and make the data available for public use.
- Create programmes that allow women to work collectively, providing them with a network of mutual support.

**Selected recommendations for strengthening programmes**

Author makes the following programmatic recommendations:

- Design programmes that require people applying for loans submit to training and coaching on good financial management practices.

\textsuperscript{91} Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
\textsuperscript{92} Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Morvan, “Etude de cas”.
• Design educational programmes on how to develop and adapt coping strategies to minimize harm to health, through for example, education on why balanced diet is important, nutritional priorities, healthy ways to reduce consumption.
• Survey existing income generation project around the world as a means of identifying ideas that might be useful locally.

Author makes the following policy relevant recommendations:

• Encourage self-sufficiency through sustainable agricultural livelihoods.
• Share information among different organizations in order to minimize duplication and increase effectiveness of each organization.

Author makes the following implementation recommendations:

• Assess qualifications of applicants for a programme’s benefits (e.g. microfinance) to ensure a threshold capability to benefit from the programme.
• Promote inter-agency cooperation by creating practical links between development and relief projects that lead to making the best use of local resources and supporting the local economy and finding ways of developing models for increased self-sufficiency.
• Develop poverty and vulnerability indicators that will be appropriate to the local context, i.e. the international benchmark for poverty of 1.00 US$ per day is not appropriate for Palestinians, falling well below the necessary minimum.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{96} Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
3. Do the different case studies share any concerns?

Each of the case studies addresses the question of coping strategies differently, and authors bring to each one a unique set of concerns. Nonetheless, there are some convergences in the authors’ recommendations for strengthening individual and community coping mechanisms of people facing the aftermath of crises. These convergences point to areas of shared concern across the case studies, which focus on different geographical regions, different types of crisis and different vulnerable populations.

Recommendations converged around several themes: reducing/preventing corruption in programmes; maximizing the value of programmes; strengthening local markets; information sharing; and reviving self-respect through self-sufficiency.

Recommendations for reducing/preventing corruption:

- Transparency in use of funds and management of programme, as well as in selection of programme managers/administrators and beneficiaries.
- Equal accountability of all local stakeholders.
- There should be a shift in policy from limiting migration to managing migration in order to avoid the negative effects of people smuggling and corruption.
- Transparency of government administration must be effected to ensure increased access to passports through formal channels and without the need for bribes.

Recommendations for maximizing value/benefits of programme:

- Vocational training programmes should focus on building on existing skills and capabilities especially when those skills are in demand locally. 97
- Ensure a threshold capability to benefit from the programme by assessing potential beneficiary’s qualifications and providing training and technical assistance tailored to specific needs of beneficiaries. 98
- Make available supplies needed to undertake new professions (e.g., seeds and farming tools) for which people are being trained.
- Flexible schedules for training programmes so that young people and women with families can participate easily.
- Preparations for programme implementation should be complete by the time financial support is in place.

Recommendations for strengthening local markets:

- Encourage the use of local materials and contractors to boost market demand.
- Forbid “food for work” programmes in favor of “cash for food” programmes to permit the introduction of revenue into local markets and limit the negative effects of food aid programmes on the local food providing sector.

Recommendation for information sharing:

- Encourage information sharing within and between development and relief organizations locally and internationally in order to promote mutual trust, minimize duplication and increase effectiveness.

97 Duplat, “Reinventado la subsistencia”.
98 Ibid.
Recommendation for reviving self-respect by promoting a culture of self-sufficiency

- Donors should provide sufficient financial support (in the form of formal and informal loans, grants, and cash) for short term work within a reasonably short period post conflict to rebuild the confidence and self-respect of the community and avoid the growth of a culture of dependency that is promoted by aid programmes.

Some of the recommendations that are unique to a given case study raise important issues, even though they do not explicitly reflect shared concerns.

Policy recommendations include:

- Implicit in public policies should be the recognition that displaced people have a right to socio-economic security.
- Promote apprenticeships as training vehicles since they involve reintegrating into society through collaboration with civilians and passing of knowledge from one generation to another.
- Encourage programmes to promote changes in social and cultural attitudes toward women by, for example, creating training programmes for women that are not limited to skills training for jobs typically associated with women, but rather that prepare them for work in all kinds of fields, those dominated by men as well as those dominated by women.
- Programme policies should foster mechanisms for preparedness, mitigation, and early warning, such as savings plans and the incorporation of disaster risk into business plans;
- Support cooperative agricultural activities to limit negative impacts on individuals.
- A policy of sharing project evaluations with all stakeholders should be adopted so that the evaluation can serve as the basis for dialogue
- Work closely with the receiving population to strengthen common mechanisms of protection in order to alleviate their potential envy or jealousy of the benefit being accorded to the displaced.
- Labour migrants should benefit from refugee protection.

Programmatic recommendations include:

- Provide assistance to commercial distribution services in order to expedite restoration of local distribution lines of goods and services;
- Create incentives for investment by private entrepreneurs; and
- Provide support to farmers in order to revive agricultural activity.
- Develop poverty and vulnerability indicators that will be appropriate to the local context;
- Create a centralized national data collection and management effort to which local and international organizations contribute, and make the data available for public use;
- Identify benchmarks for evaluating progress toward programme goals;
- Create a precise and in-depth mapping of local stakeholders and their interactions so they can all be called to participate in the process;
- Create a mechanism for effectively disseminating information useful to displaced women, e.g., where to find existing employment programmes, information about the culture of the receiving community to help them adapt

Implementation recommendations include:

- Establish regular opportunities to review progress and apply lessons learned up to that point to future phases of activities.
- Adopt a holistic approach, designing programmes that address emotional and physical needs as well as socio-economic needs.
4. A few concluding remarks and observations

**Addressing the problem of corruption and profiteering**

Because corruption and profiteering are so widespread, transparency and accountability are prominent in the recommendations of authors of the case studies.

Unequal power relations create conditions of socio-economic vulnerability, and post-conflict economies are often shaped to privilege certain powerful political actors. In Carolyn Nordstrom’s 2004 *Shadows of War*, she quotes a Sri Lankan friend who describes her country’s situation:

“Women and girls scrape together just enough to get some food or goods to sell to make some money to feed their families. And then you see the police and the military, taking what little these girls and women have. They feel entitled. You see it all the time: a woman will be walking down the street with goods to sell, and the police or the soldiers will just go up and take it. They have the power, she has nothing now.”

Nordstrom tells us that “Just as these troops demand payment from poor women, so must they pay up the ladder, compensating their commanding officers. And their commanding officers are able to demand far greater goods in their own sphere of work.”

But armed conflict is not the only context in which power relations and corruption play a role in aggravating socio-economic vulnerability. School officials have been reported to abuse their authority by raping and exploiting students, exchanging sex for grades or overcharging for tuition. In northern Uganda, rebels reportedly abducted young people from schools and along roads to and from school, and in Kosovo, parallel school systems taught different versions of history to Albanian and Serbian students, emphasizing divisions between them in the years leading up to the war.

The West Bank-Gaza case study briefly mentions illegal or unethical coping strategies such as “smuggling, theft, beggary [sic] and prostitution”, but does not elaborate. Stites acknowledges that corruption is likely to remain a presence in Bosnia until the Bosnian economy has grown sufficiently to create new jobs and opportunities for young people. Barakat & Wardell acknowledge that “there will always be persons and groups that have built wartime systems to exploit opportunities through the war economy.” But surprisingly they choose to ignore this fact and instead recommend that reconstruction and development efforts be based “on an accurate assessment of the genuine need for assistance to the most vulnerable in society” and to continue to provide relief on this basis only.

Nordstrom does not exaggerate when she tells us that: “For the people standing on that thin line of survival between living and becoming a casualty of war, the impact of [corruption and profiteering] is of existential proportions… But for most people in the world, these brushes with life, death, and profiteering are largely invisible…because militarily, much of war violates human sensibilities; because logistically, the front lines are

---

99 Nordstrom, Shadows of War.
100 Ibid.
101 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.
102 Barakat and Wardell, “Capitalizing on Capacities”.

36
difficult to document with neutrality; because economically, fortunes are made and lost in less than ethical ways; because politically, power covers its tracks.”

Noting that 90 per cent of Angola’s economy; 50 per cent of Kenya’s, Italy’s, and Peru’s economies; 40 to 60 per cent of Russia’s economy; and between 10 and 30 per cent of the United States economy enters into extra-state transactions, Nordstrom asks why a comparable amount of research and publication is not being produced on the topic of the “non-legal”. She argues that “extra-state economies are central to the world’s power grids” and that it is critical to “study the shadows” in order to understand the origins of major – and very visible events – taking place in the world today.

Given the significant presence of corruption, is it not naïve of the ILO to proceed as if giving all stakeholders a seat at the table, irrespective of the representational status within the existing power structure, will led to “a common vision among the different agendas”? According to the ILO Crisis Response Manual, the “basic pillars of the [recovery] system should be transparency, accountability and the rule of law.” But what if Nordstrom is right that the rule of law does not apply?

The obvious concern throughout the literature with the problem of corruption and profiteering requires immediate attention. For no matter how tight the design of a programme or project, no matter how well-funded the programme is, it cannot possibly have the desired impact if its design features are being compromised to please a corrupt official and funds are disappearing into the black holes of profiteering.

Creating distinct categories of victims of crisis

The migration patterns identified in the case study on Afghanistan suggested to the authors of the study that there is a “blurred boundary” between the category of ‘refugees’ on the one hand and the category of ‘voluntary economic migrants’ on the other. This suggests a rethinking the motivations for and implications of categorizing victims of crisis, especially if a distinction among victims leads to inadvertent discrimination against one or another victim group. Consider, for example, the fact that refugees may fare better than internally displaced people because they can take advantage of benefits offered by UNHCR while there may be no international agency present that is charged with the protection and care of IDPs.

A note on cultural sensitivity

According to the ILO Crisis Response Manual, addressing economic issues with sensitivity to local social and political contexts and respect for traditional practices should promote political stability and social dialogue. But the obstacles to socio-economic progress presented by some of the sociocultural traditions and practices described in the literature beg the question of how far one should go in respecting traditional practices. Obvious examples are the instances of social marginalization resulting from traditional views of women and children. ILO must tackle the question: what -if any- are the limits of respect for traditional practice? What should be the protocol when respect for traditional practice contributes to or perpetuates a violation of human rights?

103 Nordstrom, Shadows of War.
104 Ibid.
106 Women’s Commission, “Youth Speak Out”.

37
Sharing benefits of programmes targeting displaced people with local populations in need

Armed conflicts have profound and damaging consequences for the social-political structure, often leaving the civil society in shambles. An influx of displaced persons can strain a country’s already fragile infrastructure. One way of avoiding or alleviating potential tensions between the receiving community and the displaced population and thereby strengthening migration as a coping strategy is to follow the example given in Hall. When a UNHCR-funded ILO mission found that people in local agricultural communities and towns were as impoverished as the refugees who settled there, they proposed a set of 16 projects to create employment opportunities and reliable sources of income for both refugees and Sudanese living in the same localities.

Resettlement vs. integration into local communities

Further research is obviously needed on the question of whether and when it is appropriate for the ILO to supporting resettlement programmes for displaced people. Clearly, there is no single—or simple—answer. Evidence from the Afghanistan case study indicates that resettlement solutions fail to take into account the multidirectional aspect of population movements or the fact that the observed circulation of people in Afghanistan is neither transitory nor temporary. On the other hand, Stites reports that for the majority of Bosnian households in the study population, the desire to return home was central to their livelihood strategy during their period of displacement.

Environment

Violent conflict and militarization can result in misuse of natural resources, migration to and over-use of fragile lands, and other adverse environmental effects and environmental change can have direct and immediate effects on livelihoods. The West Bank-Gaza study claims that restrictions on movement stemming from the armed conflict are leading to negative repercussions for the environment as a result of difficulties in collecting, transporting, processing, and disposing of garbage appropriately. They report that there dumping is occurring near residential areas and much garbage is burnt openly. The study also refers to compromises in infrastructure, water quality and availability, forests and land as a consequence of the armed conflict.

Environmental factors such as water scarcity and population growth can undermine livelihood opportunities. Khagram et al maintain that the numerous interconnections among social systems, natural systems, and economic systems illustrate that protection and responsible management of natural resources can have an important role in preventing a skewed pattern of resource distribution that can lead to the restriction of economic and political opportunities for people. They argue that the notion of human security and human development leads to a view of human security as a right, as opposed to a need and that progress towards achieving sustainable security and development is more likely when historically disenfranchised and disempowered individuals and groups are directly involved in the process.

108 Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
109 Clark, Khagram and Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security”.
110 Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
111 Clark, Khagram and Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security”.

38
They argue further that successful governmental agencies and authorities work in a transparent, participatory and accountable manner, and that changing the rhetoric from development to security might call attention to the urgency of achieving these goals and encouraging the formulation of interconnected sustainable security and sustainable development objectives.\textsuperscript{112}

**Weighing local vs. global considerations**

It is now widely recognized that global forces operate differently in the different local and national contexts to determine social and economic outcomes around the world. According to the ILO \textit{Crisis Response Manual}, top-down approaches that apply identical solutions to different parts of the national territory and attempt to standardize development policies has largely failed because each territory is characterized by different socio-economic, cultural and political needs and characteristics.\textsuperscript{113}

Khagram et al argue that both threats to and opportunities for sustainable development do not emerge primarily at global or local levels, but at “intermediate scales, where both broader trends and the particularities of place come together”. They also argue that the need for economic flexibility within global markets has strengthened the argument that centrally planned, top down policies (or the mere reproduction of development policies in different contexts) are no longer appropriate for the achievement of long-term economic growth targets.\textsuperscript{114}

**Infrastructure development**

When considering the recommendations offered in the case studies which are at the heart of this paper, it is important to consider that the benefits of infrastructure development are important even if they are not readily apparent.\textsuperscript{115} For example, the repair and extension of arterial and feeder roads into remote rural areas helps improve access to markets for the agricultural and handicraft sectors in which rural women are employed. In addition, infrastructural developments such as roads and rural electrification can free up women’s time from involvement in traditional tasks such as water collection, firewood gathering etc., thereby enabling investment in activities that enhance the quality of their lives.

**Combining short and long term strategies**

The West Bank/Gaza case study illustrates the benefits of combining short and long term strategies. It describes one project in which a school uniform sewing project culminated in the distribution of the uniforms to the poor in the community; in another, villagers cut off from markets by security closures, bought olive oil produced in the West Bank and distributed it as part of food aid among recipients in other areas.\textsuperscript{116} These examples fuel Khagram et al’s claim that sustainability is most often achieved by actions that address immediate challenges while focusing on longer-term goals through a series of intermediate range actions.\textsuperscript{117} This claim is consistent with an approach in which relief and development are offered in tandem, as encouraged by the ILO, and Hall seems to call for dispensing with the distinction between “humanitarian” and “development” aid and instead thinking about aid programmes as sui generis.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} ILO, “Rapid Needs Assessment Manual”.
\textsuperscript{114} Clark, Khagram and Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security”.
\textsuperscript{115} Barakat and Wardell, “Capitalizing on Capacities”.
\textsuperscript{116} Engler, “Women and Women-Headed Households Vulnerability”.
\textsuperscript{117} Clark, Khagram and Raad, “From the Environment and Human Security”.
\textsuperscript{118} Hall, “Eye to the Future”.
**Listening to youth**

“*Youth Speak Out*” tells us that young people

“...are still not systematically sought out by adult decision-makers, and their capacities to find innovative solutions are still largely disregarded by governments and humanitarian groups. young people said adults did not take their opinions into account consistently in decision-making, or engage them in programme action regularly, leaving them with limited opportunities to develop their skills and improve their lives.”

It makes a case for promoting the participation of young people in decision-making as an essential means of ensuring their protection and for the need to create opportunities to build strong, constructive relationships between young people and adults.\(^{119}\)

**Ensuring a minimum threshold of support**

It is important for both organizations and funders to recognize that unless the level of funding meets a minimum threshold, it cannot be expected to make much of an impact. Hall’s discussion of an under-funded project is a cautionary tale. She describes a project whose activities required transporting a limited supply of materials and equipment between 28 settlements and six towns because they could not afford to buy enough to leave in each location. As a result, tremendous efforts were required to maintain efficiency and effectiveness but it was impossible to make a substantial impact at any one of the sites.\(^{120}\)

By the same token, this tale also cautions against trying to accomplish too much with too little. Had the programme design been scaled-down to suit the level of funding provided, less effort would have been required to achieve the same level of impact. It is even conceivable that the project would have had a greater impact at each individual site if the number of sites had been reduced.

\(^{119}\) Women’s Commission, “*Youth Speak Out*”.  
\(^{120}\) Hall, “*Eye to the Future*”.  

---

40
Annexes

1. Bibliography


Anne Anlin Cheng: “The Melancholy of Race”.


Sean Loughna: “What is forced migration?”, Forced Migration On-Line.


42


Paper commissioned by ILO on Indonesia [charley: no info was provided in paper, my copy started with the body of the paper.]


Celia Wells, Derek Morgan & Oliver Quick, N.D. on line article

The vulnerability and recovery capacity of the informal sector in the face of natural disasters: A case study of natural disasters in Indonesia

Dr. Krishna S. Pribadi

August 2005
Acknowledgements

The implementation of this research study within the framework of the research programme on “Strengthening employment in response to crises” has been accomplished thanks to the efforts and support from a number of partners, whose cooperation in the project has been essential to its completion. We are thankful for the welcoming and kind contribution of all the respondents in the informal sector without whom this study would not have seen the light. We also wish to express our thankfulness to the many institutions that granted their support to this endeavour. In the Banda Aceh Municipality, we would like to point out: the Community Empowerment Board and their sections of Employment and Population, of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises, of Industry and Trade and the Local Environmental Monitoring Board. In the East Jakarta Municipality, appreciation is due to the sub sections of Community Protection, of Cooperation and Small Medium Enterprises, the Local Disaster Management Unit, and the City Planning Board. In the Cimahi Municipality, we thank the section of Community Welfare, of Community Empowerment and National Integrity, of Sanitary and Environmental Management and of Information and Communication. And in the Bandung District, we thank the sections of Environmental Management, of Sanitary Improvement as well as the Local Disaster Management Unit.

Appreciation is also due to Mr. Luca Fedi from the InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Recovery (IFP/CRISIS) of the International Labour Organization (ILO), for his support and encouragement to the project team, without whom this study would not have achieved the present result. We would like to extend the same appreciation to the ILO Office in Banda Aceh for their valuable and appreciated support to our field work in Banda Aceh.

The execution of the project has benefited from the contributions of the whole project team of the Center of Disaster Mitigation at the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), I. Wayan Sengara (Director of the center), Krishna S. Pribadi (Team leader), Teti A. Argo (Community development specialist), Aria Mariany and Lyly Fresty Lubis (Research assistants) and Puspa Sarwo Rini (Supporting staff).
# Table of contents

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 45

List of acronyms ............................................................................................................................. 48

Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 49

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 49

2. Project approach and methodology ............................................................................................ 52
   2.1. The framework ....................................................................................................................... 52
   2.2. Design of the surveys ............................................................................................................ 54
   2.3. Survey implementation .......................................................................................................... 54

3. A profile of natural disasters in Indonesia ..................................................................................... 55
   3.1. Major natural hazards in Indonesia ........................................................................................ 55
   3.2. Man-made hazards ............................................................................................................... 58
   3.3. Disaster case studies ............................................................................................................. 59
       3.3.1. Banda Aceh .................................................................................................................. 59
       3.3.2. East Jakarta .................................................................................................................... 60
       3.3.3. Leuwigajah ..................................................................................................................... 61

4. The characteristics of the informal sector ..................................................................................... 63
   4.1. Defining the informal sector, business and livelihoods ......................................................... 63
   4.2. General characteristics of the informal sector ...................................................................... 64
   4.3. Proposed analytical framework for informal micro and small businesses ......................... 65
   4.4. The informal sector in Indonesia .......................................................................................... 66
       4.4.1. Banda Aceh .................................................................................................................. 66
       4.4.2. East Jakarta .................................................................................................................... 68
       4.4.3. Leuwigajah ..................................................................................................................... 69

5. Vulnerability and capacity of the informal sector to cope with various hazards ......................... 72
   5.1. The earthquake and tsunami in Banda Aceh ................................................................. 72
       5.1.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms ................................................. 72
       5.1.2. Socio-economic vulnerability and impact assessment ................................................... 72
       5.1.3. Coping strategies and capacity to respond .................................................................... 73
   5.2. Seasonal river floods in East Jakarta .................................................................................. 74
       5.2.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms ................................................. 74
       5.2.2. Socio-economic vulnerability and impact assessment ................................................... 74
       5.2.3. Coping strategies and capacities to respond ................................................................. 75
   5.3. Solid waste slides in Leuwigajah ......................................................................................... 75
       5.3.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms ................................................. 75
### List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Area Development Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>Capital Special Region – Daerah Khusus Ibukota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFT</td>
<td>Food For Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDR</td>
<td>Indonesian Rupiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILCS</td>
<td>International Conference of Labour Statisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITB</td>
<td>Institut Teknologi Bandung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (province)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2KP</td>
<td>Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Final Solid Waste Disposal Site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

This study attempts to contribute to an understanding of the functioning of the local economy in the aftermath of a natural disaster. The vulnerability and capacity of the local economy to recover in the face of three types of disasters is considered through field research in three case study areas: Banda Aceh, as exemplifying an earthquake and tsunami disaster; East Jakarta as a case of seasonal-related floods; and Leuwigajah as a case of man-made disasters, in this case a solid waste-slide.

The study focuses on the informal sector, considered as the most significant sector in terms of the local economy and employment, and the most vulnerable to disasters in socio-economic terms. A categorization of the sector into three sub-sectors is identified for the purpose of the analysis: the primary sub-sector includes services provided to consumers excluding trade, the secondary sub-sector manufactures consumption goods from modified raw materials, and the tertiary sub-sector refers to the trading sector. These sub-sectors are then analysed in conjunction with the operation factors for their effective functioning, namely the inputs (raw materials and equipment), the production process (or provision of services) and market demand.

We will also focus our attention on the assessment of the post-disaster economics in the informal sector. The vulnerability and capacity of this sector to recover from disaster is analysed across three analytic stages: early warning, preparatory and mitigation mechanisms; their socio-economic vulnerability and their capacity for recovery. As far as early warning and preparatory mechanisms, the study found that while in Banda Aceh and Leuwigajah, no such mechanisms were in place to reduce the vulnerability of the sector to the specific disaster that struck them, East Jakarta was properly equipped with such mechanisms that considerably reduced the impact of the seasonal river floodings affecting the area. The impact of the disaster itself on the livelihoods of informal sector operators is thereafter assessed. Expectedly, the three informal sub-sectors in Banda Aceh have been gravely affected by the disaster at all stages of operation, however, the study finds that specific sub-sectors are more affected than others, as well as specific operation factors within each sub-sector of activity. The study also points to the recovery capacity and the time-line for the recovery in each sub-sector, which differ significantly.

The study thereafter examines external support programmes for informal sector recovery from governmental and non-governmental organizations in the three case study areas. It is found that while governmental assistance focuses either on the immediate humanitarian needs of affected communities, or on the longer-term infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation works, only the non-governmental sector has engaged in specific support to the informal sector to this very day.

On the basis of this analysis, the study outlines a set of action-oriented recommendations for the support to the recovery of the informal sector in the aftermath of a disaster. Priority areas of support are highlighted, based on the assessed needs and the capacity of the sector to recover, and a time-line of recovery. Targetted areas of support to specific sectors, and to specific operation factors are identified, along with appropriate response tools to facilitate the recovery process of the local economy while minimizing potential distortions induced by external intervention.
Introduction

This study aims at assessing the vulnerability of the informal sector to natural and human-made disasters in Indonesia, its capacity to recover and the necessary conditions for this recovery.

Three case studies were conducted to address this issue. The first case study was conducted in the Municipality of Banda Aceh, in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), struck by an earthquake rating 9.3 on the Richter scale, followed by a tsunami, on 26 December 2004. The second case study took place in the Municipality of East Jakarta, part of the Jakarta Capital Special Region – Daerah Khusus Ibukota province (DKI), which is prone to annual monsoon-related floods. The third case study was located in an area covering several villages in the District of Bandung and the Municipality of Cimahi, both located in the province of West Java, which suffered a solid waste-slide from the Final Solid Waste Disposal Site (TPA) of Leuwigajah on 21 February 2005.

Section 2 in this study describes the framework of approach and analysis, design of survey, survey implementation and data analysis. Section 3 describes natural and man-made hazards in Indonesia and in the case study areas (Banda Aceh, East Jakarta, and Leuwigajah). Section 4 presents a definition of the informal sector, its characteristics in Indonesia and in the case study areas. Section 5 attempts analyses of the informal sector’s vulnerability and capacity to recover on the basis of the conducted field research. Section 6 provides an overview of current informal sector support efforts from governmental, international and non-governmental organizations in the case study areas. Finally, recommendations are made in Section 7 for improving approaches towards livelihood support in the aftermath of a natural disaster with special focus on building on the local capacities of the informal sector.
2. Project approach and methodology

2.1. The framework

The knowledge base for this study has been assembled in the three case study areas using the logical matrix in Annex 2 (cf The methodological framework for field research and analysis). The matrix provides a framework to analyse the intersection of the informal sector with the phases of disaster (pre, impact and post) and the expected outcomes of each stage. The assessment is based on a categorisation of factors of business operation (inputs, production and marketing). Governmental, non-governmental or international programmes and projects that aim at strengthening the capacity of the informal sector are also examined through this matrix. The desk study is continuously employed in order to verify the process of data-gathering and to expedite the analysis stage. Interim analysis is referred to in order to look into the interim vulnerability patterns.

The key concepts as used in this research are defined below.

**Hazard and disaster**

The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements defined a natural disaster "as the interaction between natural hazard, generated in most cases from a sudden and unexpected natural event, and vulnerable conditions which cause severe losses to man and his environment (built and natural)” (UNCHS, 1994 in El-Masri & Tipple, 1997:3). These losses create suffering and chaos in the normal patterns of life, with socio-economic, cultural and sometimes, political impacts. Disaster risk is defined as the possibility of disaster occurrence which causes certain losses in terms of lives, livelihoods, and/or property.

**Vulnerability**

The working definition of vulnerability for the purpose of this study is the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or human-made hazard. It includes factors such as the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event. We interpret vulnerability as a negative factor that heightens the likely impact of particular disaster.

The vulnerability of the micro and small enterprises sector is examined based on the condition during various stages of the disaster cycle, namely pre-impact and post-disaster (see Figure 1: Disaster management cycle):

- the examination of the pre-disaster situation is carried out for the purpose of defining a profile of the informal sector under “normal” conditions. The main question to focus on is that of preparedness;
- the examination of the impact of a given disaster (immediate impact stage) is made in particular by looking at the nature of destruction and the level of vulnerability that may be recognized;
- the examination of the post-disaster stage emphasizes the capacity of the community to recover their businesses, to rehabilitate their properties, mitigate and increase preparedness with a view to future risks.
**Capacity**

By “capacity”, we understand the existing means and resources present in individuals, households, in the community and in businesses, enabling them to cope with, mitigate and recover from the economic impact of a disaster.

Capacity is henceforward considered as including:

- physical, material and economic means, in the form of cash, land, tools, food, jobs or access to credit;
- social or organizational means in the community such as good leadership, caring local and national institutions, solidarity and cooperation;
- individual behavioural or motivational means (self-confidence, autonomy, resourcefulness).

**Informal sector**

While an extensive definition of the informal sector is proposed in Section 4, it is worthwhile to note here that three sub-sectors of informal businesses are identified for the purpose of this analysis. These are:

- the *primary informal sub-sector* (Personal services): informal actors in this sector provide services to consumers on the basis of specific skills, as for example vehicle repair shops, owner of commercial phone booths, etc. For analytic purposes, the trade sector is excluded from this sub-sector;
- the *secondary informal sub-sector*: economic actors in this sector process raw materials into marketable goods and services, such as the small food and beverages industry;
- the *tertiary informal sub-sector*: this sector comprises the trade sector and in particular retail traders, such as vendors in local markets, itinerant vegetable vendors, etc.
The above three sub-sectors are analysed on the basis of their business operation cycles. Three dimensions are considered as far as the factors conducive for operation:

- **the input**: factors include raw materials, labour, capital, and equipment;
- **the production** (or trading): this dimension refers to the environment conducive for operation such as location factors, legal and administrative regulations, competitors, infrastructure, the natural environment and security;
- **market demand**: factors such as consumer power and access to consumers.

### 2.2. Design of the surveys

The following qualitative tools have been used in the field research to address respective research objectives:

- semi-structured interviews with government officials, business development officials and local community organizations such as RT and RW (neighbourhood units) were conducted to understand the territories and economic activities affected, as well as the level of external support they are granted in such circumstances to strengthen, revive and rebuild businesses;
- questionnaire interviews by field investigators were directed towards the actors in the informal sectors;
- visual observations were conducted to refine the understanding of the level of vulnerability and the capacity of the local informal sector;
- sampling criteria for the definition of the informal sector referring to the general definition of the informal sector (see Section 4). The criteria as far as the impact of the disaster distinguished four levels of impact:
  - the home is affected, while the business location (either production or marketing) has remained unaffected;
  - only the consumer base is affected;
  - the production or marketing location is affected, but consumer base is not;
  - their consumers and production are affected.

### 2.3. Survey implementation

The survey in Banda Aceh was conducted from 6 to 10 April, 2005 among a sample of informal businesses struck by the 26 December earthquake and following tsunami. It produced 32 valid respondents from the informal businesses sector (23 men and 9 women). Informal sector entrepreneurs and employees were identified and approached in campsites, markets, commercial neighbourhoods and through personal networks of the field investigators.

The Leuwigajah area was surveyed from 6 to 10 April, 2005. Fourteen valid informal businesses respondents, victims of the solid waste-slide and seven respondents from both governmental and non-governmental organizations were obtained. Informal sector businesses were interviewed representing the informal sector that work in the solid waste economy as well as in the larger small business communities in the territory.

In East Jakarta the survey was conducted from 13 to 17 April, 2005 in the villages of Kelurahan, Bidara Cina, Kampung Melayu and Cawang, located on the Ciliwung riverbank, an area prone to annual floods. Twenty-three respondents of the informal sector and three respondents of governmental agencies in East Jakarta were obtained.
3. **A profile of natural disasters in Indonesia**

Indonesia is the largest archipelago-nation in the world. The country is made up of 17,508 islands stretching over 3,977 miles between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and two continents, Asia and Australia. This strategic geopolitical position reflects in its cultural, social, political, and economic features. The five largest islands are Sumatera (473,606 Km$^2$), Java (132,107 Km$^2$), Kalimantan – the third largest island in the world (539,460 Km$^2$), Sulawesi (189,216 Km$^2$) and Papua (421,981 Km$^2$).

![Map of Indonesian archipelago](image)

3.1. **Major natural hazards in Indonesia**

Indonesia is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, a feature recently compounded by the 26 December, 2004 earthquake and tsunami. Indonesia has an intense history of natural disasters ranging from volcanic and seismic-related activities to landslides and floods, droughts, forest fires and haze.

The geodynamic position of Indonesia places it in the "Pacific Ring of Fire", denoting the interaction of four tectonic plates (i.e. the Indonesian-Australian plate, the Eurasian plate, the Philippine plate and the Pacific plate). This particular feature makes Indonesia one of the most seismically active countries in the world. Some active transformed faults, well-known as earthquake generators, include the Great Sumatra Fault (Sumatera Island), Palu-Koro Fault (Central Sulawesi/Celebes) and Sorong Fault (Papua Island). Several severe earthquakes have devastated cities and rural areas in the past, causing major losses of life and property. Earthquake epicentres located on the seabed are also known to have caused devastating tsunami waves.

Recent events related to the Aceh-Andaman-Nicobar earthquake and tsunami, claiming over 250,000 lives in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait region, have highlighted a lack of awareness and preparedness at all levels in Indonesia, despite the well-known intense seismic and volcanic activity in the region. Indeed, major destructive earthquakes and tsunamis have been recorded in the past 15 years such as tsunamis in Flores, Biak, Banggai Island, and Banyuwangi. Other locations in the country such as Liwa in the Lampung Province, Bengkulu, Kerinci in the Jambi Province, Bali, Alor Island, Nabire and Manokwari in the Papua Province have been struck by earthquakes of a magnitude of over 6.0 on the Richter scale within the past year.
The following map divides Indonesia into six seismic-risk zones. Zone 1 (white) is the area with the lowest earthquake magnitude and Zone 6 is the one with the highest.

**Figure 3: Seismic Zoning Map of Indonesia**

The earthquake magnitude in each zone is as follows: Zone 1 (white): 0.05 g, Zone 2 (blue): 0.05 – 0.15 g, Zone 3 (green): 0.15 – 0.20 g, Zone 4 (yellow): 0.20 – 0.25 g, Zone 5 (light blue): 0.25 – 0.30 g, Zone 6 (red): 0.30– 0.40 g.

Tectonic activity is also at the origin of volcanic activity and eruptions. In Indonesia there are currently more than 500 “young” volcanoes including 128 active ones, a figure equal to 15 per cent of the active volcanoes in the world. The most active volcano in Indonesia is Mount Merapi, situated 20 kilometres to the north of the densely-populated city of Yogyakarta. In many cases, with the current technology and monitoring procedure, the impact of tectonic eruption has been increasingly mitigated in the past 30 years.
Figure 4: Location of active volcanoes (blue) and volcanic eruptions (yellow)

![Map showing active volcanoes and volcanic eruptions in Indonesia.](image)

Source: US Department of Interior, 2002

NB: Red dots represent cities.

Other natural disasters, sometimes exacerbated by human activities or even generated by them, include floods, landslides, droughts, and forest fires. These are often linked to environmental degradation and erosion. In the monsoon season, Indonesia is threatened by floods and landslides. The landslide hazard in some parts of Indonesia is compounded by the geomorphology of the country, consisting of landslide-prone soil and rock formation in mountainous steep-sloped terrain.

**Recent disasters in Indonesia**

Floods and landslides were Indonesia’s predominant natural disasters in 2003. Global climate changes and regional climate conditions were considered to influence these natural disasters; the following table presents data collection on natural disasters in Indonesia in 2003 and 2004.
Table 1: Natural disaster occurrence in Indonesia in 2003 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of disaster</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Damaged houses</th>
<th>Human casualties</th>
<th>Value of lost goods (in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>28,287</td>
<td>5,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landslide</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoon</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>6,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land/forest fire and haze</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>13,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanic eruption</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>55,219</td>
<td>29,016</td>
<td>1,748,415,772,434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2005, 134 strong earthquakes were recorded, some of them causing major destruction; several floods occurred in Indonesia between January and April of that same year. Among the types of disasters, earthquakes claimed the most human lives, despite the fact that the number of occurrences was lower than other types of disasters.

3.2. Man-made hazards

Besides natural disasters, Indonesia is also facing an ever increasing number of man-made types of disasters. The table below recollects such recent disasters that occurred between 2003 and 2004.

Table 2: Man-made disasters in Indonesia in 2003 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of disaster</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Damaged houses</th>
<th>Human casualties</th>
<th>Value of lost goods (in IDR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological failures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>161,022,422,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 21 February 2005, a landslide -more appropriately called a solid waste-slide- occurred on the solid waste disposal site in Leuwigajah, near the city of Bandung, claiming more than 140 lives in a densely-populated village situated at the foot of the site (Pikiran-Rakyat Daily Newspaper, 2005). The event can be qualified as a man-made disaster due to the origin of the tragedy, stemming from the poor management of the sanitary landfill system.
3.3. Disaster case studies

This study focuses on three case studies of natural and man-made disasters in Indonesia, namely earthquakes and consequent tsunamis, monsoon-related floods and solid waste-slides. The terrible earthquakes and tsunami waves which struck Banda Aceh caused unprecedented devastation at both human and economic levels. The flood disaster in East Jakarta directly affected a part of the economic territory with damage limited to properties/assets in a delimited area. The solid waste-slide in Leuwigajah affected delimited sections of a territory directly but claimed lives, infrastructure and properties/assets. A basic categorization of these types of disasters is provided in the table.

Table 3: Categorization of disaster impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic magnitude</th>
<th>Devastation level</th>
<th>High (lives, infrastructures, and properties/assets)</th>
<th>Limited (properties/assets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affecting a whole economic territory</td>
<td>Earthquake and tsunami disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flood disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affecting a part of the economic territory</td>
<td>Solid waste slide</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flood disaster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1. Banda Aceh

Banda Aceh is the capital and largest city of the NAD province, located on the island of Sumatera at 5°31’N and 95°25’E, with an elevation of 21 m. above sea-level. The population is estimated at 225,000 inhabitants.

Geographically, NAD is bordered by the Andaman Sea to the north, the Malaka Straits to the east, the Province of North Sumatera to the south, and the Indian Ocean to the west. The population in Banda Aceh in 2004 before the major disaster amounted to 1,734,722 people (875,873 male and 858,849 female). The population density rate was 76 persons per Km² and annual population growth rate was 1.46 per cent.
In general, the physiography of NAD is divided into 3 morphologies: (ITB, 2005)

- on the west coast from Barisan Mountain, a line of precipitous hills rises up to 2,000 m.;
- Banda Aceh is dominated by alluvial sedimentation and by plio-plistosin sedimentation;
- on the north coast, a set of 500 m. high hillocks can be found, dominated by soft young tertiary sedimentation.

On 26 December, 2004, one of the deadliest natural disasters in modern history, the Indian Ocean earthquake, struck off the western coast of Sumatera. It was an undersea earthquake that occurred at 00:58:53 UTC (07:58:53 local time). The earthquake and subsequent tsunamis reportedly killed over 250,000 people around the rim of the Indian Ocean. On Wednesday, 19 January, the Indonesian Ministry of Health declared 166,320 deaths and 6,245 people missing as a result of the disaster. Relief agencies warned of the possibility of more deaths to come as a result of epidemics caused by poor sanitation while the threat of starvation seemed to have been largely averted (BBC News, 9 January, 2005). The plight of the Acehnese people prompted a massive and widespread international humanitarian response.

3.3.2. East Jakarta

East Jakarta is divided into 10 sub-districts and 65 villages with a population of 1,960,000 inhabitants (about 10 per cent of the total population in DKI Jakarta). The population density rate is of 10,445 persons per Km², and annual population growth rate is 2.4 per cent. The average per capita income is 5,057,040 IDR (+532 US$) per year. Ninety-five per cent of the area surrounding East Jakarta is made up of land while the remaining 5 per cent are essentially rice fields and marshes.

East Jakarta is especially vulnerable to periodic floodings due to its geographic situation; the region lies approximately 50 m. above sea level and is bathed by numerous rivers. In February 2002, floods claimed at least 31 lives and the capital was paralyzed for days. According to data provided by the provincial government of DKI Jakarta, 601 RW in 176 Kelurahan (urban villages) were submerged and about 300,000 residents had to be evacuated.

---

121 The numbers released from official and media sources differed. The Social Affairs Ministry has been keeping a count that on Wednesday (19 January, 2005) stood at 114,978 dead and 12,132 missing. The Associated Press (AP) has used the Social Affairs Ministry count for its tally of casualties. The total compiled by AP from governments in each country is at least 162,228 deaths. The United Nations on Tuesday (18 January) listed the number of deaths in the 26 December, 2004 disaster at 165,493.
122 The exchange rate of IDR at the time of the study was 1 US$= 9,500 IDR
123 Kelurahan is village under the sub-district (kecamatan) authority, which is also under Municipality authority
Twenty-four per cent of the total area of 650 Km$^2$ was flooded (Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, 2002). These floods, alongside those of 1996 have caused great economic losses in and around the city, especially in the east.

According to the information provided by the Sub Section of Community Protection of East Jakarta, the five most severely affected Kelurahan were: Kampung Melayu, Bidara Cina, Cawang, Cipinang Besar Utara and Cipinang Besar Selatan.

Heavy rainfall in Jakarta and its immediate vicinity caused floods in many parts of the city; however densely-populated areas such as those near the Ciliwung river were especially affected.

The 1996 and 2002 floods seem to display a worsening in the phenomenon, a reality often attributed to unlimited urbanization with its impact on soil erosion and urbanization in high risk flood-prone areas.

3.3.3. Leuwigajah

Leuwigajah is a TPA for the Bandung and Cimahi municipalities located in the Municipality of Cimahi, West Java province. The actual site covers 25.1 hectares, 5.5 hectares of which belong to the Municipality of Cimahi.

Bandung is the capital city of West Java province. The population of Bandung Municipality (based on 2000 figures) was estimated at 2,585,446 people (among them 4,301 expatriates) with a population density ratio of 155 inhabitants per Km$^2$.

The solid waste-slide occurred on 21 February, 2005 at 02.00 am when a 70 m wall of solid waste suddenly collapsed and slid for about 1 Km, crashing into a settlement, killing 145 persons; 69 houses were damaged, causing the displacement of 136 inhabitants.
Apparently, the origin of this disaster was persistent rainfall (>80 mm/day), which eventually caused land instability and methane (bio-gas) explosions, triggering the fatal landslide. Local witnesses confirmed hearing several explosions prior to being struck by the landslide.

Field observations clearly show that the main slide was concentrated on the spring flow covered by litter, i.e. on the western slope of the site. The width of the landslide was 200 meters, creating semi-vertical slopes of waste close to 50 to 60 meters high on either sides of the valley, thus heightening the risk of further slides.

**Picture 3: The solid waste-slide at Leuwigajah(2)**
4. **The characteristics of the informal sector**

4.1. **Defining the informal sector, business and livelihoods**

The informal sector is often characterized in terms of what it is not: it is not the formal sector (non-formal); it is not controlled by the government or taxable (non-planned, hidden, unofficial, unrecorded, parallel); and it is not legal (illegal, black / grey, shadow). More recent definitions have used the characteristics of the sector itself (casual, family enterprise), some emphasizing poverty (subsistence, petty commodity, and one-person enterprise) or its 'temporary' nature (transient, intermediate).

A number of definitions of the informal sector have been proposed since the early 1970s. The ILO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were referring in 1972 “to the non-structured sector that has emerged in the urban centres as a result of the incapacity of the modern sector to absorb new entrants”. The same type of definition has been described for those in the rural areas as well.

The concept of the informal sector was introduced to international usage in 1972 by the ILO in its Kenya Mission Report, which defined informality as a “way of doing things characterized by (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) family ownership; (d) small scale operations; (e) labour intensive and adaptive technology; (e) skills acquired outside of the formal sector; (g) unregulated and competitive markets”.

A “Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in The Informal Sector” was adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILCS) in January 1993. The ILCS stated that “The informal sector comprises informal own-account enterprises and enterprises of informal employers. Enterprises of informal employers are defined in terms of one or more of the following three criteria: small size of the establishment(s) in terms of employment, nonregistration of the enterprise and its employees (in terms of the absence of employment contracts which commit the employer to pay relevant taxes and social security contributions on behalf of the employees or which make employment relationships subject to standard labour legislation). The total of employees is including the business owner(s) and family workers”.

The ILO/ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) international symposium on the informal sector in 1999 proposed the informal sector workforce could be categorized into three broad groups:

- owner-employees of micro enterprises, which employ a few paid workers, with or without apprentices;
- own-account workers, who own and operate one-person businesses, who work alone or with the help of unpaid workers, generally family members and apprentices;
- dependent workers, paid or unpaid, including wageworkers in micro enterprises, unpaid family workers, apprentices, contract labour, home workers and paid domestic workers.

The Statistical Bureau of Indonesia has not come out with a precise definition of the informal sector, and therefore several definitions exist among governmental agencies, regional and local authorities. As far as employment statistics, the definition of the informal sector includes unpaid workers and family member workers.
At the empirical level, the informal sector is often defined to include enterprises which employ less than a certain number of persons (e.g. 5 to 10 people, depending on the country's official procedures) per unit, and which simultaneously satisfies one or more of the following criteria:

- it operates in open spaces;
- it is housed in a temporary or semi-permanent structure;
- it does not operate from spaces assigned by the government, municipality or private organizers of officially recognized market-places;
- it operates from residences or backyards;
- it is not registered.

4.2. General characteristics of the informal sector

The informal sector plays an important and controversial role. It certainly contributes in reducing un- and underemployment as well as poverty, but in many cases the jobs are poorly-paid and levels of job security remain low. It bolsters entrepreneurial activity, but at the detriment of State regulation compliance (particularly regarding tax and labour legislation). Its size and role in the economy typically increases during economic downturns, periods of economic adjustment and transition, and other crises. The size of the informal labour market varies from the estimated 4 to 6 per cent in the high-income countries to over 50 per cent in the low-income countries.

The modern, regulated, formal sector has not had the capacity to absorb all the new entrants to the labour market, especially in developing countries. Informal sector activities provide an alternative to high open unemployment (it is estimated for example that more than 50 per cent of the non-agricultural employment in Africa is found in the informal sector).

Despite their numbers and their contribution to the economy, most workers in the informal economy face greater risks and enjoy fewer opportunities to make progress in their careers than their counterparts in the formal economy. To begin with, informal workers face greater exposure to general risks such as illness, property loss, disability, old age and death. Second, informal workers face greater work-related risks, such as less secure contracts, fewer benefits, and poorer working conditions than wageworkers. The self-employed have less access to information and low bargaining power for capital or products. Third, those who work in the informal economy typically have fewer mechanisms for dealing with risks, that is, less access to formal sources of finance and labour protection. Finally, informal wageworkers enjoy fewer career opportunities than formal wageworkers and informal entrepreneurs enjoy fewer market opportunities than formal counterparts.

The main features of informal sector businesses are listed by McLaughlin (1990):

- the use of family and unpaid labour (apprentices);
- the reliance on manual labour rather than on sophisticated machinery and equipment;
- flexibility, allowing people to enter and exit economic activities in response to market demand;
- simple and sometimes precarious facilities;
- the ability to improvise products from scrap materials;
- a willingness to operate businesses at times and locations convenient to customers;
- a tendency to locate in smaller markets, out of the reach of the larger firms.
In its 1998 World Employment Report, the ILO identified three categories of the informal sector: small and micro enterprises, household-based enterprises and the individual service sector. Informal employment is comprised of two basic components: self-employment in informal enterprises and wage-employment in informal jobs. While the processes of production and distribution in the informal economy are often irregular or even illegal, the goods and services produced by the informal sector are generally legal.

McLaughlin (1990) finds that micro enterprises only provide a means of subsistence through the production of goods and services on a small-scale with lower quality and prices, while small and medium enterprises are associated with higher levels of education of the entrepreneurs, higher levels of income and a longer time in business.

The type of activities carried-out in the sector varies between urban and rural areas. Entrepreneurs in urban areas are involved in activities which are more geared towards the needs of the modern sector. Some of the most common fields of activities are vehicle and radio repair, appliance repair, manufacture of bricks and aggregates for construction, currency exchange, etc. The most frequent activities identified in rural areas relate to blacksmithing, leather crafts, water pump manufacture, herbal medicines, etc. In rural areas, earnings are much lower than in urban areas; this situation gives rise to a net migration of the youth from the countrysides to towns and cities, creating a number of social problems in the towns adding to the already existing pressure on social services. Such a situation finally leads to delinquency and the growth of shanty suburban areas.

### 4.3. Proposed analytical framework for informal micro and small businesses

For the purpose of this research, we use a somewhat modified form of the conventional classification of business into primary, secondary and tertiary sub-sectors (Keesgrave, 2002) to categorize informal sector businesses. As mentioned in Section 2, three informal sub-sectors are identified for the sake of this analysis. The primary sub-sector consists of personal or individual services, the secondary sub-sector comprises production and manufacturing businesses whereas the tertiary sub-sector includes distribution and trading services. Within each identified sector, the livelihood activity is apprehended on the basis of the factors for operation, namely the inputs (raw materials, goods and equipment), the production process (that may also include delivery of services), and market demand.

The primary sub-sector is populated by informal businesses relying on one or a few employees to offer individual services to customers. Employees usually develop skills based on experiences, and the vast majority of these entrepreneurs/employees never receive vocational training. Examples of activity areas include motorcycle repair, gate repair, hairdresser, etc.
The secondary sub-sector produces and sells consumer goods by processing raw materials. Production, marketing and sales can be done in permanent or mobile locations depending on customer location and demand. Their production and marketing mechanisms depend on their social network and economic skills. They begin their work/trade with own capital and possibly with some loans from friends or family. They usually employ staff on a permanent, temporary or seasonal basis (usually neighbours), and may also employ family members (often without direct retribution).

The tertiary sub-sector is composed of businesses that act as distributors. They often begin work with own capital, and sometimes with loans from their social network. They usually work by themselves or are supported by their family, and in many cases have no employees. However, on certain occasions, when demand increases sharply, for example during festivity periods, they hire temporary staff to cope with increasing demand.

4.4. The informal sector in Indonesia

The characteristics of informal sector businesses in Indonesia correspond to the general features of the informal sector as cited from McLaughlin (1990) above. They do not have legal business operation permits from relevant governmental agencies, nor tax identification from the tax authorities. Living conditions of the actors of the informal sector vary from those living in poverty to those in the middle class level. Based on the study by Sethuraman (1997), the informal economy has accounted for approximately 53.8 per cent of the total employment in the early 1980s, while Wiebe (1996) reported that in 1993, it had accounted for 68 per cent of the total working population, in particular in urban areas, in 1990, the informal sector had accounted for 42 per cent of the total urban employment (ILO, 1994). Sussangkarn (1999) predicted that post 1997/1998 economic crisis, the share of the informal sector was at about 66.6 per cent. The growth of the informal economy during crisis periods demonstrates its flexible character, its nature as a reliable safety net. The informal economy grows more in urban areas compared to rural areas because of higher urban unemployment levels and a constant flow of migrants from rural to urban areas. Extensive governmental investment in the transportation network in the 1970s and 1980s, facilitated urban-rural migration and eased rural travel; however this same infrastructure project enabled many rural households to supplement their income by commuting to urban areas for informal employment.

In the following section are presented the most common activity areas performed by the informal sector as surveyed in the three case study areas of Banda Aceh, East Jakarta and Leuwigajah. The types of activities are classified within the three sub-sectors of the informal economy as identified above: the primary, secondary and tertiary sub-sectors.

4.4.1. Banda Aceh

23 men and nine women working in the informal sector in Banda Aceh before the tsunami struck were interviewed.

Personal service/the individual service

Informal sector livelihoods included in this sector rely on their personal skills and labour as the main production factor for their service. Most of the interviewees began their business with personal capital. They hire occasional/temporary employees depending on monthly or even daily activity. The specific economic activities surveyed falling into this sector include: vehicle repair workshops (car, motorcycle, etc.), gate building and repairing services, craftsmen, bridal gown tailors, tailors and contractors.
Secondary production sector

Surveyed business activities falling into this category include: chicken farmers, small stores, street vendors and home-based industries, each of whom offered a specific range of products and services.

Tertiary production sector

In this sector, businesses purchase products to be sold to particular market niches. Daily goods like seafood, fruits and vegetables and household appliances are bought from Pasar Aceh and Pasar Peunayong markets. Generic differences were not perceived in this category. Businesses included in this category include: livestock food enterprises, street vendors (selling books and black velvet, news and magazines, cell phones, nine types of local basic-needs, medicine and cosmetics, fruits, vegetables and seafood), small shops (bags and shoes, clothes, household equipment and accessories) and small stores (food and drink, everyday products).
4.4.2. East Jakarta

23 interviews were conducted with informal sector businesses and three respondents from governmental agencies in East Jakarta were obtained.

**Personal service/the individual service**

The informal businesses in this group are led by men and include rental services for video game consoles, telephone booths and bicycle repair workshops. We noted that the initial capital was their own.

**Secondary production sector**

12 respondents in East Jakarta (Village of Kampung Melayu, Cawang, and Bidara Cina) are included in this category, eight among them men. The capital of these enterprises was their own.

Activities included in this category are: recycled material collectors\(^{124}\), street vendors (PKL) and itinerant vendors (instant noodles, soft drinks, snacks, manager and the trader of cooked chicken or beef in skewers, and meatball soup itinerant traders), home-based cafeterias, and home industries (tin can craftsmanship, fermented soybean cake, tofu, bean sprouts, Aloe Vera drink and catering).

---

\(^{124}\) Persons or informal businesses collecting the recyclable or reusable material from garbage collectors and separate them into several categories for sale to successive users within the supply chain of the solid waste recycling business.
Tertiary production sector

In East Jakarta (Village of Kampung Melayu, Cawang, and Bidara Cina) nine business units fall into this category, of which seven are women-led. Two men act as garbage collectors. Most started and ran their businesses using their own funding. Those included in this category are stalls focused on the sale of everyday products (daily needs, vegetables) and market vendors (vegetables, clothes).

4.4.3. Leuwigajah

There were 14 respondents interviewed in this location, nine of whom were women.

Individual service

There is only one respondent in this category, i.e. a hair and beauty salon enterprise run by a 50 year-old woman. In the beginning of her enterprise, she used personal capital and further on began to rely on loans in order to expand her business.

125 Person who picks and collects recyclable or reusable material from solid waste dumping sites to be sold to other persons for further use.
Secondary production sector

Four respondents included in this category were home-based industries (cooking food, cassava flour, tin can and button manufacturing). There were also recycled material collectors, who collect garbage from the garbage collector, sort it into saleable and non saleable goods, and then sell them to the recycled material distributing agent as well as to the home-based industry whose input also originates from recycled garbage, such as tin cans and the button production. These recycled material collectors are men of 30 to 40 years of age. Most of them started their business with a governmental programme loan with an interest of about 57,500 IDR, (approximately 6 US$)\textsuperscript{126} per month.

Tertiary production sector

The majority of respondents in TPA Leuwigajah fall within this category, most of them are between 20 to 40 years of age and are working to support the family or the husband financially. The main activities in this production sector are:

- clothes creditors\textsuperscript{127} and providers of the nine local basic needs (sembako\textsuperscript{128});
- small local stalls situated in residential areas whose activity consists in purchasing everyday products with the aim of selling them directly to their clients;
- garbage recycling. A garbage collector searches for valuable items which can be re-sold to recycled material collectors who then sells them to a recycled material distributing agent\textsuperscript{129} who acts as an intermediary with factories and enterprises for which these items are of interest.

Picture 9: Informal sector in Leuwigajah (from top-left: Button manufacturing, tin can, and foodstuffs home industries, the recycled material collector)

\textsuperscript{126} The exchange rate of IDR at the time of the study is 1 US$ = 9,500 IDR
\textsuperscript{127} Consumers can buy products in two or three payments/instalments.
\textsuperscript{128} These basic needs are considered as the minimum standard of food needed by the community consisting of rice, sugar, cooking oil, salt, flour, salted fish, kerosene, cassava and corn (Local Government of Sidoarjo, 2003)
\textsuperscript{129} Person or informal business entity who receives the sorted products from recycled material collectors to be distributed as primary production factors for (usually small) industries such as metal foundry, plastic factory, paper and packaging industry, etc.
Informal sector activities in Indonesia have been found to be quite similar across the different case study areas. Most informal sector businesses engage in street vending, itinerant vending, small stall holding and home industry as well as personal service livelihood. In TPA Leuwigajah, livelihood activities are oriented towards the garbage industry.
5. Vulnerability and capacity of the informal sector to cope with various hazards

This section considers the interaction of informal sector businesses and the various hazards they faced in the case study areas. This analysis looks at the preventative strategies (early warning, preparation, and mitigation mechanisms), the social vulnerability and capacity to recover of the informal sector. The section reveals both the weaknesses and the strengths of the informal sector when faced with natural disasters.

5.1. The earthquake and tsunami in Banda Aceh

5.1.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms

Banda Aceh and its immediate surroundings had no Early Warning System (EWS) or other preparation and mitigation mechanisms to rely on in detecting natural threats. Early detection of pre-tsunami signs and a subsequent efficient alert dissemination system to the local population would have been crucial in protecting lives and assets.

The Banda Aceh population was, and remains, extremely vulnerable to such natural disasters, as today people are rebuilding and re-establishing themselves without any form of early detection and mitigation strategies having been set-up and adopted to date.

5.1.2. Socio-economic vulnerability and impact assessment

Based on the survey, it has appeared that economic activity in the affected areas has been gravely crippled at all levels (destroyed input, production, and marketing processes). Other direct economic consequences of the tsunami can be accounted for:

- lack or shortage of raw materials caused by the damage of input location;
- loss of tools and equipment for producing goods/services and lack of cash or capital for buying raw materials;
- loss of income as well as material possessions affecting consumer purchasing power.

The most vulnerable types of livelihoods have proven to be those in the secondary production sub-sector, as they are typically home-based businesses and are particularly affected by the shortages in production factor inputs and production locations. All the input, such as raw materials, equipment and products, are stocked in their homes. As for the purchase of inputs (materials and/or equipment), most of the actors in this category bought their inputs from local markets. These markets were destroyed to a large extent and ceased to function as a result of the disaster. Nonetheless, some local businesses have been able to rebuild economic activity through trading with markets located in other (often farther) municipalities, in particular those of Medan, at the price, however, of greater transportation costs and rising prices. Moreover, businesses that sold goods in fixed locations, such as in local markets, kindergartens or elementary schools have seen themselves more affected than mobile and itinerant vendors.
In the tertiary sub-sector, the marketing process was the most affected while production inputs, which are often bought from outside Banda Aceh, such as books and black velvet, medicines and cosmetics, were not affected by the disaster. Similarly to vicinity shops, their marketing places were situated around the mosque and school or other activity centres, local markets, or even in their own homes. As a result of the disaster, these locations as well as local market demand have been greatly affected.

The primary sub-sector may be said to be the least affected by the disaster. The earthquake and the following tsunami washed away the sectors’ marketing location or service-supplying area. The loss of equipment was not such a great impediment for this sector to rebuild itself as it does not rely so heavily on equipment as other sectors do. As far as production inputs, these businesses can also obtain inputs (even if in reduced quantities and at greater cost) from outside Banda Aceh (such as Pasar Peunayong market).

5.1.3. Coping strategies and capacity to respond

In the personal service sector, those whose homes were not affected by the disaster tended to recuperate the same livelihoods with minimal equipment and cope with the depressed market demand. Repair workshop businesses such as vehicle repair workshops even experienced increases in demand. Self-employed business whose houses were severely damaged or destroyed, such as tailors or bridal services, preferred to move to relocation camps or with their family, and look for new opportunities. A tendency was also noticed that self-employed businesses reconverted themselves to the construction sector, because of the high labour demand but also because of stable, quick yielding wages (one day’s work can earn up to 40,000 IDR (4.21 US$)). These wages are often saved to a large extent to re-invest in workers’ former business sectors. The same may be said for governmental and NGO grants offered to the tsunami-struck population. Although slow, livelihoods in this sector restart their activities on average in one or two months time after the disaster. Input, included equipment, is bought again from markets that have not been affected like Pasar Lambaro and Pasar Peunayong. They often sell their remaining possessions to accumulate an adequate capital for recovering their livelihoods and look at obtaining grants/loans from their relatives and/or friends.

The most affected location of the tertiary sector is the service-supplying area such as their houses, local markets, or other usually busy public places (school surroundings, main streets, etc.). In many cases those actors in the sector whose houses and business were affected by the disaster, have tended to change their livelihood overnight. Most of the business operators in the sector tend however to look for alternative livelihood sources as a means to buy time for markets to reopen and consumer power to gain momentum. Therefore some accept to be taken care of in evacuation camps, others enrol in the construction sector, resume their commercial activities with different products such as everyday goods (food and drinks, cigarettes and the “nine basic needs”) or change their livelihoods to the personal services sector. Itinerant traders are an exception to the above as they were able to move to new marketing areas not affected by the disaster. Actors in this sector find it difficult to recover their lost livelihoods without external support. Social networks of friends and relatives are the only source of capital available for those attempting to re-invest in their past livelihoods, but for many this remains insufficient. A limited number of these actors can restart their livelihoods 2 or 3 months after the disaster but under conditions that barely offer them minimal means of survival.

Bridal service is an informal sector that provides services in assisting with brides’ and grooms’ preparations on their wedding day.
The secondary sector starts to recover its activities 2 to 3 months on average after the disaster. Those whose houses were totally damaged are forced to stay in the relocation camps and change their profession to new livelihood opportunities or alternative sectors. Those whose houses were not damaged continue their pre-disaster activities at a much lower pace, because of difficulties to obtain inputs from local markets and low purchasing power (considering the large death toll). Those who have mobile marketing means travel to unaffected locations. Production input can be obtained from non-affected markets while waiting for local markets to reopen. Businesses may also be able to purchase these inputs by credit. Much effort is needed to repair damaged means of production, such as boats, wheelbarrows, motorized pedicabs, or motor cycles, in order for them to re-launch their activities and be able to earn the stable cash-flow they so desperately require.

This sub-sector is highly dependent on the availability of credits or grants for the recovery of their businesses. When consulted, respondents mentioned they would have been able to recover their activities in 10 days after the disaster if they had had such capital at hand. The actors in this sub-sector looked for informal credit lines, through friends and relatives that have not been affected by the disaster; however, in most cases such funding has proven difficult to obtain as large proportions of the population has been forced to stop their livelihoods for a few months.

Many such self-employed informal sectors reverted to other sources of income and especially in the construction sector for fulfilling their daily needs while accumulating capital to re-launch their business. Psychologically, these persons are ready to reinvest and re-launch their activity, but they anticipate a lengthy process of demand-recovery.

Overall, informal sector actors in Banda Aceh are facing hardships recovering because of the extreme impact of the natural disaster on consumer power, the lack of pre-disaster savings and capital sources to recover their business. Having said this, their energy to claim back their lives is the most valuable asset to be considered for local economic recovery.

5.2. Seasonal river floods in East Jakarta

5.2.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms

Community and household mitigation mechanisms have been refined in order to cope with the annual floods. A community-based EWS informs the village of imminent floods by simply measuring upstream water levels. Based on that information, the primary and secondary sub-sector businesses quickly respond by relocating their stock and equipments to the upper floors of their houses or to safe areas. They also take preparedness measures by relocating their heavier tools and equipment to safer areas.

5.2.2. Socio-economic vulnerability and impact assessment

Even though the population is aware of the risk of their vulnerability to flooding in the area surveyed, their limited capital and economic means offers them little choice to move to safer locations. This means, in practice, based on their current level of economic activity and equipment, these businesses find it more costly to move from the current site than to prepare for, and recover from the floods.
In personal service livelihoods, it was found that only some businesses with fixed production locations, such as bicycle repair shops and retail, were affected by the floods in terms of disruption of the activity during the monsoon period. The marketing process in this category occurs within or in the vicinities of the production location, and may likewise be affected temporarily and periodically.

Almost all the actors in the secondary sector operate within their houses, and therefore see themselves obliged to cease activity every time this natural phenomenon occurs. The production segment therefore represents the most vulnerable element for this sector, whereas the marketing process may be moved to higher zones during the flood period.

The informal sector in the category of the tertiary sector may purchase inputs from several local markets and from unaffected sites, but similar to vicinity shops and stalls, their business often stops in the case of floods. Therefore, the most vulnerable operation element in the sector is their marketing location.

The vulnerability of the informal sector in East Jakarta is related principally to the home-based production and marketing processes in flood-prone areas.

5.2.3. Coping strategies and capacities to respond

Similar coping strategies are practiced by all the sectors, on the basis of their experience with annual flood patterns and availability of a seemingly effective warning system. Communities do also develop community saving schemes, which are used to support households and businesses in case of need or simply on a rotating basis for business-investment purposes (arisan). Such community schemes are valuable assets when facing post-flood situations (particularly when confronted with most severe floods, such as in 1996 and 2002). Interest-free loans are commonly offered by friends and relatives for such recovery purposes. Small and Medium Entrepreneur Associations, such as the fermented soybean cake entrepreneur association, also provide recovery loans. Some informal businesses also access commercial loans, with interests of on average 3 million IDR (315.79 US$)\textsuperscript{131} per month.

In average, affected businesses are able to re-launch their activity 2 to 3 days after the flood subsided. In the case of most severe floods such as in 1996 and 2002, most businesses were able to return to normal activity after a month.

5.3. Solid waste-slides in Leuwigajah

5.3.1. Early warning, preparation and mitigation mechanisms

No functioning EWS and preparation mechanisms were at hand when the solid waste-slide occurred, although a similar event had taken place in 1992. On this occasion, no victims or loss of properties were claimed. After the event, the local government focused on improving the management of solid waste disposal sites, while no local or community-based EWS and preparation mechanisms were set in place. It appears that the risk of such a disaster did not decline significantly, as changes in the solid waste disposal management proved insignificant. The garbage pile remained layered following an open dumping system, thus ignoring the likelihood of gas formation (the explosion of such gasses being one of the decisive triggers of the landslide on 21 February 2005).

\textsuperscript{131} The exchange rate of IDR at the time of the study is US$ 1 = IDR 9,500
5.3.2. Socio-economic vulnerability and impact assessment

Communities, businesses and farming activities that are directly vulnerable to the slides are those located in the settlements at the foot of the TPA, whereas the larger economic basin could be considered as indirectly vulnerable.

The solid waste-slides directly damaged the properties and livelihood assets of the primary and secondary sub-sector businesses. However, the largest economic consequence of the disaster is not linked, in this circumstance, to the direct destruction but to the actual closing of the site to the public, i.e. to informal sector operators. Closing down the TPA directly affected the tertiary production sector (the garbage collectors and croupiers) and some of the informal sectors in the secondary production sector (recycled material collector), which ceased to operate overnight. This has caused major chain effects on the other two sectors, as the “garbage sector” is the driving sector of the local economy in Leuwigajah.

5.3.3. Coping strategies and capacity to respond

It has been noted that members of the informal sector in Leuwigajah expect to access safety net schemes of the local government in order to reopen the TPA. Leuwigajah informal sector actors do not have savings and many do not consider changing their livelihoods in the face of the potential landslide risk. Almost all of the personal service, secondary and tertiary sectors actors interviewed did not request relocation and are note considering to move away from the garbage industry.

Some actors, however, in the secondary and tertiary sectors do express their intention to engage in alternative livelihood opportunities, in consideration of the risk and uncertainty of garbage sector livelihoods. In those cases, social networking and access to a local Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (P2KP-Proyek Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan, cf Section 6 of this report) are most common avenues to access the small loans required to invest in alternative livelihood opportunities.
5.4. Conclusion

The analytic conclusions derived from this section are compiled in the table below, which outlines the preparation, vulnerability and capacity of the informal sector to respond to the three types of disasters studied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: The informal sector and natural disasters in Indonesia: Vulnerability and capacity to recover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster phases</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Warning, preparatory and mitigating mechanisms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic vulnerability and impact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coping strategy and capacity to recover</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Institutional mapping of existing programmes for vulnerability reduction in the informal sector

This section compiles information about governmental and non-governmental programmes addressing the challenges of economic recovery and reconstruction in the studied areas. The objective of this non-exhaustive compilation is to map and compare the programmes of governmental and non-governmental agencies related to the informal sector and/or disaster-prone areas. Some examples of proposed programmes on economic recovery from different organisations and agencies are described in the following sections.

6.1. Banda Aceh: Earthquake and tsunami

**Governmental programme**

The National Planning Board-led P2KP has launched the P2KP Rehabilitation project (from July 2005 to April 2006) to support communities in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing in the aftermath of the Banda Aceh tsunami.

The National Planning Board is also running the Disaster Impact Mitigation Project in the municipality. The first phase of the programme covered the immediate minimum basic needs of the affected communities in the first three months following the disaster. For its second phase (April 2005 to December 2006), the programme has initiated the rehabilitation and restoring of social and economic public services and infrastructure, settling land and property rights disputes and has also integrated psychological assistance. Finally, the large-scale reconstruction programme for homes and large infrastructure is planned to start in July 2006 and run until December 2009.

**Non-governmental programme**

The Economic Rehabilitation in Post-Tsunami Banda Aceh is run in the municipality to revitalize economic activities and re-engage tsunami survivors in economic activity in the most affected districts of the municipality. The programme looks at rehabilitation of key points of economic production and trade, assisting micro and small enterprises, the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and construction of shelters.

6.2. East Jakarta: Flood-related disaster

**Governmental programme**

The authorities are leading two programmes in East Jakarta involving support to the economic recovery of the area, and particularly of the informal sector. The Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises Sub section of the East Jakarta municipality has launched the Assistantship of Street Vendors Programme to foster the development and formalization of their businesses. The programme includes activities such as assistantship and counselling, development of vendor cooperatives (principally for the purpose of safety nets) and facilitating access to commercial loans. The programme also offers basic equipment and provides commercial sites for street vendor activities; rehabilitates, renovates and cleans commercial areas and organizes “competitions” between street vendors on aesthetic and hygiene. Another
programme aimed at protecting East Jakarta from annual floods is currently being implemented
by the Department of Regional Infrastructure and Settlement (Kimpraswil) in cooperation with
the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta; a canal to intercept five rivers in the area is under
construction (project completion will be spread from 2004 to 2011).

Non-governmental programme

Several INGO and NGO programmes have been launched to address the impact of the
floods in East Jakarta. These include work-for-food, Food-For-Training (FFT) activities and
maternal and child health. Area Development Programmes (ADP) facilitate integrated
community development endeavours in the target areas, to improve access to education, primary
health services, basic infrastructure and training for micro-entrepreneurship. These programmes
often integrate the objective of sustainability through fostering community organization and
self-help associations.

6.3. Leuwigajah: Solid waste-slide

Governmental programme

The Environmental Management Section, Technical Execution Unit and Sanitary
Management Section of the local authority run a programme in TPA Leuwigajah to improve
the waste management system and rehabilitate and improve the living conditions in the area. This
programme has relocated some of the victims of the Leuwigajah disaster and proposed a number
of preparatory and mitigation activities such as building a retaining wall, using alternative
disposal sites, enlarging the waste disposal site and improving waste management through a
pilot plan. The Bandung District Authority assists the persons who lost their homes by
providing food, counselling, training and assistantship for community preparedness. Finally, the
P2KP has been implemented by East Batujajar villagers’ organization (Merpati) and provides
micro-credit loans to community groups (Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat-KSM) or individuals
in East Jakarta.

Non-governmental programme

An NGO is currently implementing a community-based city waste management
programme on the basis of similar models in 50 pilot projects, training and assistantship in order
to offer alternatives to urban waste management, reduction and mitigation of the environmental
damage. Additionally, by counselling locals on compost techniques and consumption goods
production from scrap material the programme looks at working with communities to generate
new livelihood opportunities in the waste recycling sector.

6.4. Conclusion

Governmental programmes in the three case study areas are focused on immediate human
emergency relief challenges and on the longer term infrastructural reconstruction and
improvements aspects, rather than on the economic recovery. Where governmental programmes
are designed to support the informal sector (as in Jakarta), they address the hindrances of the
informal sector in general and do not include disaster-related issues. Some P2KP programmes
do focus their objectives on addressing the impact of disasters, such as in Jakarta, but this
remains, it seems, on an ad-hoc basis. Some interesting examples have been researched on non-
governmental programmes addressing the livelihood aspects in disaster-prone areas in a much
more direct manner and develop innovative and contextualized approaches to support the
livelihoods of the vulnerable communities.
7. **Recommendations**

In this section, we point at certain recommendations as drawn from the present research, for external interventions to contribute to the economic recovery and vulnerability reduction in post-disaster contexts, by supporting the livelihoods and the activities of the informal sector.

The following recommendations of the study refer to immediate and short-term needs and to the medium and longer term. While it is probably practical to assume that the immediate and short term may stretch from the disaster itself to up to a year, it should be noted that in practice the short-term period ceases once communities are prepared to recover their normal condition. The short-term phase will therefore refer here, more precisely, to the phase where livelihoods and markets are struggling to revive their function so as to allow communities, households as well as consumers to obtain their requirement of basic needs from the markets. The short-term period referred to below may involve up to a 3-month period for areas that are only limitedly affected (considering either the magnitude of the disaster or the preparedness of the community and its limited vulnerability), or as long as up to a year for territories and communities that have been gravely struck.

**Immediate and short term support to the informal sector**

Priority support should focus at setting the grounds for a conducive environment for the recovery of the informal sector and for assisting informal actors to rapidly restart their activities and cope with the recovery challenges of the disaster. If properly supported, and where external aid interventions integrate an understanding of the local economy, the informal sector may play a central role in the immediate and short term aftermath, to cater to the needs of essential goods and services of a population, and therefore facilitate a quick and smooth recovery. Some recommendations for the immediate and short term period are:

- **external interventions** should focus at supporting local capacities and economies and limit the international aid economy to those needs and activities that cannot be provided by the sector. It has been noted that informal sector actors may adapt quickly to new livelihood opportunities, by identifying new niches for their business activities;

- the **business transaction environment** is shaped by the provision of free goods and services by external actors, by accessibility through available transportation networks (both to customers and to the markets where these operators will purchase their goods), by commercial networks and by the functioning of economic infrastructure (such as local markets). Short term work-for-cash schemes and the use of local materials and contractors in the reconstruction programme should be used, to the extent possible, as a safety net mechanism that will allow market demand to boost and allow informal sector operators to accumulate savings in order to re-launch their activity or engage in alternative livelihood opportunities. In some cases, external support may focus at providing the raw materials and light equipment (the inputs) for the informal sector production processes to quickly restart providing goods and services to the market;

- the ownership of commercial distribution services by local private actors is a critical element in the recovery of the local economy. Some of these goods and services may not be provided at an affordable price to the community, particularly the most vulnerable members. Hence there is a need for focused and temporary external safety net mechanisms. The sustainability of the distribution of basic goods and services tends to find its balance shortly where the market is not externally intervened through, for example, large scale provision of free basic consumption goods (the tertiary informal sub-sector recovers almost immediately and more quickly than that of the others). Operators in the other sub-sectors often revert to tertiary activities as a temporary strategy for quick cash-earning purposes. Rapid assistance in this regard should therefore be granted to expedite the
restoration of local distribution lines of goods and services to the community, by producing a conducive environment for the operations of the tertiary sector;

- **the secondary sub-sector** carries the heaviest burden of the recovery, because of its relatively high level of equipment and infrastructure needs. Moreover, the sector is highly sensitive to a potential impact on all three elements of the operation process (input, production and market). Additionally, the types of businesses in this sector are more home-based than that in any other. On the other hand, the sector may be considered as the engine of the local economy as it absorbs more workforce than the other two. It provides essential needs (especially for production of food and beverages, and other basic needs). Therefore, the secondary sector appears to be the one that will necessitate the greater assistance effort in view of restarting its activity. More precisely, support should focus on the needs of its production stage of operation;

- **the primary sub-sector** will typically recover faster and without important investment needs, exception is made for the home-based segment. Support should focus at supporting informal operators that wish to move to non-home-based tertiary activities by providing basic vocational skills programmes suited to the needs of the local economy;

- **business recovery support** for these three sub-sectors include several and complementary lines of action. Financial schemes such as short term small loans without collateral (micro-credit), or even very focused disaster-recovery grants, should be put in place to assist the (re)investment needs of the informal sector. Basic business development assistance (counselling on new livelihood opportunities, drawing a business plan and assisting and monitoring the progress of the business) and information and awareness campaigns could also be beneficial to foster entrepreneurship, initiatives and innovation (particularly for the youth segment).

**Medium to longer term support**

For the medium-to-longer term, focus should obviously be placed on reducing the vulnerability of the informal sector by promoting early warning, preparedness and mitigation mechanisms, as well as by reinforcing the coping capacity of the sector:

- support to the informal sector should continue by focusing on the **secondary sub-sector**, in particular on the needs of its production stage of operation, as some of its activities and factors of operation will not have been recuperated in the short term;

- **business support avenues** in the long term should include continuing support for moving up the ladder of entrepreneurship to becoming medium scale enterprises. In particular, informal sector operators can be assisted in reconsidering their business plans by integrating disaster risk. This would involve assessing the costs involved with doing business in disaster-prone areas, which in turn limit their capacities to invest and expand their businesses, and considering, therefore, alternative livelihood options or mitigation measures (for example using one’s own savings for recovery). Saving schemes should be promoted within communities and the informal sector as a way to increase the capacity to recover from natural or man-made disasters. Other avenues to that end may include encouraging social networking (community-based or by sector of activity). Skills training, counselling and information programmes to foster alternative livelihood opportunities to mitigate vulnerabilities. Support programmes in the medium to longer term should also recognize that local business is also a vehicle of local culture. Several segments, such as in the artisanal food or clothing industries, specifically belong to the areas and losing these segments of activity also means losing a considerable part of the communities’ culture and tradition;

- external efforts are needed to foster decentralized, community-based, or informal sector-related mechanisms for preparedness, mitigation and early warning as key avenues for vulnerability reduction within disaster-prone areas;

- local construction techniques and urban development programmes need to integrate risk assessments to minimize the potential damage on infrastructures and livelihoods. Furthermore, reconstruction programmes should consider houses not only as shelters but also as crucial economic assets for the home-based sector;
• comprehensive local development programmes in disaster-prone areas, to lift informal sector operators and their communities from poverty, certainly remain the best means to reduce their vulnerability and the likely impact of disasters.

Table 5: Prioritized external support to informal sector livelihoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immediate and short term</th>
<th>Medium and long term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priority sectors</strong></td>
<td>Tertiary production, especially in trading basic needs goods.</td>
<td>Secondary sub-sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary production, especially in producing basic needs goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business operation element</strong></td>
<td>Tertiary and secondary sub-sectors: Production process</td>
<td>Production process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business environment</strong></td>
<td>Distribution lines, accessibility, transportation; small loans without collateral; injection of cash in the community through temporary cash-for-work programmes; rehabilitating main economic infrastructures and substitution of the required inputs.</td>
<td>Rebuilding and rehabilitating houses in consideration of their economic potential and early warning mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The informal sector, it has been noted, is a crucial actor in the post-disaster recovery of affected communities. External assistance interventions, while continuing to meet the essential needs of the most vulnerable groups within communities, need to recognize the capacities of the sector, if adequately supported, to meet even the most immediate needs of the affected community in terms of essential goods and services. Assisting this sector in meeting the needs of its community, to the largest extent possible, is in turn, a crucial element for a steady and prompt post-disaster recovery.

The functioning of the informal sector in this peculiar, post-disaster context, its vulnerability and capacities, will need continued research. More in-depth studies of the characteristics of the informal sector in poor disaster-prone areas, in Indonesia and beyond, appear necessary to reach more detailed conclusions, and refine support approaches thereafter.
Annexes

1. Bibliography


2. Internet websites


### 3. The methodological framework for field research and analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Pre-disaster</th>
<th>Impact (loss, damage, suffering)</th>
<th>Post-disaster (relief, rehabilitation, preparedness)</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Expected outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inputs</td>
<td>Instability of the provision of raw materials; inability to pay salaries to workers; unavailability of cash to continue the business; unfulfilled requirement of equipment.</td>
<td>Which ones that contribute most the loss of business?</td>
<td>The possibility of gaining back labour that is lost? Use of non local labour; require voluntary workers to help the operation back in business. No collateral to build the business.</td>
<td>I, Q, O</td>
<td>To build characteristics of the informal sector: specifically their awareness on the risk of operating business in the disaster-prone areas; to identify factors that contribute to the survival of the business and to provide employment to the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Production</td>
<td>Location of disaster areas, involuntary risk; unregistered retribution to the government; unavailability of infrastructure; supports for gangs, non-formal security persons; criminality.</td>
<td>What part of the production process that leads to loss of business (never recover), or damage or suffering?</td>
<td>What makes the business never recover? Continually in operation but cannot get back to normal? When to give up the business?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consumers</td>
<td>Overdue credits; instability of products; consumers cannot rely on their services; social networks to support the consumer base.</td>
<td>Do you loose your customer base? For how long? Do you loose their trust towards you? Do people look for competitors for serving their needs?</td>
<td>No payment of overdue credits (write off); lost of customer base; relatively permanent loss of social network.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Stability of supply materials; Limited availability of raw</td>
<td>Limited availability of raw</td>
<td>Which inputs or combination of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- raw materials</td>
<td>stability of salaries for labour; use of local labour. Availability of cash to continue the operation; ability to operate equipment at full capacity; capability to repair tools.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- labour</td>
<td>materials, and other input to continue the operation of the business. Availability of ‘leftover’ materials that help the operation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- capital</td>
<td>inputs that contribute to the recovery of the business most? Are there any other means that contribute to recovery of the business? Can you still hire the same employment as before?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- equipment</td>
<td>- Production - location factors (close to higher areas) - local government regulations (use as a point of service for the community) - competitors (healthy competition) - availability of infrastructure - security aspects (provide security for surrounding areas; absence of crime)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consumers - types of goods / services provided - types of products sold - access to consumers - social networks</td>
<td>- Geographical location close to higher / safer grounds; government uses the informal sector as the source of income; availability of sanitation; absence of gangs, crime and non-formal security personnel. - Basic needs or non basic needs. Regularly provided; easy access for consumers (overnight services; can take credits) - Location factors as the main reason for operation of the business; competitors help survive the business; infrastructure collapse but business remains intact; security personnel help with disaster. - Customer base that is left; what to do with remaining products to be sold; social networks help with the resuing the goods / services; customers can visit the areas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs (external support) - Governmental (micro financing, community economic developments etc.) - for securing inputs - for securing productions - for securing consumers</td>
<td>- Does your government help with emergency? - Does the non-governmental institutions help with emergency?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Non-Governmental (micro financing, community economic developments, etc.) - for securing inputs - for securing productions - for securing consumers</td>
<td>- access to capital, cash and training - marketing, bonus - access to capital, training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Production - location factors (close to higher areas) - local government regulations (use as a point of service for the community) - competitors (healthy competition) - availability of infrastructure - security aspects (provide security for surrounding areas; absence of crime)

- Consumers - types of goods / services provided - types of products sold - access to consumers - social networks

- Geographical location close to higher / safer grounds; government uses the informal sector as the source of income; availability of sanitation; absence of gangs, crime and non-formal security personnel.

- Basic needs or non basic needs. Regularly provided; easy access for consumers (overnight services; can take credits)

- Location factors as the main reason for operation of the business; competitors help survive the business; infrastructure collapse but business remains intact; security personnel help with disaster.

- Customer base that is left; what to do with remaining products to be sold; social networks help with the resuing the goods / services; customers can visit the areas.

To identify the positive characteristics of the informal sector in the areas; to develop understanding on the capacity to recover and operate the business.
Etude de cas : Jeunes, violence chronique et pauvreté dans les territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe au Sud-Kivu (RD Congo)

Hélène MORVAN

Décembre 2004
Remerciements

Beaucoup de personnes ont contribué à la réalisation de ce travail et je voudrais les en remercier. Mes remerciements vont tout d’abord aux jeunes d’Uvira, Fizi et Minembwe qui ont accepté de partager leurs expériences et de répondre à mes questions. C’est leur parole qui fait la richesse de ce travail. Merci aux membres d’UGEAFI (Union des groupes d’études et d’actions pour le développement de Fizi) et tout particulièrement à son président Butoto Naum pour leur collaboration dans la réalisation de cette étude. Je voudrais remercier spécialement les enquêteurs qui ont mené les enquêtes de terrain : Charles Ngolo Senge, Zacharie Hakizimawa, Gilbert Amuli et Jean Kalubi. Sans leur travail, cette recherche n’aurait pas été possible.

Hélène Morvan
# Table des matières

Remerciements .................................................................................................................. 90

Liste des acronymes .......................................................................................................... 92

Résumé exécutif .................................................................................................................. 94

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 96

2. Revue de la littérature ................................................................................................... 98

3. Profilage de la RDC et du Sud-Kivu ............................................................................. 101

4. Étude de cas : Jeunes, violence chronique et pauvreté dans le Sud-Kivu ................. 107
   4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 107
   4.2. Perspective historique : Violence chronique, territoire et identité ethnique ...... 107
   4.3. Les jeunes dans les groupes armés : la violence comme stratégie de survie .... 109
     4.3.1. Les combattants ................................ ................................ ............................. 109
     4.3.1. Les filles associées aux groupes armés ................................ .................... 112
   4.4. Les jeunes civils : stratégies de survie dans un contexte de conflit ................. 114
     4.4.1. La survie en milieu rural .............................................................................. 114
     4.4.2. La « débrouille » en milieu urbain ................................ ........................... 115
   4.5. Insertion économique des jeunes : opportunités et limites ............................... 117
     4.5.1. L’armée ........................................................................................................... 117
     4.5.2. L’éducation ...................................................................................................... 118
     4.5.3. L’emploi .......................................................................................................... 119
   4.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 120

5. Recommandations .......................................................................................................... 122
   5.1. Programme de DDR en RDC .............................................................................. 122
     5.1.1. Principes du PN-DDR .................................................................................. 122
     5.1.2. Recommandations concernant la planification du DDR ......................... 123
     5.1.3. Recommandations concernant les activités de DDR ................................ 124
   5.2. Développement socio-économique local et territorialisé .................................... 125
     5.2.1. Recommandations concernant l’investissement social .............................. 125
     5.2.2. Recommandations concernant le développement économique .............. 127

Annexes .............................................................................................................................. 129
Liste des acronymes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyme</th>
<th>Définition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIR</td>
<td>Armée de libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée nationale congolaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Armée patriotique rwandaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIT/IPEC</td>
<td>Bureau international du travail/Programme international pour l’élimination du travail des enfants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICR</td>
<td>Comité international de la croix-rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Centre d’orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>Centre de transit et d’orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Programme de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Programme de désarmement, démobilisation, rapatriement, réintégration et réinsertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICO</td>
<td>Dialogue intercongolais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAFGA</td>
<td>Enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces armées congolaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Organisation des nations unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces armées zaïroises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la défense de la démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Front national de libération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPR</td>
<td>Front patriotique rwandais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCR</td>
<td>Haut commissariat aux réfugiés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIMO</td>
<td>Activités à haute intensité de main-d’œuvre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFESH</td>
<td>The International Foundation for Education et Self-Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Résumé exécutif

Depuis la rébellion muléliste de 1960, la région d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe est l’un des principaux foyers de violence en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Malgré les évolutions du contexte politique au niveau national, régional et international, ces territoires sont caractérisés par une constante insécurité et la présence de groupes armés. La propension de ces territoires à reproduire des logiques violentes permettent d’affirmer l’existence de logiques locales distinctes des enjeux politiques globaux. Les recherches passées et présentes indiquent la prédominance dans les groupes armés de jeunes hommes pauvres et issus des milieux ruraux. Pour les jeunes combattants interrogés, le manque d’accès aux ressources et opportunités économiques ainsi qu’aux services de l’État (particulièrement en matière d’éducation) ont été les principales causes de leur enrôlement. Par ailleurs, la prédominance des jeunes ruraux dans les groupes armés marque un double assujettissement. En rejoignant les groupes armés, les jeunes tenteront d’échapper à la pauvreté mais aussi au fort contrôle social qui caractérise la société rurale.

Les stratégies d’intégration par la violence ont permis à de nombreux jeunes d’améliorer leurs conditions matérielles de vie et de gagner en autorité en défiant les réseaux traditionnels d’accès au pouvoir. Toutefois, si l’enquête confirme le fait que les jeunes se soient majoritairement enrôlés pour des raisons socio-économiques, les guerres ont aussi engendré leurs propres causes. La peur et les expériences vécues par la population depuis les années 60 ont favorisé le repli communautaire et les réflexes sécuritaires tout en contribuant à légitimer les discours xénophobes et la violence ethnique. Pour beaucoup de jeunes, s’enrôler dans l’armée est une manière d’assurer leur sécurité et la sécurité de leurs proches. Cette dimension est particulièrement forte chez les filles que la guerre a rendues extrêmement vulnérables aux violences sexuelles. Les recommandations émises ont été développées en référence aux observations, aux attentes et aux stratégies des jeunes interrogées. Elles mettent l’accent sur l’importance d’un développement local territorialisé valorisant les opportunités offertes par l’économie locale et les compétences acquises par les jeunes combattants et non-combattants durant la guerre. Les expériences développées dans l’économie informelle attestent de la capacité des jeunes à répondre à la crise en développant des solutions innovantes. Toutefois, la création d’emplois et les formations n’apporteront pas une solution durable à la violence si ces initiatives ne s’accompagnent pas de mécanismes pour réduire la violence structurelle et les inégalités sociales.
1. Introduction

Le projet de recherche dans lequel s’inscrit cette étude de cas est intitulé « Renforcer l’emploi et les autres dimensions socio-économiques en réponse aux situations de conflit armé et de catastrophe naturelle ». Ce projet répond aux préoccupations nées à la suite d’une consultation qui s’est tenue à Genève en mai 2000 sur la gestion des crises. Cette consultation a relevé l’importance de valoriser les initiatives socio-économiques dans la gestion des crises en révélant le lien intrinsèque existant entre le manque d’opportunités économiques, la pauvreté et les crises, que ces crises soient de nature politique ou naturelle. L’objectif principal de cette recherche est de renforcer et affiner les programmes et stratégies de réduction des vulnérabilités socio-économiques dans des contextes de violence chronique. Pour le Bureau international du travail (BIT), le rétablissement de la paix dans ces zones doit s’appuyer sur un développement local territorialisé (c’est à dire intégrant les spécificités géographiques et culturelles du milieu d’intervention). L’étude conduite en RDC traite de la situation des jeunes (population comprise entre 15 à 24 ans selon la définition de l’ONU et du BIT) dans les territoires de Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe au Sud-Kivu. L’étude analyse les interactions existantes entre l’histoire de la violence dans ces territoires, le contexte socio-économique local et les stratégies développés par les jeunes pour faire face à la crise. Le choix des « jeunes » est légitimé par le fait qu’ils ont été victimes de la violence mais aussi, depuis les années 60, les acteurs essentiels de cette violence.


---

132 Le territoire de Minembwe existe comme territoire administratif autonome depuis 1999. Le territoire a été reconnu par le mouvement de rébellion, RCD. Légalement, la transition n’a pas le pouvoir de remettre en cause les arrêtés administratifs émis par le RCD toutefois la légitimité de ce territoire est fortement contestée.
grande majorité est originaire du territoire de Fizi. Cependant, le temps et les moyens impartis pour le travail d’enquête et la situation sécuritaire n’ont pas permis de mener des enquêtes dans le territoire de Minembwe et de se rendre dans des zones rurales plus enclavées.

L’approche qui a été privilégiée pour cette recherche est la méthode compréhensive. Elle consiste à découvrir les catégories de pensée des interviewés et considérer leurs perceptions et leurs analyses comme une source fondamentale de connaissance de la réalité sociale. Dans cette enquête, les enquêteurs se sont intéressés aux motivations, aux craintes, aux espérances, aux expériences et aux opinions des jeunes congolais mais aussi, grâce aux entretiens collectifs, à l’influence du groupe, aux liens de solidarité et de tensions qui peuvent exister entre les jeunes. La réalisation d’entretiens collectifs et individuels, formels et informels ont permis de limiter les problèmes liés à la sous-représentation de « catégories » de jeunes, renforçant le crédit des résultats obtenus sur le terrain (cf. liste des personnes enquêtées en annexe). D’autre part, des entretiens ont été réalisés au-delà de la zone d’enquête, notamment à Bukavu et dans ses environs afin d’apprécier les ressemblances et dissemblances existants entre le lieu d’enquête et le reste de la province du Sud-Kivu. Toutefois, il est à déplorer que les enquêteurs n’ont pas pu toujours atteindre les jeunes qu’ils avaient identifiés lors de l’atelier préparatoire. Cette limite a joué particulièrement à la défaveur des filles associées aux groupes armés, trois des entretiens qui avaient planifié avec ce groupe n’ont pu avoir lieu. D’autre part, les entretiens menés auprès des populations banyamulenge d’Uvira ont été réalisés avec difficultés et ont dû être complétés par des entretiens à Bujumbura. En effet, entre juin et août 2004, des troubles armés et des violences à caractère ethnique ont contraint la majorité des Banyamulenge de Bukavu, Uvira et de la plaine de la Ruzizi à s’exiler. Ceux qui ont choisi de rester sont, par peur de représailles, souvent peu enclin à parler.

La grille d’entretien utilisée par les enquêteurs était divisée en quatre thèmes principaux : la situation socio-économique (avant et pendant la guerre), les groupes armés (causes d’enrôlement des jeunes, relations civils/combattants et les conditions pour la démobilisation), l’analyse du conflit (la connaissance de l’histoire des conflits, leurs causes et leur impact sur les relations inter-ethniques) et le processus de paix/perspective d’avenir (impact de la transition sur leur condition de vie, leurs ambitions personnelles et leurs besoins.) (cf. grille d’entretien en annexe). Pour les entretiens individuels, chaque enquêteur a identifié trois enquêtés pour la catégorie « civil » et trois enquêtés pour la catégorie « combattants et ex-combattants ». La sélection des enquêtés s’est faite en fonction de l’âge (15-24 ans), du sexe, du lieu de vie (représentation du milieu rural et urbain), des activités sociales ou/et économiques et de l’appartenance ethnique dans les territoires d’enquête. D’autre part, les enquêteurs ont essayé d’identifier des acteurs représentant des tendances plus marginales et souvent plus vulnérables telles qu’un jeune issu d’un mariage inter-ethnique, qu’un ex-combattant démobilisé pour des troubles psychiatriques ou encore une jeune fille vivant avec un combattant.

La présentation des résultats de cette enquête réserve un espace important à la parole des enquêtés et à leurs récits. Les propos recueillis par les enquêteurs constituent la base du travail d’analyse, et ils permettent d’éclairer la spécificité du terrain d’enquête. La conduite d’entretiens dans les territoires d’Uvira et Fizi permettent aussi d’enrichir la connaissance d’un territoire qui reste peu connu bien que sujet à d’intenses débats politiques.
2. Revue de la littérature


De nombreux auteurs ont révélé le lien existant entre la pauvreté, le manque d’opportunités économiques et le risque d’enrôlement des jeunes dans les groupes armés (Machel 2001, p.8; Brett et Specht 2004). Toutefois, cette approche ne doit pas occulter les dimensions sociétales et historiques qui ont favorisé l’enrôlement de ces jeunes. Crumme (Crumme 1985) souligne l’importance d’analyser les causes des violences actuelles à la lumière de l’histoire des conflits sociaux. La pauvreté doit être appréhendée dans ses dimensions structurelles en mettant l’accent sur les mécanismes de marginalisation sociale et économique voir d’exploitation qui ont favorisé les frustrations et les tensions sociales. « Violence et destruction sont devenus les armes des jeunes soldats pour prendre possession d’une histoire qui les a marginalisés. » (Jourdan 2004, p. 168). Pottier (Pottier 2003), Richards (Richards 2004), et Van Acker et Vlassenroot (Van Acker et Vlassenroot 2000) établissent un lien entre le développement des milices en milieu rural, le système d’accès à la terre et les rapports de servitude. Dans le territoire de Masisi et en Ituri en RDC, le développement des milices est lié à la privatisation de la terre et à la création de grands domaines agricoles privant ainsi les paysans de leur source de revenus et d’alimentation.
L’implication des organisations internationales sur la question des jeunes en situation de conflit s’est développée en réponse à un sentiment de responsabilité moral face à l’enrôlement de mineurs dans les groupes armés. La communauté internationale a développé un ensemble d’instruments juridiques visant à protéger les enfants du risque de recrutement, notamment le Protocole Facultatif se rapportant à la Convention relative aux Droits de l’enfant concernant l’implication d’enfants dans les conflits armés, la Convention 182 du BIT sur les pires formes de travail des enfants et la Chartre Africaine pour les Droits et le Bien-Etre des enfants. Ces trois textes fixent l’âge légal de recrutement dans les forces armées à 18 ans ; ils ont été signés et ratifiés par le gouvernement de la RDC et intégré dans le cadre légal national (article 184 de la Constitution de la Transition, le code du travail et le code judiciaire militaire). Le développement de ces instruments juridiques se base sur une analyse biomédicale qui établit la vulnérabilité physique et psychologique des enfants. Cette approche en termes de vulnérabilité a favorisé la mise en place de programmes d’accompagnement psychologique des enfants victimes de conflits et permis de porter une attention particulière à l’impact de la guerre sur les filles (Machel 1996). Toutefois, cette approche biomédicale a suscité de nombreuses réactions notamment chez les anthropologues. Les travaux de Boyden, Berry et Honwana (Boyen et Berry 2004, Honwana 1999) condamnent cette approche qui, selon elles, tend à imposer une réponse uniforme, notamment le syndrome de stress post-traumatique (PTSD), à un phénomène qui ne l’est pas. Ces auteurs défendent l’idée que la période de l’enfance est un construit social tout comme les guerres sont le résultat d’une époque et d’un lieu défini. En conséquence, elles optent pour une étude de la guerre et de ses effets qui prennent en compte les expériences spécifiques de communautés et d’individus. Honwana comme Thompson, soulignent l’importance de s’appuyer sur les ressources et les valeurs propres aux sociétés en conflit dans les programmes d’accompagnement psychologique et de réintégration sociale des ex-combattants (Honwana 1999, Thompson 1999).


Les jeunes occupent une position paradoxale dans la société. Si la tendance vise à aborder la question des jeunes principalement comme un problème, ils jouissent aussi d’un statut positif attaché au rôle social que la société leur prête. Les jeunes sont la génération d’avenir et un moteur d’innovation. L’amélioration de la situation du continent africain repose sur leurs capacités à proposer un meilleur futur. Cette dimension positive de la jeunesse transparaît dans différents ouvrages. « Les enfants ne sont pas seulement des victimes vulnérables, passives, assujetties aux réalités politiques et socio-économiques africaines …. Ils sont aussi des sujets actifs constructeurs et briseurs de ces réalités. » (De Boeck 2004, p.182). De la Silicon Valley à N’djamena en passant par Kinshasa, les jeunes ont développé de nouveaux espaces économiques et sociaux.
3. Profilage de la RDC et du Sud-Kivu

Population

La République Démocratique du Congo est le troisième pays d’Afrique en terme d’étendue et le quatrième en terme de population. Sa superficie est de 2 344 932 Km² et sa population est de 54,4 millions d’habitants (FNUAP, 2004). Le Congo est caractérisé par une population jeune et une très forte croissance démographique. 46,8 pour cent (UNDP, 2003) de la population congolaise à moins de 15 ans. Le taux de fécondité est de 6,7 naissances par femme. Avec un taux de croissance démographique de 2,9 pour cent par an, les prévisions démographiques établissent que d’ici 2050, la population congolaise devrait voir sa population triplée, atteignant les 151,6 millions d’habitants (FNUAP, 2004).

Cependant, ces données et cette forte croissance démographique ne reflètent pas l’impact de la guerre. La population congolaise a été gravement affectée par la guerre. 3,8 millions de congolais auraient trouvé la mort suite au conflit (IRC, 2004). 80 à 90 pour cent de ces victimes seraient des civils. Les résultats de l’étude menée par l’IRC placent le conflit congolais comme le conflit le plus meurtrier depuis la 2ème guerre mondiale. Le taux de mortalité serait passé de 1,2 décès pour 1000 à 2 ‰. L’enquête démontre le lien étroit qui existerait entre la situation sécuritaire et le taux de mortalité. Les provinces de l’Est, plus insécurisées, compteraient 77 pour cent des décès « excédentaires », c’est-à-dire causés par la guerre.

La population congolaise est majoritairement une population rurale (68,8 pour cent des congolais résident en milieu rural). Ce taux national reste toutefois en dessous de la réalité lorsqu’il s’agit de décrire les territoires du Kivu. Avec 14 pour cent de taux d’urbanisation (Nicolai, 1998, p.6), le Kivu est la province la moins urbanisée en RDC et la plus densément peuplée. Au Kivu, la densité peut parfois dépasser 150 habitants au Km². Dans les territoires de Fizi, Uvira et Minembwe, la densité est très inégale (cf carte 3 : La répartition et la densité de la population dans les territoires d’uvira et Fizi). Les territoires de Fizi et de Minembwe sont faiblement peuplés tandis que le territoire d’Uvira est densément peuplé. Le peuplement du territoire d’Uvira date de l’époque coloniale, période durant laquelle l’administration coloniale a développé des plantations de coton, de riz et de sucre dans la plaine de la Ruzizi. Uvira, quatrième ville du Kivu, a vu sa population augmenter avec la mise en valeur de plaine de la Ruzizi et du fait de sa position frontalière. En 1995, la population d’Uvira était estimée à 150 000 habitants (Bruneau cité par Nicolai, 1998).


Le système national de santé et d’éducation

Le gouvernement post-indépendance de Mobutu s’est illustré par une gestion ploutocratique de l’Etat au profit de la classe dirigeante et au dépend du développement économique et social du pays. L’impact de la gestion mobutiste sur le fonctionnement des services sociaux a été d’autant plus dramatique que le pays a dû au même moment faire face à une rapide croissance démographique. La population du Congo a plus que doublé entre 1975 (23,9 millions d’habitants) et 1995 (53 millions d’habitants). La guerre affaiblira encore les services publics. De 1996 à 2002, plus d’un cinquième des dépenses publiques ont été allouées à la défense nationale alors que le budget de la santé et de l’éducation a été réduit de moitié. Pour 1 USD affecté aux besoins de santé et d’éducation, le gouvernement allouait 28 USD à la guerre (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Les provinces de l’Est qui jusqu’au mois de décembre 2002 étaient sous le contrôle de mouvements de rébellions, ne bénéficiaient en conséquence d’aucun d’appui du gouvernement.

Insécurité et accès aux soins de santé

L’espérance de vie à la naissance, qui était de 45 ans en 1970, est aujourd’hui de 41,4 ans (PNUD, 2003). Le taux de mortalité infantile est de 129 pour cent, l’un des plus forts sur le continent africain. A titre de comparaison, le taux de mortalité infantile des régions développées est évalué à 8 ‰. Cette tendance est confirmée par l’étude menée par l’IRC. Parmi les décès causés par la guerre, 45,5 pour cent sont des enfants de moins de 5 ans (alors que cette catégorie d’âge représente moins de 20 pour cent de la population totale). Les causes de ces décès sont largement attribuées à des maladies bénignes tels que les fièvres, la diarrhée, les infections respiratoires, le paludisme (pour lesquelles un système de prévention et de traitement existent) et la malnutrition. Pour cause d’insécurité, les campagnes de vaccinations ont été interrompues dans de nombreux territoires ruraux. Le territoire de Fizi compte deux hôpitaux de référence mais ces deux hôpitaux comme les centres de santé ont été systématiquement pillés et les infrastructures ont été lourdement endommagées par les conflits. Nombre de structures de santé en milieu rural fonctionnent uniquement par l’autofinancement. Les malades paient d’avance les médicaments et les soins médicaux qui permettent de payer le personnel soignant. Beaucoup de familles par manque de moyens ont recours à la médecine traditionnelle (sorcier, féticheur, guérisseur) ou aux maisons de prières. Il est estimé que plus de 70 pour cent de la population congolaise n’aurait pas accès à des soins de santé primaire et que le taux de malnutrition au niveau national attendrait les 16 pour cent et pourrait atteindre 30 pour cent dans certaines zones de l’Est (Amnesty International, 2004). L’insécurité a contraint de nombreux congolais à fuir leur lieu de résidence. En août 2003, le Bureau des nations-unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires (OCHA) évaluait à 3,4 millions le nombre de congolais déplacés. Selon un rapport d’Oxfam International publié en 2001, 80 pour cent des populations rurales dans les provinces du Nord et du Sud-Kivu ont été forcées de se déplacer au moins une fois depuis 1996. Beaucoup de ces déplacés ont trouvé refuge dans des lieux non construits (forêt, brousse) où ils se sont retrouvés privés d’accès aux soins de santé de base, à l’eau potable, sans abris et sans vivres.
**Santé en matière de reproduction**


**Education**


L’absence de paiement des salaires par le gouvernement a contraint les parents à prendre en charge le salaire des enseignants. Le montant de la prime scolaire varie selon le type d’établissement scolaire (privé non conventionné, privé conventionné, publics) et le milieu de vie, entre 60 et 3 USD par trimestre et par enfant. Dans certaines écoles des barèmes ont été adoptés. Le montant de la prime à payer est fixé en fonction des revenus des parents. Le salaire des enseignants dépend du paiement ou non de la prime par les élèves ; plus le nombre d’élèves par classe est important, plus le salaire est élevé. Toutefois, dans le milieu rural, le salaire des enseignants dépasse rarement plus de 15 USD. Dans certaines localités rurales, les enfants dont les parents ne peuvent payer la prime scolaire (3 USD / trimestre) versent une partie de la prime en nature (produits vivriers) ou effectuent des travaux champêtres pour l’enseignant. Malgré l’existence de mécanismes de substitution pour pallier les carences de l’État dans le domaine de l’enseignement, de nombreux enfants ne sont pas scolarisés. Le taux net d’inscription à l’école primaire a chuté de 54 pour cent en 1990/91 à 35 pour cent en 1998/99 (PNUD, 2003). Les familles favorisent la scolarisation des garçons au détriment des filles. Cette préférence est particulièrement visible dans les familles pauvres vivant en milieu rural et tend à s’accroître dans l’enseignement secondaire et supérieur.
Dans certains territoires ruraux à l’Est du pays, l’insécurité a contraint à la fermeture de nombreux établissements scolaires. La baisse des affrontements liée à la mise en place du gouvernement de transition a favorisé la réouverture d’un grand nombre d’établissements scolaires. Cependant, le secteur rural souffre d’un manque d’enseignants qualifiés et de conditions d’enseignements très précaires.

La province du Sud-Kivu compte plus d’une dizaine d’établissements d’enseignement supérieur qui ont des formations dans des domaines aussi divers que la pédagogie, le développement rural, les langues, les techniques médicales, l’informatique, le droit, la gestion, la théologie (...). Comme pour l’enseignement primaire et secondaire, les frais de scolarité sont pris en charge par les étudiants et leur famille et l’accès à l’enseignement supérieur est limité à une minorité qui a les moyens financiers. La qualité de l’enseignement est généralement médiocre. Les enseignants sont sous-qualifiés et sous-payés et ces établissements ne bénéficient pas de facilicites pour apprendre. Les établissements catholiques qui reçoivent des aides extérieures importantes sont souvent plus fonctionnels.

**Economie**


La RDC, troisième pays en Afrique par sa superficie, est caractérisée par d’abondantes ressources naturelles (forêts, rivières, minéraux), et l’exploitation des ressources minières est le premier secteur d’activité économique. La production minière représentait 69 pour cent des revenus d’exportations en 2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Les principaux minéraux sont le cuivre, le cobalt, le zinc, le diamant, le coltan, la cassitérite et l’or. Le Katanga et le Kasai-Oriental sont les deux principales provinces d’extraction. Dans le territoire de Fizi, des mines d’or et d’argent sont exploitées artisanalement. La libéralisation de l’exploitation minière a favorisé le déplacement de nombreux jeunes originaire de Fizi dans les sites miniers mais aussi le développement des comptoirs d’achat dans la ville d’Uvira. Le commerce de l’or a été un facteur important du développement de la ville.

Le climat tropical humide, l’importante hydrographie et la diversité des reliefs offrent de grands potentiels pour l’agriculture. Les principales cultures industrielles sont le café (le pays est le 15ème producteur mondial), l’huile de palme, le coton, le cacao, le caoutchouc et le tabac. Dans les territoires de Fizi, d’Uvira et de Minembwe, les cultures industrielles sont le café, le coton, le palmier à huile et la canne à sucre. Avant l’indépendance les territoires d’Uvira et de Fizi connaissaient une relative prospérité économique fondée sur la culture industrielle du coton et du sucre. Les rendements de coton à l’hectare étaient parmi les plus élevés au Congo (Verheagen, 1969). La production de coton fut particulièrement affectée par la détérioration des conditions économiques qui suivirent l’indépendance du pays. La guerre en limitant les opportunités commerciales contraindra les agriculteurs à se reconvertir dans les cultures vivrières au détriment des cultures industrielles. La production de café qui atteignait 39 tonnes en 1998 était estimée à 2,3 tonnes en 2001 (The Economist Intelligence Unit).
Outre l’agriculture, les territoires de Fizi, d’Uvira et Minembwe ont un important potentiel dans le domaine de la pêche et de l’élevage. Les populations banyamulenge ainsi qu’une partie des populations bafúlero vivant dans les hauts et les moyens-plateaux sont traditionnellement des éleveurs de bovins. De nombreux éleveurs ont plus d’une centaine de têtes, toutefois cette production reste dominé par un élevage de prestige. Le nombre de bêtes sert à augmenter la position sociale de son propriétaire plutôt qu’à assurer le développement de leur milieu. Les populations riveraines du lac Tanganyika vivent des revenus de la pêche. Avant la guerre, la production utilisait des méthodes de production semi-industrielles. L’élevage et la pêche ont été durement affecté par les pillages causant les pêcheurs a en revenir aux techniques artisanales.

L’emploi

Les dernières statistiques disponibles concernant la répartition de la population par secteur d’activité montrent que l’agriculture est le premier secteur d’embauche pour les femmes comme pour les hommes. 68 pour cent de la population active travaille dans le secteur agricole (58 pour cent pour les hommes et 81 pour cent pour les femmes). Le deuxième secteur d’activité est le secteur des services qui embauche 19 pour cent de la population active et enfin l’industrie avec 13 pour cent (dont seulement 5 pour cent de femmes) (Nations-Unies, 1990). Dans le secteur des services, les ONG locales, nationales et internationales sont un des principaux employeurs. En 2000, le taux de chômage pour les hommes était estimé à 59 pour cent et pour les femmes 65 pour cent. Toutefois, ces statistiques ne permettent pas d’apprécier un marché de l’emploi où l’informel tel que les activités de petit commerce occupe une place considérable. D’autre part, l’économie rurale est une économie familiale qui s’appuie sur une main-d’œuvre non rémunérée.

Les principaux secteurs d’activités dans les territoires de Minembwe, Fizi et Uvira sont la pêche, l’élevage, l’agriculture et le petit commerce, notamment le commerce transfrontalier. La pêche et l’élevage sont deux domaines exclusivement masculins tandis que l’agriculture est dominée par les femmes. Les jeunes pêcheurs qui en général ne possèdent pas de filets ni de pirogues travaillent pour le responsable d’une unité de pêche, souvent un membre de leur famille. Les revenus d’une journée pour un pêcheur avoisinent 2 USD par personne/jour.

La libéralisation du secteur minier dans les années 80 a imposé le secteur minier comme un moyen de subsistance pour de nombreux congolais. La hausse du prix du coltan provoquera un nouvel engouement pour cette activité à la fin des années 90. En milieu rural, le développement du secteur minier a fortement affecté l’économie locale en poussant de nombreux jeunes à abandonner l’agriculture, l’élevage et la pêche.

Limites des données statistiques

Le recensement de 1984 réalisé sous la supervision du Fonds des nations unies pour les activités en matière de population (FNUAP) est considéré comme la référence statistique la plus fiable. Les chiffres produits depuis ce dernier recensement ont été faits par extrapolation de ces données. Cependant, malgré le sérieux attribué à ce travail, certaines zones n’ont pu être visitées. Pour des raisons politiques, le recensement n’a pu être réalisé sur les versants et les hauts-plateaux du lac Tanganyika, situé en zone de Fizi car cette zone est le lieu d’installation de mouvements armés. D’autres zones n’ont pas pu être visitées pour des raisons géographiques, notamment les hauts-plateaux d’Itombwe situé à plus de 2500 m. d’altitude (Nicolaï 1998), zone située dans le territoire de Minembwe.
D’autre part, de nombreuses zones du Congo connaissent d’importants mouvements migratoires qui ont été amplifiés par les guerres successives dans la région des Grands Lacs. Toutefois, la présence des populations étrangères est mal documentée. Les mouvements de populations sont mal connus à cause de l’insécurité mais surtout de la dimension politique que recouvre l’appartenance ethnique. La question de la nationalité des populations rwandophones souffre d’une ambiguïté législative qui rend difficile l’identification des nationaux et favorise les comportements de dissimulation.


Les statistiques produites par territoire sont souvent imprécises dû à la disparité des espaces de références utilisés (territoire administratif, collectivité-secteur, chefferie) et aux variations des limites de ces espaces. Le territoire de Minembwe créé en 1999 par un décret promulgué par le RCD, est très contesté et peu de données ont été produites sur ce territoire. Une enquête sur l’économie des ménages à Minembwe a été réalisée en 2004 par Save the Children mais les résultats ne sont pas encore disponibles. D’autre part, les organisations locales modifient parfois les chiffres et les réalités pour pouvoir bénéficier d’une assistance humanitaire.

Le manque de statistiques économiques reflète la nature de l’économie au Congo. En effet, l’économie congolaise est dominée par une économie familiale en milieu rural et une économie informelle en milieu urbain. L’économie informelle comme familiale regroupe des activités échappant au cadre institutionnel et réglementaire officiel de l’économie et ne sont donc ni contrôlées ni enregistrés. D’autre part, le développement de ces activités en dehors du contrôle de l’État est lié au fait qu’elles sont souvent illégales voir criminelles. La dissimulation de ces activités et surtout des revenus qu’elles engendrent est une nécessité pour les personnes engagées dans ces activités.
4. Etude de cas : Jeunes, violence chronique et pauvreté dans le Sud-Kivu

4.1. Introduction

Le renforcement des stratégies de gestion des crises nécessite de connaître les causes des conflits et leurs évolutions mais aussi les raisons qui poussent certains acteurs à adopter des comportements violents. La présentation des faits historiques s’intéressera aux causes de la violence en décrivant les liens existants entre les acteurs de la violence, l’assise territoriale du conflit et l’accès aux ressources socio-économiques. A la lumière des entretiens menés auprès de jeunes, vivants dans les territoires du Sud-Kivu, l’étude analysera les raisons qui ont poussé certains jeunes à rejoindre les groupes armés comme combattants ou associés aux groupes armés. Par ailleurs, elle tentera d’évaluer les bénéfices que ces jeunes ont pu retirer de cette présence dans les groupes armés. Dans un troisième temps, l’étude s’intéressera aux alternatives à la violence en analysant les stratégies de survie que les jeunes civils ont développés durant le conflit. Enfin, ce travail identifiera les voies et moyens à l’insertion économique des jeunes des territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe en confrontant leurs attentes avec les opportunités économiques offertes par le milieu mais aussi la position que la société congolaise leur attribue.

4.2. Perspective historique : Violence chronique, territoire et identité ethnique

La région d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe est considérée comme l’un des principaux foyers d’insécurité en RDC et la violence y est récurrente depuis les années 60. Par ailleurs, le développement des milices et de la violence armée dans les territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe a été fortement marqué par les évolutions des enjeux nationaux et internationaux.

que le gouvernement de Mobutu ait réprimé avec force la rébellion Simba, des foyers insurrectionnels se maintiendront. Laurent Désiré Kabila s’illustrera comme un des principaux dirigeants du maquis installé en territoire de Fizi. Tout en continuant à former militairement de nombreux jeunes babembe, la rébellion se réorganisera sous la forme d’une guérilla vivant de l’exploitation et du commerce de l’or.


Incapable d’aboutir à une victoire militaire, les différentes factions en conflit concèdent après près de 8 ans de guerre et près de 4 millions de morts (IRC, 2004) à signer un accord de paix. Cet accord aboutit en mai 2003 à la mise en place du gouvernement de transition rassemblant les principaux ex-belligérants, y compris les milices locales maï-maï. La formation du gouvernement de transition permettra une relative accalmie mais ne mettra pas fin aux tensions ethniques. Les affrontements de Kanyambayonga au Nord-Kivu en décembre 2004 et de Bukavu en juin 2004 ainsi que les massacres dans le camp de réfugiés de Gatumba au Burundi en août 2004 qui ont causé la mort et le déplacement de milliers de civils ont renforcé les logiques tribales et offert une nouvelle légitimité aux groupes armés locaux dits d’autodéfense.

4.3. Les jeunes dans les groupes armés :
là violence comme stratégie de survie

4.3.1. Les combattants

Pour des raisons physiques (la force, la santé, l’agilité), psychologiques (le courage, la prise de risque et le dynamisme) et sociales (leur absence de responsabilité familiale), les jeunes hommes ont toujours été prédominants dans l’armée. Dans le continent africain, cette tendance est renforcée par des facteurs démographiques; 46,8 pour cent de la population congolaise a moins de 15 ans (UNDP, 2003). Au-delà de ces données générales, les entretiens menés auprès de jeunes (ex-)combattants ont permis d’identifier les critères individuels qui ont conduit ces jeunes à intégrer les groupes armés. De ces entretiens, il ressort que la majorité des jeunes ont rejoint l’armée sans y avoir été contraint physiquement. Dans l’échantillon des personnes interrogées, un seul dit avoir été enrôlé de force.

**Les motivations socio-économiques**


Le choix de l’armée a permis à certains de ces jeunes d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie :

« Dans le RCD, je ne gagnais pas d’argent mais comme mon problème était de ne pas mourir de faim, je me sentais bien, vraiment bien. J’étais une escorte d’un bon commandant qui me protégeait et m’aimait beaucoup. » (20 ans, garçon, ex-combattant RCD, ethnie fulero).


Au-delà de cette logique de survie, la violence est devenue un mode d’expression et un moyen d’améliorer leur statut social. L’environnement dans lequel évoluent ces jeunes, dominé par la guerre et la violence, a imposé l’arme et l’appartenance à l’armée comme des symboles d’autorité et de prestige. Les jeunes sont animés par « l’ambiance du mouvement » et la fierté d’être militaire (Jourdan 2004).
« J’étais satisfait par le port de la tenue militaire, même si je ne recevais pas de solde, ma
tenue militaire me donnait beaucoup d’amour pour la RDC. … C’est le problème de la
maladie (il est atteint de troubles psychiatriques) qui m’a obligé à abandonner l’armée mais
c’était vraiment ma vocation.» (20 ans, garçon, ex-combattant RCD, ethnie fulero).

Si le renforcement des groupes armés a permis aux jeunes d’acquérir un pouvoir qui
leur était jusque là largement refusé, cette reconnaissance et cette autorité restent
limitées :

« Quelque fois je suis content et j’aime quand je porte mes tenues militaires, quand on me
salue mais c’est une joie très courte qui ne vaut pas ma liberté. (…) J’ai été gradé dans le
rang des mai-maï, comme sous-lieutenant en septembre 2004 mais ce grade ne me dit rien et
ne me sert à rien … Je n’aime pas être un combattant. Je n’aime pas être commandé comme
un prisonnier ou un esclave. Je déteste la confiscation de ma liberté. Je ne peux pas voir mes
parents comme je veux. C’est une sorte de torture morale si on doit vivre sans contact et sans
nouvelle de sa famille.» (24 ans, garçon, combattant mai-maï, ethnie vira).

Beaucoup de jeunes regrettent leur famille, l’école et la vie civile. Les mai-maï et en
particulier les enfants-soldats vivent dans des conditions très précaires. Beaucoup ne
mangent pas à leur faim et n’ont pas un endroit où dormir. Ils sont souvent contraints à
monter la garde la nuit. De plus, ces jeunes recrues sont dénigrées par leurs supérieurs et
sommis à des châtiments physiques et à des actes d’humiliation. Beaucoup de jeunes
enquêtés se plaignent de devoir obéir aveuglement à leur supérieur et souhaitent être
démobilisés.

« Cela me plaisait de gagner ce peu d’argent pour aider mes parents mais je détestais la
soumission aveugle et forcée aux plus gradés. » (16 ans, garçon, combattant mai-maï, ethnie
fulero).

« Les conditions dans l’armée n’étaient pas bonnes, nous ne pouvions pas laver nos habits,
nous n’avions pas de médicaments et pas assez à manger et puis j’avais des problèmes avec
les supérieurs car je craignais la mort et ne pouvait pas suivre leurs ordres de tuer. » (18 ans,
garçon, ex-combattant RCD, ethnie munyamulenge).

Les motivations sécuritaires

Les entretiens menés auprès des combattants et des ex-combattants permettent
d’affirmer que la haine ethnique n’est pas un facteur de leur enrôlement. Aucun des
enquêtés ne dit avoir joint les groupes armés par haine d’un autre groupe ethnique.
Cependant, l’appartenance ethnique a été utilisée par les chefs locaux comme une
stratégie de mobilisation.

« J’ai rejoint le groupe mai-maï en 1998, à 19 ans, quand le RCD a voulu renverser le régime
de Kabila, grand artisan du mouvement mai-maï bembe. C’est le groupe mai-maï bembe qui
defend les intérêts de nos familles. … Nos pапas и nos leaders nous ont poussé à combattre
le RCD or comme les jeunes ici sont collés à leur famille ils acceptent facilement l’avis de
leurs aînés. … Les parents n’ont pas senti la présence des Banyamulenge dans le RCD, une
sorte de concurrence. Ils pensaient qu’il fallait à tout prix combattre le RCD au risque d’être
dominé par les Banyamulenge.» (25 ans, garçon, combattant mai-maï, ethnie bembe).

La majorité des groupes armés, et en particulier les groupes mai-maï, s’est
organisée, a commis des violences et s’est engagée sur base de ces appartenances. Si
beaucoup de jeunes affirment se battre pour l’intégrité du pays, pour la majorité, leur
principale objectif est d’assurer la protection de leur communauté et de leurs proches :
« Ma famille a été victime de la guerre. Nous avons été pillés à maintes reprises. (…) Les maï-maï venaient chercher mon père la nuit. Ils disaient que mon père collaborait avec les Banuyamulenge. … J’ai rejoint le groupe maï-maï, le groupe que haïssait mon père pour pouvoir le défendre.» (25 ans, fille, ex-combattante maï-maï, ethnie bembe).

Pour les combattants banyamulenge, que le conflit a opposé aux autres groupes ethniques, la protection de leur communauté apparaît comme la cause principale de leur enrôlement. En août 2004, 150 Banyamulenge ont été tué dans le camp de réfugiés de Gatumba au Burundi à la frontière avec Uvira. Cet événement a renforcé, au sein de la communauté Banyamulenge, l’idée qu’ils devaient, malgré la transition, rester mobilisés pour assurer leur protection.

4.3.1. Les filles associées aux groupes armés

Les rapports des organisations de Droits de l’Homme rapportent de nombreux cas de filles qui ont intégré les groupes armés sous la contrainte. Les filles étaient kidnappées dans les villages pour servir d’esclave sexuel dans les camps militaires (Amnesty International 2004 et Human Rights Watch 2002). Toutefois, les enquêtes montrent que certaines filles ont aussi provoqué leur enrôlement dans les groupes, parfois sous l’incitation de membres de leur famille. Les filles circulaient autours des camps militaires dans l’espoir de se faire remarquer par un commandant, et celles qui ont intégré l’armée l’ont rarement fait au titre de combattante et pour celles qui l’ont fait ce statut leur a rarement été reconnu, exception faite de l’AFDL qui en 1996 a promu l’enrôlement des garçons comme des filles. Les civils comme les combattants interrogés considèrent que l’armée est un domaine d’activité réservé aux hommes :

« Les filles qui ont essayé de faire partie de l’armée, elles ont fini par être mariées dans ce même groupe et ont cessé d’être des combattantes. Elles sont devenues des femmes mariées obligées de garder la maison ou les camps de combattants. » (20 ans, garçon, ex-combattant RCD, fulero).


Les motivations socio-économiques

En intégrant l’armée, les filles ont développé des stratégies de survie qui s’inscrivent dans les limites étroites du statut que la norme sociale impose aux femmes. De nombreuses filles ont rejoint ces groupes avec l’espoir d’y trouver un mari répondant ainsi à l’exigence sociale qui conditionne le statut de femme au mariage. Pour certaines filles qui ne pouvaient plus se marier, l’armée est devenue une réponse :

« Je suis rentrée dans l’armée en 2002 quand j’avais déjà 22 ans. … Si, je suis rentrée dans l’armée c’est parce que j’ai été abusée par un militaire et c’était pour moi une honte de faire le mariage tout en n’étant pas vierge. … Lorsque, je me suis enrôlée, je n’ai pas informé mes parents. J’étais en refuge chez mon oncle. Je me suis enrôlée avec d’autres filles. C’était devenu un peu à la mode que des filles d’un même groupe s’enrôlent ensemble. » (25 ans, fille, ex-combattante maï-maï, ethnie bembe)

La guerre a imposé les groupes armés au centre de l’économie (de Berry 2004) et en choisissant d’épouser un combattant, les femmes espèrent améliorer leur situation économique, profitant du statut de leur mari pour obtenir certaines faveurs tels que la gratuité des soins médicaux et des transports ou avoir accès aux produits des pillages et les revenus des taxes. Les militaires de la Mission des nations unies en République
Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) sont particulièrement recherchés car ils disposent de plus de moyens matériels.

Toutefois, les stratégies de survie développées par les filles ne leur apportent qu’un bénéfice limité. En se mariant avec un militaire, ces filles ont perdu aux yeux de la communauté la moralité attachée au statut d’épouse et se trouvent marginalisées dans leur communauté.

« Les filles qui ont été dans l’armée sont considérées comme des femmes libres, filles légères et ne sont pas considérées socialement. » (25 ans, fille, ex-combattante maï-maï, bembe).

Par ailleurs, le statut de femme de militaire est précaire. De nombreux combattants ont des moyens financiers limités qui leur permettent difficilement de prendre en charge leur famille:

« Mon copain avec qui j’ai un enfant et attend un deuxième est dans le groupe maï-maï. Je pense que le choix de mon copain de rejoindre les maï-maï est un mauvais choix. Il ne touche pas suffisamment d’argent pour soutenir notre foyer. Nous souffrons beaucoup les enfants et moi. Je n’en peux plus. Je risque de le quitter car je ne continuerais pas à manger de l’air. » (23 ans, fille, civil, ethnie rega).

Les unions de ces filles avec les militaires sont pour la plupart conclues à la suite d’une grossesse et sans consentement des parents. Le taux de grossesses précoces en RDC est l’un des plus fort au monde. Sur 1000 naissances 230 mères ont moins de 20 ans (FNUAP, 2004). Ces chiffres sont attribués à une évolution des comportements sexuels dû à la situation de conflit. L’exposition à la violence, l’interruption des activités scolaires, les déplacements forcés ont remis en cause la stabilité des relations familiales et communautaires et les normes sociales et culturelles qui régissent les comportements sexuels. « Les jeunes séparés de leur famille et de leur communauté sont particulièrement vulnérables à l’exploitation sexuelle et s’engagent plus facilement dans un comportement sexuel à haut risque. » (FNUAP, 2004, p. 84). Par ailleurs, ces unions échappent aux normes de la coutume et à la loi augmentant la fréquence des séparations et limitant le sentiment de responsabilité des conjoints.

Enfin, la guerre a contribué à renforcer l’inégalité des sexes en consolidant la division traditionnelle des tâches et en renforçant la polygamie. Les femmes dans les groupes armés préparent à manger, cultivent, font la lessive et servent de partenaire sexuelle. Les fréquents déplacements des militaires favorisent les relations extra-conjugales et la polygamie. Mats Utas montre qu’au Libéria, les pratiques de polygamie développées durant la guerre tendent à se perpétuer dans l’après-guerre (Utas, 2003, p.220).

**Les motivations sécuritaires**

Si les motivations socio-économiques apparaissent être la cause première d’enrôlement des garçons dans les groupes armés (exception faite des Banyamulenge), les motivations sécuritaires sont la première cause d’enrôlement des filles. Les filles qui choisissent d’élargir un militar le font avec l’espoir de voir leurs conditions de vie s’améliorer mais cette union représente surtout une protection contre les risques de violences sexuelles. Les femmes qui ont réussi à gagner l’affection d’un commandant gradé sont moins susceptibles d’être victimes d’agressions sexuelles. En RDC, 40 000 cas de viols dont 25 000 dans le Sud-Kivu ont été reportés auprès de «The Joint Initiative on the Fight Against Sexual Violence Towards Women and Children » (Amnesty International, 2004).

4.4. Les jeunes civils : stratégies de survie dans un contexte de conflit

4.4.1. La survie en milieu rural

Avec 14 pour cent de taux d’urbanisation (Nicolaï, 1998, p.6), le Kivu est la province la moins urbanisée en RDC et la plus densément peuplée. L’agriculture est l’activité principale dans le milieu rural, elle est aussi le premier secteur d’activité en RDC. La RDC, troisième pays en Afrique par sa superficie, est caractérisée par d’abondantes ressources naturelles (forêts, rivières, minerais). Le climat tropical humide, l’importante hydrographie et la diversité des reliefs offrent de grands potentiels pour l’agriculture. Le pays est le 15ème producteur mondial de café. Dans les territoires de Fizi, d’Uvira et de Minembwe, les cultures industrielles sont le café, le coton, le palmier à huile et la canne à sucre. Toutefois, le secteur agricole est marqué par de très faibles rendements dus au manque d’infrastructure et d’investissement pour la modernisation des techniques de production. Ce secteur a été négligé par l’État congolais et en conséquence a été lourdement affecté par la crise économique qui a touché le pays dans les années 80. En limitant les opportunités commerciales, la guerre contraindra les agriculteurs à se reconvertir dans les cultures vivrières au détriment des cultures industrielles. La production nationale de café qui atteignait 39 tonnes en 1998 et était estimé à 23 tonnes en 2001 (The Economist Intelligence Unit). D’autre part, le manque d’attrait du milieu rural a favorisé l’exode rural des jeunes garçons.

Pendant la guerre, le milieu rural caractérisé par un manque d’opportunité économique a été le principal lieu de recrutement des combattants. Il a aussi été le principal lieu d’installation des groupes armés, contraignant les populations rurales à cohabiter avec eux. Avec la dégradation de la sécurité alimentaire, les produits vivriers se sont imposés comme la ressource la plus convoitée. Le taux de malnutrition attendrait 30 pour cent dans certaines zones de l’Est (Amnesty International, 2004). Dans de nombreux territoires pour éviter les pratiques de prédation violente, les autorités civiles ont mis en place un système de collecte de denrées alimentaires. Les combattants assurent la sécurité physique des populations civiles et en échange les populations locales contribuent financièrement et matériellement au mouvement armé (Zahar 2001, p.50). Les stratégies de survie des populations paysannes sont caractérisées par une certaine résignation et une faible capacité d’adaptation. Cette situation doit être envisagée à la lumière des opportunités économiques mais aussi sociales offertes par le milieu rural. Le système patriarcal et gérontocratique tend à concentrer les biens matériels et le pouvoir de décision dans les mains des anciens (Weicker 1996, p.556). Dans le souci de garder leur contrôle, les élites traditionnelles freinent l’innovation et ont tendance à stigmatiser les personnes hors norme. Cette volonté de préserver l’ordre social traditionnel favorise un nivellement de la société par le bas. L’économie rurale est une économie familiale où les jeunes garçons non mariés travaillent au service de leur famille tandis que les filles sont dépendantes et soumises à leur famille avant le mariage et lorsqu’elles sont mariées à leur belle-famille. Cette dépendance des jeunes ruraux réduit leurs possibilités à développer des stratégies individuelles de survie et donc à s’adapter aux changements. Les rôles sont
strictement répartis entre les femmes qui sont chargées de l’agriculture vivrière et les hommes qui s’occupent de l’agriculture commerciale, de l’élevage et de la pêche. Enfin, le système social traditionnel s’appuie sur un système de réciprocité et de redistribution que la guerre, en appauvrissant les familles, a contribué à remettre en cause.

Toutefois, ce contrat tacite entre combattants et civils est très instable. L’insécurité créée par la présence de ces groupes armés a renforcé l’enclavement des territoires ruraux et entraîné la baisse des échanges commerciaux et des activités agricoles. Les femmes ne pouvaient plus se rendre aux champs de peur d’être violées. Les centres de santé et les écoles ont été détruits. Les populations ont été pillées. L’augmentation de la pauvreté en réduisant la capacité des populations à « coopérer » avec les combattants les a exposées aux risques de représailles. D’autre part, les jeunes garçons et filles, potentiels recrues de ces groupes armés, sont souvent l’objet de menaces et d’actes d’humiliation. Pour répondre à l’insécurité mais aussi au manque d’opportunité scolaire, économique et à la rigidité du système sociale, de nombreux jeunes garçons choisissent le départ. Les jeunes rejoignent la ville pour intégrer l’école ou trouver un emploi. Cette stratégie ne date pas de la guerre mais s’est renforcée avec la dégradation de la situation sécuritaire et économique causée par celle-ci.

« La situation en milieu rural s’est empirée à cause de l’insécurité causée par les groupes armés. Les champs sont dévastés, la pêche rendue impossible à cause de la piraterie. … La pluspart de mes amis qui n’ont pas choisi l’armée sont presque tous installés en ville à la recherche d’un emploi. … Dans notre milieu, il faut être un soldat pour avoir un salaire. » (25 ans, garçon, combattant maï-maï, ethnie bembe).

L’engouement pour le secteur minier qui s’est développé dans les années 80 avec la libération de l’exploitation minière va s’accroître avec l’augmentation du prix du coltan dans les années 90 et la dégradation de la situation économique. Pendant la guerre, l’exploitation des ressources naturelles est devenue une des sources de revenus les plus attractives. La production minière représentait 69 pour cent des revenus d’exportations en 2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Toutefois comme pour l’agriculture, les groupes armés tendent à imposer leur autorité sur cette économie. Les populations civiles exploitent les mines et organisent sa commercialisation et les groupes armés profitent du contrôle qu’ils ont sur les réseaux de communication pour prélever des taxes. S’agissant des filles, leur éducation ne favorise par leur départ du milieu rural. Le rôle social de la femme s’inscrit au sein de sa famille puis de celle de son mari auxquelles elle est dépendante et soumise et au niveau économique, elle est responsable de la subsistance de la famille. En ce sens, la guerre n’a pas altéré le rôle économique des filles mais au contraire l’a renforcé. La détérioration de la situation sécuritaire en réduisant les opportunités de commercialisation a contraint les paysans à une agriculture de subsistance et la femme responsable de la production de subsistance, s’est retrouvée seule à la charge d’une grande part de l’économie familiale.

4.4.2. La « débrouille » en milieu urbain

La crise économique qui frappe la RDC depuis le début des années 80 a conduit au développement de logiques de survie basées essentiellement sur le système informel. Ce secteur est le principal secteur d’emploi en milieu urbain et offre des opportunités de travail aux jeunes, aux migrants ruraux et aux femmes, souvent exclues du secteur formel et notamment des services publics.
« La vie en ville n’est pas la même qu’au village. En ville nous nous débrouillons pour vivre, nous luttions et nos yeux sont déjà ouverts par rapport aux jeunes du village qui ne font rien. Je préfère rester en ville car je peux continuer à exercer mes petites activités commerciales. … Je suis orpheline de père depuis longtemps et chacun dans notre famille se débrouille par lui-même pour vivre. … Je fais du petit commerce. Avant la guerre, je vendais du poisson, de la canne à sucre. A fin de chaque mois, je pouvais avoir un bénéfice de 50 $. » (23 ans, fille, civil, rega).

L’économie informelle ou de la « débrouille » est faite d’activités qui échappent au cadre institutionnel et réglementaire officiel de l’économie qui sont dès lors non contrôlées et non enregistrées, et à des degrés divers, non légales (De Villers, 2002). Ce secteur d’activité économique rassemble l’ensemble des réponses individuelles à la crise. Toutefois si ce secteur est dominé par les logiques individuelles, les activités s’enracinent dans l’environnement social local. Les acteurs de l’économie informelle s’appuient sur leurs réseaux de relations sociales et les ressources locales pour tenter de s’adapter à l’adversité environnante (Trefon 2004, p 21).


Les baisses du budget de l’Etat affecté aux services publics et la raréfaction des biens et services ont renforcé l’importance du secteur informel tout en diminuant les bénéfices offerts par ces activités. Pour de nombreux congolais, le secteur informel leur offre des revenus modiques proportionnels au capital de départ, aux investissements mais aussi à l’apprentissage d’une certaine gestion du risque. La multiplication des pillages a contraint de nombreux commerçants à réduire leurs stocks. D’autre part, la guerre a contribué à la dégradation des conditions de travail et à l’augmentation des pratiques d’exploitation. Face à l’appauvrissement des familles, des enfants de plus en plus jeunes sont forcés à se « débrouiller », certains vivent dans la rue ou se prostituent. L’extrême pauvreté des populations a renforcé leur vulnérabilité aux pratiques d’exploitation. Les mécanismes de solidarité traditionnels favorisent l’utilisation d’une main-d’œuvre familiale non-rémunérée et échappant à tout mécanisme de contrôle institutionnel. Les

4.5. Insertion économique des jeunes : opportunités et limites

4.5.1. L’armée

L’enquête menée dans les territoires d’Uvira, Fizi et Minembwe montre que l’armée ne représente pas pour les jeunes un moyen de subsistance attrayant. La majorité des jeunes combattants souhaite quitter l’armée et les familles sont la plupart du temps d’accord de les accueillir. Toutefois, si ces jeunes affirment leur volonté de quitter l’armée, leur démobilisation n’est envisageable que si la vie civile est capable de leur apporter une alternative durable et rentable. La majorité des jeunes conditionnent leur démobilisation à l’obtention d’une compensation matérielle.

« Je ne souhaite pas rester dans l’armée. Si je reste dans l’armée, mon avenir sera très compromis et ma liberté réduite .... Quand je serais démobilisé, il faudra mettre à ma disposition des moyens afin de m’assurer un avenir meilleur. Je veux faire une formation en menuiserie et avoir du matériel et un fond de démarrage pour ouvrir mon propre atelier. … Ma famille souhaite et dit chaque jour qu’il faut que je regagne la maison. Elle est prête à vivre avec moi, d’ailleurs mon épouse et mes deux enfants sont à la maison avec mes parents. » (24 ans, garçon, combattant maï-maï, vira).

« Les conditions des combattants sont difficiles, nous n’avons ni uniforme ni formation militaire et nous recevons 5 000Fc par mois (12.5 $) mais les maï-maï vivent tout de même mieux qu’un civil qui ne travaille pas. Les gens de mon niveau d’étude n’ont rien. … Je garde l’espoir qu’un jour l’armée aura un salaire satisfaisant. De toutes les façons, je ne peux pas quitter l’armée alors que je n’ai pas encore gagné mon argent. Kabila doit nous payer notre argent. » (25 ans, garçon, combattant maï-maï, bembe).

Par ailleurs, de nombreux ex-combattants ne souhaitent pas joindre l’armée nationale craignant d’être inéligibles par manque d’éducation et de formation militaire mais aussi parce qu’ils préfèrent rester dans leur territoire d’origine qu’ils contrôlent politiquement et économiquement. La peur d’être marginalisé et le désir de conserver la reconnaissance sociale, l’autorité politique et les bénéfices économiques acquis pendant la guerre encouragent les jeunes combattants à perpétuer des comportements violents pour s’« intégrer » dans la société (Van Acker F. et Koen Vlassenroot K.,2000).

L’absence des filles est liée à leur statut dans l’armée mais aussi à leur statut dans la société, les deux étant étroitement liés, elles ne représentent pas un danger immédiat pour la stabilité de la société car la plupart ne portent pas d’armes. Elles sont généralement dans les groupes armés comme « femmes des militaires ». Même s’ils n’ont pas conclu de mariage et que la fille a été prise de force, elles ne peuvent être séparées de leur « mari » sans le consentement de ce dernier qui souvent ne souhaite pas se séparer de sa ou ses femmes au moment de la démobilisation. « Les combattants compensent la perte de pouvoir que représente le fait de déposer les armes » en gardant ces filles sous leur contrôle (Shepler, 2002, p.57). D’autre part, les filles ne se définissent pas toujours comme des victimes. En devenant la partenaire d’un combattant, elles sont sorties du statut de l’enfance pour acquérir le statut plus valorisant de femme. Ce statut est d’autant plus estimé que leur partenaire occupe une position importante dans la hiérarchie militaire et peut leur offrir une certaine aisance matérielle et une protection physique. Enfin, la société porte un regard moralisateur sur ces filles favorisant leur stigmatisation et parfois leur imputant la responsabilité de ce qui leur est arrivé. En réponse dans l’après-guerre, les filles préfèrent rester avec leur époux militaire ou dissimuler leur passé pour préserver leur respectabilité et leurs chances de se marier.

4.5.2. L’éducation

Pour la majorité des jeunes congolais, l’éducation et la formation professionnelle représentent le meilleur moyen d’améliorer leur conditions de vie. L’éducation est perçue comme un moyen de progrès social pour les individus comme pour la communauté. D’autre part, l’éducation représente un investissement sur le long-terme en renforçant les compétences des jeunes et leurs capacités à créer leur propre emploi.


« Les conditions de vie étaient meilleures dans le maquis que dans la vie civile, nous mangions et nous pouvions avoir de l’argent. Cependant quand j’ai eu le message de mon oncle qui disait qu’il allait prendre en charge mes études et que mes parents voulaient que je rentre à la maison, j’ai directement décidé de quitter l’armée. … Je suis parti sans rien dire aux autres car les autorités militaires ne pouvaient pas me permettre de quitter. Quand ils ont entendu que j’étais en train d’étudier, ils ont dit que j’avais de la chance de ne pas être récupéré à cause de l’école. Ils ont dit que si je ne fais rien, ils vont venir me récupérer. A la maison, j’ai été accueilli par toute ma famille et mes voisins qui m’ont félicité d’avoir quitté les maï-maï pour venir étudier. » (16 ans, garçon, combattant maï-maï, fulero).

L’éducation formelle représente un enjeu important pour la réinsertion sociale des jeunes en leur donnant une occasion de retrouver des conditions de vie normales et d’être revalorisé. Deux études de l’Institute for Security Studies (ISS) sur le DDR en Angola et en Afrique du Sud mettent en avant le fait que la majorité des ex-combattants considèrent que le temps qu’ils ont passé dans l’armée ne leur a pas apporté une formation valable sur le marché de l’emploi.

Toutefois, si le système d’enseignement rencontre les faveurs des jeunes congolais, beaucoup de jeunes diplômés sont sans emploi. Le désengagement de l’Etat dans le secteur éducatif a conduit à l’effondrement du système d’enseignement public. Les enseignants ne bénéficient plus de séminaires de formation et de recyclage. Les dépenses nationales dans le domaine de l’éducation sont passés de 15,1 pour cent en 1972 à 0,8 pour cent en 1995 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). L’accès à l’enseignement
supérieur est limité à une minorité qui a le niveau d’étude requis et surtout les moyens financiers. La qualité de l’enseignement varie d’un établissement à un autre mais reste généralement médiocre. Les enseignants sont sous-qualifiés et sous-payés et ces établissements ne bénéficient pas de facilités pour apprendre. D’autre part, la marchandisation de l’enseignement favorise les pratiques clientélistes et la corruption et, en contrecoup, contribue à la dévalorisation des diplômes. Les formations aux métiers et l’apprentissage restent marginales et lorsqu’elles existent ces formations ne répondent souvent pas aux besoins du marché.

L’accès à l’éducation est fortement inégalitaire. Le statut social de la femme fait que la scolarisation des filles est souvent négligée ; pour la famille, leur éducation est moins rentable car celle-ci s’installera chez sa belle-famille. D’autre part, les obligations familiales de la femme réduisent le temps qu’elle consacre aux études. Le manque d’investissement de l’Etat dans le milieu rural fait que de nombreux territoires manquent de structures d’enseignements et que souvent les professeurs formés refusent d’y enseigner. De plus, la guerre a réduit l’accès des jeunes ruraux à l’éducation. De nombreux bâtiments ont été détruits et les enseignants ont fui pour cause d’insécurité. Pour les ex-combattants, l’accès à l’éducation se heurte au fait que beaucoup de ces jeunes souffrent d’un important retard scolaire, certains n’ont jamais été à l’école. L’enquête a aussi mis en avant que la peur d’être victime de violences à caractère ethnique a poussé certains jeunes à délaisser l’école. Pour ces jeunes, l’émigration apparaît être l’unique solution pour continuer leur scolarisation.

« Je suis détenteur d’un diplôme d’état (diplôme de fin d’étude secondaire). Je devrais continuer mes études à Lubumbashi mais avec ma morphologie de tutsi (il est issu d’un mariage mixte, son père est vira et sa mère munyamulenge) je crains beaucoup pour ma vie. … J’ai des relations avec les autres ethnies mais ces relations ont changé. Il est difficile de faire confiance. Quand on poursuivait les personnes avec une morphologie tutsi, il fallait parfois se cacher. … Je suis en train de voir comment aller à l’étranger pour continuer mes études. Je préfère aller dans les pays européens là où je n’aurais pas de problèmes de morphologie tutsi et où je pourrais préparer mon avenir en paix comme tous les jeunes du monde. » (23 ans, garçon, civil, vira/munyamulenge).

4.5.3. L’emploi

L’agriculture, l’élevage et la pêche sont les principaux secteurs d’activités en RDC et ce secteur primaire a une forte capacité d’absorption de main-d’œuvre non-qualifiée. Les ressources naturelles et les compétences sont disponibles et le marché offre d’importantes possibilités. La combinaison de l’agriculture, l’élevage et de la pêche est une opportunité importante pour les populations locales qui peuvent ainsi diversifier leur production et donc leur régime alimentaire mais aussi l’augmenter, grâce à la commercialisation. Dans le cadre de la réinsertion des ex-combattants, ce secteur permet de réintégrer ces jeunes en majorité ruraux dans leur communauté d’origine. Cependant, l’Etat congolais a négligé le développement du secteur agricole et des infrastructures de communication. En conséquence, ce milieu est dominé par une agriculture de subsistance et des méthodes de production non-mécanisées. D’autre part, la pénibilité des travaux agricoles, la faiblesse des revenus générés par cette activité et le poids des structures sociales traditionnelles rendent ce secteur d’activité peu attrayant pour les jeunes. Le paysan est celui qui n’a pas le don de faire un métier (Weicker 1992, p.546).

Au contraire, la ville symbolise le progrès social en permettant la réalisation personnelle et garantit l’accès aux symboles matériels de la modernité. Le micro-entreprenariat qui s’est développé sous la forme de l’économie de la « débrouille » atteste de la créativité et de la volonté de nombreux jeunes d’assurer leur survie. De plus, ce secteur en expansion a révélé des potentialités en terme économique mais aussi de
mobilité sociale. Toutefois, ce secteur qui oscille entre la légalité et l’illégalité a favorisé les pratiques de contournement de la loi. D’autre part, si les jeunes ont développé des activités dans le secteur informel, le secteur formel demeure une référence en terme d’emploi. Ce secteur est aujourd’hui dominé par les ONG internationales. La disparité des salaires existant entre les services publics et ces organisations a poussé de nombreux diplômés à quitter le service public. Les espoirs que les jeunes placent dans les ONG internationales favorisent les frustrations car leur capacité d’embauche comme leur présence dans le pays sont limitées. A Uvira, les jeunes diplômés ont violemment manifesté contre les ONG internationales auxquels ils reprochaient d’employer des jeunes qui n’étaient pas du territoire d’Uvira. Par ailleurs, le développement des ONG locales financées par l’aide internationale a favorisé une culture d’assistanat et d’attentisme qui représente un frein au développement économique.

Enfin, la participation des filles dans l’économie non-agricole et notamment dans le petit commerce en permettant la diversification des revenus, est un enjeu majeur pour améliorer le pouvoir d’achat des familles. La guerre a vu une participation accrue des femmes dans le secteur économique qui ont souvent dû assumer seuls l’éducation des enfants et pourvoir à leurs besoins matériels. Toutefois, le constat fait par Mats Utas (Utas 2003, p. 220) au Liberia montre la fragilité de cette émancipation économique de la femme. Les femmes libérées qui se sont aussi affirmées dans la sphère économique pendant le conflit, ont pour la plupart réintégrées leur position d’avant guerre avec la fin des hostilités. Le retour des maris dans le foyer et le redémarrage des activités économiques ont restauré les relations socio-économiques d’avant-guerre au sein des ménages.

4.6. Conclusion

En dépit de l’évolution du contexte national et international, les territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe ont été marqués depuis 1960 par une constante insécurité. La persistance de l’insécurité et de la violence permettent de considérer que la situation de ces territoires est liée à des enjeux strictement locaux.

Eloignée du pouvoir central, cette région limitrophe au relief accidenté constitue un cadre favorable à l’installation des mouvements insurrectionnels. Si les jeunes interrogés ont rejoint ces groupes armés volontairement, ce choix apparaît rarement motivé par le désir de se battre. Confronté à l’absence d’opportunité économique et à l’insécurité, l’armée s’est imposée comme la meilleure alternative de subsistance. Beaucoup de jeunes avouent avoir rejoint ces groupes pour améliorer leurs conditions de vie et leur statut social. Toutefois, nombreux disent avoir été déçus par la vie militaire, trompés par leurs supérieurs et souhaitent reprendre la vie civile. Ces jeunes posent cependant comme condition à leur démobilisation, la création d’opportunités socio-économiques leur permettant d’assurer leur subsistance et d’améliorer leur statut social. Ils confirment ainsi l’idée que le développement socio-économique est une dimension essentielle dans la gestion des crises et le retour à la paix.

50 ans d’instabilité et de violence ont fortement marqué les populations des territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe. Si l’analyse des origines de la violence met en avant la primauté des facteurs économiques sur les enjeux identitaires, la multiplication des actes de violence à caractère tribal a imposé « la cause ethnique » comme un facteur de violence, irréductible aux causes qui l’ont vu naître. D’autre part, pour les dirigeants nationaux et locaux, les appartenances ethniques sont devenues un enjeu de mobilisation politique. Dans les territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe, l’utilisation des appartenances
ethniques à des fins politiques a conduit à enfermer le débat politique autour de la nationalité des Banyamulenge.

L’analyse de l’enrôlement des jeunes dans les groupes armés dans les territoires d’Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe révèle avec une particulière acuité le malaise de la société congolaise tout en permettant de comprendre la complexité et la singularité de ces territoires. L’imbrication des enjeux économiques, sociaux et politiques propres à ces territoires ont plongé la région dans un conflit chronique irréductible aux causes nationales et internationales des guerres. Tout comme la situation de cette région est unique, les réponses à y apporter doivent être uniques. Le développement local territorialisé en favorisant le dialogue et la participation des différents groupes de populations présents sur un territoire permet de développer des stratégies répondant aux attentes et aux besoins de ces populations. En s’appuyant sur les ressources et les opportunités disponibles au sein d’un même bassin économique, cette approche favorise des réponses innovantes, adaptées et durables. Toutefois, s’il est à essentiel d’agir localement, il est impératif d’inscrire ces actions dans le contexte global. L’exigence à faire reculer l’exclusion qu’elle soit économique, politique, culturelle ou sociale nécessite d’adopter une approche intégrée et inclusive. Une telle perspective implique de renforcer l’engagement de l’État et de ses instances régionales dans la gestion nationale tout en développant des mécanismes capables d’intégrer la diversité des populations congolaises et de favoriser la cohabitation pacifique des différentes communautés.
5. Recommandations


Les recommandations dans chacune des quatre catégories (planification du DDR, activités de DDR, investissement social et développement économique dans le cadre d’un développement territorialisé) sont classées par ordre décroissant de priorité en fonction des besoins exprimés par les jeunes lors des entretiens.

5.1. Programme de DDR en RDC

5.1.1. Principes du PN-DDR

En mai 2004, le Programme national de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion (PN-DDR) a été officiellement adopté et placé sous la responsabilité de la Commission nationale de démobilisation et de réinsertion (CONADER). La CONADER est compétent pour la planification et la mise en œuvre du Plan national de DDR (PN-DDR) qui a pour tâche de démobiliser 150 000 combattants adultes et 30 000 enfants. Il est secondé dans gestion du programme par la division des affaires sociales, l’armée (état-major), les Nations-Unies et ses agences (MONUC, PNUD, UNICEF, BIT, FAO), la banque mondiale avec la structure régionale du MDRP, le CICR, des organisations non-gouvernementales internationales (CARE, Save the Children, IRC, IFESH) et des organisations non-gouvernementales nationales.

Le PN-DDR promeut une approche intégrant la réforme du secteur de la défense mais aussi le renforcement des capacités des communautés dans la lutte contre la pauvreté. D’autre part, ce programme s’inscrit dans un cadre régional, le Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration (MDRP, programme géré par la Banque Mondiale), intégrant l’Angola, le Burundi, la République du Congo, la République Centrafricaine, le Rwanda et l’Ouganda. L’approche du MDRP consistant à coordonner différents programmes nationaux de DDR représente une innovation.

Concernant la démobilisation des enfants-soldats, des programmes ont existé pendant une grande partie de la guerre et, depuis 2001, le gouvernement et de nombreux groupes armés se sont formellement engagés à démobiliser ces enfants. Entre 40 et 50 organisations locales sont actuellement actives dans la démobilisation des enfants-soldats. En février 2004, le cadre opérationnel intérimaire pour la prévention, le retrait et la réintégration des Enfants associés aux forces et groupes armés (EAFGA) a été adopté. Ce cadre fixe les principes et procédures de démobilisation et de réintégration des EAFGA.
5.1.2. Recommandations concernant la planification du DDR

Les ex-combattants bénéficiaires des programmes de DDR ont largement critiqué le fait que le retour dans leurs familles n’est pas accompagné de mesures d’aide à la réinsertion économique et quand ces mesures existent, elles sont insuffisantes. Les jeunes mettent en avant le fait qu’ils avaient dans l’armée un salaire et qu’en réintégrant la vie civile ils se trouveront démuni et incapable d’aider les siens.

- La planification des activités de DDR doit se faire une fois que les financements des trois volets de ce programme sont assurés.
- Octroyer aux organisations locales des financements qui permettent la mise en œuvre effective de programmes de réinsertion économique. Pour beaucoup d’organisations locales, l’appui à la réinsertion se limite à une aide symbolique (un cochon à élever, un kit scolaire comprenant un cahier et un crayon, l’argent pour payer une année d’école, une houe).

Les ex-combattants dénoncent leur exploitation par les chefs des groupes armés. Ils se sont battus pour défendre leur pays, ont souffert, souvent ils étaient appelés à combattre en première ligne et lorsque l’armée a commencé à payer les soldes ils ont été démobilisés et ramenés dans leur famille sans aucune reconnaissance ni compensation matérielle. Les jalousies et les frustrations de ces jeunes sont renforcés par les mesures souvent contradictoires qui ont été prises par le gouvernement qui d’un côté soutient le DDR et de l’autre renforce l’armée. Par ailleurs, des détournements de fond par les organisations locales actives gérant les Centres de transit et d’orientation (CTO) ont été dénoncés par les jeunes qui, là encore, y voit une tentative des adultes de s’enrichir sur leurs souffrances.

- La communauté internationale doit encourager l’inclusion du programme de DDR dans l’élaboration des réformes du secteur de la défense et faire un suivi rigoureux des décisions prises par le gouvernement. En février 2004, le gouvernement a adopté le cadre opérationnel intérimaire fixant les procédures de démobilisation des enfants-soldats. En mai, des enfants qui avaient été démobilisés ont reçu leur solde et certains se sont vus attribués un grade militaire. Par ailleurs, des disparités de traitement (versement de solde, octroi d’uniformes, etc.) entre des militaires de l’armée nationale favorisent les tensions entre les différentes composantes et groupes armés. En octobre 2004, des échanges de tirs ont eu lieu dans la plaine entre les ex-maï-maï bafulero et les troupes de Masunzu au motif que ce dernier avait reçu des tenues militaires du gouvernement et pas les maï-maï.
- Des mécanismes de contrôle stricts doivent être mis en place pour assurer que les financements sont utilisés conformément aux programmes qui ont été approuvées. La pléthore d’acteurs engagés dans le DDR, en compliquant la chaîne décisionnelle, augmente les risques de détournement d’argent et de corruption.
5.1.3. Recommandations concernant les activités de DDR

Les ex-combattants mettent particulièrement l’accent sur le fait qu’ils souhaitent réintégrer l’école et avoir accès à des formations qualifiantes. L’accès à l’éducation représente pour eux un moyen d’être revalorisé et de devenir des jeunes femmes et hommes comme les autres.

- Mettre en place des programmes d’enseignement alternatifs tels que les programmes de rattrapage scolaire et les formations aux métiers qui apportent une réponse au retard scolaire qu’accusent de nombreux ex-combattants.
- Les programmes de DDR doivent proposer des programmes d’enseignement alternatifs pour répondre à la volonté des ex-combattants d’intégrer l’école et la nécessité de proposer une formation qualifiante sur le marché du travail.
- Privilégier les formations court-termes ou en alternance pour permettre aux jeunes ayant des responsabilités familiales de s’investir parallèlement dans des activités génératrices de revenus.
- Valoriser l’apprentissage car il permet d’acquérir une formation et participe à la réinsertion sociale des jeunes en favorisant le travail en collaboration avec des civils et le transfert de savoir entre générations.

Les filles combattantes et associées aux groupes armés sont stigmatisées au sein de leur communauté comme des filles sans moralité. En conséquence, de nombreuses filles refusent d’être démobilisées ou dissimulent leur passé par crainte d’être marginalisées et de perdre leurs chances de se marier.

- L’identification et l’entrée en contact avec les filles doivent se faire en collaboration avec les familles et nécessitent d’engager un dialogue avec les combattants et les filles.
- Respecter la volonté d’anonymat de ces filles en proposant un accompagnement individuel et des activités non-institutionnelles. La création de centres de formation et d’alphabétisation pour les filles en rupture scolaire notamment les filles-mères et les ex-combattantes offrent un espace protégé où des filles qui partagent une expérience commune peuvent se retrouver et suivre un enseignement sans être marginalisées. Ces centres engageront du personnel féminin.

Les jeunes rencontrés dans les CTO se plaignaient de rester trop longtemps dans ces centres et de s’y ennuyer. Par ailleurs, les organisations locales qui gèrent les CTO constatent que les jeunes démobilisés sont sujets à des troubles du comportement. Filles et garçons ont été victimes et souvent acteurs de violences sexuelles. Les pratiques homosexuelles sont notoires chez les ex-combattants. De nombreux jeunes reproduisent les abus sexuels dont ils ont été victimes, justifiant leur comportement par le fait qu’ils peuvent abuser des plus jeunes car eux aussi ont été abusés par leurs aînés.

- L’existence des CTO exige un engagement des bailleurs de fonds et des organisations gérant ces centres dans le recrutement et la formation du personnel et notamment la formation dans le domaine de l’accompagnement psychologique et le développement de méthodes éducatives adaptées.
- Les activités éducationnelles sont souvent moralisantes (cours de morale, d’hygiène, éducation religieuse) au détriment de l’accompagnement psychologique des enfants. Les CTO devraient s’efforcer de pallier le tabou attaché à la sexualité en RDC et la condamnation morale et juridique de l’homosexualité en développant des programmes d’éducation à la santé reproductive, à la sexualité et le suivi psychologique des jeunes associés aux groupes armés.
- Les activités ludiques et sportives devront être multipliées dans les CTO.
5.2. Développement socio-économique local et territorialisé

Si le phénomène des jeunes combattants est symptomatique de la crise économique et politique en RDC, les programmes de gestion des crises devront adopter une perspective plus large en intégrant l’ensemble des populations affectées par le conflit et notamment les réfugiés, les déplacés et les victimes des violences des groupes armés. Depuis la mise en place du gouvernement de transition, le territoire de Fizi accueille quotidiennement des retournés. Ces retours se font de façon spontanée et en dehors de la supervision et de l’assistance du HCR. Le retour d’une grande population dans des communautés très appauvries, et qui ont parfois profité du départ des réfugiés pour s’emparer de leurs biens, représentent une menace pour la stabilité sociale et économique de ce territoire.

Donner préférence aux acteurs de la violence au détriment des victimes risque de légitimer le fait que la violence soit rentable. Les ex-combattants sont gratifiés d’une double prime, la prime issue de leur position de force pendant la guerre et la prime de réinsertion dans la vie civile offerte par les programmes de DDR. D’autre part, l’élaboration de projets strictement réservés aux ex-combattants risque de les conforter dans l’idée qu’ils constituent une classe à part dans la communauté favorisant la perpétuation des logiques et comportements acquis dans les groupes armés.

Par ailleurs, dans de nombreux cas, les chefs politiques et traditionnels ont été impliqués dans la propagation de discours prônant la haine ethnique et l’enrôlement des jeunes dans les milices ethniques. Parfois, les églises ont servi de tribune politique. Dans la transition, les chefs politiques ont acquis des postes grâce à ces groupes. Les communautés interrogées pour cette étude reconnaissent que la guerre a amélioré la situation politique de leur communauté en lui offrant une meilleure représentation au niveau étatique.

Enfin, la reproduction des logiques violentes d’intégration socio-économique depuis les années 60 atteste du fait que le développement des milices n’est pas un problème conjoncturel mais est lié à des facteurs structurels qui nécessite en conséquence l’adoption d’une approche sociétale.

5.2.1. Recommandations concernant l’investissement social

La majorité des jeunes disent avoir rejoint les groupes armés car leur milieu de vie ne leur offrait pas d’autres alternatives. Ils dénoncent la pauvreté existant dans les milieux ruraux mais affirment aussi leur préférence à vivre dans leur milieu d’origine à proximité de leurs proches.

- Réhabiliter les infrastructures de communication et renforcer les institutions étatiques afin de prévenir le risque de voir se développer des enclaves de pouvoir échappant au contrôle de l’Etat.
- Assurer la prise en charge par l’Etat des soins de santé primaire et d’urgence ainsi que de l’éducation primaire. Le taux de mortalité infantile est de 129 ‰, l’un des plus forts sur le continent africain. Parmi les 3,8 millions (IRC, 2004) de décès causés par la guerre, 45,5 pour cent sont des enfants de moins de 5 ans (alors que cette catégorie d’âge représente moins de 20 pour cent de la population totale). Les causes de ces décès sont largement attribuées à des maladies bénignes tels que les fièvres, la diarrhée, les infections respiratoires, le paludisme (pour lesquelles un
système de prévention et de traitement existent) et la malnutrition. Il est estimé que plus de 70 pour cent de la population congolaise n’aurait pas accès à des soins de santé primaire. L’Etat devra être le premier pourvoyeur de ces services sociaux, toutefois, les organisations humanitaires et de développement internationales pourront apporter un soutien temporaire pour le fonctionnement des services publics et le paiement des salaires aux fonctionnaires.

- Prendre en compte dans les programmes d’assistance et de développement les initiatives développées par les communautés locales pour pallier les carences de l’Etat dans le fonctionnement des services sociaux. L’investissement dans les ressources humaines locales est une condition fondamentale de durabilité des actions de développement.

- Mettre en place des mesures incitatives pour favoriser l’investissement des entrepreneurs privés et l’installation de personnel qualifié, notamment des enseignants et du personnel de santé, en milieu rural.

*Le crédit accordé par les jeunes à l’éducation doit être capitalisé par des mesures contribuant à améliorer la qualité du système éducatif congolais.*

- Rééquilibrer le budget des dépenses publiques en revoyant à la hausse la part allouée à l’éducation qui est actuellement largement délaissée. La prise en charge par l’Etat de l’éducation primaire est une condition importante pour assurer la scolarisation des filles.

- Réformer le système d’enseignement. La réforme de l’enseignement doit permettre d’inscrire l’éducation au sein d’un projet national de société et proposer un programme scolaire répondant au défi de la RDC d’après-guerre et aux enjeux du 21 ème siècle.

- Offrir des formations répondant aux besoins économiques locaux. L’offre de formations techniques, professionnelles et d’apprentissages devra être précédée d’une étude du marché.

*Le respect de la confidentialité dans les programmes de réintégration des filles associées aux groupes armés ne doit pas contribuer à dissimuler la violence structurelle. Les filles interrogées disent être complexées vis-à-vis des garçons car elles sont moins éduquées. Par ailleurs, elles dénoncent le fait que les hommes les traitent comme des esclaves.*

- Favoriser la scolarisation des filles et notamment des filles-mères.

- Valoriser les bénéfices résultant de la participation accrue des femmes dans le domaine économique durant la guerre.

- L’émancipation économique des femmes doit être renforcée par la promotion de leur participation dans la gestion du ménage et les prises de décision au niveau communautaire.

- Apporter aux femmes une assistance leur permettant de réduire la charge de leurs activités quotidiennes (réhabilitation des routes d’accès agricole, multiplication des points d’eau, installation de moulins).

- Lutter contre les violences structurelles liées à l’inégalité des sexes en développant des programmes communautaires et en élaborant des campagnes d’information, notamment sur la violence conjugale.

*La réinsertion sociale des ex-combattants doit tenir compte des changements sociaux que la guerre a favorisé. Le renforcement des groupes armés a permis aux jeunes d’acquérir un pouvoir qui leur était jusque là largement refusé. Les entretiens révèlent la volonté des jeunes de se soustraire à un système de pouvoir asservissant. Ils dénoncent les abus de pouvoir des autorités militaires comme la manipulation des élites politiques.*
• Proposer une alternative à l’expression violente des conflits inter-générationnels en favorisant l’implication des jeunes garçons et filles dans les prises de décision à travers notamment le développement du milieu associatif ou encore la participation des jeunes à l’élaboration et le suivi de politiques nationales tel que le programme de DDR.

• Encourager les communautés, au-delà des seuls combattants, à s’interroger sur le rôle qu’elles ont joué dans le développement de logiques violentes et sur l’impact socio-économique de ces stratégies.

5.2.2. Recommandations concernant le développement économique

Le manque d’opportunités économiques est l’une des principales causes d’enrôlement des jeunes dans les groupes armés. La création d’activités génératrices de revenus est une priorité pour assurer l’autosubsistance des populations congolaises.

• Pourvoir les agriculteurs avec des outils oratoires, des semences, des animaux de petit élevage pour permettre la relance des activités agricoles et aider à lutter contre l’insécurité alimentaire. De même, la pêche et l’élevage devront être soutenus.

• Développer les activités de réhabilitation des infrastructures et les activités agricoles qui ont une forte capacité d’absorption de main-d’œuvre non-qualifiée.

• Combiner les activités à Haute intensité de main-d’œuvre (HIMO) avec des formations professionnelles afin de permettre aux jeunes de se réorienter dans une autre activité lors du retrait des bailleurs de fonds.

• Identifier les filières économiques génératrices d’emploi et de revenus.

Certains jeunes interrogés et particulièrement les Banyamulenge ont mis en avant leurs craintes d’être persécutés et en conséquence exprimé le vœu de s’exiler. Les stratégies de développement économique local devront être définies avec l’ensemble de la population afin d’intégrer les spécificités des expériences et des perceptions des différentes communautés présentes localement et faciliter le dialogue et la restauration de relations de confiance entre ces communautés.

• Intégrer dans les programmes de DDR et de relance économique des mécanismes susceptibles d’encourager le dialogue inter-communautaire en mettant en avant les bénéfices que les populations peuvent retirer d’une meilleure cohabitation (restauration des échanges commerciaux entre les différents territoires et les États de la sous-région, participation des différentes communautés aux activités HIMO). En 1997-98, des travaux ont été réalisés afin de réhabiliter la route Uvira-Fizi-Minembwe. Ces travaux ont suscité l’enthousiasme des différentes communautés ethniques qui, ensemble, se sont investies dans les travaux. Toutefois, dû à la reprise des affrontements armés, la réhabilitation de la route a été stoppée.

La création d’emploi devra être accompagnée de mesures visant à assurer aux travailleurs un salaire décent permettant notamment aux jeunes de s’intégrer socialement (achat d’une parcelle, paiement de la dot, scolarisation des enfants, etc.).

• Combiner les activités agricoles avec des activités génératrices de revenus. L’implication des femmes dans les activités génératrices de revenus pendant la guerre devront être encouragé dans l’après-guerre.

• Proscrire les programmes travail contre nourriture (« food for work ») au profit des programmes du travail rémunéré en argent (« cash for food »), ce qui permet d’injecter des revenus dans le circuit économique local et de limiter les effets négatifs de l’aide alimentaire sur le secteur agroalimentaire local.
Les emplois créés devront aussi permettre de renforcer l'autonomie des plus vulnérables en leur offrant des outils d’émancipation politique et intellectuelles. Les programmes de relance économique devront combattre les pratiques d’exploitation qui entretiennent les frustrations et les tensions sociales.

- Valoriser l’esprit d’innovation, de prises de risques et la mobilité sociale qui se sont notamment révélés chez les jeunes actifs dans l’économie de la débrouille en encourageant le développement de petites entreprises à travers le développement de formation et l’accès aux (micro-)crédits.
- Promouvoir à travers les jeunes l’innovation agricole et le développement des activités de commercialisation et transformation de la production agricole.
- Lutter contre les pratiques d’exploitation en favorisant l’accès des plus vulnérables à l’information, à l’éducation et en encourageant l’organisation des travailleurs.
- Soutenir la mise en place de coopératives agricoles, de pêche et d’élevage qui permettent de limiter la vulnérabilité des populations face aux élites politiques et économiques.
Annexes

1. Bibliographie


OCHA : « Armed non-states actors in the Great Lakes region. The allied democratic forces, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the maï-maï », research project (New-York, OCHA, 2002).


Utas M. : « Sweet battlefields : Youth and the Liberian civil war » (Uppsala, Uppsala University, 2003).


2. **Sites internet**

Amnesty International : [http://www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org), report on children and women’s rights in DRC.


Human Rights Watch : [http://www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org), report on children and women’s rights in DRC.


3. **Textes juridiques, accords de paix et documents des Nations-Unies**


## Liste des personnes interrogées (entretiens individuels et collectifs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Lieu d'enquête</th>
<th>Enquêteur</th>
<th>Enquêté</th>
<th>Activité</th>
<th>Sexe</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Situation matrimoniale</th>
<th>Niveau d’étude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13/11/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Zacharie Hakizimawa</td>
<td>Enquêté</td>
<td>Fille</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>3ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Charles Ngolo Senge</td>
<td>Sans activité</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Marié</td>
<td>6 enfants</td>
<td>Diplôme de 3ème année universitaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Charles Ngolo Senge</td>
<td>Fonctionnaire</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Marié</td>
<td>4 enfants</td>
<td>Diplôme de fin d’étude secondaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Charles Ngolo Senge</td>
<td>Ex-combattante mai-mai Elève</td>
<td>Fille</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>1ère année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/11/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Zacharie Hakizimawa</td>
<td>Elève</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>5ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Zacharie Hakizimawa</td>
<td>Combattant FRC Groupe Masunzu</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>5ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Zacharie Hakizimawa</td>
<td>Sans activité</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>4ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Femme au foyer</td>
<td>Fille</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mariée</td>
<td>2 enfants</td>
<td>Diplôme de fin d’étude secondaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Gilbert Amuli</td>
<td>Taxi-vélo</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Marié</td>
<td>1 enfant</td>
<td>2ème année secondaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Ex-combattant RCD Elève</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>5ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Gilbert Amuli</td>
<td>Ex-combattant RCD Invalide</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>6ème année primaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Gilbert Amuli</td>
<td>Femme au foyer</td>
<td>Fille</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Fille-mère</td>
<td>3 enfants</td>
<td>6ème année primaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Gilbert Amuli</td>
<td>Enseignant</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>6ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Gilbert Amuli</td>
<td>Ex-combattant mai-mai Elève</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Célibataire</td>
<td>2ème année secondaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/12/2004</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Ex-combattant AFDU/RCD Cambiste et étudiant</td>
<td>Garçon</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Marié</td>
<td>2 enfants</td>
<td>2ème année de licence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Lieu</td>
<td>Enquêteur</td>
<td>Enquêté</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/11/2004</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretiens avec membres d’une association de jeunes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/11/2004</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Réunion associations locales, SC, CARITAS, MONUC et BIT pour le programme IPEC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/2004</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec le responsable de projet à Save the Children.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/2004</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec le coordinateur de Group One (projet de programme de réinsertion économique des ex-combattants).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/11/2004</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec le représentant d’ECHO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec des membres d’une coopérative de jeunes pêcheurs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Visite d’une briqueterie artisanale et entretien avec les membres.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Visite des activités d’une association de micro-crédit et entretien avec les membres.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/2004</td>
<td>Baraka</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretiens avec des jeunes filles (filles-mères et victimes de viol) encadrés par l’association AFIP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2003</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretiens avec des enfants des rues encadrés par la CARITAS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec des membres de l’association des taxi-vélo.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec des étudiants d’une université d’Uvira (UNICA SIGEA).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretiens avec des enfants-soldats démobilisés (centre de DDR de l’association AVREO).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/12/2004</td>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec des filles domestiques encadrées par l’association CENEAS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/12/2004</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Entretien avec un commandant banyamulenge ex-FAZ, ex-AFDL et opposant RCD (en exil).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/12/2004</td>
<td>Bujumbura</td>
<td>Hélène Morvan</td>
<td>Visite des activités d’une association de micro crédits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. **Grille d'entretien : combattant ou ex-combattant**

*Nom de l’enquêteur :*
*Date :*
*Lieu d’enquête :*

**Renseignement sur l’enquêté :**
*Age :*
*Sexe :*
*Position dans la fratrie :*
*Situation matrimoniale/enfants :*
*Appartenance ethnique :*
*Village/ville de naissance :*
*Village/ville où il/elle vit actuellement :*

**Thème 1 : Situation socio-économique**

Cette enquête s’intéresse à l’impact de la guerre sur la situation économique et sociale en République Démocratique du Congo. Elle s’intéresse particulièrement à l’impact de la guerre sur les conditions de vie des jeunes congolais vivant dans le sud-Kivu.

**Avant la guerre de 1996**

1. Décrivez les conditions de vie dans votre famille avant la guerre de 1996 (« guerre de l’AFDL »)? Alliez-vous à l’école ? Aviez-vous une activité économique rémunérée ? Si vous étiez malade, est-ce que vos parents pouvaient payer les soins de santé à l’hôpital ? Quelle était votre alimentation de base ? Comment étaient vos relations avec vos parents ? Comment étaient vos relations avec vos frères et sœurs ?

2. Décrire vos activités économiques et celles de votre famille ainsi que le montant de vos revenus avant 1996 ?

3. Avant la guerre, comment envisagiez-vous votre avenir professionnel, familial et socioculturel ?

4. Est-ce que vous pensez qu’il était plus facile pour vos parents lorsqu’ils avaient votre âge d’aller à l’école ? Si oui, pourquoi ?

5. Est-ce que vous pensez qu’il était plus facile pour vos parents lorsqu’ils avaient votre âge de trouver un travail ? Si oui, pourquoi ?

6. Quel est la position de votre famille dans votre communauté d’origine ? (Est-ce que votre famille est une famille considérée comme riche ? Est-ce que des membres de votre famille sont dans la chefferie ou dans l’administration ? Est-ce que des membres de votre famille ont une profession qui est particulièrement respectable pour les membres de votre communauté, par exemple prêtre ou préfet ? Etc.) Est-ce que cette position a évolué avec la guerre ?

**Pendant la guerre**


8. Quel est votre niveau scolaire ? Avez-vous suivi une formation professionnelle et si oui, dans quel domaine ?

9. Est-ce que vous aimiez l’école ? Qu’est que vous aimiez dans l’école et qu’est que vous n’aimiez pas ? Aviez-vous des bons résultats ? Aviez-vous de bonnes relations avec les enseignants ?

10. Si vous aviez une activité rémunérée avant d’entrer dans les groupes armés, quel était cette activité ? Quelles difficultés rencontriez-vous dans la réalisation de cette activité ? Combien gagniez-vous par semaine ? Est-ce que
cette activité vous permettez d’aider votre famille ? (Décrivez cette activité professionnelle : activité journalière ou ponctuelle, est-ce que cette activité que vous faites seules ou collectivement, est-ce que vous avez un supérieur hiérarchique)

11. Comment les jeunes sont considérés dans votre communauté d’origine ? (Est-ce qu’ils sont écoutés lorsqu’il y a des décisions à prendre pour la famille ou la communauté ? Est-ce qu’ils sont représentés dans l’administration ou dans la chefferie ? Est-ce qu’ils font le même travail que les adultes ? Etc.)

12. Pensez-vous que la situation en milieu rural est plus difficile qu’en milieu urbain ? Si oui, pourquoi ? Est-ce que la situation en milieu rural a changé avec la guerre ? Est-ce que vous aimeriez vivre en ville ou est-ce que certains de vos amis ont choisi de s’installer en ville ? Si oui, pourquoi ?

13. Quel est le statut des jeunes filles dans votre communauté d’origine ? Est-ce que la situation des filles à changer avec la guerre ?

14. Est-ce qu’il existe des organisations ou des institutions (école, églises, ONG locale ou internationale, administration) qui soutiennent et aident les jeunes ? Quelles sont ces organisations ? Quel type d’aide, ces organisations leur apportent ?

Thème 2 : Expérience dans les groupes armés

Dans l’Est du Congo, la guerre a vu le développement des groupes armés et notamment du mouvement maa-maa et des mouvements de rébellion. Beaucoup de jeunes de votre âge ont décidé de rejoindre ces groupes.

15. Vous avez rejoint un de ces groupes armés, quel groupe avez-vous joint et pourquoi avez-vous décidé de rejoindre ce groupe et pas un autre ? En quelle année avez-vous rejoint le groupe armé ? Quel âge aviez-vous ?

16. Pourquoi avez-vous rejoint un groupe armé ?

17. Est-ce que le statut de combattant répond à vos attentes ? Est-ce que vous avez trouvé une réponse aux problèmes que vous aviez en rejoignant l’armée ? Si oui, quelle réponse à quel problème ?

18. Est-ce que vos motivations à rejoindre les groupes armés ont évoluées avec votre expérience de combattant ? Si oui, comment ?

19. À votre avis, pourquoi il y a plus de jeunes que de vieux dans les groupes armés ?

20. Pourquoi il y a plus de garçons que de filles dans les groupes armés ?

21. Pourquoi se sont essentiellement des jeunes du milieu rural qui sont dans les groupes armés ?


23. Est-ce que quelqu’un de votre famille appartient ou a appartenu à un groupe armé ? Qui ? Dans quel groupe ? À quel grade ? Est-ce qu’il y appartient toujours ?

24. Est-ce que certains de vos amis ont aussi rejoint des groupes armés ? Est-ce qu’ils ont joint le même groupe que vous ou un autre groupe ? Êtes-vous toujours amis ? Est-ce que vous vous êtes fait de nouveaux amis lorsque vous étiez dans les groupes armés ?

25. Qu’est-ce que vous aimez dans la vie de combattant et qu’est-ce que vous n’aimez pas ?

26. Quelle a été votre carrière dans les groupes armés ? Avez-vous reçu une formation militaire ? Si oui, quel type de formation ? Avez-vous été gradé ? Quel grade et à quelle occasion ? Est-ce que ce grade est important pour vous et, si oui pourquoi ?
27. Quelles sont les conditions de vie d’un combattant ? Percevez-vous un revenu et, si oui, quel est le montant de ce revenu ? Quels sont vos conditions de logement, d’alimentation, d’accès aux soins médicaux ? Est-ce que les combattants consomment de la drogue ou de l’alcool ?

28. Est-ce que vos conditions de vie étaient ou sont meilleures dans l’armée que dans la vie civile ? Si les conditions de vie ne sont pas meilleures, pourquoi restez-vous dans l’armée ?

29. Est-ce que l’attitude des civils envers vous a changé depuis que vous êtes dans un combattant ? Si oui, comment ? Si vous avez quitté l’armée, est-ce que les relations avec les civils ont aussi changé ? Si oui, comment ?

30. Avez-vous des relations avec vos amis et vos frères et sœurs qui sont civils ? Qu’est-ce qu’ils font actuellement ? Est-ce que vous pensez que leur situation est meilleure que la votre ?

31. Si vous avez quitté les groupes armés, comment et pourquoi avez-vous quitté les groupes armés ? Si non, quelles conditions doivent être réunies pour que vous retourniez dans la vie civile ?

32. Si vous quittez l’armée, est-ce que votre famille acceptera de vous rentre vivre chez eux ? Si non, pourquoi ? Pour ceux qui ont quitté l’armée, est-ce que vous vivez actuellement dans votre famille ?

33. Quels types d’emplois ou quelles activités rémunérées les ex-combattants, de retour à la vie civile ont plus de chance d’occuper ? (Préciser les activités qui sont spécifiques aux filles et celles qui sont spécifiques aux garçons.)

34. Connaissez-vous des structures qui ont des programme de DDR (désarmement, démobilisation et la réinsertion des ex-combattants) ? Quels sont ses structures et qu’est ce qu’elles font ? Est-ce que vous avez déjà participé à de tels programmes ? Si oui, comment cela s’est passé ? Si non, voudriez-vous participer à ces programmes et pourquoi ?

**Thème 3 : Analyse du conflit**

La guerre a affecté l’ensemble des populations congolaises. Toutefois, les régions de l’Est est la zone où les affrontements armés ont été et demeure les plus importants. Le territoire de Fizi-Uvira-Itombwe est un lieu de tensions depuis les années 60 et aussi un lieu de violences inter-ethniques.

35. Est-ce que vous connaissez l’histoire de la rébellion muléliste ? Quels étaient les groupes en conflit ? Pourquoi ces groupes se sont affrontés ? Est-ce que vous avez des membres de votre famille qui ont participé aux événements de 1964, si oui dans quel groupe ?


37. Avez-vous des relations avec des membres d’autres communautés ethniques ? Est-ce que la guerre a changé vos relations ? Si oui, pourquoi vos relations ont changé et comment ont-elles changées ?

38. Qu’elle est la situation de votre communauté ethnique par rapport aux autres communautés ethniques du Sud-Kivu ? (Est-ce que votre communauté est marginalisée politiquement ? Est-ce que votre communauté est plus pauvre que les autres ? Etc.) Est-ce que la situation de votre communauté a changé avec la guerre ?
Thème 4 : Processus de paix et perspective d’avenir


39. Est-ce que vous pensez que le Congo est aujourd’hui en paix ? Est-ce que vous avez confiance dans le gouvernement de transition et l’espoir qu’une paix durable s’installe dans votre pays ? Si oui pourquoi ? Si non, pourquoi ?

41. Est-ce que la mise en place du gouvernement de transition a permis l’évolution de la situation des combattants ? Si oui, comment ?

42. Quels sont vos rêves pour le futur?

42. 1- Si vous êtes toujours combattant, est-ce que vous souhaitez rester dans l’armée ? Si oui, pourquoi ?

42. 2- Si vous ne voulez pas restez dans l’armée ou si vous êtes déjà démobilisé, que voulez-vous faire ? Avez-vous des ambitions professionnelles ? Est-ce qu’il y a un travail que vous voudriez faire ? Précisez quel travail ? Est-ce que vous voudriez reprendre des études ou faire une formation professionnelle ? Précisez quelles études ou formations Si vous n’êtes pas marié, voudriez-vous vous marier et avoir des enfants ? Est-ce que vous voulez continuer à vivre dans votre village ou est-ce que vous voulez vous installer ailleurs ? Si vous voulez vous installer ailleurs, où et pourquoi ? Si vous voulez rester dans votre village, pourquoi ?

43. Si vous voulez rejoindre la vie civile ou rester dans l’armée, quels sont les obstacles que vous pourriez rencontrer dans la réalisation de vos projets ?

44. Si vous deviez recevoir une assistance, quels sont vos besoins prioritaires ? Est-ce que vous avez des besoins particuliers dans le domaine de l’éducation, de la formation et de l’emploi ? Si oui, précisez la nature de ces besoins ?

45. Sur le long-terme, quels sont les actions à mettre en place pour améliorer la situation socio-économique de votre communauté et plus particulièrement des jeunes ?

46. Est-ce qu’il y a un point que cette enquête n’a pas abordé et sur lequel vous aimeriez vous exprimer ?

Merci d’avoir répondu à ces questions et d’avoir partagé avec nous vos expériences, vos analyses et vos espoirs. Cet entretien est anonyme et votre identité ne sera pas révélée. Les informations recueillies seront transmises aux organisations internationales, nationales et locales qui travaillent avec les jeunes afin que leurs actions répondent mieux aux besoins des jeunes congolais mais aussi des jeunes vivant dans d’autres pays en guerre.
6. Localisation cartographique

Carte 1: Le Minembwe
Carte 2. : La région du Kivu et ses territoires
Carte 3. : La répartition et la densité de la population dans les territoires d’Uvira et Fizi
Reinventando la subsistencia: Estrategias socio-económicas de mujeres desplazadas, jefas de hogar, en Bogotá

Adriana Alejandra Ramírez Duplat

Agosto 2005
Agradecimientos

Este estudio no se hubiera realizado sin el interés de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), quienes me brindaron la oportunidad de formar parte de una investigación más global sobre el desplazamiento. Principalmente a Luca Fedi con quien me he mantenido en contacto y quien ha enriquecido el estudio con su amable retroalimentación.

Importante reconocer el apoyo de la Maestría en Estudios de Género de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia por quienes me vincule a este proceso.

He contado con la atención de funcionarios de varias organizaciones que en Bogotá trabajan con la población en situación de desplazamiento, Fundación Menonita Colombiana para el Desarrollo (MENCOLDES), Opción Legal, Consejería en Proyectos, la Red de Solidaridad Social (RSS), y principalmente el Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para Refugiados (ACNUR), que tan amablemente me han atendido. También agradecer a la Red de Mujeres.

Finalmente un agradecer profundamente y reconocer que el trabajo de campo no se hubiera podido realizar sin la palabra desinteresada de mujeres desplazadas, entre ellas las de la Asociación de Afrocolombianos Desplazados (AFRODES).
Indice

Agradecimientos ........................................................................................................ 146
Abreviaturas .............................................................................................................. 147

Resumen ejecutivo .................................................................................................... 148

1. Introducción .......................................................................................................... 149
2. Contexto general .................................................................................................. 151
   2.1. Perfil demográfico ...................................................................................... 151
   2.2. Contexto social ........................................................................................... 152
   2.3. Contexto económico .................................................................................. 153
   2.4. Perspectiva histórica del desplazamiento en Colombia ......................... 153
   2.5. El desplazamiento en Bogotá ...................................................................... 155
3. Análisis ................................................................................................................ 157
   3.1. El concepto de desplazamiento y su traducción en las políticas publicas .... 157
   3.2. Aspectos socio-económicos del desplazamiento en Bogotá ................. 159
      3.2.1. Estrategias económicas de subsistencia ........................................... 161
      3.2.2. Redes sociales de solidaridad ......................................................... 163
   3.3. Retos e oportunidades de los proyectos de apoyo productivos .............. 164
4. Recomendaciones .................................................................................................. 166
   4.1. Aspectos generales de apoyo a la estabilidad económica de la PSD ....... 166
   4.2. Fortalecer colaboraciones entre organizaciones internacionales ............. 167
Anexos ....................................................................................................................... 169
### Abreviaturas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abreviatura</th>
<th>Explicación</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACNUR</td>
<td>Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para Refugiados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRODES</td>
<td>Asociación de Afrocolombianos Desplazados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODHES</td>
<td>Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPES</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANE</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDHH</td>
<td>Derechos Humanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIH</td>
<td>Derecho Internacional Humanitario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCORA</td>
<td>Instituto Colombiano para la Reforma Agraria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENCOLDES</td>
<td>Fundación Menonita Colombiana para el Desarrollo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONG</td>
<td>Organización No Gubernamental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIT</td>
<td>Organización Internacional del Trabajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Población en Situación de Desplazamiento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Red de Solidaridad Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENA</td>
<td>Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAID</td>
<td>Unidad de Atención Integral a Población Desplazada del Distrito Capital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Resumen ejecutivo

En el escenario del conflicto armado interno que vive Colombia, este documento presenta un estudio sobre la situación de mujeres jefas de hogar que se han desplazado forzadamente. Se busca llegar a un entendimiento sobre las problemáticas de subsistencia que afrontan al asentarse en grandes centros urbanos, en este caso la ciudad de Bogotá.

Metodológicamente, se realizó una búsqueda bibliográfica sobre el desplazamiento forzado con el objetivo de situarlo en un escenario de construcción social. Se ahondó en el entendimiento de sus orígenes históricos, aspectos culturales, económicos y demográficos. Esta información se contextualizó con trabajo de campo en el que se realizaron entrevistas a mujeres desplazadas, trabajadores humanitarios y a miembros de organizaciones internacionales y no gubernamentales.

Por medio del análisis de las estrategias económicas, de las redes sociales formales e informales, se vislumbra la necesidad de un acompañamiento constante y coherente a estos procesos. En cuanto a la implementación de políticas públicas y a la financiación de proyectos, se recomienda estudios previos a profundidad con el fin de no descuidar ninguno de los aspectos que conforman esta compleja realidad.
1. Introducción

Este estudio tiene como objetivo investigar sobre las estrategias de subsistencia implementadas por mujeres jefas de hogar, en situación de desplazamiento, que se encuentran asentadas en la ciudad de Bogotá, capital de Colombia.

En un contexto de conflicto y de post-conflicto, se hace más que necesario analizar la situación de poblaciones desplazadas, las cuales viven un alto grado de vulnerabilidad económica y social. En Colombia, las mujeres y los niños son las mayores victimas del desplazamiento, dinámica que traduce en un empoderamiento de las mujeres en cuanto a los procesos de reconstrucción. Las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar son las mayores creadoras y generadoras de medios de subsistencia para ellas y para sus familias. Bogotá como mayor foco de recepción de población en situación de desplazamiento, se ve abocada a generar respuestas para integrar armónicamente esta población en su mundo económico y laboral.

Se pretende además, ahondar en el conocimiento de los procesos enfrentados por estas mujeres al introducirse en las dinámicas socio-económicas de la ciudad. Conocer las redes de solidaridad generadas formal e informalmente, analizar la respuesta Estatal a este fenómeno, y la ayuda de entidades no gubernamentales y de la comunidad internacional.

Este estudio fue encargado por la OIT en el marco de una investigación más amplia sobre las estrategias de sustentamiento de poblaciones vulnerables en contextos de conflicto armado, post-conflicto y desastres naturales, dentro del programa de búsquedas “Reforzar el empleo en respuesta a condiciones de crisis”.

Para acercarse a las demandas requeridas para el estudio fue necesario asumir la problemática del desplazamiento desde una mirada diferencial de género, edad y etnia. Este es un método de análisis que toma en cuenta las diversas inequidades existentes, con el propósito de brindar una adecuada atención y protección de derechos. El enfoque diferencial de género, edad y etnia parte de los principios básicos del libre ejercicio de los derechos, de la equidad y del reconocimiento de las diferencias entre los grupos poblacionales, en este caso particularmente se situó el género como categoría de análisis.

Metodológicamente, el estudio se acercó al análisis con herramientas investigativas como el trabajo de campo y el de escritorio. La contextualización histórica del desplazamiento se llevó a cabo por medio de una búsqueda bibliográfica, además se revisaron los últimos documentos publicados por el Gobierno Distrital y organizaciones como la ACNUR y la Red de Mujeres, en relación a mujeres jefas de hogar y al impacto del desplazamiento en Bogotá. Para acercarse al perfil socio-económico del país se revisó información estadística, consultando documentos y proyecciones realizadas por entidades como el Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), la Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) y la RSS.

El sustento etnográfico del estudio se realizó por medio del trabajo de campo, este tuvo procesos de cambio durante su ejecución. Se realizaron entrevistas a funcionarios de organizaciones de apoyo a la población desplazada como MENCOLDES, Opción legal y la Consejería en Proyectos. Se visitaron organizaciones de población desplazada como AFRODES y asentamientos como el barrio Los Robles en la localidad de Ciudad Bolívar, se llevaron a cabo conversaciones y entrevistas a mujeres desplazadas. Se realizó un contacto positivo con la ACNUR en el cual se intercambiaron opiniones y puntos de vista sobre la situación de las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar en Bogotá.
El desplazamiento como fenómeno vulnerabiliza a miles de personas sin importar la clase, el sexo, la raza o el credo. A la vez tiene un efecto desproporcionado sobre algunos sectores poblacionales, como las mujeres, debido a sus condiciones previas de discriminación y vulnerabilidad:

“esta desproporcionalidad parte de reconocer que el conflicto no solo recrudece sino que aprovecha y exacerba las condiciones de discriminación, en tanto promueve formas de relación a partir de la imposición del orden por la fuerza, el miedo y el abuso, según esquemas patriarcales de ejercicio de la autoridad. Esta dinámica, además, genera y explica ciertas condiciones de vulnerabilidad de las mujeres en la guerra, según lo confirma la situación de las mujeres antes, durante y después del desplazamiento.”

Por esta razón el término “desplazado” se presenta problemático para el análisis ya que dice muy poco del antes y del después, de las rupturas y de los procesos de reconstrucción emprendidos por las personas. Autoras como Osorio y Segura plantean no reducir la situación de la población que se moviliza a la condición de “desplazado”. Proponen usar la categoría “población en situación de desplazamiento”, debido a que la identidad dada por este hecho es dinámica, diferenciada (de acuerdo a la historia personal y colectiva de quienes se movilizan) y está condicionada a factores como: la reubicación, la finalización de la ayuda humanitaria, la relación establecida con las instituciones, por el retorno o porque los individuos y familias que migran a centros urbanos u otros espacios rurales se convierten en habitantes, viviendo y asumiendo las problemáticas de las comunidades nativas.

2. Contexto general

2.1. Perfil demográfico

La Carta Constitucional\textsuperscript{136} de 1991 reconoce a Colombia\textsuperscript{137} como un país pluriétnico y multicultural. Según las proyecciones anuales de población realizadas por el DANE para el año 2005, Colombia cuenta con un total de 46 039 144\textsuperscript{138} habitantes de los cuales, el 75 por ciento vive en las cabeceras municipales. De este total 23 275 014 son mujeres lo que representa un 51 por ciento de la población.

La esperanza de vida al nacer ha aumentado ligeramente para ambos sexos, siendo un poco más alta en las mujeres. En 1995 se esperaba que las mujeres alcanzarían los 73 años de edad (9 años más que los hombres) pero en el 2000 la esperanza de vida de las mujeres fue de 74 años (7 más que los hombres).\textsuperscript{139}

Colombia registra una población muy joven, con una media de 25,11 años; casi una cuarta parte del total de la población tiene menos de 10 años y alrededor de un tercio menos de 14. El 21,4 por ciento de las mujeres y el 22,8 por ciento de los hombres tienen entre 0 años y 9 años y el 31,4 por ciento de las mujeres y el 33,4 por ciento de los hombres tienen menos de 15 años.\textsuperscript{140}

El índice de feminidad de la población colombiana para el 2000 era 102/108 en la zona urbana y 88 en la zona rural.\textsuperscript{141} Este índice es menor a 100 en la población con menos de 25 años, a partir de los 25 el índice de feminidad es mayor a 100 y crece en la medida en que la población aumenta de edad. Este cambio en la composición piramidal se relaciona con la mayor esperanza de vida en las mujeres y el hecho de que tanto la violencia sociopolítica como la común afectan más a los hombres.\textsuperscript{142}

En cuanto a las características étnicas, la población afrocolombiana se estima entre el 18,1 y el 24,8 por ciento del total de la población colombiana, el 69,3 por ciento de esta vive en las cabeceras municipales.\textsuperscript{143} Según Urrea y Viáfara el área con mayor concentración de población afro-descendiente es el pacífico, principalmente los departamentos de Nariño, Cauca, Valle y Chocó en los cuales habitan el 12,8 por ciento de este total.\textsuperscript{144}

La población indígena colombiana representa aproximadamente el 1,8 por ciento del total. El total de la población indígena colombiana es de 1 105 499 individuos de los cuales 599 931 son hombres y 546 568 mujeres. La mayoría vive en zonas rurales con 846 341 del total de la población habitando en ellas.\textsuperscript{145} Los departamentos en los que existe mayor

\textsuperscript{136} “El estado reconoce y protege la diversidad étnica y cultural de la Nación Colombiana “. Constitución Política de Colombia, Título I, artículo 7, Bogotá, Legis Editores S.A; 1991.
\textsuperscript{137} Localización geográfica. (Ver Anexos Mapa 1: Localización de Colombia y Bogotá).
\textsuperscript{138} Fuente DANE. (Ver Anexos Tabla 1: Colombia, indicadores demográficos de 1985 a 2015).
\textsuperscript{140} Índice calculado sobre las proyecciones de población realizadas por el DANE. “DANE: Colombia. Proyecciones anuales de población 1990-2015”.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibíd.:149
\textsuperscript{142} Ibíd.: DANE Población indígena y negra censada por área de residencia y sexo, según grupo étnico. 1993.
\textsuperscript{143} Fuente: 142
\textsuperscript{144} Informe Derechos de las Mujeres en Colombia 2003. Red Nacional de Mujeres. Proyecto Democracia y Derechos Humanos. (Pág. 30)
\textsuperscript{145} Ibíd.:154
concentración son el Cauca con el 23,8 por ciento del total de la población indígena del país, La Guajira, Nariño y Chocó con 21,4, 9,9 y 5,2 por ciento respectivamente.

En Colombia la mayor concentración poblacional se da en la ciudad de Bogotá, en esta viven el 15,7 por ciento de las mujeres y el 14,7 por ciento del total nacional. Otros departamentos con concentraciones de población superiores al 10 por ciento son el Valle del Cauca y Antioquia.

2.2. **Contexto social**

Según datos de PROFAMILIA para el año 2000 en cuanto a Cobertura de Salud las mujeres se encuentran en una proporción un poco más alta de afiliación al sistema nacional (57,9 por ciento) del total de mujeres encuestada respecto a las no afiliadas (40 por ciento). Los hombres registran 56,8 por ciento de afiliados y 43,2 por ciento de no afiliados.

Para la Población en Situación de Desplazamiento (PSD) las limitaciones en el acceso a los servicios de salud y su baja calidad constituyen vulneraciones históricas a este derecho que ponen en riesgo la vida de mujeres, niñas y jóvenes. Algunas limitaciones para acceder a los servicios de salud, se dan en razón de la condición de desplazadas interactuando con otras condiciones como la etnia y la clase.

En cuanto a los procesos de educación el promedio de años entre hombres y mujeres se ha mantenido equiparable desde 1951. Para ambos grupos los años promedio de estudio han aumentado notablemente: de 2,3 y 2,1 años de educación (en hombres y mujeres respectivamente) en 1951 se ha llegado a un promedio de 6,9 y 7 años de estudio en 2000. El número de años de estudio, en la población de 15 a 24 años, es sensiblemente menor en las zonas rurales tanto para las mujeres como para los hombres; y el promedio de años es superior en ambos casos en las mujeres.

En cuanto a la educación superior, al revisarse el número de graduadas y graduados, desde 1990 al año 2002, se permite establecer que hay una proporción un poco más alta de mujeres graduadas (54,6 por ciento) que de hombres (45,4). Esta diferencia está relacionada con que la proporción de mujeres que se gradúa, con respecto al número que ingresa, es más alta que la de los hombres.

Más de la mitad de la PSD abandona sus estudios luego de los hechos violentos. Del 25,1 por ciento de las mujeres que tenían acceso al sistema escolar antes del

---

146 Ibíd.:149
147 Ibíd.:149
148 Ibíd.: 151. Las estadísticas que se presentan a continuación se encuentran en este informe en el anexo 2. Se basan en testimonios de PSD dados al Observatorio Mujer y Derechos y en encuestas de PROFAMILIA
149 Cálculos DNP-UDS-DIOGS con base en DANE y censos
2.3. **Contexto económico**

Entre el primer trimestre del 2004 y el mismo trimestre del año anterior, la población en edad de trabajar se incrementó en 710 864 personas (2,2 por ciento). De esta población 285 000 personas, se sumaron a la población económicamente inactiva, mostrando un crecimiento del 2,3 por ciento. A pesar de que la oferta de trabajo aumentó en un 2,1 por ciento, el desempleo también lo hizo. El número de personas desempleadas se elevó de 3 046 900 a 3 135 700, representando un subida en el nivel de desocupación absoluta de 88 800 nuevos desempleados (2,9 por ciento).

En consecuencia, el número de desocupados urbanos se amplió en un 2 por ciento. En el área rural el panorama de desaliento laboral es mayor. En el primer trimestre del 2004 al tiempo que la tasa de ocupación descendió (1,1 por ciento); la de desempleo se ubicó en 10,3 por ciento. La tasa de subempleo pasó de 28,5 por ciento a 36,1 por ciento, poniendo en evidencia el deterioro en la calidad del empleo rural.

En el primer trimestre de 2004 las actividades de servicios, comercio, agricultura e industria, emplearon el mayor número de personas, con un 93,6 por ciento del total de ocupados. Actividades como la electricidad, gas y agua, minas y construcción ocupaban el 6,3 por ciento del total. En las cabeceras municipales se concentran las actividades de comercio, servicios e industria con 86,6 por ciento. En el sector rural, las actividades agrícolas, de servicios y comercio emplearon, en conjunto, el mayor número de personas al 88,7 por ciento del total, siendo la rama de la agricultura la que genera el mayor número de empleos.

### Indicadores económicos para el primer trimestre del 2005:

- Tasa de desempleo: 12,1%
- IPC: 0,42% de variación mensual
- PIB: 4,28% de variación anual
- MMM: -3,96 de producción
- Importaciones: 12,5%
- Exportaciones: 39,5%

1 Fuente: www.dane.gov.co

2.4. **Perspectiva histórica del desplazamiento en Colombia**

La movilización y el desplazamiento forzado de millones de personas al interior de Colombia ha sido un fenómeno constante desde mediados del siglo XX. Esta movilización de población se ha generado en contextos de violencia política, desigualdad social y desarrollo económico. En las últimas décadas ha aumentado la población en situación de desplazamiento debido, principalmente, al recrudecimiento del Conflicto Armado Interno.

---

152 Informe de Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres en Colombia. Pág. 152, con base en Reporte emitido octubre 2002 por Pastoral Social.
153 Sobre la evolución del mercado y el empleo, se hace relacionando el primer trimestre del 2004 con el mismo del año anterior. La información que se presenta a continuación es tomada de: “Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Documentos Técnicos sobre Mercado Laboral. Bogotá, 2004.”
En la década de los cincuenta del siglo pasado el desarrollo económico y social del país se fundó a partir de procesos de urbanización, políticas que delineaban un cambio socio-espacial de la población en una dirección rural-urbana. Paralelamente, la población campesina sufría más intensamente las consecuencias de la lucha bipartidista que tan duramente azotaban a Colombia, época conocida académicamente como “La Violencia”. Otra causa de la movilización constante de población al interior del país ha sido las desigualdades sociales y económicas que impulsan la migración de cientos de personas desde sus lugares de origen hacia grandes centros urbanos en busca de mejores oportunidades laborales y educativas.

En las últimas décadas ha aumentado la población en situación de desplazamiento debido, principalmente, al recrudecimiento del Conflicto Armado Interno. En el contexto del conflicto colombiano la tierra y la lucha por su propiedad es causa fundamental de su recrudecimiento:

“Las causas de la expulsión de sus tierras de unos 3 000 000 de colombianos se pueden asociar a procesos de concentración y usos de la tierra en función de actividades privadas que despojan a miles de campesinos, que deterioran el medio ambiente y que ponen en riesgo la seguridad alimentaria de amplios grupos de población. Se relaciona también con la represión y las expresiones políticas de oposición, la situación de pobreza extrema, el desconocimiento de la diversidad cultural y la ausencia histórica del Estado en algunas regiones del país.”

A partir del 2002, año en el que se presenta la mayor cantidad de PSD con 412 553 personas registradas, se generan nuevas modalidades de desplazamiento (p.ej. la inseguridad social y política fomenta la movilidad de población de unos barrios a otros dentro del mismo casco urbano). La fumigación de cultivos ilícitos contamina los alimentos y afecta la salud de poblaciones campesinas e indígenas, esto se ve reflejado en una movilidad constante de vereda en vereda por parte de diversos grupos poblacionales. Las comunidades indígenas y afrocolombianas se han convertido, en los últimos años, en puntos de referencia visibles. En la actualidad muchos de estos grupos se encuentran sitiados por actores armados que impiden su movilidad, ejemplo es la situación en que se encuentran las comunidades indígenas que pueblan la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, o los Emberá Katios del Nudo del Pajarillo.

El Gobierno colombiano ha orientado su Plan de Desarrollo (2002-2006) a la construcción de un Estado comunitario, con énfasis en la seguridad democrática, buscando involucrar a la ciudadanía en la consecución de sus “fines sociales”. Cuando se mira más profundo se encuentra una ausencia política sobre los derechos humanos, esto en virtud de la militarización como principal instrumento para garantizar la seguridad. Él carácter excluyente y controlador de esta política se ha evidenciado con la creciente militarización de la sociedad, la reducción en el gasto social, la violencia socio-política y la falta de garantías para el ejercicio de derechos, a todo esto se añade la persecución que han sufrido las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONGs) internacionales. Esta situación afecta profundamente a las mujeres y particularmente a las mujeres rurales.
La información estadística sobre la PSD siempre ha sido difícil de coordinar. Históricamente, las estimaciones más conservadoras han sido realizadas por el Estado. Por ejemplo en 1995, año en que comienzan ha establecerse los registros, la RSS hablaba de 284 personas desplazadas, para ese mismo año CODHES estimaba en 89 000 las personas desplazadas al interior del país. En los últimos dos años la PSD registrada ha disminuido, si en el 2002 se hablaba de 412 553 personas, para el tercer trimestre de 2004 se registran 205 504 personas desplazadas. La respuesta al por qué de esta disminución de casi un 50 por ciento en las cifras de la PSD registrada se ubica principalmente en el debilitamiento de la asistencia gubernamental. En realidad por lo tanto, esas cifras reflejan una ausencia de políticas que generan un empeoramiento en las condiciones de vida y oportunidades para la PSD. Otros elementos como las estrategias de los actores del conflicto de disminuir la visibilidad del fenómeno fueron mencionadas por las autoras del Informe de Derechos Humanos de Mujeres -2004:

“…nuevas circunstancias de la dinámica migratoria en el país, como el interés de los actores armados de hacer invisible, aún más, el desplazamiento y por supuesto, su responsabilidad al respecto. Por lo mismo, en el momento de la expulsión de las familias de sus hogares les ordenan no registrarse para no perder permiso de vida en la misma zona de llegada. También acontece ahora que, de antemano, las y los nuevos desplazados conocen las limitaciones de la atención estatal y prefieren no esperar ayuda alguna. Por todo esto es evidente por qué este registro no da cuenta de la magnitud real del problema.”

Esto es más claro si el registro que se toma como referencia es el de la RSS en el cual solo aparecen las personas que al desplazarse se registran oficialmente y reciben algún beneficio por parte del Estado.

2.5. El desplazamiento en Bogotá

Bogotá es la capital y principal centro político, comercial, industrial y cultural. Al ser la ciudad más grande de Colombia también es la de mayor crecimiento físico y demográfico. Para 1996, año en que se realizó el último Censo Nacional, la población Bogotana era de 6 276 428 personas. En la actualidad se estima que habitan 7 185 889 personas, lo que habla de un crecimiento anual del 2,08 por ciento.

Ubicada al interior de Colombia, a una altura de 2 640 metros, Bogotá se divide en 20 localidades, de las cuales Ciudad Bolívar es la de mayor recepción de PSD. Para el año 2001 de un total de 5 018 hogares atendidos por la Unidad de Atención Integral a Población Desplazada del Distrito Capital (UAID), 1 339 habían sido en esta localidad. Otras localidades con un alto numero de hogares registrados son Kennedy, Bosa y Usme, respectivamente. Es muy importante mencionar al municipio aledaño de Soacha, el cual aunque no hace parte del Distrito cuenta con un altísimo porcentaje de PSD. Ubicado entre las localidades de Ciudad Bolívar y Bosa, este municipio a tenido un crecimiento

---

157 La RSS maneja cifras de la oficiales, el CODHES integra a población no registrad por eso maneja mayor amplitud en cuanto tiempos y poblaciones.
158 Fuente: www.codhes.org.co Consultado en noviembre del 2004. (Ver Anexo 2, Gráfica 1: Sobre la estimación de la PSD por parte del CODHES)
159 Red Nacional de Mujeres, Organización Femenina Popular. 2004. la Situación de Los Derechos Humanos de las Mujeres en Colombia: entre el conflicto armado y la política de seguridad democrática.
160 Para contrastar información. Estadísticas RSS. (Ver Anexos Tabla 2: La estimación de la PSD por parte de la RSS)
161 Ver anexo. (Mapa 2: Localidad de Bogotá)
162 Ver Anexo. (Mapa 2: Localidad de Bogotá)
demográfico y físico muy importante debido al asentamiento de PSD en sus terrenos, población que se mueve y busca sus alternativas económicas de subsistencia en la capital.

Bogotá históricamente no ha sido centro de confrontación armada. El rostro del conflicto interno se presenta en las oleadas de población desplazada que llegan constantemente a la ciudad. Desde finales de la década de los ochenta, la confrontación entre los diferentes actores armados no solamente se agudizó la utilización del terror como estrategia de guerra, causó la huida de población campesina hacia las cabeceras municipales o hacia las capitales de Departamento, en donde debieron afrontar condiciones desfavorables. Esta situación se veía agravada por la creciente incertidumbre que generaba la falta de soluciones efectivas a mediano y largo plazo. Bogotá se convirtió en el mayor foco de recepción de PSD.¹⁶³

El estimativo de la población desplazada en Bogotá, de acuerdo a los registros de CODHES, que datan de 1985 hasta agosto de 2002, es de 480 000 personas, es decir, el 23 por ciento del total de la población desplazada del país. El informe de Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris del 2004,¹⁶⁴ que se basa sobre encuestas e información del CODHES y la RSS, considera que la PSD asentada en Bogotá asciende a 558 140 personas, agrupadas en 111 628 familias (de aproximadamente 5 miembros). Según cifras del UAID, que se basan en los datos oficiales de la Red de Solidaridad, entre mayo de 1999 y agosto de 2002, en Bogotá se ha orientado y atendido a 8 362 familias desplazadas, equivalentes a 35 000 personas aproximadamente.

Por lo general, la PSD es joven, tanto los hombres (27,8) como las mujeres (26,3 por ciento) se concentran en grupos etáreos menores de 10 años y jóvenes de hasta 20 años. (Ver Tabla 3). La forma familiar predominante es nuclear con un promedio de 2 a 4 hijos. Étnicamente, solo un 5 por ciento se reconoce como indígena y el 2 por ciento como afrodescendiente. La mayoría de la PSD es campesina proveniente de los departamentos de Tolima, Cundinamarca, Caldas, Antioquia, Chocó y Cesar. Según CODHES en la década de los ochenta los mayores expulsores de PSD eran los departamentos del Meta, Guaviare y Caquetá. En los años noventa, los flujos migratorios provenían de los departamentos de Antioquia, Córdoba y Chocó. Los últimos años, Tolima, Huila y Cundinamarca, se han convertido en fuertes zonas de expulsión. Los registros de la UAID indican que en la actualidad la mayoría de las familias atendidas provienen de Tolima, Meta, Cundinamarca, Antioquia y Caquetá, departamentos ubicados en la zona central del país, de una amplia tradición agrícola.¹⁶⁵ Desde la época colonial los antioqueños han vivido de la minería de oro de veta y aluvión. En Caquetá, las actividades económicas más sobresalientes son la agricultura, la ganadería, la pesca y las actividades extractivas. Cundinamarca depende principalmente de la industria, el comercio, los servicios, que se centran en Bogotá y en los municipios cercanos. El Departamento de Meta vive de la ganadería, la agricultura, el comercio y los servicios. En Tolima sobresale la producción agrícola de productos como arroz, algodón, ajonjoli, tabaco y caña de azúcar y la explotación minera de oro y plata, y del campo petrolífero de Tetuán, en Ortega.

3. **Análisis**

Por su naturaleza y magnitud, la realidad del desplazamiento en Bogotá es muy compleja, plantea múltiples desafíos frente al impacto que genera sobre la ciudad, sobre su sociedad y el Estado. Al analizar los aspectos socio-económicos del desplazamiento y de las estrategias que desarrollan las mujeres desplazadas en el contexto urbano de Bogotá, se hace entonces necesario cuestionarse por:

- los efectos del desplazamiento en aspectos socio-económicos de la ciudad como el empleo, educación y vivienda, los sistemas de salud, el espacio público y la seguridad;
- los impactos directos que sufren las localidades receptoras. Indicadores de pobreza, exclusión social y territorial, nuevos conflictos generados entre los “pobres históricos” y los “recién llegados”;
- el impacto sobre la institucionalidad pública y la capacidad de respuesta del Distrito y la Nación.

3.1. **El concepto de desplazamiento y su traducción en las políticas públicas**

El concepto de “desplazamiento” en que se enmarca este estudio, se ubica dentro de una forma particular de migración, aquella que se da como consecuencia de la violencia política y se realiza dentro del mismo país de origen. El Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos define la violencia política cómo:

“… todo tipo de persecución por motivos de raza, religión, nacionalidad, pertenencia a determinado grupo social u opiniones políticas, así como amenazas de vida, seguridad o libertad por perturbación grave del orden público, ocasionada por la violencia generalizada, la agresión extranjera, los conflictos internos, la violación masiva de derechos humanos u otras circunstancias.”

Según la definición adoptada por el Gobierno colombiano, tomada de la *Consulta Permanente Para El Desplazamiento En Las Américas*, se considera “desplazada” a toda persona que se ve forzada a migrar dentro del territorio nacional, a abandonar su localidad de residencia y las actividades económicas habituales, porque su vida, su integridad física, su seguridad o libertad personales han sido vulneradas o se encuentran amenazadas, debido a la existencia de cualquiera de las siguientes situaciones causadas por el hombre: conflicto armado interno, disturbios o tensiones interiores, violencia generalizada, violaciones masivas de los Derechos Humanos (DDHH), infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) u otras circunstancias emanadas de las situaciones anteriores que pueden alterar o alteren drásticamente el orden público.

---

166 Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. 1991.
El desplazamiento esta estrechamente relacionado al concepto de DDHH, en tanto es una migración forzada causada por factores externos relacionados con los conflictos políticos y sociales de carácter violento y con una violación sistemática de estos, cuyo garante fundamental debería ser el Estado. Tratar el desplazamiento forzado como fenómeno, implica abordarlo en sus manifestaciones visibles: el éxodo masivo y la invasión creciente de los espacios urbanos marginales por cientos y miles de familias que se ven obligadas a huir para salvar lo único que les queda: sus vidas.

A través de la definición anterior se puede extraer que el “desplazamiento” como problema social no sólo implica la violación de los DDHH, sino que además desestructura los proyectos de vida en individuos, familias y colectivos.

Solamente hasta el año de 1995 se da una respuesta Estatal con la preparación por parte del Gobierno de documentos dirigidos a la atención de población en situación de desplazamiento en cuanto a los aspectos sociales y económicos. Iniciativa que se formalizó en un Plan Nacional para la Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada por la Violencia, por medio de la promulgación de la Ley 387, aprobada en el Congreso de la República el 18 de julio de 1997.

En la reflexión sobre la política estatal dirigida a la PSD es constante la preocupación por la incoherencia entre una política dirigida al retorno y una práctica de reubicación urbana. Donny Meertens\(^{168}\) destaca como en el Protocolo de Restablecimiento (RSS, 2001) el orden de los escenarios de restablecimiento privilegia el retorno voluntario como la primera opción, y el reasentamiento urbano como la última, cuando la dinámica y las consecuencias del conflicto armado muestran todo lo contrario.\(^{169}\) Para Martha Bello son contradictorios los esfuerzos realizados para lograr el retorno de población teniendo en cuenta resultados desalentadores: “…es ampliamente conocido que el retorno ha decrecido de manera alarmante, con un índice que fluctúa entre el 37 por ciento para el 2000, 11 por ciento para el 2001 y el 2 por ciento para el primer semestre del 2002.”\(^{170}\) Plantea ella la necesidad de desarrollar mayores instrumentos normativos y estrategias específicas hacia la realidad y las tendencias cada vez más fuertes de reubicación.

En el Artículo No. 17 de la Ley 387 de 1997 se plantea referente a la consolidación y estabilización de la población desplazada que el Gobierno nacional promoverá acciones y medidas de mediano y largo plazo con el propósito de generar condiciones de sostenibilidad económica y social para la población desplazada a la oferta social del Gobierno, en particular a los programas relacionados con:

- proyectos productivos;
- el Sistema Nacional de Reforma Agraria y Desarrollo Rural Campesino;
- el fomento de la microempresa;
- la capacitación y organización social;
- la atención social en salud, educación, vivienda urbana y rural, la niñez, la mujer y las personas de la tercera edad;
- planes de empleo urbano y rural de la Red de Solidaridad social.

\(^{168}\) Docente, Universidad Nacional de Colombia en Bogotá, consultora del ACNUR.
En su artículo 10 esta misma ley plantea brindar atención especial a niños y mujeres. Preferencialmente a las viudas, mujeres cabeza de familia y huérfanos.\textsuperscript{171} Meertens considera que en la práctica, desafortunadamente no se ha implementado ningún enfoque diferencial en esas áreas, los avances solo se pueden ver en relación a los proyectos productivos, se han realizado formulaciones específicas para mujeres jefas de hogar, asumiendo esto como una mínima expresión de la política diferencial.

3.2. Aspectos socio-económicos del desplazamiento en Bogotá\textsuperscript{172}

Son varias las razones que motivan a la PSD para elegir a Bogotá como su destino final, una de las más fuertes es la presencia previa de parientes, también se cree mucho en el imaginario de la seguridad social y las oportunidades de trabajo que la ciudad capital ofrece. Estas expectativas se traducen en que el 70 por ciento de la PSD quiera permanecer en Bogotá, el 16 por ciento esté dispuesta a reubicarse en la región (aledaña a Bogotá) o en otro sitio del país distinto a sus lugares de origen y solo el 5 por ciento esté en disposición de retornar. Se une a estas expectativas la inexistencia de políticas de atención al desplazamiento en las ciudades capitales y municipios próximos a las zonas expulsoras.

Pero estas expectativas disciernen mucho de la realidad que en general vive la ciudad y en particular de las posibilidades para la PSD, que sufre de esta manera un acumulado de vulnerabilidad. Por ejemplo en cuanto a los ingresos familiares se resalta un altísimo estado de exclusión ya que el 52 por ciento recibe hasta 42.985 US$ y solo el 7 por ciento, de la misma más de 171.938 US$ mensuales. En promedio las familias reciben al mes 72.32 US$ que corresponde tan solo a 0,47 SMMLV\textsuperscript{173} que es de 163.98 US$. (Véase Tabla 4 en anexo). De este ingreso la mayoría es destinada a la alimentación (50 por ciento) y a la vivienda o arriendo (29 por ciento), significativo al compararlo con la estructura de gasto de la canasta familiar definida por el DANE, que plantea como en promedio una familia tipo, destina solo el 29,5 por ciento de su ingreso a la alimentación y 29,4 por ciento a la vivienda/arriendo y a los servicios públicos.

En cuanto a Seguridad Social el 19 por ciento de la PSD se encuentra desprotegida y quienes están afiliados predomina el régimen subsidiado (57 por ciento) y vinculado (16 por ciento), son muy pocas las familias con miembros en capacidad de cotizar. En la población desplazada la tasa de escolaridad de los menores de 18 años, hombres y mujeres es del 51,4 por ciento y la de desempleo de personas en edad de trabajar es de 51,8 por ciento. Esta situación contrasta con la tasa de desempleo anterior al desplazamiento la cual alcanzaba tan solo el 1,9 por ciento (Ver Gráfica 6).

Como se ve, la diferencia es abismal entre lo que se deja y lo que se adquiere, p.ej. las familias desplazadas afirman haber abandonado 90 938 bienes entre fincas, parcelas, casas o apartamentos. Ahora la mayoría vive en condiciones de hacinamiento y en arriendo, son pocas las propiedades que se logran adquirir.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.: p.9
\textsuperscript{172} La información de esta sección tiene como fuente directa el informe de la Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris. 2004. Sobre el “Impacto del desplazamiento en el Distrito Capital”. Ellos basan sus estadísticas en encuestas e información del CODHES y la RSS.
\textsuperscript{173} Salarios Mínimos Mensuales Legales Vigentes.
En este escenario de vulnerabilidad las mujeres la sufren múltiplemente, para comenzar son la mayor parte de la PSD en Bogotá con el 51 por ciento del total, y de este porcentaje la mayoría son jefas de hogar (52 por ciento). Es importante señalar las dificultades conceptuales que plantea la jefatura de hogar tal como se considera en los censos poblacionales y en las encuestas de hogar, se asume que dentro del núcleo conyugal el jefe de hogar es la persona reconocida como tal por los demás miembros del hogar, independientemente del proceso real de toma de decisiones y de la composición del aporte económico. Esta es una carga más que a cuestas llevan las mujeres desplazadas, el no reconocimiento de sus aportes económicos por la presencia de un hombre en el hogar, entonces esa cifra de mujeres jefas de hogar puede ser en la realidad mayor.

Osorio realiza un estudio sobre Jefatura Femenina y Desplazamiento, en el cual expone información estadística que ayuda a entender los estados de vulnerabilidad social a la que se ven sujetas estas mujeres: el 74 por ciento de las mujeres jefas de hogar tienen menos de 40 años y están a cargo de hijos menores y de ancianos. Sus hogares registran un 79 por ciento de miembros menores de 20 años y un 2,7 por ciento de ancianos; mientras en los hogares con jefatura masculina un 68 por ciento de sus miembros tienen menos de 20 años y un 1,3 por ciento pertenecen a la dicha “tercera edad”. Esta realidad se ve agravada por condiciones como la falta de capacitación técnica, de oportunidades de empleo y la discriminación en el medio laboral, que disminuyen la capacidad de la mujer para proveer la subsistencia del hogar. Más aún, cuando en su mayoría son mujeres provenientes del campo, en donde los roles femeninos tradicionales, sumergen a las mujeres en las funciones domésticas, reproductivas y en la producción inmediata de comestibles, con la consiguiente reducción de su mundo al ámbito privado, mientras los hombres tienen funciones como las derivadas de la comercialización y el mercadeo, de las gestiones con las instituciones públicas y privadas, de la participación en partidos políticos, que los vinculan al ámbito público.

Podemos ver como la tasa de desempleo en Bogotá en las mujeres desplazadas alcanza el 53,4 y en los hombres el 50,6 por ciento, estos desarrollan actividades relacionadas con el estudio (26,7 por ciento) y buscando trabajo (21,6 por ciento). De los que trabajan (21,1 por ciento), priman los empleados / obreros particulares (83 por ciento), desempeñándose en ramas de actividad de servicios, construcción y comercio (Ver Gráficos 2 a 5). Es importante para el análisis tener presente que la cantidad de población femenina es mayor lo que implica más competencia y por consiguiente menos posibilidades prácticas. La mayoría de las mujeres se dedican a actividades relacionadas con el estudio (25,3 por ciento) y los oficios del hogar (22.3 por ciento). Dentro de estas mujeres activas (14,1 por ciento), las ocupaciones más representativas corresponden a empleada / obrera particular y trabajadora independiente (31 y 50 por ciento respectivamente), en las ramas de actividad económica de servicios y comercio.

Estas cifras nos muestran las dos caras que tiene el escenario de la subsistencia para las mujeres desplazadas en Bogotá. Por un lado, esas estadísticas nos hablan de un mercado laboral precario que las hace conseguir “cualquier tipo” de trabajo, por lo general temporal, sin seguridad social, realizar labores domésticas o crear mecanismos generadores de ingresos a través de la economía informal. En las cifras se habla de un 0 por ciento que se reconoce como empleada doméstica lo cual es solo entendible en la medida que un 31 por ciento lo hace como trabajadora independiente en el área de servicios, del cual hace parte el doméstico. Es importante reflexionar al respecto ya que este tipo de servicio es una de las alternativas más viables de vinculación laboral para las mujeres desplazadas, a pesar de los sesgos y estigmas sociales que implica el termino “desplazada”.

---

176 Hace parte de la investigación Memorias de la Violencia, realizada por Patricia Tovar.
La otra cara de la moneda es la de la creatividad y la capacidad de seguir adelante a pesar de la suma de adversidades que se van enfrentando. La capacidad de adaptación y de creación de nuevas actividades que las enriquece, no solo en cuanto a la posibilidad de sobrevivir económicamente, sino y principalmente en cuanto a las oportunidades de conocerse, formarse y crecer como personas. La capacidad de construir su propio empoderamiento entendiéndolo como la redistribución del poder que cambia las relaciones en beneficio de quienes antes tenían escasa autoridad.

3.2.1. Estrategias económicas de subsistencia

Más allá del reconocimiento social y cultural y de lo que las estadísticas puedan reflejar, es necesario destacar el entendimiento de que en la PSD existe un alto porcentaje de jefatura de hogar femenina de facto. Este es el eje principal que se destaca de nuestras discusiones con familias y mujeres desplazadas en diferentes barrios y comunidades de Bogotá. La realidad de las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar, nos muestra como la necesidad de subsistir y de salir adelante quebranta cualquier tipo de barrera y supera cualquier sesgo, social y cultural. Estas mujeres se insertan cada vez más en el espacio de lo público, preneden a moverse en los espacios de la burocracia, negocien y gestionen y se empoderan. Ellas reinventan sus formas de participar en la vida colectiva y económica, en el contexto social y económico del desplazamiento en Bogotá, un contexto muy distinto de sus regiones de origen (rurales por gran parte).

En los procesos de subsistencia y búsqueda de trabajo son varias las realidades que se confrontan, los hombres y sus capacidades de trabajo manual y en particular sobre la tierra, las mujeres con sus conocimientos sobre la tierra pero y principalmente sus capacidades en el trabajo doméstico. Un mundo doméstico que se ha desarticulado pero que se reconstruye, ahora presentándose como la mejor opción para el sustento económico del grupo familiar. Mujeres desplazadas nos contaron así algunas de sus experiencias de sustentación del hogar:

“Yo aquí actualmente estoy haciendo aseo en apartamentos, salgo a lavar ropas, eso yo horita me mantengo en la casa... Yo hago blusas en crochet, eso yo que es lo que no hago. Antes, allá como teníamos la finca y teníamos la casa, teníamos cosechas, gallinas, había mucha cosa de que sobrevivir. Y él [el esposo] no me dejaba salir de la casa a echar machete, por que yo era todo en la casa y antes pagábamos obreros y estábamos bien.”

_Araceli habita en los Robles, tiene 28 años y cuatro hijos_

“Como vendía almuerzos por encargo, hacia los almuerzos ahí mismo y los empacaba en un portátil y se entregaban. Cada 8 días me pagaban. Con los dos pelados entregaba los almuerzos. Y por la tarde hacía empanadas y llevaba refrigerios, el niño se iba para el centro con 50 empanadas y llevaba refrigerios.”

“Ahora estoy en la casa haciendo bolsos para dama. Hago los bolsos con la hermana [comunidad Religiosa]. Somos un grupo de 30 mujeres y yo soy una de las líderes de 15 mujeres…. Estamos trabajando en los bolsos hace como tres meses, pero hace como dos años y medio que estamos con la hermana, hemos aprendido muchas labores que nos enseño.”

_Virginia vive en el sector de Kennedy, tiene 38 años y seis hijos_

Lo doméstico que antes era invisibilizado económicamente al no tener reconocimiento monetario se presenta ahora como la mayor fuente de ingresos para las

---

177 Araceli proviene del departamento del Meta. Los Robles es un sector habilitado por PSD que une a Bogotá con el municipio aledaño de Soacha. En la actualidad Araceli se dedica a los oficios domésticos.

178 Virginia proviene del departamento de Caldas. En la actualidad se dedica a la confección artesanal.
familias desplazadas. Ingresos que por lo general son muy escasos, no son estables y no implican ninguna forma de seguridad social.

Las mujeres que antes se movían principalmente en el ámbito de lo privado salen ahora a confrontar el espacio de lo público y encuentran retribución económica a sus habilidades. Los trabajos más comunes son el servicio doméstico, aseo de casas, lavado de ropas, cuidado de niños, enfermos o personas mayores y la venta ambulante de alimentos. Algunas otras estrategias tienen marcas regionales, la venta de cocadas y la peinada son prácticas de las mujeres Afro-descendientes. La elaboración de artesanías, principalmente tejidos como mochilas son más comunes en las mujeres de origen indígena.

Una de las más representativas en la subsistencia informal de la ciudad es la venta de dulces y otros enseres. Esta práctica tienen como escenario el espacio público y se llevan a cabo en calles, semáforos y en el transporte público:

“Es que a mí a veces me toca ir a los semáforos a vender dulces, hoy por lo menos no fui porque me vine para aquí pero a mí me toca salir a buscar, claro...”

Patricia vive en Bosa, tiene 49 años y cuatro hijos.

Las estrategias económicas, formales e informales, desarrolladas como alternativas de subsistencia por parte de mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar en Bogotá son muchas y enfrentan diversos obstáculos en su desarrollo, como la escasez de oportunidades formales, mercados discriminatorios, incoherencia de las políticas públicas distritales en relación a la realidad social de la ciudad. En fin, un contexto desalentador por el cual estas prácticas informales son aun más válidas y exitosas ya que logran, entre otros aspectos, su primer objetivo: sobrevivir. El análisis sobre la productividad y sostenibilidad de estas estrategias y del número de proyectos muertos en sus orígenes vuelve a poner un alerta sobre cómo se construyen los canales de comunicación entre la PSD y las políticas de atención, estatales o no gubernamentales.

Un punto crítico dentro de este escenario es el de las políticas asistenciales que se han convertido en una estrategia económica por excelencia. Aunque necesarias, al ser netamente asistencialistas inmovilizan y coartan las posibilidades creativas. Según funcionaria de atención a la PSD en Bogotá:

“Una de las mujeres nos decía, lo que pasa es que a uno le va mejor siendo desplazado. Entre las señoras que iban a las reuniones había unas con líos muy tenaces y ellas sí que no están inscritas en ninguna parte. Digamos que las políticas públicas de nuestro país no piensan que no basta con satisfacer las necesidades básicas, y además medio satisfacerlas, sino que los seres humanos somos más y que además requerimos un ambiente, unas condiciones económicas pero también una estructura cultural y social que favorezca ese desarrollo y ese ejercicio.”

Estela asiste a un centro de atención en el sector de Teusaquillo.

Esta realidad alerta sobre las respuestas asistencialistas de corto plazo y de su escaso efecto ya que desvían la atención del punto fundamental, reconocer a las víctimas del desplazamiento como sujetos de derechos y actoras de su propio empoderamiento.

“Yo trabajo tres días por el mercado, trabajando en la escuela o a veces abriendo todas esas zanjas para hacer tuberías, si toca trabajar, pero es rico trabajar ganándose algo y no que le regalen. Sí, no que le regalen a toda hora.”

179 La peinada es referido la elaboración de trenzas postizas, lo cual es un negocio de las mujeres afrocolombianas.
180 Patricia proviene de Tumaco. En la actualidad se dedica al trabajo informal.
Verónica habita en los Robles, tiene 38 años y tres hijos.\footnote{181}

En este panorama las experiencias de los comedores y las ollas comunitarias se destacan en cuanto integran varios aspectos y logran una proyección a largo plazo. Cubren la subsistencia, generan alguna rentabilidad, es una labor digna, se manifiestan prácticas y conocimientos, además son generadores de redes de solidaridad y procesos de empoderamiento:

“Yo me siento muy contenta por la labor, por ejemplo con la olla comunitaria que es una ayuda para la demás gente… Bueno, la olla comunitaria es que habemos 8 mujeres que los días sábados salimos a pedir a las puertas (comida que les puedan regalar), de puesto en puesto, unas veces nos tratan mal, otras veces nos dan poquito, otras veces nos dicen cansonas. Pedimos la comida y los días domingo lo cocinamos, 220 o 230 almuerzos, los vendemos a 500 pesos y ahí, con la plata que hacemos compramos la carne para el otro domingo y lo que queda, fondos para el ahorro de plan de vivienda de nosotros… La olla comunitaria es para el ahorro del plan de vivienda, vendemos el almuerzo a todos los desplazados y todos los necesitados y hay mucha gente que por ejemplo, no tiene nada que comer y que en realidad nosotros vemos que es verdad, les regalamos el almuerzo”.

Mercedes vive en Bosa, tiene 49 años y dos hijos.\footnote{182}

3.2.2. Redes sociales de solidaridad

La solidaridad para la PSD se convierte en su máxima añoranza y en su mayor fortaleza. Los discursos hablan de una confrontación constante con la ciudad y con su gente. Pero a la vez lo que se logra, en su gran mayoría, ha sido gracias a la solidaridad de personas semejantes o extrañas, desplazadas o “pobres históricos”, familiares o amigos. No son iguales a las redes de solidaridad que culturalmente se conocían, estas se reconstruyen y se transforman. Se convierten en la mejor y más eficaz forma de ayuda desde el mismo momento en que se llega a Bogotá, a pesar de los conflictos que siempre están presentes.

“Llegue donde una hermana que tengo... yo lloraba la separación de él, el ambiente nuevo aquí que yo no conocía ni por donde andaba. Eso era durísimo y mí hermana y todos trabajaban. A mí me dejaron una camita y uno meterse y arruncharse con los 4 niños. El niño pequeñito se enfermó del cambio de clima, de caliente a frío, duró mes y medio en el hospital de Soacha, casi se me murió. Pero a pesar de todo, no me ha ido mal, no puedo ser desagradecida tampoco.”

\textit{Virginia}\footnote{183}

“Yo acá no conocía a nadie pero como ya practicaba el evangelio entonces llegue y pregunte por una iglesia. Hay me dijeron "si hermana que bueno que ha venido", y entonces una hermana me llevo a tal parte donde tenía una casita, una casalote. Pude quedarme hay a vivir con mis hijos, pagando 15 000 US$ o 10 000 US$ cuando los tenía.”

\textit{Patricia}\footnote{184}

Desde el primer momento, en la llegada y el asentamiento son las redes de solidaridad, principalmente familiares o religiosas, pero también comunitarias entre desplazados, las que surgen como la primera alternativa para la búsqueda de empleo o en la construcción y levantamiento de viviendas y sitios comunales:

\footnotetext[181]{Verónica proviene del departamento de Tolima. En la actualidad se dedica a los oficios domésticos.}
\footnotetext[182]{Mercedes proviene del departamento de Tolima. En la actualidad es ama de casa.}
\footnotetext[183]{Ibíd.: 178}
\footnotetext[184]{Ibíd.: 180}
“Compre ese lote y con la ayuda de la gente toda, la gente del barrio, subimos el rancho y ahí estoy con los niños.”

“Cuando yo comencé a trabajar los niños se quedaban solitos. Mi mama no pudo ayudarme porque ellos tienen muchas cosas en el llano. Aquí como entre todas las vecinas, se le haga un favor, se la hace, entonces ellas mismas les echan ojo y me los despachan al colegio.”

Estos son ejemplos de las formas que toman las redes de solidaridad informales, estas surgen autónomamente en los mismos grupos como una respuesta clara al estado de vulnerabilidad económica y social. En este contexto las agencias de ayuda humanitaria juegan un papel importante ya que impulsan procesos de construcción y mejoramiento de los barrios en que se asienta la PSD que son en su mayoría marginales. Las redes informales y humanitarias son una respuesta a la carencia de políticas e instituciones gubernamentales que generen confianza y sean vistas como eficientes:

“Es que actualmente no tengo nada. No tengo seguridad social porque dicen que necesitan una carta del pueblo donde uno viene y otra cantidad de cosas para darme el Seguro. Yo entonces fui a la Cruz Roja Internacional y me dieron la droga para mi niño.”

Lucia habita en la localidad de ciudad Bolívar tiene 44 años y siete hijos

“Sólo el desplazado que certifica tiene ayuda, el que no, como yo que deje todo, no recibe ayuda de nadie.”

La solidaridad y las redes que se conforman alrededor de ella, siguen siendo la herramienta principal con la que cuentan las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar, para subsistir en Bogotá. Esta solidaridad, aunque respuesta a la ineficiencia de las políticas para atención a la PSD, es una forma de resistencia, es una apuesta por la reconciliación y la reconstrucción, es seguir viviendo.

3.3. Retos e oportunidades de los proyectos de apoyo productivos

Los proyectos productivos se han convertido en el eje de las políticas de restablecimiento, para Meertens el proceso de selección, aprobación y puesta en marcha de los proyectos, ha sido lento y errático. Se plantean tres puntos para la reflexión:

- el Estado colombiano y su funcionamiento enmarcado en una cultura burocrática de muchos trámites y poco presupuesto para el seguimiento de los proyectos;
- dentro del desplazamiento, la dispersión de las familias que llegan individualmente junto a la gran heterogeneidad de la PSD que se asienta en Bogotá;
- el sector no gubernamental, muestra en algunos casos debilidades técnicas para ejecutar los proyectos productivos.

El panorama de los proyectos productivos y de las alternativas económicas sostenibles no es nada halagador, se identifica un escenario de constantes fracasos y frustraciones. Se plantea un cuestionamiento fundamental ¿Por que, específicamente en Bogotá, el porcentaje de éxito de los proyectos productivos es tan bajo? Existen varias
las respuestas desde la diversidad de los discursos (Mujeres Desplazadas, Organizaciones Humanitarias, ACNUR) y dentro de estas se identifican algunas constantes:

- la ausencia, específicamente en este gobierno, de políticas de Estado dirigidas al reasentamiento de la PSD en las ciudades. Las políticas actuales se dirigen al retorno, práctica en contravía del deseo de la PSD y de las propuestas desarrolladas por las organizaciones humanitarias;
- la dimensión y rudeza de la ciudad. Bogotá es una ciudad de grandes dimensiones humanas, sociales y económicas, vincularse económicamente en la dinámica de las redes comerciales implica un conocimiento previo del proceso. Se hace necesario una guía por parte de entidades empresariales, tanto estatales como privadas, con el fin de lograr proyectos rentable, competitivos y auto sostenibles;
- el choque cultural y la ausencia de una formación empresarial hace que las mujeres desplazadas, vinculadas a estos proyectos no tengan mayores posibilidades de movilidad, negociación y proyección;
- en este momento la frustración y desconfianza generan escepticismo frente a las posibilidades de los proyectos. Muchas mujeres prefieren asegurar lo poco que consiguen, antes de invertirlo en posibles fracasos.

Al preguntarle a la PSD por sus necesidades es interesante ver como sus mayores demandas, vivienda, empleo y salud, han sido históricamente los puntos más débiles en los programas para atención de la PSD. El empleo se constituye como el tema más crítico ya que se prioriza su consecución (55 por ciento), en un escenario de escasa oferta. Entre las razones que se argumentan como aquellas que dificultan el acceso a los servicios de empleo se destacan el desconocimiento y la falta de información respecto de programas brindados por el Estado (48 por ciento) y escasa demanda (31 por ciento). Se aboga por la posibilidad de formar microempresas (20 por ciento) y por la necesidad de capacitarse (17 por ciento), para no seguir repitiendo las historias de fracasos.

Ver Anexos, Gráfica 7: Principales ayudas requeridas por la población desplazada
4. **Recomendaciones**

Para un país como Colombia que lleva décadas de conflicto interno y millones de PSD a cuestas, es imposible tratar a las víctimas del conflicto como sujetos sin derechos y sin memoria. Cuando se define a las personas como “desplazados” o “desplazadas” se corre el riesgo de invisibilizar y negar todo lo que son, personas con múltiples conocimientos y prácticas que deben ser reconocidas y escuchadas en el momento de comenzar procesos de reconstrucción.

A pesar del alto grado de adaptabilidad que tiene la PSD en Colombia, sigue siendo necesario trabajar en pos de recursos económicos y humanos que acompañen a esta población en sus procesos de empoderamiento y construcción de autonomía. Más allá de la generación de ingresos, es necesario garantizar la inserción armónica de la PSD en las redes económicas y en el mundo laboral.

4.1. **Aspectos generales de apoyo a la estabilidad económica de la PSD**

Con el fin de lograr verdaderos mecanismos de estabilidad económica para las mujeres jefas de hogar como parte de una PSD en general, se hace esencial trabajar constante y coherentemente en algunos aspectos:

- el 85 por ciento de la PSD quiere quedarse y proyectar su vida en Bogotá. El retorno nunca ha sido la elección, menos cuando no se ha logrado garantizar la seguridad y la dignidad.;
- las ciudades receptoras, en este caso Bogotá, deben asumir el desplazamiento forzado como realidades propias;
- la PSD tiene la necesidad de capacitarse para lograr una integración positiva a las nuevas dinámicas económicas y comerciales;
- es más que fundamental propiciar la participación de las mujeres en la definición y concertación de políticas para la atención, ya que son las mayores víctimas del desplazamiento.

Las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar asentadas en Bogotá, que poseen una historia en cuanto a la implementación de proyectos productivos, identifican algunas fallas comunes en estos procesos:

- problemas personales, desconfianza generalizada. Cuando se plantean entre familias no logran organizarse armónicamente;
- ausencia de integralidad en los procesos;
- poca experiencia empresarial y en capacitación;
- competencia comercial muy fuerte;
- el modelo económico de la ciudad hace que empresas con presupuestos económicos pequeños, tengan una vida corta.
El éxito en estos procesos puede comenzar a construirse identificando los puntos positivos y los fallos que se han tenido, haciendo trabajos previos de investigación que garanticen algún grado de inserción y sostenibilidad en el espacio de los mercados locales, p.ej. acuerdos con algunos de los grandes supermercados. Creando vías de comunicación, y entablando compromisos entre los diferentes actores sociales, se puede llegar a resultados dignos y exitosos. Algunas alternativas:

- originalidad en las propuestas, salirse de las ofertas comunes para generar cierta ventaja competitiva;
- trabajar nuevos procesos enfocados en prácticas y conocimientos ancestrales. Proyectos como Las Huertas Integrales a través de la Agricultura Urbana y la Periférica;
- construir procesos holísticos donde las necesidades físicas y emocionales tengan lugar. Son mujeres con hijos, responsabilidades, miedos, etc.;
- trabajar de la mano con la población receptora con el fin de que no se generen envidias, celos y para que se fortalezcan los mecanismos de protección comunitarios. (Es importante tener presente que mucha de la población habitante de los barrios a los que se integra la PSD ha sido desplazada en algún momento, y comparten el mismo grado de vulnerabilidad).

4.2. Fortalecer colaboraciones entre organizaciones internacionales

La ACNUR, en su Balance sobre las políticas públicas de prevención, protección y atención al desplazamiento interno en Colombia (agosto del 2002 a 2004), plantea que para dar respuestas estructurales y coherentes a esta problemática se debe alcanzar un equilibrio entre la efectiva aplicación de las normas y la funcionalidad institucional, con el fin de convertir a la política pública en un verdadero instrumento de derechos de la PSD, como correlato de las obligaciones del Estado. Dentro de este balance y para ir dibujando un escenario de ayuda internacional es necesario destacar algunos puntos:

- la política de estabilización socioeconómica para la PSD se ha centrado en la opción de generación de ingresos y ha descuidado la vinculación al mercado laboral. Significativo cuando la tendencia no es la del retorno voluntario sino el asentamiento en los centros urbanos;
- cada vez es menor la ayuda dirigida por parte del Gobierno hacia los procesos de generación de ingresos por cuenta propia. Capacitación, asistencia técnica y acompañamiento;
- en cuanto a las entidades públicas, solo el Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA) ha prestado servicios de capacitación productiva a la PSD.

El trabajo principal de la ACNUR en Colombia es el de desarrollar procesos de fortalecimiento en las instituciones del Estado encargadas de atender a la PSD (RSS, Procuraduría, Registraduría, etc.). También se trabaja en el fortalecimiento de las asociaciones de PSD, en cuanto al conocimiento y exigibilidad de sus derechos y la capacidad de negociación con el Estado. De esta manera se pueden construir procesos complementarios a los mandatos de la OIT enfocados en temas de desarrollo socioeconómico. Plantear una colaboración entre estas dos organizaciones puede ser muy exitosa, se puede proyectar por varias vías y hacía varias problemáticas:

• generación de líneas de crédito para las mujeres desplazadas jefas de hogar en Bogotá. Estas mujeres por lo general no cuentan con los requisitos y nunca pueden ser beneficiarias de los créditos que se ofrecen;
• programas de capacitación enfocados hacia nuevos conocimientos para las mujeres. Conocimientos que socialmente son vistos como masculinos pero que pueden abrir puertas de inserción en la dinámica local (p.ej. en contacto con el SENA);
• procesos de formación dirigidos a mujeres donde se les otorguen elementos de conocimiento que las motiven a explorar nuevas cosas con el fin de obtener más viabilidad en los proyectos. Mujer campesina que deviene en mujer empresaria;
• esquemas educativos que formen a las mujeres en cuanto a Cooperativas con Fondo Rotativo.
Anexos

1. Bibliografía


Eric Wolf: «Los Campesinos».


Páginas de Internet:

- CODHES: www.codhes.or.co
- DANE: www.dane.gov.co
- ICFES: www.icfes.gov.co
- R.S.S: www.red.gov.co
2. Gráficas y tablas

Gráfica 1: Sobre la estimación de la PSD por parte del CODHES

Fuente CODHES en: www.codhes.or.co

Fuente gráficas 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 y 7: Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, “Impacto del desplazamiento en el Distrito Capital” desarrollada por la Unión Temporal “– Economía Regional y Social, 2004.

Gráfica 2: Actividad actual de la población desplazada femenina
Gráfica 3: Actividad actual de la población masculina desplazada

- Estudianado: 8%
- Buscando trabajo: 2%
- Trabajando: 19%
- NS / NR y inf. edad: 2%
- Otra: 2%
- Inválido: 0%
- Oficios hogar: 0%
- Rentista: 22%
- Trabajando: 26%

Gráfica 4: Posición ocupacional de la población femenina desplazada

- Empleada / Obrera particular: 16%
- Trabajadora independiente: 16%
- Patrona: 50%
- Empleada del Gobierno: 31%
- NS / NR: 1%
- Trabajo sin remuneración: 1%
- Empleada doméstica: 1%

Gráfica 5: Posición ocupacional de la población masculina desplazada

- Empleado / Obrero particular: 12%
- Patron: 1%
- Trabajador independiente: 1%
- NS / NR: 1%
- Trabajo sin remuneración: 2%
- Empleado del Gobierno: 83%
Gráfica 6: Tasa de desempleo y tasa global de participación de la población desplazada

Gráfica 7: Principales ayudas requeridas por la población desplazada
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Años</th>
<th>Población</th>
<th>Relaciones de:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Hombres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>31 658 714</td>
<td>15 727 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>32 304 897</td>
<td>16 043 744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>32 963 445</td>
<td>16 365 539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>33 645 591</td>
<td>16 701 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>34 313 534</td>
<td>17 024 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>34 969 651</td>
<td>17 340 087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>35 668 266</td>
<td>17 684 804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>36 406 209</td>
<td>18 030 628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>37 127 293</td>
<td>18 378 951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>37 849 150</td>
<td>18 722 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>38 541 630</td>
<td>19 049 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>39 295 797</td>
<td>19 412 942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40 064 092</td>
<td>19 795 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>40 826 815</td>
<td>20 177 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>41 589 018</td>
<td>20 554 940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>42 321 386</td>
<td>20 914 523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>43 070 703</td>
<td>21 282 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>43 834 115</td>
<td>21 666 433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>44 583 577</td>
<td>22 043 894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>45 325 261</td>
<td>22 412 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>46 039 144</td>
<td>22 764 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>46 772 285</td>
<td>23 124 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>47 520 862</td>
<td>23 501 553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>48 256 721</td>
<td>23 872 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>48 982 067</td>
<td>24 233 779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>49 665 341</td>
<td>24 570 477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>50 387 702</td>
<td>24 923 662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>51 120 064</td>
<td>25 290 764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>51 838 183</td>
<td>25 650 927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>52 542 135</td>
<td>25 999 916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>53 182 961</td>
<td>26 313 321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: DANE. Colombia. Proyecciones anuales de población por sexo y edad 1985 al 2015. Estudios censales No.4
Tabla 2: La estimación de la PSD por parte de la RSS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fecha</th>
<th>No. Hogares</th>
<th>No. Personas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>2429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2 237</td>
<td>9 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8 965</td>
<td>31 896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7 185</td>
<td>24 471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>56 703</td>
<td>262 992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>67 317</td>
<td>317 856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>60 273</td>
<td>276 747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin información y hasta 1994</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203 427</td>
<td>926 565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estadísticas Estatales www.red.gov.co

Tabla 3: Grupos etarios de la población desplazada según género

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edades</th>
<th>Hombres</th>
<th>Porcentaje</th>
<th>Mujeres</th>
<th>Porcentaje</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De 0 a 10</td>
<td>83 095</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>78 256</td>
<td>14,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 11 a 20</td>
<td>65 909</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>62 739</td>
<td>11,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 21 a 30</td>
<td>33 705</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>42 549</td>
<td>7,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 31 a 40</td>
<td>30 535</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>41 214</td>
<td>7,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 41 a 50</td>
<td>20 357</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>22 359</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 51 a 60</td>
<td>11 680</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>12 681</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 61 y más</td>
<td>15 518</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>15 685</td>
<td>2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260 799</td>
<td>48,6</td>
<td>275 483</td>
<td>51,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tabla 4: Ingresos mensuales de las familias en la actualidad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingresos</th>
<th>Hogares</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De 0 a 100 000</td>
<td>57 232</td>
<td>1 340 882 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 100 001 a 200 000</td>
<td>16 853</td>
<td>2 676 902 846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 200 001 a 300 000</td>
<td>12 181</td>
<td>3 252 239 398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 300 001 a 400 000</td>
<td>17 020</td>
<td>6 090 485 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior a 400 000</td>
<td>8 009</td>
<td>5 364 317 746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 294</td>
<td>18 724 828 118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Mapas

Mapa 1: Colombia y Bogotá

Mapa 2: Localidad de Bogotá
Women and women-headed households vulnerability in civil violence contexts: Some lessons-learned from the Occupied Territories (OT)

Bisan Center for Research and Development

September 2005
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all of our staff and fieldworkers who contributed to this project with much time and effort. Our fieldworkers traveled through checkpoints at their own risk in order to conduct some of the focus groups and we dearly appreciate their commitment. Most of all, we would like to thank the participants in the focus groups who took time from their work and responsibilities to share with us their experiences, thoughts, and ideas. They did so because they understood that this work might benefit other women in their position, and expected no reward in return. Many came to the sessions hungry, grieving, angry or depressed, but they all contributed to the discussions with good will and spirit. While we could not offer them any direct assistance, we hope that we can give them the satisfaction that their suggestions, opinions and stories have been accurately portrayed and that their voices are being heard in the efforts to bring appropriate assistance to women in conflict zones.
Table of contents

 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 178
 List of acronyms ............................................................................................................. 180
 Executive summary ......................................................................................................... 181
 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 183
 2. Desk survey ...................................................................................................................... 185
   2.1. Selected sources ......................................................................................................... 185
   2.2. Palestinian poverty ..................................................................................................... 186
   2.3. Coping with poverty in Palestine ............................................................................. 186
   2.4. Women coping with the Intifada and poverty ......................................................... 187
 3. Profile of the Occupied Territories ............................................................................. 189
   3.1. Historical perspective ............................................................................................... 189
   3.2. Demographic environment ....................................................................................... 190
   3.3. Social environment assessment .............................................................................. 190
   3.4. Economic environment assessment ....................................................................... 192
 4. Research results .............................................................................................................. 195
   4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 195
   4.2. Defining and identifying poverty ............................................................................. 195
   4.3. The impact of poverty and women’s vulnerability ................................................... 196
   4.4. Coping mechanisms ............................................................................................... 199
 5. Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 203
 Annexes ............................................................................................................................... 205
**List of acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli shekel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT</td>
<td>Occupied Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECDAR</td>
<td>Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISPAL</td>
<td>United Nations Informations System on Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBGS</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

The economic status of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza is a subject that has been studied extensively by international, national and local organizations and institutions especially in the wake of the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. Understanding how households and individuals have coped with the economic downturn since the commencement of the conflict provides insight into how the economically vulnerable and the poor can be assisted. With a protracted conflict and constant political instability that makes planning difficult, many coping mechanisms have been exhausted and many others have been implemented that are not sustainable or that may have long-term negative effects.

With many coping mechanisms exhausted such as minimizing consumption, taking out loans or credit, selling assets, seeking assistance or attempting to find work, many poor see their only options as relying on aid, creating income generation projects –whether legal or illegal– or engaging in informal labour. While there is a heavy dependence on aid in Palestine, it cannot keep large portions of the population from sinking into poverty.

Women are especially vulnerable and marginalized in Palestinian society, yet play a crucial role in supporting their families in times of hardship, psychologically as well as economically. Women experience heightened vulnerability during conflict in Palestine as social and political restrictions further distance them from resources and services thus isolating them from support networks. Despite constraints, women are capable and willing to learn and work to support their families. In order to do so effectively, women need to have supportive local networks, resources and services in their communities, sources of funding, appropriate training and coaching and opportunities to participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives.
1. Introduction

The objectives of this research are fourfold: 1) to survey how conflict, occupation, and poverty are affecting different aspects of Palestinian society; 2) to explore the effects of the conflict on poor women; 3) to investigate the ways in which poor women have developed strategies to cope with the conflict and loss of livelihood and 4) to offer some recommendations for future policy and programme design based on the findings. The overall goal of the project is to assist the ILO and other actors to undertake appropriate and effective crisis response measures during conflict that target the vulnerable and the poor, and support their abilities to cope with the crisis. As there are currently a number of studies produced on households in the current crisis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), every effort was made not to replicate work. As Bisan views this study as complementary to existing research, we have chosen a qualitative approach to our original research in order to shed some light on the intricate and myriad ways which women are experiencing, and coping with conflict and its accompanying economic effects.

The research itself consisted of four main methodologies: 1) a literature review; 2) focus groups; 3) in-depth interviews and 4) organization mapping.

A literature review was carried out using relevant studies, surveys and supplied information for the country profile, background and environment assessments. It also provided information about indicators of poverty, vulnerability and coping mechanisms employed across the population.

Focus groups comprised the heart of the original research of the study. Seven focus groups were held in the WBGS. Sessions were conducted in rural, urban and refugee camp locations distributed throughout the Occupied Territories (OT). Five focus groups were conducted in the West Bank: in the south, groups met in Hebron city and in the village of Doura, in the central area near Jerusalem a session was held in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp and in the north, in the Ein Beit Il Ma’ refugee camp as well as a cluster of villages east of Nablus including Beit Furik, Beita and Salem were targeted. In Gaza, focus groups were held in two locations gathering women from different parts of the Gaza Strip. Though the range of target communities for the focus groups was geographically wide, because of the small sample, the results should be read as indicative rather than representative. All participants were women whose ages ranged from young women of 16 to older women in their fifties and sixties all of whom identified themselves as poor. Each focus group consisted of approximately eight to 16 women and took a minimum of three hours. Women were asked to discuss how they define and recognize poverty, how the conflict has affected their households and what coping strategies they have used to deal with both the conflict and poverty. Women participated in an exercise to rank the coping mechanisms they used in terms of the order in which they were implemented. In addition, women were asked to describe successful local income generation projects, as well as rate projects and programmes that support such projects in their communities.

In-depth unstructured interviews were held with one participant after each focus group. The purpose of these interviews was to thoroughly analyse points brought up in the session, and in a number of cases these interviews led to household visits and community tours where researchers were confronted face-to-face with poor living conditions or income generation projects themselves.
A simple survey was administered to organizations providing support to women in the form of job creation, income generation or micro-finance projects. While it was difficult to conduct a comprehensive review as many organizations are now incorporating these aspects into their programme design, and some organizations refused to respond, a table indicating some of the ongoing or recent projects by larger local and international agencies and organizations can be found in the annexes.

Results from the different methodologies were compiled and analysed by members of Bisan’s research unit with the assistance of the fieldworkers working on the study.
2. Desk survey

2.1. Selected sources

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the World Bank both jointly and individually publish reports and statistics on the economic status of Palestine and the effects of the Intifada on the economy and population regularly as does the Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) monitors indicators and produces regular updates on the status of checkpoints, injuries, fatalities and destruction caused by the Israeli occupation. The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) and the Palestine Trade Center (PalTrade) regularly disseminate statistics and information on the business environment. The PCBS conducts perception studies on the impact of the Intifada on businesses, households and individuals as have university-affiliated institutes such as Birzeit University’s Community Mental Health Programme, the Women’s Studies Institute and the Development Studies Programme (DSP). The DSP publishes an annual Palestinian Human Development Report. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2002 published the results of their Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) conducted in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning, in an attempt to create an accurate portrait of Palestinian poverty using detail-oriented qualitative methods, and couple them with expert analysis in themed reports. The Norwegian independent research foundation, Fafo, also produces informative studies written by international experts on the region. The World Food Programme (WFP) is including Palestine in its Coping Strategies Index and has conducted studies on food security, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA), WFP and the United Nations Relief and Works Programme (UNRWA) has also addressed the topic based on extensive field research. UNRWA conducts reviews of its own work and publishes regular strategic plans offering some information about refugee camps and their residents. There are myriad reports produced by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and donors involving both primary and secondary research that are used to support programme design, justify aid and advocate for Palestinian rights. The potentials for an actual alleviation of the prevalent and increasingly entrenched poverty in the current situation, through both formal development and relief projects and informal individual and collective strategies have been less comprehensively reviewed. More elusive in the literature are the roles of informal work and income generation projects established independently, their evolution, successes, failures and lessons learned. There is a growing trend to conduct professional external evaluations, but these, like project documents, are not always publicly available.

There has been a host of literature published on Palestinian women, which dates back to studies of strong women’s committees and organizations in the 1980s. These have been written by both local and international academics and many celebrate the strong history of women’s activism and participation in a part of the world normally associated with the socio-economic marginalization and oppression of women. Birzeit University’s Women’s Studies Institute, which develops papers on women and gender issues in Palestine, published a series of monographs as a larger “Status Report” on Palestinian women. Topics addressed included women in Palestinian society, family, labour, the economy, social support, politics, law, development and health. Though these pre-date the second Intifada by several years, they are good resources. While there is an initiative by the PCBS to track gender statistics, there is currently no comprehensive body of data about female-headed households.
A question that needs to be further explored is how this vast body of literature is disseminated and to what extent it is effectively applied to inform policy and programme design.

2.2. Palestinian poverty

The main causes for Palestinian poverty narrow to the Israeli occupation of the WBGS and the current conflict, the lack of natural resources and the lack of cohesion, organization and leadership in Palestinian society. The poor have not, according to the World Bank, suffered more than other sectors of society during this Intifada, as they have, as a sector, collectively benefited from substantial assistance. But they have grown more vulnerable. The same study found that poverty often correlates with lower levels of education and large families in WBGS as well as unemployment or unstable employment. Rural families and those in Gaza who are in need are less likely to receive assistance (see Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - and World Bank, 2004). FAO research points to the fact that though food is available, access is limited because of closures, curfew and poverty (see FAO, 2003).

2.3. Coping with poverty in Palestine

As part of the 2002 Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) Project sponsored by the UNDP and the Ministry of Planning, a report was developed on coping strategies of the poor. In this report, a framework was outlined to describe the measures implemented by households, these were defined as survival-, coping- and social mobility strategies. The report outlines four main strategies for coping with poverty as mentioned by the poor participants in the study: 1) establishing micro-projects; 2) finding work opportunities for unemployed family members; 3) reducing expenditure and 4) receiving assistance from family members or organizations (Mheisen, 2002, p. 1). At the same time, Mheisen translates these into four broader strategies: 1) limiting expenditure; 2) developing market strategies; 3) relying on social support networks and 4) seeking the support of external actors such as the State and NGOs. The same report divides the measures taken by households as immediate, precautionary and sustainable (Mheisen, 2002, p. 1). As the report seeks to offer prescriptive measures for coping it does not dwell on the use of savings and selling of different types of assets that play a prominent role in discussions of coping mechanisms by PCBS and the World Bank.

While the PPA report does briefly mention illegal or unethical coping strategies such as “smuggling, theft, beggary [sic] and prostitution” (Mheisen 2002, p. 2) it does not elaborate. There are also unofficial reports of increased drug use, production and trade. Many studies ignore these coping measures altogether lacking sufficient data or not wanting to perpetuate a negative image of Palestinians. There are no published criminal activity statistics to provide a basis for further hypothesis. In a socially conservative culture, it is very difficult to discuss such sensitive topics qualitatively. This is an area that could use further study.

Many coping strategies may have harmful long-term effects on families practising them. These measures include depriving children of their education, compromising health care, selling assets and using the capital to cover daily needs rather than investing in income generation projects thereby further threatening household security.
2.4. Women coping with the Intifada and poverty

There is no disagreement within the literature that women are marginalized and vulnerable in many aspects of Palestinian society (see Amnesty International, 2005; Esim and Kuttab, 2002; Johnson, 1997, and others). In the context of the second Intifada, however, there are two main threads in the literature about how the conflict affects women and how they are coping. On the one hand, women bear the brunt of negative effects of the conflict and resulting economic downturn whereas, on the other, women are valiantly forging new ways of survival for their families through creative economizing and income generation.

Women are poorly represented in the formal labour force, do not own as many assets as men, they earn lower wages, are subject to social restrictions thus limiting movement, association, and actions and are excluded from many decision-making processes at all levels of society from the household to politics. Bearing the burden of domestic duties and care for family members in addition to any external responsibilities, women’s work is often under-counted. In the second Intifada, care for the injured, traumatized and depressed has been added to women’s duties. Moreover, many women have had to search for work or develop income generation projects to provide for the families’ needs when men are absent, incapacitated or unable to find employment. Palestinian women, especially those who are poor and less well educated, tend to bear many children, which is a physical, psychological as well as a financial burden. Women who wish to enter the work force are challenged by high fertility rates and early childbearing. The PPA report observes that some women have been “pushed” into the labour market by male relatives (Mheisen, 2002, p. 8). A United Nations Informations System on Palestine (UNISPAL) press release quoting the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People states: "the hardship of daily life was felt most acutely by Palestinian women who carried the burden of responsibility within the household because of death, imprisonment, or unemployment of male members” during the second Intifada (UNISPAL, 2005). A 2005 Amnesty International report echoes this view.

Female-headed households are especially vulnerable. Female-headed households make up the majority of those identified as the “chronically poor” by the WFP, meaning those who do not have sufficient opportunities to work, lack assets, and depend upon external aid (Siblot, 2004). In 1997, female-headed households comprised 9 per cent of the Palestinian population (PCBS, 1997); one can only assume that this number has risen. Males have made up the vast majority of casualties in the conflict, and there are currently thousands of men still imprisoned in Israeli jails. At the same time, it appears that female-headed households have been more effectively targeted for aid and while more vulnerable, are not necessarily more poverty-stricken in terms of income (PCBS and World Bank, 2004).

Even when working, many women face social and cultural obstacles. Though most women having established income generating projects are in charge of their work, only 16.3 per cent have ownership over the productive assets of their projects, with the vast majority of assets owned by other family members (mostly husbands). This is indicative of the paucity of women’s resources (Esim and Kuttab, 2002, p. 24) and their vulnerability. Though the PPA report notes that women have limited access to the labour market, the research found that they are active in coping with economic hardship; “It is women, especially those from the refugee camps and the villages who make up the highest percentages when it comes to the number of poor people who have opted to establish micro-projects” (Mheisen, 2002, p. 1). As Kuttab and Esim write, “Palestinian women are not passive recipients of gender segregation, but rather they are active agents of resistance and change who use informal and creative mechanisms as forms of survival” (Esim and Kuttab, 2002 p.2). While women’s contributions help families’ survival, they do not
necessarily mean that they can improve the financial situation substantially. Esim and Kuttab remind us that “women’s informal employment in the Palestinian context [...] is [...] mainly confined to a series of survivalist activities with limited financial returns” (Esim and Kuttab, 2002, p. 27).

Palestinian women do suffer the brunt of effects of the conflict and poverty in Palestine and they do find creative mechanisms to attempt to overcome their situation. The one does not preclude the other. Understanding how women’s active participation in coping with the current conflict and economic hardship can be used to help other women in similar situations, but also should be examined to see how it could lead to more active participation by women in their communities and the larger Palestinian society.
3. **Profile of the Occupied Territories (OT)**

3.1. **Historical perspective**

Palestine, or more correctly, the Occupied Territories (OT) currently denotes the land occupied by Israel in 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel annexed Jerusalem, which was also occupied at that time. From 1967 through 1993, Israel administered the WBGS both civilly and militarily. In 1987, the first Palestinian popular uprising against the Israeli occupation, or Intifada, broke out and lasted six years. In 1993, the conflict was resolved at the negotiating table with Israel ceding authority over portions of the WBGS to a new PA. The PA had charge of portions of the WBGS designated: “Area A” which was mainly comprised of populous Palestinian urban centers; “Area B” over which the PA had only partial authority as Palestinians held civil control, but Israeli military control; and “Area C” which was under Israeli control and included settlements as well as extensive rural tracts. More land was to be put under Palestinian control as PA capacity grew and a handful of crucial negotiations were planned to complete the peace process. Six years later, with little growth or geographical unification of the fragmented Palestinian-controlled areas, little headway on the so-called Final Status Agreements with Israel that were to negotiate water rights, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, borders, Israeli settlements and security, precarious stability in which to establish public and private institutions, and with many Palestinians feeling marginalized from both the negotiating tables and any economic growth, the second Intifada broke out. Open conflict was sparked when on 29 September, 2000 Ariel Sharon decided to enter the Haram Al Sharif. Sharon’s entry into the third holiest Muslim religious site sparked unrest which was met with harsh Israeli measures and overnight escalated into the second or Al Aqsa Intifada. This conflict has differed from the previous Intifada. It did not have as large a base of grassroots participation, some Palestinians used firearms and the Israeli military implemented measures whose harshness far exceeded those of the first Intifada, including large-scale military invasions, assassinations of political leaders and air strikes in addition to long-term curfews and closures that have strangled the Palestinian economy. The Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been plunged into poverty that becomes more entrenched as time passes.

Movement of people and goods both within and between Palestinian areas and internationally is entirely controlled by Israel. In mid-2004, there were an estimated “750 checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds and gates” (PRCS, 2005 p. 1) dividing the OT in the West Bank and Gaza thus preventing people from moving freely between villages, in and out of urban areas and prohibiting access to Jerusalem and nearly all traffic between Gaza and the West Bank. The OT has no autonomous borders so all imports and exports as well as international travel to and from the country must go through Israel.

In the West Bank, the 600 kilometre-long Separation Wall the Israelis are building in the name of security is being completed, despite the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings on its illegality. Not constructed along the Green Line (the 1967 borders of the West Bank) but in many places well within the OT, the wall has created a number of isolated enclaves, has stranded many communities between it and the Green Line and has cut off many people from their lands, some of which have been destroyed to pave its way. With only about 50 gates in the Wall, many with short or irregular opening times, and requiring special permits for passage, this Wall effects further economic decline for Palestinians.
Since September 28, 2000, over the five years of conflict, 3,700 Palestinians have been killed and 29,181 injured according to September 2005 figures collected by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. In addition, areas in the West Bank have suffered the equivalent of approximately 1,091 days of curfew collectively and Israeli forces have demolished over 4,047 Palestine homes in the WBGS. The conflict has destroyed businesses and agricultural land as well as public institutions and infrastructure. While the scale of destruction and loss of life does not compete with conflicts elsewhere, it cannot be underestimated how much the constant state of fear, uncertainty, and instability affect all aspects of life for Palestinians in the WBGS. Palestinian society currently lies at a crossroads, either the cycle of poverty will intensify, drawing more and more people into its orbit or with easing of restrictions and economic growth the foundations for a viable and sustainable Palestinian State will emerge. The Palestinians are by and large an educated population, and given control over their human and natural resources, there is great potential for the successful development of the society.

3.2. Demographic environment

The area of the WBGS was approximately 6,162 square kilometers in 2003. The total projected population of Palestinians residing in the WBGS in July 2005 was calculated to be 3,762,005, with approximately 37 per cent living in the Gaza Strip and 53 per cent in the West Bank. Urban residents make up approximately 59 per cent of the population (WHO, 2003), and 17.5 per cent of the population live in refugee camps (UNRWA, n.d.).

The Palestinian population is young. According to the 1997 census which was the first such study of the population, 47 per cent of the population was 14 or younger and 20.1 per cent of the population consisted of young people between 15 and 24 years of age. Overall, over 67 per cent of the population were calculated to be under the age of 25 and nearly 75 per cent of the population under 30. The population growth rate is 2.4 per cent and fertility rates are averaged at 3.9. The dependency ratio is between 6 and 7 up from 5 in 1999 (World Bank, 2004, p. 39).

3.3. Social environment assessment

The Israeli military occupation affects negatively all aspects of life for the Palestinian population. Many communities and households have suffered the loss of members to death and imprisonment, destruction resulting from the conflict has ruined Palestinian public and private assets. The ongoing Israeli policy of closures, curfews and checkpoints has separated Palestinians from economic, medical, educational as well as social and political support, services and resources. The country’s resulting economic decline and increased poverty is further preventing more and more people from accessing the support, services and resources they need. School children are prevented from reaching their schools, teachers cannot reach their classrooms, medical personnel cannot reach patients, patients cannot reach care, people cannot reach their places of work and visiting friends or family even in neighbouring areas can be difficult. Transportation costs have increased, as have the costs of goods in the market creating further challenges to a population already vulnerable.

192 It is difficult to determine the exact size of the WBGS as there are no set borders and Israel continues to expropriate land for settlement establishment and expansion.
Many women are suffering from heightened social restrictions as well the effects of the direct Israeli measures and economic downturn. In Palestinian society, a family’s honour depends largely on the honour of its women. With the difficulties of mobility and Israeli presence, many families worry about the often humiliating treatment of women at checkpoints and the risks of their being at the mercy of strangers if stranded in a closure. These socio-cultural considerations coupled with the high economic dependence of women upon men have further limited women’s freedom of movement and association during the second Intifada.

Development indicators for Palestine are higher than many other countries in the Arab world (even after five years of conflict) but these indicators are declining. Historically, the Palestinian population is an educated one and education is highly valued. After 57 years of the uncertainty of living under Israeli occupation, education is considered one of the most valuable and permanent assets an individual can secure, however according to PCBS and Ministry of Education figures, school enrolment is declining. Enrolment in primary school is 91 per cent, and at secondary level it drops to 86 per cent. Enrolment rates for girls are slightly less (by 1 per cent) than for boys. Across all age groups, female literacy rates are significantly lower for women than men at 86 and 96 per cent respectively (WHO, 2003).

Environmental health is in decline. With increased difficulty in movement, municipalities are experiencing mounting difficulties in collecting, transporting, processing and disposing of garbage appropriately. Dumping is occurring near residential areas and much garbage is burnt openly. The destruction caused by Israeli attacks has compromised infrastructure and water quality and availability has been affected.

Both physical and mental health continues to deteriorate. Child malnutrition as well as anaemia in mothers, is rising among the poor because of prolonged incapacity to obtain sufficient and varied foodstuffs. Restricted access to health services because of distance or cost is affecting large portions of the population. The poor and those living in remote areas limit medical care to urgent curative procedures for economic reasons. But this strategy is rarely effective as without preventative or early attention, injury or disease often intensifies and requires additional (and costly) attention. The long-term pressures of poverty, in addition to the tensions of the political situation have affected the psychological health of the population. Children have become victims to trauma from their everyday experiences and many have symptoms of post-traumatic stress. Unemployed men, traditional breadwinners, are being recorded as having increased incidence of depression as they find themselves ineffectual as providers for their families, and parents grow anxious as they cannot care adequately for their children nor protect them from the violence and humiliation of the Israeli occupation.

According to a June 2005 PCBS survey, food was the primary need for Palestinian households, followed by money and employment. While the PA, national and international NGOs have worked hard to maintain basic services and provide relief, depending largely on foreign donors and aid, there are still gaps.

The Palestinian police force has been deployed in the past year and is attempting to enforce a respect for the law and establish the legitimacy of the PA, but with limited success. Intra-Palestinian fighting has occurred between political parties as well as in the context of family feuds. The police must gain legitimacy and authority before their presence has meaningful effect.
3.4. Economic environment assessment

Please note: The vast majority of national statistics are produced by the PCBS. The PCBS has only collected economic data since the coming of the PA in 1994. The first Palestinian census was conducted in 1997 and the next one is planned for 2007. Many aspects of demographic data used in this report, and others, are based upon the 1997 census. Without an updated census, data given throughout this report may not reflect developments that may have occurred in the intervening eight years or resulting from the Al Aqsa Intifada.

After the coming of the PA in 1994, there was an economic boom as economic investment and donor assistance poured into the country with the promise of new stability and the necessity for the creation of sustainable institutions and infrastructure. It was also necessary to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian population. While economic investment aimed to encourage local production and new markets, the ultimate goal of the aid assistance was to promote peace in the region (Le More, n.d.). This economic boom slipped into a depression in 1995 and 1996 and stagnation in 1997 (Manalo 2003, p.27) then was followed by a short period of growth which was curtailed in September 2000 by the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. The closure and curfew that the Israelis imposed and the construction of the illegal separation wall hampered movement of goods and people effectively strangling Palestinian economy. In 2001 and 2002 the economy contracted, it showed a slight growth in 2003, with a lull in the violence and some diplomatic developments, but 2004 saw yet another year of stagnation (World Bank 2004, p.xiii).

Macro-economic indicators between 1994 and 1999 showed overall growth, albeit uneven. The Gross Domestic Investment rates, which had grown from 1,852.70 US$ in 1994 to 2,077.4 US$ in 1999, had dropped to 1,656.55 US$ by 2002. The chart below provides the recent available figures for the GNP per capita and growth rate from 1994 to 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP/capita (US$)</th>
<th>Growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,625.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,650.8</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,577.3</td>
<td>-4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,675.6</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,860.9</td>
<td>11.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,934.8</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,722.7</td>
<td>10.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,460.3</td>
<td>-15.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,203.4</td>
<td>-17.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table adapted from figures available on the PCBS website (www.pcbs.ps.gov).

In a 2004 World Bank report, it is noted that “The Palestinian economy remains severely depressed compared with the pre-Intifada period. The World Bank estimates that GDP is 23 percent lower than in 1999” and taking into account population growth concludes that the “real GDP per capita is some 35 percent below its pre-intifada level.” (World Bank 2004, p. xiv).

3.4.1. The labour force and wages

Between 1995 and 1999 there was an increase of the employment rate from 60.7 to 82.8 per cent. In the same period, under-employment decreased from 21.1 to 5.4 per cent and unemployment declined from 18.2 to 11.85 per cent. Over the years between 1995 and 1999, the differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in terms of employment and unemployment rates decreased. The figures indicate however, that in moments of economic decline, the disparities between the two regions increase, and Gaza tends to suffer more because of its lack of resources and the narrow possibilities of alternate income of its inhabitants.
Between the year 2000, when the Al Aqsa Intifada broke out in the third quarter and the end of 2004, employment rates had plummeted from 80.9 to 66.8 per cent. Unemployment rose from 14.15 to 26.8 per cent, peaking in 2002 at 31.3 per cent overall. 2002 marked the year of the worst and most widespread Israeli curfews, closures, invasions and destruction in the WBGS. Unemployment in the West Bank during this year was 28.2 per cent while in Gaza it reached 38 per cent. In 2004, unemployment was 22.9 per cent in the West Bank and 35.4 per cent in the Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, since 1995, unemployment consistently remained higher than in the West Bank, though underemployment appears more prevalent in the West Bank than in Gaza. While unemployment decreased in the West Bank and Gaza in 2003, this was largely due to part-time jobs and 2004 saw a large decline in the number of full-time jobs (World Bank 2004, p.xiv). Work in Israel used to be a lucrative source of income for many Palestinians, especially important to refugee camp residents and those without productive assets. Since 2000, the number of Palestinians admitted to Israel for work has dropped by more than a half (World Bank, 2004, p xv). After more than four years of the closures of Israel to Palestinians, it is doubtful whether Palestinians will recover their former jobs.

Participation rates in the labour force are much higher for males than females. For men, in 2002, participation was 65.5 per cent while for women it was 10.4 per cent. While the overall unemployment rate nearly tripled between 1999 and 2002, unemployment rates for women remained more constant than those of men, increasing by only 31 per cent as opposed to 165 per cent. Women’s participation in the formal labour force is concentrated in skilled agriculture as well as professional work, followed at much lower rates by craft and elementary occupations. Of those women who work, 0.9 per cent are actually employers, 14.6 per cent are self-employed, 56.8 per cent are wage employees and 27.7 per cent are involved in unpaid family work (Esim and Kuttab, 2002, p. 10). Unaccounted for in the labour participation rates are those women involved in the informal economy although women make up 55.6 per cent of the informal economy in the West Bank and 60.6 per cent in Gaza (Esim and Kuttab, 2002, p. 11). Women’s unpaid labour is very high with only 6 per cent of women’s work remunerated (Johnson et al., 2004, p. 8).

Young people between the ages of 15 and 24 had the highest unemployment rates of all age groups. Youth unemployment rates rose from 17.3 in 1999 to 42.6 per cent in 2002. Participation rates of youth in the labour force in 1999 were counted at 30.4 per cent while in 2002 they had dropped to 24.4 per cent. In 2004, 39.8 per cent of 15 to 24 year-olds were unemployed and unemployment rates were higher among young women than men (44.8 and 38.9 per cent respectively). The differences by region and gender for youth unemployment are recorded in the chart below:

### Table 2: Unemployment in 2004 according to PCBS statistics (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Total WBGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men (15-24)</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (15-24)</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total youth (15-24)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (15+)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the West Bank there tends to be more parity in the work trends between young men and young women than in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that the similarity in numbers fades as one examines older age groups. Parallel to the trends of increasing disparities between the employment rates in Gaza and the West Bank in times of crisis, it may appear that gender balance is also affected in crisis or under duress, but more investigation into this topic is necessary than the data available can support.

New entrants into the labour force per year over time are presented in the table below:
Table 3: New entrants into the labour force: 1995 to 2002 based upon PCBS data (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Employment Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>5.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>9.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>-22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>-12.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>-8.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.b.: yearly entrance into the labour force is given by percentage rather than absolute value here.

The Employment/GDP elasticity can be observed in the chart below:

Table 4: Employment/GDP elasticity according to PCBS statistics: 1994 to 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment/GDP elasticity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.3904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.7803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.4241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.0232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.3930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wages

Average daily wages vary by type of employee and by region. Wages in the West Bank are significantly higher than those in the Gaza Strip. Wages are higher in the Jerusalem governorate, and highest in Israel and the Israeli settlements. Wages in Israel and the Israeli settlements are generally over double wages in Gaza. In 2002, the average daily wage in the West Bank was 14.67 US$, while in Gaza it was just under 11.63 US$, in Jerusalem it was 21.48 US$ and in Israel and settlements the average ranged 24.80 US$. Daily wages in the Palestinian public and private sector differed slightly, with private sector daily wages being approximately 6 per cent higher than in the public sector. Between 2000 and 2005, the median monthly income had dropped by 40 per cent to 330 US$ in the West Bank and 267 US$ in Gaza.

Overall losses to the Palestinian economy have been totaled at over 20 billion US$ and it is estimated that between 2000 and 2004 576 million US$ were lost because of lack of investment. Approximately, 75 million US$ worth of destruction was caused to industrial structures, 634 million to infrastructure, and 25 million to transportation alone (Abdel Hadi and Engler, 2005). The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture calculated losses in the sector at 1,091,543,986 US$ by the end of August 2004 (Wafa News, 2004) which included more than 1.14 million uprooted trees and 6,873 hectares leveled.

3.4.2. Poverty

Poverty rates have more than doubled since the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada and by the end of 2004 almost half the population was living on about 2.10 US$ per day or less, in the Gaza Strip, 68 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line. The general poverty line is set at 2.10 US$ per day per person. In 2003, the World Bank and the PCBS developed a “subsistence” poverty line set at 1.59 US$ per day. This represents the estimated cost of food at the minimum calorific intake, calculated at 29.43 US$ per month, with an additional 17.70 US$ per month per person for other necessary expenses such as housing and utilities (Abdel Hadi and Engler, 2005). In December 2003, over 600,000 Palestinians, or 16 per cent of the population, were living below the subsistence or absolute poverty line (World Bank, 2004). “Families living in subsistence poverty are generally large; they have many non-working dependents and low levels of education. Most live in Gaza” reports a 2004 World Bank study. A 2004 WFP study reports that 1.3 million or 37 per cent of the Palestinian population “is food insecure and another 975,000 are at risk of becoming so” (WFP 2004 p.1). There are no figures as to what percentage of the population lives on less than 1 US$ per day.

193 To generate these figures the average Interbank exchange rate from 2002 of NIS 4.73 per 1 US$ was employed. The source of this rate was www.oanda.com.
4. **Research results**

4.1. **Introduction**

While exploring women’s economic vulnerabilities in the WBGS, it must be understood that a large portion of the population has moved beyond vulnerability as household and individual assets as well as coping mechanisms have been exhausted. The majority of Palestinians are no longer simply economically vulnerable, but living below the poverty line. This poverty brings with it a host of vulnerabilities threatening mental and physical health, education and life, and taken collectively, the successful development of a future Palestinian State.

This study focuses on perceptions of poverty and vulnerability as well as their indicators and economic coping mechanisms of women among some of the most marginalized and poverty stricken sectors of Palestinian society, but more investigation needs to be conducted on other segments of Palestinian society as many families may still maintain the appearance of stability, yet suffer from increasing economic vulnerability out of sight of neighbours, family and friends, in addition to organizations that might help them, their coping mechanisms could inform further understanding of the Palestinian situation in economic down-turn. This study focuses on women and female heads of households and the organizations intended to serve them, but further exploration is needed into any informal collective efforts in local communities to address economic needs as well as the work of local authorities.

4.2. **Defining and identifying poverty**

Among the female focus group participants from both Gaza and the West Bank, the definition of economic poverty and the identification of its indicators were linked with basic needs and the immediate and concrete results of these needs being unmet. Many participants, when asked to define poverty offered both specific economic as well as broader social conceptions. Broader definitions of poverty offered included being deprived of support, opportunities, family, understanding, education and health; but as participants identified financial hardship as the source of much of this deprivation, for our purposes we will mean financial poverty unless otherwise indicated.

Participants defined poverty as a lack of money, the inability to cover a family or household’s basic needs (specified as food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education) the inability to meet the needs of children, cover necessary expenses and generally a poor quality of life. The indicators of this poverty, according to participants, are uneducated and unhealthy children, debt, poor living conditions and health, poor quality and condition of clothing (especially children’s clothing), children leaving school to work, and families selling off furniture and assets in order to live. While many women acknowledged that poverty can be difficult to discern in Palestine, they offered advice for researchers and aid workers; one woman said, “Look at what people are buying in stores. When you see a woman buy half a kilo of chicken and you know she has a big family, you know they don’t
have enough [money]. The shopkeepers know even if women try to hide their financial state from their neighbours.”

In the West Bank, in addition to the attributes mentioned by those in Gaza, participants noted that poverty entails the unavailability of consumer goods, the cutting-off of household utilities and difficulties in all aspects of economic life. For Palestinians living in the West Bank the indicators of poverty were not all direct reflections of the lack of basic needs, but also changes in social behaviour and relations. While it was difficult for participants to articulate the specific nature of these changes, aspects of these changes were described as people keeping more to themselves out of shame and experiencing increased tension in the household.

For the purposes of this study, we chose to concentrate on highlighting qualitative, rather than quantitative, indicators for poverty and the economic vulnerability of women and their families through exploring terms and concepts used and developed by the participant vulnerable women themselves. Reasons for this are multiple. If indicators are to be utilized to inform programming and policy during a crisis: 1) available quantitative data may be outdated or deceiving especially in the case of swift economic downturn; 2) in a conflict situation, officials may not be available to provide data and time and security may not allow for a proper survey of the population; 3) in times of crisis, responses may have to be localized and having a foundation upon which to understand the socio-cultural dynamics between actors can facilitate intervention; 4) poverty is an abstract concept and using local vocabulary will ease in its identification and 5) it is our belief that the more the local community is involved in all aspects of identifying, articulating, acting, and reflecting in order to best meet their needs, the more appropriate and sustainable any resulting programmes or services.

4.3. The impact of poverty and women’s vulnerability

In both Gaza and the West Bank, focus group participants agreed that poverty is a main cause of social problems and participant women asserted that the current economic decline will have negative effects for generations to come. Vulnerabilities experienced by women which they associated with their poverty and as well as with their gendered roles as women, wives and mothers, included decreased educational opportunities, increased restrictions on freedom of movement, increased social and physical isolation, early marriage, suffering of domestic and political violence, decreased health care and deteriorating health, increased responsibilities providing and caring for children and family members, increased pressure to generate income and increased psychological tension.

Children and youth in economically vulnerable households are often taken out of school to save on the cost of school supplies, transportation and fees. Some children are taken out of school to either work in the home, family business, or in the local market in spite of strong cultural values that encourage education. Travel to universities is lengthened by checkpoints and subsequently more expensive and many students have had to take rooms near their universities to insure their attendance in classes at all because of

---

194 It should be noted that shopkeepers often extend credit and even provide assistance to needy families from their own stock. No study has been undertaken of the financial role of local shopkeepers.

195 While variations in results from focus groups in different areas can be attributed to differences in the facilitation style of moderators, the sampling of participants, or the mood of a particular group’s participants, in general, poverty levels in the Gaza Strip are much higher than in the West Bank. This manifests itself in the data presented here through greater concentration on basic needs by Gazan participants as more of their coping mechanisms have been exhausted.
closures. This increases the economic burden of education enormously. Many students have had to terminate their education at high school level or withdraw from higher education altogether for economic reasons. If parents have to choose among their children which to take out of school or refuse university, it is often girls who are deprived of their education. As girls will grow up to marry into their husband’s family, many parents choose to invest in sons who will be expected to take care of them as they age. There are additional social reasons why parents prefer to keep young women from their education in times of conflict. With increased difficulty and danger in travel, parents are reluctant to expose their daughters to lengthy and humiliating waits at checkpoints, long walks through isolated areas circumventing checkpoints and the possibility that they may be stuck far from home by closure, fearing for their safety and honour. These social concerns also prevent many parents from allowing female university students to reside away from home.

Tightened social and financial restrictions on movement do not only apply to female students during times of unrest. Noticeable numbers of teachers and other women working outside their communities have left their positions and many women are cut off from markets for income generation project products. Women are living in further physical isolation as even household shopping can be curbed by both lack of funds and concern for safety and honour. These restrictions coupled with the direct ones imposed by the Israeli occupation translate into lessened access to personal support networks of family and friends for women, and reduced access to resources and services. Debt creates social tensions that further marginalize people from their creditors who may be family or local community members. Without funds, people do not visit each other often as they cannot properly entertain guests in a culture that emphasizes hospitality as a virtue and cannot afford even simple transportation. A number of women noted that they cannot even afford to visit their families. Families provide an important social network of support for women, especially in a culture where family problems should not be aired to strangers. Poverty leads to psychological stress and isolation that further marginalizes the already impoverished, especially women, increasing vulnerability.

Poverty affects marriage patterns. Some families are marrying their daughters off at young ages to cut on the expenses of their household and possibly gain from mahr or dowry paid by the husband despite a growing awareness about the need to raise marriage age in Palestine.\textsuperscript{196} In a series of 2002 interviews with young women in the northern West Bank, Bisan found that youths were concerned that families may not even take care to marry their daughters to appropriate husbands in the face of poverty, and some young women, describing the experience of friends and family members offered an important reminder that there is no guarantee that the new husband’s family may be any better off than a young woman’s current family. While young women are being married off earlier, young men are marrying later as they have fewer resources with which to pay the mahr. And in a number of cases, participants cited engaged couples who broke off their plans for marriage entirely because they could not afford setting up a household together.

Participants noted a causal relationship between violence within households with unmarried young men living with their families and while not talked about openly, there was reference to the potential for and possibilities of sexual abuse.\textsuperscript{197} If young men do marry, unable to afford independent housing, many are remaining with their parents and the increased number of family members and families under one roof brings with it new tensions. The increased tensions resulting from the stressors of poverty are blamed with what are perceived as increased divorce rates in some communities or simply seen as the cause for most divorces in others. As many women are financially dependent upon their husbands, if the men cannot provide for them, women will leave their marriages, as a

\textsuperscript{196} It is worth mentioning that even informants who are knowledgeable about the negative effects of early marriage noted that without a solution to their poverty, they would marry their daughters young.

\textsuperscript{197} This is a topic that needs study in Palestine.
handful of focus group participants had done. But Palestinian society is not very accepting of divorced women no matter what the causes of the divorce.

Participants stated that poverty is a main cause of domestic tensions and violence and that women and children are often the primary victims of this violence. While all groups interviewed described domestic violence, from the terminology used by West Bank participants it can be deduced that participants have been exposed to more awareness raising about the topic. A number of women expressed the fact that men are taking out their frustration with their situation on the women of the household through anger and violence.

Participants remarked that it is the poorer and more isolated areas that have been most affected with the effects of the political violence of the conflict. Refugee camps and villages have been particularly hard hit by Israeli attacks and invasions, and villages suffer frequent incursions. The second Intifada has not been a popular uprising; Palestinian participants in the conflict have largely come from the poorer segment of the population who have suffered economically and not necessarily benefited from the coming of the PA. Members of the Palestinian security forces, like most modern armies today, often come from poorer backgrounds with their work providing important income and benefits for their families. Many supporters of extremist groups are also partially drawn by the social services these groups offer. People with less to lose, are willing to take greater risks, and Palestinian ‘martyrs’ or ‘suicide bombers’ often come from marginalized areas. Israel’s measures of collective punishment including closures, curfews and incursions, often target these areas and their illegal policy of demolishing the homes of such activists has devastated the lives of many families who were already suffering from poverty.

Of other social problems catalyzed by poverty, informants discussed fears of theft, gambling and drug addiction. The lure of drugs as an escape and potential income worried many participants. Some mentioned fear of the growth of other crimes such as murder, and many acknowledged the increased number of those working as collaborators with Israeli intelligence services and drew a direct relationship agreeing that “poverty creates collaborators”. Participants specified that the youth are particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon, especially those who have dropped out of school and have few prospects as they are offered permission to work in Israel in exchange for information.

With poverty, health deteriorates. Many people eliminate routine medical care or that which is perceived as not critical such as dental and gynecological care. People rely upon traditional remedies when they are unable to afford institutional health care. This coupled with poor nutrition and living conditions makes the poor more vulnerable. When household utilities are cut off, poor food preservation and access to potable water also challenge the health status of the poor. The poor seek medical treatment only when their condition is or has reached a stage deemed sufficiently serious, which also often makes care more expensive and complicated. Using public hospitals with the cheapest government insurance, informants in the West Bank said, did not necessarily result in adequate care as hospitals are often overcrowded and unclean.

Most focus group participants agreed that poverty affects men and women differently. Many women said it affects women more than men as “women really suffer when they stay in the house and look at the children and can do nothing to make their lives better while husbands leave the house”, however some women pointed out that men suffer more because they are ultimately responsible for supporting the family. Participants noted that men and women differ in the way they handle poverty at home. Participants emphasized the psychological effects of the strain of poverty upon family members. Women described they could not finish anything or do anything well. They cannot relax because they feel they are not responding to the needs of the family. As one women south of Hebron said, “Children want things. All children go to their mothers to ask for money or things that they
want. They know their mother is the way to their father. They don’t approach the father. The mother is responsible for giving the children money and taking care of the house. I cannot be comfortable when I can’t give them what they need.” Women repeatedly emphasized they were responsible for feeding the family on whatever they were provided with by their husbands and if their husbands were not able to do so, they had to find solutions on their own to keep the household together. Many women have been left as female heads of households through the death, injury or imprisonment of their husbands, and a number of women added the loss of husbands or fathers to debilitating depression when they cannot find what they consider appropriate employment. Whether male heads of household are physically present or not, if they cannot provide for their families, it is women who must cope with the needs of the household in a society that imposes numerous social restrictions upon them.

4.4. Coping mechanisms

Temporary coping measures implemented by families during the initial stages of the Al Aqsa Intifada and documented in a 2001 study, proved unsustainable as the conflict continued. Measures used included decreasing consumption, utilizing credit, relying on aid and selling assets.\(^{198}\) Decreasing consumption reached such levels that in the following year malnutrition was present in 22 per cent of children according to UNRWA officials\(^ {199}\) and more recently in 2004, 70 per cent of new mothers tested were found to be anemic.\(^ {200}\) Shopkeepers (the vast majority of small creditors) have long since ceased to issue credit to many customers because they have little hope of being repaid, and aid, which in many cases was intended to supplement people’s diets and living, has become a staple for many. Personal assets have been sold and relatives have been depended upon for financial assistance and support. In addition to the unsustainability of many coping mechanisms, many coping strategies employed by families place additional burdens upon women.

As the Al Aqsa Intifada was not popular, coping mechanisms in terms of basic needs are quite traditional and largely confined to households or families rather than taking the form of collective efforts. While there were some community efforts at popular education when schools were closed and curfews imposed, there was little evidence of any of the spontaneous local organizing of food rationing and distribution that occurred during the first Intifada. This was also due to the Israeli occupation strategies of strict closures and curfews further isolating Palestinians from one another and caused blanket economic concerns.

\(^{198}\) FAFO, Paying a Price: Coping with Closure in Jericho, Gaza City, and in Two Palestinian Villages. UNSCO, 2001.


Women participating in focus groups were asked to order the coping mechanisms they have employed or would employ. These rankings differed from area to area, and each group defined their terms slightly differently. The differences are interesting as indicative of variation only, as the sample size was not significant enough to build any generalizations. The main livelihood strategies employed mentioned in the focus groups besides income generation projects are listed below and not ordered:

- Eliminating luxury or costly goods (buying only the cheapest goods and not buying new clothing) and reducing consumption to basic needs;
- cutting down or eliminating meat and fruit from the diet;
- growing own fruits and vegetables or raising animals;
- going into debt;
- using wood instead of gas or electricity for cooking;
- disconnecting the telephone and utilities;
- taking children out of school;
- withdrawing children from universities (especially females);
- children made to work;
- relying on charity and aid;
- selling of jewellery and assets;
- cutting of social visits;
- trying to find a job.

The differences in coping mechanisms mentioned between the WBGS points to the fact that there is higher poverty in Gaza and the population, being largely refugee, is more vulnerable and more coping mechanisms have already been exhausted. These results were not read as fundamental differences between the regions but rather as temporal differences in the stages of economic decline.

Most participants said when faced with economic hardship, they began by eliminating luxury or costly goods (buying only the cheapest goods and not buying new clothing) and reducing consumption to basic needs. Women said they bought second-hand clothes, used goods, or simply did without. They walked to save transportation money or simply did not travel. Families forewent doctors’ visits, which were replaced with consulting pharmacist, traditional healers and using the services of local midwives. Food was prioritized over even curative medical care as one woman said, “Pain is nothing next to hunger”. Women said they avoided social occasions such as weddings and engagements to save costs of presents and did not pay visits or invite guests to save costs of hospitality. Women described saving money in the kitchen by buying the cheapest quality of foodstuffs and reduced meals to simple ingredients. As poverty became more severe, women cut down or eliminated meat and fruit from their families’ diet. Women said they ate meat or chicken as unfrequently as once every two months and one woman said she had been unable to give her children fruit in over half a year. Rice, bread, oil, and lentils comprised the basis of the diets of many.

201 The prioritization varied remarkably. For example, in one location in Gaza women ranked taking children out of school as the first coping mechanism they would employ while in another location, also in the Gaza Strip they ranked it fourth. In some of the West Bank workshop, women could not agree on the order of the rankings and simply insisted that their rankings be listed individually.
Growing fruits and vegetables and raising animals: In all areas women agreed that “no one owns land that they do not use” in the face of financial hardship. But even small agricultural projects, whether for subsistence or for profit, pose problems. Women cited the high cost of fertilizers and equipment, seeds and plants. Other women noted high veterinary costs and lack of knowledge to maximize production while another interviewee involved in bee-keeping specified she cannot afford the medicine to treat recent illnesses among bees that are killing out her hives. Women living in refugee camps noted that though some people attempt to raise animals in the camps to supplement their diets, crowded conditions are unsanitary for both the animals and the residents. Only a few of the refugee camp residents said they had attempted to plant vegetables in or around their homes, but in the West Bank some participants stated they gathered wild herbs to sell in the market when it was safe to go to nearby open areas.

Most poor families are in debt to home utility companies as well as local shops for credit on goods received. Families try to economize on the use of electrical equipment and light to save money. Telephone lines are disconnected when people cannot pay bills (further cutting them off from social relations) and an increasing number of households are living without electricity altogether. Some houses have also discontinued piped water, though municipalities have tried to accommodate for people’s hardship. Palestinians are reverting to the use of rainwater cisterns and wells, communal taps, or buying water at a greater expense. Instead of relying on gas canisters or electric ovens for cooking, women are turning to firewood that they gather themselves. For food, families are buying on credit from local stores. Because of local social relations, these are often the debts that they try to repay first.

As discussed above, families have taken children out of school or university to save on fees, and many are obliged to work. While girls are mainly kept at home to aid in housework and support other family members who work outside the home, boys are sent out to work or work in family businesses replacing paid employees to save expenses. One woman said, “If a child can earn ten shekels [2.2 US$] per day, sometimes I can say it is worth taking him out of school for that. It is money and we need it”. One woman said that some children are taken out of school to beg.

When families sell assets, they are usually most reluctant to sell their land or the jewellery belonging to the woman as part of her wedding, but with extended poverty, these assets are being sold and families are left without anything to fall back upon. When a woman marries, her husband’s family gives her an agreed upon amount of gold and jewellery. This gold is hers to dispose of as she sees fit. It is often carefully saved (and often worn so it is portable in case of crises) and only spent under extreme duress or to invest in family endeavours such as in a business or a home, or the higher education of her children. The loss of this gold to cover basic needs takes away a woman’s individual economic safety net and leaves her to rely on the shared assets of the family.

All women interviewed for this study expressed the desire to work if jobs suited their schedule and capacities, if it was socially acceptable in their communities and if they could find suitable and affordable or free child care. The large number of children in most families prevented women from pursuing work inside or outside the home. Many women in the focus groups had attempted income generation projects, but not all were met with success. About half of the women who said they had attempted to start an income generation project said they enjoyed some success. Women noted that the successful income generation projects helped to cover the costs of the household’s basic needs, but a number of women noted that their projects were only successful for a short-lived period and then failed. The main reasons for

---

202 It would be impossible to gauge from the data collected, a representative proportion of women who had received assistance from organizations in the setting up of their businesses due to the nature of the sampling implemented for this study.
failure of such projects were: the current economic situation, the lack of capacity in designing and running projects, the socio-cultural context which does not easily support women running their own business and the lack of capital as well as technical expertise. Because of accumulated debts over the four and a half years of conflict, women complained that when starting businesses their expenses were so much higher than their income that they could not sustain them. Other reasons mentioned by the women included the inability to compete in the market and the fact that since all communities are affected by the economic decline, the demand for many goods has also declined. With a huge and growing poor and unemployed population, women noted even the decline for poultry and other food items they produce. In the market Israeli food products often undercut Palestinian ones and are of higher quality. One woman also noted that she had approximately 2,000 olive trees destroyed by the Israeli forces making her unable to continue with her business.

If women want to work, it is difficult for them to leave their homes. One woman said, “I think of working, but where can I put nine children while I am out of the house?” Another said she took a series of First Aid courses and had the opportunity to be a trainer with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, but could not with small children at home. Other women said that even if they could leave the house there were few job opportunities within their communities and there are social pressures for women not to work too far away from the home or in places which are not locally familiar. Many women wish to work in a local (women’s) organization or out of their own homes.

The participants who had income generation projects who did receive support lauded the organizations such as UNRWA, Asala, and Faten for providing a source of credit without requiring sponsors, and treating beneficiaries in a respectful manner. These women did, however, criticize these organizations for not allowing a significant grace period after receiving the loan, charging high interest rates and not being understanding when projects failed. There was a perception among these women that the organizations do not really help the destitute, but assist in creating a new source of income for families that already have some resources, disqualifying poor families with no other source of income. Support from other sources came from relatives, friends and donations of supplies such as trees from the Ministry of Agriculture.

A small number of women participants in the focus groups in the West Bank had been part of a job creation program. In Nablus two women had been employed in UNRWA’s emergency job creation programme to work in local community centers. From the information gathered it appeared however that their positions were not necessarily newly created but that the funding for their positions had been transferred to this programme as their contracts were being extended. When women were asked what their suggestions were for projects to help them financially through job creation or income generation project they offered the following ideas:

- teach women how to start projects;
- training in both technical and business skills to support their projects;
- teach women how to market their products effectively;
- assist women with low or no-interest loans;
- assist women with obtaining raw materials at lower prices.
5. Recommendations

To combat Palestinian poverty and women’s vulnerabilities while supporting women, their households and their efforts to cope economically, we propose the following:

**Strengthening women’s participation**

- Create opportunities for women to work collectively to identify their needs and come up with innovative solutions while providing a support network for each other;
- develop strategies to increase female participation in the labour force without increasing their burden of responsibility. To create enabling environments for women’s work, which would entail efforts to change social and cultural attitudes, as well as insuring proper measures of social protection for women working whether in the informal, domestic, or formal sectors;
- develop strategies to increase women’s participation in local decision-making processes.

**Data monitoring**

- Encourage the collection and compilation of detailed qualitative data in order to promote profound understanding of the wide variety of circumstances and factors which increase the vulnerability and decrease security of women and their households across different demographic strata. In addition, to develop a sound and thorough understanding of the stages and types of coping mechanisms employed through regular tracking and documentation of qualitative indicators over time;
- develop and promote local poverty indicators while utilizing the momentum of and participating in global anti-poverty efforts. The international benchmark for poverty of 1.00 US$ per day is not appropriate for Palestinians, falling well below the necessary minimum;
- conduct further in-depth study to draw up frameworks for and characteristics of “appropriate”, possible and socially acceptable work opportunities; examples need to be offered. While much literature and many informants discuss the need for work opportunities and income generation projects for women that are socially acceptable, care also needs to be taken to discourage activities that inadvertently overburden women by further subjugating them to the needs of their families and few outline what forms this “appropriate” work could take. For example in the focus group in the village of Doura, south of Hebron, women were pleased with a funded sewing project that employed them to run up school uniforms in their local women’s centre. The project was close to home, gave them skills, provided income and was housed in a facility respected by the local community. In addition, the women welcomed the opportunity to work outside their homes and the social support they drew from each other and being associated with the centre;
- ensure local and international organizations play an active role in supporting and contributing to centralized data collection by national bodies (in the Palestinian case PCBS) to insure the availability of appropriate indicators and statistics for public use.

**Programme design and policy development**

- Encourage participatory approaches to programme design, implementation and evaluation as well as policy development;
- develop appropriate strategies to combat women and vulnerable people’s social isolation in times of hardship;
- explore creative and innovative income generation project ideas as well as non-traditional markets for products, through review of examples from other parts of the world;
• make practical links between development and relief projects in order to make best use of local resources, support the local economy and find ways of developing models for increased self-sufficiency. The funded school uniform project mentioned in the previous point culminated with the uniforms being distributed to the poor in the community. Another project run by the UNDP in 2003 involved buying olive oil produced in the West Bank by villagers cut off from markets by Israeli closures and distributing it as part of food aid among recipients in other areas;
• create new and diverse local sources of income, as there is a correlation between decreased vulnerability and increased variety of income sources within localities;
• foster community organization to advocate for appropriate policies and programmes developed according to local priorities;
• work with the poor and economically vulnerable to develop and adapt coping strategies to minimize harm in the short or long terms. Examples of this would be, for example, to raise awareness about balanced nutrition for people of all ages and nutritional priorities and alternatives for those who have to reduce or minimize consumption;
• encourage self-sufficiency in the household as well as at community and national levels. Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power have not been explored. Sustainable livelihoods should be encouraged where possible to combat the problems related with isolation and access;
• ensure thorough assessments of beneficiaries in any programs to ascertain the appropriateness of their participation. For example, in a review of micro-finance in three locations including WBGS, it was noted that micro-finance programmes “have been established to help poor entrepreneurs” (World Bank 2003, p. 2) but the failure of many Palestinian projects is due to lack of capacity, knowledge, or experience of participants and possible inadequate training or support. Micro finance is only a successful response to poverty when instituted by people capable of implementing it;
• develop systems of low interest loans for the poor and vulnerable accompanied with training and coaching.

**Inter-agency cooperation**

• To develop a set of national Palestinian indicators for poverty and vulnerability to insure appropriate coverage and targeting in relief and development projects by local and international actors;
• encourage the development of a unified vision of poverty alleviation and cooperation among all organizations involved in the issue to minimize duplication, increase effectiveness, and share lessons learned. Too many local as well as international organizations work in isolation and competition with other organizations in their fields. This is heightened by the competition for funding, the financial insecurity of local agencies and organizations because of the predominance of programme and project as opposed to core funding, and the phenomenon of organizations being forced to work outside their specialties and mandates as a result.
Annexes

1. Bibliography


Johnson, P.; Sara, Y.; Abu Ramadan, M.; Al Mughrabi, A.; Suleiman, J.: “Socio-economic needs, challenges and priorities of the Palestinian refugees”. (Ramallah, Palestine, Bisan Center for Research and Development in cooperation with UNRWA, April, 2004).


2. **Focus group questions and instructions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ILO FOCUS GROUPS 2005</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOCUS GROUP COMPOSITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups should be composed of 8-12 women of all ages (18+) who are poor. Approximately one quarter of the women participants in the focus groups should be between 18 and 24 years of age and one quarter of the women should be heads of households. <strong>At least</strong> one quarter of the women involved in the focus groups should have had some experience with household economy projects, micro finance, or small businesses whether initiated individually or in conjunction with an organized program. The main criterion for the women is that they are suffering economically either from direct or indirect affects of the current conflict.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FOCUS GROUP CHECKLIST</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time and place confirmed. Local contact confirmed with contact information. Participants confirmed Venue Refreshments Tape recorder Tapes Batteries Attendance form Questions and report format</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Remember to save all receipts from the refreshments, transportation and other expenses and return them to the coordinator at Bisan.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FOCUS GROUP INTRODUCTION</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The focus groups should begin with an introduction that should resemble the template offered here below:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>My name is ___________ and I am working with Bisan Center for Research and Development, a local Palestinian organization based in Ramallah. We are working on a project with the International Labour Organization, (ILO) which is a UN agency. The purpose of this project is to see how to help women living under conflict. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss aspects of the situation here in Palestine to inform the ILO on how they can best design programs for women in Palestine and other conflicted areas in the Arab World for the future. The results of this session will be compiled into a report that Bisan is writing about seven such sessions being held in the West Bank and Gaza. By participating in this group you are helping women all over the region. We are working to make sure that assistance and funding from abroad suits the needs and priorities of Palestinians as defined by Palestinians rather than by outsiders. We thank you for your time and participation. The session should take about two to two and a half hours. At the end of the session we would like to interview one participant for an additional 30 minutes if possible. We will choose that person together at the end of the group. I don’t want to take too much of your time so let’s begin.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In addition, assure participants of the following:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Their names will not be recorded by Bisan staff; neither will their comments be linked with their names. Participants should be asked to keep their comments as close to their own experience and knowledge as possible, and that honesty and accuracy is important. Emphasize that you might be talking about some sensitive and personal subjects and that nothing said in the room will during</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the focus group should be discussed publicly afterwards to protect everyone’s privacy. Ask everyone to be respectful of each other’s privacy, problems, and differences of opinion. If anyone has any questions or concerns about this during the meeting they should raise them, and after the meeting they should contact Bisan. Try to create a comfortable, informal, yet professional atmosphere. The session will be audio taped in case Bisan staff needs to review the session to make any clarifications over the results. Insure that no one has objections to audio taping the sessions. If there are strong objections, insure that there is a professional observer to take complete notes of the session.

PARTICIPANT INTRODUCTION

Ask participants to introduce themselves and as they do elicit and note the information needed for the report cover format sheet. Introduce yourself as the facilitator telling them a bit about yourself. Try not to give any information that will make them feel uncomfortable or emphasize social or economic differences between you and the participants. Remember you can give lots of information that is not so relevant but that can help to break the ice or appear funny. (e.g. My name is X. I am married, have three children, and like spinach… etc.). The basic information you will need to collect about each participant is their name, age, sex, marital status, where they live (area), number of children, number of household members, and occupation. Any other information that seems pertinent about their socio-economic status should also be noted. When everyone has been introduced, start the discussion.

FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is poverty? How can you tell that someone is poor? What are the effects of poverty on you? Your family? Your social relations? Other?

2. What have you or people you know done to cut back on expenses in the face of lower or loss of income? Can you try to rank these in the order that you took these actions over time as your income decreased?

3. Have you or your family members done anything to attempt to generate income in new ways for your family? How have these attempts been successful? What made them successful? How have these attempts not been successful?

4. For those of you who have attempted to develop income generating projects, have you or any of your family members been assisted by any organizations in your efforts? What organizations? How were these organizations helpful? How were they not? How could such organizations be more helpful in the future? Did you receive any other assistance? From whom did you receive assistance?

5. Do you think there are any differences in the way that women and men experience poverty in Palestine?

6. Do you think there are differences in the way the Al Aqsa Intifada affected women and the way the Al Aqsa Intifada has affected men?

At the end of the focus group session, you will select one person to discuss in depth their experience, life situation and their coping mechanisms. It is preferable that this person is someone who has experience in starting an income generation project. The interview should focus on the challenges and successes of that income generation project and how that income assists the...
household, what the money earned is used for and what exactly the roles of women in the household are in this project. The testimony should be written as told - in the first person.

**FOCUS GROUP REPORT FORMAT**

1. What is poverty? How can you tell that someone is poor? What are the effects of poverty on you? Your family? Your social relations? Other?

   **Definitions of Poverty:**

   **Indicators of Poverty:**

   **Effects of Poverty on Participants:**

   **Other Comments:**

2. What have you or people you know done to cut back on expenses in the face of lower or loss of income? Can you try to rank these in the order that you took these actions over time as your income decreased?

   **Coping Mechanisms that Restrict Expenditures:**

   **Ranking of Such Coping Mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Mechanism Used</th>
<th>Second Mechanism Used</th>
<th>Third Mechanism Used</th>
<th>Fourth Mechanism Used</th>
<th>Fifth Mechanism Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Mechanism Used</td>
<td>Seventh Mechanism Used</td>
<td>Eighth Mechanism Used</td>
<td>Ninth Mechanism Used</td>
<td>Tenth Mechanism Used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **Other mechanisms:**

3. Have you or your family members done anything to attempt to generate income in new ways for your family? How have these attempts been successful? What made them successful? How have these attempts not been successful?
How many people say they or their family members have attempted income generation projects: __________

How many people say that these attempts have been successful: ______

How have they been successful:

How have they not been successful:

4. For those of you who have attempted to develop income generating projects, have you or any of your family members been assisted by any organizations in your efforts? What organizations? How were these organizations helpful? How were they not? How could such organizations be more helpful in the future? Did you receive any other assistance? From whom did you receive assistance?

How many participants/families of participants who have developed income generation projects have been assisted by an organization:________

What organizations were these:

How were these organizations helpful:

How were these organizations not helpful:

How could these organizations improve their services:

How many participants/families of participants received assistance from other bodies in their income generation projects:_______

What were these other bodies:

5. Do you think there are any differences in the way that women and men experience poverty in Palestine?

How many participants though there are differences in the way that men and women experience poverty:________

What are the ways in which the experience of poverty is different:

6. Do you think there are differences in the way the Al Aqsa Intifada affected women and the way the Al Aqsa Intifada has affected men?

How many participants though there are differences in the way that men and women have been affected by the Intifada:________

What are the ways in which the effects are different:
Please include in your report a section about general comments about the session and the participants and their attitudes, any problems and how they were dealt with, and any suggestions for future session.

**Interview:**

**Participant Description:**
Age, Sex, Occupation, Marital Status, Residence, Number of Children, Number of Household Members, Type of Residence, Monthly Income, Monthly Expenditures (both of household), Sources of Income.

**Testimony:**
3. **Overview of recent programs and providers in poverty alleviation**

Numerous efforts for poverty alleviation are being implemented in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations. Many of these organizations play more than one role in a complex network of partners, funders/donors, implementing agencies, and consulting organizations. Poverty alleviation efforts themselves are varied and encompass direct humanitarian assistance in the form of food, in kind, cash, housing, and medical assistance, as well as educational assistance, job creation, microfinance and micro-enterprise development. For the purposes of this paper, we are most concerned with job creation, microfinance and micro-enterprise development. While there are many unemployed and skilled Palestinians, job training is essential to many employment projects and is often coupled with or included in job creation and income generation programs.

UNRWA is the main donor for food aid, while trade unions are an important source of financial assistance; as of 2003 most job assistance was channeled through the Palestinian Authority (Bocco, 2003, p. 80). As of September 2002 there were approximately twenty-four organizations providing financial services for income generation and micro-enterprise. Female participation in and use of these services was highest in the organizations whose goals were poverty alleviation (Esim and Kuttab, 2002, p. 15). International organizations involved in micro-finance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip include CARE, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Save the Children, World Vision, and USAID. Locally two organizations play a major and specialized role in micro-finance: Palestine for Credit and Development (FATEN) and the Palestinian Businesswomen’s Association (ASALA). Some local organizations such as the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) and the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) offer programme components in job creation and microfinance, but are not singularly devoted to these activities and other organizations such as Bisan Center for Research and Development conduct microfinance activities in partnership with organizations that are specialized in the field. Charitable organizations, such as Reviving the Family (In’ash Al Usra) in Ramallah, play an important role on a more local and regional level in vocational education, job creation and income generation. Some organizations affiliated with political parties also implement micro-credit and job creation programs.

As an example of governmental agency assistance, the figures available show that USAID, one of the largest donors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, has created over 2.5 million person days of employment, in addition to providing women with micro-loans and attempting to strengthen the economy through assisting businesses with exports and marketing. Many of USAID’s job creation programs are linked with its development projects which have included renovating classrooms, as well as constructing and renovating community youth and education centers and vocational projects. USAID projects have partners such as Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), UNDP, ANERA, and Save the Children Federation (SCF).

---

203 It should be noted that there were no dates given for the time period for these projects.
UNRWA is one of the largest service providers to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Through its general operations, UNRWA employs a significant number of people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in its emergency job creation programs the agency has employed many more. In the agency’s 2004 mid-year review, it was reported that in the first half of the year, 431,067 job days were created to implement UNRWA programs, and an additional 99,348 job days were created through construction and maintenance needs. The jobs created both served the chronically poor and unskilled in addition to specialized professionals (UNRWA, 2004, 5.3). In 2002, the combined portfolio of UNRWA’s microfinance and micro-enterprise programs was nearly USD 70 million. In addition to these programs, UNRWA provides relief in the form of food, cash, housing, and medical assistance to refugees (UNRWA, n.d.). Besides UNRWA, other UN agencies, such as the ILO and UNDP, support income generation and job creation projects.

The table below outlines projects implemented by beneficiaries of the Palestinian NGO Project of the Welfare Association’s emergency program. While this table provides only small sample of job creation programs implemented in Palestine it offers an indicative glance at types of current programming, their budgets and the number of employment days generated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization name</th>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Project location</th>
<th>Grant amount (US$)</th>
<th>Person-days generated</th>
<th>Concrete outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG)</td>
<td>Creation of jobs in the area of rain cisterns</td>
<td>Beit Furik, Beit, Dajan, and Yatta villages</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>40 wells constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Working Women’s Society</td>
<td>Employment of Palestinian Women in Crisis</td>
<td>West Bank villages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>Production of 2,040 embroidery pieces (various)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC)</td>
<td>Productive Job Opportunities</td>
<td>Hebron, Bethlehem, and Ramallah</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>13,200 sq. meters of agricultural retaining walls in ten villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalandia Camp Handicraft Cooperative</td>
<td>Job Creation</td>
<td>Refugee camps and villages in the Central West Bank</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>embroidery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society of Ina’sh Al Usra</td>
<td>Embroidery Employment Generation Project</td>
<td>Ramallah villages</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>embroidery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Charitable Society – Jerusalem</td>
<td>Women and Handcrafts in the Current Situation</td>
<td>Villages and Refugee Camps in the West Bank</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>embroidery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Seera Club</td>
<td>Job Creation for Unemployed Workers in Agriculture</td>
<td>Beit Seera village</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>120 sq metre flat finished to be used as the only clinic in the village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Union of Palestinian Women</td>
<td>Job Creation</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>232 children treated for psychological stress, 42 severe cases referred to specialized clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Beit Alsamed</td>
<td>Income Generation Sewing Workshop</td>
<td>Gaza City</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>6,178 garment pieces produced. 3889 pieces distributed to poor children free of charge. The remaining garments were sold at cost price for a total of 6,119.00 US$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Amal Rehabilitation Society – Rafah</td>
<td>Job Creation</td>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>4,626</td>
<td>1,000 poor families received vegetable packages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Cultural Center – Jabaliya Camp</td>
<td>Production of Traditional Palestinian Textiles</td>
<td>Jabaliya Refugee Camp (Gaza)</td>
<td>19,532</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>various textiles produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian General Union of NGOs</td>
<td>Job Creation for Unemployed Workers</td>
<td>Northern Gaza</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>44 groves were cleared of grass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Cooperative</td>
<td>Job Creation for Unemployed Workers in Agriculture</td>
<td>Beit Hanoun</td>
<td>9,818</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>Farms and public spaces benefited from clearing and cleaning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.pngo-project.org/programs/worldbankemergency.html
Territorial development, vulnerability reduction and community-reconciliation: A case study of Local Economic Development (LED) projects in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia)

Slavica Singer

September 2005
Acknowledgements

Our acknowledgments are owed to Ms. Mirela Glavas, of the Croatian Employment Office Branch office in Vukovar, who provided valuable information on regional unemployment; Mr. Zvonimir Cordasic, the director of the Entrepreneurship Centre in charge of handling the Local Economic Development programme in Vukovar-Sirmium County and provided useful information on the programme and further precious comments and Mr. Boris Lauc, the director of the Centre for Entrepreneurship which was in charge of handling this programme in Osijek-Baranya County provided useful information on the programme, and his comments on this study endeavour.

Mr. Ljubomir Mikic, president of the Centre for Peace in Vukovar has also contributed invaluable information and insights on programmes, activities and issues related to reconciliation in multi-ethnic communities of eastern Slavonia.

Special thanks go to Boris Lauc, MSc. director of Osijek’s Centre for Entrepreneurship and Nevenka Pulfer, graduate student from the J.J. Strossmayer University in Osijek, who assisted the author in developing the statistical data sets for this study.
Table of contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................216
List of acronyms ..............................................................................................................217
Executive summary........................................................................................................220
1. Introduction ..............................................................................................................221
2. Profile of Croatia and Eastern Slavonia .................................................................224
  2.1. Historical perspective of eastern Croatia .........................................................226
  2.2. Regional demographic environment ..............................................................227
  2.3. Regional social environment assessment .......................................................227
  2.4. Economic environment assessment ..................................................................228
3. Local economic development and reconciliation processes – how, where and when they meet? ..................................................................................................................231
  3.1. War is our reality. What now? .........................................................................231
  3.2. Reconciliation? Yes, but how without jobs? .....................................................232
  3.3. How: Loans instead of aid, but is it enough? ....................................................233
  3.4. Who: New actors are needed ..........................................................................235
  3.5. Local economic development programs, but which region has a priority? ......236
  3.6. Transition from aid to local economic development programs - when? ..........237
  3.7. Have LED and reconciliation processes met? ....................................................237
4. Recommendations ....................................................................................................239
Annexes.........................................................................................................................241

List of tables

Table 1: Population by age and gender .........................................................................243
Table 2: Population by ethnicity (%) ............................................................................244
Table 3: Population contingents ...................................................................................245
Table 4: Population aged 15 and over, by educational attainment (%) .........................246
Table 5: Population aged 10 years and over and illiterate persons by age .....................247
Table 6: Population by activity and gender ....................................................................248
Table 7: Agricultural population by activity ...................................................................249
Table 8: Persons in employment, by income sources and gender (%) ............................250
Table 9: Economically-active vs. economically-inactive population, by gender ............251
Table 10: Structure of economically-active population, by gender ..............................252
Table 11: Structure of economically-inactive population, by gender ............................253
Table 12: The employed, by gender ..............................................................................254
Table 13: The unemployed, by gender and age ................................................................. 255
Table 14: Job-seekers, by gender ................................................................................... 256
Table 15: First job-seekers, by gender and age ............................................................... 257
Table 16: New job-seekers, by gender and age ............................................................... 258
Table 17: Population, by type of working mode ............................................................. 259
Table 18: Unemployed persons, by educational attainment and gender, (31 December 2004, Vukovar-Sirmium County) ............................................................................. 260
Table 19: The unemployed in Vukovar-Sirmium County, by duration of unemployment, (31 December 2004) ........................................................................................................... 261
Table 20: The unemployed, by age, 1997-2004 (Vukovar-Sirmium County) .................... 262
Table 21: Number of persons who found a job through the Croatian Employment Agency (Vukovar office) ........................................................................................................... 263
Table 22: GDP per capita, all counties (US$) .................................................................. 264
Map 2: Mine suspected areas in Croatia ....................................................................... 265
Map 3: Mine suspected areas in Vukovar-Sirmium County ........................................... 266
### List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEA</td>
<td>Total Entrepreneurial Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Intellectual Capital Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small to Medium-sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRI</td>
<td>European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

This study has been developed in the framework of the research programme led by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva on “Strengthening employment and related socio-economic dimensions in response to crises.” It is a case-study of Local Economic Development (LED) projects’ ability to address the challenges of war-affected communities.

This study reviews the demographic, social and economic environment of LED projects in eastern Slavonia (more specifically in Vukovar-Sirmium County), based on a desk survey of existing knowledge and data sources. It also looks at the linkages between reconciliation projects in war-affected communities and LED efforts, based on two UNDP\textsuperscript{204}/UNOPS\textsuperscript{205}/ILO-led projects in the area. Key analytical outcomes, formulated as nine lessons learnt, and six key recommendations, are identified. These outcomes can be summarized as the absence of a tangible connection between LED programmes and community-reconciliation processes in the region: these two processes have been following parallel courses. It is found that LED projects in this war-affected area of Croatia have focused on financial schemes and technical assistance components geared toward developing networks of local economic stakeholders and particularly entrepreneurs. Such an effort has proved to be extremely valuable in the economic recovery and development of the territory. Yet this remains insufficient in post-conflict contexts, where community reconciliation is an essential element of sustainable development, as demonstrated in the case of the Vukovar-Sirmium county.

Based on such findings, six key recommendations are provided to strengthen the complementarity and mutual positive externalities of LED and community-reconciliation processes in post-conflict territories.

\textsuperscript{204} United Nations Development Programme
\textsuperscript{205} United Nations Office for Project Services
1. Introduction

As a case-study of LED projects’ ability to address the challenges of war-affected communities, this study has aimed at providing an assessment of the socio-economic environment of the LED projects, based on a desk survey of existing knowledge/data sources, and to identify the linkage between LED efforts (mainly based on UNDP, UNOPS and ILO-led projects in the area), vulnerability reduction and reconciliation in war-affected Vukovar-Sirmium County.

Key definitions and methodology

Vulnerable populations are defined in this study as groups of individuals and communities faced with the loss of livelihoods and/or social exclusion and particularly as a result of conflict.

Croatia is divided into counties (zupanija); eastern Slavonia is a geographical notion which may be referred administratively to two counties, Osijek-Baranya and Vukovar-Sirmium, as well as to part of Brodsko-posavska County. LED projects were implemented in the two counties of Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranya. This study focuses principally on the Vukovar-Sirmium county, albeit projects in Osijek-Baranya county are also considered, to provide a consideration of the parallel course of economic development at local level and the reconciliation of antagonized communities and groups of population following the 1991-1995 Balkan war.

This study is mainly based on a desk research of existing statistics (analysis of statistical data on Croatia and Vukovar-Sirmium county), documentation regarding LED projects implemented in Vukovar-Sirmium county and official documentation regarding development strategies and concrete activities in this respect for Vukovar-Sirmium county. The research has also relied on interviews with key local officials involved in the implementation of LED and community-reconciliation programmes in the county.

The analytical steps implemented in this research can be described as:

- mapping organizations/institutions involved in LED projects in Vukovar-Sirmium county and in the reconciliation process of vulnerable communities;
- reviewing and collecting public sources of information, such as web pages of organizations involved in the LED process in Vukovar-Sirmium county and community-reconciliation processes;
- contacting relevant organizations/institutions to assess availability of additional documentation, especially regarding concrete experiences on LED and community-reconciliation;
- holding meetings with selected organizations (Entrepreneurship Centre of Vukovar-Sirmium county in Vinkovci, Centre for Entrepreneurship in Osijek, Centre for Peace in Vukovar) in order to collect additional documentation and conducting interviews with officials and personnel involved in LED projects and reconciliation processes;
- analysing collected statistical data, documentation and minutes of interviews.
The informational framework of the survey

The informational framework of the survey is represented by the desk survey of public sources, first-hand data, acquired field experiences and information obtained through pertinent literature, mostly foreign sources.

This desk survey investigated the following seven sources of information:

- statistical data sets on unemployment specially designed for the purpose of this survey by the Croatian Employment Agency branch office in Vukovar (compiled in Tables 18 to 21, Annex 2);
- reports and studies from Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranya counties, as presented in Annex 1, were used for emphasizing obstacles and opportunities in regional development processes. Reports on the reconstruction of dwellings in Vukovar-Sirmium county, from 1998 to 2004, were used to assess the process of implementing donor-funded and national programmes to revitalize Vukovar-Sirmium county;
- various reports, from different international institutions and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), (cf. Annex 1), were used to define the broader context in assessing vulnerability-reduction and reconciliation at community level in eastern Slavonia;
- interviews with several individuals from Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranya counties, to further guide the research process and provide first-hand information on implementation of concrete projects for LED and community-reconciliation;
- a survey of relevant literature (cf. Annex 1).

The most reliable statistical data for the purpose of this study are those obtained through censuses, as well as statistical data obtained from the Croatian Employment Agency. Changes in the Croatian political and economic system have produced problems of continuity in data sets as territorial and methodological definitions have been modified. The territorial organization of counties and municipalities was changed in 1992 and the structure of the collected information was modified with the 2001 census. Therefore, some statistical data from the 1971 and 1981 censuses had to be re-constructed, using territorial sub-units such as municipalities to fit into the day’s territorial definition of Vukovar-Sirmium county. The 40-year time span and changes in political and economic systems required a careful analysis of definitions for each category of data, in order to make their comparison possible. These modifications in the methodology and territorial coverage of official statistics explain the different time brackets and varying indicators within them for the provided series of data (cf. Annex 2): 

- the demographic environment (ethnicity, age) is assessed in the 1971 to 2001 period using data provided by censuses conducted in 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 (cf. Tables 1 to 3, Annex 2);
- the social environment has only been considered with respect to the structure of population by educational attainment and illiteracy, due to the unavailability of other social indicators. This series is assessed for the same 1971 to 2001 period, using data from the same censuses (cf. Tables 4 to 5, Annex 2);
- the economic environment is assessed referring to data on the economically-active population and the population by activity and gender (cf. Tables 6, 7 and 9, Annex 2). Those tables cover the 1971 to 2001 period and provide a comparison between Croatia and Vukovar-Sirmium county. The structure of the economically-inactive
population at county level is available only for 2001 (cf. Table 11, Annex 2). Due to the change of structure of collected information in the 2001 census, in Tables 8, 10 and 12 to 17, more detailed data on the economically-active population is available for that same year (employed, unemployed, job-seekers). Tables 18 to 21 present in more detail the unemployment situation in Vukovar-Sirmium county, by educational attainment, age, duration of unemployment and gender. Table 22 presents the rank of Croatian counties according to the GDP/capita, in 2001/2003.

Interviews conducted in June 2005 with Mr. Zvonimir Cordasic and Mr. Boris Lauc were focused on economic aspects of this process and the interview with Mr. Ljubomir Mikic, representing the Centre for Peace in Vukovar, concentrated on the reconciliation aspect of this process, providing substantial insights to this research.

Literature focusing on the linkage between LED and reconciliation among vulnerable populations in eastern Slavonia does not exist, and the desk survey has therefore focused on the role of local/regional economic development in closing the gap between more and less developed regions in Croatia.  

Surprisingly, there is neither an extensive literature on the role of local economic development in Croatia nor empirical data, despite disturbing signals of a widening gap between Zagreb, the capital, and some other regions, especially the most war-affected regions. Recently, in its “55 Policy recommendations for raising Croatia’s competitiveness” (2004), the Croatian National Competitiveness Council addressed the issue of regional development imbalances as a danger for national cohesion. This may be interpreted as an encouraging signal that professional and public sensitivity on this issue is replacing present highly politicized approach or complete neglect of the issue.

---

206 Surprisingly, there is neither an extensive literature on the role of local economic development in Croatia nor empirical data, despite disturbing signals of a widening gap between Zagreb, the capital, and some other regions, especially the most war-affected regions. Recently, in its “55 Policy recommendations for raising Croatia’s competitiveness” (2004), the Croatian National Competitiveness Council addressed the issue of regional development imbalances as a danger for national cohesion. This may be interpreted as an encouraging signal that professional and public sensitivity on this issue is replacing present highly politicized approach or complete neglect of the issue.
2. **A profile of eastern Slavonia**

Croatia is a modest-size country of 56,610 Km² with 4.3 million people, but with long mainland borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy (2028 km), as well as 930 km of coastline. Croatia is administratively structured into 20 counties, comprising 122 towns and 416 municipalities; the capital, Zagreb, is regarded as a separate entity.

Vukovar-Sirmium county, as seen in Map 1 below, is the easternmost Croatian county, located between the rivers Danube and Sava (acting as natural borders with Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina, respectively), and neighbouring two other Croatian counties (i.e. Osijek-Baranya and Brodsko-posavska).

For the purpose of profiling eastern Slavonia as a region where surveyed LED projects were implemented, four dimensions (historical perspective, demographical environment, social environment and economic environment) were analysed, and wherever it was possible, relative comparisons were provided between Croatia and Vukovar-Sirmium county. The collected raw data compiled in Annex 2 is synthesized and analysed in this section to provide a profile of Croatia and eastern Slavonia.

---

Croatia emerged from the disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia, declaring its independence on 8 October, 1991. In the period between 1991 and 2005, the political, social and economic landscape in Croatia was determined by three parallel transition processes:

- transition from a single-party to a pluralistic political system;
- transition from the economy being determined by social ownership and workers’ self-management\(^{208}\) to a market economy;
- transition from war to peace.

Those still-ongoing processes have strong influences on the quality of life in the country. Croatia today is burdened with numerous demographic (depopulation, aging), economic (high unemployment, low competitiveness, low entrepreneurial activity, high corruption) and political (Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and unprosecuted war crimes) problems. The pluralistic political system is turbulent: many small political parties are trying to get a foothold on the actual political scene. Similar political agendas (ethnic agendas are still an important dimension of their programs) and opportunistic coalitions among them are not contributing to establishing them in the political system but rather are making their constituencies confused and sceptical. A mismanaged and allegedly corrupt privatization process prevented a positive impact on the development cycle and has sharply increased unemployment. Transition from war to peace left many issues unresolved: the flow of returning refugees remains too slow, many war crimes have still not been tried and analysed and the demining process drags on with the possibility of lasting another 15 years. Eastern Slavonia remains among the most-heavily mined area in Croatia, as illustrated in Map 2 and Map 3 (cf. Annex 3).

Croatia has a long, deep-rooted tradition of regionalization, with dissimilar geographical, historical, ethnic and economic profiles. During most of its history Croatia was either fragmented into various kingdoms (Dalmatia, Slavonia), under foreign governance (Turkish period) or part of a much larger political entity (Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Croatia is a very recent independent State, established on 8 October 1991. The 1991/1995 war halted the processes of democratization and decentralization that today need to be supported. Strengthening politically and administratively the decentralization process appears to be an important leverage of regional social capital, greatly needed for implementing the principle of subsidiarity and building a country capable of using all its resources in the process of making itself globally competitive and internally reconciled after the 1991/1995 war.

\(^{208}\) Social ownership and workers’ self management were two basic distinctive features of the economy in Former Yugoslavia, comparing to State-controlled economies of other eastern European countries. This distinction is worthy to be noted, as it contributed to strong feelings among the majority of the employed population, (especially among the senior citizens), of being robbed by the privatization process. Interesting insights in scholars’ views of these topics can be found in Franicevic and Uvalic (2000) and Lynn, Mulej and Jurse (2002). After 15 years of corrupt privatization, confirmed by the latest report of privatization processes of the State Audit Office (2004), this became a controversial political issue. Parallel to open requests to revise the whole process of privatization, there are more and more examples of implementing the ESOP model, which is seen as a more appropriate privatization approach, especially in the framework of the Former Yugoslav experience with social ownership and workers’ self management economy.
2.1. Historical perspective of eastern Croatia

The Vukovar Sirmium is recorded to have been inhabited since neolithic times, witnessing the succession of the Roman and Ottoman empires; the Vukovar Sirmium county was later a constituent part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (until World War 2), and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (within the Republic of Croatia). Since 1991, the region has been part of the independent Republic of Croatia.

Eastern Croatia’s natural resources (fertile soil, abundance of water and dense forests), geographic (in particular the access to the river Danube) and geopolitical location (usually on outskirts of some political entity, bordering others) have contributed maintaining its diverse ethnic structure and cross-border networks built through mixed families and multi-ethnic economic activity.

Political tensions among diverse ethnic groups were hardly present during the period the region was part of a large political entity (i.e. Austro-Hungarian Empire). It was only since the re-sizing to a smaller scale (Yugoslavia) that ethnic issues gained ground and importance in the political agenda. Political interests rather than any rational or geographical delimitations prevailed in the definition of the politico-administrative borders of the region, extending them deep towards Belgrade. The turbulence of political interests and administrative changes in between 1918 and 1939 contributed to migrations and especially large immigration of Serbs. After World War II, the ethnic composition of the population changed again with a decrease in the German minority.

The definition of ethnicities belonging in the Former Yugoslavia produced significant psychological and political consequences during and after the 1991/1995 war. Tito’s Yugoslav definition of Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenians and Muslims (Croats and Serbs) as “constituent nationalities” implied that all those ethnic groups were considered as majority, regardless of their demographic relevance. The debate on ethnic belonging made its appearance on the political scene shortly after Tito’s death and the following disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Many Serbs argued that their new minority status was in itself discriminatory. Politicians in Serbia used these tensions for their aims. Political illiteracy regarding individual human rights and rights of minorities was effectively used by nationalistic Serbs but also Croat politicians in the escalation of tensions and violence in the early 1990s that led to the war, and many continued in the post-war era. Since the years that preceded the war the public opinion in Croatia has largely seen the rights of individuals and of minorities largely as externally-enforced concepts (by NGOs and international organizations), while the baseline rule remained "the majority rules", and that meant the ethnic majority.

209 If attitudes of local nationalistic politicians could be explained, it is difficult to explain why international institutions and experts, involved in issues of resolving the conflict between Serbs and Croats, did not pay enough attention to the fact that many people in that region were confused with the meanings of ethnicity and citizenship. For example, many people did not understand the difference of being ethnic Serb and political Croat, and that such affirmations are in no way contradictory.

210 In the recent survey of the process of opening of Croatian society (Open Society Institute, 2005, p.57) considerably greater importance was given to the relationship of the majority towards the minority and to the fairness of public communication related to that issue than to the issue of formal protection of rights, meaning that despite considerable improvements in the legal attitude towards protection of minority rights, this issue of majority versus minority is still one of the most important issues, not only in multi-ethnic communities in war-torn regions.
2.2. Demographic environment

In the 40-year time-span considered in this study (from 1971 to 2001), the principal demographic features in Vukovar-Sirmium county were the following:\textsuperscript{211}

- stagnating population;
- altered ethnic structure, with decreasing representation of minorities (from 30.44 to 18.55 per cent), especially Serbs (falling from 21.11 to 15.45 per cent);
- aging population, from 34 (average age) in 1971 to 39.30 in 2001 for Croatia, and from 31.5 to 37.8 for Vukovar-Sirmium county. Both indicators (aging index and aging coefficient)\textsuperscript{212} reveal that the population in Vukovar-Sirmium county was aging at a faster pace than in the rest of the country.

2.3. Social environment

The Croatian formal social safety net has changed dramatically over the the period considered for this study. At the times of the Former Yugoslavia, access to important aspects of social services such as education and health services was mostly free of charge. However, access to the the social security system remained selective and limited.

The transition to the market economy in the early 1990s brought along new concepts in the provision of social services, like participation in covering part of the costs of health services, or paying university fees, making life for vulnerable social groups even more difficult.

Although Vukovar-Sirmium county was considered as a developed county in pre-war Croatia, educational attainment indicators in particular revealed serious early signals of marginalization. The devastation and hardships linked with war further contributed to deepen the gap between national average educational attainment rates and Vukovar-Sirmium county indicators:

- in only primary level schooling has the county obtained more satisfactory results than Croatian averages, but it indicates that there is more population with the lowest educational attainment in Vukovar-Sirmium county than in Croatia;
- secondary level enrolment in Vukovar-Sirmium county is lower than the national average. The gap has recently started receding thanks to higher enrolment in vocational and skilled-unskilled workers institutions;
- tertiary level enrolment rates are considerably lower than national standards, although a recuperation had been remarked until 2001 when results widened once again.

\textsuperscript{211} Detailed structure of population by age, gender, ethnicity and population contingents between 1971 and 2001 is presented in Annex 2, Tables 1 to 3.

\textsuperscript{212} Aging index shows the relationship between the share (%) of population of 60 years and over to the share of population aged 0 to 19 years of age. Aging coefficient shows the relationship between the share (%) of population of 60 years and over to total population.
Though nationwide statistics reveal the number of illiterate people has decreased, illiteracy rates remained more significant in Vukovar-Sirmium county.\textsuperscript{213} Starting almost at the same relative level in 1971 (9 per cent of illiterate persons in Croatia compared to 9.8 in Vukovar-Sirmium county), in 2001 statistics showed 1.77 per cent in Croatia and 3.17 in Vukovar-Sirmium county. The share of population with no schooling is also quite similar: in 1971 18.55 per cent of the Croatian population did not have schooling, compared with 20.73 in Vukovar-Sirmium county, while in 2001 the respective data was 2.86 per cent in Croatia and 5.31 in Vukovar-Sirmium county).

Besides the right to basic education, another crucial element of formal social service provision is the access to basic health services. The health reform approved by the Croatian government in July 2000 outlined three objectives: to prolong life expectancy, to improve health-related quality of life and to reduce inequalities in health and access to health care. Unfortunately, we did not have any information as far as progress made toward these goals. Statistical data on the use of health care and other benefits from health insurance reveal positive improvements: the number of services in primary health care increased from 51.3 million in 1999 to 67.5 million in 2003, number of services in consultative specialist health care increased from 50.3 million in 1999 to 64.9 million in 2003, number of services in dental health care increased from 10.8 million in 1999 to 12.7 million in 2003, the number of insured persons also increased from 4.16 million in 1999 to 4.3 million in 2003;\textsuperscript{214} however the public perception is that costs have also risen.

2.4. Economic environment

There exists a long term trend of economic marginalization and recession in eastern Slavonia, deepened by the adverse effects of war on basic resources (population, social capital, natural resources, infrastructure and business activities). Our insight on regional economic trends was very limited due to the scarcity and poor methodological structure of social and economic indicators, while some indicators were not available at the local level.

The economic environment for both Osijek-Baranya and Vukovar-Sirmium counties has been assessed through selected indicators as compared with the national average and best county indicators. This assessment is based on most recent data available and years of measure are indicated for each indicator.

Both counties are well-endowed with natural resources (soil, water, forests, climate...), and before the war, these counties figured among the most developed in Croatia. However the economic development of both counties is lagging behind the Croatian average on many instances:

- higher unemployment (2001): 24.2 per cent in Osijek-Baranya county and 26.5 in Vukovar-Sirmium county, as compared to a national rate of 20.4 per cent, and 12.1 per cent for the Medjimurje county.
- Less participation in the labour market: 58 per cent rate of economically-inactive population in Osijek-Baranya county and 59.3 in Vukovar-Sirmium county (2001),

\textsuperscript{213} Detailed structure of population aged 10 and over and illiterate persons by age between 1971 and 2001 is presented in Annex 2, Table 5.
\textsuperscript{214} Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 558
as compared to a national rate of 56 per cent and 48 per cent for the Medjimurje county, 42 per cent rate of economically-active population in Osijek-Baranya county and 40.4 in Vukovar-Sirmium county (2001), as compared to a national average of 44 per cent and 52 per cent for the Medjimurje county.

- Lower index of using intellectual capital – measured by ICE index\textsuperscript{215} (2003): 2.08 in Osijek-Baranya county and 2.28 in Vukovar-Sirmium county, as compared to a national index of 2.44 and 2.80 for the Istrian county.

- Lower entrepreneurial activity – measured by the Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) index\textsuperscript{216} (2002): TEA index 1 for five eastern Croatian counties (Osijek-Baranya, Vukovar-Sirmium, Brodsko-posavska, Pozesko-slavonska, Viroviticko-podravska), as compared to a national index of 3.1 and best indexes for the Zagreb county (4.3) and Istria (3.1).

- Significantly less active agricultural population (2001): 60 per cent in Osijek-Baranya county and 56 in Vukovar-Sirmium county, as compared to a national rate of 67 per cent and 80 per cent for the Medjimurje county.

- Fewer employed persons with income from permanent work (2001): 30 per cent in Osijek-Baranya county and 28 in Vukovar-Sirmium county, as compared to a national rate of 34 per cent, 41 per cent for Zagreb and 40 per cent for the Medjimurje county.

- More persons without income (2001): 40 per cent in Osijek-Baranya county and 43 per cent in Vukovar-Sirmium county, with a national average rate of 36 per cent and 31 per cent for the Istrian county.


The GDP/capita indicator for the period 2001/2003 is particularly revealing as Vukovar-Sirmium county ranked among the poorest in Croatia.

Gender disparity is also more marked in the Vukovar-Sirmium county than in the national context (2001):

- lower share of employed females in the economically-active female population (69 per cent in contrast to 79 per cent);
- higher share of unemployed females in the economically-active female population (31 per cent in contrast to 21 per cent);
- more housewives in the structure of economically-inactive population than the national average (18 per cent in contrast to 12 per cent).

Unemployment among youth aged 15 to 24 is higher in Vukovar-Sirmium county when compared to the national average (13 and 25 per cent respectively). Once again, this difference is also reflected in the young female population (31 and 27 per cent), (cf. Table 13, Annex 2). More job-seekers (and women job-seekers) are to be found in Vukovar-Sirmium county than anywhere else in Croatia. There are fewer job-seekers looking for new employment, which can be interpreted as revealing a less dynamic workforce (cf.

\textsuperscript{215} The ICE index shows how much of value added is produced by one money unit invested in employed persons. Higher ICE value means higher efficiency of intellectual capital (employed persons) in producing value added.

\textsuperscript{216} The TEA has been developed in the framework of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project (www.gemconsortium.org), in which Croatia participates since 2002, as a measure of the level of entrepreneurial activity in a country. The TEA index presents the number of start-up businesses, not older than 42 months, on 100 adults of 18 to 64 years of age.
Table 14, Annex 2). On the positive side, a higher rate than national average of pupils and students in the economically inactive population could be considered as a promising indicator (cf. Table 11, Annex 2).

The detailed structure of unemployed persons in Vukovar-Sirmium county, by educational attainment, gender, age and by duration of unemployment is provided in Tables 18, 20 and 19 in Annex 2 respectively. A growing number of unemployed persons with longer unemployment periods is the most concerning feature; for example, the share of persons unemployed for longer than three years increased from 22 per cent in 2000 to 30 in 2004.
3. LED and reconciliation processes – how, where and when do they meet?\textsuperscript{217}

There exists numerous types of crises, but only two possible responses: external assistance through national or international programmes, or self-help strategies (coping strategies). It may be noted that those two types of response should be connected, interwoven, as neither one may achieve its aims in isolation from the other.

3.1. War is our reality. What now?

Living in a multi-ethnic, economically-developed region such as eastern Slavonia, where Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Germans and Jews and many other ethnicities coexisted for centuries, many of us did not see the early signals of the escalating conflict. In retrospect, it is difficult to set a precise date for the point of no return, when full-scale war could not be avoided anymore. Violence between ethnic communities erupted in mid-1991 in Eastern Slavonia. To avoid the 1991 summer months, many spent their life savings in their flight to southern Hungary, in the hope that such unprecedented violence would end with the beginning of the 1991 school year in September. When Vukovar fell on 17 November 1991, people started to understand that they were facing a war, and that it would last.

Looking back over the years preceding, during and following the war, based on publicly known information and personal experience, it appears that the war had many facets, uses and dynamics, whether one considers the national level (national politicians), communities or international institutions. It may be asserted, however, that the major factor fueling the war has been the national political elite, in their refusal to accept the challenges of a democratized and market-based Yugoslavia. Another avenue to protect their political power was chosen: aggressive nationalism. The war was not ignited by grass-roots distrust and hatred between ethnic communities, but by high-ranking politicians in the Former Yugoslavia (and chiefly, those in office in Belgrade at the time). Ethnic conflicts were fuelled by politicians from Serbia, visiting regions in Croatia with Serbian populations, delivering fiery nationalistic speeches, instrumentalizing World War II memories of conflicts between Serbs and Croats (reviving the ustasha).\textsuperscript{218} The political élite in Croatia adopted this same political strategy by taking up the nationalistic challenge, and revived on their end the Croatian collective memories of World War II chetnicks. The Yugoslav Army, controlled by the (Serbian) élite of Belgrade, launched hostilities.

\textsuperscript{217} This section will be informed by the author’s personal experience. Born, raised and living in Osijek throughout the war, the author has been a direct witness of the escalating crisis, the many attempts to diffuse it and the unfolding of this savage conflict. Living on the edge of chaos for years, it was difficult to not to loose faith at times on external assistance. The speed of the process, from when fact finding missions are launchged to the actual implementation of projects on the ground, takes years sometimes. If nothing at all happened (and this was not so rare) it was crucial to look for other solutions and opportunities while not losing confidence in good intentions.

\textsuperscript{218} It would be interesting to browse through broadcast news reports from the late 1990s and early 1991, paying special attention to high-ranking Serb politicians’ public speeches insisting on the marginalization of Serbs in Croatia and simultaneously observe how many local Serbs were confused with concepts of ethnicity, religious orientation and citizenship.
The large majority of the local population in eastern Slavonia did not have any role in the war but suffered from it. Communities were divided in terms of ethnicity. Some ethnic communities remained (mostly Serbs) and some left (mostly Croats), initiating a large flow of refugees and displaced people in September 1991. International assistance was needed immediately. International interventions were slow to meet the humanitarian crisis, and their actions sometimes raised distrust and misunderstandings. For many local populations, for example, it remains a mystery why the UN-administered region in Eastern Slavonia was administratively annexed by Serbia, thereby prolonging the process of reconciliation and economic reconstruction following the war.

As the conflict appeared to be prolonging itself, and even more so in its immediate aftermath, it appeared that other approaches beyond humanitarian assistance were needed to support the recovery and reconciliation process: LED programmes featured at the forefront of these efforts.

Post-war politics, however, continued playing against the interests of reconciliation and economic recovery. LED programmes cannot be successfully implemented without a collaboration between all local stakeholders, including local governments, the business sector, training institutions, financial institutions, NGOs etc. LED processes therefore started by mapping local stakeholders and considering the difficult question of their representativeness. In eastern Slavonia, the coordination of local stakeholders was entrusted to the UN administration from 1996 until 1998, and after that to the OSCE office in Vukovar.

In a new country emerging from such a bitter conflict, with practically nonexistent civil society institutions, and with complex, multilayered and interconnected layers of political interests, the understanding and mapping of stakeholders is an arduous and quite sensitive endeavour. The process involved mapping stakeholders according to their declared mission, excluding some and building or strengthening others along the way. Dialogue and networks among those institutions are typically broken by the war, and the new local politics emerging from antagonised communities are to be factored in.

Lesson learnt 1

The most critical issue in implementing local economic development programmes is to promote dialogue and concertation among key socio-economic stakeholders of the territory, ultimately developing mutual trust. This will help in overcoming shortages of institutional structure and will be the most important ingredient in developing social capital.

3.2. Reconciliation? Yes, but how without jobs?

Losing a family member is always traumatic, but when a war is the cause of such a loss, there is a need to clarify causes and outline responsibilities of all parties as a basis for reconciliation. This is a lasting process, which at some point in time, can be transformed from a political issue to a historical case.
There were hundreds of reconciliation programmes in eastern Slavonia. One was called Common bench. The idea was to get people to come together and talk – so benches were put in the middle of villages, in some central location. The results of the project were very limited, in some cases counterproductive. One major issue in Eastern Slavonia is the disappearance of 1,300 people during the war. Croat inhabitants used these common benches in some villages to demand explanations on these disappearances from their Serb neighbours, who had not fled during the war.

On the other hand, devastation in the Vukovar-Sirmium county resulted in 1,815 killed persons, 5,113 invalids, 22,083 hectares of mined terrain (half of it forests, the other half fertile land) and approximately 2.5 billion EUR of ravaged private property and economic/business capacities. Quite often Croats blamed Serbs for economic hardships: the economic devastation and the lack of employment sharpened divisions in multi-ethnic communities.

**Lesson learnt 2**

*The reconciliation process is inseparable from LED processes, but such an interaction may hardly be evidenced as a direct causal relationship of more jobs, fewer tensions. Job opportunities are fundamental and need to be available as soon as possible. However, other elements need to be factored in, such as educational opportunities, the role of the media and above all political commitment to reconciliation.*

**Patience, long term vision** and understanding the complexity of local stakeholders must be the driving principles of a kind of “mini Marshall plan” for each region. To ensure continuity, it is crucial that such economic recovery programmes are not subjected to the short-term interests of any single stakeholder. The project strategy needs constant revising and updating on the basis of achievements/drawbacks in the course of its implementation. The reconciliation process is a long term process, whose effectiveness will be downgraded if disturbed with changes caused by short-term political interests.

### 3.3. How: Loans instead of aid, but is it enough?

Access to financial resources is essential, but a real impact on enterprise-creation and development is conditioned by numerous other factors, such as availability of entrepreneurial skills and the regulatory framework.

In regions devastated by war, such as Vukovar-Sirmium county, everything is needed at once. Therefore, good planning and synchronized actions are of utmost importance in order to achieve a better and faster impact.

Considering the devastation in Vukovar-Sirmium county, it is not possible to make an isolated assessment, in light of the implemented projects under review, of the parallel course of economic development at the local level and the reconciliation of antagonized communities and groups within the same communities following the 1991/1995 war. The projects under review in this study (local economic rehabilitation of the war affected areas – Income generation and SME support: projects CRO/02/Q02 and CRO/02/Q03) were implemented by the Entrepreneurship Centre Vukovar-Sirmium county.

---

219 Taken from Statisticka karta Vukovarsko-srijemska zupanija, 1999
(Poduzetnicki centar Vukovarsko-srijemske županije) by the Centre for Entrepreneurship in Osijek. The programme’s main component was an SME Guarantee Fund provided by UNDP/UNOPS and enriched with ILO technical assistance in the form of training services for entrepreneurship development. The fund was administered by the Croatia Banka, based on an agreement signed on 5 September 2002. Programme promotion, pre-screening of potential clients and training services for clients were handled through two centres for entrepreneurship (in Vinkovci and Osijek). The following statistics describe the outcomes of the project, as reported by both implementers, as per the end of 2004:

Achievements of the UNOPS/UNDP/ILO Income generation and SME support projects in Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek Counties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entrepreneurship Centre Vukovar-Sirmium county</th>
<th>Centre for Entrepreneurship Osijek</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of loans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of awarded loans, EUR</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>349,800</td>
<td>633,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average loan size, EUR</td>
<td>47,333</td>
<td>29,150</td>
<td>35,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of jobs created, as per 31 August 2003</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to cooperatives, EUR</td>
<td>344,800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>344,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The call for projects was announced by UNDP/UNOPS. At the time when the programme was announced, the programme was “competitive” to other credit lines provided by the Government:

- half of the loan value was guaranteed by the UNDP Guarantee Fund;
- simpler bank procedure;
- investments in business facilities and in working capital;
- longer repayment period (up to 6 years);
- longer grace period (6 to 18 months);
- training services.

---

220 The history of involvement of the Osijek's Center is a good illustration of the environment in which such programmes were implemented. UNDP representatives approached Osijek's Center for Entrepreneurship with the intention of implementing the programme in both Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranya counties, after implementation in Vukovar-Sirmium County and the municipality of Vukovar had agreed with authorities. However when Osijek's Center agreed to the project in December 2001, Vukovar-Sirmium County decided to establish its own Entrepreneurship Center (VUDECO) and went on to protest to the Ministry of SME, the EC Delegation in Zagreb, the UNDP, and the media against the implementation of the programme by the Osijek center (a foreign institution) in their own County. The programme has thus been fragmented between both institutions. In Osijek-Baranya county, finally, the programme could not start because the local government did not make any progress in establishing the implementing organization, despite its declared support. Another such case of “double agenda” was when the Croatian Government proclaimed eastern Slavonia a region of special concern, but without any programmes to operationalize such a declaration.

221 Loan programmes to entrepreneurs which can be provided through government, international donors or commercial banks are compete in practice with one another on certain features such as interest rates, grace period, length of repayment period, guarantee schemes, technical assistance, etc.
On the other hand, the practiced interest rate of 6.5 per cent was less competitive. Another difficulty emerging at the onset of the programme was related to the exact amount of the Guarantee Fund. As it emerged from an internal communication between implementers and UNDP officials, neither implementers nor the partner bank (Croatia Banka), knew whether the 200’000 EUR was to be the definite size of the Guarantee Fund or whether it may have increased. Because of that, marketing of the programme was not as strong as it could be. Despite of it, both implementing organizations successfully selected enough clients to disburse more loans than the 200,000 EUR per implementer initially planned. Mr. Zvonimir Cordasic emphasized the issue of non-competitive interest rates and the difficulties of finding potential clients linked to this fact.

In Vukovar-Sirmium county, nine municipalities agreed to subsidize the interest rate from 6.5 per cent on the level of 5.5 and 4.5 per cent.

The importance of the training programme was immediately recognized. Both implementers provided ILO Start Your Business training, and Osijek’s Centre had already developed training programs for business development.

**Lesson learnt 3**

*Access to financial sources is very important, but it should come in different modes accompanied with different “accessories”. The most competitive feature of that UNOPS/UNDP/ILO programme was its focus on the guarantee issue, because it was, and still is, a burning problem for many small entrepreneurs, especially farmers. The additional training services component was a needed complement to ensure higher success rates in newly established and developing businesses.*

*More flexibility in adjusting interest rates to market changes could contribute to the competitiveness of the program. An additional possible component could be mentorship services to provide direct counselling services to clients. It could add to the effectiveness of the programme by supporting growth efforts in invested projects.*

**3.4. Who: New actors are needed**

The transition from aid to economic development programmes opens the question of stakeholder and institutional readiness to implement such programs. Timing is also important: during the war, a highly-centralized government is justified, but in the post-war period, high centralization inhibits local level capacities and accountability. This is very much the case in Croatia, where local governments had and still have limited capacity and accountability.

LED programmes implemented in eastern Slavonia were handled through local NGOs: the Entrepreneurship Centre of the Vukovar-Sirmium county (founders are local institutions) and Centre for Entrepreneurship in Osijek (founders are individuals, from academic and business communities). Both centres benefited from ILO technical assistance component to take over training programs on the basis of the Start Your Business methodology after the LED programme ended.

---

222 Provided through interviews with Mr. Zvonimir Cordasic, director of the Entrepreneurship Centre Vukovar-Srijem County and Mr. Boris Lauc, director of Osijek’s Center for Entrepreneurship, June 2005.
Lesson learnt 4

LED programmes are often faced with the risk of stakeholders’ instrumentalization of the programme for local political interests. In the case of Croatia, despite the fact that the government (under pressure from foreign institutions) defined war-torn areas as “special state concern” regions, many programmes like the UNDP/UNOPS/ILO LED programme encountered difficulties in establishing agreements with local implementing parties.

The selection of project implementers is a crucial element, and should be made through a public call, thereby ensuring transparency and competition and decreasing the scope for political manipulation (and corruption).

Lesson learnt 5

All international programmes focused on local economic development must recognize the lack of local capacities and accountability and focus on building local level capacities. Programmes cannot be sustainable if they do not contribute to building local capacities. This can be achieved in two or three years of implementation but only if sound cooperation with local implementing organizations and donors takes place.

3.5. Local economic development programs, but which region has a priority?

LED programmes typically focus on the least developed areas with highest unemployment and poverty. In the post-conflict context, however, the territorial coverage of the programmes is a very sensitive question in political terms. Making the needs of crisis-affected peoples the absolute priority may become a challenge, as local, regional and national political interests (and corruption) often interfere. Such issues bring the discussion of “where” back to the how and who questions.

The choice of intervening in eastern Slavonia was straightforward, since the socio-economic environment and the impact of the war in the region made it a clear candidate for external support: low economic activity, high unemployment and presence highly of vulnerable groups (in particular returnees).

Lesson learnt 6

Needs assessment should be clearly made the only basis for delimitating a territorial area for LED projects. The focus should be kept away from political and other sensitivities and projects should not disburse limited resources on too wide a region.
3.6. Transition from aid to LED programmes - when?

Help is always welcome, but the sooner the better. If 1991-1995 is considered as the mostly humanitarian phase, it was reasonable to expect that as soon as hostilities ceased, reconstruction activities could and should be started. In eastern Slavonia local economic development programmes were initiated by foreign and international donors, much before than Croatian Government developed its own programmes. USAID was the first to establish presence in October 1996 with a 3 million US$ micro credit programme. The programme was implemented by a local financial institution, the credit and saving cooperative NOA, located in Osijek, through subcontracting with Opportunity International. LED programmes under the European-funded Quick Impact Facility umbrella, accompanied with ILO technical assistance, have been implemented in Croatia since 1997. The LED projects CRO/02/Q02 and CRO/02/Q03, focusing on rehabilitation of war-torn areas in eastern Croatia, were initiated only in 2002.

Lesson learnt 7

Once the conflict is over, the transition from aid to LED programmes must commence promptly (in the first 3 months after the end of the war). Earlier start of local economic development programmes would contribute to developing self-confidence and self-respect, rather than developing dependency brought by long lasting aid programmes.

3.7. Have LED and reconciliation processes met?

Research for this study (looking at annual reports of Vukovar-Sirmium county, OSCE and ECRI reports, and studies on future development of the region) revealed that no formal linkage between LED programmes and reconciliation processes had been put in place. An interesting indication is that leading persons involved in reconciliation process (Mr. Ljubomir Mikic, president of the Centre for Peace in Vukovar) and in local economic development process (Mr. Zvonimir Cordasic, director of the Entrepreneurship Centre Vukovar-Sirmium county) never met!

As Mr. Mikic said: “…the basic problem is that information about many projects implemented in the region are not easy to find. Information which we have is mostly informal reactions and public opinion expressed by groups of people, based on personal experience”. This opinion is confirmed by a simple check of the web page of the UNDP office in Zagreb www.undp.hr: in the Gospodarski razvoj (Economic Development) section two projects are listed, and nothing else:

- Poticaj brzog ucinka (Quick Impact Facility)
- Obnova lokalnog gospodarstva u ratom zahvacenim područjima u Hrvatskoj

NOA started with loan activities in Vukovar region even in years when the region was under UN administration. In the period from 1997 to 2005, NOA disbursed 579 loans (492 men, 87 women) in the amount of 2,782,723 US$, average loan size is 4,806 US$. Those loans helped in new job creation of 387 and 923 sustained jobs.

This line is not translated into English on the web site, but translates as „Reconstruction of local economies in war-torn regions in Croatia“
Lesson learnt 8

More transparency and coordination is needed, at least to increase the positive mutual externalities of LED and reconciliation processes. Transparency and coordination needs to be ensured at all stages of programme development, from needs assessment, programme design to working together in implementation phase. It is also essential to have an overview of the programme, as people just do not know what is going on. And if such programmes are not internalized in local mental maps of local governments, business communities or NGOs, knowledge of them will disappear with the end of the programmes.

Lesson learnt 9

Implementation of LED programmes should provide networking of all programmes in order to strengthen local institutions in handling them. Otherwise local institutions would never learn the basic lesson of cooperating and looking for value adding networking, instead of only competing.
4. Recommendations

Analysis and lessons learnt from this exercise have a meaning only if they can be translated into actions that improve the future activities of all stakeholders of territorial development, vulnerability reduction and community reconciliation in post-conflict contexts. On the basis of the analysis and lessons learnt above, the following recommendations are proposed at operational, programmatic and policy level:

Recommendation 1

In order to achieve trust among local stakeholders, LED and reconciliation programs must make all of them equally accountable. Differentiation among them can be based only on the level of commitment and efficiency in contributing to the common goals. A precise and in-depth mapping of local stakeholders and their interactions is needed. Local government, schools, representatives of entrepreneurs/farmers, prominent NGOs working on reconciliation, returnees and other marginalized groups should all be made participants to the process. Focusing on only one or a few stakeholders only prolongs the process of building trust since the commitment (or lack thereof) of such stakeholders is the decisive factor (positive or negative) in the process.

Recommendation 2

In order to achieve trust among local stakeholders, LED and reconciliation programmes should share information acquired through their respective needs assessments. Such assessments should be based on different sources and obtained from several stakeholders. Ideally, common needs assessments should be undertaken by different intervening agencies and local stakeholders. These would then be openly discussed in the community in which the programme is to be implemented, to contribute to a common awareness of community needs (e.g. human and socio-economic rights, employment, access to education, health services, etc.), as well as of common goals. This would also ensure from the start that stakeholders are active participants in the process, helping them overcome a status of being asked but not always heard and being beneficiaries who are not always able to own a process and make it sustainable.

Recommendation 3

All stakeholders involved in the process must receive progress reports and evaluation results on a regular base. Without them, learning processes are not completed for implementers or for donors. A dialogue among implementers, donors and beneficiaries, based on evaluation findings, is as important for those involved in the process as for policy makers on the international, national and regional levels.

The evaluation and monitoring process is also critical to improving the interconnection and complementarity of reconciliation and economic development at the local level. In particular, the issue of indicators of progress needs to be addressed carefully. The number of disbursed loans, for example, is not a meaningful indicator of the whole scope of an LED programme’s impact, particularly as far as its positive impact on institutional networks and reconciliation. LED programmes should be monitored

---

I could not get a report produced by the UNOPS office in Zagreb on results of the studied projects in eastern Slavonia.
through a larger indicator base, including, for example, measures of dialogue among local stakeholders and networks, as well as activities emerging from sub-programmes focused on younger people.

**Recommendation 4**

In order to interweave the processes of LED and reconciliation ensure they add value to each other, it is necessary to make it very clear that funding is necessary but not sufficient. The combination of financial resources (in the form of loans, guarantee funds or even grants) and technical assistance is essential. On the financial side, the policy could be focused on either start-ups or growing businesses, or a combination of both, depending on the assessed needs for each specific region. To strengthen capacities and ensure sustainability, technical assistance to local banks and financial institutions may be provided for the implementation of the micro enterprise and SME start-up and development components of the projects. This technical assistance should not be made on the basis of a one-size-fits-all approach throughout the region, but should take into consideration the specific challenges of the future or present entrepreneurs that will become the project’s customers.

**Recommendation 5**

LED and reconciliation programmes do not need to be formally integrated, but they should be coordinated and devised as complementary to each other. Two levels of coordination and complementarity could be focused on: “patchworking” (horizontal compatibility) and designing a value-added chain (vertical compatibility). On the horizontal level, the LED programmes could diversify their components to include loans, investments in infrastructures of common economic interest (e.g. silos, cooling capacity, milk collecting units, small processing facility, etc.), pupil competitions in business ideas/plans, school programmes in entrepreneurship, business development services, etc. All of this contributes to economic development, but also builds social linkages among various social groups (pupils, farmers, etc.), which are extremely important in communities divided through conflict. Reconciliation does not start with older people, but younger ones. On the vertical level, LED could, for example, focus on core activities (concerning adults), while reconciliation efforts focus on the younger population. This will connect the programmes in a virtual way and help them balance each other out. Such a balance could be achievable provided discussion among the various stakeholders takes place.

**Recommendation 6**

In order to make the process of LED and reconciliation more effective and efficient, the implementation of any LED programme should be based on the following operational principles:

- transparency in selection of implementers (open call);
- transparency in selection of beneficiaries;
- transparency in the process of implementing the programmes;
- continuous dialogue among sub-programmes during the programme, in order to advance the process of better understanding as a pre-requisite for reconciliation in a specific community/region;
- division of the implementing process into several phases, allowing for lesson-gathering and re-focusing on next phases.
Annexes

1. Bibliography


Europska komisija protiv rasizma i nesnosljivosti, Trece izvjesce o Hrvatskoj, 41 pp, (ECRI, Strasbourg, 2005).


Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, commissioner for human rights, on his visit to the Republic of Croatia, 14 to 16 June 2004.


Status report on Croatia’s progress in meeting international commitments (OSCE, Mission to Croatia, from 1998).

Uspjesnost na nacionalnoj, zupanijskoj i poduzetnickoj razini 2003, 47 pp, (Zagreb, Hrvatska gospodarska komora i FINA, 2004).
## 2. Statistical data sets

Table 1: Population by age and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,426,221</td>
<td>217,423</td>
<td>4,601,469</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2,139,048</td>
<td>104,249</td>
<td>2,226,890</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,287,173</td>
<td>113,174</td>
<td>2,374,579</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>48.33</td>
<td>47.95</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>51.67</td>
<td>52.05</td>
<td>51.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By age group (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 4</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 9</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 44</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 49</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 54</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 59</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 64</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 69</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 to 74</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 and over</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Population by ethnicity (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>79.38</td>
<td>68.45</td>
<td>75.08</td>
<td>63.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities, all</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>30.44</td>
<td>21.55</td>
<td>34.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniacs (2001), Muslims</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>17.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnically uncommitted</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Austrians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Macedonians, Germans, Poles, Romanians, Slovenians, Italians, Turks, "Vlasi", Jews.

## Table 3: Population contingents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Vukovar-Sirmium County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,426,221</td>
<td>217,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4,601,469</td>
<td>224,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4,784,265</td>
<td>231,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>204,768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total population

- **Average age**
  - 1971: 34.00
  - 1981: 35.40
  - 1991: 37.10
  - 2001: 39.30

- **Aging index**
  - 1971: 47.20
  - 1981: 52.60
  - 1991: 66.70
  - 2001: 90.70

- **Aging coefficient**
  - 1971: 14.87
  - 1981: 14.85
  - 1991: 17.45
  - 2001: 21.52

### Number of reproductive-age women (15 to 49 age group)

- **Total number**
  - 1971: 1,174,488
  - 1981: 1,152,704
  - 1991: 1,149,407
  - 2001: 1,080,121

### Percentage of total women

- **Total women**
  - 1971: 51.35
  - 1981: 48.54
  - 1991: 46.62
  - 2001: 46.93

### Of which 20 to 29 age group

- **20 to 29 age group**
  - 1971: 311,179
  - 1981: 360,138
  - 1991: 327,257
  - 2001: 295,723

### Percentage of total reproductive-age women

- **Total reproductive-age women**
  - 1971: 26.49
  - 1981: 31.24
  - 1991: 28.47
  - 2001: 27.38

### Labour force (women 15 to 59, men 15 to 64 age groups)

- **Total labour force**
  - 1971: 2,843,979
  - 1981: 2,983,331
  - 1991: 3,077,538
  - 2001: 2,828,632

### Percentage of total population

- **Total population**
  - 1971: 64.25
  - 1981: 64.83
  - 1991: 64.91
  - 2001: 64.60

---

Table 4: Population aged 15 and over, by educational attainment (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,781,944</td>
<td>179,307</td>
<td>3,637,769</td>
<td>171,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>18.55</td>
<td>20.73</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 primary school grades</td>
<td>46.26</td>
<td>50.03 **</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 primary school grades</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.93</td>
<td>35.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>13.44</td>
<td>19.23</td>
<td>22.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schools, All</td>
<td>18.47</td>
<td>13.86</td>
<td>28.28</td>
<td>22.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of those, Vocational schools lasting 1-3 years and schools for skilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>63.26</td>
<td>66.16</td>
<td>51.31</td>
<td>51.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of those, Gymnasiums</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>37.73</td>
<td>42.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of those, University-level education or more</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Population aged 10 and over

** 4 primary school grades

Table 5: Population aged 10 years and over and illiterate persons by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population aged 10 and over</td>
<td>3,781,944</td>
<td>179,040</td>
<td>3,953,657</td>
<td>189,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of illiterate persons</td>
<td>338,518</td>
<td>17,576</td>
<td>219,648</td>
<td>12,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>6.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate persons by age group (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 34</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 49</td>
<td>17.97</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>19.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 64</td>
<td>34.79</td>
<td>32.28</td>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>34.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>35.33</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>40.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Population by activity and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>4,426,221</td>
<td>217,423</td>
<td>4,601,469</td>
<td>224,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,287,173</td>
<td>113,174</td>
<td>2,374,579</td>
<td>115,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active population, All</td>
<td>2,015,918</td>
<td>87,040</td>
<td>1,985,201</td>
<td>86,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total population</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>38.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in occupation, % of total population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active female population, All</td>
<td>776,959</td>
<td>29,956</td>
<td>814,028</td>
<td>31,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female population</td>
<td>34.28</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>34.28</td>
<td>27.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in occupation, % of all female population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with personal income, All</td>
<td>366,743</td>
<td>14,804</td>
<td>506,496</td>
<td>19,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total population</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>11.01</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females with personal income</td>
<td>171,862</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>263,152</td>
<td>10,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female population</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>9.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported population, All*</td>
<td>2,043,560</td>
<td>115,579</td>
<td>1,899,442</td>
<td>105,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total population</td>
<td>46.17</td>
<td>53.16</td>
<td>41.28</td>
<td>47.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, Supported</td>
<td>1,338,352</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,207,067</td>
<td>68,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female population</td>
<td>58.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50.83</td>
<td>58.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Difference to “Total” refers to the population supported by persons with personal income, legal entities or by an unknown supporter.

Table 7: Agricultural population by activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total agricultural population</td>
<td>1,431,685</td>
<td>84,397</td>
<td>667,696</td>
<td>43,265</td>
<td>409,647</td>
<td>30,320</td>
<td>246,089</td>
<td>19,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active agricultural population, total*</td>
<td>828,389</td>
<td>38,929</td>
<td>414,742</td>
<td>22,648</td>
<td>264,895</td>
<td>15,475</td>
<td>166,044</td>
<td>10,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total population</td>
<td>18.72</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total agricultural population</td>
<td>57.86</td>
<td>46.13</td>
<td>62.12</td>
<td>52.35</td>
<td>64.66</td>
<td>51.04</td>
<td>67.47</td>
<td>55.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed on own farm, without workers, % of total active agricultural population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64.39</td>
<td>61.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed on own farm, with workers, % of total active agricultural population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers, % of total active agricultural population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>15.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported agricultural population, total</td>
<td>603,296</td>
<td>45,468</td>
<td>252,954</td>
<td>22,808</td>
<td>144,752</td>
<td>14,845</td>
<td>80,045</td>
<td>8,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total agricultural population</td>
<td>42.14</td>
<td>53.87</td>
<td>37.88</td>
<td>52.72</td>
<td>35.34</td>
<td>48.96</td>
<td>32.53</td>
<td>44.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Difference to “Total” refers to persons active outside their farm.

Table 8: Persons in employment, by income sources and gender (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income source</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Vukovar-Sirmium County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>204,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from permanent work.</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>33.66</td>
<td>27.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from permanent work and pension</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from permanent work and other income (social welfare, property income, etc.)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension only</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>20.76</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension and social welfare</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension and other income (property income, etc.)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare only</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property income only</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular support from others only</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>35.75</td>
<td>43.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown, (%)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Economically-active vs. economically-inactive population, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>4,426,221</td>
<td>217,423</td>
<td>4,601,469</td>
<td>224,103</td>
<td>4,784,265</td>
<td>231,241</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>204,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2,139,048</td>
<td>104,249</td>
<td>2,226,890</td>
<td>108,585</td>
<td>2,318,623</td>
<td>112,647</td>
<td>2,135,900</td>
<td>98,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>2,287,173</td>
<td>113,174</td>
<td>2,374,579</td>
<td>115,518</td>
<td>2,465,642</td>
<td>118,594</td>
<td>2,301,560</td>
<td>106,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active</td>
<td>2,015,918</td>
<td>87,040</td>
<td>1,985,201</td>
<td>86,431</td>
<td>2,039,833</td>
<td>89,542</td>
<td>1,952,619</td>
<td>82,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>40.03</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>38.57</td>
<td>42.64</td>
<td>38.72</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>40.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active males</td>
<td>1,238,959</td>
<td>57,084</td>
<td>1,171,173</td>
<td>55,104</td>
<td>1,165,728</td>
<td>56,206</td>
<td>1,085,137</td>
<td>49,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of males</td>
<td>27.99</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>25.45</td>
<td>24.59</td>
<td>24.37</td>
<td>24.31</td>
<td>50.80</td>
<td>50.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active females</td>
<td>776,959</td>
<td>29,956</td>
<td>814,028</td>
<td>31,327</td>
<td>874,105</td>
<td>33,336</td>
<td>867,482</td>
<td>33,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of females</td>
<td>33.97</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>34.28</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>35.45</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>37.69</td>
<td>31.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive</td>
<td>2,410,303</td>
<td>130,383</td>
<td>2,405,938</td>
<td>125,006</td>
<td>2,459,216</td>
<td>125,116</td>
<td>2,475,654</td>
<td>121,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>54.46</td>
<td>59.97</td>
<td>52.29</td>
<td>55.78</td>
<td>51.40</td>
<td>54.11</td>
<td>55.79</td>
<td>59.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive males</td>
<td>900,089</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>935,719</td>
<td>46,380</td>
<td>996,427</td>
<td>47,539</td>
<td>1,045,892</td>
<td>48,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of males</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42.42</td>
<td>42.71</td>
<td>42.97</td>
<td>42.20</td>
<td>48.97</td>
<td>49.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive females</td>
<td>1,510,214</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,470,219</td>
<td>78,626</td>
<td>1,462,789</td>
<td>77,577</td>
<td>1,429,762</td>
<td>72,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of females</td>
<td>66.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61.91</td>
<td>68.06</td>
<td>59.33</td>
<td>65.41</td>
<td>62.12</td>
<td>68.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,187</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,871</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,316</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Structure of economically-active population, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economically-active population.</td>
<td>1,952,619</td>
<td>82,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1,085,137</td>
<td>49,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>867,482</td>
<td>33,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1,553,643</td>
<td>60,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>79.57</td>
<td>73.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed males</td>
<td>871,054</td>
<td>38,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-active males (%)</td>
<td>80.27</td>
<td>76.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed females</td>
<td>682,589</td>
<td>22,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-active females (%)</td>
<td>78.69</td>
<td>68.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>398,976</td>
<td>21,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>20.43</td>
<td>26.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed males</td>
<td>214,083</td>
<td>11,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-active males (%)</td>
<td>19.73</td>
<td>23.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed females</td>
<td>184,893</td>
<td>10,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-active females (%)</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>31.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sirmium County</th>
<th>Sirmium County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total economically-inactive population</strong></td>
<td>2,410,303 130,383</td>
<td>2,459,216 125,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>900,089</td>
<td>47,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1,510,214</td>
<td>77,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils and students</td>
<td>807,654</td>
<td>744,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>33.51</td>
<td>30.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>421,649</td>
<td>371,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive males (%)</td>
<td>46.85</td>
<td>35.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>386,005</td>
<td>372,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive females (%)</td>
<td>25.56</td>
<td>26.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>337,366</td>
<td>966,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>39.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>185,516</td>
<td>435,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive males (%)</td>
<td>20.61</td>
<td>41.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>151,850</td>
<td>531,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive females (%)</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>29.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>635,804</td>
<td>303,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>26.38</td>
<td>18.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to work</td>
<td>17,783</td>
<td>58,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>7,648</td>
<td>1,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive males (%)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>10,135</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive females (%)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children not attending school</td>
<td>464,511</td>
<td>341,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>11.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>235,991</td>
<td>175,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive males (%)</td>
<td>26.22</td>
<td>16.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>228,520</td>
<td>166,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically-inactive females (%)</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The difference to “Total” refers to the children, pupils and students with unknown school attendance.

Table 12: The employed, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employed persons</td>
<td>1,553,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>871,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>682,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>1,267,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>81.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>693,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed males (%)</td>
<td>79.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>574,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed females (%)</td>
<td>84.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>67,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>48,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed males (%)</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>18,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed females (%)</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>218,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>14.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>116,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed males (%)</td>
<td>13.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>102,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed females (%)</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Age, relative structure (%) | 2001 |  
|-----------------------------|------|------|  
|                             | Croatia | Vukovar-Sirmium County |  
| Total unemployed persons    | 398,976 | 21,922 |  
| Males                       | 214,083 | 11,639 |  
| Percentage                  | 53.66   | 53.09  |  
| Females                     | 184,893 | 10,283 |  
| Percentage                  | 46.34   | 46.91  |  
| **15 to 24 age group, total unemployed persons** | 25.00 | 31.49 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 30.11   | 31.69  |  
| Total unemployed females    | 27.57   | 31.27  |  
| **25 to 34 age group, total unemployed persons** | 27.62 | 27.42 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 24.64   | 25.73  |  
| Total unemployed females    | 31.09   | 29.34  |  
| **35 to 39 age group, total unemployed persons** | 11.70 | 11.45 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 10.72   | 10.50  |  
| Total unemployed females    | 12.84   | 12.52  |  
| **40 to 44 age group, total unemployed persons** | 10.82 | 10.15 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 10.64   | 9.79   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 11.02   | 10.56  |  
| **45 to 49 age group, total unemployed persons** | 10.18 | 9.53 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 10.16   | 9.30   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 10.20   | 9.79   |  
| **50 to 54 age group, total unemployed persons** | 7.05 | 6.17 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 8.15    | 7.05   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 5.78    | 5.16   |  
| **55 to 59 age group, total unemployed persons** | 2.63 | 2.73 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 4.05    | 4.36   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 0.99    | 0.89   |  
| **60 and over, total unemployed persons** | 0.79 | 0.81 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 1.28    | 1.37   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 0.22    | 0.18   |  
| **Unknown, total unemployed persons** | 0.27 | 0.25 |  
| Total unemployed males      | 0.26    | 0.21   |  
| Total unemployed females    | 0.29    | 0.28   |  

### Table 14: Job-seekers, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployed persons</td>
<td>398,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>214,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>184,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking first job</td>
<td>113,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>28.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>61,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of all males</td>
<td>28.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>51,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of all females</td>
<td>28.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking new job</td>
<td>285,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>71.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>152,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of all males</td>
<td>71.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>132,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of all females</td>
<td>71.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: First job-seekers, by gender and age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age, relative structure (%)</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Vukovar-Sirmium County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total first job-seekers</td>
<td>113,652</td>
<td>7,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>61,744</td>
<td>3,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>51,908</td>
<td>3,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19 age group, total</td>
<td>27.02</td>
<td>26.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>28.54</td>
<td>27.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>26.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24 age group, total</td>
<td>39.06</td>
<td>39.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>42.01</td>
<td>41.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>35.54</td>
<td>37.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29 age group, total</td>
<td>18.48</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>16.97</td>
<td>16.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>20.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34 age group, total</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>7.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>9.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 and over, total</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>6.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>6.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown, total</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: New job-seekers, by gender and age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total new job-seekers</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total new job-seekers</td>
<td>285,324</td>
<td>152,339</td>
<td>132,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>152,339</td>
<td>7,778</td>
<td>6,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>132,985</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>6,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, relative structure (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19 age group, total</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24 age group, total</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>11.95</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29 age group, total</td>
<td>13.89</td>
<td>13.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>12.56</td>
<td>13.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34 age group, total</td>
<td>14.24</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>13.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 and over, total</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>15.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>16.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown age group, total</td>
<td>14.41</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All males</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>13.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All females</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>15.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Table 17: Population, by type of working mode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Vukovar-Sirmium County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>204,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in any sector of ownership.</td>
<td>1,267,266</td>
<td>48,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>28.56</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed, without employees.</td>
<td>54,489</td>
<td>1,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual farmer, without employees.</td>
<td>107,894</td>
<td>6,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed, with employees.</td>
<td>67,146</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual farmer, with employees.</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working on the base of a working contract, authorship agreement or</td>
<td>14,657</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>receives compensation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family worker helping in a company, craft or similar, owned by</td>
<td>4,626</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a household.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family worker helping on a farm.</td>
<td>31,821</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed seeking first job.</td>
<td>113,652</td>
<td>7,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed seeking new job.</td>
<td>285,324</td>
<td>14,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrupted employment due to military service, imprisonment or penalty.</td>
<td>10,880</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>303,658</td>
<td>22,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>10.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child, pupil or student.</td>
<td>1,093,876</td>
<td>53,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>24.65</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>966,800</td>
<td>38,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>21.79</td>
<td>19.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to work.</td>
<td>58,454</td>
<td>3,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and unknown.</td>
<td>56,373</td>
<td>3,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Unemployed persons, by educational attainment and gender (31 December 2004, Vukovar-Sirmium County)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>All women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>Trained skilled workers</td>
<td>Schools for skilled workers</td>
<td>Vocational schools</td>
<td>Non-university colleges</td>
<td>University level education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>10.054</td>
<td>5.231</td>
<td>1.401</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>2.650</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>2.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995*</td>
<td>10.945</td>
<td>5.467</td>
<td>2.279</td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>3.175</td>
<td>1.324</td>
<td>4.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12.010</td>
<td>5.840</td>
<td>2.279</td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>3.175</td>
<td>1.324</td>
<td>4.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>20.179</td>
<td>10.242</td>
<td>2.546</td>
<td>1.533</td>
<td>5.665</td>
<td>2.473</td>
<td>7.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*without data for occupied part of the Vukovar-Srijem County
Table 19: The unemployed in Vukovar-Sirmium County, by duration of unemployment by (31 December 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployed</td>
<td>22,668</td>
<td>20,179</td>
<td>23,364</td>
<td>22,543</td>
<td>20,897</td>
<td>20,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 3 months</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>3,579</td>
<td>3,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 6 months</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>3,316</td>
<td>2,721</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>2,357</td>
<td>2,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 9 months</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 to 12 months</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 12 months</td>
<td>9,365</td>
<td>9,715</td>
<td>9,332</td>
<td>8,477</td>
<td>8,926</td>
<td>8,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>41.31</td>
<td>48.14</td>
<td>39.94</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>42.71</td>
<td>42.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 3 years</td>
<td>8,382</td>
<td>6,624</td>
<td>7,941</td>
<td>7,274</td>
<td>5,581</td>
<td>5,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>36.98</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>33.99</td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>27.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 years</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>3,103</td>
<td>2,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>16.59</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 8 years</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,778</td>
<td>2,133</td>
<td>2,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>11.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 8 years</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje, Podruci ured Vukovar
### Table 20: The unemployed, by age, 1997-2004 (Vukovar-Sirmium County)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>4,341</td>
<td>4,333</td>
<td>4,136</td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.54</td>
<td>19.07</td>
<td>19.15</td>
<td>18.55</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2,974</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>3,358</td>
<td>3,141</td>
<td>2,619</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>2,333</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>2,826</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>12.76</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>12.47</td>
<td>12.75</td>
<td>12.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 44</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>10.86</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 49</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>2,449</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>10.04</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>11.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 55</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 60</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>308</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje, Područni ured Vukovar
Table 21: Number of persons who found a job through the Croatian Employment Agency (Vukovar office)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Unskilled workers</th>
<th>Trained skilled workers</th>
<th>Schools for skilled workers</th>
<th>Vocational schools</th>
<th>Non-university colleges</th>
<th>University level education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,852</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6,611</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7,112</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7,693</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>1,884</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,630</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>1,908</td>
<td>4,226</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje, Podruci ured Vukovar
Table 22: GDP per capita, all counties (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Zagreb</td>
<td>14,253</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,162</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,843</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istria</td>
<td>6,071</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,659</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorje-Gorski Kotar</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,193</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koprivnica-Kríževci</td>
<td>3,275</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,649</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varaždin</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,748</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,524</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlovac</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Međimurje</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,412</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,489</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubrovnik-Neretva</td>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split-Dalmatia</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,982</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osijek-Baranya</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,074</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>2,354</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,311</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zadar</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krapina-Zagorje</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,882</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Požega-Slavonia</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virovitica-Posavina</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisak-Moslavina</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjelovar-Bilogora</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibenik-Knin</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavonski Brod-Posavina</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vukovar-Sirmium</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lika-Senj</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,473</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,056</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Intelektualni kapital: Uspješnost na nacionalnoj i županijskoj poduzetnickoj razini, Hrvatska gospodarska komora i FINA, June 2004, p.7
3. Cartographic localisation of the area under research

Map 2: Mine suspected areas in Croatia

**CROATIA**
**MINE SUSPECTED AREAS**

**Legend**
- Suspected mined area
- County border

**WARNING:**
This map shows the area at greatest risk from possible contamination of mines and unexploded ordnance.

**March 2005.**

Source: Hrvatski centar za razminiranje (Croatian Mine Action Center), [www.hcr.hr](http://www.hcr.hr) (mine situation)
Map 3: Mine suspected areas in Vukovar-Sirmium County

![Map of Vukovar Sirmium County showing suspected mine areas](image)

**Legend**
- Suspected mined area
- Country border

**WARNING:**
This map shows the area at greatest risk from possible contamination of mines and unexploded ordnance.

December 2004

Source: Hrvatski centar za razminiranje (Croatian Mine Action Center), [www.hcr.hr](http://www.hcr.hr) (mine situation)
Transnational networks: Recognising a regional reality

Elca Stigter & Alessandro Monsutt

April 2005
Preface

This paper has been prepared by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and is published jointly by the UNHCR and the ILO as partner agencies to the research programme on "Strengthening employment in response to conflicts and natural disasters".

This case study forms part of a series of case studies undertaken under this programme on the coping strategies of crisis-affected groups. It broadens our understanding of transnational NETWORKS and finds they are a key livelihood strategy for war affected populations in Afghanistan.

We therefore believe that this paper provides valuable insights that can sharpen humanitarian and development policies and programmes supporting vulnerable groups in Afghanistan and other countries affected by war, thereby contributing to their economic recovery and stabilization.

Donato Kiniger-Passigli, ILO / CRISIS
ILO Coordinator, HEI-ILO
Research Programme on “Strengthening Employment in Response to Crises”

Salvatore Lombardo, UNHCR Afghanistan Desk
# Table of contents

Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 270

1. Causes of migration .................................................................................................................. 272

2. The migrant profile .................................................................................................................. 275

3. Smuggling networks and ways of entering Iran ........................................................................ 277

4. The informal labour market in Iran .......................................................................................... 280

5. Income, expenditure and savings ............................................................................................. 282

6. The way forward: Migration as a key livelihoods strategy ...................................................... 284
Overview

The purpose of this briefing paper is to highlight the importance of transnational migratory networks to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This paper focuses on Afghan population movements into Iran, and is part of AREU’s ongoing research project into Afghan transnational networks being implemented in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. It points to actions that could be taken to reduce and eliminate the costs, financial and otherwise, to Afghans migrating to Iran, while at the same time ensuring individual and state security on both sides of the border. It argues that the Afghan government and policymakers need to acknowledge and realise the economic potential of regional labour migration for Afghanistan’s future growth.

After the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of the interim administration in Afghanistan in December 2001, Afghan refugees have returned in large numbers. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation figures, at the end of January 2005, 2,256,712 individuals had returned from Pakistan and 767,887 from Iran. Potentially, more than one million of the up to four million Afghans who remain in the two countries may return home in the next two years. This level of repatriation not only shows a degree of confidence in the renascent state, but also reflects expectations created by donor pledges to rebuild the country and the deterioration of living conditions in the places of refuge. To a lesser degree, it has also been affected by the Iranian and Pakistani authorities increasingly implementing policies to encourage Afghans to return home since a government supported by the international community has been established in Kabul.

Despite the high levels of return to Afghanistan, families and individuals continue to move, and it seems unlikely that the back-and-forth movements will stop while they constitute a key livelihoods strategy. Many Afghans have been shifting from one place to the next for years – some never returning to their place of origin, others only on a temporary basis before deciding to return into Iran or Pakistan. Young men in particular, who have not travelled before, are still choosing to cross into Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries – suggesting that displacement is not only caused by conflict, but that other reasons continue to prompt movement to Iran and Pakistan.

Migration to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, and the very significant sum of remittances sent home, can be seen not only as a response to war and poverty, but also as an efficient livelihoods strategy for households and a key contribution to the economy of the country as a whole. There is a clear pattern of multidirectional cross-border movements that indicates the ongoing, cyclical nature of migration – blurring the boundaries between “refugees” and “voluntary” migrants. The concept of a permanent resettlement or irreversible displacement does not take into account this multidirectional aspect of population movements. Through the continuous circulation of people, money and commodities, as well as information, Afghans who are spread across a range of locations remain linked; in this way transnational networks are constituted by Afghans interacting and cooperating with each other across international frontiers.
This conclusion must be taken into account by policymakers: the repatriation of all Afghans living in neighbouring countries is not feasible, and it would undoubtedly have a negative impact on the economic reconstruction of the country. In formulating an appropriate response to Afghan migration, the governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, along with the assistance community, must:

- recognise that migration is not only a reaction to war and economic hardship, but also a key livelihoods strategy that is likely to continue well beyond the UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation programme;
- establish a bilateral labour migration framework that provides a clear legal identity and rights for Afghan labourers in Iran;
- provide easier access to passports for Afghans;
- increase awareness of the contribution, both in labour and otherwise, of Afghans to the Iranian and Pakistani economy; and
- in line with international conventions, continue to uphold the refugee status and protection of the most vulnerable.
1. Causes of migration

**Migration as a way of life**

Since 1978, Afghanistan has been torn apart by war and civil strife, generating one of the most significant population displacements in the world. The strategies developed by Afghans during these many years cannot be accounted for simply by using the definition of “refugee” given by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and that of the “labour migrant”. Along with endemic insecurity, the economic differential between Afghanistan and Iran has long led Afghans to migrate to their neighbouring country to find employment and enjoy the benefits of a higher income.

In the 1960s and 70s, with industrialisation in Afghanistan negligible, there were insufficient employment opportunities for the newly educated and the growing rural populations. The Middle East oil boom in 1973 was a catalyst for many Afghans to cross into Iran to capitalise on increased labour opportunities. Remittances to Afghanistan from abroad rose in response to the demand for cash, and just before the start of the Soviet occupation several hundred thousand Afghan migrant workers were in Iran.\(^{226}\)

Employment opportunities and relatively higher wages, as well as the pursuit of asylum and welfare, continue to encourage Afghan men to cross the border, despite the difficulties Afghans experience in Iran. For many, migration has become a way of life: it is now highly organised, and the transnational networks that have developed to support it are a major, even constitutive, element in the social, cultural and economic life of Afghans. One of the most striking aspects of this phenomenon is the significant flow of capital remitted to Afghanistan, which is playing a crucial role in the reconstruction of the country.\(^{227}\)


Population growth

Although no precise figures are available, the population of Afghanistan in the late 1970s was estimated at about 15 million, while in 2004 the UN quoted it at 29,863,000. The UN also estimates that by 2050 Afghanistan’s population will have tripled to 97,324,000.  


In spite of the war and the extensive Afghan diaspora, Afghanistan’s population has increased dramatically over the past 25 years, with a high proportion of young people (44.7 per cent between 0 and 14 years).  

In some regions like Behsud, the density when recalculated on the basis of cultivable land is greater than that of Bangladesh. The size of land parcels owned by individuals continues to decrease with each generation, because of inheritance customs that stipulate the division of property among the sons of a family. At the same time, there has been insufficient economic growth in urban centres to absorb the increased number of Afghans needing work. This has resulted in shifts in wealth, as some well-off families lose their primary income source (agricultural land, livestock) while some enterprising people have set up new businesses.

The impact of drought and pests

Rural Afghan families both with and without land and livestock have had to adapt their livelihoods strategies to deal with the impact of drought. Male out-migration in particular emerged as a coping strategy in response to the effects of drought in the 1970s and again in the late 1990s. Though 2003 saw major agricultural improvement with record harvests, in 2004 Afghans in at least 17 provinces were again faced with the effects of the long-lasting drought, loss of groundwater, diminished snow packs and less rainfall. Besides the lack of water – exacerbated by the fact that many irrigation facilities were destroyed during conflict through military aggression and neglect – plant diseases and low-quality seeds have further increased crop losses. This situation has prompted many men from rural areas, as well as former tenants, sharecroppers and small landowners from semi-urban areas, to leave their places of origin. As one arbab (head or representative of a village) in Faryab Province indicated, “five hundred men will return from Iran, but a thousand might depart,” because of the inability of men to provide for their families.

Uneven economic development

Inequitable economic growth seriously undermines Afghanistan’s development, as trade opportunities tend to be monopolised by the rich and powerful. The informal economy and the black market account for a large proportion of the Afghan economy, while the booming drugs trade is controlled by commanders who keep farmers under pressure to produce. Even with some economic growth taking place in major cities since the end of the Taliban regime, large-scale investment and national emergency and development programmes have reached different regions in Afghanistan unevenly.

---

229 52.9 per cent 15 to 64 years; 2.4 per cent 65 years and over.
232 In 2003, Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons of opium and provided more than three-quarters of the world’s supply of illicit opium and heroin. See UNODC, 2004, 2004 World Drug Report, 59.
For instance, Herat in western Afghanistan is thriving because of its trade with Iran, and the related customs income has allowed for major investment in the city’s infrastructure. Although employment opportunities remain irregular and often insecure, most people (including returnees) with connections (wasita) have generally been able to find work. A few kilometres outside the city’s boundaries, however, overall employment opportunities remain limited because of the drought, relatively small landholdings and population growth, and the fact that no industries have been established. Across socio-economic classes and ethnicity, many men from Herat continue to depart to seek work in Iran.

In a small provincial capital such as Maimana, in the northwestern province of Faryab, there is a lack of regular work for skilled and unskilled labourers in industry, construction and trade. Those with traditional skills in small local industries like leather production face difficulties obtaining credit and selling their produce because of poor infrastructure, drought, and the impact of globalisation. Not even being able to cover the needs of its own inhabitants, provincial towns like Maimana have little hope of providing opportunities for its surrounding rural areas.

No rule of law

More than two decades of fighting has not only devastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure, it has also weakened government institutions and resulted in an absence of rule of law in many parts of the country. Along with difficult socio-economic conditions, Afghans of all ethnic groups continue to experience insecurity due to political instability.

At present, migration to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries is prompted by persecution and security-related concerns in only a minority of cases, however the levels of protection-related departures are still significant in some areas. While migration is therefore primarily economically driven, motivations may overlap and many men still flee their villages because of ethnic tensions, and, particularly in northern Afghanistan, to avoid forced conscription and taxation by some local commanders.
2. The migrant profile

Along with those external social, political, economic and environmental causes of migration, personal circumstances such as gender, age and family composition influence the decision to migrate. Recent migration has been shown in AREU’s study to be a male phenomenon, with both single and married men crossing the border into Iran and Pakistan to seek employment.

Networks of protection for families at home

A family’s integration within networks of support will partially determine whether a male member is able to seek work elsewhere. Access to resources (such as finances, goods and credit) from horizontal support networks is available when families have sufficient means to be able to reciprocate. Only then, or when vertical redistribution networks (on the basis of ethnicity or other commonalities) provide sufficient protection, can men depart with the knowledge that the remaining members of their families are taken care of. Contemporary labour migration cuts across all socio-economic classes and ethnic groups: daily labourers, small traders, sharecroppers, tenants and small landlords are all among those making their way to Iran to seek work.

Age and marital status of migrants

Men who migrate are mostly those who are able-bodied and physically strong – in their teens, twenties, thirties and early forties. Single men often seek work abroad to save for a dowry as well as to provide for their parents and siblings at home; husbands go in order to send remittances to cover the basic needs of their family.

For young men, migration is sometimes a “rite of passage” in which they are able to live independently and prove themselves as adults. They usually go to Iran once before they marry, so that they can save something for wedding expenses and gain some experience of living away from the parental home. The first stay in Iran is often the longest (sometimes up to four, five or even more years), while married men tend to leave for two years at the most.

Composition of the family

Many families try to always have one of their men in Iran as a means of ongoing financial support. It is age and marital status, but also the composition of the household, that determines who migrates: if a father is too old or ill then he will stay behind, and if a family has only one son it is unlikely that he will be allowed to leave for Iran. Husbands in their twenties, thirties and possibly early forties commonly migrate, along with single or engaged men in their teens or early twenties – not necessarily the oldest sons, but the oldest unmarried ones. In exceptional cases a wife or mother is left behind without male protection, but mostly one of her male relatives will provide the necessary care. There is often a migratory cycle among brothers: a man leaves for Iran; after two or three years one of his brothers joins him and benefits from his experiences and contacts; they stay together for a few weeks or months; then the first one goes back to Afghanistan, and the cycle continues.

Who is deciding?

Household decisions about migration are made within the context of broader domestic strategies. In some cases, adult men will make their own decision to migrate, but most often the decision will involve either the father or the brothers. Brothers and cousins, and sometimes more distant relations and neighbours, will help each other and possibly fund
the journey to Iran. The presence of friends and relations abroad will then influence the ultimate destination of the migrant.

There are different trends in the decisions of young men to migrate: most obtain the consent of their parents before leaving, while some are requested to go by their family for particular reasons, such as the prospect of forced conscription. In some cases, adolescents leave in groups without informing their parents – most often because they have been deceived by a smuggler who lures them with the prospect of high salaries and a luxurious lifestyle.

The role of women in deciding whether an adolescent migrates is not usually acknowledged in public. While it is assumed that married men make all the household decisions, women – especially mothers, where adolescent boys are concerned – may strongly influence the decision-making process.
3. Smuggling networks and ways of entering Iran

The large majority of Afghans travelling to Iran resort to using smugglers to guide them across the border. In western Afghanistan the two formal border crossings, namely Islam Qala in Herat province and Zaranj in Nimroz, are for this reason avoided. Moreover, people-smuggling routes constantly adapt to changing circumstances; currently most routes run through the provinces of Farah and Nimroz in southwestern Afghanistan.

Functions of smugglers

Smugglers organise the crossing of the border between Afghanistan and Iran. They also facilitate the maintenance of social ties over a vast geographical area, playing a vital role in the transnational networks of people scattered throughout different countries. The smuggling networks are diverse, and so are those occupying positions within these structures.

While some experienced migrants start out by themselves to reduce the costs of hiring a smuggler at the beginning of the journey, most end up becoming part of a group of up to 20 people. A guide from the same region normally accompanies them and works as an intermediary to get in touch with the people smuggler (generally a local Baluch or Pashtun) who organises the crossing of the international border, then hands the group over to another smuggler in Iran. This initial guide can be a relative or a neighbour from the place of origin; if so, he is more likely to take on additional functions such as providing credit, facilitating employment, acting as remittance specialist or messenger – especially if he accompanies the group all the way to the city of destination in Iran. An experienced migrant, who might receive a tip for his additional responsibility, or a representative of a group of relatives, sometimes takes on this guidance function.

Ethnicity, place of origin, and personal recommendations are of overriding importance in the selection of a guide before getting to the Baluch territories in southern Afghanistan, especially when the migrants are inexperienced. Collaboration with other smuggling networks takes place to provide the necessary protection and guidance: taxi drivers, for instance, can introduce migrants to smugglers (thereby increasing the costs).

Crossing the Iranian border is the most dangerous part of the journey, as a patrol can always intercept the convoy. The migrants are most commonly led by a Baluch smuggler who takes them across the frontier on foot. They are then taken to their final destination in vehicles provided by the smuggler, who handles the delicate relations with Iranian police along the way. The risks are high, although the checkpoints thin out as they move west. At each checkpoint it may be necessary to pay bribes, and it is always possible that the policemen or soldiers refuse the money and intern everyone in a camp before expelling them from the country.

Passport politics

Since the fall of the Taliban, an increasing number of migrants have been able to get a passport and a visa to go to Iran – although the majority continue to cross the border illegally. The official cost of a passport is 1,160 afghani (23.20 US$), yet many end up paying more because of the lack of information about formal passport prices and the huge inflation of costs caused by corruption. The same applies to the process of obtaining an Iranian visa, with official prices ranging from 30 US$ for a tourist visa to 90 US$ for a business visa.
Getting a passport through the formal procedures is time-consuming, and requires that the applicant possess an Afghan identity card or some other documentation proving his existence – which the large majority of Afghans do not have because of difficulties associated with the many years of conflict. Other obstacles to accessing passports include not having the cash nor the time to cover the necessary bribes, lodging and travel expenses if the province of origin does not have a functioning passport section in the local government (as is the case in Maimana). For those applicants without connections, there is often discrimination towards those from neighbouring provinces in the seven provincial capitals in which passports can be issued.

As a consequence of these difficulties, many would-be migrants obtain their passports illegally. Herat, like other main cities, has a thriving black market in which both new and used passports can be bought. Criminal networks are able to exploit already poor men who plan to go to Iran, causing them to enter significant debts in exchange for false passports. In 2004, it was said that villagers in one area in Faryab were buying illegal passports for 15,000 afghani (300 US$), which is almost 13 times the official price.

Deportation of illegal Afghan immigrants

Contrary to the intention of the Iranian government, the arrest and imprisonment of smugglers and illegal migrants fails to curb migration. Deportation stops a few Afghans from returning, but despite these examples of “failed” migrants, the majority will continue attempting to cross the border to find employment. Smuggling networks will remain in demand as long as the causes of departure, and the challenges around access to passports, are not addressed.

Deportations from Iran take place at the two formal border crossings in western Afghanistan: in Islam Qala a total of 26,732 Afghans were deported in 2002, and 28,311 in 2003. Deportees are mostly single men, with the majority picked up at the border or on their way to cities, and a smaller percentage arrested during ”round-ups” in major urban centres in Iran. An increase in deportations has occurred since the passing of the Iranian government’s deadline for all unregistered Afghans to leave the country by the end of August 2002.

Many Afghans return to Iran after being deported, in particular if the arrest has occurred immediately after entering the country. At this stage, migrants have not incurred any major costs (except psychologically and emotionally) as smugglers are often paid upon arrival. Deportees are also more inclined to try re-entering Iran to avoid returning home without having been able to send promised or expected remittances. For some men, however, the experience of deportation, which can include physical violence by Iranian police and forced labour, is so traumatic that they avoid ever having to go through it again.

Travel costs

The costs of getting to Iran are not only financial but can be emotional, in particular when deportation occurs or when smuggling enters the realm of trafficking – in which coercion, deception and exploitation characterise the travel and the period after arrival. If the migrant does not have any fellow travellers at the time of departure, nor support networks upon arrival, his vulnerability to exploitation is much greater.

---

The estimated cost of the trip from Faryab to Iran – including vehicle rent, commissions and bribes – is around 300 US$, while the shorter journey from Herat averages 150 to 200 US$. Experienced travellers, or those who are guided by a relative, are said to pay much less (30 to 60 US$). Most commonly the journey’s expenses are covered by a relative of the migrant, a brother or a cousin, who is already in Iran and had been given advance notice. Migrants are not released by the smugglers until the debt is paid, and if it needs to be earned in Iran by the migrant himself, it will take a minimum of two to three months’ unskilled construction work.

Without any form of social security once working, the costs and risks for Afghan migrants are significant. The lack of legal identity, labour contracts and insurance exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability, especially in the case of illness or injury. If forced to stop working, ill or injured migrants cannot afford health care and are likely to return to Afghanistan unless financial support is received from relatives or acquaintances. Moreover, migrants experience difficulties in accessing justice mechanisms in a context in which they already face discrimination, and in which they are often used as scapegoats in criminal cases. The emotional costs are apparent: many migrants experience a high degree of stress because of the risks of deportation, illness or injury, and legal problems – all of which is intensified by being away from their families.
4. The informal labour market in Iran

**Functions of transnational Afghan networks**

Afghan labour migrants, partially because they come without their families, are able to move around relatively easily in Iran, receiving support from their relatives, neighbours, smugglers, remittance specialists (hawaladars) and employers (who provide work, accommodation and are likely to maintain working relations with Iranian authorities). At the same time, there is a fine line between assistance and exploitation of Afghans – among each other, between migrants and smugglers, or between Iranians and Afghans, as in the case of employers liaising with smugglers at the cost of labourers.

Ideally, relatives or friends in the different neighbourhoods of the migrants’ arrival in Iran provide the initial care for new arrivals. They lend the money to pay the smuggler, offer a place to stay for the first couple of nights, and possibly make introductions to potential employers. The availability of acquaintances offers support and much-needed protection from incorporation into smugglers’ exploitative networks. Besides networks of relatives and neighbours, roommates, who often tend to be from the same ethnic group or place of origin, can become a close-knit unit, providing company and assistance wherever needed in a country foreign to all of them. They share household responsibilities such as cooking, cleaning and washing, and in cases of illness they take each other to hospital.

Afghans’ social networks in Iran function as sources of solidarity, credit, information on culture and practice in Iran, contacts with the labour market, and providers of initial accommodation as well as social and emotional support. These networks can be based on family connections, ethnic identity or acquaintances from the area of origin. Smugglers sometimes play an integral part in these networks, ensuring that money and news are brought to and from the migrant’s home in Afghanistan, although the latter function is becoming less important with the use of mobile and satellite phones.

**Iranian migration policy**

In the 1980s, when Iranian authorities were focused on Islamic solidarity, Afghans were better accepted in the social fabric of their host country. Especially during the war against Iraq and the ensuing reconstruction, Iran needed Afghan workers – even though the government wanted to avoid a Pakistan-type situation in which Afghans monopolised some sectors of the national economy.

Since the US-led international coalition forces intervened in Afghanistan causing the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the living conditions of Afghans in Iran have deteriorated, especially for families. Increasingly the Iranian authorities are trying to limit their number, arguing that their home country is now peaceful. Regulation of the labour market became stricter, and building sites and factories hiring illegal Afghan workers are fined severely. Education and health services welfare, which were previously available to Afghans in Iran, have been progressively withdrawn.

**The informal labour market**

In practice, most migrants, despite varying causes of departure and aspirations, become labourers in Iran. Afghans are primarily employed as unskilled workers (the most common employment opportunities are construction work, digging ditches and agricultural jobs) while they find that many activities are forbidden to them (for instance, they are not allowed to open a shop). Migrants from some rural areas have established a pattern of first taking on agricultural work before moving on to better paid, jobs in construction.
Irrespective of the kind of work, the jobs Afghans do in Iran are uninspiring and physically demanding.

Afghan workers are constantly moving around from one building site to the next. In this context, employment networks play a key role, and enterprising and competent individuals may be promoted to take charge of a work team. The foreman is usually an Afghan himself and is responsible for the hiring of workers. The Iranian employer allows him considerable leeway and, as long as things are running smoothly, does little to intervene in the everyday organisation of work. The workers form temporary groups around a central leader, and it is the relationship of each individual with that figure which is critical. The members of the team are not necessarily related through existing networks, since the sources of their relationships with the foreman may be diverse: paternal kinship, maternal kinship, kinship through marriage, neighbourhood circles in the village of origin, and so on.

**Afghan labourers in the context of the Iranian economy**

Iranians have a mixed feeling towards Afghans. On one hand, the media periodically points them out as being a cause of insecurity and taking employment opportunities from Iranians, even if the evidence for this is weak. But on the other hand, as the migrants mostly work outside the realms of official state administration, they constitute a flexible, cheap and highly productive labour source that is beneficial to the Iranian economy. It appears that many employers are prepared, therefore, to protect, stand guarantee and bail out their employees when they face problems with local and national authorities.

Iran’s Afghan policy needs to be considered in the context of the country’s string of economic collapses and modest upturns. The informal labour market has continued to develop strongly in spite of, or because of, these crises, and it is in this sector that Afghans have managed to create a niche for themselves. Despite its high levels of unemployment, the Iranian economy needs the help of these immigrant workers, who put up with low wages and have a reputation for hard work. In 1994 to 1995, for instance, their labour contributed 4.4 per cent to the Iranian GNP — a sum of several billion US$. Furthermore, money is sometimes spent on jewellery and other presents to take home to families in Afghanistan. Informal labour as well as expenditure patterns of Afghan migrants clearly contribute to the Iranian economy, though the full extent of this has not yet been studied.

**Length and patterns of stay**

Seasonal patterns of economic activity in both Iran and Afghanistan partially determine the departure and return of migrants. In spring, the need to cultivate the land draws more men of rural origin to their home areas, while in summer the number of travellers to Iran increases after the harvest, when no other work is available. In autumn and winter, migrants are more inclined to go home because of the decline in available construction work. However, other factors come into play as well, determined by family demands and major lifecycle events such as weddings.

A migrant is more likely to stay away longer when he is single. The first stay in Iran is often the longest (sometimes up to four, five or even more years), while married men tend to stay no more than two years at a time. In semi-urban Herat, unmarried men tended to stay for more than a year, while husbands opted for shorter trips, with some migrating annually or biannually. As it is more expensive and risky to travel to Iran than to Pakistan (where some Afghans go on a seasonal base for only a few months at a time), migrants tend to stay longer in Iran.
5. Income, expenditure and savings

Income and savings

Salaries are based on either daily rates or piecework, with the amount paid dependent on the kind of work, and the age and skill of the worker. Wages in Iran are at least twice those of a labourer in Afghanistan. An unskilled construction labourer can earn around 5,000–7,000 tomans (5–7 US$) per day and a skilled labourer around 8,000–10,000 tomans (8–10 US$); while a daily wage worker in Afghanistan earns 100–150 Afghanis (2–3 US$) per day and a skilled labourer around 300 Afghanis (6 US$), along with a greater degree of irregularity in work opportunities.

Migrants can save a relatively high proportion of their wage, as they only spend about 1,000 tomans per day on food and other basic needs. On average, depending on the migrant’s income and life expenses, about 70 to 80 per cent of their income can be remitted to Afghanistan.

Remittances

Remittance flows are a critical source of external funding for developing countries. They augment households’ income and increase the recipient country’s foreign exchange reserves. In particular, when unskilled workers emigrate, the gain for their country of origin is clear: spending on consumption and investment generates positive effects; families are sustained; further depletion of assets is halted; and in some cases there is accumulation of assets.

In Afghanistan, remittances and savings from Iran constitute a significant way of providing for the basic needs of relatives staying at home, by directly enhancing their purchasing power and by covering debts that have been contracted in Afghanistan, as well as by repaying the larger investment made in sending one of its sons to Iran. Remittances are used for social reasons (dowries and weddings, alms for the needy and votive gifts such as a meal offered to relatives and neighbours); for household consumption (food, clothes, medicines); for investment (land, houses, cars); and increasingly – with the relative improvement of security in Afghanistan – to start a business (shop, workshop, transport vehicle).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Costs, wages and remittances for migrants in Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official cost of passport</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of passport quoted in rural Faryab</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of Iranian tourist visa</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of Iranian business visa</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Smugglers’ charges for travel from Faryab to Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Smugglers’ charges for travel from Herat to Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daily wages in Afghanistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daily wages in Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hawala commission</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hawala commission through smuggler</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual remittances from Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The money is often sent to the head of the household, which is the father in those cases where the migrant is single. In other instances, the money is directly sent to the migrant’s wife or mother (not only if she is a widow) or the oldest brother if the father has died. Sometimes the amount is split and sent to different members of the same household. The average amount of remittances is 500 to 1,200 US$ per year, while one mason indicated that he was able to remit 2,000 US$ in one year. On average, remittances are sent four to six times a year, with a higher frequency for the provinces bordering Iran.234

In sum, remittances sustain families in their place of origin, and, in some instances when migrants have returned from displacement elsewhere, allow for sustainable reintegration. For most Afghans, migration is a coping strategy to maintain and diversify their assets, but also the corresponding money transfers play a crucial role in producing and reproducing social relations as they are the main means by which dispersed family members keep in contact and cooperate. Even debts may be seen as mechanisms of reciprocity – not only covering financial, economic and social needs, but also strengthening and maintaining social networks within and across borders.

**The hawala system: costs and benefits**

Since the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the media has taken a new interest in the hawala system – all too often stressing the uses that terrorist networks have made of it. Although its boundaries may not be clear to the outsider, the money transfer system established by Afghan migrants must not be simply equated with international smuggling and money laundering networks. Such a viewpoint is inappropriate, because it discredits a practice that has limited the humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. Operating outside of the control of both the Iranian and Afghan states, the informal hawala system is known for its efficiency in the absence of formal banking alternatives.

Remittance specialists, or hawaladars, provide a reliable, convenient, and cost-effective system of making international and domestic payments.235 The cost of money transfers through the hawala system and other informal money-transfer channels is generally lower than through formal channels; the system is therefore of benefit to those who occupy the lower echelons of Afghan society.

In 2004, hawaladars charged 3,000 tomans per 100,000 tomans (equivalent to a 3 percent commission) for transferring money from Iran to Afghanistan, while other channels such as smugglers sometimes charged even less. In Iran, some individuals were said to charge migrants the higher commission rate of 5 percent, acting as an intermediary between the migrant and the hawaladar and thereby increasing the costs to the labour migrant. Instances of swindlers posing as hawaladar have been reported. Despite the many advantages of this informal money transfer system, the fact that it remains outside official channels results not only in a fiscal loss for the states but also the potential for abuse of the system and loss for migrants.

Some estimates suggest that in the 1970s, Afghans working in Iran or the Gulf states sent home 100 to 300 million US$ per year. This flow of money, already far from insignificant, sharply increased in both absolute and relative terms during the more than 20 years of war. The hawala system has enabled many families to feed themselves, and remittances are considerably larger, and much better distributed, than the total sum of humanitarian aid. The social dimension of the money transfers may also be highly significant, as they play a crucial role in maintaining and developing social relations despite the prevailing dispersion and insecurity.

---

234 Estimates are based on remittance figures of migrants who have spent at least a year in Iran. If only one sum was remitted, or if the time period was not specified, then this figure was not used in calculating the average amount. Furthermore, some estimates might have been on the high side, possibly resulting in an inflated average estimate of annual remittances. See also Monsutti, 2005, *War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan*, New York & London: Routledge.

6. The way forward: Migration as a key livelihoods strategy

Migration is not only a response to war, insecurity and poverty, it is also a positive livelihoods strategy. It is therefore critical not to think of this phenomenon as transitory or temporary. Transnational networks and the remittance system established by Afghans are of practical importance for the policies of government, neighbouring countries and the assistance community. They play an under-appreciated but crucial role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and no attempt to rebuild the country sustainably can afford to ignore them.

The people of Afghanistan have shown proof of inventiveness and dynamism in their development of effective social strategies in the face of conflict and economic hardship. Migrants actively contribute to the livelihood of their families and to the reconstruction of their home country. More generally, the system of migration and remittances makes it possible for geographically dispersed networks to maintain strong social relations.

Afghan movement blurs the boundary between forced and voluntary migration, as the social strategies of people labelled as refugees and those of economic migrants are sometimes very similar. There is a very real necessity to look beyond the three solutions to the refugee problems recommended and promoted by UNHCR: voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, integration in the host country or resettlement in a third country.

Without denying the importance of protecting and assisting the most vulnerable people, a more comprehensive solution is urgently required – one that takes into account the strategies developed by the Afghan population in which people move back and forth between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries.

Even if the causes of migration are addressed to the greatest extent possible in Afghanistan, and the Government of Afghanistan is able to gradually provide more effective, authoritative and democratic guidance, migration will undoubtedly continue because of population growth, the underdevelopment of the country, persistent lack of rule of law, and potential natural disasters, as well as corresponding demands of the neighbouring countries’ economies.

To eliminate the costs – financial and otherwise – to Afghan migrants who seek work in Iran, while ensuring both individual and state security, the following recommendations are made.

- The issue of Afghans migrating to seek labour elsewhere should be recognised by both the government and the assistance community as a key livelihoods strategy, and an important factor in the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a whole. Despite changing political and economic conditions, migration persists as a consequence of many years of conflict and drought, and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
- A continued strengthening of bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Iran should include the establishment of a legal labour migration framework and an increased presence of the Afghan government in Iran (including the involvement of the Afghan Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs). Such a framework should facilitate formal labour migration and provide a clear legal identity and legal rights for labourers. There should be a policy shift from limiting migration to managing migration – with both governments reaping the shared benefits of greater international labour mobility, and avoiding the negative effects of people smuggling and corruption.
- The Afghan government must improve the transparency of its administration and ensure increased access to passports able to be obtained formally, without bribes.
• An increased awareness of the contribution, both in labour and otherwise, of Afghans to the Iranian economy would help to reduce discrimination against Afghans in Iran.
• Although the case of Afghans migrating to their neighbouring countries tends to blur the boundaries between what is internationally recognised as “refugee status” and labour migration, it is critical to remember that there are still vulnerable people who need to be protected and assisted. In line with international conventions, refugee protection must be upheld, and a screening mechanism for potential refugees must be established.
About the authors

Elca Stigter was an AREU consultant who researched and wrote two AREU transnational networks case studies in 2004–05. Alessandro Monsutti is AREU’s transnational networks research project adviser and the author of Guerres et Migrations (2004). He is currently teaching social anthropology and methods in social sciences at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, Geneva.

About the research project

This briefing paper draws on the findings of the two transnational network case studies published by AREU in 2004/2005, and is part of AREU’s ongoing transnational networks research project funded by the European Commission (EC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Stichting Vluchteling. The project comprises research in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.