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**The Role and Impact of Economic and Social Councils and Similar
Institutions (ESC-Sis) in the Response to the Global, Financial,
Economic and Jobs Crisis**

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List of Abbreviations

AICESIS and	International Association of Economic and Social Councils Similar Institutions
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
ESC	Economic and Social Council
ESC-SIs	Economic and Social Council and Similar Institutions
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GJP	Global Jobs Pact
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILC	International Labour Conference
ILO	International Labour Organisation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

1. Introduction

The global, financial, economic and jobs crisis has highlighted the unprecedented degree of globalization in the contemporary world. In halting the economic downturn, many countries were quick to adopt reforms and implement austerity measures, often with far-reaching impacts on society¹. While some countries have to some extent advanced on the path to recovery, others are still struggling thereby placing a persisting drag on a global recovery.

From the outset, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been at the forefront of the international response to the global crisis². Since the beginning of 2008 the ILO Governing Body agreed on a series of orientations to assist countries in developing immediate crisis response policies. The International Labour Office convened tripartite sectoral meetings in certain areas, such as the financial sector, to assess and explore mechanisms to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Research efforts on the effects of the crisis in countries, as well as on national and international responses culminated in two key background documents³ for the 100th Session of the International Labour Conference (ILC), in 2009. At the conference, ILO constituents recognised the urgency for tripartite action and adopted the Global Jobs Pact (GJP), which firmly placed social dialogue at all levels alongside the need for promoting Decent Work opportunities as pivotal to a successful crisis-response⁴. Moreover, the ILO also engaged other international organizations, such as the OECD (through information sharing), the G20 (at the 2009 London Jobs Summit, which resulted in tasking the ILO to assess taken and required policy measures), and the wider United Nations System (by participating in formulating the nine joint crisis initiatives, which included the Global Jobs Pact and the Social Protection Floor)⁵. In addition, the ILO organised various regional meetings, such as the October 2009 ILO Conference on Africa's response to the crisis in Johannesburg, which saw the adoption of a Plan of Action on the Social Economy⁶, and the 9th ILO European Regional Meeting in April 2013. The corresponding adoption of the Oslo Declaration reaffirmed the role of the ILO in promoting Decent Work and International Labour Standards as means to recover from the crisis⁷. Finally, at the 102nd session of the ILC in 2013, reference was once again made to the value of social dialogue in times of crisis, and a framework for strengthening and promoting social dialogue was

¹ ILO (2011) *The Global Crisis: Causes, Responses and Challenges*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): iv.

² For an overview of the ILO crisis response in the past years, see: ILO. *ILO Global Job Crisis Observatory. The ILO Response*. Available online at: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/lib/financialcrisis/ilo/> (accessed November 7, 2013) and ILO. *ILO Global Job Crisis Observatory*. Available online at: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/jobcrisis/f?p=11105:55:2390846121415292::NO::> (accessed November 7, 2013).

³ ILO (2009) "Tackling the Global Jobs Crisis. Recovery through Decent Work Policies", *Report of the Director-General*, International Labour Conference, 98th Session 2009 (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/98thSession/ReportssubmittedtotheConference/WCMS_106162/lang--en/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2013); ILO (2009) *The Financial and Economic Crisis: A Decent Work Response* (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_107583.pdf (accessed October 20, 2013).

⁴ ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): 128-130.

⁵ ILO (2009) *The ILO Role in Global Response to the Crisis*. Presentation by José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, at the Meeting of the European Members of the International Organization of Employers (IOE), Riga, Latvia, September 11, 2009; UNSCEB (2009) *Joint Crisis Initiatives (JCIS): UN System-Wide Response*. Available online at : <http://www.unsceb.org/content/joint-crisis-initiatives-jcis-un-system-wide-response> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁶ ILO (2009) *Regional conference on the Social Economy – Africa's Response to the Global Crisis*. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/gender/Events/WCMS_117448/lang--en/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁷ ILO (2013) *The Oslo Declaration: Restoring Confidence in Jobs and Growth* (Oslo, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/europe-and-central-asia/erm-9/WCMS_210356/lang--nl/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2013).

adopted⁸. The International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS) also actively responded to the crisis.. In October 2010 an ILO-AICESIS-Benin conference led to the adoption of the Cotonou Declaration of African ESCs on the implementation of the GJP through Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCP)⁹. In 2012, AICESIS presented a report to the G20, as a synthesis of discussions between its more than 70 members. This report assessed the impact of the crisis and proposed a set of criteria for overcoming the crisis along a sustainable and inclusive framework for recovery. In the same year AICESIS presented a similar report at the Rio+20 UN Conference, and participated at the ECOSOC Youth Forum and subsequently shared a report on the youth employment crisis¹⁰.

In the past decades, economic crises have become commonplace. The many experiences the ILO has studied over the decades show that the state alone is unable to effectively mediate their socio-economic impact¹¹. Social dialogue is an irreplaceable form of governance in crisis management and in balancing the impacts of an increasingly complex globalization process. Social dialogue enables more effective policy-design with a wider set of possible solutions. It helps to ensure industrial and social peace and increased legitimacy and ownership over policies with effective compliance during implementation. Importantly, social dialogue can provide support in mitigating adverse effects on the most vulnerable groups¹². As such, Economic and Social Councils or Similar Institutions (ESC-SIs) have a key role to play in any effective crisis-response by bringing together key segments of society and thereby enabling the systemic creation of broad support for tailor-made policy measures. The ILO-AICESIS conference in Madrid, December 3-4, 2013, for which this background paper will provide a basis for discussion, will be an important exercise in determining what the role and policy responses of ESC-SIs have been during the Global, Financial, and Economic Jobs Crisis.

Following this introduction, the second chapter of this paper gives a brief overview of the various roles and forms of national social dialogue institutions, followed by a summary of possible preconditions and challenges with regard to ESC-SIs and social dialogue. The paper will show that these preconditions can become even more important during times of crisis. The third chapter

⁸ ILO (2013) *Report of the Committee for the Recurrent Discussion on Social Dialogue – Provisial Record*, International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, Geneva, June 2013 (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_216305.pdf (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁹ Decent Work Country Programmes (DWCP) have been established as the main vehicle for delivery of ILO support to countries, each organised around a limited number of country programme priorities and outcomes. For more information, see: ILO (2012) *Decent Work Country Programmes*. Available online at: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/program/dwcp/> (accessed November 7, 2013); AICESIS (2010) *AICESIS News!* N. 19, November 2010. Available online at: http://www.aicesis.org/spip.php?page=newsletter&id_newsletter=80 (accessed November 7, 2013).

¹⁰ AICESIS (2012) *Impacts of the Global Crisis: A Vision of Civil Society*. Available online at: <http://www.aicesis.org/spip.php?article1176&lang=en> (accessed November 7, 2013); AICESIS (2012) *Further Steps to Achieve Sustainable Development through Green Economy* (Seoul, AICESIS). Available online at: <http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/754120619%20side%20event%20Report%20final%20EN.doc> (accessed November 13, 2013); AICESIS (2012) *Promoting Employment and Socio-Occupational Integration of Young People* (Algiers, AICESIS). Available online at: http://www.aicesis.org/IMG/doc_130903-rapport_final_emploi_des_jeunes_EN-2.doc (accessed November 13, 2013).

¹¹ Auer, P. (2000) *Employment Revival in Europe: Labour Market Success in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands* (Geneva, ILO); ILO (1996) "Tripartite Consultation at the National Level on Economic and Social Policy", *Report VI, International Labour Conference, 83th Session* (Geneva, ILO); Fashoyin, T. (2004) "Tripartite Cooperation, Social Dialogue and National Development", *International Labour Review*, Vol. 143, No. 4; Rychly, L. (2009) "Social Dialogue in Times of Crisis: Finding Better Solutions", ILO, Dialogue, WP No. 1.

¹² ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): 128-130; ILO (2011) *The Global Crisis: Causes, Responses and Challenges*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): 3.

serves as the main body of the paper by outlining the various experiences of ESC-SIs in policy-making during the crisis. Besides secondary literature, the paper uses the findings of a survey conducted by ILO-AICESIS among 47 ESC-SIs. It will become apparent that during the crisis a share of ESC-SIs have been at the centre of policy-responses, or have played a supporting role. However, in other cases, mainly in Europe ESC-SIs have played a more marginal role and have been unable to fulfil their potential role. Finally, in the closing chapter, the conclusion of this paper is followed by a list of tentative discussion points for the conference.

2. ESC-SIs and Challenges to Social Dialogue

2.1 Forms of ESC-SIs

As of 2012, 139 ILO member states had established an ESC-SI (see table 1. in section 3.2), with more than 95% of these having ratified ILO - *Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144)*¹³. Across these member states, there is a wide variety of ESC-SIs, for example an ESC-SI can have a plenary body as sizeable as the 200-strong Chinese Economic and Social Council (the French ESC-SI has an even greater number of members with 233), many of these committees debate on a wide set of issues relating to social and economic development; it may resemble the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs of Poland, with 60 counsellors; or even take the shape of the Tripartite Labour Council of Vanuatu, which includes nine members and provides recommendations and advice solely on labour market issues. The composition of members can also vary. The ILO mainly promotes tripartism as social dialogue between government, employers and workers, however it also recognises the value of tripartism “plus”, based on the principle involvement of civil society organizations alongside traditional social partners¹⁴. This composition is especially suitable for councils whose scope goes beyond issues related to the labour market, as well as for those countries with commonly weak organisations of workers and a significant share of informal employment¹⁵.

Similarly ESC-SIs also vary in their mandate, which coincides with the ILO’s working definition of social dialogue as “all types of negotiation, consultation or information sharing among representatives of governments, employers, and workers or between those of employers and workers on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy”¹⁶. Information sharing is the most limited form of social dialogue. It can however be very valuable in creating informed policy decisions and ultimately lead to more substantive discussions. Consultation occurs when views on (proposed) policies and legislation are exchanged (the majority of ESC-SIs fall within this category). It is crucial that all parties feel their views have been seriously considered and in some countries, the government is therefore obliged to react to, or share with parliament, the opinions of the social partners. Consultation can lead to ownership of policies by the concerned constituents, leading to more effective implementation, as well as a broader analysis of a problem in society,

¹³ ILO (2013) ‘Social Dialogue. Recurrent Discussion under the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization’, *Report IV. International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013* (Geneva, International Labour Office): 43.

¹⁴ See the ‘Resolution Concerning Tripartism and Social Dialogue’. ILO (2002) *Resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 90th Session*, Geneva, June 2002 (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/pdf/res.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2013).

¹⁵ ILO (2009) *National Level Social Dialogue Institutions. Profiles from around the World. Revised Version* (Geneva, ILO): 4.

¹⁶ ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): 17

which can result in a wider set of solutions. It also allows the social partners to understand the governments' intent, and retain influence without making unwanted commitments to pacts. The third form, concertation/negotiation, is the most formal and binding form of social dialogue, and involves negotiating agreements between conflicting interests.

However, a clear distinction between these three types is not necessarily rigid when it comes to ESC-SIs. Countries also often have more than one ESC-SI, with ideally a sound division of labour between institutions. In all forms, the core of social dialogue decision-making revolves around consensus-building, concessions and creating win-win agreements made on a voluntary basis¹⁷.

2.2 Preconditions

For social dialogue to produce enduring results certain basic conditions must be met. This is not to say that in the absence of certain preconditions, social dialogue is not worth pursuing. Establishing participatory democracy should be perceived as a goal in itself and practice in learning how to cooperate and reformulate narrow interests towards common goals will also breed results¹⁸. However, as the ILO has argued before, certain preconditions are conducive to successful social dialogue outcomes¹⁹. Indeed, a study on social dialogue in Europe during the crisis shows that countries which meet the preconditions show a greater success in formulating a collective response in mitigating the impact of the crisis²⁰. In outlining the experiences of ESC-SIs during the crisis, these institutional factors must therefore not be overlooked. A diminished presence of the preconditions listed below, might be a partial cause of undesired experiences during the crisis²¹:

- Democratic foundations and freedom of association allow social partners to organize freely, develop professional organisations, and freely express their interests.
- Strong, legitimate, independent and representative workers' and employers' organizations, with appropriate technical competence, to enable accurate analyses of problem-load and solutions as well as the capacity to deliver and comply with commitments.
- Political will and a sense of responsibility and commitment of all parties to engage in social dialogue.
- Sufficient institutionalisation, through funding and well-defined legal mandates, which ensure continuity of operations during political change.
- Practice and experience in breeding trust as well as negotiation and cooperation skills.
- Accurate information and sound information exchange.
- Sufficient public profile from ESC-SIs to influence the policy process and societal support²².

¹⁷ ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office): 20-25, 30, 83.

¹⁸ Ibid: 40-46.

¹⁹ Ghellab, Y. (2009) 'Recovering from the Crisis through Social Dialogue', *Dialogue in Brief No.1 November 2009* (Geneva, International Labour Office); ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office); Rychly, L. (2009) 'Social Dialogue in Times of Crisis: Finding Better Solutions', *Working Paper No. 1*. (Geneva, International Labour Office).

²⁰ Eurofound (2012) *Social Dialogue in Times of Global Economic Crisis* (Dublin, Eurofound): 61-63.

²¹ ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office).

²² ILO (2013) 'Social Dialogue. Recurrent Discussion under the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization', *Report IV. International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013* (Geneva, International Labour Office): 42; Mihes, C. (2011) *Challenges and Solutions for Economic and Social Council in the Western Balkans and Moldova at a Time of Crisis* (ILO, Geneva): 9.

2.3 Challenges during times of crisis

In times of crisis a lack of required preconditions may easily translate into a failure for social dialogue to produce results. An exercise in ascertaining the presence of any of the above listed conditions might explain the experience an ESC-SI has had. However, the nature of a crisis implies additional challenges to the role and impact of ESC-SIs.

First of all, tripartite social dialogue requires time when resolving complex issues²³. In contrast, during a crisis it is often perceived that measures should be formulated and implemented within a limited timeframe, thereby leaving little room for reaching a consensus. Parties can even disagree on the underlying causes of the crisis, let alone agree on a solution.

Secondly, even when a consensus has been reached, the socio-economic context is prone to rapid change, often invalidating agreed solutions or inhibiting proper implementation. In addition, an uncertain outlook affects negotiation dynamics as parties are uncertain about the future, both in socio-economic developments as well as their own negotiating power and interests, which can hinder determining win-win solutions.

Thirdly, previously perceived common interests or successes with concession bargaining do not guarantee future results. Particularly, in times of crises, political alliances or common interests might change dramatically as the impact of the crisis becomes apparent. Within and between actors, interests and political alliances might be reformulated, and concessions made during an economic boom might be much more costly during a crisis. Even the configuration of interest groups themselves might change with a changing member base, changing demands, and a change in attitudes towards social dialogue. Internal strain on social groups and their representative organisations becomes especially intractable when targeted groups in society are resisting implementation of crisis measures, entailing a failure to deliver by social partners.

Fourthly, it might become apparent during a crisis that those most affected, or those whose cooperation is needed for effective implementation, had not been included in the policy-making process, greatly hindering informed and legitimate policy implementation.

Fifthly, the independence of the parties to create room for manoeuvre within social dialogue might become constrained by the presence of external actors exercising power. For example, during the current and past financial crises, international financial institutions (IFI) often played a dominant role in shaping policy responses, using their financial means as leverage. Besides issues with legitimacy and democracy, this leads to decreased ownership and public support, and sometimes decreased appropriateness of policies. In addition, the austerity measures prescribed by IFIs have typically neglected or purposefully ignored public deliberation, curtailing the role of social dialogue and ESC-SIs²⁴. At the same time, the global aspect of this crisis renders national institutions invalid if their involvement in the response is only limited the national level, while the bulk of more significant policy-decisions are made on the international level.

²³ ILO (2013) *National Tripartite Social Dialogue: An ILO Guide for Improved Governance*. (Geneva, International Labour Office).

²⁴ Ghellab, Y. and K. Papadakis (2011) 'The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Europe: State Unilateralism or Social Dialogue?', in ILO. *The Global Crisis: Causes, Responses and Challenges* (Geneva, International Labour Office): 81.

However, it should not be forgotten that crises also present opportunities. Previous deadlocks might be overcome as a shared sense of urgency and the necessity to act collectively can induce parties to start cooperating or deepen their pre-existing collaboration.

3. Role and Impact ESC-SIs

3.1 Impact of the crisis and policy responses

Although every country has felt the impact of the crisis, the severity and persistence of its effects have varied. Many developed countries immediately experienced an impact due to their integrated financial and trade channels. However, even for developing countries low primary commodity prices, a sharp decrease in foreign investment flows and demand, modest decreases in remittances²⁵ and tourism, did not fail to have an impact.

The close integration of much of Europe with global financial markets has meant the crisis has had a direct impact on the continent. In response, besides many national fiscal stimulus measures²⁶ especially those targeting the banking sector, the European Council approved a €200 billion Recovery Plan in 2008²⁷. This has likely cushioned the already severe 4.3% contraction of gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union (EU) in 2009. Despite a modest recovery of 2.1% in the following year, from 2011 onwards, the situation deteriorated as it became increasingly clear many countries within and beyond the Eurozone had difficulty following the propagated fiscal consolidation. Facing intense pressure from international financial institutions and financial markets many have seen themselves forced to adopt austerity measures, often through emergency laws or without consultation by social partners. Greece, Ireland and Portugal committed themselves through a Memorandum of Understanding with the 'Troika'²⁸, which involved severe reforms in exchange for a bailout. Similarly, the Troika has urged countries to reduce their public deficit. As such many countries have responded through the reformation of their labour and social security legislation, including a weakening of freedom of association and collective bargaining²⁹. Prospects on a recovery slimmed again as unemployment rose, and economic growth further decelerated. Noting these developments, the ILO has repeatedly warned that an austerity driven policy response is not the solution. Instead, ILO research has found that it results weaker economic growth, decreased productivity and rising unemployment. As such, the ILO has continuously propagated a shift away from austerity focussed policies, to a job-centred policy response³⁰. These policies have been further reaffirmed through the Oslo Declaration which states that:³¹

²⁵ Remittances only dropped by 5.2% in 2009, and quickly recovered. Source: World Bank (2012) *Global Mobility Unaffected by Financial Crisis, as Remittances Remained Resilient*. Available online at: <http://go.worldbank.org/MVBD7SDKSO> (accessed October 18, 2013).

²⁶ Watt, A (2009) *A Quantum of Solace? An Assessment of Fiscal Stimulus Packages by EU Member States in Response to the Economic Crisis*. (Brussels, European Trade Union Institute). Available online at: http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ETUI-Working_Paper_WATT_UK_ok-hi_.pdf (accessed October 20, 2013).

²⁷ ILO (2009) *The Financial and Economic Crisis: A Decent Work Response* (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_107583.pdf (Accessed October 20, 2013).

²⁸ The International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission.

²⁹ Clauwaert, S. and I. Schomann (2012) *The Crisis and National Labour Law Reforms: A Mapping Exercise* (Brussels, ETUI): 6, 8.

³⁰ ILO (2013) *ILO Calls for Urgent Shift to a Job-Centred Crisis Response in Europe*. April 8, 2013. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/brussels/press/press-releases/WCMS_211054/lang--en/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2013); ILO (2011) *World of Work Report 2011* (Geneva, ILO). Available online at:

“Fiscal consolidation, structural reform and competitiveness, on the one hand, and stimulus packages, investment in the real economy, quality jobs, increased credit for enterprises, on the other, should not be competing paradigms”.

In much of the world the crisis had a more indirect impact and after a dip late 2008 and early 2009, GDP growth quickly picked up again³². Africa’s quick recovery is attributed to a variety of factors, including previous trade diversification towards Asia, sound macroeconomic policies and fiscal surpluses in oil exporting countries, as well as fiscal support³³. Similarly, East-Asia’s quick recovery can partially be attributed to fiscal stimulus packages enacted by countries. For China this amounted to a staggering 13% of GDP³⁴. For Latin America, global demand for commodities from Asia increased, and several Latin American countries successfully managed counter-cyclical stimuli. The previous economic performance of the region also coincided with lower unemployment levels, and rates of poverty, which in turn boosted domestic demand. This trend has only suffered mildly from the crisis, and is expected to improve further³⁵. Similarly to the experience of the other regions, oil exporters in the Arab world weathered the crisis reasonably well, despite a slight decline in average growth rates. In response, the government of Saudi Arabia introduced a stimulus package amounting to 11.3% of its GDP in 2009 (the second biggest after China)³⁶.

However, having resisted the initial drops in foreign investment and trade, as the problems in the Eurozone continue and the initial fiscal stimulus packages are phased out; those regions which

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_166021.pdf (accessed November 7, 2013); ILO (2012) *World of Work Report 2012* (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_179453.pdf (accessed November 7, 2013); ILO (2012) *Eurozone Job Crisis: Trends and Policy Responses* (ILO, Geneva). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_184910.pdf (accessed October 20, 2013). ILO (2013) *Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip* (Geneva, ILO); ILO (2012) *Global Employment Trends 2012: Preventing a Deeper Jobs Crisis* (Geneva, ILO).

³¹ ILO (2013) The Oslo Declaration: *Restoring confidence in jobs and growth*. Ninth European Regional Meeting Oslo, Norway, 8–11 April 2013. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_210356.pdf (accessed November 7, 2013).

³² World Bank. *GDP Growth (annual %)*. Available online at:

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-ZJ-EU-ZG-Z4-1A?display=graph> (accessed October 18, 2013).

³³ World Bank. *Africa Overview*. Available online at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview> (accessed October 18, 2013); AfDB (2010) ‘Africa in the Post-Crisis Global Economy: Turning the Recovery into Strong, Sustained and Shared Growth’, *Committee of Ten Policy Briefs*. African Development Bank. Available online at: [http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/C-0%20Note%201%20English%20\(final\)_for%20posting.pdf](http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/C-0%20Note%201%20English%20(final)_for%20posting.pdf) (accessed October 18, 2013); Kasekende, L.; Brixova, Z. And L. Ndikumana (2010) ‘Africa: Africa’s Counter-Cyclical Policy Responses to the Crisis’, *Journal of Globalization and Development* (1) 1.

³⁴ ILO / International Institute for Labour Studies (2009) *The Financial Crisis: A Decent Work Response* (Geneva, ILO): 27 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_107583.pdf (accessed October 18, 2013).

³⁵ Ocampo, J.A. (2009) ‘Latin America and the Global Financial Crisis’, *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (33): 703-724. Available online at: <http://www.perpustakaan.depkeu.go.id/folderjurnal/703.full.pdf> (accessed October 18, 2013); World Bank. *LCR Crisis Briefs*. Available online at: <http://go.worldbank.org/2IWPN6MH20> (accessed October 18, 2013); World Bank. *Latin America and Caribbean Overview*. Available online at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview> (accessed October 18, 2013).

³⁶ ILO / International Institute for Labour Studies (2009) *The Financial Crisis: A Decent Work Response* (Geneva, ILO): 27 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_107583.pdf (accessed October 18, 2013).

experienced a quick recovery now face slowing growth rates³⁷. While global unemployment decreased over 2009-10, the figure rose to 197.3 million in 2012, an increase of 4.2 million over the previous year, and a 16.8% increase when compared to 2007³⁸. Furthermore, in most parts of the world many development challenges still remain such as vast decent work deficits, growing inequality, informality, unproductive or low-value added work, in addition to structural youth unemployment and underemployment problems for certain countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa youth unemployment averaged 11.9% in 2012. In East Asia job creation rates slowed down in 2012, increasing unemployment figures. Especially for young job seekers, the labour market has become more difficult to navigate³⁹. Chronic problems with (youth) unemployment have also affected those non-oil exporting countries in the Arab States. Countries which faced social unrest during the Arab Spring showed much lower growth, or even contraction. For most of the countries in the Arab region, the potential for social dialogue is hampered by previously weak social partners and weak institutionalisation of tripartism in many countries.

3.2 General Overview Survey results – Role and Impact

88 ESC-SIs around the world were contacted between July and August 2013 with the aim of collecting information on their experiences throughout the crisis (see Annex 3 for a copy of the questionnaire). A little over half of these, 47, returned a completed questionnaire, the majority of which were from Europe, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. This distribution more or less follows the total existence of ESC-SIs around the world by region (see table 1.).

All survey respondents indicated that their respective ESC-SI was not established with respect to the current crisis. With 79% of surveyed ESC-SIs indicating that they took one or more initiatives in light of the crisis, only ten ESC-SIs remained passive on their own account. In 27 cases ESC-SIs adopted a special report or opinion on the crisis, in 21 cases a specific committee or working group was established, in 17 cases a special internal meeting was convened, and in 16 cases a conference was organised in light of the crisis (see figure 1. on how this is distributed across regions). **Brazil, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Vietnam** did all of the above, whereas eleven other ESC-SIs conducted three of the above activities (see Annex 1. for an overview of activities by country).

Table 1. Distribution Respondents and ESC-SIs by Region⁴⁰

Regions	Respondents	Share in %	Number of ESC-SIs	Share in %
Africa ⁴¹	14	30%	38	27%
Americas	8	17%	29	21%
Arab states	3	6%	4	3%

³⁷ ILO (2013) *Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip* (Geneva, ILO); World Bank. *Latin America and Caribbean Overview*. Available online at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview> (accessed October 18, 2013).

³⁸ ILO (2013) *Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip* (Geneva, ILO).


³⁹ Africa Renewal Online (2013) *Africa's Youth: A "Ticking Time Bomb" or an Opportunity?* Available online at: <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/africa%E2%80%99s-youth-%E2%80%9Cticking-time-bomb%E2%80%9D-or-opportunity> (accessed October 18, 2013); ILO. Key Indicators Labour Market (KILM); ILO (2013) *Global Employment Trends 2013: Recovering from a Second Jobs Dip* (Geneva, ILO); ILO (2012) *Global Employment Trends 2012: Preventing a Deeper Jobs Crisis* (Geneva, ILO).

⁴⁰ ILO (2009) *National Level Social Dialogue Institutions. Profiles from around the World. Revised Version* (Geneva, ILO).

⁴¹ In this background paper North-African countries are shared under Arab States.

Asia & the Pacific	4	9%	23	17%
Europe & Cent. Asia	18	38%	45	32%
Total	47	100%	139	100%

Figure 1. Specific Initiative in Response to the Crisis by Region (No. of respondents)



10 ESC-SIs indicated that they were not involved by the national public authorities in response to the crisis, which is 21% of respondents. 73% of ESC-SIs were however asked to participate in the crisis response in one way or another. Figure 2. specifies these activities per region (see section 3.3. for specific examples of countries). For all regions besides the Americas, the majority of ESC-SIs consulted on policy packages or advised on drafting legislation and policies. ESC-SIs were involved in numerous different policy responses by the government. Figure 3. illustrates how this activity is distributed across the regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, ESC-SIs were often involved in sectoral policies and job creation programmes (such as in **Benin**, **Burkina Faso**, **Cameroun** and **South-Africa**, amongst others). In Europe and Central Asia, ESC-SIs were more often involved in job creation programmes as well (including **France**, **Portugal**, the **Netherlands** and **Russia**), on reforms of labour legislation, while sectoral policies were only designed four times with the help of ESC-SIs, which is a low share in the overall activity of ESC-SIs from Europe and Central Asia (see Annex 1 for an overview per country).

Figure 2. Activities of ESC-SIs by Region (No. of respondents)





Figure 3. Involvement of ESC-SIs per Activity by Region (No. of respondents)



3.3 Common Experiences during the Crisis

Based on the questionnaire and secondary literature, four common experiences can be deducted: ESC-SIs at the centre of the crisis-response; failed concertation and unilateral action; ESC-SIs as advisory and consultative bodies; and ESC-SIs which remained passive.

3.3.1 ESC-SIs at the centre of the crisis-response

During the initial outbreak of the crisis, most states responded by issuing fiscal stimulus packages to mitigate the impact of the crisis and accelerate recovery. ESC-SIs in some countries have been at the centre of this policy response. The ESC-SIs of **South-Africa**, the **Czech Republic**, **Belgium**, **Slovenia**,

the **Netherlands, Poland** (initial negotiations took place outside ESC-SI), **Brazil, Lithuania**, and the **Republic of Korea** all experienced successful negotiations of national agreements on anti-crisis measures in 2008-2009 (although in Korea the second biggest trade union did not sign, and in Lithuania certain partners also abstained). Commonly, measures included provisions on part-time employment, work-sharing, strengthening of social security, training, fiscal support, investment in infrastructure and job creation or retention programmes. At a later stage in the crisis some ESC-SIs were involved in new collective responses, such as in **Bulgaria, Honduras, the Netherlands**, and **Slovenia**.

Honduras Grand National Agreement

In 2012 the Social Economic Council of Honduras was tasked with producing measures in response to the impact of the crisis. Tripartite consultations led to the signing of the Grand National Agreement for Economic Growth and Social Equity (GAN), which holds measures to target the high rates of unemployment and underemployment, reduction of public spending, public investment, competitiveness, export promotion, credit expansion for SMEs, provisions for private sector workers, vulnerable workers and more. It is estimated that the agreement will lead to at least 50,000 jobs in Construction and Infrastructure, Light Manufacturing and Assembling, Renewable Energy, SMEs, Agriculture and Services. Public Investment in infrastructure and irrigation of nine thousand acres will provide at least 30,000 new jobs, which is expected to increase through forward and backward linkages.

The GAN also provided for the establishment of six committees on the Investment Climate, Simplification of Administration, Consumption, Education, Employment and Agriculture.

Within this group of countries, circumstances with respect to the impact of the crisis differed as well as their industrial relations profiles and their configuration of ESC-SIs. For instance, the strength of unions at the national level varies, as does the legacy of social dialogue. The ESC-SIs of Brazil, Korea and South Africa are tripartite plus, that of Bulgaria is a civic dialogue platform, while the others are tripartite. Furthermore, the economies in Europe have typically been more affected by the crisis and the impact of austerity measures, than those in other parts of the world. However, the variety of successful and collective responses across countries has shown how the presence of different preconditions does not pose insurmountable barriers⁴². In addition, these cases also demonstrate that an ESC-SI does not explicitly have to be a tripartite negotiation platform to remain relevant. For instance, in **Belgium**, the bipartite National Labour Council (CNT – *Conseil National du Travail*) provided consultations and support of implementation for the 2009-2010 Inter professional agreement, which was implemented alongside the government stimulus package. In January 2013, it oversaw the signing of a social pact (social partners were unable to produce a second agreement for 2011-2012. However during that period the CNT continued to advise the new government on legislative reforms)⁴³.

⁴² Baccaro, L. and S. Heeb (2011) *Social Dialogue during the Financial and Economic Crisis. Results from the ILO/World Bank Inventory using a Boolean Analysis on 44 countries* (Geneva, ILO).

⁴³ OKE - Economic and Social Council of Greece (2013) *Annual Meeting of the Secretaries General of the Economic and Social Councils of the EU Member States and the European Economic and Social Committee* (Athens, OKE): 9-11.

The Quadripartite Pact for Overcoming the Economic Crisis in the Republic of Korea

The tripartite plus Economic and Social Development Commission (ESDC) acts as an advisory and social dialogue forum. In October 2008, the ESDC proposed a social pact to overcome the negative impact of the crisis. In February 2009, an emergency meeting involving the social partners, government, civil society organizations and religious leaders, led to a series of consultations. At the beginning of these negotiations social partners found it difficult to reach a consensus while mounting dissent and backlashes occurred in the private and public sectors. The government undertook steps to maintain social dialogue and in the end a comprehensive pact was concluded. The 'Quadripartite Pact for Overcoming the Economic Crisis', which provides for work-sharing, job retention, financial support for income loss, and social security net expansion for low-income vulnerable groups and the unemployed. In return, unions committed to industrial peace. The tripartite plus Committee for Implementation within the ESDC monitors and evaluates implementation of the 64 agreed items based on the implementation plan and its assessment standards. Following the pact, 150 regional and industrial agreements were made (the ESDC has various regional counterparts). Besides enjoying the third highest economic growth among OECD countries during the crisis, in 2009, 44.44% of companies moderated or froze wage growth through agreements, which is an increase of 6.2 times compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the ESDC reported that by October 2009, 90,000 jobs were retained due to the 2.4 increase in labor-management collaboration. Unemployment levels have almost returned to pre-crisis levels, with 3.2% for May 2010, compared to 3.1% for December 2007.

3.3.2 Failed Social Concertation and Unilateral Action in Europe

In contrast to the positive experiences in the previous section, in other cases mainly in Europe, despite legacies of institutionalised social dialogue, ESC-SIs have been either unable to produce a collective response or have been (partially) ignored in policy-making. Despite initial involvement, the ESC-SIs of the **Netherlands, Greece, Belgium Romania, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Ireland** have all experienced a decline in their involvement during 2010-2011. Usually this coincided with a deterioration of the economic situation (although in many countries a change in government also entailed a different attitude towards social dialogue). This rendered earlier agreements obsolete and pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission spurred governments to adopt quick reforms through decrees. In the **Netherlands**, despite early success with the agreements of 2008 and 2009, parties in the Social and Economic Council (SER) were unable to produce a consensus on reforming the right to dismissal, or an alternative to the government's pension plans by September 2009, which led the government to act unilaterally on the latter (although social dialogue was restored within two years). In September 2011, a tripartite agreement on the pension reforms came at the cost of strong internal tension within the biggest trade union federation, which in turn slowed down operations of the ESC as the union was unable to participate in decision-making. In addition, employers opted to directly consult with a centre-right government on policies⁴⁴. Similarly, in **Luxembourg** employers left the main tripartite bodies, including the ESC which had been providing the government with

⁴⁴ OKE, 2013: 41-46; Sarfati, H. and Ghellab, Y. (2012) *The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Times of Global Crisis: State Unilateralism or Social Dialogue* (Geneva, ILO): 57-58; SER - Social Economic Council of the Netherlands (2011a) 'The Future of Social Dialogue? ESCs Working in a more Diverse and Polarised Environment', *Annual Meeting of Secretaries-General of European ESCs. The Hague, May 12-13th 2011*. (The Hague, SER): 3-4.

proposals, as there was no more foreseeable consensus on a collective response to the crisis by June 2010. The government has taken action independently since, but has however stated that it remains open to social dialogue. It has been asserted by the Secretary-General of the Luxembourgian ESC that the economic situation is not the main problem, but rather a lack of trust between partners as well as an overlap with other tripartite bodies⁴⁵.

In **France** the tripartite plus Advisory Council on Pensions started with consultations, however in 2010 the government did not engage in these tripartite negotiations, stating a need for urgent action⁴⁶. In **Romania** the government was obliged to consult the ESC before submitting bills to parliament⁴⁷, as such the social partners were initially involved in developing crisis measures. However, in 2010 the government adopted an austerity package through a decree, in the absence of consultations with the social partners. Unions left all tripartite bodies in protest⁴⁸. In **Belgium** negotiations between tripartite parties broke down in December 2009. The CNT only managed to issue a divided advice on one of the labour reforms. The government unilaterally extended crisis measures, while trying to involve social partners⁴⁹ and transposed the 2011-2012 'interprofessional' agreement into law, as not all social partners signed the proposed text⁵⁰. In 2011, the **Lithuanian** government started to delegate lower ranking officials to the Tripartite Council in 2011, blocking any significant decision making and thereby downgrading the councils' profile. The government also intended to establish a new social dialogue institution, but ceased. Eurofound concludes that despite an active council, social dialogue has weakened in Lithuania⁵¹.

Prior to the emergency loans by the Troika, the Economic and Social Council of **Greece** (OKE) formulated a National Social Development Plan, which was accepted by the tripartite parties during a conference in Athens in March 2009. Unfortunately, with the onset of the crisis the implementation of the agreement's provisions became obsolete, and social dialogue was superseded by the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the government and the Troika⁵². Information on the December 2010 pension reforms were shared with a committee of experts for explanation only, not consultation. The OKE prepared two reports expressing its opinion that the reform would greatly reduce the state burden on pensions, However, within the OKE parties were unable to agree on elaborate alternatives to the reform⁵³. With the introduction of austerity measures, tensions in society rose. In response to cuts in public sector wages, several general strikes were organised⁵⁴. After a formal complaint by unions, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association ruled that there were repeated state interventions into free and voluntary collective bargaining and

⁴⁵ SER, 2011a: 7-8.

⁴⁶ Sarfati, H. and Ghellab, Y. (2012) *The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Times of Global Crisis: State Unilateralism or Social Dialogue* (Geneva, ILO): 76-78.

⁴⁷ Mihes, 2011: 5.

⁴⁸ Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011: 87; OKE, 2013: 33.

⁴⁹ Eurofound (2010) *Crisis in Social Dialogue due to Anti-Crisis Measures*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/02/articles/be1002019i.htm> (accessed October 20, 2013).

⁵⁰ Eurofound (2011) *Ministry Rejects Sectoral Collective Agreement*. Available online at: <http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/08/articles/be1108011i.htm> (accessed October 20, 2013).

⁵¹ Eurofound (2013) *Lithuania: Impact of the Crisis on Industrial Relations*. Available at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1301019s/lt1301019q.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

⁵² Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011: 87.

⁵³ Sarfati, H. and Ghellab, Y. (2012) *The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Times of Global Crisis: State Unilateralism or Social Dialogue* (Geneva, ILO): 69-72

⁵⁴ Eurofound (2012) *Social Dialogue in Times of Global Economic Crisis* (Dublin, Eurofound): 24.

a marked deficit in inclusive social dialogue⁵⁵. In **Portugal** some consultations have taken place, however, it has been suggested that this was used by the government in an attempt to create legitimacy for its pre-decided austerity plan⁵⁶. In March 2011 a tripartite agreement was reached (although the biggest union; the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP) did not sign). However, as the government fell in April 2011, implementation was suspended, except for the establishment of the Labour Industrial Relations Centre. Social dialogue under the new government has been weak, as it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika, and only a few proposals on labour market reforms were offered to the Standing Commission for Social Concertation (CPCS), an independent body of the ESC of Portugal.

In the **Czech Republic**, the initial strong tripartite response coordinated in the Council of Economic and Social Agreement (RHSD), took a downturn after 2010, when the newly elected government proved to be an obstacle. A possible factor explaining this development is the fact that the RHSD is chaired by the prime minister. The ILO has asserted that such a set-up can endanger institutionalized social dialogue during a government change⁵⁷. In any case, a right-wing government unilaterally initiated pension, health care, social security and tax reform and as a result, unions left the RHSD in 2011⁵⁸. Despite three decades of social partnership, social dialogue in **Ireland** came to a halt as well. While in September 2008 a landmark transitional national agreement was signed (as unions feared IMF intervention)⁵⁹, deterioration of the economy rendered it invalid. In 2009 employers withdrew from negotiations over the renewal of the pay agreement, massive demonstrations occurred, and strikes were announced. In response to this, the government proposed a new recovery plan within the National Economic & Social Council (NESC) however negotiations later failed⁶⁰ and the government enacted emergency legislation freezing public sector pay. From there on conflict was mediated through the Labour Relations Commission (notably the 2010 and 2013 Croke Park agreements)⁶¹. It is asserted that part of the obstacle for social dialogue was the lack of shared analysis on the underlying causes of Ireland's problems⁶². While the NESC has been tasked by the government to continue partnership, its influence has diminished as the Department of Finance has taken over policy coordination, especially in light of the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Troika. By May 2011, members had not been appointed for nine months⁶³.

In **Spain** social dialogue, after an initial statement of intent in 2008, came to a halt in 2009. While a February 2010 bipartite agreement was signed to balance wages and employment rates, the centre-left government acted unilaterally in implementing a number of austerity measures from May 2010

⁵⁵ ILO (2012) *ILO Calls on Greece to Bring its Labour Relations System back to Fundamental Rights*. November 15, 2012. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/brussels/press/press-releases/WCMS_193308/lang--en/index.htm (accessed October 24, 2013).

⁵⁶ Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011: 87.

⁵⁷ ILO (2009) *National Level Social Dialogue Institutions. Profiles from around the World. Revised Version* (Geneva, ILO): 9.

⁵⁸ However, general secretary David Kadecka asserts that the ESC was not threatened itself, and unions are committed to reforms and the walkout was for public purposes. Source: SER, 2011a: 3.

⁵⁹ Eurofound (2008) *Social Partners agree on National Pay Deal and Industrial Relations*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2008/10/articles/ie0810019i.htm> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁶⁰ Freyssinet, J. (2010) *Tripartite Responses to the Economic Crisis in the Principal Western European Countries* (Geneva, ILO): 13.

⁶¹ Regan, 2012: 14-16; Eurofound, 2012: 24; Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011: 87; Eurofound (2013) *Public Sector Unions agree to New Deal*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/07/articles/ie1307019i.htm> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁶² The government pointed to high labour costs in the public sector built up in the decades of growth, whereas others point to a lack of private sector competitiveness. Source: Regan, 2012.

⁶³ Regan, 2012: 14-16, 22; SER, 2011a: 3.

onwards, as no consensus between the social partners could be reached. The 2010-2020 Industrial Policy Programme, which was based on consultation, became obsolete. A tripartite pact on employment and pensions was signed in early 2011 (the Spanish ESC was seemingly not involved), however the government had to act unilaterally on collective bargaining as once again, consensus could not be reached⁶⁴. Furthermore, the new centre-right government, elected in 2011 has made no steps towards an inclusive tripartite social dialogue. The ESC of Spain indicated that it was not consulted on many issues and limited its activities to publishing reports on the socio-economic situation of the country, and the need for social and financial policies at the EU level. The lack of consultation is partially explained by no institutionalized obligation for the government to consult with social partners⁶⁵.

However, some countries have managed to recover from this downturn in social dialogue. Currently in the **Netherlands**, social dialogue has made a strong comeback. The rift in the main union confederation was successfully resolved and a new labour/liberal government came to power which subsequently needed support from the social partners due to a weak electoral mandate. As a result, a social pact was reached in the spring of 2013. Negotiated within the Labour Foundation (a bipartite collective bargaining/concertation platform closely linked to the ESC), it presented pro-growth alternatives to the governments' original austerity plan. The ESC itself produced a tripartite plus agreement on renewable energy in that same year, based on extensive consultations with civil society organizations. Similarly in **Slovenia**, while parties managed to agree on an anti-crisis package in 2008 and public pay cuts in 2009⁶⁶, 2010 public sector wage freezes by the government led to strikes by the unions. This was ultimately solved through the signing of strike agreements in 2010 and 2012. However, reforms on the labour market and pensions were defeated through referenda in 2011, which led to the collapse of the government⁶⁷. Afterwards, starting points for a social agreement for the period 2012-2016, including the state budget and labour market and pension reforms, were agreed upon within the ESC⁶⁸. As mentioned above, in **Belgium** a January 2013 Social Pact was also concluded with the help of the CNT. In the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) of **Bulgaria**, negotiations at the onset of the crisis were unsuccessful and led to the unions leaving the Council. However, in 2010 parties within the NCTC agreed on a new anti-crisis package⁶⁹, for which the civic dialogue ESC provided key proposals.

⁶⁴ Eurofound (2012) *Spain: Annual Review 2011*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/comparative/tn1203020s/es1203021q.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013); Eurofound (2011) *Agreement Signed on Growth, Employment and Guaranteed Pensions*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/02/articles/es1102031i.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

⁶⁵ OKE, 2013: 38-41; Eurofound, 2012: 26-27; Molina, O. and F. Miguélez (2013) *From Negotiation to Imposition: Social Dialogue in Austerity Times in Spain* (Geneva, ILO): 11-12.

⁶⁶ Eurofound (2010) *Slovenia: EIRO Annual Review – 2008*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0903029s/si0903029q.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

⁶⁷ Eurofound (2013) *Slovenia: Industrial Relations Profile*. Available online at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/slovenia_2.htm (accessed October 23, 2013).

⁶⁸ Eurofound (2013) *Slovenia: Impact of the Crisis on Industrial Relations*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1301019s/si1301011q.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

Eurofound (2013) *Slovenia: Industrial Relations Profile: Industrial Relations*. Available online at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/slovenia_4.htm (accessed October 23, 2013).

⁶⁹ Eurofound (2009) *Impact of Economic Crisis on Social Partners and Social Dialogue*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/07/articles/bg0907029i.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013). Eurofound (2010) *Government and Social Partners Agree New Anti-Crisis Package*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/04/articles/bg1004011i.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

In addition to the successes of the eight countries mentioned above, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Slovenia more or less recovered from their impasse in social dialogue. Nevertheless, in the nine other cases the ESC-SIs have not rebounded as quickly and instead have continued with publishing reports or limited consultation, all within the absence of concertation. In **Greece**, at the request of the government, the ESC produced an “Action Plan on the Creation of Jobs and Support of the Unemployed”, which was adopted. The ESC of **Portugal** has been very active in 2012 and 2013, with the organization of meetings and seminars related to the crisis. It also provided reports on the state budget. In January 2012 the Social Concertation Agreement was signed between Social Partners and government to promote social dialogue. The RHSD of the **Czech Republic** has expressed willingness to remain involved in the response to the crisis but asserts that this will depend on the will of the government. Despite the downturn in social dialogue, by April 2012, the ESC stated that they have been very active. Working groups were discussing the National Reform Program. Special Working Teams were established for dealing with economic growth and social support measures and issues such as retraining and fiscal support for businesses⁷⁰. Despite the weakening of social dialogue, in 2012 a 6.25% increase in the minimum wage was agreed upon within the **Lithuanian** ESC-SI⁷¹. Nevertheless, for some of the above ESC-SIs the developments during the crisis have compelled them to reorient their function vis-à-vis the policy process more extensively (see section 3.6.3 on change).

3.3.3 ESC-SIs as Advisory and Consultative Bodies

The majority of ESC-SIs were not involved in the crisis response to the extent of concluding, or failing to conclude, a tripartite response. This is not necessarily due to a failure on the part of ESC-SIs or an absence of a culture of social dialogue. The mandate of most ESC-SIs in the world, and most of the surveyed ESC-SIs, is defined towards advice and consultation on policy and legislative reform. The surveyed ESC-SIs have for the majority been active in that regard (as can be seen in figures 1. to 3.). In particular, by providing feedback on reforms and publishing (annual) reports on the social and economic developments in the country (including those mentioned in the above sections). Only ten out of 44 respondents were not officially involved by the government and only a few of these have remained passive (see section 3.3.4).

The Labour Policy Council of **Japan** was not involved in facilitating the 2009 tripartite response. Nevertheless, as per its mandate, it did review the subsequent proposed changes to the labour legislation, in addition to providing consultation on vocational training in the IT and Care sectors. Since the crisis, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) of **France** has published more than 30 reports on issues such as female and youth employment, labour market and social reform, and the European 2020 Strategy. The Council has also argued for alternatives to austerity. Moreover, the government has requested 14 (advisory) reports from the council since 2007, and collaborated with the CESE in organizing two conferences in 2012, and a state Council on Poverty and Inclusion⁷². In **Russia** the Civic Chamber has provided numerous recommendations and proposals for Putin’s Strategic Decrees (including the creation of 25 million modern jobs by 2020), which it will also monitor. In **Gabon**, the ESC published reports on the crisis, food security and the position of youth

⁷⁰ OKE, 2013: 14-15

⁷¹ Eurofound (2013) *Huge Rise in Minimum Wage Signals End of Freeze*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/02/articles/lt1302019i.htm> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁷² OKE, 2013: 15-19

and women in the labour market. The ESC, as per its constitutional mandate, has also contributed to social protection reforms, specifically on the establishment of the National Fund for Health Insurance and Social Security (CNAMGS) which targets the economically disadvantaged. CNAMGS operates by reflecting on implementation, required social security legislative reform and the appropriate level of contributions by workers in the public and private sector. As a result, those who registered are eligible for hospitalisation, and free medicines. **Senegal** organised a special panel of experts on the Global Jobs Pact in December 2010. The ESC of **Mauritius** organised a high-level workshop on the impact of the crisis on the Mauritian economy, and prioritised a list of issues alongside a number of recommendations. Participants included representatives from the government, private sector, trade unions, academia, civil society and other interest groups. This effort, and follow-up consultations and discussions culminated in an extensive report, focussing on different sectors and issues of unemployment.

In much of Africa, activities of ESC-SIs were mostly related to structural development issues. In **Burundi** the ESC organised a conference on economic development, especially in relation to overpopulation and the chances of youth. Since then, the government has declared that all children must complete primary school to promote a more skilled young labour force. In **Guinea** the ESC held a day of consultation on the DWCP launched in February 2010 and organised a National Forum on Youth and Women. In **Senegal** the ESC was also involved in drafting the DWCP and in designing measures to reduce child labour. However, it seemed it was excluded in designing the Strategy for Accelerated Growth, developed by the National Council for Social Dialogue (CNDS)⁷³. In **South-Africa** besides having co-initiated the tripartite crisis response, the NEDLAC oversaw signing of a youth employment accord by social partners, the introduction of a Tourism Amendment Bill, and reviewed the Labour Market legislation. In **Benin** the ESC published reports on youth unemployment and the agricultural sector, at the request of the government. In addition, the ESC has been meeting with local partners to integrate Millennium Development Goals (MDG), with other development efforts, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). However, the ESC mentions no involvement in developing the National Charter on Governance of Development, co-signed by the UNDP⁷⁴. In **Kenya** the ESC was also asked to produce a report on the impact of the crisis, and an Integrated Employment Strategy. In **Burkina Faso** the ESC produced reports and recommendations on food security, youth unemployment and energy prices at the government's request.

In **Aruba** the government requested an advisory report on the introduction of a tax on business revenues. The ESC of **Curacao** advised the government at their request on policy measures and draft legislation, as part of a wider national dialogue effort initiated by the government and covering the social partners and civil society. The ESC specifically advised on social security with the aim of decreasing health care expenditure and pension benefits by raising the retirement age, and fiscal support for the financial service industry within OECD tax haven criteria. However it was left out of the formulation of the 'Strategies for Sustainable Long Term Economic Development in Curacao',

⁷³ LeSoleil (2013) *Croissance Economique au Sénégal : Un Pacte Social pour Bâtir les Bases du Consensus entre Acteurs* [Economic Growth in Senegal: A Social Pact to Build the Basis for a Consensus between Actors], May 17, 2013. Available online at: http://www.lesoleil.sn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28710:croissance-economique-au-senegal-un-pacte-social-pour-batir-les-bases-du-consensus-entre-acteurs&catid=51:economy&Itemid=63 (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁷⁴ Benin (2013) *Charte Nationale pour la Gouvernance du Développement du Bénin* [National Charter for Governance of the Development of Benin]. Available online at: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/benin/docs/gouvernance/charte-pour-la-gouvernance-du-benin.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2013).

executed by a private European research group, which was produced at the request of the government. The ESC notes that the government proposals, aimed at reducing the budget deficit, failed to meet their target and ignored multiple calls by the ESC for more substantive measures. Since then the government has consulted with the ESC on additional measures to increase tax income. In **Honduras** besides signing the Grand National Agreement (see section 3.3.1), the council also developed and oversaw the signing of a minimum wage fixing agreement for the next two to three years, with the assistance of the ILO. It is expected that this will greatly contribute to maintaining competitiveness, predictability, foreign investment and employment. Besides a tripartite crisis response led by the CDES in **Brazil** the tripartite CODEFAT, attached to the Ministry of Labour and Employment, approved the extension of unemployment benefits in early 2009, which benefitted more than 320,000 workers⁷⁵. It also created the Worker Qualification Programme, which replaces employment with training for a limited period to avoid dismissals.

Although the **Jordanian** ESC did not undertake any special initiatives in response to the crisis, it was involved by the government in preparing economic and social reports, and proposing an Economic Strategy for 2014. It organized many round table discussions with officials to discuss the removal of subsidies on oil derivatives and the impact of rising electricity prices. The council also organized a National Consultation on Youth Employability. The government adopted the advice of the ESC on poverty and unemployment as well as on creating an industrial and media city. A new tripartite labour committee has also raised the minimum wage⁷⁶. In **Algeria**, the ESC was officially involved by the government in the crisis response. In December 2010, a month before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Algeria renewed a 2009 Tripartite Pact and an interdepartmental working group was set up to prepare proposals for labour law amendments⁷⁷. With respect to the crisis it also conveyed a conference, established a special working group and convened special meetings. It organized the first General Assembly of Civil Society in June 2011, and the Social and Economic Forum for the 50th anniversary of Independence in June 2013. Most of the council's recommendations have been included in the government's plans and are being implemented. The ESC is now part of the national tripartite meetings and, as part of its mandate, will continue to report on socio-economic developments in the country.

For other countries in the region, there have also been developments during the crisis. In **Tunisia** a social contract was signed in January 2013, which also foresees the establishment of a national council of social dialogue. In July 2011 the Environmental, Economic and Social Council became operational in **Morocco**⁷⁸. Prior to this, in April 2011, a tripartite accord was reached which entailed

⁷⁵ Baccaro, L. and S. Heeb (2011) Social Dialogue during the Financial and Economic Crisis. Results from the ILO/World Bank Inventory using a Boolean Analysis on 44 countries (Geneva, ILO): 19.

⁷⁶ ILO (2011) *Global Jobs Pact Country Scan: Jordan 2011*, p. 64-65; ILO (2012) *ILO, Decent Work Country Programme 2012-2015: Jordan, March 2012* (Geneva, ILO): 11.

⁷⁷ Oumarou, M. and Y. Ghellab (2012) *Rapport de Mission, Alger, 7-0, 2012* (Geneva, ILO): 3.

⁷⁸ Conseil Economique et Social du Maroc. "Actualités". Available at: <http://www.ces.ma/Pages/presentation.aspx> (accessed April 24, 2013).

significant advances in terms of salary for public sector workers, guarantees for minimum wage and concession for the agricultural sector and pensions⁷⁹.

However, high levels of activity within an ESC do not necessarily mean the government will involve the ESC in designing measures. For instance, despite organising the high-level workshop mentioned above, the ESC of **Mauritius** as an institute was never officially involved in consultations on the 2008 fiscal stimulus package, nor in the expansionary monetary policies. Instead individual counsellors acting on their interests groups were involved in national policy formulation. However, despite a lack of official involvement, the ESC still initiated two reports on youth unemployment and challenges to global integration, aimed at assisting policy-makers in identifying challenges and solutions.

Despite no immediate concertation role, as was the case for some of the ESC-SIs in the section on failed concertation, relations with governments have still become sour in some cases. In **Italy** for instance, social concertation was already under strain in the decade prior to the government's enactment of an austerity package by decree on May 31st, 2010⁸⁰. Throughout the crisis the National Council for Economics and Labour (CNEL) continued its role in reviewing labour bills. In 2011 the government enacted changes to the CNEL against its wishes, claiming that it would upset the balance of power within the institution (see section 3.6.3. on changes). Since this enactment, relations have not been good. However, the CNEL has remained active in publishing its Annual Labour Market report and has organized three conferences in 2012 and 2013 on well-being, welfare and inclusivity; on female labour; and on productivity. The latter conference coincided with a November 2012 bipartite pact on Productivity and Competitiveness in Italy. It also participated in parliamentary hearings, and provided advice on the new apprenticeship system.

Finally, eight ESC-SIs were also involved in dispute settlement, mainly in Africa. In **Senegal** tensions in the education sector arose due to the inability of the state to finance its commitments, ultimately part of the demands of the unions were met and negotiations resumed. In **Burundi** the ESC heard the striking unions in a plenary session. In **Benin** the ESC mediated in a university strike in 2010. In this respect, the ESC of **Gabon** has also advised to institutionalise its role in conflict prevention and the creation of labour courts. The ESC of **Burkina Faso** made an intervention in 2008 to appease conflict between the government and unions over rising food and fuel prices. In **Portugal** the ESC has a specialised body to mediate collective conflicts in the public sector.

3.3.4 Passive ESC-SIs

Although it can be asserted that the role of some ESC-SIs mentioned in 3.3.2 has diminished, a small minority of surveyed ESC-SIs seemed to have played a less than marginal role during the crisis. The ESC-SIs of **Niger**, **Saint-Maarten** and **Venezuela** were not involved in any crisis response measures. The **Omanian** Tripartite Committee for Social Dialogue (CSD) was only established in 2010, and has not yet established a secretariat. So far the Omani CSD has only informally held meetings but has consequently established a special working group in response to the crisis. In **Albania** the National Labour Council (KKP), attached to the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, played a marginal role. It is reported that meetings are held infrequently, and there are issues with

⁷⁹ Papadakis, K.; Hamdan, W. and Oechslin, E. (2011) *Mission conjointe BIT- Gouvernement et partenaires sociaux belges au Maroc*, 26-27 septembre 2011.

⁸⁰ Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011 : 87.

its mandate; the KKP exists next to several other ESC-SIs. The limited activity is attributed to the Council's close ties to a government, which is of the opinion that the crisis does not affect Albania (indeed, the unemployment rate has consistently been around 13% in the past years but GDP growth has slowed to 3.1% in 2011, down from 7.5% in 2008)⁸¹. It is asserted that the government does not grant the ESC enough decision-making power, or political support to form opinions. Social Dialogue now mainly occurs outside the National Labour Council⁸².

3.4 Breakdown and Cooperation

Only 6 ESC-SIs indicated that negotiations broke down during the formulation of responses to the crisis (**Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium, Slovenia** and **Senegal**). In **Slovenia** public sector trade unions signed agreements on two separate occasions to comply with public reforms. In seven countries the crisis negatively affected the dynamics of industrial relations (**Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Netherlands** and **South Africa**). In the **Czech Republic** cooperation did increase but only between the social partners themselves, polarisation occurred between partners and the government. In the **Netherlands** the crisis response led to divergence within the biggest trade union confederation. Despite being heavily involved in the crisis response, the NEDLAC in **South-Africa** indicated that relations between the parties became more polarised than usual. Eight ESC-SIs reported that their dynamics have remained unchanged. In contrast, 24 ESC-SIs indicated that no breakdown of negotiations occurred⁸³. Similarly, the majority of ESC-SIs indicated that the crisis had intensified their cooperation (62%).

3.5 Collaboration with other institutions

Approximately one a third of ESC-SIs have indicated they or the government have collaborated with other institutions in the crisis response. Typically this has been parliament, government ministries and national statistics offices or civil society organizations. However, some ESC-SIs have also collaborated across borders with others institutions. For instance, in **Gabon**, and **Mauritania** ESCs collaborated with the IMF and World Bank (on the PRSP), in **Benin** with the UNDP on the MDG, in **Burkina Faso** with the Food and Agriculture Organization, amongst others, and in **Honduras** with USAID and German Cooperation (GIZ).

24 ESC-SIs have also collaborated with ILO Field Offices, which typically provided technical assistance on a range of labour and social issues and policies as well as training (see Annex 2. for more details per country). On the other hand, a number ESC-SIs did not cooperate with a field office, while a few have expressed interest to do so.

About half of the ESC-SIs surveyed also indicated they have collaborated with other ESC-SIs during the crisis. Several have reported cooperation with the ESC-SI of **Spain** (including Bulgaria, Jordan, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama and Portugal) which seems to have been very active in exchanging experiences and assisting in developing the capacity of other ESC-SIs. The **Brazilian** CDES has signed a collaboration agreement with the ESC-SIs of Algeria and Congo⁸⁴. More commonly, collaboration

⁸¹ Statistics Office of Albania. Available online at: <http://www.instat.gov.al/en/home.aspx> (accessed October 14th, 2013).

⁸² Mihes, 2011: 3; ILO Staff.

⁸³ For the remaining ESC-Sis, the question was not applicable or unanswered.

⁸⁴ HighBeam (2011) *Brazil: Brazilian Council Signs Agreement with Algeria*, July 27, 2011. Available online at: <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-262587776.html> (accessed November 7, 2013).

has occurred within international bodies such as AICESIS, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the Union of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions of Africa (UCESA), and its counterpart for Francophone countries, UCESIF. ESC-SIs have also hosted international conferences, where the valuable exchange of experiences has taken place. These include ESC-SIs in the **Congo**⁸⁵, **Benin**, **Senegal**, **Italy**, **Bulgaria**, **Greece**, and **Ireland**. The Cotonou Declaration, the Dakar Roadmap, and the June 2013 launch of the UCESIF Social Charter, are a few examples of the significant outcomes⁸⁶. Many ESC-SIs have also cooperated with the ILO, with respect to the Global Jobs Pact of 2009, or with a field office in the region. In 2009, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) established a Tripartite Council for Labour and Social Dialogue to provide space for consultation on the sub-regional level⁸⁷. In December 2011, Algeria together with the ILO, Belgium, Morocco and Tunisia, launched a partnership to promote social dialogue in the Maghreb countries⁸⁸. The ILO asserts that in a global crisis, where decision-making has shifted away from the national, requires an international response by social dialogue actors and institutions⁸⁹. In this regard it is worth mentioning the many opinions that the EESC has issued in the past years to the European Commission. In particular, the cooperation agreement it signed with the European Commission in February 2012⁹⁰. Furthermore in 2013 the EESC was asked for the first time by the European Council to issue an opinion on Employment, Education and Training, Demography and Poverty⁹¹.

3.6 Post-crisis

3.6.1 Continuing involvement: Consultation and Monitoring

The majority of ESC-SIs have indicated they that will continue to be involved in formulating crisis response mechanisms, while only eight ESC-SIs have indicated the opposite. More than half of the respondents (27 of ESC-SIs) indicate they will continue to be involved in monitoring reforms and outcomes, or in administrating new programs (six cases). For most countries this falls within their mandate, while only a few ESC-SIs mention concrete steps. The CDES of **Brazil** has been very active in monitoring both the impact of the crisis, as well as the outcomes of the measures taken by the government. It presents additional recommendations to the President for more effective policies. The working group set-up in 2008 to monitor the crisis has become the most important working group within the CDES. For others this constitutes implementation or monitoring of a DWCP (**Guinea**, **Congo** and **South-Africa**), or PRSP (**Mauritania**), or administrating agreements (in the **Netherlands** the bipartite Labour Foundation has established a tripartite plus 'Action Team Crisis Response' to

⁸⁵ AICESIS (2013) *International Symposium on Food Security*. Available online at: <http://www.aicesis.org/spip.php?article1197&lang=en> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁸⁶ AICESIS (2013) *AICESIS News!* N.43, June 2013. Available online at: http://www.aicesis.org/spip.php?page=newsletter&id_newsletter=213 (accessed November 7, 2013); AICESIS (2011) *AICESIS/ILO for Africa/UCESA: Follow-up of the Dakar Conference*. Available online at: <http://www.aicesis.org/spip.php?article1047&lang=en> (accessed November 7, 2013).

⁸⁷ UEMOA. *Conseil du Travail et du Dialogue Social [Council for Labour and Social Dialogue]*. Available online at: <http://www.uemoa.int/Organes/Conseil%20du%20Travail%20et%20du%20Dialogue%20Social.aspx> (November 7, 2013).

⁸⁸ ILO (December 2011) "Belgium – ILO Partnership on Promoting and Reinforcing Social Dialogue in the Maghreb". Available at: http://www.ilo.org/brussels/WCMS_170645/lang--en/index.htm (accessed April 24, 2013).

⁸⁹ ILO (2013) 'Social Dialogue. Recurrent Discussion under the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization', *Report IV. International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013* (Geneva, International Labour Office): 47.

⁹⁰ EESC (2012) *Protocol on Cooperation Between the European Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee*, February 23, 2012. Available online at: <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.eu-cooperation.22469> (accessed October 25, 2013).

⁹¹ OKE, 2013: 52.

assist in implementing provisions of the 2013 Social Pact). In **Burundi** the ESC monitors the governments' 'Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty'. In **Gabon** a special observatory has been created within the ESC-SI to monitor the government's reforms and state expenditures. The **Russian** Civic Chamber has indicated that they will monitor Putin's Strategic Decrees, which put forward a set of key areas in developing the Russian economy, including, amongst others, development of industrial sectors which can boost internal demand, improve competitiveness, eradicate tariff obstacles, and promote non-state arbitrary court systems. One of the goals is to create 25 million jobs by 2020.

3.6.2 Adopted measures and impact

Several ESC-SIs have indicated that it is difficult to assess whether the measures have met their targets due to the nature of advice or consultations. This could be attributed to the fact that implementation is on-going or too early to assess, or because the global nature of the crisis can often limit the effectiveness of national responses. Of the surveyed ESC-SIs, 34 (72%) indicate their proposals have been adopted (two ESC-SIs indicated that all of these have been adopted), although they, and their impact are generally unspecified (only 17 ESC-SIs report targets have been reached, with only a few giving specifications). Below are some examples that have not been mentioned in the previous sections.

In some cases the proposals are still under consideration (**Mauritius**), or have been adopted but not implemented (**Senegal, Kenya**). The ESC in **Cameroun** refers to a decrease in youth unemployment, and improvements in labour legislation as indicators of the measures reaching their targets. The activities of the **Bulgarian** ESC resulted, amongst others, in the adoption of key proposals in the tripartite document on "Measures Supporting Employment, Households, Businesses and the Fiscal Position". These provisions included the introduction of vouchers for vocational training combined with part-time employment for a period of no longer than six months, and the improvement of the Integrated Information System for Demand and Supply of Labour at the Employment Agency. Following ESC advice, further decentralized employment commissions which received substantial additional funding.

The tripartite Standing Committee for the Coordination of Social Affairs (CPCS) in **Macau** is responsible for studying and discussing labour and social policies as well as draft legislation, and as such advised on the "Temporary measures for the supplementary income", which came into force on January 1st, 2008. After discussions within the CPCS the criteria for recipients were relaxed and the amount of benefits increased. With the improvement of the economic situation, the number of applications fell from 2,300 to 1,700 in 2008-2012. The CPCS is also reviewing the new Labour Relations law of 2008, to further improve labour legislation. Thanks to discussions and a review of the 2010 Social Security System law, the initial benefit was gradually increased in 2011 and 2013. The minimum wage for outsourced security guards and cleaners for the public department, set in 2007, was similarly increased in the same years. In August 2011 the **Jordanian** King tasked the Tripartite Labour Committee to review the minimum wage, following calls for an increase from 150 Jordanian Dinar (JD) to a monthly JD 250-30. As a result, the minimum wage was increased by 26 per cent to 190 JD, although foreign workers are excluded⁹². The ESC in **Cameroun** refers to a decrease in youth unemployment, and improvements in labour legislation as indicators of the measures

⁹² ILO (2012) *Decent Work Country Programme 2012-2015: Jordan*, March 2012 (Geneva, ILO): 12.

reaching their targets. In **Burkina Faso**, recommendations made by the ESC have been partially adopted, most notably the establishment of a Youth Council, the adoption of a National Programme for Rural Development, financed by 14% of the national budget, and efforts to bring electricity to 600 communities by 2015. The ESDC of **Korea** reports that by October 2009, 90,000 jobs were retained due to the 2.4 increase in labour-management collaboration. Unemployment levels have almost returned to pre-crisis levels, with 3.2% in May 2010, compared to 3.1% in December 2007. The ESC of the **Netherlands** reports that 5,000 to 6,000 jobs have been saved through the part-time employment insurance.

3.6.3 Change

A minority of ESC-SIs have indicated a change in their working methods following the crisis, while only nine have reported institutional changes. In general, most ESC-SIs have asserted that their role within society increased or became more visible. Several ESC-SIs have also experienced more concrete changes in their working methods. The ESCs of **Austria**⁹³, **Netherlands**, **France** and **Ireland** all indicate that they are producing shorter reports at a faster rate since the crisis, due to the need for quick responses.

In several countries the crisis has had a sizeable impact on the workings and functions of the ESC-SIs. ESC-SIs in **Greece**, **France** and **Italy** have reported reductions in their budget. For the Greek OKE this meant that all 22 organisations have been making their contributions voluntarily⁹⁴. The example of the **Lithuanian** government weakening the ESC-SI has already been noted in chapter 3. With the breakdown of Social Partnership, the NESC of **Ireland** (which is attached to office of the head of government) has also undergone some changes. When reconvening in June 2011, a fourth environmental pillar was added (and the sustainable development council abolished). In addition, the government has expressed that Social Partnership has little future anymore, and instead views the NESC as a Multilateral Forum, which should treat on subjects close to the governments' agenda. The Irish government has requested of the NESC to not always seek consensus, and let counsellors speak on their own tittle, instead of as representatives⁹⁵. This is especially worrisome, as creating consensus and broad support is one of the main strengths of social dialogue. The NESC expressed concern that its new tasks will lead it to become too much of a direct aid to the government, instead as a platform for social and civil dialogue. As of 2013, part of the Secretariat has been assisting certain government departments on a temporary basis⁹⁶.

In **Romania** the government has replaced its seats with civil society organizations, and the ESC no longer plays a role in collective bargaining, as per the new Social Dialogue code (which the social partners have protested against and were not adequately consulted on)⁹⁷. The government has also established a new National Tripartite Council for Social Dialogue chaired by the prime minister⁹⁸. By 2012 unions had returned to the council, although members still have to be appointed, limiting the operations of the council. By April 2013 the ESC had still not been given new tasks by the

⁹³ SER, 2011a: 6.

⁹⁴ OKE, 2013: 15-19, 47.

⁹⁵ SER (2011b) *Engaging Younger Generations: The Future of ESCs. Annual Meeting of the Presidents & Secretaries-General of the European ESCs and the EESC. The Hague, 9-10 November 2011* (The Hague, SER): 2-3.

⁹⁶ OKE, 2013; ILO E-mail exchange with staff NESC.

⁹⁷ SER, 2011a: 8.

⁹⁸ Eurofound (2012) *Social Partners Opt Out of Social Dialogue in Protest at New Legislation*. Available online at: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/12/articles/ro1112019i.htm> (accessed October 23, 2013).

government⁹⁹. After the impasse in **Luxembourg** the ESC has decided to focus on the medium and long term future, instead of immediate policy issues. As per the new working method, no issue will be treated which has no foreseeable consensus¹⁰⁰. It is agreed that all documents sent by the European institutions to the parliament, are also sent to the ESC to improve coordination and cooperation.

Several ESC-SIs have also changed their institutional configuration. A recent law in **Greece** has added representatives from Civil Society organizations, increasing the number of members from 48 to 60. In **Lithuania** the council expanded from 15 to 21 members. Against the will of the **Italian** CNEL the membership size has been reduced from 120 to a maximum of 70, while the number of vice-presidents rose from two to four¹⁰¹. It has been asserted this occurred without respect to proportionate social partner representation¹⁰². In **France** the number of counsellors has been capped to 233, while environmental as well as youth representatives have been added. In the **Netherlands** a representative for the own account workers has been added¹⁰³.

Some ESC-SIs have been given new tasks, or have had tasks withdrawn. For example, the environment now falls under the scope of the **French** CESE. The addition of environmental parties has reportedly led to more difficulty in reaching consensus¹⁰⁴. The CNEL of **Italy** is now tasked with updating the National Archive of Collective Agreements in the Public Sector, and publishing annual reports on the status of collective bargaining in the public sector. It will also publish an annual report on quality of services by public and local administrations, and organise relevant annual conferences.

To end this section with a positive development, the **Russian** Civic Chamber has been assisting in establishing regional civic chambers and has gained the right to present the results of its public reviews of federal and regional bills during plenary meetings of the lower house of Parliament since 2011¹⁰⁵. By mid-2012 more than 200 reviews of bills related to social issues were conducted.

4. Conclusion and Points for Discussion

While the crisis has had the most apparent impact in European countries, across the globe, states have formulated policy responses to overcome the challenges of the crisis. While there has been success in certain regions, the global economy is only slowly beginning to recover. Economic growth is decelerating and global unemployment figures are rising.

The results of the questionnaire show that in general most ESC-SIs have been active in the response to the crisis, with the majority also officially involved by the government. Throughout the crisis, the role of the majority of ESC-SIs has been, and continuous to be, providing advice and consultation on

⁹⁹ OKE, 2013: 33.

¹⁰⁰ SER, 2011b: 2.

¹⁰¹ SER, 2011b: 3; NESC (2012) *Social and Civil Dialogue in a Time of National and European Crisis. Annual Meeting of the Secretaries-General of the ESCs of the EU and the EESC. 3rd & 4th May 2012* (Dublin, NESC).

¹⁰² The new total membership is 10 economic, social and legal experts, 22 members representing employees (instead of 44), 9 members representing self-employed workers (instead of 18) and 17 employers' representatives (instead of 37). Clauwaert, S. and I. Schömann (2013) "The crisis and national labour law reforms: a mapping exercise. Country report: Italy", ETUI, January 2013 (Brussels, ETUI).

¹⁰³ SER, 2011a: 2-3.

¹⁰⁴ SER, 2011b: 3.

¹⁰⁵ By law the Civic Chamber receives all bills submitted to the lower house, which it will send to lawyers and experts, and discuss it with its members

policy packages and legislative reforms. A significant share will proceed to monitor the impact of the crisis as well as the effects of the measures taken however; these tasks are rarely connected to a specific programme. Instead, ESC-SIs continue to publish annual reports, or otherwise provide updates on the socio-economic developments of the country.

With respect to the role ESC-SIs have played, approximately nine ESC-SIs have been at the centre of the policy-process by collectively developing a set of anti-crisis measures in the first years of the crisis, while a few others developed a collective response at later stages. This occurred not only in Europe, but in other regions of the world as well. The variety in economic conditions, industrial relations and make-up of the ESC-SIs across these cases of success, demonstrate that perhaps the only real barrier to a national social dialogue response is the political will and commitment by all parties to work together.

In contrast, a similar minority share has also experienced setbacks as the crisis deepened. These experiences typically illustrate the challenges ESC-SIs face during crises (see chapter 2), such as (perceived) time constraint and international pressure. Indeed, part of these ESC-SIs were located in countries where some governments were under immense pressure from International Financial Institutions, as well as financial markets and other states to quickly adopt crisis measures. Nevertheless, the case of Luxembourg also demonstrates how social dialogue can fail without much international pressure or a deteriorating economy. These findings are in line with earlier signalled trends that social dialogue, for the initial period of 2008-2009, was used as a tool to mitigate the crisis. However, from 2010 onwards, social dialogue began to be seen as a barrier for implementation by policy-makers. As a result, many social dialogue and collective bargaining institutions were placed in a secondary role¹⁰⁶. This development is cause for serious concern, as when economic growth returns and demands for higher wages are made, the dismantling of social dialogue institutions will mean there is no space for peaceful consultations or dialogue in creating positive-sum policies for sustainable and inclusive growth.

A small share of ESC-SIs have undertaken the role of bystander during the crisis, namely a lack of involvement by the government, in addition to little activity in respect to the crisis. The immediate cause is not directly clear. Although for Oman the ESC-SI was only recently established, and for Albania, a close connection with a government denying the impact of the crisis, has hampered the role of this ESC-SI.

Due to the different impacts of the crisis across the world, the area of policy responses by ESC-SIs has differed as well. While in Europe designing crisis emergency measures took precedence (although in other parts of the world, ESC-SIs were also active in this regard), a large share of ESC-SIs, especially those in developing countries, have focussed on more structural development issues, such as youth unemployment and food security, especially those in Africa (although the EESC has also organised a conference on youth employment). For these ESC-SIs, the crisis amplified the need to address pre-existing challenges.

A crisis can bind parties together, as evident from the overwhelming majority of ESC-SIs which indicated that cooperation increased throughout the crisis. However, for European countries the

¹⁰⁶ ILO (2013) *ILO Director-General Report on Jobs, Growth, and Social Justice*, 9th European Regional Meeting Oslo, April 2013 (Geneva, ILO). Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/regional-meetings/europe-and-central-asia/erm-9/WCMS_205270/lang--en/index.htm (accessed November 7, 2013).

experience has been different, and where reported, increased cooperation within ESC-SIs was combined with social unrest in the rest of society. It should also be noted that several ESC-SIs were forced to reconsider their purpose within the policy process in their country, while several were institutionally weakened or marginalized.

For all of the above roles, in most cases the verdict is still out on what the exact impact of ESC-SIs has been during the crisis. This is partially explained by the difficulty of measuring impacts of policy measures on an economy, especially if those economies are for a significant part also subjugated to exogenous factors. In that respect, while many ESC-SIs have bilaterally or multilaterally collaborated and there have been significant developments, more attention should be paid to the international level. The lack of clear impact is also partially due to the nature of the role of ESC-SIs during the crisis. There is no clear agreed methodology to measure to which extent proposals have been adopted or not, or how much legislation is influenced by consultation. Notwithstanding these reservations, the results of the survey show that the majority of ESC-SIs indicate their proposals have been adopted by the government (although only two ESC-SIs state that this has been done fully) and it can therefore be said that ESC-SIs had a significant impact on the policy process.

In closing, it should be noted that every crisis also presents opportunities. In debating the above described experiences during the conference, it is vital to draw lessons from them and discuss how ESC-SIs can retain and strengthen their relevance in the policy response to the diverse challenges an increasingly globalised economy poses.

Points for discussion

- In a context of austerity measures and pressure from international organizations and financial markets for quick action, how can ESC-SIs enhance their role and impact, and how should the pursuit of consensus be valued?
- How can an ESC-SI continue to contribute to a crisis response if concertation has failed?
- Can it be discerned that the role of ESC-SIs within the policy-making process has weakened when compared to previous decades? Which factors have contributed to such a trend?
- How can the monitoring function of ESC-SIs be improved?
- Noting the examples of Japan and Poland, to what degree is formulating a collective crisis response outside of an ESC-SI a problem?
- How can the ILO and AICESIS assist in strengthening ESC-SIs and social dialogue/tripartism as instruments of sound governance of the Labour Market and the economy as a whole?

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Annex 1: Results Questionnaire – Activities per ESC-SI in light of crisis

Country	Officially involved?	Setting up of a specific committee or working group	Organise special internal meetings	Organise conference	Adopt one (or several) report(s) or opinion(s)	Consult on policy packages	Advisory role drafting legislation and policies	Negotiation agreements/ social pacts	Dispute settlement	Administration policies
Albania	N									
Algeria	Y	X	X	X		X	X			
Aruba	Y				X		X	X		
Belgium	Y					X	X	X		
Benin	Y			X	X		X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	Y		X	X	X	X	X			
Burkina Faso	Y				X			X		
Burundi	Y		X	X		X			X	
Brazil	Y	X	X	X	X	X		X		
Cameroun	Y	X			X	X	X	X		
Congo	Y	X	X		X					
Curacao	Y						X			
Czech Republic	Y	X	X		X	X	X			
France	Y			X	X		X			
Gabon	N				X		X			X
Greece		X	X	X	X	X	X			
Guatemala	Y	X	X			X		X		X
Honduras	Y	X			X			X		
Ireland	N				X					
Italy	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Japan	Y					X	X			X
Jordan	Y				X	X	X			X
Kenya	Y	X		X		X	X			
Lithuania	Y				X	X	X	X	X	X
Luxembourg	Y	X	X	X	X					
Macao	Y					X	X			
Mali	Y			X	X	X	X	X	X	
Mauritania	Y									
Mauritius	N		X	X	X					
Netherlands	Y	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
Niger	N									
Nigeria	Y	X					X			
Oman	N	X								
Panama	N					X	X			
Poland	Y	X				X	X			
Portugal	Y		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Romania	N				X					
Russia	Y		X	X	X	X	X			
Saint-Maarten	N									
Senegal	Y	X		X	X		X		X	
Slovenia	Y						X	X		
Spain	N	X								
South-Africa	Y	X				X	X			
South-Korea	Y	X	X		X	X	X	X		
Ukraine	Y	X	X		X	X	X			
Venezuela	N									
Vietnam	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

Country	Social Pact	Labour Reform	Social Security reform	Jobs creation	Fiscal Support	Public Infrastructure	Sector-Specific	Other
Albania								
Algeria	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Aruba		X	X					
Belgium	X	X	X		X			
Benin				X		X	X	
Bulgaria		X	X					
Burkina Faso				X			X	
Burundi			X				X	
Brazil					X	X	X	
Cameroun	X	X	X	X				
Congo	X	X	X	X			X	
Curacao			X				X	
Czech Republic				X	X	X		
France		X	X	X	X	X		
Gabon			X					
Greece				X				
Guatemala	X			X	X			
Honduras	X	X		X				
Ireland								
Italy								X
Japan		X	X	X	X		X	
Jordan		X	X	X			X	
Kenya						X	X	
Lithuania		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Luxembourg		X		X		X	X	
Macao		X	X				X	X
Mali	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Mauritania								
Mauritius			X	X			X	
Netherlands	X	X	X	X				X
Niger								
Nigeria		X	X	X				
Oman								
Panama							X	X
Poland		X	X		X			
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Romania								
Russia				X	X	X		
Saint-Maarten								
Senegal	X			X			X	X
Slovenia		X			X			
Spain								
South-Africa		X		X			X	
South-Korea			X					
Ukraine		X	X	X	X			
Venezuela								
Vietnam	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

Annex 2: Results Questionnaire – Expectations from ILO & AICESIS

Country	Input expected from ILO?	Cooperated with Field Office? (total: 17 'no', 21 'yes')
Albania	Technical Assistance, so the NCL can be involved with the consultation process on the impact of the global crisis.	Yes (always): Consultation on DWCP, Labour Code Revision, Labour Inspection, and Improving Social Dialogue.
Algeria	Consolidation of relations, with respect to annually adopted themes and the cooperation agreement ILO and ESC.	No.
Aruba		Yes: Good relationship with labour department, which has ILO Officers.
Belgium	Promote social partnership; Promote a counterweight to other International Organizations (with strict economic and financial policies) to develop a social consensus on international issues.	Yes: Protocol accord with Ministry to implement Convention 144; initiative for more transparent, consultative reporting on ILO conventions (without replacing the ILO mechanisms).
Benin	Reinforce partnership; Training and specialization of staff.	Yes.
Bulgaria	Keep addressing upcoming challenges to European Labour Market; Cooperation ILO Labour Markets reform.	Yes: The ESC-SI hosted the second and final TRESMED.
Burkina Faso	Technical assistance in developing best practices to promote youth employment through seminars or conferences.	No
Burundi	Reinforce capacity; organising thematic meetings with employers.	Thematic organizations.
Brazil	Continue Cooperation with AICESIS, and bring new perspectives.	Yes: Several occasions, especially in formulating Sugar Cane Pact for Decent Work.
Cameroun	ILO Studies; exchange experiences on ESC-SIs	Not enough: Developing Decent Work Programme and Social Protection Framework.
Congo	Technical Assistance; internships/scholarships, forums/seminars, equipment.	Yes. Wishes to sign a partnership agreement.
Curacao	Comparative data (including on small island economies)	No. Ministry of Social Development, Labor and Well-being has.
Czech Republic	Best practices of ILO and other ESCs. Promote role of ESCs.	No. Only separately.
France	Good relation; Regular information on ILO's on-going work.	
Gabon	Formulating advice and recommendation; Examples from labour policies in developed countries and the value of social dialogue.	No. Wants to establish cooperation as soon as possible.
Greece		
Guatemala	Technical support: Statistics; Good public policy examples, especially on ESC-SIs; Documents/articles.	No. Only through a meeting with the Tripartite Commission in the Ministry of Labour.
Honduras	Technical support: employment, vocational training and social security and developing communications plan ESC.	Yes. Developing Minimum Wage mechanism.
Ireland		No.
Italy	Closer cooperation (especially on youth and women), and comparative analysis of legislation.	Yes. Through a CNEL seminar on Youth (25 January 2012).
Japan	None.	No.
Jordan	Job creation, youth employment, equal job opportunities, improved working conditions programs	Yes. Co-organized National Consultation on Youth Employability.
Kenya	Expert support on Integrated Labour Policies, especially on youth, women and other marginalized groups.	No. Wishes to sign a Memorandum of Understanding.
Lithuania		Yes. Discussions on C144 and passing relevant decisions.
Luxembourg	Exchange best practices.	Not directly, although many other actors have. Hosted Director-General Juan

Macao		Somovia during a conference on Financial Policy and Decent Work.
Mali	Capacity building members and ESC; Partnership rapport.	Yes. Workshop on Social Dialogue and Decent Work in June 2013.
Mauritania	Technical Assistance on Employment and Entrepreneurship; training of staff; support for study travel	No.
Mauritius	Develop clear guidelines for studies; Technical and Financial assistance; Previous requests for assistance on Social Protection Floor, Social Dialogue and Decent Work have not been met. Efforts on going.	Yes. DWCP; Have sought contact with Pretoria and Madagascar (attempts are on-going).
Netherlands	Continue with current work.	No.
Niger	Training, Institutional Support, Expertise.	No.
Nigeria	Technical Assistance and Financial support.	Yes.
Oman	Technical Support to Establish a Secretariat of the National Tripartite Committee.	Yes.
Panama	Training; Exchange of experiences and documentation.	No. Only indirectly through ministry.
Poland		No.
Portugal	More publications on Portugal; More co-organisation of local events.	Yes: Co-organised the seminar on Social Dialogue and Development in Jan. 2013. Promoted meeting within ESC of representatives from Public Administration of the African Portuguese Speaking countries, in Sept. 2011.
Romania		No.
Russia	Close cooperation to reform labour legislation.	Yes. Various workshops, discussions, round tables.
Saint-Maarten	Support.	
Senegal	Technical support to strengthen impact advice; Financial support.	Yes. Signing protocol accord on the Global Jobs Pact.
Slovenia	Present cooperation satisfactory.	No.
Spain	A key role in the governance of globalization at all levels.	Yes. Regular contacts, and activities.
South-Africa		Yes. DWCP
South-Korea	Hopes to cooperate with the regional office, to organise the Asia Social Dialogue Forum 2008 on a regular basis, and other activities to promote social dialogue.	Yes: Regional Office, by promoting the 2008 Forum; ESDC participated in Cambodia workshop on Social Protection Floor on 29-31 May, 2013; currently cooperating to organise new social dialogue form for Asia.
Ukraine		Yes.
Venezuela	None.	
Vietnam		

Country	Expectations from AICESIS
Albania	Exchanging experience in the role of the ESC-EI to face global crisis impacts.
Algeria	Exchange experiences; promote establishment of ESC-SIs in countries which do not have them.
Aruba	Share experiences and best practices.
Belgium	Share experiences and practices.
Benin	Reinforce collaboration; establish a platform for collaboration and reinforcement of capacity of ESC-SIs; exchange experiences and best practices.
Bulgaria	Share best practices.
Burkina Faso	Technical collaboration on training, study travel, seminars and exchanges of experiences.
Burundi	Reinforce institutional capacity.

Brazil	Exchange best practices and information through seminars and roundtables.
Cameroun	Technical assistance and recommendations.
Congo	Technical assistance in organising seminars and workshops to reinforce capacities of members and become a focal point for social dialogue.
Curacao	Support more tailored towards small island economies.
Czech Republic	Exchange best practices and experiences.
France	Promote human rights and freedom of association by the new office.
Gabon	Reinforce capacities and exchange experiences.
Greece	
Guatemala	Exchange best practices and experiences.
Honduras	Place to express opinions; Develop contacts, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Ireland	
Italy	Closer collaboration on labour issues (particularly women and youth) and comparative analysis of legislation.
Japan	Exchange best practices.
Jordan	
Kenya	Exchange best practices and information; Case by case benchmarking; promoting ESC-SIs among the UN and African Union, and East Africa.
Lithuania	
Luxembourg	Exchange best practices and promote participatory democracy.
Macao	
Mali	Reinforce partnership and capacity members and ESC-SI.
Mauritania	Strengthening capacity; support in developing workplan; documents to support mission ESC; ensure presence ESC at all regional and international meetings; establish partnerships with other ESC-SIS,
Mauritius	Exchange and networking; help provide experts from international organizations; to assist in drafting policy responses and opinion reports.
Netherlands	Quickly bring together various ESC-SIs to discuss events, as it is doing now.
Niger	Exchange best practices.
Nigeria	Technical and financial support.
Oman	Guidelines on how to develop work and provide information on latest developments in social dialogue policy.
Panama	Training and exchange of information and experiences; Assist in developing database
Poland	
Portugal	Annual contribution suspended due to budget constraints. Remains open to close collaboration.
Romania	
Russia	Assist in implementing the agenda Civic Chamber during the possible presidency of the AICESIS.
Saint-Maarten	Support each other.
Senegal	Technical and financial support; establish bilateral partnerships with other ESC-SIs; organise workshops.
Slovenia	Present cooperation quite satisfactory.
Spain	Improve as a forum for meetings and cooperation.
South-Africa	Reinforce institutional capacity; research.
South-Korea	AICESIS to have more joint cooperative projects with the ILO and Asian countries.
Ukraine	
Venezuela	None.
Vietnam	

Annex 3: Questionnaire

Questionnaire

Information concerning the ESC-SI	
Country:	
Name of the institution:	
Website:	
President:	
Information concerning the focal point (for the purpose of the Conference)	
Name:	
Department and function:	
Address:	
E-mail:	
Phone / Fax number	

Involvement of the ESC-SI in response to the current crisis

1. Was the ESC-SI established specifically in response to the current crisis?
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
2. Did the ESC-SI take a specific initiative on its own in response to the current crisis?
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

If the answer to question 2 is yes, please specify which type of initiative was taken in response to the crisis:

- 2.1. What type of initiative was taken? Please specify your answer:
- ☐ Setting up of a specific committee or working group
- ☐ Organisation of special internal meetings
- ☐ Organisation of a conference
- ☐ Adoption of one (or several) report(s) or opinion(s)

2.2. Has the ESC-SI operated differently than usual in terms of discussion and decision-making reforms in light of the crisis (e.g. additional meetings, crisis summit...)? If so, please explain how.

Click here to enter text

3. Was the ESC-SI officially involved by national public authorities in response to the current crisis?
- ☐ Yes, please specify (e.g. specific consultation, request for a report, etc.)
- ☐ No

[Click here to enter text](#)

If the answer to question 3 is yes, please specify:

3.1. Did the policy formulations in response to the crisis, in which the ESC-SI was involved, include any of the following functions?

- ☐ Consultation on policy packages
- ☐ Advisory role in drafting legislation and devising policy measures
- ☐ Negotiation of tripartite agreements/social pacts
- ☐ Dispute Settlement
- ☐ Administration of established policies and programs

3.2. How has the ESC-SI been involved in the reforms in light of the crisis? Which of the policy responses by the public authorities have been dependent on negotiation, agreements, joint statements, recommendations, reports, or information generated or facilitated by ESC-SI? *The list below provides examples of possible policy responses.*

- ☐ Social Pact
- ☐ Reform of the labour legislation
- ☐ Reform of social security / welfare
- ☐ Jobs creation program
- ☐ Fiscal support (subsidies) for enterprises
- ☐ Public infrastructure program
- ☐ Policies targeting specific sectors (e.g. tourism, financial, etc.), please specify
- ☐ Other, please specify

[Click here to enter text](#)

4. If the policy responses by the public authorities have been dependent on negotiation, was there a breakdown of negotiations during the formulation of responses to the crisis within the structure of the ESC-SI? Please specify which policies or areas? Why parties could not reach an agreement?

[Click here to enter text](#)

If the answer to question 4 is yes, please specify:

4.1. Did the government take any confidence building measures to restore trust and resume social dialogue /negotiations?

- ☐ Yes, please specify
- ☐ No

[Click here to enter text](#)

5. Did the government and ESC-SI cooperate with other institutions in formulating policy responses during the crisis?

- ☐ Yes, please specify
- ☐ No

[Click here to enter text](#)

6. Did the ESC-SI cooperate with another ESC-SI(s) in response to the crisis?

- ☐ Yes, please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

Follow-up and impact of the crisis-related reforms

7. Will the ESC-SI continue to be involved in information sharing, consultation, or negotiation in the context of the formulated responses to the crisis? Has the ESC-SI made some concrete steps in this respect?

☐ Yes, please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

8. Will the ESC-SI be involved in monitoring the reforms and outcomes, or in administrating new programs or policies?

☐ Yes, please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

9. Have the proposals made by the ESC-SI been adopted and implemented by the public authorities?

☐ Yes (fully or partially), please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

10. Did these proposals/reforms meet their targets?

☐ Yes, please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

11. Did the reform process affect the dynamics between the members of the ESC-SI? If yes, how?

☐ Increased cooperation

☐ Led to polarisation

☐ Situation unchanged

☐ Other, please specify

Click here to enter text

12. Has the reform process led to any changes in the role of the ESC-SI (e.g. widening of the scope of the policy areas in which the ESC-SI is involved, contraction or expansion of its responsibilities...)?

☐ Yes, please specify

☐ No

Click here to enter text

13. Did the reform process lead to any formal institutional changes in the ESC-SI or in its dealings with other actors?

- ☐ Yes, please specify
☐ No

Click here to enter text

Closing Questions

14. What kind of input or support would the ESC-SI expect from the ILO?

Click here to enter text

15. Does the ESC-SI work closely with the local ILO office?

- ☐ Yes, please specify (e.g. role of the ESC-SI in the elaboration of the Decent Work Country Program; social protection floor and framework; partnership agreement,...)
☐ No

Click here to enter text

16. What kind of input or support would the ESC-SI expect from the AICESIS?

Click here to enter text

17. Please fill in below any additional comments that might be of use for drafting the background report for the conference, as well as other issues that the ESCSI feels should be addressed during the conference.

Click here to enter text

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION
