

Short-time work and temporary workers in Spain: A dual labour market amid the Covid19 pandemic

Miguel Á. Malo

Department of Economics, University of Salamanca (Spain)
malo@usal.es

**Paper prepared for presentation at the
“7th Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work Network”
Virtual Conference, International Labour Office Geneva, Switzerland
6-9 July 2021**

Abstract

In this article, I analyse the use of the short-time work schemes in Spain (the so-called ERTE, ‘Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo’) during the pandemic by contract type. In fact, the ERTE applies irrespective of the contract type of the worker, but, at the same time, the Spanish labour market is well known because of its dual structure or segmentation by contract type, resting adjustment to the business cycle on temporary employment. The information from the Spanish Labour Force Survey and different administrative data shows a different pattern of employment adjustment during the pandemic with a massive use of ERTE to protect employment. However, temporary workers have been much less covered by the ERTes once the lockdown finished and they have suffered a huge part of the employment adjustment beyond the ERTes. The great hiring deficit during the pandemic crisis also mainly affects to temporary contracts.

Keywords: Short-time work, temporary workers, segmentation, dual labour markets

Copyright 2021 by author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.

1. Introduction

The objective of this research consists of analysing how the Short-Time Work (STW) schemes has protected employment amid the Covid-19 pandemic in a labour market segmented by contract type. The national case we analyse is Spain, where the share of temporary employment has been one of the highest in the European Union since the mid-1980s, always above 20% and sometimes above 30% (García-Serrano and Malo, 2014; ILO, 2011). The Spanish labour market is an example of the so-called ‘flexibility at the margin’, focusing on new entrants into the labour market. Temporary contracts are the entry port for almost any occupation, bringing about a sort of probationary period more and more extended. The extensive use of temporary contracts has reinforced the segmentation of jobs between two groups of workers who enjoy different degrees of stability and working conditions, and visible via the contract type. Although other sorts of segmentation exist in the Spanish labour market (for example, by age, educational level and skills), all of them are subsumed into the segmentation by contract type (García-Serrano and Malo, 2014).

The STW existed in Spain before the current pandemic. They are called ERTE (*Expediente de Regulación Temporal de Empleo*, or ‘procedure for a temporary employment adjustment’). This type of STW is rather similar to other existing in the European Union, as the German ‘Kurzarbeit’, but usually not including training courses for those workers with a contract suspension. The Spanish ERTE existed before the current pandemic, but they were adapted and updated to the current needs through tripartite social dialogue. Thanks to the implementation of the ERTE the adjustment of total employment has been much smaller than in previous recessions, limiting the rise in unemployment as in other EU countries with different STW schemes (Eurofound, 2021).

The STW schemes are designed to protect incumbent workers, and especially workers with an open-ended contract. According to Eurofound (2021), in the EU workers on casual contracts, agency contracts and, sometimes, temporary workers are excluded from access to these schemes. However, in the Spanish case temporary workers had explicit access to the ERTE, whatever their seniority or the expected deadline of the contract. Therefore, the Spanish case is an especially suitable national case to analyse

whether this type of STW protects all workers irrespective of their contract type in a dual labour market or not.

In this research, I use different type of data. First, the analysis mainly rests on aggregate information from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (KFS) and different administrative data. Second, I will use the microdata from the Spanish LFS to compare the coverage of temporary and permanent workers by the ERTE during the pandemic.

The preliminary results show the great importance of the ERTEs respect to other types of employment adjustment in the current crisis, especially respect to the previous financial crisis. However, the data also show that the ERTEs have not prevented that a huge weight of the employment adjustment has been on temporary workers, who are also the most affected by the much lower prospects of being re-hired because of the fall of new hires during the pandemic.

2. Short-Time Work in Spain: the ERTE

When a negative shock occurs, companies can adjust in different ways. The two main ones related to employment are reducing employment –using dismissals or waiting to the end of temporary contracts- or working hours. The reduction in employment would seem more related to adjustments to permanent situations, since laying off workers has a significant cost. However, temporary contracts also allow companies to adjust their workforce quickly and at a relatively lower cost. In fact, the Spanish labour market, having a dual structure, responds strongly to the oscillations of the economic cycle with adjustments in temporary employment, which does not exclude large adjustments of workers with permanent contracts in intense crisis, as happened during the Great Recession (Malo and González Sánchez, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes and Malo, 2019).

The legal form of the adjustment facing a negative situation by reducing working hours required in Spain is the ERTE, especially when the reduction of hours is actually a suspension of the employment relationship. By design, this form of adjustment to a crisis is more related to negative situations that are considered transitory, something that is recognized even in the name of ERTE ('T' is for 'temporal' meaning here transitory). Of course, sometimes it is not easy for the company, or for anyone, to determine whether a negative situation is going to be temporary or permanent. However, when facing an

economic shock that deeply transforms some economic sectors in the medium term, the use of ERTE may even be counterproductive, since the company delays adaptation to the new situation, which could damage its competitiveness and its probability of long-term survival. This may entail a broader economic damage, since it would slow down the reallocation of work and other resources from the less competitive sectors to those better adapted to the new situation, which, presumably, are more productive.

The general regulation of ERTE and the specific one of ERTE due to force majeure related to the pandemic assume the transitory nature of these measures (Roqueta, 2021), and hence the requirement to maintain employment for six months (Cruz, 2021) beyond the end of the ERTE. If they are really transitory, we should observe a significant dynamic of entry and exit of companies and individual workers in the ERTE situation. At the moment, it is not easy to carry out this longitudinal analysis, as there are hardly any databases available that allow it. The longitudinal LFS is one of the few accessible to all researchers that allows some analyses of this type, as in Izquierdo *et al.* (2021). The transitions of workers affected by an ERTE in the second quarter of 2020 show a return to employment in the third quarter much higher than that of those who were not under this scheme. However, this effect decreases very clearly the longer the duration of the ERTE situation is. In short, the ERTE facilitate the return to employment of the affected workers when the company is affected temporarily; however, when the ERTE was prolonged, that effectiveness would be lost.

Beyond the data from the LFS, the most widely used are those that account for the stock of affected employees, that is, the number of people under an ERTE at a certain point in time. Social Security provides this data every month, offering the daily stock of total affiliates and those affected by ERTE since the start of the pandemic. Figure 1 shows the evolution daily of the total affiliation, highlighting the situation ERTE affiliates. From a legal point of view, affiliates with ERTE are considered employed, even though they receive unemployment benefits (Roqueta, 2021). For this reason, workers covered by an ERTE are not counted in the registered unemployment statistics even when they are not working at all, as they maintain their employment relationship.




Figure 1. Daily affiliates to Social Security (in black, affiliates covered by ERTE).
Source: Spanish Social Security.

It is important to notice that it would not be correct to affirm that, without the ERTE, the volume of affiliates would have fallen by the same amount as the people covered by them. However, as the ERTEs have covered up to more than 3 million affiliates at certain times and the oscillation observed in total affiliation was around 1 million, the crucial buffering role of the ERTEs in the pandemic crisis in Spain is undeniable.

3. Employment adjustment by contract type in the pandemic

To understand how the ERTE has replaced the traditional adjustment pattern by contract type in past crisis, Figure 2 shows how the sudden arrival of the pandemic and confinement drastically changed the distribution of the new entries into the unemployment benefits system. Whereas in recent years new entries by ERTE had a very small representation (less than 5%), from March 2020 the ERTE have been the main cause of new entries in unemployment benefits, reaching over 90% in March and April, and 60% in August. Thus, it is clearly visible how the adjustment pattern in the current crisis has been very different, compared to the previous financial crisis, when sectoral

reallocation of employment was evident (García-Serrano, 2011; Amuedo - Dorantes and Malo, 2019).

All in all, it could be argued that the great relative weight of the ERTes perhaps does not allow us to see whether the adjustment –in terms of people affected by contract ends and layoffs– is of a magnitude similar to that of the previous crisis. Figure 3 shows that there was a peak in the number of new entries in April 2020, the month in which this cause of entry almost reached 80 thousand, when it ranged between 30 and 40 thousand in previous years. In a similar vein, in April 2020, new entries because of end of a temporary contract reached just over 155 thousand, a figure unknown since the beginning of the financial crisis, i.e. the autumn-winter of 2008. Thus, April 2020 marked the worst moment of the lockdown in terms of employment, not only due to the number of people under an ERTE, but also due to the volume of dismissals and ends of temporary contracts.




Figure 2. Monthly distribution of new entries into unemployment benefits by reason of entry (2007M1-2021M03)

But what is striking is that while the number of dismissals shows a much smaller oscillation than in the previous crisis, the same does not happen for the ends of temporary contracts (Figure 3). Thus, the replacement of the adjustment of the number

of people by the adjustment through hours and suspensions of employment has clearly occurred among those workers with a permanent contract, but not among those with a temporary contract. This is a clear manifestation of the dual structure of the Spanish labour market: even with a STW such as the ERTE, designed to use it regardless of the type of contract the worker has (Falguera, 2021), it protects more to those already enjoying greater protection thanks to their type of contract. In short, the adjustment through employment rests precisely on those who already suffer from less job stability due to having a temporary contract.




Figure 3. Gross flow of entries into unemployment benefits because of dismissal and end of temporary contract.

In the same vein, Figure 4 shows that the number of permanent workers has recovered in the first quarter of 2021 the figures of the first quarter of 2019, but not so with the number of temporary workers. This result remains by gender, although the difference for temporary workers among men is more pronounced. Returning to Figure 3, new entries in unemployment benefits because of the end of temporary contracts have fallen intensely during the first quarter of 2021, especially in March. Therefore, the negative trend in the

levels of temporary workers showed by the LFS in Figure 4 are related with a deficit of new temporary contracts, which is confirmed by Figure 5.




Figure 4. Wage and salary workers by contract type, gender, and quarter. Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey.


Figure 5 shows the evolution of the number of new contracts distinguishing temporary and permanent. This graph confirms the dual structure of the Spanish labour market during the pandemic, here as a deficit contracts respect to the the average of the same months of 2017 to 2019. During of the lockdown in 2020, there was a large decrease in hiring compared to what happened in the same months of the previous three years (on average). Specifically, the number of contracts fell by more than one million in April and May, and almost in 900 thousand in June. This hiring deficit -which was decreasing after finishing the lockdown to 380 thousand in September- is due to the sharp decrease in the gross flow of new temporary contracts compared to the average for the same months of the previous three years.

The decrease in hiring shows the slowdown in the economic activity as a consequence of the lockdown, affecting to the opportunities for those who are on the margin of being hired. In other words, young workers who are wrestling with their labour market

integration, and also workers with lower education levels and immigrants, all of them workers who suffer a high turnover in the labour market. The drop in the number of new temporary contracts also happened during the financial crisis, especially in its early years (Malo and Cueto, 2012, 2014).

The hiring deficit remained in the summer months of 2020, despite the fact that the average affiliation to Social Security increased by just over 330 thousand affiliates (1.8%) from the minimum in April to August, and from August to September in 84 thousand more. It is important to notice that affiliation to Social Security was somewhat higher in August than is usually observed in other years this month.¹

In September, despite the largest monthly increase in the series in that month, the hiring deficit reached 380 thousand contracts. Later, the deficit of new contracts remained around 350 thousand in the rest of 2020, oscillating in 2021 between 450 thousand in January and just 300 thousand in March.²



¹ "Quarterly report on the Spanish economy", *Economic Bulletin 3/2020*, Bank of Spain.

² The data for March 2021 shows an increase in new permanent contracts with respect to the average for the same month from 2017 to 2019. The reason lies in the campaign to combat fraud in the temporary hiring of the Labour Inspection. The result of this campaign was the transformation into permanent contracts of a substantial number of temporary contracts.

Figure 5. New hires by contract type in 2020 and 2021, and from 2017 to 2019 on average, by month. Source: Register of Contracts, Spanish Public Employment Office.

To sum up, the new adjustment pattern based on ERTes has not prevented temporary workers from having suffered a significant adjustment through employment. At the same time, these workers ‘at the margin’ have seen diminished their possibilities of returning to employment diminished because of the huge deficit in new contracts compared to previous years.

4. Temporary and permanent workers affected by an ERTE

Figure 5 shows the quarterly evolution in 2020 of the percentage of wage and salary workers covered by ERTE. Considering all workers (black columns), the worst quarter was the second one (65.2%), because it included the lockdown, which lasted from mid-March to June. The first quarter was only affected by the lockdown a couple of weeks, but the percentage of affected workers was not negligible (18.6%). The second part of the year it was a bit above 20%. By contract type, the relative coverage of temporary workers was slightly higher than that of permanent workers in the first and second quarters, while for the third and fourth quarters the results are the opposite and the difference against temporary workers increasing. Therefore, when the unexpected shock of the lockdown affected the Spanish economy, the use of ERTE was so wide that the general coverage of the ERTE irrespective of the type of contract was very effective protecting all workers and, especially, those under temporary contracts. However, when the economy partially re-opened in the second part of 2020, probably the temporary contracts ended and in subsequent ERTE were increasingly more focused on workers with an open-ended contract, as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Wage and salary workers covered by ERTE, by quarter. Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey (own calculations)

Table 1 presents these results also by gender. The percentage of female temporary workers covered by an ERTE in all quarters of 2020 was higher than for male with the same type of contract (see the last column), while this percentage was almost the same for females and males with an open-ended contract (see the second column). In addition, the coverage of the ERTE was more similar for open-ended and temporary contracts in the second part of the year for women than for men.

Finally, in order to consider that temporary and open-ended workers may be in different sectors affected in a very different manner by the pandemic crisis or having different characteristics, I have estimated some logistic regressions on the probability of being covered by an ERTE in 2020. I estimated models for all workers and also by gender.³ The odds ratio corresponds to the characteristic of having a temporary contract respect to an open-ended contract and it is shown in the last row of Table 1. Confirming the previous descriptive results, the lower probability for those with a temporary contract of

³ In the logistic regressions, the dependent variable is being affected by an ERTE (yes=1) and the independent variables are gender, age (3 dummies), married (yes=1), university education (yes=1), nationality (Spanish=1), type of contract (temporary contract=1), part time contract (yes=1), occupation (9 dummies), economic activity (13 dummies), region of residence (17 dummies) and quarter (4 dummies). Full results are available upon request.

being under an ERTE (87.5 per cent lower respect to those with an open-ended contract) is almost exclusively related to the case of male workers (81.8 per cent lower). For female workers the estimated difference is much closer to 1 (i.e. the same probability of being affected by an ERTE irrespective of the contract type) and in addition it is not statistically significant (i.e. at conventional levels of confidence it is not possible to distinguish whether women with a temporary have a different probability of being affected by ERTE or not).

Table 1. Percentage of wage and salary workers affected by an ERTE. Source: Spanish LFS and own calculations.

ALL WORKERS			
Quarter	All	OpenEnded	Temp
2020Q1	18.6	18.0	20.9
2020Q2	65.2	64.3	68.8
2020Q3	22.3	22.7	19.8
2020Q4	21.3	22.7	14.8
MALE WORKERS			
Quarter	All	OpenEnded	Temp
2020Q1	18.7	18.3	20.4
2020Q2	65.3	65.2	65.5
2020Q3	21.3	22.1	16.8
2020Q4	19.9	21.6	12.5
FEMALE WORKERS			
Quarter	All	OpenEnded	Temp
2020Q1	18.5	17.7	21.6
2020Q2	65.1	63.4	72.0
2020Q3	23.3	23.3	22.9
2020Q4	22.8	23.9	17.5
Logistic regressions on being affected by an ERTE – Odds ratio			
	All	Males	Females
Temp. Contract	0.875	0.818	0.935(n.s.)

NOTE: n.s. means not statistically significant at conventional levels

5. Conclusions

The use of different STW schemes across the EU has been a bold characteristic of the labour market amid the pandemic crisis. In some countries, the STW does not discriminate by contract type, trying to provide this type of protection against transitory

shocks to all workers. However, in countries with a long tradition of segmentation by contract type it is possible that temporary workers may have a weaker position and, then, they are less protected by the STW even when the legal regulation does not make any distinction by contract type. The Spanish labour market is a suitable national case to test this hypothesis, because of the high share of temporary contracts since the eighties of the past century and because the coverage of the STW (the so-called ERTE) is the same irrespective of the worker's contract type.

The analysis of aggregate information from the Spanish LFS and different administrative data show that until the second quarter of 2020 there was a more or less balanced coverage for workers with open-ended and temporary contracts. However, in the second part of the year, temporary workers are not so present in the ERTE as workers with an open-ended contract. At the same time, there is an important hiring monthly deficit respect to the average of the three previous years mainly affecting to temporary contracts.

By gender, among women the coverage of the ERTE was more similar for open-ended and temporary contracts in the second part of the year than among men. In fact, the percentage of female temporary workers covered by an ERTE in all quarters of 2020 was higher than for male with the same type of contract, while this percentage was almost the same for females and males with an open-ended contract. As a result, estimations show that workers with a temporary contract have a probability of being covered by an ERTE around 87 per cent lower than workers with an open-ended contract and separated estimations by gender confirm that this effect corresponds almost exclusively to the case of males (81 per cent).

These results suggest that the ERTE were successful overpassing the divide of contract type in the first months of the pandemic, but later the end of suspended temporary contracts when some ERTE finished and the deficit of temporary contracts' hires show an employment adjustment pattern coherent with the segmentation of the Spanish labour market by contract type, mainly affecting to men. In other words, the well-known pattern of adjustment in Spain resting heavily on temporary employment have remained even when there has been a widespread use of the ERTE, with a legal regulation covering all workers irrespective of their contract type. If we want to fight against the dual structure of the Spanish labour market with their negative economic and social effects, the ERTEs are not enough.

6. References

Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and Malo, M.Á. (2019), “Coping with turbulent economic times: Establishments’ employment adjustment practices by gender and contract type”, *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali*, 2: 195-216.

Cruz, J. (2021). “Las medidas de evitación de la destrucción de empleo ante la emergencia sanitaria: incentivos al retorno del empleo y sanciones frente a la resolución contractual”, in J.M. Gómez Muñoz and M.J. Rodríguez Ramos (eds.), *Nuevos escenarios del sistema de relaciones laborales derivados de la Covid19*, Editorial Bomarzo, 589-626.

Eurofound (2021). *COVID-19: Implications for employment and working life*, COVID-19 series, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Link: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2021/covid-19-implications-for-employment-and-working-life>

Felguera, M.Á. (2021). *Los ERTEs en la legislación extraordinaria derivada de la crisis sanitaria*. Editorial Bomarzo.

García-Serrano C. and Malo, M.A. (2013). “Beyond the contract type segmentation in Spain”, Employment Sector, Employment Working Paper n° 143, International Labour Organization, Geneva (Switzerland). Link: https://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/working-papers/WCMS_218970/lang--en/index.htm

ILO (2011). *Spain. Quality jobs for a new economy*. Research Department, International Labour Organization, Geneva (Switzerland). Link: https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ilo-bookstore/order-online/books/WCMS_158537/lang--en/index.htm

Izquierdo, M., Puente, S. and Regil, A. (2021). “Los ERTE en la crisis del covid-19: un primer análisis de la reincorporación al empleo de los trabajadores afectados”, *Boletín Económico del Banco de España*, 2/2021.

Malo, M.Á. and Cueto, B. (2012): “Biografía laboral, ciclo económico y flujos brutos en el mercado de trabajo español: el diferente impacto de la crisis en las generaciones”. *Panorama Social*, 15: 43-60.

Malo, M.Á. and Cueto, B. (2014): “El bloqueo de la entrada en el mercado de trabajo español durante la recesión. ¿Solo un problema de los jóvenes?”. Fundación FOESSA, working paper, October 2014.

Malo, M.Á. and González Sánchez, J.J. (2010). *El análisis comparado de los procedimientos de despido: Perspectiva económica y jurídica*. Ministerio de Trabajo. Madrid.

Rodríguez Fernández, M. L. (2020). “El Ministerio de Trabajo, 2004-2011: de la esperanza del pleno empleo a la contención de los efectos devastadores de la crisis económica”, in S. Castillo (Dir.) *Cien años del Ministerio de Trabajo en España*, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo, 307-345.

Roqueta, R. (2021). *Los Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo*. Segunda edición. Editorial Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia.

APPENDIX

Table A.1. Percentage of wage and salary workers covered by ERTE, by contract type and quarter. All workers. Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey (own calculations).

Quarter	Contract		ERTE: No	ERTE: Yes	All
2020Q1	Temp	% Row (Temp)	79.1	20.9	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	20.4	23.7	21.0
	Open Ended	% Row (Open Ended)	82.0	18.0	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	79.6	76.3	79.0
	All	% Row (All)	81.4	18.6	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q2	Temp	% Row (Temp)	31.2	68.8	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	17.5	20.6	19.5
	Open Ended	% Row (Open Ended)	35.7	64.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	82.5	79.4	80.5
	All	% Row (All)	34.8	65.2	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q3	Temp	% Row (Temp)	80.2	19.8	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	14.6	12.5	14.1
	Open Ended	% Row (Open Ended)	77.3	22.7	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	85.4	87.5	85.9
	All	% Row (All)	77.7	22.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q4	Temp	% Row (Temp)	85.2	14.8	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	18.9	12.1	17.5
	Open Ended	% Row (Open Ended)	77.3	22.7	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	81.1	87.9	82.5
	All	% Row (All)	78.7	21.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table A.2. Percentage of wage and salary workers covered by ERTE, by contract type and quarter. Only male workers. Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey (own calculations).

Quarter	Contract		ERTE: No	ERTE: Yes	All
2020Q1	Temp	% Row (Temp)	78.4	21.6	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	19.5	23.7	20.3
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	82.3	17.7	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	80.5	76.3	79.7
	All	% Row (All)	81.5	18.5	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q2	Temp	% Row (Temp)	28.0	72.0	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	15.9	21.8	19.8
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	36.6	63.4	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	84.1	78.2	80.2
	All	% Row (All)	34.9	65.1	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q3	Temp	% Row (Temp)	77.1	22.9	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	13.8	13.5	13.7
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	76.7	23.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	86.2	86.5	86.3
	All	% Row (All)	76.7	23.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q4	Temp	% Row (Temp)	82.5	17.5	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	18.1	12.9	16.9
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	76.1	23.9	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	81.9	87.1	83.1
	All	% Row (All)	77.2	22.8	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table A.3. Percentage of wage and salary workers covered by ERTE, by contract type and quarter. Only female workers. Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey (own calculations).

Quarter	Contract		ERTE: No	ERTE: Yes	All
2020Q1	Temp	% Row (Temp)	78.4	21.6	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	19.5	23.7	20.3
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	82.3	17.7	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	80.5	76.3	79.7
	All	% Row (All)	81.5	18.5	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q2	Temp	% Row (Temp)	28.0	72.0	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	15.9	21.8	19.8
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	36.6	63.4	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	84.1	78.2	80.2
	All	% Row (All)	34.9	65.1	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q3	Temp	% Row (Temp)	77.1	22.9	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	13.8	13.5	13.7
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	76.7	23.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	86.2	86.5	86.3
	All	% Row (All)	76.7	23.3	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0
2020Q4	Temp	% Row (Temp)	82.5	17.5	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	18.1	12.9	16.9
	OpenEnded	% Row (OpenEnded)	76.1	23.9	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	81.9	87.1	83.1
	All	% Row (All)	77.2	22.8	100.0
		% Column (ERTE)	100.0	100.0	100.0