




International  
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# Towards the right to work: A guidebook for designing innovative Public Employment Programmes



## Background & Experiences from the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon

by **Francesca Battistin and Virginia Leape**

Original version December 2015. Revised March 2017



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COOPERATION

# Background & Experiences

from the Syrian Refugee  
Crisis in Lebanon

Towards the right to work:  
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Public Employment Programmes

By Francesca Battistin and Virginia Leape

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# List of abbreviations and acronyms

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| ABAAD      | Resource Center for Gender Equality (Beirut based)   |
| ACF        | Action Against Hunger                                |
| AVSI       | Association of Volunteers in International Service   |
| CAS        | Central Administration of Statistics (Lebanon)       |
| CfW        | Cash for Work  |
| COOPI      | Cooperazione Internazionale                          |
| GBV        | Gender-based Violence                                |
| GSO        | General Security Office                              |
| ICMA       | International City/County Management Association     |
| IDAL       | Investment Development Authority of Lebanon          |
| ILDES      | Lebanese Institute for Social & Economic Development |
| IT         | Information Technology                               |
| LBP        | Lebanese Pound (currency)                            |
| LC         | Livelihoods Centre                                   |
| MDI        | Multi-Deprivation Index                              |
| MoL        | Ministry of Labour                                   |
| MoSA       | Ministry of Social Affairs                           |
| MSNA       | Multi-sector Needs Assessment                        |
| NGO        | Non-governmental Organizations                       |
| NSSF       | National Social Security Fund                        |
| PEP        | Public Employment Programme                          |
| SOP        | Standard Operating Procedure                         |
| RAIS       | Refugee Assistance Information System                |
| Res. 19/1  | Resolution No. 19/1                                  |
| UN         | United Nations                                       |
| UNDESA     | UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs         |
| UNESCWA    | UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia   |
| UNHCR      | UN High Commissioner for Refugees                    |
| UNICEF     | UN Emergency Children's Fund                         |
| UN-NGO TTF | Targeting Task Force                                 |
| UNRWA      | UN Relief and Works Agency                           |
| VASyR      | Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees          |
| WB         | World Bank   |
| WG         | Working Group  |

# Introduction

The objective of this guidebook is to provide Lebanese background and experiences from the current context adding to the ILO guidebook for designing innovative Public Employment Programmes. Lebanon is experiencing a growing labour supply and increasing pressure on the labour market as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. To address job shortages and alleviate tensions among refugees and host communities, the launch of emergency employment schemes and labour-intensive infrastructure work has constituted a substantial part of the increasingly development-orientated response of the international community to the crisis. This guidebook reflects on and analyses the on-going operation of public employment programmes as well as public infrastructure programmes in light of the current context in order to ensure best informed implementation in Lebanon.

This guidebook will provide practitioners in Lebanon with tools to better assess and understand the nature and complexity of the working age population, and unemployment and underemployment in Lebanon and take into account experiences to date. Building on responses as part of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015 – 2016, as well as the inter-agency standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Cash for Work (CfW) programmes, this guidebook aims to show options and possibilities for implementation of public employment and infrastructure programmes in Lebanon. It should be noted that while this guidebook still draws from the SOPs, these have never been endorsed by the Government of Lebanon but remain the main guidance for implementation to ensure a coordinated approach. The SOPs were designed to guide Cash for Work programmes as a humanitarian aid tool, which in light of today's shift towards a more development- and resilience-based response to the refugee crisis would call for a revision.

This guidebook will also review the types of PEPs that are implemented and why. In Lebanon, the focus is on CfW, a type of PEP that is used to address emergency situations. In the protracted Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, CfW can help to mitigate the effects of high unemployment rates among affected communities, Lebanese host communities as well as refugees. It will also look at the different approaches and theories that can be used for setting wage rates including lessons learned from implementers. It will provide an overview of different targeting mechanisms and strategies commonly used in CfW programmes as well as introducing some of the criticisms and challenges of these mechanisms. The main targeting mechanisms discussed are Proxy Means Test, Multi-Deprivation Index and Maps of Risks and Resources. This guidebook will also provide information and insights regarding issues of gender equality during the implementation of PEPs.

PEPs in urban areas encounter particular policy choices, complementarities and trade-offs between goals of job creation, urban development and infrastructure development that will be addressed in this guidebook, with special attention given to the rationale, challenges and experiences of these types of projects in Lebanon. Furthermore, the relationship between Decent Work and PEPs, with regard to safety and health at work and insurance coverage, will be discussed. Moreover, the design of payments systems is not only a 'technical issue' as there are also social and economic dimensions that need to be considered. This guidebook, therefore, assesses the different cash transfer modalities that are employed in Lebanon.

# Guidance Note 1: Analysing unemployment and underemployment

## Box 1.1

### Lebanon's labour market and Public Employment Programmes (PEPs) <sup>(1)</sup>

#### Scarcity of recent primary data and challenges in estimating key labour market indicators

There are currently serious primary data gaps at both national and regional levels, for both supply and demand sides. Lebanon does not have a Labour Market Information System and labour market data is not systematically collected. The labour market data and figures that exist are outdated, the most recent being the Household Expenditure Survey (CAS 2012), the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (CAS 2009), and the Household Living Conditions Survey (CAS 2007).

In the absence of recent primary data collection, and in light of rapid and substantive demographic changes in the country, estimating key indicators and profiling Lebanon's labour market presents challenges. In Lebanon, labour force surveys are not conducted on a regular basis. The most recent labour-force data were collected in 2007 within the framework of a living conditions survey that covered the whole country except for the Palestinian camps. The first survey of this kind dates back to 2004. Since the release of the findings from the 2007 living conditions survey, several reports on the labour market have been released, all of them based on secondary data analysis and projections. The last census in Lebanon was carried out in 1932, however, which casts some doubt on the reliability of projections derived from those data.

The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, which started with the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011, has had a significant impact on the Lebanese labour market. Analyses of this impact, however, refer only to secondary data. Pre-crisis comparisons are necessary to understand the magnitude of the influx effect, of course, but now that refugee arrivals have plateaued, with new-arrival numbers fairly stable, it is essential to consider the latest available figures. In considering existing reports, moreover, it is important to remember that they have applied a variety of methodologies, and their respective results may differ from or even contradict one another.

#### Demographics of the refugee crisis: A snapshot


One way to understand the current labour market situation is to look at the demographic figures for the country and compare the current estimates to those prior to the refugee influx. The demographic pyramid in figure 1 was produced with 2015 estimates of the Lebanese population calculated from tabulates published by the US Census Bureau and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the figures represent registered Syrian refugees (Battistin, 2015).

Over the past decades, Lebanon has experienced a demographic transition, and the current fertility rate of 1.58 has fallen lower than the replacement level. The population is living longer and fewer children are being born. Between 2005 and 2010 the population grew at a rate of 1.70 per cent, whereas between 2010 and 2015 it is estimated to have grown by 3.04 per cent (UNDESA, 2012).

As of May 2015, Lebanon – a country of around 4,150,000 people – counted slightly fewer than 1,185,000 registered Syrian refugees. The composition of the registered Syrian population indicates selective migration of children as a consequence of the war in Syria: 56 per cent of the Syrian refugees are younger than 18 years, whereas Lebanese citizens in the same age group represent 29 per cent of the total population.

<sup>1</sup> CfW projects are a type of public employment programme (PEP). The Government has requested that Cash for Work (CfW) projects in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–16 not be referred to by that name. However, the inter-agency Livelihoods Working Group developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) to cover CfW projects exclusively, these being the only type of PEP being implemented in Lebanon. Thus, for the sake of consistency with the CfW SOPs – the main reference regarding CfW in the country – all Lebanon-specific contents in these Guidelines employ the term "Cash for Work (CfW)". The preferred terms by the Government are rapid employment initiatives, labour-intensive work or labour intensive development programme, and rapid-income generating activities or public works.

Figure 1: Demographic pyramid: Lebanese and UNHCR registered Syrians, 2015 (Battistin, 2015).



With a younger population, Syrian refugees in Lebanon have a higher dependency ratio than do their hosts. In other words, Syrian adults are in charge of a greater number of dependents, who are for the most part children rather than elders.

As of 2015, about 605,000 Syrian working-age refugees represented 21.2 per cent of the total working-age Lebanese population. Among both Syrians and Lebanese, there were fewer adult males than adult females. Syrians had lower male-female ratios in all age groups, however, especially in the 20–24 age group.

The demographic pyramid in figure 1 also shows a lesser proportion of registered Syrian males in the 20–24 age group compared to either other Syrian age groups or to Lebanese in the same age group.

Recent estimates by the ILO suggest that the Syrian labour force in Lebanon consists of circa 384,000 people, and 36 per cent of them are estimated to be unemployed. Two thirds of those displaced Syrians being considered employed work less than 15 days per month, and 92 per cent earn less than the survival minimum expenditure basket, suggesting high rates of underemployment. In addition, the labour force participation rate of Syrian females is very low at about 12 per cent, which is lower than the female labour force participation last reported in Syria in 2011. (LCRP, 2017)

## Immigration and migration

Immigration and migration represent an important feature of the Lebanese labour market. In 2013, according to the demographic profile of Lebanon published by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 850,000 immigrants represented 17.6 per cent of the Lebanese population. Almost half of these immigrants, or 47.6 per cent, were women (UNESCWA, 2015). The World Bank (WB) estimated that a similar number of Lebanese migrated abroad for work during the period 1960–2012.

While in the past the country presented an attractive prospect to migrants, it now seems that the desire to leave Lebanon is greater than the desire to immigrate into the country. Indeed, the Potential Net Migration Index (PNMI) declined from an estimated 15 per cent in 2007–09 to -4.0 per cent in 2010–12 (Esipova, Pugliese, and Ray, 2014).

Willingness to leave Lebanon permanently in search of better employment opportunities is particularly common among youth, of which 37 per cent would like to migrate (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015).<sup>(2)</sup>

In 2011, the Gallup World Poll found that those who wanted to emigrate were mostly men and mainly Muslim (Gallup, 2011), and that the favourite destination countries for Lebanese labour migration was the U.S. (15 per cent), Canada (13 per cent), Australia (11 per cent), France (10 per cent), and the United Arab Emirates (7 per cent). Sex ratios suggest that women were more inclined to migrate to developed countries (1.16) as opposed to less developed ones (1.64), and that they tended not to follow men when they migrated to least developed countries (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015).

## Syrians migration to Lebanon

The Governments of Lebanon and Syria have a longstanding history of regulating labour matters through formal agreements and arrangements permitting the entry and circulation of low-skilled workers (see Box 1.1 Lebanon's labour market and Public Employment Programmes (PEPs)).

Syrian migrants have worked in Lebanon for decades. According to a report published by UNDP in 1997, by the end of 1995 there were 600,000 foreign workers in Lebanon, of which 450,000 were Syrians. In addition to Syrians, Palestinian refugees and nationals from Asian and African countries were also commonly found filling low-skilled jobs.

Of these migrant workers, 92 per cent lacked professional qualifications. Reportedly, most of the Syrian nationals were employed in roads and building construction, farming (especially seasonal), car servicing, cleaning and garbage collection, repair and maintenance workshops, and as peddlers, porters, and shoe polishers. Working conditions did not meet "decent" standards, and most of the workers were not entitled to social security or health insurance coverage.

The report indicated that Syrians competed with an unskilled, illiterate Lebanese workforce representing 40 per cent of the total population. Employers tended to find them both cheaper, since they accepted lower wages and did not require social security registration, and more productive (UNDP, 1997).

Currently, there are 25 per cent more working-age Syrian migrants in Lebanon (605,000) than there were in 1995 (450,000). Their occupations have remained similar to those pursued 20 years ago (ILO, 2013), mostly work in domestic and personal services, e.g. as drivers and housekeepers (36 per cent); in agricultural activities (28 per cent); in commerce (15 per cent); and in construction (12 per cent).

Three-quarters of the Syrians work on hourly, daily, or seasonal bases. The vast majority (92 per cent) do not have work contracts (ILO, 2013). The ILO found that, since Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon are almost exclusively employed in the informal economy, they do not receive social protection coverage and they are paid less than the minimum wage, although they work long hours (Aljuni and Kawar, 2015).<sup>(3)</sup>

The current situation is similar to that reported as prevailing in the 1990s (UNDP, 1997), where working Syrian refugees presented a cheaper alternative to the Lebanese workforce, both because they were paid lower wages and because they mostly worked as informal labourers. The ILO estimated that 57 per cent of workers earned less than 450,000 Lebanese pounds (LBP) (US\$ 300)<sup>(4)</sup> per month (ILO, 2013). Women earned around 40 per cent less than males (LBP 248,000 [US\$ 165]), which suggested an alarming discriminatory situation (ILO, 2013).

### Overview of the current labour market situation

In 2010, prior to the refugee crisis, Lebanon's estimated working-age population was around 2,800,000 (US Census Bureau, 2010) and the total labour force numbered about 1,550,000.

The average unemployment rate in 2010 was 8.93 per cent. Youth were especially affected, their 34 per cent unemployment rate almost four times that of the general population. Most of the workforce was employed in services and trade. Employment growth was faster in the trade, services, and construction sectors than it was in transformative and higher productivity activities.

As of 2013, one Lebanese labour market issue was the scarcity of jobs for qualified and graduated jobseekers within what was generally a highly educated workforce. In fact, one-fifth of men and two-fifths of working-age women had university degrees. As their educational level rose, jobseekers experienced a greater probability of being unemployed, although this tended to be for shorter periods compared to jobseekers with lesser educational levels. Given prevailing job shortages, highly educated people were inclined to migrate or to exit the labour force. Overall, the inactivity rate among youth was estimated at 70 per cent in 2013, compared to a world average of 52.6 per cent.

Lebanese women were significantly less economically active than men. Their participation rate was one-third that of men (21 per cent versus 66 per cent) (Yaacoub and Badre, 2011). However, female labour force participation was increasing. Coupled with the above-described demographic transition, and regardless of the influx of refugees, this led to a labour force that was growing faster than the general population.

<sup>3</sup> This study has been commissioned and published by the ILO Regional Office for Arab States.

<sup>4</sup> The Lebanese pound (LBP) has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1999 and currently its value is around 1,500 LBP to the USD. This paper will provide a rough USD equivalent when amounts are reported in LBP using the exchange rate 1,500 LBP to 1 USD.

The influx of Syrians in Lebanon, concurrently with the disruption of economic activities and trade as a consequence of the war, had expanded the labour supply and, hence, depressed wages – especially in more highly competitive sectors (UNDP, 2014).

The ILO reported that 47 per cent of working-age Syrian refugees were economically active, i.e. were working or in search of work. The participation rate among women was 19 per cent, which was relatively high for the region, and was consistent with the demographic composition of the Syrian refugee population (ILO, 2013).

However, the figures for economically active working-age Syrians described only part of the reality. As mentioned above, more than half of Syrian refugees were younger than 18 years. In principle, children should not participate in the labour market, and therefore should not compete within the Lebanese workforce. In reality, however, due to hardships associated with being displaced and the need for households to earn at least a subsistence income, Syrian children younger than 18 years were also entering the labour market (UNDP, 2014).

While the minimum legal working age is 16 years – provided that certain conditions are satisfied – younger children were also being employed. Many were working and serving as breadwinners for their families at extremely young ages – in Lebanon, they might have been as young as six years (Save the Children and UNICEF, 2015a). They were also engaged in the worst forms of child labour, and those working in agricultural activities reported being beaten by landowners (Save the Children and UNICEF, 2015b).

The estimated unemployment rate among Syrians was 33 per cent, about four times the average rate for Lebanon and about 52 per cent of total unemployment in Lebanon. At 68 per cent, females experienced an unemployment rate more than the double the average (Aljuni and Kawar, 2015).<sup>5</sup> A 2013 study led by the ILO reported very poor and exploitative work conditions among displaced Syrians (ILO, 2013).

Competition was particularly high between Syrian refugees and Syrian migrants, especially in informal services and agriculture, those sectors where they were most commonly employed. Low-skilled and low-educated Lebanese, as well as casual workers, also compete directly with Syrians. In fact, an estimated one-third of working-age Syrian refugees were illiterate and three out of four did not go beyond primary education, and only 3 per cent had university degrees (ILO, 2013). In principle, Lebanese graduates were unaffected by Syrian workforce competition.

In areas with the greatest number of refugees and where labour was abundant, businessmen and employers were benefitting because they could recruit cheaper labour under those conditions of heightened competition (UNDP, 2013).

Competition with Syrian workers was only one cause of unemployment among Lebanese, and not the most important one. Only a portion of the Lebanese labour force, i.e. the illiterate and in those in elementary occupations (ILO, 2012b), competes with its Syrian counterpart (Aljuni and Kawar, 2015). A major cause of unemployment in Lebanon was low economic growth due to investment in low-productivity sectors such as real estate and trade; the recession in Syria, which was an important trade partner; Lebanese products that were uncompetitive with imported ones; loss of revenue for the Government due to increased pressure on public services, such as healthcare; and the costs of harbouring Syrian refugees.

### PEP to address labour market issues in Lebanon

To keep up with the growing labour supply, in 2013, the World Bank estimated that the market should create 23,000 jobs per year; However, this has not been happening (WB, 2013; UNDP, 2014).

Recommendations made to address job shortages and to help settle tensions among refugees and host communities included the launch of emergency employment schemes and labour-intensive infrastructure work (UNDP, 2014). While injecting cash into the pockets of both workers and suppliers of raw materials and supplementary services, such schemes can also upgrade or create new urban and agriculture infrastructure as well as public services.

These jobs are mostly unsuited for the more highly educated and qualified Lebanese workforce, however, both because of the types of work entailed and because of the very low wages, which make the return on education investment unattractive. For this labour market segment, it is necessary to devise other, innovative emergency employment solutions.

5 This study has been commissioned and published by the ILO Regional Office for Arab States.

PEP programmes in Lebanon should prioritize low-skilled jobseekers and those interested in elementary occupations. Schemes ought to be intensified during winter months, when agricultural activities run at a slower pace.

Design of PEP schemes also needs to take into account the fact that one in five Syrian households is headed by a woman (WFP, 2015), and that the unemployment rate among women is double that of men (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015).<sup>6</sup>

So far, the great majority of the CfW schemes in Lebanon appeal to men, both because of the type of work they propose and because of the working conditions (e.g. long working hours, lack of childcare services) that beneficiaries confront. A programmatic shift is needed to make CfW more accessible to women.

In Lebanon, the main areas where CfW projects are implemented are in the Bekaa Valley and in North Lebanon. This is in line with where there are large populations of Syrian refugees residing. Furthermore, the bulk of the projects implement activities related to waste management, forest management and irrigation. The average labour intensity of the projects lie around 50 per cent, which indicates a move away from emergency employment measures (around 80 per cent) and towards a more development focused agenda. (ILO, 2016)

## Box 1.2

### Local labour market profiling by the IRC Livelihoods Centre in Akkar

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) Livelihoods Centre in North Lebanon serves, among other functions, to better match jobseekers and employers by first registering and profiling them (Battistin, 2014). The information recorded in the Livelihoods Centre database was used, without the need to conduct ad hoc surveys, to produce a snapshot of the labour market situation in the area served by the centre. A report was produced in April 2014 covering the first annual quarter of the centre's activity.

This report found that 59 per cent of the Centre's users were Syrians and the remainder were Lebanese. This may have been partly because outreach to Syrians was easier and partly thanks to a parallel IRC cash assistance programme where the Livelihoods Centre was advertised. Syrians had already been coming to register at the centre in large groups, but targeted outreach and information activities were subsequently conducted to increase Lebanese jobseeker usage of the centre.

Over the reporting period, most registered jobseekers (65 per cent) were aged between 25 and 59 years, while 27 per cent were aged between 18 and 24 years. This distribution was in line with age-group proportions estimated for the country (Battistin, 2015), which included both Lebanese and Syrians (see "Demographics of the refugee crisis: A snapshot", above). It was also found that 44 per cent of the clients were female and 56 per cent were male. Women mostly registered for vocational training activities, while men opted for job search.

Interestingly, the Syrian clients reported higher educational levels than did the Lebanese, but the two groups expressed similar job preferences, which represented a predictor of competition for jobs. Job preferences focused on crafts and trades (e.g. building, electricians, carpentry, food processing), elementary occupations (e.g. cleaners, helpers, labourers in construction and agriculture) and, in third place, professional occupations (e.g. engineering, health, education).

Syrians and Lebanese expressed different preferences in terms of livelihoods centre services. Almost all Syrian clients (94 per cent) asked for job referral services; most of them also requested vocational training (60 per cent), and nearly half wanted to be involved in CfW activities. The Lebanese clients, on the other hand, mainly requested vocational training (70 per cent), followed by job referral services (68 per cent), and CfW (35 per cent). This finding may suggest that Syrians have a greater predisposition than Lebanese do for CfW.

Because employers would not come to the Livelihoods Centre of their own initiative, mapping employers and job vacancies proved more demanding than did profiling jobseekers, and project staff had to reach out to them. An additional challenge was that the north of Lebanon is mostly rural, and farming was the main source of livelihoods; but the Livelihoods Centre did not focus on occupations in the agricultural sector. Part of the strategy was to serve non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the area, aiming to help them to identify, where applicable, suitable project staff, CfW participants, and volunteers.

Of the employers mapped by the centre, 74 per cent were in the wholesale and retail trade sector. Mostly micro and small enterprises, more than two-thirds had between two and ten employees, and one-fourth, had between 11 and 20 employees. Most employees (84 per cent) were male.

The vacancies shared with the Livelihoods Centre included 55 per cent in service and sales jobs (employees to be in charge of the respective shops), 15 per cent in elementary occupations, and 10 per cent in the managerial category. Average salaries ranged as low as US\$200 per month, below the \$450 minimum wage.

Employers mostly looked for women (70 per cent), perhaps because they generally accepted lower salaries than men did. For a variety of reasons, however – among these inadequate working hours, disapproval of the males in their family, and excessive commuting distances from home to workplace – many of them declined the job offers.

Men also preferred not to travel to long distances, for one thing wishing to avoid checkpoints. Another job matching challenge was that the skills available among the centre's clients did not match the requirements of the available jobs; for example NGOs commonly asked for English-language proficiency and information technology (IT) literacy.

## Box 1.3

### Labour-related regulatory framework in Lebanon

The legal framework regulating labour matters and, more specifically, the participation of Syrians in the Lebanese labour market, is complex and in some ways unclear due to (1) the addition of new legal instruments over a relatively short period of time, (2) poor enforcement of existing laws, and (3) the ambiguous status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (UNDP, 2014).

#### Status of Syrians in Lebanon

Before the crisis, Syrians could enter Lebanon without a visa and were granted a six-month temporary residence permit as migrants coming to Lebanon in search of job opportunities.

But both the basic situation and the primary motives leading Syrians to Lebanon have changed importantly in light of the prevailing conflict in Syria. People are fleeing Syria in search of security. Their status in Lebanon is no longer that of migrants, yet because Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, neither are they legally entitled to refugee status. Not being legally recognized as refugees means they are treated in the same way as are any other foreign nationals. Under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), however, to which Lebanon is a party, the “principle of non-refoulement” applies, which means the Government cannot legally force the return of Syrians who are under threat of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Syrians, as well as Palestinian refugees from Syria, may either enter Lebanon regularly or pass through illegal crossing points, and consequently they may or may not have an official permit to stay. Previously, Syrians were entitled to one year residency permit for LBP 300,000 (US\$200) that was renewable on a yearly basis. Those Syrians who entered Lebanon irregularly needed to formalize their stay at the General Security offices. Payment against irregularities are considered on a case-by case.

At the beginning of 2017, however, the residency permit fee was lifted. General Security issued a circular reporting that residency will be provided free of charge and will be renewable to refugees holding UNHCR certificates or otherwise registered with UNHCR. This is not applicable to displaced Syrians under other categories such as sponsorship.

These measures are subject to changes based on decisions issued by the Directorates. For further and up-to-date

information it is advisable to consult with GSO directly, by phone, over the internet or download the phone application. Whether or not their presence in Lebanon is “regular”, they are entitled to humanitarian assistance pending their registration, with UNHCR in the case of Syrian nationals, or with UNRWA in the case of Palestinian Refugees from Syria (SNAP, 2013). The right to access humanitarian assistance in times of armed conflict is guaranteed through a multitude of international legal instruments. Affected people have the right to protection; food, shelter, and water; health care medication and hygiene; and clothing, among other basic necessities for physical and material well-being (Haider, 2013; Ziegler, 2012).

In this crisis, provision of and access to humanitarian assistance is complicated by the fact that Syrian refugees are “urban refugees” displaced all over Lebanon. In fact, the Government has decided that there are no official camps for Syrians in Lebanon. Individuals who have fled Syria instead occupy informal (tented) settlements, apartments, unfinished buildings, and other types of shelters. At the same time, identification and targeting of beneficiaries, as well as access to services, basic necessities, and livelihoods, are all administered within host communities.

The Policy on Syrian Displacement, adopted by the Cabinet on 23 October 2014, put an end to legitimate cross-border displacement except in exceptional humanitarian circumstances. The UNHCR was asked to stop registering displaced Syrians, and can now only do so with the approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The key change introduced by this policy is that candidates have to register the reason for entry. On 31 December 2014, the General Security announced that Syrians can legally enter Lebanon for any one of the following reasons: tourism, work visit, trade, owning or leasing property, study, travel, health treatment, or embassy consultation. If none of these reasons applies, they need a Lebanese sponsor.

On 14th January 2015 the General Security published a more detailed directive introducing additional categories of people who might be entitled to an entry permit, among these holders of a residential rental agreement; holders of Lebanese residence permits and their family members; spouses of Lebanese nationals; children of Lebanese women; wives of Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon; holders of residence permits in another Arab or foreign country; and diplomats. Also in January 2015, General Security Rules regulating the entry of Syrians and their residency in Lebanon stipulated that displaced Syrians wishing to renew their residency permits on the basis of a UNHCR registration certificate had to sign a pledge not to work certified by the Notary.

For 18 months, the notarised ‘Pledge not to work’ was required to obtain a residency permit on the basis of UNHCR registration and impeded Syrian refugees’ legal access to work in the sectors approved by the Ministry of Labour. Following ministerial meetings at the beginning of June 2016, the Government of Lebanon communicated its decision to lift the ‘Pledge not to Work’ and replace it with the ‘Pledge to abide by Lebanese laws’.

The entry and residency regulations currently stipulate that Syrian refugees have two ways of obtaining and maintaining valid residency permits in Lebanon: 1) applying for residency on the basis of a UNHCR registration certificate; or 2) obtaining a pledge of responsibility (similar to a sponsorship) by a Lebanese citizen. <sup>(7)</sup>

But the foregoing overview indicates that, given the ambiguous status to which Syrians in Lebanon are currently relegated, the two options offered to them promise only limited practical effect. The pledge of responsibility (sponsorship) is not a suitable alternative as it is creating increased risks of exploitation such as the employers are charging additional fees to the refugee (ranging from US\$ 800 to 1,000) to provide sponsorship, bonded labour, unpaid services, difficult work conditions, or threats to withdraw the pledge of responsibility. Furthermore, the pledge of responsibility is not linked to a labour contract nor does it include any reference to labour rights (working conditions, dispute resolution etc). Finally, this option does not substitute for a work permit, it only ‘encourages’ the employer to obtain a work permit without this being a compulsory condition.

## Labour legislation

The following are among the main legal instruments setting the framework for Syrians working in Lebanon:

- Lebanese Labour Law of 1946;
- Decree No. 17561 (1964) on organizing foreigners’ employment;
- Bilateral Agreement of 1993 for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic;

- Bilateral Labour Agreement of 1994 between the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding bilateral cooperation in labour matters;
- Ministry of Labour (MoL) Resolution No. 1/19 of February 2013 on professions reserved exclusively for Lebanese citizens;
- MoL Resolution No. 1/197 of December 2014 annulling the exceptions in Resolution No. 1/19 and restricting again the range of occupations allowed to foreigners; and
- Regulations on independent professions (e.g. Law No. 8/70 dated 1970 on regulating the profession of attorney).
- MoL Decision no. 1/218 of 19th of December 2015 (replacing decision 1/197 from December 2014) indicating new parameters for the occupations open to Syrians (environment sector replacing cleaning sector) and specifying the necessary three month search for a Lebanese worker;
- MoL Decision no. 1/49 of the 3rd January 2017 indicating new ratios for number of foreign workers per Lebanese in companies, in particular with regard to the cleaning, construction, domestic work and agricultural sectors, and;
- MoL Decision 1/41 of 31st January 2017 (replacing decision 1/218 from December 2015) indicating rules for occupations open to foreigners, maintain that agriculture, environment and construction sectors are open to Syrians.

The Lebanese Labour Law (1946) sets out a general principle of preference that nationals should fill vacant jobs. The work of foreigners, including Syrians, is more specifically regulated in Decree No. 17561 (1964). This specifies “technicians to perform public work” (article 1); and it stipulates that a work permit is required whether or not the work is remunerated (article 2), and the permit must be requested prior to entering the country. Foreigners who possess expertise not found among Lebanese jobseekers can be employed in Lebanon (article 8). Under the Labour Law, in January of each year the MoL is granted the prerogative of issuing a list of professions reserved exclusively for Lebanese citizens (article 9).

The Bilateral Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic (1993) contains specific provisions on the situation of Syrian workers in Lebanon and vice versa. It stipulates their freedom to stay, to be employed, and to perform economic activity in conformity with the laws and regulations in force in each country. To enforce this Agreement within Lebanon, including with respect to work matters involving Syrians in Lebanon, the Bilateral Labour Agreement (1994) was promulgated to create a dedicated division within the Lebanese MoL that monitors the work of foreigners. It also stipulates that “all workforces in both countries enjoy equal treatment, advantages, rights, and duties” (article 4).

These agreements entitle Syrians to work indefinitely in Lebanon and, provided they hold a work permit, to enjoy the article 4 privileges. For all seasonal occupations, a provisional work card should be released by the MoL division established following the Bilateral Labour Agreement. This entry card is free of charge, but non-renewable. It allows seasonal agriculture workers from Syria to enter Lebanon and work for one entire season, as well as to bring with them family members older than ten years. Permissions are granted for varying periods, depending on the type of seasonal work entailed; for instance, migrants engaged in the harvest of citrus and olives can stay in Lebanon from 1–30 October.

Although work permits or provisional cards are in fact necessary for all foreigners, informality has always prevailed. Thus, even before the current crisis, work permits were only rarely granted and Syrians were commonly employed without work permits. A 1999 study of migrant workers in Lebanon reported that, out of the hundreds of thousands of Syrians believed to be working in the country in that year, only 530 were granted a work permit (Young, 1999).

In February 2013, two years after the beginning of the crisis, the MoL issued Resolution No. 1/19 (hereafter Res. 1/19), which amends articles No. 8 and 9 of Decree 17561. Specifying exceptions made on humanitarian grounds, Res. 1/19 granting Syrians and Palestinians access to professions in construction, electricity, carpentry, blacksmithery, and sales. Other professions were allowed where the foreigners are certified specialists or experts whose work cannot be performed by a Lebanese, or if they have resided in Lebanon since birth, or they were born to a Lebanese mother, or they are managing a company registered in Lebanon.

In December 2014, MOL Res. No. 1/197 was issued to annul part of the exceptions introduced by Res. 1/19, reducing the range of professions open to Syrians to agriculture, construction, and cleaning, as well as setting further conditions.

Subsequently, on the 19th of December 2015 the Decision no. 1/218 was issued by the Ministry of Labour changed the language indicating that Syrian nationals would be allowed to work in the agriculture, construction and environment sectors (replacing cleaning), confirmed in Decision 1/41 from 31st of January 2017. Under article 3 of Decision 1/41, the minister of labour may consider exemptions to this decision and allow a Lebanese employer to recruit a foreigner if they can provide evidence that they failed to find a Lebanese for a specific position after three months of searching, proven through a statement issued by the National Employment Office.

For independent professions, it is the syndicate<sup>(8)</sup> of the professional category that rules the conditions of access and legality. For instance, foreigners (including Syrians) can practise medicine and engineering professions, but one or more of the following conditions should apply: reciprocity agreements (essential); a license in their home country; and a work permit in Lebanon. The laws regulating liberal professions are many; some require being a Lebanese national while others stipulate complying with the provision of reciprocity.

As of the January 2017 Decision no. 1/49, Article four stipulates that the number of foreign workers (regardless of nationality) per company must not exceed 1 foreigner per 10 Lebanese workers. The workers who are fully exempt from this rule are domestic workers, Palestinian refugees, and agricultural workers who work for individuals on the basis of one worker per 5000 square metres. Modified ratios apply to cleaning companies, where there is a maximum ratio of 10 foreigners to one Lebanese, and construction or equivalent work where there can be one foreign worker per Lebanese worker. This final point regarding the ratio in construction, agriculture and cleaning may have an impact on CfW programmes.

As in the case of status of Syrians in Lebanon during these times of war in Syria, a degree of ambiguity and inconsistency is apparent in legislation concerning labour matters. On the one hand, the Government is attempting to tighten and regulate employment of Syrians in Lebanon; on the other hand, employers benefit from the Syrians presence where they provide a source of cheap labour.

## Working conditions

The minimum wage in Lebanon is LBP 675,000 (US\$ 450) per month. Workdays are eight hours, and work weeks are 40 hours. The maximum work week is 48 hours, and the extra hours are to be paid at 1.5 times the normal hourly wage. Where wage earners work more than six hours a day, they have the right to take a break of one hour. They are entitled to rest a minimum of 36 consecutive hours on a weekly basis, and to take 15 days of paid annual leave after one year of employment.

To employ foreigners, the employer should apply for a work permit prior to the employee's entry into Lebanon, with a contract to be signed by a public notary. Foreign workers are entitled to participate in trade unions, but cannot vote or be elected as members of the board.

The Social Security Law of 1963 established the National Social Security System and the related National Social Security Fund (NSSF) to cover sickness, work-related accidents and diseases, maternity care, pensions, and family allowance. Legal foreign workers, i.e. those with work permits, are entitled to NSSF on the basis of reciprocity of treatment in the country of origin, and only if they come from Belgium, France, Italy, Syria, or the U.K. If the contract has been concluded abroad, and the worker is not resident in Lebanon, exemptions to the NSSF can apply. All foreigners are entitled to compensation for employment injuries.

## Cash for Work (CfW) and labour legislation

According to the Ministry of Labour, Syrians will need a regular work permit to participate. Regarding types of profession allowed for Syrian workers, no particular issue should emerge from CfW and other PEP programmes, if their conduct requires full application of the labour regulations. Such cases likely fall within lists of admitted occupations for wage earners, for example elementary occupations in construction, agriculture, and environment. On the other hand, current legislation would not permit Syrians to pursue the following occupations: manager/assistant, accountant, salesman, tailor, driver, cook of Arabic food, electrical installations, mechanics and maintenance, paintwork, technical professions in the construction sector, nursing, teaching, engineering, and surveying.

The terminology for these types of interventions in the LCRP has changed over the years since 2014, in line with the requests of the Government of Lebanon (see footnote 1 for more details). In the ‘Statement of Intent’ issued by the Government of Lebanon in preparation for the Supporting Syria & the Region conference, the Government of Lebanon promulgated that it would take measures to ease the access of Syrians to the job market in certain sectors where they are not in direct competition with Lebanese, such as agriculture, construction and other labour-intensive sectors. The statement details the urgent national-level infrastructure needs in areas related to the crisis and national security, which has the potential to create further job opportunities as well as the need for investments in municipalities, requesting support for projects at municipal levels that create job opportunities and contribute directly to fighting poverty. (Republic of Lebanon, 2016)

## Box 1.4

### Children’s participation in CfW and its compatibility with Lebanese law

The main legal instruments regulating children’s participation in productive and economic activities in Lebanon are the Labour Law of 1946, which contains general provisions on minimum working age and related conditions; Decree No. 8987, adopted in 2012, on the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour; and the two relevant ILO Conventions, i.e. Minimum Age, 1973 (No. 138), and Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (No. 182), which the Republic of Lebanon ratified in 2003 and 2001, respectively.

With regard to displaced Syrian children in Lebanon, the Child Protection Working Group (WG) and the Global Protection Cluster are engaged in setting out the programmatic standards to which all humanitarian agencies should refer, as well as in influencing related policy-making. The work of the Child Protection WG and the Global Protection Cluster is aligned with the Lebanese legal framework and ILO Conventions.

Lebanese labour law stipulates a legal minimum working age of 13, provided that such children are fully protected, instructed, and trained. Different provisions apply for different ages between 13 and 17 years. For instance, children aged 13 years can be legally engaged in “light work”, although the Lebanese law does not define “light”.

With specific reference to Lebanon and the Syrian refugee crisis response, the Child Protection WG states that work is generally harmful for children (i.e. individuals younger than 18 years) because it interferes with their education and harms their “emotional, developmental and physical wellbeing” (CPWG, 2012). The WG tends to oppose the employment of under-age individuals on the grounds it contravenes their best interests.

The worst forms of child labour are prohibited for any child younger than 18 years. In Lebanon, this matter is regulated by Decree No. 8987 (2012), which increases the minimum age for hazardous work from 16 – as it is stipulated in the Labour Law of 1946 – to 18 years. In 2014, concerned line ministries endorsed the National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Lebanon by 2016.

The worst forms of child labour are defined as occupations which by nature or circumstances can jeopardize a child’s health, morals or safety, and include among others hazardous work (e.g. many agricultural activities, domestic work, street work). Certain CfW tasks could qualify as hazardous work, and no child should be involved in those. As a rule of thumb, all the jobs that require personal protective equipment or exposure to carcinogens, or prevent academic education are considered worst forms of child labour. Decree No. 8987 (2012), mentioned above, provides an exhaustive list of Hazardous Occupations Prohibited for Children in Lebanon.

Minimum working conditions for children allowed to work in Lebanon include a maximum of six hours per day with a one-hour break and a mandatory 13 hours of rest between two consecutive shifts. They are not permitted to work between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., and a medical certificate is compulsory.

With Syrian refugees, the Child Protection WG within the Global Protection Cluster in Lebanon has adopted a relatively tolerant position regarding the engagement of adolescents in productive activities. This is not a practice that must be eliminated, but it must be appropriate for the age and physical development of the workers, and should never interfere

with the child's education (Global Protection Cluster, 2014).

In fact, the refugee crisis has prevailed since 2011, and desperation – the very need to survive – leads the most vulnerable families to send their children to work. In this context, CfW standard operating procedures in Lebanon have established that the minimum age for participating in CfW projects is 18 years. Exceptions are allowed, however, for adolescents aged 16 and 17 years if the CfW activities “are not a worst form of child labour; are legal for children of that age; do not interfere with the child's education or training; [or] do not engage the child on a full-time basis” (Livelihoods WG, 2014). These individuals may be the only sufficiently able-bodied members from some households available for work.

In general, if these working condition recommendations are implemented, CfW activities are not expected to engage participants full time, which is conducive to pursuing parallel activities. Thus, in order not to further interfere with education and training, candidate adolescents could be enrolled during school breaks, for example. In any case, the recommendation is for implementing organizations to seek the expert advice of specialized child protection agencies with regard to the legality of the specific activity for this age group (Livelihoods WG, 2014).

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# Contents for Guidance Note 2: Spectrum of public employment programmes (PEPs)

## Box 2.1

### CfW programmes in Lebanon

CfW programmes, a type of PEP, are generally used to address emergency situations rather than long-term unemployment issues. In the protracted Syrian refugee crisis, which is far from being concluded, CfW can play an important role in lessening the effects of persistent high unemployment rates.

The long-term nature of the crisis and limited available resources raise fundamental questions for CfW programme designers in Lebanon, especially concerning the problems CfW is expected to address, including scale-up and possible exit strategies. The answers to these questions will emerge through learning from actual CfW project challenges and achievements in Lebanon.

In general, PEPs, CfW projects among them, differ from other interventions supporting refugees in two main ways:

- they create work for willing participant who would otherwise be unable to take part; and
- they create outputs that can in turn help to address other crisis-related issues and needs (e.g. lack of sanitation or insufficient access to education).

If CfW is to maximize its impact, it is essential to exploit these two niches. In practical terms, this requires CFW policy-makers, donors, and programme designers to regularly review the following goals:

- ensure CfW programmes remain relevant in an ever-changing and complex context;
- clearly identify CfW targets;
- ascertain what work should be executed; and
- decide how best that work should be organized,

In 2014, 12 agencies reported in the inter-agency Activity Info that they had executed CfW projects for a total of 37 initiatives and slightly more than 6,000 beneficiaries across the whole country. The district with the greatest number of beneficiaries was Akkar (928), followed by Baalbek (770) and Aley in Mt. Lebanon (696). In 2015, 17 partners implemented CfW activities involving 9,664 people and 83,000 workmen days. The total number of beneficiaries was 50 per cent higher than in 2014. Successively, in 2016 CfW interventions were carried out by 12 partners and there were 7,151 people, consisting of 67,731 workmen days. The total value of the 2016 CfW interventions in infrastructure rehabilitation was US\$ 2,025,130.

It is possible that the above figures understate the real magnitude of CfW in Lebanon, since not all agencies conducting CfW were aware of the reporting obligations within the Livelihoods WG or, if they were, they did not comply with them. Even if they are to a certain extent underrepresented, the efforts are not able to meet the demands in the livelihoods sectors. Despite the amplified attention given to economic opportunities and jobs at the London Conference in February 2016, Livelihoods remained the most underfunded sector of the LCRP, securing only 13 percent of the sector appeal. In particular, very few longer-term and larger scale programmes aimed at supporting the capacity of national systems and markets to create jobs or income have started

## Box 2.2

### Participation rules and conditions in CfW in Lebanon

Since 2014, numbers of both CfW projects and agencies executing CfW initiatives in Lebanon have increased. Each agency operates individually, rather than within the framework of consortia or alliances, which has resulted in a proliferation of diverse CfW projects. And these present a variety of rules governing participation, working conditions, and wages, thus creating confusion, inequalities, and possible competition for beneficiaries among executing agencies. To avoid such outcomes and to facilitate the harmonization of CfW projects across agencies, in 2014 the Livelihoods Working Group drafted a set of standard operating procedures (SOPs). The main recommendation for agencies executing CfW projects – especially when working in the same geographic area – was to apply the same payment per unit of time, same duration of CfW assistance, and similar eligibility criteria.

Agencies are recommended to enrol CfW beneficiaries for equal periods of time quantified in terms of days, hours, and months. Beneficiaries thus receive the same cumulative compensation regardless of which project they are enrolled in.

The SOPs also recommend that beneficiary participation in CfW projects does not exceed 10–12 days per month, and that each beneficiary's cycle in the project lasts a maximum of three months. In this way, these participants can also engage in parallel income-generating activities while earning a CfW income for three months. At the same time, this provides other beneficiaries with the opportunity to participate. Where more households are given the chance to benefit from the initiative, supposedly, the risk of contention is mitigated.

To support more households, the SOPs also recommend that members of the same household are not concurrently enrolled in CfW. Neither should the same beneficiary participate in consecutive cycles. Action Against Hunger (ACF), for instance, enrolls beneficiaries for ten days a month for three months, and requires an interim two months before enrolling them again.

According to the SOPs, “Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees should be given equal opportunities to enrol in CfW schemes, [while] ensuring that both communities (and especially the most vulnerable households) are informed about the existence of CfW initiatives in their village and have access to enrolment campaigns.” The 50–50 per cent allocation of quotas is recommended for entire CfW portfolios implemented in a given location by one or more actors, not necessarily for individual CfW projects.

One year on from the circulation of the SOPs within the Livelihoods WG, agencies reported, for a variety of reasons, failing to entirely observe these recommendations:

- Some agencies, for instance, opted for having beneficiaries work an entire month on a full-time basis, rather than pursue short monthly cycles. They preferred this arrangement, they said, because participants would otherwise have found it difficult to plan their work schedule, and they preferred the certainty of an entire month of work before then moving on to other opportunities.

In addition, these agencies believed that, when successful performance of tasks required regular practice, daily repetition proved more effective.

- Oxfam Italy set an eight-hour working day, with a sufficiently long break, instead of the recommended five or six-hour working day.
- In some locations, agencies found it challenging to identify enough CfW participants, in which case they may have allowed members of the same family to participate during the same working cycle.
- Finding Lebanese interested in work has also been reported as a difficulty in certain locations (but not in

Tripoli, where the Italian NGO Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) reported high levels of unemployment, especially among youth) and in certain types of projects. Therefore, the equal quotas rule has not always been applied (Battistin, 2015c).

- In other cases, local authorities requested permission to enrol more Lebanese than Syrians, since the latter also had access to other types of assistance. This was the case for COOPI, which had initially set equal quotas for Lebanese and Syrians and shifted then to 60–40 per cent to ease tensions between the two communities (Battistin, 2015c).
- ACF does not set quotas of Lebanese and Syrians. Instead, its selections are based on vulnerability levels, and they enrol the most vulnerable in the targeted village regardless of their nationality (Battistin, 2015b).
- The national wage level was set in the SOPs at US\$ 20 for unskilled and US\$ 25 for skilled; the challenge arises when in some regions US\$ 20 is not enough and fails to attract labour, and in other areas US\$ 20 is above the market wage. For example, the NGO Armadilla reported that in the Chouf region, the olive harvesters were being offered \$US 30 per day, which meant lower participation rates in CfW programmes operating in the area (ILO 2016).

## Box 2.3

### IRC livelihoods centres and linkages to CfW

The experience of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Lebanon demonstrates how CfW can be linked to employment services and training activities.

In February 2014, the IRC opened its first Livelihoods Centre (LC) in the Northern Governorate of Akkar; a second Livelihoods Centre was opened in June 2015 in Beirut, serving the city and the District of Mount Lebanon (Battistin, 2015f). The LCs provide a venue for training activities and provide information and employment-related services to jobseekers, training providers, and employers. The goal is to help registered applicants find vacancies and training options, and to assist employers in identifying employees that match their skills requirements. The LCs also aim to provide jobseekers with information on legal matters related to work and business set-ups in Lebanon. Finally, they assist employers with organizing vocational training courses in skills areas where finding suitable workforce proves a challenge (Battistin, 2014).

The services are provided free of charge to all Lebanese and Syrians residing in the designated geographic areas, regardless (if refugees) of their registration status. Between February and July 2014, the LC in Akkar registered more than 1,200 jobseekers and referred more than 600 of them to employers or – more broadly – to providers of income-generating opportunities (Battistin, 2014).

Among the job matching functions of the LCs is the identification of CfW beneficiaries through jobseeker profiling. This service is available for internal purposes, to find participants for IRC CfW projects, and for other NGOs executing CfW projects in the area. With CfW projects where workers are paid to produce items at home, the IRC offers preparatory training to all participants. As with the other services, training is also organized within the framework of LC activities (Battistin, 2015f).

There are multiple advantages to using the LCs to identify CfW participants:

- Registration at a LC is voluntary, as is participation in CfW projects.
- LC staff are trained in profiling jobseekers and matching them with the most suitable service (e.g. vocational

training, CfW, referral to employers) and specific CfW projects.

- The LC database helps to keep track of all activities and projects in which registered individuals participate, thus ensuring more equitable access to humanitarian assistance for as many individuals as possible.
- Selection of CfW participants is unbiased by local authority pressure that might be exerted on project staff to enrol specific individuals.

## Box 2.4

### Existing employment service centres as sources of CfW participant lists

CfW project teams can devote much time and effort to identifying beneficiaries and then monitoring their engagement in the course of a CfW activity. Two factors must be considered here: the extent to which individuals and their families need such support (i.e. the humanitarian/social welfare aspect of the project); and the willingness and availability of identified individuals to participate. Unlike other humanitarian/recovery interventions, CfW projects demand protracted, active engagement from beneficiaries, which is why these individuals are more appropriately referred to as participants.

Efficiency demands that, without compromising the quality of results, project time and efforts allocated to participant identification should be optimized. Basically, CfW participant identification is a matter of access to relevant and reliable information, and in Lebanon this does not present a major issue. A rich base of information on seekers of livelihoods opportunities, including Syrian refugees, is available and may be capitalized on in sourcing long lists of CfW candidates.

In total, 20 non-profit centres are mandated with providing employment services in Lebanon, either to Lebanese citizens alone or both to Lebanese and to Palestinian and Syrian refugees. CfW implementers can partner with employment service centres in the geographic areas of interest to gain access to their databases. As described in Box 2.3 IRC livelihoods centres and linkages to CfW, such types of collaboration between LC staff and a CfW project team have proved highly advantageous.

Many existing centres are located in Beirut, others are found in the North and the South. The Bekaa, however, remains uncovered. Three centres are managed by the National Employment Office of the Ministry of Labour (Beirut, Saida, and Tripoli) and serve only Lebanese citizens; four of them are managed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and serve only Palestinians; the remainder are managed by NGOs, foundations, and associations, including the IRC centre described in box 2.3.

Jobseekers voluntarily visit and register with these centres. According to available information, only the IRC LCs conduct outreach activities in attracting potential clients within the surrounding communities. In these centres, dedicated staff screen and profile jobseekers according to education and professional backgrounds, as well as to their availability for work and job preferences.

It is important to note that employment centres collect information regarding those who visit the centre and are willing to work. These people are presumably in need of work, but they are not necessarily the “most in need”; very vulnerable people may be entirely unaware of such services. That is why employment centre databases are likely incomplete, and their lists of potential CfW participants must be expanded through outreach to targeted segments of the population.

In Lebanon, the nature and content of information exchange is the most important feature of the partnership between employment service centres and CfW implementing agencies. These parties should together define the datapoints to be collected and shared, and decide in which form they should be shared. Information flow many not necessarily be unidirectional, i.e. from the employment centres to the CfW implementers. Harmonizing data collection forms (the key fields, at least) across CfW implementing agencies and employment centres, would help facilitate the effective migration of information between different platforms.

Contact information for these centres is provided below:

| Institution   | Address   | Contact person  | Phone number  | Website   |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <b>National Employment Office</b>                             |   |   |   |   |
| NEO Beirut  | Melhem Khalaf Street<br>Next to St Mary Church<br>for Syrian Catholic<br>Museum Blvd. | Ghada El Nachef<br>(Chief of Department<br>– Employment Office)<br>Jean Abi Fadel<br>(Director General) | Tel.<br>+961 (1) 616335<br>(Ghada El Nachef)<br>+961 1 615909<br>(Jean Abi Fadel) | <a href="http://www.neo.gov.lb">www.neo.gov.lb</a>                                |
| NEO Saida   | Serail Saida<br>2nd Floor   | Joumana El Abed<br>(Chief of Employment<br>Office)  | Tel.<br>+961 (7) /727911  |   |
| NEO Tripoli   | Serail Tripoli<br>6th Floor   | Raymond Moawad<br>(Chief of Employment<br>Office)   | Tel.<br>+961 (6) 447440   |   |
| <b>International Rescue Committee</b>                         |   |   |   |   |
| IRC Akkar   | Deir Dalloum, Highway,<br>Radwan El Hassan<br>Building                                | Mahmoud El Saadi  | Tel.<br>+961 (76) 064550  |   |
| IRC Beirut  | Mkalles, Near Hypco<br>Station, RAED Building   | Elias Sahyoun   | Tel.<br>+961 (71) 496418  |   |
| <b>UNRWA</b>  |   |   |   |   |
| UNRWA Beirut  | LFO, UNRWA Main office,<br>Bir Hassan facing Sports<br>City                           | Jamil Kanaana   | Tel.<br>+961 (1) 830400,<br>ext. 5337   | <a href="https://www.facebook.com/UnrwaESC">https://www.facebook.com/UnrwaESC</a> |
| UNRWA Saida   | Sit Nafisi St., behind<br>Ogero Bldg., Abu Zeid<br>Bldg., Ground Fl                   | Salem Yassin  | Tel.<br>+961 (70) 724243  |   |
| UNRWA Tyre  | Athar St., Next to Al<br>Athar Laundry, Bitar<br>Bldg, 1st Fl                         |   | Tel.<br>+961 (76) 700252  |   |
| UNRWA Tripoli   | Tripoli, Me'atein St.,<br>Al Rawda intersection,<br>UNRWA Main Office                 | Nader Ghaffour  | Tel.<br>+961 (3) 001856   |   |
| Institut<br>Européen de<br>Coopération et de<br>Développement | Rue Hopital al Hayat,<br>Imm. Ford, Etage 3<br>Area: Chiah,<br>City: Beirut           | Tina Comaty;<br>David El Chabab   | Tel.<br>+961 (0) 1 556 338  | <a href="http://www.iecd.org">www.iecd.org</a>                                    |

| Institution   | Address  | Contact person   | Phone number  | Website   |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| <b>Lebanese Physical Handicap Union</b>                                 | 2nd Floor, Rida Building,<br>Salah Al-Deen Ayoubi<br>Str.<br>Area: Rawshe<br>City: Beirut<br>Additional directions:<br>near Rotana Hotel, same<br>building as Jaw Café | Sylvana Lakkis<br>(President)  | Tel.<br>+961 (1) 307365   | <a href="http://www.lphu.com">http://www.lphu.com</a>                 |
| <b>Arc-en-Ciel</b>  | Arcenciel, John Kennedy<br>Street<br>Area: Jisr el Bacha –<br>Sinn El Fil<br>City: Beirut  | Recruitment section<br>HR department   | Tel.<br>+961 (1) 495 561/5<br>Fax<br>+961 (1) 512 107                             | <a href="http://www.arcenciel.org">http://www.arcenciel.org</a>       |
| <b>Forum for Handicapped North Lebanon</b>                              | El Mountada, El<br>Mountatda St.<br>Area: El Mina<br>City: Tripoli<br>Additional directions:<br>parallel to Port Said Blvd.  | Dr Nawaf Kabbara<br>(President)<br>Hassan Mostafa  | Tel.<br>+961 (6) 213426 /<br>610195<br>Fax<br>+961 (6) 213426 /<br>610195         |   |
| <b>Safadi Foundation</b>  | Tripoli, Al Maarad Street,<br>Ramzi Safadi Street<br>Safadi Cultural Centre,<br>4th Floor<br>P.O. Box 575 Tripoli,<br>Lebanon  | Rana Mawlawi<br>(Director General)<br>Vanessa Yakan (Senior<br>Project Development<br>Officer)<br>Reem Tajjedine<br>(Employment Officer) | Tel. 1290 or<br>+961 (6) 410014<br>+961 (6) 411035<br>Fax<br>+961 (6) 411119      | <a href="http://www.job-helper.com">http://www.job-helper.com</a>     |
| <b>FORAS – Rene Moawad</b>  | 6th Floor Loyar Bldg.,<br>Alfred Nakash Street<br>Area: Ashrafieh, facing<br>Hotel Dieux<br>City: Beirut   | Nabil Moawad<br>(General Director)   | Tel.<br>+961 (1) 613<br>367/8/9   | <a href="http://www.rm.f.org.lb">http://www.rm.f.org.lb</a>           |
| <b>FORAS – Rene Moawad Foundation (Zgharta)</b>                         | Rene Moawad<br>Foundation Zgharta<br>Area: Mejdlaya<br>City: Zgharta   | Johnny Namnoum<br>(Director of FORAS)  | Tel<br>+961 (6) 666 093   |   |
| <b>Koudourat Association</b>  | 6th Floor, Labban Centre,<br>Near Byblos Bank, Sami<br>el Solh Avenue, Beirut,<br>Lebanon  | Dr Dal Hitti (President)   | Tel./fax<br>+961 (1) 396061<br>Cell<br>+961 (3) 396558                            | <a href="http://www.koudourat.org">http://www.koudourat.org</a>       |
| <b>Labora</b>   | 5th Floor Antonine<br>Bldg., Block C, Brothers<br>Rahbanist.<br>Area: Antelias<br>City: Antelias   | Pere Tony Khadra<br>(President)<br>Vanessa Fayad<br>(Private Sector<br>Coordinator)  | Tel.<br>+961 (4) 403352;<br>(4) 413352  | <a href="http://www.laboraonline.com">http://www.laboraonline.com</a> |
| <b>Lebanese Institute for Social &amp; Economic Development (ILDES)</b> | ILDES – LEBANON<br>Tours Harboyan<br>Bloc A et Bloc C, rue BC<br>Jal El Dib – Metn   |  | Tel.<br>+961 (4) 710.535-6<br>Cell<br>+961 (3) 680.061<br>Fax<br>+961 (4) 710.537 | <a href="http://www.ildesliban.org">http://www.ildesliban.org</a>     |

| Institution                | Address   | Contact person           | Phone number                                | Website  |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--|
| <b>Ahlouna Association</b> | Office location: Ahlouna Building, NA<br>Area: Al Hlaliyeh<br>City: Saida | Rashid Hamtou<br>Manager | +961 (7) 752 280<br>Fax<br>+961 (7) 726 085 | <a href="http://www.ahlouna.org">www.ahlouna.org</a> |

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# Contents for Guidance Note 5: Setting the appropriate wage rate in PEPs

## Box 5.1

### CfW wage rate in Lebanon according to SOPs (Livelihoods WG, 2014)

The CfW SOPs in Lebanon recommend the harmonization of the compensation rate across CfW projects. Since monetary compensation lies at the core of assistance to CfW participants, it needs to be set in the light of humanitarian considerations, including average household expenditure on basic needs, a household's income-generating capacity, and the poverty line as estimated for Lebanon:

- The estimated average expenditure on survival items for a family of five refugees in Lebanon (i.e. the Survival Expenditure Basket) is \$435 per month (i.e. \$87 per capita), and includes costs of food, water, housing, clothing, hygiene items, communication, and transportation. <sup>(9)</sup>
- Lower and upper national poverty lines for Lebanon were constructed within the framework of a study, released in 2008, based on household expenditures. The lower line (i.e. extreme poverty) was the equivalent of \$72 per month per capita, and the upper poverty line was the equivalent of \$120 per month per capita (IDEA, 2008).
- In addition, CfW compensation should be adjusted to labour market features such as prevailing casual labour wages in the agricultural or construction sectors, and the minimum wage, which in Lebanon is currently set at \$450 per month.

Consequently, the SOPs recommend compensation of \$20 per day for tasks not requiring specific skills, and \$25 per day for tasks requiring specific skills. According to the SOPs, such amounts are unlikely to generate competition for workers among employers and CfW agencies. In fact, Lebanese workers are said not to be inclined to engage in elementary occupations in the construction and agriculture sector; they are also said to expect higher wages.

On the other hand, women's salaries in the market – especially in the agricultural sector, where women workers are concentrated – are significantly lower than US\$20 per day, ranging as low as LBP 8,000 (US\$ 5) per day (Battistin, 2015i). As these wages are exploitative and well below the minimum wage, challenging them could be seen as a way of improving women's working conditions. It is unlikely, though, that the competition for female workers would exert meaningful pressure on market wages, since the CfW female beneficiaries comprise a minority.

## Box 5.2

### Wage-setting lessons from CfW implementers

Not all CfW executing agencies applied the SOP-recommended compensation rates, reporting a variety of reasons for this. Neither did all agencies set the working day at the same number of hours, which effectively resulted in different compensation rates (thus making it more appropriate to compare the actual compensation rates per hour rather than per day). To date, there are still certain challenges faced in the context of equal remuneration. CfW implementers

indicate that there are challenges faced on a regional basis, that is to say in some regions the national wage level set by the SOPs is too low and fails to attract enough labour, whereas in other regions it is considered too high. (ILO, 2016)

For its part, the UNDP did follow the SOP recommendations, but it noted that the rate was too low in some geographic areas, compared with the prevailing daily wages in the market, while in other areas it was too high. They also noted that Lebanese nationals would not always accept work at that rate, holding to a higher reservation wage rate than did the Syrians (Battistin, 2015e and ILO, 2016).

According to ACF, on the other hand, low wages do not explain the difficulty in attracting Lebanese to CfW that it is instead because they pursue longer-term working opportunities and other types of occupations (Battistin, 2015b).

Save the Children found that, in Bekaa and Akkar, \$20 per day would be higher than the wages paid by private sector employers. In an attempt to align to the labour market, they set a daily compensation of \$15 per day. Feedback from beneficiaries was positive, and the agency has not encountered difficulties in finding interested participants, including Lebanese (Battistin, 2015d). Oxfam Italy reported that in Bekaa entire families, including children, were employed in the fields and paid as little as LBP 8,000 (US\$ 5) per day for very long working hours. When given the opportunity, they preferred working for the CfW project, which paid a daily wage of US\$20, in line with the SOPs. Unfortunately, the CfW opportunities were very limited at this time (Battistin, 2015i).

Armadilla reports that in the Chouf they witnessed a reduced participation of beneficiaries during the olive harvest season as a result of competitive wages of 30 USD per day (ILO, 2016).

Overall, it is impossible to report with confidence positive or negative effects (i.e. distortions) of the CfW compensation level in the labour market. When the SOPs were finalized and CfW projects were still uncommon in Lebanon, it was expected that the recommended compensation rate would draw women away from low-paid agricultural work. In the two years since the SOPs were submitted to the Livelihoods Working Group, no significant evidence indicates that this had happened, and women are currently paid, on average, half the wage of men. It is possible that the increased focus on the participation of women in CfW, accompanied by awareness raising, will lead to upward pressure on labour market wages.

To conclude, more evidence is needed if agencies are to set more effective CfW compensation rates in Lebanon. In the first place, it is important to settle the controversial issue of whether or not the Lebanese reservation rate (opportunity cost to work) is lower than that of Syrians. In addition, it is necessary to study, in a more empirical way, the factors based on which the SOPs compensation rates have been set. These include the minimum expenditure basket in light of diminishing food assistance from the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and of prevailing labour market wages in Lebanon. An analysis that disaggregates by governorate and/or differentiates between rural and urban areas would be ideal, because the respective costs of living might differ. Rather than harmonizing daily rates, agencies should look at the actual compensation, taking into account the number of working hours in a given day.

Finally, programme scale, total enrolment duration, and wage rate have a combined effect on labour markets and should all be considered when reflecting on possible distortions.

## Box 5.3

### The importance of equal compensation

The SOPs emphasize the importance of refraining from discriminatory practices, e.g. applying different compensation rates on the ground of nationality and/or sex. One CfW-executing NGO in Lebanon remarked on the difficulty of attracting Lebanese to CfW projects because of the low daily compensation, while Syrians would still participate under those conditions. They also reported, on the basis of anecdotal information, that Lebanese find it unfair that Syrians receive multiple types of assistance and also receive the same cash grant amount for participating in CfW. On these grounds, the NGO considered the option of applying higher rates to Lebanese citizens. At the time of this writing, to the author's knowledge, such a measure had not been applied.

The principle of non-discrimination at work is an international standard, protected by such international instruments

as the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), which entered into force in 1953 (ILO, 1951). Impartiality is another core humanitarian principle, one which all humanitarian agencies are bound to observe.

In face of such issues, and should the fact be confirmed that Lebanese nationals are indeed reluctant to accept CfW opportunities because of inadequate compensation, the most appropriate action would be to raise pay across the board, regardless of participant nationality. CfW compensations are intentionally set low to allow for self-targeting and to encourage the participation of the most vulnerable people, who have no better alternative to earn a living in a given period.

Perhaps a survey could inform a more empirically grounded approach to the issue as a basis for a possible compensation amendment.

## Box 5.4

### Trade-off between caseload size and duration of enrolment (Battistin, 2015d)

Save the Children in Akkar and Bekaa chose a different compensation rate than the one recommended in the SOP. They also opted for shorter enrolment periods. All in all, this system of rotation permitted a larger caseload – around 2,000 beneficiaries – and benefitted a larger number of households with emergency cash assistance.

Save the Children offered a daily rate of \$15, rather than \$20, and each participant was to be engaged for a maximum of 15 days, not necessarily to be worked 15 days consecutively, and would be paid via ATM transfer at the end of the 15-day cycle. This payment modality can require extra administrative time and effort, especially when participants do not end their cycle simultaneously and multiple cash transfer requests need to be submitted to the bank.

The rationale for setting the compensation rate lower than \$20 per day was to avoid competing with the local labour market, since daily wages in Bekaa and Akkar were lower than \$20. In Bekaa in particular, \$15 was very close to the daily wage in the agricultural sector.

Participant samples were interviewed to collect opinions regarding the CfW experience, including related wages. The interviewees reported being satisfied with the pay and with the type of work; no challenges were reported to Save the Children in terms of identifying and attracting Syrians and Lebanese for the projects.

Neither were distortions observed in the labour market, supposedly because of the relatively small number of job opportunities offered within CfW projects compared to income opportunities within the labour market at large.

With regard to UNDP's largest fund for labour intensive reforestation and forest management in 2016, the average number of participants per intervention is 47, however this number varies from 16 to 82 depending on the size of the site in terms of hectares for reforestation. On average the workers work 18 days over a 2 month period. This balance of case load and duration of project was due to the nature of the work (seasonality and weather conditions) and the funding cycle as the majority of interventions have two months of actual implementation on the ground. Based on this, the aim was to maximize the amount of workers involved in each site while allowing for each worker to work approximately 20 days split over 2 months.

The UNDP project reportedly had a positive social impact by hiring both Lebanese and Syrians as well as having a specific focus on the involvement of women. There was, however, an expressed need among participants for more projects throughout the year so that they could continue working. (ILO, 2016)

For Oxfam Italy the average number of participants per rapid employment intervention they execute is 390. The work cycle chosen consists of 20 to 24 working days in total per participant scheduled as a first period of 10 to 12 working days followed by a 2 week uncompensated break and then a second period of 10 to 12 working days. As the vulnerability of the participants is the core reason for the interventions and in order to seek more impact on a slightly larger scale, Oxfam Italy opt for more beneficiaries and fewer days (but not less than 20 working days per beneficiary). (ILO, 2016)

## Box 5.5

### Alternative wage setting: Piece-rate for home-based CfW

The CfW SOPs in Lebanon describe two types of wage-setting modalities: time-based and productivity-based. The SOPs recommend to choose according to the nature of the work (e.g. service-oriented or production-oriented), as well as the ease of quantifying the effort needed to monitor task performance.

Time-based wage-setting arrangements in CfW projects are most common in Lebanon. These involve fixed compensation for a fixed number of hours or, more commonly, for a day, without requiring evidence that a worker has performed a given quantity of work. The advantages of time-based arrangements are that they are simple to organize and related book-keeping is easy. The disadvantages are that they require much supervision, and the rate of progress toward project completion may be extremely variable and difficult to control.

Less common are productivity-based arrangements, which can be of two types: (1) compensation based on number of pieces produced (e.g. blankets, pieces of soap), without reference to the amount of time required to deliver them; or (2) compensation based on the quantity of work accomplished in a full day of work (e.g. number of metres of road rehabilitated). In both cases, compensation is a function of the unit cost of time and of the estimated number of hours/days that are required in the specific CfW project.

With productivity-based payments, the challenge lies in determining how much of the output can be produced on average per unit of time, and this may require expert advice. To facilitate accurate budgeting and control of expenditures, the implementing organization should set a maximum number of outputs per day that will be paid for. Otherwise, highly productive CfW participants will end up making more than the allocated amounts. Another shortcoming is that such payment systems are complicated to organize and administer, and require regular monitoring and counting of items or tasks accomplished.

The advantages of task-based arrangements are that they allow beneficiaries to finish working earlier and as soon as the task is complete. On the other hand, they require close supervision during the daily performance of the work. Furthermore, if the expected production is set improperly or is changed after work has begun, this arrangement can lead to exploitation.

An example of item-based payment is that adopted by the IRC in home-based CfW projects. IRC has designed their approach to promote the participation of women, who prefer to work from home because they can then more efficiently schedule their parallel household duties. For example, they do not have to find childcare solutions, and they are less exposed to the risks of commuting to the workplace. Projects have included production of fishnets, which were then distributed to vulnerable fishermen in the area; and tailored or knitted clothing items for distribution, in cooperation with the IRC Child Protection Programme, to children in vulnerable households (Battistin, 2014).

All of these home-based CfW projects were preceded by two or three months of training during which participants learned production techniques from experienced trainers. During the CfW project, the CfW officer (a female) and the trainer would visit beneficiaries weekly at home to check on progress and quality of production. By the end of the month, the CfW officer would collect all items, produce a report, and request payments from the Finance Department. No particular challenges were encountered in the execution of these schemes. However, the economic viability of handmade production of items, when cheaper substitutes are available in the market, is arguable (Battistin, 2014).

## Box 5.6

### Wage setting when CfW is implemented by private sector contractors

In 2014–2015, although UNDP CfW projects in Lebanon were executed through a private sector contractor, calls for competitive bids included among their clauses several CfW SOP recommendations. Among these, UNDP requested that the contractor maintain a daily rate consistent with the \$20 recommended in the SOPs, as well as the recommended

number of working hours per day and working days per month.

The UNDP reported that the main difficulty in this arrangement was ensuring compliance throughout project implementation. While the UNDP's driving motive was provision of financial assistance to vulnerable households, the contractor's goal was to make a profit by getting the work done at the lowest possible cost. In the end, however, the contractor agreed to the stipulated conditions and paid the workers the recommended amount.

The contractor delivered payment in cash, in the presence of the UNDP, and following the preparation of pay slips that UNDP had overseen. After payment, UNDP would select a sample of beneficiaries and interview them to verify they had been paid as per pay slip and in line with their participation in the project.

Outsourcing payment to the contractor was reported as an advantage because it reduced UNDP efforts in setting up and administering the system. On the other hand, it required close monitoring of the contractor to avoid cash misappropriation and mishandling. (Battistin, 2015e).

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# Contents for Guidance Note 6-1: Targeting strategies and mechanisms in PEPs

## Box 6-1.1

### Proxy Means Test Index to target cash assistance in Lebanon (UN-NGO Targeting Task Force for Lebanon, 2014a and 2014b) and the ProGres Based Desk Formula

In 2013 and part of 2014, agencies delivering unconditional, multi-purpose cash assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon were applying a variety of targeting criteria, an approach that proved inefficient, confusing, and in general too complex to sustain over the long run. In 2014, the humanitarian community, encouraged by donors, moved toward standardizing the targeting system and, in February 2014, they formed the UN-NGO Targeting Task Force (TTF), with the mandate of developing such a system.

The TTF worked to develop an index to measure the economic vulnerability of households in the most objective and comprehensive way possible. A harmonized targeting system aims to help agencies to produce consistent inclusion/exclusion decisions. Such a system assumes that the same family can be targeted by all agencies adhering consistently to the same targeting approach and, whenever an agency phases out, the assisted households should be considered similarly eligible by any other active agency.

The ideal targeting system minimizes both inclusion and exclusion errors and is cost efficient. Inclusion error occurs when the programme selects a household that does not match targeting criteria. To reduce this, it is necessary to adopt a more rigorous selection approach. On the other hand, exclusion error appears when a household that meets the targeting criteria is wrongly excluded from cash assistance. Response to this problem requires a wider outreach toward the target group. Aid providers should determine which type of error they will least tolerate and minimize this one even at the expense of the other type of error. They should also define thresholds for acceptable inclusion and exclusion errors, in order to later assess the performance of the targeting system.

The development of the economic vulnerability index by the TTF involved comparing its performance to a measure that was (ideally) found in nature and that best described the phenomenon to be measured (i.e. the gold standard). While no gold standard exists for economic vulnerability – i.e. there is no direct objective measure of this condition – expenditures were chosen indirectly as the key indicator of a household's economic status. Therefore, expenditures was the variable to be predicted by measuring other, correlated factors that are believed to be more easily and more objectively observed. The result of the TTF's work was a Proxy Means Test (PMT) Index, as a predictor of expenditures.

Between January 2015 and December 2016 more than 180,000 household visits were conducted using the Household Profiling Questionnaire. Data were uploaded to the Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS), and the PMT score was automatically calculated; part of this information was made accessible to agencies that had data-sharing agreements with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2015).

The multi-purpose cash targeting formula that predicted household expenditure by considering “proxy” indicators has now been replaced by a ProGres<sup>(10)</sup> based desk formula. This formula was developed by AUB using the VASyR 2015 dataset and uses non-economic variables from the UNHCR ProGres registration database to predict a household's monthly expenditure per capita. Households are then ranked based on this predicted expenditure level. It does not require additional data collection via household visits, and in testing was found to perform similarly to the PMT. Although it will be a desk-based formula, some household visits will continue under the new model, but it is not yet agreed to what extent.

## Box 6-1.2

### Multi-Deprivation Index and Maps of Risks and Resources for geographic and vulnerability targeting

The UNDP released The Multi-deprivation Index (MDI) during the first quarter of 2015. The MDI facilitates geographic targeting in Lebanon for humanitarian assistance, to help to map out 251 localities identified as the most vulnerable according to the following criteria: access to health services; income levels; access to education services; access to water and sanitation services; and housing conditions.

In 2004 the CAS, the UNDP, and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) performed a previous assessment and ranking of locations based on respective level of deprivation using the Living Conditions and Household Budget Survey. The MDI combines that survey data, which focused on the status of host communities, with the refugee population figures collected by the UNHCR and the UNRWA, including Syrians and both Palestinian Returnees from Syria and Lebanese Returnees.

The MDI highlights areas experiencing a high ratio of refugees to local population, which can entail a concomitantly high degree of population pressure on services and resources. The 251 localities are equally distributed across five levels of deprivation, and information is displayed on a publicly available map.

According to the index, Hermel has a high concentration of deprived Lebanese and Syrians, but no high pressure on services specifically. Meanwhile Aarsal, some municipalities in Central Bekaa, the municipalities to the north of Tripoli, and areas around Beirut and Saida, among others, have both high concentrations of deprived Lebanese and Syrians and high pressures on services. The UNHCR and aid agencies delivering cash assistance and/or executing CfW projects are not using the MDI yet, with the exception of UNDP. The latter have preferred a “convenience” approach to geographic targeting. They tend to choose locations where they had already worked and felt familiar with the context, where they had good relationships with local authorities, and where their CfW efforts could complement other projects. Such an approach is entirely legitimate, since success in implementing CfW projects depends largely on the nature and quality of collaboration with local actors as well as on a good understanding of the context, including local infrastructure and service needs. Poor relationships with local actors can lead to the delay or interruption of CfW projects, even to conflicts and security threats.

On the one hand, the MDI detects localities that suffer from services deprivation, and on the other hand CfW aims at improving public infrastructures and services. Thus the MDI could also be used to prioritize locations where CfW projects should be executed. In that case, the MDI ranking should be periodically revised to reflect any changes in the situation.

The process of Mapping Risks and Resources (MRR) involves using the MDI described above and conducting workshops at community level, in which the different parties collect information and develop multi-sectoral Municipal Action Plans. The MRR consists of an overall target of 1.2 million vulnerable Lebanese and a subset of some 600,000 Lebanese living in 251 host communities facing particularly acute vulnerability. Notably, the most affected quintile of cadastres identified by this method as the highly vulnerable communities capture nearly 75 per cent of registered refugees and 67 per cent of the poor Lebanese. The MRR data and Municipal Action Plans are uploaded to the MoSA website, which LCRP partners can consult.

For the identification and development of projects, the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNDP use a participatory approach for the identification of community priorities: The Maps of Risks and Resources (MRR). This proven methodology uses a participatory research approach aimed at developing the planning capacity of the local authority and bringing together civil society to identify their risks and problems as per their priority. The result of the MRR is a Municipal Action Plan that summarizes the needs and priorities of each municipality. This plan is henceforth owned by the municipality and acts as a tool to organize all projects implemented in the village and re-direct interventions towards sustainable development.

With the support of UNDP, MoSA has taken full ownership of the MRR process. The process has now been completed in each of Lebanon's 251 most vulnerable localities. All communities have identified priorities within the following sectors: health, education, livelihood, social cohesion, environment, local governance and WASH. The need for infrastructure projects is cross-cutting in most of these sectors. The first screening of potential infrastructure projects is based on the priorities identified through this process.

ACTED reported that they do not use the MRR as a planning tool for interventions currently as it does not cover all municipalities, only the most vulnerable, and therefore does not always fit their targeting needs. (ILO, 2016).

## Box 6-1.3

### CfW and unconditional cash assistance: Targeting considerations

By mid-2015, the combined caseload of all unconditional cash assistance programmes in Lebanon included more than 20,000 Syrian households. The CfW SOPs recommend that, wherever possible, households of individuals participating in CfW should not also be recipients of unconditional cash assistance.

The SOPs also mention that receiving other forms of service-based assistance, or even restricted cash assistance (e.g. food vouchers), should always be considered when assessing individual eligibility for CfW, but should not preclude individuals from participating in CfW.

In spite of this, a few agencies executing CfW projects (e.g. Save the Children, ACF, and IRC) did consider participation in unconditional cash assistance programmes to be an exclusionary criterion for CfW. Therefore, it is likely that – among the other executing organizations – some Syrian households benefitted from both types of assistance. It is also likely, on the other hand, that other households found eligible for unconditional cash assistance through PMT scoring were nonetheless neither receiving such assistance nor were likely to be part of CfW.

Since Lebanese do not receive unconditional cash assistance or, if they do, their numbers are negligible, it is safe to assume that unconditional cash assistance and CfW overlap only for Syrians. Given the very limited outreach of CfW programmes, and generally decreasing assistance to refugees, it would be reasonable to conceive of these programmes as complementary. ACF takes this approach, for instance; some people were found too old or physically unfit for sustained CfW tasks, and hence were instead given unconditional cash assistance.

Finally, if we consider the short duration of CfW enrolment compared to eligibility for unconditional cash assistance (minimum six months), being a recipient of unconditional cash assistance should be enforced as an exclusion criterion for participation in CfW projects, but not vice versa.

## Box 6-1.4

### SOP recommendations on eligibility and exclusion criteria

Basically, in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, CfW is a means to provide humanitarian assistance to economically vulnerable households rather than employment (as defined in the SOPs). CfW recipients are not selected according to the criteria employers would typically apply. Instead, they are chosen on the basis of humanitarian consideration of their needs and, more generally, on the basis of respect for their human rights.

The minimum age recommended by the SOPs for participation in CfW projects is 18 years. Exceptions can be made for 16- and 17-year-olds under certain conditions: the work should not worst form of child labour; the work should be legal for children of that age; the work and its schedule should not interfere with the child's education or training; the

child should not be engaged on a full-time basis. Ideally, children of that age would be involved during school breaks. In general, it is recommended that the advice of child protection experts be sought.

The Italian NGO Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) includes 16- and 17-year-old children. Some beneficiaries, they found, were as young as 12 years old; they would use fake ID and lie about their real age. They were immediately identified because they were known from other activities; cross-checks at work sites were strengthened to avoid such situations.

In line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the SOPs recommend that no potential candidate be “excluded from any CfW on the sole basis of a medical condition or physical/psychical impairment. However, in specific CfW projects requiring physical effort, being fit for extensive periods of physical and sustained activity can be required among the inclusion/exclusion criteria” (Livelihoods WG, 2015).

For persons with disabilities, older people, or other specific protection cases, participating in CfW programmes may either increase their burden or further endanger the overall protection of the household. For this reason, these cases should be carefully considered, and project staff in all implementing organizations should be trained in how to apply existing inter-agency referral mechanisms. Complementary services such as social safety nets, home-based activities, or capacity building schemes could also be added to CfW (Livelihoods WG, 2015).

The SOPs recommend that all nationalities be included in CfW programmes, ensuring that a balance is maintained in the interests of equity and social cohesion. In addition, non-registered refugees should be considered as potential beneficiaries. As mentioned elsewhere, some agencies have experienced difficulties in identifying Lebanese interested in participating in CfW.

The SOPs suggest economic vulnerability as the main criterion for CfW beneficiary selection. Cash assistance responds to household struggles to make ends meet, which is why the most economically deprived should be the priority beneficiaries. In a way, setting compensation rates fairly low – although not to exploitative levels – may help self-selection. Only those who are truly in need will come forward to accept CfW conditions. With Syrians, the SOPs suggest referring to the PMT index, while Lebanese agencies can refer to the National Poverty Targeting rankings. Economic vulnerability changes over time, and thus need periodic reassessment.

## Box 6-1.5

### Targeting CfW beneficiaries in Lebanon

In 2015, agencies executing CfW programmes reported having used different beneficiary selection methodologies and criteria. The degree of local authority involvement varied across agencies and locations. Steps included the preliminary generation of long lists and then the final selection.

Agencies applied different approaches to generating beneficiary source lists.

In the Bekaa and Akkar, Save the Children organized registration days. In the most sensitive locations, these were events separately targeting Syrians and Lebanese, meaning to avoid inciting tensions at the project’s outset. These events recognized the importance of informing both Lebanese and Syrians of this opportunity through wide-coverage information campaigns.

In most CfW projects, final decisions regarding beneficiaries were taken by the agencies themselves, although municipalities might have participated in providing the long lists. With COOPI, lists of the most vulnerable Syrians and Lebanese based on criteria suggested by the NGOs were collected from the municipalities. These criteria included number of children, income level, and sex of the household head. The lists submitted by municipalities were very long, and only some of the candidates could make it into the programme. A score was awarded to each household, and they were ranked before beneficiaries were selected. Then, without conducting surveys but instead relying on project team knowledge of the local communities, COOPI would verify the appropriateness of the selected participant list.

To pre-identify possible Syrian participants, the Italian NGO AVSI relied on the Shawish<sup>(11)</sup> in the targeted informal settlements. First explaining to them the purpose of the project and the ideal profile of the beneficiaries, they waited for the Shawish to negotiate among themselves in producing a list of beneficiaries.

AVSI selection of Lebanese beneficiaries followed a different process. Each of the four targeted municipalities delivered a list of those considered to be deprived families. The lists were cross-checked against an existing database of children from 430 vulnerable households produced in the framework of a different project. They would conduct household surveys where listed candidates were not present in this database; otherwise they would simply rely on the available information to make their decisions. They selected an equal number of households from each of the four municipalities. The Kaymakam<sup>(12)</sup> who oversaw that group of municipalities ensured that the process went smoothly.

Oxfam Italy organized information sessions and registration in informal settlements. Then, together with the municipality, they convened town-hall meetings. Applications for CfW projects were accepted over several days, and were also collected at the municipality offices in cases where individuals had missed registration day at the informal settlement. Data collected through the application questionnaires were loaded to a database and a score was calculated for each applicant.

With IRC projects, municipalities were not involved in any of the selection stages. The IRC used its Livelihoods Centre to register and profile jobseekers, some of whom expressed interest in participating in CfW activities. Door-to-door CfW outreach and information was conducted in the targeted villages through Lebanese and Syrian community focal points, themselves enrolled as CfW participants. Initially, besides profiling CfW candidates' education, professional background, and employment preferences, they were also interviewed to assess their vulnerability. At a later stage, it became apparent that these multiple levels of interviews were inefficient, and it was decided to drop the vulnerability assessment. The team considered that the low CfW compensation would by default discourage the non-economically vulnerable.

The agencies implementing CfW programmes in 2016 and 2017 reported additional methods for targeting and recruiting beneficiaries, in terms of Syrian and Lebanese and male and female participants.

Intersos reported that when faced with a challenging environment for attracting Lebanese workers for their CfW projects, they managed to attain their quota of Lebanese by reaching out through local NGOs. As described in more detail in the 'Gender Equity' section, Oxfam Italy reported implementing activities in women-only groups with a female social worker monitoring the interventions in order to attain an average of 40 per cent participation rate of women in certain projects. Also, UNDP reported that they attained a 60 per cent participation rate of women in one of their projects through intensive awareness-raising efforts to encourage a change in attitudes towards the types of work women can and should participate in. (ILO, 2016)

As describe in more detail in the 'Gender Equity' section, Oxfam Italy reported implementing activities in women-only groups with a female social worker monitoring the interventions 40 per cent participation rate of women through. Also, UNDP reported that they attained a 60 per cent participation rate of women through intensive awareness-raising efforts to encourage a change in attitudes towards the types of work women can and should participate in (ILO, 2016).

## Box 6-1.6

### Challenges in targeting

Agencies executing CfW projects in Lebanon reported difficulties in identifying women (see Contents for Guidance Note 6-2: Ensuring gender equity in PEPs) and, in some instances, Lebanese citizens.

The problem in attracting Lebanese was twofold: (1) it was more difficult to reach out to them than to Syrians because they were less involved in humanitarian assistance; and (2) they were often less willing to accept the working

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The Shawish are community leaders acting as middlemen for landlords recruiting workers for their farms. They generally offer workers a place to stay.

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In Lebanon, the Kaymakam is the governor of a provincial district.

conditions. The wage was not the main issue; more, it was the proposed type of work. The IRC found that the most effective way to attract Lebanese was to conduct outreach at the community level through Lebanese citizens, rather than through Syrians, and to reach out to the most deprived among them.

Several CfW actors reported that minimum age laws were not always observed. They noted children younger than 18 years, sometimes as young as 12 years, at worksites. These workers evaded the minimum age rule by showing fake IDs.

None of the interviewed agencies reported requesting and receiving lists of Lebanese beneficiaries from the National Poverty Targeting Programme of MoSA, as recommended in the CfW SOPs at the MoSA's request. This modality had never been activated for the selection of Lebanese CfW participants, most likely because implementing agencies were unaware of the possibility of going through such channels or because they preferred to cooperate directly with municipalities.

COOPI reported that, in soliciting lists from municipalities, the challenge was to make them understand the selection criteria. COOPI received very long lists, and then had to perform much short-listing. COOPI noticed that some of the recommended households were ineligible, since they did not seem vulnerable. Some beneficiaries also tried to participate in all work cycles, leveraging off personal contacts with local authorities and politicians, or even exchanging ID cards with others. To avoid abuses, COOPI found it necessary to have supervisors who were acquainted with all the participants across the different cycles. Mutual trust and smooth communications with local stakeholders were also essential.

Some agencies have reported that their targeting is based on the donor priorities. Certain donors or organisations prioritise either Syrians or host communities to varying extents. In addition, they may have an additional focus on social cohesion or gender. Therefore, their mandate will not always fall easily into the 251 vulnerable cadastres as per the Maps for Risks and Resources (See Box 15-1.3 for more information). This can be a challenge as it limits the possibility of a coordinated and systematic response between different implementing agencies,

A key challenge reported by UNDP when targeting women for their CfW interventions was the common assumption that women were unable to carry out certain types of work. To respond to this challenge UNDP invested in extensive awareness raising activities in order to demonstrate that women are able to perform tasks in the context of forest management.

A final challenge is that agencies have reported difficulties in finding enough participants to fulfil quotas. It was reported that lack of resources, data availability and coordination were hindering the process. The short term nature of most current CfW projects acts as a barrier to long term efficient and effective targeting of both Syrians and women, as these stages of project design and implementation are time-consuming and can be costly. Various actors agree that with more data available and better coordination between agencies implementing in the same region, targets could be more easily met. (ILO, 2016).

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# Contents for Guidance Note 6-2: Ensuring gender equity in PEPs

## Box 6-2.1

### Women in the labour market in Lebanon

The demographic pyramid of Lebanese and Syrians in Lebanon (figure 1) presents useful information regarding the working-age population. Among other things, it indicates there were fewer adult males than adult females among both Syrians and Lebanese; Syrians, however, had lower male-female ratios in all age groups, especially for those aged 20–24 years.

This suggests a considerable number of Syrian households were headed by females, a proposition confirmed by the preliminary results of the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR, 2015), according to which women-headed households represented about 20 per cent of the Syrian households in Lebanon.

Lebanese women were significantly less economically active than men. At 21 per cent versus 66 per cent, their participation rate was one-third that of men (Yaacoub and Badre, 2011). Female labour force participation was increasing, however. Together with the demographic transition described above, and regardless of the influx of refugees, this was leading an overall labour force growth greater than that of the general population. Women in the workforce were also more educated than men: two-fifths of women had a university degree, compared to one-fifth of the male population.

As for the Syrian population, the participation rate among women was 19 per cent, relatively high for the region but consistent with the demographic composition of the Syrian refugee population (ILO, 2013). Among Syrian women, the unemployment rate was more than double that of Syrian men, or 68 per cent versus 33 per cent (Ajuni and Kavar, 2015).<sup>(13)</sup> Syrian women earned around 40 per cent (LBP 248,000 [US\$ 165]) less than males (ILO, 2013). For instance, women engaged in harvesting on Lebanese farms in the Bekaa Valley earned as little as LBP 8,000 (US\$ 5) per day (Battistin, 2015i).

PEP schemes should take account of the fact that one out of five Syrian households is headed by a woman (WFP, 2015), and that the unemployment rate among women is double that of men (Ajuni and Kavar, 2015). So far, the great majority of CfW projects in Lebanon target men, both because of the type of work entailed and due to the working conditions (working hours, lack of childcare services). A programmatic shift is needed to make CfW more accessible to women.

## Box 6-2.2

### Gender equity in CfW projects in Lebanon

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, few women were involved in CfW projects.

According to the Italian NGO COOPI, which implemented CfW in Tripoli and surrounding municipalities, women, due to socio-cultural factors, did not feel comfortable working side by side with men. Furthermore, the work was sometimes too physically demanding for them. Engaging women and leaving husbands at home would have also created tensions within households; women themselves recommended enrolling their husbands, and this approach was supported by municipalities.

Initially, COOPI aimed to attain a quota of 30 per cent of females; in the end, they had to adjust this target to 7 per cent. Women were mostly involved in social cohesion and outreach activities within their own communities, where they felt

safe. Their task was to get feedback on CfW projects from neighbours and provide information regarding the project (e.g. who funded it, including the fact it involved Syrians).

The IRC organized women-only home-based CfW projects to promote women's participation. Women prefer to work from home because they can more efficiently schedule their multiple duties in the household, they do not have to find childcare solutions, and they are less exposed to the risks of commuting to the workplace. Projects included the production of fishnets, which were then distributed to vulnerable fishermen in the area; and making tailored or knitted clothing items which, in cooperation with the IRC Child Protection Programme, were distributed to children in vulnerable households. All these home-based CfW projects were preceded by two or three months of training in which participants learned production techniques from experienced trainers. Participants were offered transportation to and from the training site, and childcare facilities and personnel were made available to those who required them.

Trainees found IRC childcare services for women participants a helpful addition to the programmes. So far, to the best of the author's knowledge, they have not been used in CfW projects in Lebanon; in future, however, they could be considered a complementary service to encourage women's participation in outdoor CfW activities.

The ACF experience shows how various programmatic adjustments may affect women's willingness and capacity to participate in CfW projects. Despite the fact the ACF did not set quotas for women and men, their Bekaa and the South caseloads, following the use of two different execution approaches, presented different gender ratios. In both cases, selection criteria were negotiated with local stakeholders. In Bekaa, the ACF targeted informal settlements and enrolled only individuals who resided in the camp for garbage collection within the camp itself. In the South, on the other hand, CfW activities were not executed in informal settlements, and beneficiaries did not know each other because they came from different areas. This factor alone is believed to have limited women's readiness to participate. Furthermore, some municipalities were reluctant to execute gender-sensitive activities and preferred engaging male workers.

In the Bekaa, working conditions within the CfW projects were decisive in achieving a 70 per cent female participant rate, although this was not a pre-defined target. The most important enabling conditions included (1) the fact the work was undertaken within the boundaries of the informal settlements where they resided; (2) permission to pause their work and go home from time to time to check on their children; and (3) the fact that their co-workers and supervisors were all females. As a result, women felt confident in coming forward. Most men, on the other hand, refused to collect garbage in front of people they knew.

UNDP have managed to attain high women participation rate after a long and costly awareness raising process. The initial assumption in the communities was that women were incapable of carrying out certain types of work; this viewpoint was slowly changed through awareness-raising activities including the involvement of qualified female engineers. In this respect, it was also recommended that, although tempting, agencies should go beyond employing women only in gendered areas of work such as childcare and cooking as this risks reinforcing damaging stereotypes. UNDP also highlighted that whilst increased female participation should be aimed for, it is necessary that in doing so one must be aware of and mitigate the risk of 'double burden'<sup>(14)</sup> and heightened tensions it could provoke in the household where possible (ILO, 2016).

Oxfam Italy, similar to COOPI, reported that the women they have interacted with have not wanted to work in mixed groups, preferring to participate in all-women workgroups. They reported having reached an average female participation of 40 per cent in their project by using female-only workgroups as well as employing a female social worker to monitor the all-female groups. Furthermore, they reported that by recruiting women from the same area tends to create groups of women who know each other and therefore are more willing to participate. Terre des Hommes Italia have a 20 per cent participation rate of women in their project through implementing baking activities for women and distributing baked products to workers on the cash for work projects. (ILO, 2016)

To conclude, gender sensitivity in CfW can be promoted by creating the workplace conditions that encourage women to come forward and feel comfortable. It is a good practice to consult women and their spouses when designing the programme before establishing work hours, sites, work-team composition, and the sex of supervisors. Thus far, no CfW programmes are offering childcare to enable women's participation. It is important to agree on and promote the implementation of complementary services such as transportation to and from work and childcare to encourage

<sup>14</sup> 'Double burden' refers to the workload of people (often women) who work to earn income as well as being responsible for unpaid domestic labour.

and facilitate the participation of women. Finally, equal pay for women must be pursued in line with the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100).

## Box 6-2.3

### Building self-confidence and pride

In 2013, Oxfam and the Beirut-based ABAAD-Resource Center for Gender Equality released an assessment of how gender roles changed within the Syrian population as a result of displacement to Lebanon. Before coming to Lebanon, Syrian women were not used to earning an independent income, and usually their spouses would take the lead in making financial decisions. While some women reported distress due to the new situation, some others felt an “increased sense of empowerment” (El-Masri, Harvey, and Garwood, 2013).

In its unconditional cash assistance programme in Lebanon, the IRC offered all women heads of household the opportunity to enrol in financial literacy training. In fact, the IRC noticed that “receiving cash assistance was a great relief for these women. However, in spite of being aware of its temporary duration, they generally reported not having a plan for when the assistance would be over.” The training was delivered in collaboration with the IRC Women Protection and Empowerment Programme (WPE) and Al Majmoua.

The training consisted of 12 sessions delivered across six weeks. Household-level budgeting, debt management and negotiation, savings, and banking services were among the topic covered. Graduates of this training reported greater self-confidence and more effective participation in decision-making within their households. According to the IRC (Battistin, 2014), this can ultimately reduce use of negative coping strategies and exposure to gender based violence (GBV).” Household financial management training represents another entry point – and a necessary complement – for further initiatives to promote income generation.

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# Contents for Guidance Note 7-3: PEPs and urban works

## Box 7-3.1

### A rationale for urban works in Lebanon

Most of the many arguments for focusing PEP programmes in Lebanon on urban works are linked to the national demographic situation and its continuing evolution, as well as to the current state of that country's infrastructure and services.

According to definitions and estimates from the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the Lebanese urban population has grown steadily over the last 60 years, swelling from 42 per cent of the total population in 1960 to 87 per cent in 2011.<sup>(15)</sup> This rate is higher than the national average across the Western Asia region, where the urban population accounts for less than an estimated 70 per cent of the total (UNDESA, Population Division, 2015). More than half of the Lebanese population now resides in Beirut.

Given that Lebanon provides no official refugee camps, the urban population has further grown in the past four years due to the influx of over 1 million Syrian refugees into urban settlements. This has generated increased pressure on existing infrastructure and services, which were already inadequate.

The Multi-sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) report released in 2014 highlighted limited resources at the municipal level, particularly among small municipalities, to respond to the increased needs of a growing population. It also warned of possible security threats from unemployed youth. Furthermore, according to the MSNA, Syrians in displacement in urban areas might be especially vulnerable because traditional safety nets are supposedly weaker there than in rural areas. This marginalization was compounded by the host population's perception that it was the Syrian refugees' fault if municipalities were affected by these issues (MSNA, 2014).

Given that nearly 90 per cent of the Lebanese population resides in urban areas, and in light of severe urban infrastructure and services deficits, it seems reasonable to prioritize urban works within public employment programmes. These may not translate into greater economic productivity, as do those to improve rural infrastructure, but they do improve community living conditions and health (ILO, 2012b).

According to a WB-led study in 2013 on socio-economic impacts in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanon stands in need of extensive infrastructure rehabilitation. The WB estimated that the Syrian refugee influx had generated a fiscal cost on infrastructure of \$589 million between 2012 and 2014. This figure included (1) direct costs arising from public debt and emergency measures to support financial institutions, and (2) indirect costs from lower tax revenues and higher government spending. The same report found that restoring access and quality of infrastructure would cost \$1.1 billion (WB, 2013).

The WB study covered three types of infrastructure and public services of particular interest for urban works: water supply systems; solid waste management services; and transport infrastructure.

According to the MSNA, the influx of refugees had generated a 7 per cent increase in demand for water. It also reported that as many as 28 per cent of the refugees were unable to access safe water. Meanwhile, a widespread perception prevailed among the host population that many water-related issues were a consequence of the refugee influx (MSNA, 2014). In reality, these issues instead appeared to have been the result of obsolescent infrastructure and inadequate maintenance. In the first place, water quality was compromised by the limited capacity of municipalities to deal with source contamination from wastewater and agricultural activities. Water storage infrastructure was obsolete and storage capacity was low, while water distribution networks were poorly maintained, resulting in much water being lost (MSNA, 2014).

<sup>15</sup> Urban areas are defined by national statistical offices, and urban populations include people living in those areas. Estimated urban and rural population ratios are provided by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs in the yearly World Urbanization Prospects. See: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/> [accessed 1 June 2016].

Aside from issues related to failures to meet increased demand, water quality standards, and adequate distribution, another problem was wastewater disposal, which was conducted only through “informal” structures. Poor wastewater treatment puts public health at risk. Yet wastewater treatment facilities were insufficient, and the wastewater collection systems had a limited capacity.

Productive farming infrastructure was also of low quality; e.g. in rural areas irrigation systems were insufficient, mostly consisting of open channels (MSNA, 2014).

In the light of such reports, the WB recommends a series of infrastructure rehabilitation interventions: (1) urgent sanitation interventions; (2) short-term infrastructure/equipment and restoration of services in schools; (3) rehabilitation of water storage and transfer infrastructure; (4) water network rehabilitation and replacement; (5) water and wastewater treatment; and (6) irrigation expansion and improvement (WB, 2013).

Solid-waste management also suffered from inefficiencies and mismanagement. Such services and infrastructure were matters of municipal responsibility, and in most cases municipalities resorted to private contractors for collection and transportation to dumping sites. Services delivery was fragmented, given that collaboration among municipalities was limited. As a result, transaction costs were high and opportunities to benefit from economies of scale were typically missed (WB, 2013).

Given both the massive population increase and lack of any corresponding adjustment of waste management capacity, needs and capacity were mismatched and makeshift measures had become the norm. Solid waste was dumped illegally and burned; recycling was non-existent or very limited, perhaps in part because of unawareness of its importance; fees went uncollected or collected only irregularly among the population, thus leaving few resources for this service (MSNA, 2014).

These issues preceded the crisis, but became exacerbated post-crisis by the increase of waste production over the past four years. A ten-year plan was issued in 2006 for solid waste management, but it has never been implemented for lack of funding and consensus regarding how to proceed (WB, 2013).

The WB estimated a budget of \$193–206 million to (1) close and rehabilitate uncontrolled municipal solid-waste dumps and then reopen them; (2) establish composting, waste separation, and land-filling facilities; and (3) extend financial support to host municipalities to cover the expected additional operational and capital expenditures (WB, 2013).

Transportation infrastructure had not been especially affected by the refugee influx, although the population increase might have increased wear and tear on road networks and exacerbated urban traffic congestion. Such problems, however, were already apparent prior to the refugee crisis. The road network was poorly maintained, there was no clear assignment of responsibilities and resources to address rehabilitation, and maintenance requirements were insufficient.

The WB estimated a budget of \$246–525 million was needed for (1) asset preservation and road maintenance; (2) network reconstruction, widening, and expansion; (3) the introduction of public transport solutions; and (4) freight and transit sector interventions, e.g. compensation to transport operators.

## Box 7-3.2

### Potential challenges in urban works in Lebanon

Urban works implementers in Lebanon need to consider a number of potential challenges.

First and foremost, they will likely have to deal on multiple levels with limited municipality capacities. Among other services, municipalities in Lebanon are responsible for the construction, installation, and regular maintenance of roads, road lighting, and sidewalks. They are also responsible for the construction of potable water networks, the maintenance of retaining walls, and for waste collection (Boujikian and Atallah, 2015). Yet despite the burden of

such responsibilities, municipalities face administrative and fiscal constraints that make it difficult to fulfil their duties (Atallah, 2012). According to a recent study, 70 per cent of the 1,108 Lebanese municipalities are small, each with fewer than 4,000 registered people (Boujikian and Atallah, 2015). They also have to operate with limited human resources: almost 400 of these small municipalities have no employees, and it takes three years on average to hire municipal staff (Boujikian and Atallah, 2015). Furthermore, the few available staff are in general poorly equipped for administrative tasks: they have limited competence in financial administration, and, as of 2011, one in five municipalities had no IT equipment (ICMA, 2011). The same study found that only 36 per cent of municipalities were able to deliver 8 or more of eleven essential services (Boujikian and Atallah, 2015).

The incapacity to collect sufficient financial resources at the municipal level for the delivery of essential services leaves municipalities highly dependent on central government transfers.

One recourse is greater efficiency in the use of scarce resources, e.g. by pooling resources and investing in inter-municipality projects under the aegis of unions of municipalities. Currently there are 48 of the latter bodies comprising a total of 660 municipalities (Atallah, 2012). Establishing common administration services would represent another fruitful measure (ICMA, 2011).

In partnering with municipalities, PEP implementers should also take account of other, broader considerations: (1) before starting work, the land tenure situation must be assessed and approvals obtained; (2) alliances should be sought with relevant stakeholders; and (3) when conducting work in informal tented settlements, with Lebanon and the refugee crisis response specifically, implementers should get the buy-in and approval of municipalities and the landlords, as well as of the shawishes who manage the settlements.

Municipalities and unions need capacity building to partner and lead or co-lead urban works. Rather than making them immediately responsible for entire projects or important components, implementers might consider a gradual hand-over of responsibilities, articulated within a capacity building plan that encompasses skills upgrades and provision of equipment.

Urban works timeframes should be realistic. Most of the current CfW projects in Lebanon extend for less than 12 months. Such short periods are inadequate for launching large-scale urban works and concurrently building capacities of municipalities and unions.

It is also important to ensure that operations and maintenance are included in planning and budgeting.

Municipalities can sometimes exploit the employment creation potential of current infrastructure projects without having to identify and plan for new interventions.

Municipalities can also be assisted in the review of planned investments with a view to making these as labour intensive as possible, at the same time ensuring decent contractual and working conditions for the workers. Among other things, municipalities could set labour quotas in contracts with private enterprises, with clauses demanding they hire locally.

Participatory approaches can be pursued during both works design and execution. Project executors should be aware that, in communities with a high proportion of Syrian refugees compared to the host population, low levels of social cohesion will likely prevail between the two groups, and Syrian refugees might find acceptance difficult in community forums, where they exist.

## Box 7-3.3

### CfW and urban works experiences in Lebanon

Most CfW projects in Lebanon were small-scale urban works, among them the following:

- garbage collection and composting at the source (IRC);
- cleaning of sites in the vicinity of informal settlements, with community participation in project selection (ACF);
- upgrading of informal settlements and their water and sanitation facilities (Save the Children UK);
- upgrading of shelters (Save the Children UK);
- city park rehabilitation (Oxfam IT);
- rehabilitation of a playground and small park (COOPI); and
- rehabilitation of a staircase in Tripoli (COOPI).

The IRC solid waste collection project was initiated because municipalities were struggling with the excess quantities of garbage being produced and the fact this was not being deposited in the dedicated bins. The project involved cleaning the streets, collecting the garbage, and disposing of it in the bins. The CfW tasks did not include transportation to dumping sites, since this would have involved authorization from landlords, and would have likely caused friction with the contractors hired by the municipalities for this purpose. The project was implemented in 12 villages in Akkar from August 2014 till April 2015. The 205 participants, 143 Syrians and 72 Lebanese, were enrolled for periods of three months and worked ten days per month. They all received masks, boots, rubber gloves, hats, and overalls, and were provided with brooms, pans, trash pickers, and trolleys. Each team also received a first-aid kit. Large bins were placed in locations selected together with the municipal authorities, who also assumed responsibility for securing the tools in storage rooms.

ACF's three-month site cleaning project in the Bekaa Valley was launched to address the solid-waste problem in 50 informal settlements of different sizes in about ten municipalities. CfW tasks consisted of collecting the waste and transporting it outside the settlements to authorized locations. Participants were chosen from among settlement residents, and they were mostly women. They worked ten days a month for one month, and had to wait for another two months before being eligible to enrol again in a CfW project. The length of the work cycles is being reconsidered with a view to extending participant access to CfW income (Battistin, 2015b).

COOPI's staircase rehabilitation project aimed to facilitate pedestrian traffic between two neighbourhoods in Tripoli. The existing staircase was in poor condition. The ruined steps made walking dangerous, and after dark lighting was non-existent or irregular. The project consisted of tiling the steps, fixing a separation handrail in the middle of the stairway, and placing solar-energy street lamps along the way. COOPI collaborated closely with the municipality and the union of municipalities of the area. Together they selected the interventions, nominated Syrian and Lebanese beneficiaries, and supervised the works. The municipality also provided a space in which to store equipment and materials, and removed debris produced by the work (Battistin, 2015c).

ACTED implemented activities in the urban context by means of household- and community-level interventions. The project integrated a local resource based approach by conducting a market analysis of the area and only purchasing products from within a small radius of the neighbourhood. The activities implemented include painting and cleaning. DRC, too, implemented the neighbourhood approach in activities including gardening, cleaning, installation of water pipes, and construction of community halls. The average investment for these activities is USD 3,000 using an 8-12 day labour cycle. (ILO, 2016)

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# Contents for Guidance Note 9: PEPs and decent work

## Box 9.1

### CfW SOPs: Safety and health at work (Livelihoods WG, 2015)

Most CfW project work in Lebanon is physical in nature, and may involve the use of tools or the execution of tasks that can be dangerous to participant health. The CfW SOPs recommend anticipating health and safety hazards when setting up the projects and, during implementation, doing what is necessary to prevent workplace accident and illness while standing ready to respond promptly to beneficiary injuries or other health issues when they do arise.

Without such measures, any injury or health problem suffered as a consequence of CfW activities is likely to impose an unexpected economic burden on the beneficiary's household, thereby nullifying the benefits of the assistance. CfW design and execution must adopt a do-no-harm approach.

The SOPs recommend the following measures: (1) offering insurance coverage to CfW participants when the work involves health hazards; (2) providing protective equipment; (3) engaging primary healthcare providers in CfW initiatives; and (d) providing basic training on safety and health at work.

Insurance is of particular importance. In the past, CfW beneficiaries who suffered injuries in Lebanon, especially Syrian refugees, have found it difficult to access the Lebanese health system, which is mainly privatized and where medical fees are prohibitive for the poorest (Livelihoods WG, 2014).

The ILO suggests that it is safer and, at times, cheaper to eliminate known hazards at the workplace than it is to provide protective equipment to all workers, which is an important measure in many CfW projects (ILO, 1972). Protective equipment can be of two types: basic personal equipment/clothing, or specialized working equipment. Specific requirements depend on the tasks to be conducted and the type of machinery that the workers are asked to operate.

Personal equipment aims to protect vulnerable body parts such as eyes, face, head, hands, feet, and hearing. Examples of these protective items include helmets or hard hats, masks, heavy duty and or/insulated gloves, boots with slip-resistant and puncture-resistant soles, and overalls. Less importantly, protective equipment may also be designed to avoid ruining workers' clothing.

Specialized working equipment is a non-personal asset used to perform the work. Examples of hazardous activities include those undertaken in high places in the construction sector. In such cases, protective equipment includes such measures as guardrails and toe-boards around elevated platforms. However, CfW implementers should bear in mind that risks can also arise from the use of machinery that has not been properly maintained, that is misused, or is used in inappropriate contexts. Hence, a map of the possible hazards should be prepared before starting work, with risk mitigation measures and contingency response plans set in place. Project staff and CfW participants should be trained in how to proceed should a safety issue arise.

Workers should be taught how to use and maintain both their personal equipment and any specialized work equipment, and should held responsible for it. Supervisors and project teams should conduct regular checks and thorough inspections, and their findings should be documented.

The CfW SOPs also recommend alerting primary health centres in areas where projects are being executed of work in progress and that they may receive injured participants. Project executors should also assess primary health centre capacity to address such emergencies. When insuring CFW participants, it is important to check which healthcare

providers are eligible for cost reimbursement. Worker teams should have ready access to the healthcare providers' contact details.

Ultimately, the SOPs recommend that CfW teams are properly prepared to take care of their own safety. They should be provided with first-aid kits and trained in how to use them in case of emergency. They also should receive training in the work to be performed and alerted to any potential hazards they may face in the workplace. Finally, they should be proficient at using and maintaining work and protective equipment.

## Box 9.2

### Insurance coverage for CfW participants: An example

Some CfW implementers in Lebanon have secured insurance coverage for their participants, which is especially relevant when their duties involve risk of injury. This workmen's compensation plan operates within the framework of the Lebanese Labour Law, 1983 (No. 136), which stipulates the insurer's obligation to cover any injury sustained by an employee while on duty.

The main advantage of this type of plan is that the insurance policy need not be issued on an individual basis, which is convenient in CfW projects where participants, often many workers at a time, are engaged for limited periods of time and turnover is frequent. The policy insures a group of persons up to a predefined number on a daily basis, with a CfW implementer determining that number based on the maximum number of participants engaged in CfW on a given day. Workers are also covered 24 hours per day and seven days a week, including Sundays and public holidays, and they are covered while commuting between home and workplace. The fee is based on the number of persons enrolled in the particular CfW project and the amount of payments to the participants.

The contract signed by one CfW implementer involved no financial limitation for medical expenses of third class.<sup>(16)</sup> It also provided coverage in the event of death, as per the Lebanese Labour Law Total & Partial Disability as per law no. 136/83. It guaranteed a weekly indemnity up to 75 per cent of the declared salary, indemnity calculations being made in accordance with the Lebanese Labour Law.

Medical expenses must be advanced by the agency or the beneficiary. Reimbursements can be claimed by submitting all the documentation related to an accident, including declaration form, medical report, and drug prescription, as well as by proving that the affected person is a beneficiary of the CfW project (e.g. through the list of participants). According to CfW implementers that have used it, costs are typically reimbursed within 15 days.

Oxfam Italia, one of the CfW implementers that signed for this insurance plan, learned, among other lessons, the following: the health hazards of some CfW projects may be underestimated. In about two months of CfW implementation, Oxfam Italia recorded six work accidents.

All CfW participants should be clearly informed that the insurance covers only costs arising from work-related accidents. In at least one instance, a CfW participant used health services for other purposes and expected the insurance to cover the cost.

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# Contents for Guidance Note 14-1: Innovations in payment systems for PEPs: Efficiency, accountability and financial inclusion

## Box 14-1.1

### Cash transfer modalities used in Lebanon: Focus on Liban Post

In September 2014, the Cash Working Group conducted a survey to map out cash-related initiatives in Lebanon. In total, 172 projects were found to be using either conditional or unconditional, restricted or unrestricted cash-transfer interventions. The most frequent transfer modality, the pre-paid ATM card, was used in 80 of these projects (more than 50 per cent); that was followed by cheques, used in 29 projects; cash in envelopes, distributed in 25 projects; vouchers, for 24 projects; and Liban Post or Western Union in 14 projects. (Note that some projects alternated two different transfer modalities.)

A few of the NGOs executing CfW – ACF, IRC, and Save the Children – used pre-paid ATM cards. The others resorted mostly to cheques and cash-in-envelope. Two of these organizations were also running larger unconditional cash assistance programmes that used ATM cards as the transfer modality. In fact, setting up ATM payment systems requires substantive administrative effort both at the outset and then again with each transfer. This method may not be cost efficient for just one or two grant transfers. In any case it entails distributing ATM cards to all beneficiaries and explaining how to use them. This is likely the reason it has been used mostly by organizations that already have it in place for other programmes, and that process multiple transfers to each recipient.

An alternative transfer modality, one that still avails itself of professional financial services, is money transfer by Liban Post. Reportedly, Oxfam IT is the only NGO that has used this procedure in CfW projects. Oxfam IT reported the main advantages of this modality, as compared to cash-in-envelope, were its cost efficiency, transparency, safety, and simplicity.

The procedure entails the following main steps: (1) filling in the so-called campaign file, with the list of beneficiaries and amounts of cash they are to receive; (2) sending the file to Liban Post; (3) transferring the funds to Liban Post via wire transfer to its bank account. The terms and conditions of the service were set out in a MoU.

The costs of each transfer are relatively low, and include two components: (1) SMS fees for sending two messages to the beneficiaries, the first when the payment campaign starts and they can collect the money from Liban Post, and the second five days before the end of the campaign, so that they are reminded to collect the money in case they have already not done so; and (2) a disbursement fee. (Oxfam Italy does not pay any bank transfer fee, as they hold a bank account at Liban Post.)

Oxfam needs to prepare and keep in its records (also for auditing purposes), the campaign files, and the proofs of transfer, which are collected from Liban Post at the end of the campaign. When collecting their compensation from Liban Post, beneficiaries must show their personal ID or other recognized identification, the Liban Post plastic card provided by Oxfam Italia, and the campaign number received in the SMS.

In 2017, Oxfam Italia continue to use Liban Post as their payment mechanism. As of the 1st of January 2017, the new procedures put in place by Liban Post foresee the campaign period to remain open without an ending day. That is to say, the campaign will be closed when all the beneficiaries collect their money and the online access service can be used to check the withdrawals of the beneficiaries. They reported that there are two costs incurred when making transfers over LL 300,000: (1) a disbursement fee of LL 4950 (2) the cost of an SMS at LL 165. The disbursement fee

varies depending on the amount per transaction:

| Disbursement Amount            | Liban Post Commission |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Up to 300,000 LBP              | 3,300 LBP             |
| 301,000 LBP to 1,000,000 LBP   | 4,950 LBP             |
| 1,001,000 LBP to 5,000,000 LBP | 0.5 %                 |

There are at least five other international NGOs that are using Liban Post as a payment mechanism.

Oxfam Italia have reported that following two years of continuous collaboration with Liban Post, they have only positive feedback. The major benefits they have found are: efficiency, effectiveness and transparency; online access for following up the campaigns; continuous support of Liban Post staff; and, flexibility in terms of the beneficiaries being able to collect the money from any Liban Post centre. Armadilla reported that they have encountered some problems with their Liban Post payment system due to complications with their identification cards.

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# Contents for Guidance Note 15: Impact of PEPs

## Box 15-1.1

### Impact of CfW projects in Lebanon: Good practices

In general, PEPs have a wide range of impacts because of their multidimensional nature and the multiple outcomes they create. As PEPs usually do not manage to carry out a comprehensive impact assessment, they focus on key impacts linked to the primary objectives of the programme. In Lebanon, the primary objectives of the projects are to both inject cash into communities and generate employment. On the one hand, PEPs are seen as a social protection measure to enhance employment during times of crisis. On the other hand, PEPs can also be used to great effect as a sustainable model to be adopted by the government and aid partners as an efficient way to invest in national infrastructure. In Lebanon, the former has been the focus initially whilst the latter is gaining traction since the Supporting Syria & the Region conference in London in February 2016. The Republic of Lebanon issued a 'Statement of Intent' in preparation for this conference in which it delineated the importance of creating economic opportunities for both Syrians and for vulnerable Lebanese. The government declared its support for interventions that will stimulate economic growth and business expansion while providing 300,000 to 350,000 jobs for opportunities, 60 per cent of which for Syrians. The statement also indicates that the job opportunities should be geared towards addressing the urgent national-level infrastructure needs. (Republic of Lebanon, 2016)

The three main modes employed by CfW implementers in Lebanon to ensure and enhance impact and sustainability of projects by means of (1) integrated capacity building and training, (2) asset transfer and (3) linking in with on-going development agendas.

With regard to capacity building, the projects often integrate an element of capacity building of local municipalities that they work with. The capacity building can range from specific training for the municipality on operationalization and maintenance of the project to general training of staff to enhance effectiveness of the institution. According to Terre des Hommes Italia, executing the capacity building for the municipalities can at times be a sensitive topic and therefore needs to be handled with care. A soft approach to capacity building such as joint implementation appears more successful.

An indirect form of capacity building that takes place is the slow changing of the 'Wasta'<sup>(17)</sup> system through introducing fair recruitment processes in the CfW projects. By creating jobs through legitimate recruitment practices, and training on these recruitment practices, this can instigate a change in local recruitment practices.

Integrating vocational training into the projects is frequently done in Lebanon CfW projects as a means to ensure a sustained impact through skills development of beneficiaries. This training appears either in the form of on-the-job training or as a separate in-class training component, by NGOs such as IRC and CESVI. In this context, CESVI reported that they have created higher impact by using the same beneficiaries for the CfW project as for training programmes when the relevant skills training precedes the field work.

Mercy Corps indicated that a measure they take to extend the impact of the project is to hand over the equipment purchased for the project to the municipality, which ensures that the effects of the project's money stretch beyond the end of the project. The IRC however report that they have witnessed the equipment being sold by beneficiaries, deeming the immediate benefit of cash as better than continuing of activity. Although not a negative impact, it does not contribute to sustainability of income.

Finally, in Lebanon the main way of extending impact and introducing sustainability of the project is to tie in with on-going development plans. UNDP and AVSI both tie their programming into the Ministry of Agriculture reforestation

17 The 'Wasta' system refers to one's connections and influence; it is related to corruption and nepotism. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wasta>

plan, in order that the activities carried out are both relevant and likely to be continued after the project's end. UNDP, in particular, select vulnerable communities and consult the reforestation plan to find areas that satisfy both criteria. Where there is no overlap, UNDP will select an area specified by UNDP where vulnerable communities are near enough to commute.

Involving private companies in the CfW projects is another good way of ensuring the sustainability. By involving contractors (and sub-contractors), the project will empower the private sector and contribute to Local Economic Development. However, UNDP reported that involving the contractors constitutes a challenge in that the projects require a higher-level of monitoring and evaluation than that of using NGOs as implementing partners; this leads to higher overall costs for the project when involving the private sector versus the non-profit sector.

## Box 15-2

### Project Selection

The selection of the type of Cash for Work project to implement is important and often difficult to undertake for the organisations. There are various elements to the selection process that vary between different implementers depending on their respective donors' focus, their capacity and their resources. The two key decisions that need to be taken first are (1) the geographical location and (2) the type of intervention. The majority of implementers choose first the type of activities to implement and afterwards choose the region of Lebanon to work in.

UNDP's strategy consists of selecting vulnerable communities using the MRR and then consulting the Ministry of Agriculture's reforestation plan to find an area where the two criteria overlap. Where there is no direct overlap, UNDP will choose an area identified in the reforestation plan in the vicinity of vulnerable communities so that participants can commute. AVSI also links their projects into the Ministry of Agriculture's reforestation plan. ACTED reports that, in principal, they take into account all available data and choose a geographical region and piece of land that is appropriate for their intervention. In practice, however, due to the short timeframe of their projects they often cannot secure permission in a timely manner for the chosen piece of land and so are obliged to consult the local officials and respond to the needs that are described to them.

The DRC explained that project selection is often driven by the donor priorities. Some implementing agencies are instructed to target Syrians and others are to target vulnerable host communities; this then guides the choice of location and of activity. In addition, some donors prioritise number of participants, while others prioritise length of intervention. This variety in donor priorities adds a challenge to the coordination and collaboration of disparate agencies. Another challenge that needs to be addressed when selecting a project is that reportedly many municipalities do not have official, published plans for their community. Therefore, in order to carry out all the preparatory work necessary to create effective projects, a short time frame is often restricting. (ILO, 2016)

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