A Technical Assistance Mission in the Andes

by

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In February 1952 the Technical Assistance Board approved a project for the study of the conditions of indigenous populations on the Andean High Plateau to be carried out by the I.L.O., the United Nations, U.N.E.S.C.O., F.A.O. and W.H.O., in co-operation. The first stage of the project consisted of a general preliminary survey mission to study previous efforts to integrate the indigenous populations into national economic and social life, so as to determine what types of technical assistance would be best suited to supplement existing national programmes or to develop new ones, to explore the practical utility of certain pilot projects and to select the best locations for such projects. This first stage has been carried out by a Mission composed of experts appointed by the above organisations, together with a representative of the Organization of American States, under the leadership of Professor Beaglehole, the author of the following article.

The report drawn up by the Mission contains recommendations for the second stage of the project—technical assistance activities to reinforce existing or proposed national programmes covering such matters as the development of co-operative organisation for agriculture, stockraising and handicrafts; the advancement of education and hygiene; practical training in handicrafts, and an examination of the possibilities of partial mechanisation in certain cases; the training of Indian teachers and community leaders; and the possibilities of settling Indian workers migrating from the High Plateau in other areas of the countries concerned.

The findings of the Mission have not yet been made public—its report is now before the Technical Assistance Board. However, Professor Beaglehole was invited to write for the Review an account of the experiences of the Mission from a human rather than a technical
point of view, and in the following pages he describes the difficulties encountered, the techniques used and the lessons learned in carrying out a planning mission in one of the most forbidding regions in the world.

AN “off-the-record” account of the events that led to the formation of the United Nations and Specialised Agencies Joint Field Mission on Indigenous Populations, more briefly known as the Andean Indian Mission, would be interesting to write, principally because of the pleasant memories of persons and events it would recapture, the struggles that could be refought and the wisdom that one might come by after the event. It would also be an entertaining account to read because of the insight it would afford into the trials and tribulations involved in putting into practice an idea that required for its successful implementation not only the co-operation of three Governments and six international agencies but also the invention of new techniques of administration and policy making in the field of technical assistance. Such an account, however, would have to be exceedingly detailed to be accurate, and in the end might be of historical interest only. At the moment therefore all that needs recording is the fact that the immediate stimulus for the formation of the Andean Indian Mission was a resolution of the first meeting of the I.L.O. Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour held at La Paz, Bolivia, in January 1951. Because this resolution pointed in the same direction as resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, of the General Conference of U.N.E.S.C.O. and of the Organization of American States, it soon proved opportune for the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations to proceed with the organisation of the field mission as urged by the I.L.O. Committee of Experts, with the approval and support of the Technical Assistance Board. By February 1952 all the decisions had been formally made for the appointment of a chief of mission and of a mission for a chief to organise and take into the field.

THE FIELD PROBLEM

The difficulties involved in organising a relatively large field mission are directly related to the kind of problems that the mission is asked to solve and to the number of participating international organisations, each with their differing but legitimate interests in the way the problems are to be studied. It is important therefore
to analyse the problem with which the Andean Indian Mission was called upon to deal.

The Andean region is a wind-swept, treeless plateau, 2,000 to 5,000 metres (7,500 to 16,250 feet) above sea level, lying between the eastern and western cordilleras of the Andean mountain chain. The plateau is some 3,200 km. (2,000 miles) long and ranges in width from 160 km. (100 miles) in the north to 640 km. (400 miles) in the south. It is a region of violent contrasts. On the high plateaux the Indian inhabitants struggle to gain a precarious livelihood by agriculture and animal husbandry; in the higher and more sheltered valleys, where land is more fertile and can be awakened by suitable irrigation, life is superficially pleasanter but still hard because of increasing population pressure on an already overpopulated land. On the lower slopes of the Andes there are fertile tropical valleys, but the hazards of tropical diseases have so far denied these lands to the use of the Indian.

In this region live some ten million Indians, split into two mutually unintelligible linguistic groups, Aymara and Quechua, each group communicating with the other and sometimes with the white people of the region through the use of a Spanish lingua franca. Politically the region and its inhabitants are divided between the three sovereign countries of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Originally members of the Inca Empire, the Indians passed by conquest to the care and mercies of the Spanish invaders of the region. For most of the past four hundred years they remained subjects of the Spanish Crown. After the wars of independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Indians became, as part and parcel of the land wrested from the Crown, members of the national States established by these wars. Nominally Roman Catholic, a result of intensive proselytising by Spanish friars, the Indians today practise a religion that is half Christian and half pagan.

Throughout the years of conquest and subsequently through the years of national independence up to the present day the Indian has lived a life of "apartness". More exactly, he has been, and still is, integrated into a social, political and economic system in a relationship of subordination and inferiority to a dominant aristocratic, landowning and business élite. For the most part the Indian has been a peon on a large landed estate, working cheaply or without wage for several days each week and cultivating independently or on communally owned lands on his other working days, or he has been drawn to the high altitude mines or the coastal plantations as seasonal or temporary labour. His has been, by and large, a subsistence living. His integration into the economic life of his own country has so far and in general been minimal.
Socially and politically the Indian has never played anything more than a minor role in the Andean countries. Linguistic isolation, the lowest position in a social hierarchy, illiteracy, poverty and exploitation have resulted in his withdrawal from anything more than token participation in the social and cultural life of his country, and his political interests have been correlated with his lack of economic power—he has exercised political power only where others have thought it convenient or expedient. Although it is extremely difficult to generalise with exactness about the social, economic, political and cultural integration of the Andean Indian, it is not unfair to say that because his social and political integration has rarely been other than as a subordinate, his economic integration has never been more than fragmentary, his living conditions rarely above subsistence level, his health often poor and his education almost non-existent. Yet the Indian represents today a tremendous reservoir of economic and human wealth for his own country and for the Andean region as a whole.

The problem placed before the Andean Indian Mission was therefore deceptively simple: to plan action programmes with the tripartite co-operation of Governments, Indians and international organisations that would accelerate the integration of Indians into the national political, social and economic life of the three Andean countries; such integration to be orientated towards a democratically-phrased integration in place of the present prevailing master-subordinate integration; such integration finally to be regional in scope, integral in approach, organic in growth, based upon consent rather than upon coercion, and to be achieved without destroying for the Indian his present satisfying community organisation and valued way of life.

Organisation of the Mission

It is clear from the way that the Andean Indian problem has been stated (and the definition is essentially an operational one, since many definitions and solutions may be found in a voluminous literature) that the field mission had to include among its members experts in different fields—health, education, labour, agriculture and so on—so that it would be possible to evaluate solutions already suggested while at the same time keeping in view the necessity for an integral solution and not a piecemeal nibbling at the problem. The real heart of the initial problem of mission organisation therefore was to be found in the absolute importance of developing a team spirit and a team approach to the Indian problem. Only through a team approach could one be sure that no undue emphasis
on one aspect of the problem would be allowed to disturb the organic, integral and regional approach and so produce a one-sided and therefore unrealistic result. In the first stages of organisation each international agency appointed its own member to the Mission (the emphasis was and always remained on membership: no member of the Mission was only or merely a representative of his organisation—it is the function of representatives, after all, to represent first and foremost, whereas it is the function of members of a team to co-operate first and foremost with the other team members in achieving a common goal).

A genuine team can only be forged or moulded or built (the exact metaphor is difficult to achieve) by continued working together on problems of mutual and absorbing interest. This is all the more true when the members of the team are of many different nationalities and bring to a joint work many different personalities, cultural backgrounds, skills, experiences, hopes, fears and expectations. Eight nationalities were represented on the Andean Indian Mission, ranging geographically from countries as far apart as New Zealand is from Mexico or Switzerland from Peru. It must be that a certain amount of tolerance and understanding is built into most human beings. Only thus can one explain the fact that after mutual unfamiliarity had worn off, Mission members became so tolerant of others’ foibles and eccentricities that personal matters rarely if ever ruffled anything more than the surface of a continuing and genuine mutual respect.

Learning to work together is an art that most people have to acquire when faced with new situations. Some members of the Mission had immediate initiation into the art through the briefing services and inquiries that were carried on in Rome (F.A.O.), Paris (U.N.E.S.C.O.), Geneva (I.L.O.), New York (United Nations) and Washington (W.H.O. Regional Office and O.A.S.) before the Mission arrived in the field. These briefing meetings were planned in order to acquaint the Mission with the points of view and interests of each sponsoring international organisation. Valuable as the sessions were from this angle, in retrospect they seem more valuable for the opportunities they gave members of the Mission to discuss ideas and hypotheses and, in so doing, to learn what each could contribute to the common purpose. Those members who were able to travel to the United States by sea instead of being hurled through the air (has anyone paused to reflect that air travel may have increased the efficiency of an international organisation through the aeroplane’s ability to save time, only to decrease the quality of work because it cuts down the time for thought?) were able to continue fruitfully and constructively this process of hammering out an integrated approach.
One important advantage is therefore implicit in a preliminary period of mission briefing. It is as dangerous and stultifying for a mission to proceed to the field with no ideas as to how problems are to be solved as it is to proceed with cut and dried ideas. Open minds are as useless as closed minds. A reasonably adequate briefing period helps members to develop hypotheses that can be discussed and refined and discussed once more, so that implications for field work and for field testing become clear before field work actually commences. The accent in this context is upon the term "implications". Because the Mission had thoroughly explored in advance its hypotheses and their implications it was better equipped to seek the views of local authorities in the field and thus test, revise and even discard hypotheses where the implications made them politically unviable, socially unworkable or technically inadequate.

In fact an interesting case history could be written (from the point of view of hypotheses and their modification, and to take one example only) outlining the development of the Mission’s thinking about the problem of Indian resettlement. To tell the story in detail would take too long. Briefly put, the point is that during initial briefings members of the Mission were considerably impressed with the arguments in favour of elaborating a field programme whose purpose would be to move selected groups of, say, Bolivian highland Indians from their “mother” communities and resettle them in “daughter” communities in the fertile adjoining valleys of the eastern Andes. The economic advantages of such resettlement seemed to be great, and the human problems not insoluble. However, as the result of field investigations in the Bolivian lowlands, conversations with local authorities as well as intra-Mission discussions on the economics and public health aspects of tropical resettlement, the Mission became less sure of its ground. Not to the degree of abandoning the hypothesis completely, but certainly to the degree of realising that very careful field surveys require to be made, by a small team of experts, of selected geographical areas before governments should ask for technical assistance to develop resettlement projects. Nonetheless the fact remains that in the Andean region large areas of semi-tropical land lie waiting for communications to be established and cultivation to be started. With suitable health safeguards, advice on new methods of agriculture and new crops, an assured occupation of land holdings and satisfactory communications with marketing centres, it should not be impossible to attract Indian settlers from impoverished highland areas and settle them on new lands. Before going to the field the Mission was of the opinion that such resettlement projects might be initiated almost immediately; on its return it had so modified its hypothesis that all it could unanimously recommend
was that a survey should be commenced of the resettlement possibilities of the Tambopata valley in Peru in the first instance, with a later extension of the same survey to the Vacas region in Bolivia.

**Working Methods**

The technique adopted by the Mission to arrive at its hypotheses and by subsequent discussion to test the implications against the stubborn but irreducible facts of Andean socio-economic life was the rather simple technique of group discussion. Day after day, whenever the Mission was not actually on the move, all the members met together for informal discussion: discussions on what had been observed; discussions on the implications of such observations for the next stage of its work; discussions on plans and possible projects; discussions over texts and their drafting; discussions to clear the air—foggy and overcast conditions surround at times even the best organised mission; discussions on timetables and travel schedules; discussions in fact on everything and every phase of mission work. So much so that one member remarked: "To meet or not to meet, that is the mission!". One sympathised with the barb behind the wit, without however yielding the position that only by such discussions can unanimity of purpose be achieved. Memory does not record whether a formal vote was ever necessary—probably it never was required—discussion continued until what a Quaker would call "the sense of the meeting" was apparent; the implicit decision was then formally put into words as the conclusion to the interchange of ideas and judgment.

Intra-Mission discussions, continued in New York at United Nations headquarters after return from the field, proved to be the best technique for reaching, in skeleton outline, the unanimous conclusions embodied in the Mission's report. In the New York meetings there were day-to-day discussions of every phase and aspect of the action programmes agreed upon by the Mission as necessary to solve its problem. Again, all the implications of every project were thought through and related both to the regional programme and to the draft contributions of the Mission's technical experts and consultants. Accordingly, when the Mission finally dispersed, those responsible for drafting the report had clear ideas of the scope, content and recommendations of the report. Although it might be presumptuous to say that the Andean Indian Mission has made significant contributions to the technique of how technical assistance planning missions should work (presumably every mission differs because of problems, personalities and projects), nonetheless it must be recorded that the continuous discussion
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technique resulted in the development of unanimous team work, with consequent high-level thinking and reasonable efficiency in field work.

This last comment about efficiency needs perhaps further elaboration. What might be called with some accuracy the logistics of mission work presented continuous difficulties. Partly such difficulties were a product of the size of the Mission—12 or 13 people wishing to go by air or car at short notice inevitably create transport problems. Furthermore, 12 or 13 people increased to, say, 18 or 20 by national public officials temporarily seconded to the Mission by their Government can make the physical process of arranging transport a nightmare. If in addition this large group is travelling for several days continuously the very process of making sure everyone is where he ought to be at the time he ought to be may baffle ingenuity. When cars break down, or arrive late, or planes are delayed, or when telegrams asking for accommodation arrive after the Mission arrives (or not at all), then philosophy appears to be the only antidote for frenzied frustration.

In parenthesis it should also be mentioned that routine administration in headquarters located thousands of miles away always (and inevitably ?) appears to have difficulty in catching up with a mission moving about freely in its field work. The travel-schedules of such a mission, no matter how carefully drawn up in advance, are always subject to change depending upon a changing local scene and the development of new “leads” that take the group from one community to another. Not only subject to change but in fact changing at times with quite astonishing rapidity as local information becomes more precise and significant. Flexibility of movement demands adequate immediately available finance and a liberal interpretation of regulations to avoid time and money-wasting delays.

Finally, it needs to be emphasised that efficiency of work bears some relationship to the physical conditions in which field work is carried out. The Andean Indian Mission's field was the high plateau, underdeveloped country. Yet the plateau is intimately related ecologically and economically to lower valleys and to the coastal country on the west as well as the Amazon and Plata basin lands on the east. Consequently the physiological problem of adjustment to high altitudes was rendered more acute by the necessity to make periodic descents to lowland areas—each such visit seeming to undo the adaptation already achieved by high altitudes. Indeed it might be possible, though one-sided, to tell the history of the Mission in terms of unpressurised planes flying at 7,000 metres, or labouring trains zigzagging slowly up to and through passes at 5,000 metres (where the only oxygen was a
passing whiff as an almost exhausted cylinder was paraded rather tantalisingly through a carriage) or, again, of 12-hour attacks of *soroche* (high-altitude sickness) that only sleep could cure. Add to these occurrences the heat, flies and bad roads of the eastern lowlands (levering the truck out of axle-deep ruts was part of a day's work), the knife-edge cold of the highlands (particularly ferocious cold when the only accommodation was a camp stretcher in a bare barn-like *circulo militar*), meals at any odd hour, etc.; it is not to be particularly wondered at therefore if on occasions the Mission felt "browned-off" and almost ready to take the next plane back to headquarters. It would be as absurd to dwell on these hardships as it would be to forget them. Every technical assistance mission doubtless has its own story of trials and tribulations to tell. If it had none there would presumably be no underdeveloped countries and no call for technical assistance.

*Co-operation with Governments*

Technical assistance missions visit underdeveloped countries by invitation of the government concerned. Therefore co-operation with presidents and cabinet ministers, heads of technical departments and rank-and-file civil servants is part of a mission's job. Not only is this co-operation required in fact, as much as in formal letters requesting a mission's services, for a mission to work efficiently but, in addition, it is always important to realise that every country possesses its local experts who may know much about the problem under review. It is necessary therefore that any mission should be able to tap this local knowledge and experience. Once tapped, it is the duty of the mission first to remedy any gaps in the knowledge and secondly to place this information about local problems into some sort of frame derived from a wider comparative experience of how similar problems have been tackled and solved in other parts of the world. By presenting old problems in a new light, by taking an over-all view unbiased by local patterns of thought or traditional national prejudices, a mission may succeed in working out programmes that will appeal to local authorities. Underdeveloped countries are not exceptions to the rule that local experts are rarely prophets.

I have mentioned that the Andean Indian Mission brought with it hypotheses for field testing. A not insignificant part of this testing came from frank and informal discussions and conversations with local experts and authorities at all levels, in and out of government service. The technique of consultation was essentially simple. It had the several advantages of making known to the Mission the results of local thinking, of securing willing local participation in
the work, of ensuring that contemplated projects were politically, socially and technically viable, and lastly of "selling" the projects of the Mission in such fashion that co-operation and interest would continue after the Mission left the country.

The experience in Bolivia can be adduced to show how the technique worked in practice. On arrival in La Paz the usual protocol visits were paid to government officials. Thereafter more informal discussions were held with Ministers and heads of departments, including a series of round-table conferences with the heads (or their deputies) of those departments particularly interested in problems of Indian integration. As a result of these meetings the Mission not only gained a clear idea of government policy (informal discussions with the President were particularly rewarding) and the strengths and weaknesses of the means whereby this policy would have to be implemented, but also, and equally importantly, was able to initiate a feed-back process whereby government experts began to think in terms of wider horizons and of the new ways in which administrative action would be required when action programmes were commenced. In addition, the Mission was able to drive home the point that its field work must be selective and concentrated on areas where action projects would have the best chance of success. The Mission might have liked to visit the whole of Bolivia, but time was an important factor. Satisfactory field and travel schedules were thus elaborated by these joint discussions. It is sufficient commentary on the enthusiasm with which the Mission was received in Bolivia to note the fact that as many as six senior heads of government departments were detached to the Mission and accompanied it on its Bolivian field trips.

On the Mission's return to La Paz after its Bolivian field work, every opportunity was again made to discuss the Mission's tentative conclusions with members of the Government. The rather difficult question of what sort of administrative control would be required that could resolve possible conflicts between the policies of the Technical Assistance Board on the one hand and the legitimate regard of a government for its own sovereign power was also analysed with great frankness by the Government and the Mission. It is a not insignificant clue to the interest of the Bolivian Government in technical assistance, and to the need of the country for this assistance, that the final document embodying the Government's views on this question of administrative control was of such a nature that it could be immediately and officially accepted by the Mission as providing a firm basis for later negotiation by the Technical Assistance Board.

The technique of full, frank and continuous discussion with responsible government officials, thus tested out in Bolivia, was
followed in Peru and Ecuador. In all these countries the Mission was fortunate in having among its members experts with a particularly detailed and specialised knowledge of contemporary political conditions and political personalities both within and without the Government. It was undoubtedly because of this knowledge, supported as it was by briefing before the Mission left Europe on the major political groupings in the Andean countries, that the Mission was able successfully to chart a course that provided a relatively trouble-free passage through some of the shoals and submerged reefs of national political life.

In all its formal and informal contacts with Governments, the Mission emphasised the three major principles that it was convinced should guide it in elaborating an action programme. These principles may perhaps be summed up by saying that the Mission worked throughout on the assumption that every project must be at once organic, integral and regional in its operation and implication (a fourth principle, that all projects must operate with the consent of the Indians, and not through their coercion, will be mentioned below). In striving to make its projects organic in the sense that they must quickly strike roots in the socio-economic soil of the region and integral in the sense that they must unite all approaches, whether agricultural, educational, labour or public health, the Mission clearly required from governments not only a lucid appreciation of the meaning and application of these principles, but also the will to make necessary administrative adjustments to meet the demands of an integrally-conceived project. For one thing, public health plans must be implemented and administered by already established health departments, and not by temporarily resident international experts. Again, to ensure that various aspects or segments of a project do not get out of equilibrium with each other it is necessary that the different government departments concerned in the operation of a total project should be prepared to work in harmonious relations, through consultative and advisory commissions or the like. In seeking to establish the practical importance of these principles the Mission found its technique of full and frank discussion and rediscussion of the greatest value.

The significance of a regional approach was a little harder to establish for the obvious reason that apart from isolated instances such as the Titicaca Bolivia-Peru agreement on rural education, relations between the three Andean countries have in the past been frequently characterised by a cold matter-of-factness rather than by enthusiastic co-operation. Nevertheless, for the simple reason that the Andean region is a true ecological region marked by the occurrence of common social, economic, educational and cultural
denominators, it was both logically necessary and economically expedient for the Mission to plan a programme that was sufficiently regional to avoid a wasteful duplication of projects and extravagance in the use of experts. The Mission therefore has elaborated a programme each of whose individual projects is valid for the whole region and which will be held together regionally by a liaison unit centrally located and operated by persons specifically charged with the task of ensuring that all the regional aspects of each project are fully developed and integrated.

Of the three Governments requesting the Mission only one showed hesitation in accepting the regional point of view. Quite understandably, if national interests only were a primary concern, it advocated projects that would help the non-integrated Indians in the more depressed areas of the country to develop agriculturally and economically; whereas the Mission, with its regional approach, was of the opinion that a project with a different emphasis would not only help towards Indian integration in this particular country, but at the same time would most usefully complement and complete the range of regional projects.

It remains to be seen how far an initial acceptance of the regional approach by the three Governments will be turned into a firm conviction of its merits. Much will depend upon the progress made with each national project. Much also will depend upon whether United Nations fellowships and scholarships, made available to nationals of one country, Indians and non-Indians alike, for study of and participation in the projects of the other two countries, slowly build up the attitude that regionalism, far from being a rather idealistic altruism, is merely a different way of saying that co-operative learning is more efficient in the long run than lone-wolf experimentation. Regionalism thus has to sell itself on its results. The most that the Mission was able to do was to assure itself that the climate of opinion was sufficiently favourable to give regionalism a fair trial. It is now a responsibility of the international agencies to provide the ways and means, in co-operation with the Governments, whereby the specifically regional aspect of the Mission's programme is fully and satisfactorily encouraged.

**Indian Co-operation**

Throughout its examination of the problem of non-integration and its planning of solutions the Mission was in fact working with a tripartite group composed of international agencies, Governments and Indians. The Mission accepted as a basis for its work the co-operation of the international agencies (it would never have
been born without the work of the agencies) ; it strove assiduously to secure the co-operation of Governments; and it was fully aware that without the consent of Indian groups no programme of social and economic betterment, even though specifically designed for these groups, could have the faintest chance of developing organic roots in Indian community life. Hence the Mission did its utmost to make contacts with Indian communities, to learn at first hand of the generalities and uniqueness of their problems and to plan projects in which Indian co-operation would be one of the basic factors.

Parenthetically it needs emphasising that throughout the region the Mission was constantly reminded of the interest of Governments and of responsible citizens in the welfare of the non-integrated sections of the population. Part of this interest may be caused by enlightened self-interest. It was a powerful and wealthy Peruvian industrialist who remarked in an interview that the greatest wealth of Peru was to be found, not in her mines or sugar plantations, but in her Indian citizens. The implication was evident that the more educated, skilled and healthy the Indians became, the more they could contribute to the wealth and welfare of the whole country. Again it is quite apparent in other parts of the region that the welfare of the Indians must become a primary concern of governmental policy if any government is to survive and remain in power. Diehards who repeat that the only good Indian is a dead one are still to be found on many a provincial or departmental plaza. But the trend of socio-economic development in the region is as surely against them and their opinions as it was against the dinosaurs of an earlier age.

Wherever the Mission went it sought every opportunity to talk to Indians. Members with a knowledge of the two Indian languages of the region were constantly called on to interpret when Spanish could not be used in such formal or informal interviews. On the shores of Lake Titicaca an Indian building a balsa reed boat paused in his complicated lashing to explain why he wished for more education for his children, and what kind of education he desired. In Jesus de Machaca, neighbouring canton to that which contains at Tiahuanacu (Bolivia) some of the most famous archaeological ruins in the New World, Indians expressed their desire for more and better lands; in Muquiyauyu (Peru) already progressive Indians agreed to share their experiences and skills with Indians from other parts of the country; in Otavalo (Ecuador) Indians were prepared to go forward still further along the road to more complete economic integration. Though all the contacts that were made could hardly be construed as more than a slight sounding of Indian opinions—the vastness of the region, the size of the Indian population and
limitations of time precluded anything more than relatively few contacts—nonetheless the Mission formed the opinion that Indians would welcome opportunities to participate in action projects, provided only that participation included them from the very beginning. The participation itself needed also to be of such a kind that Indians played a full part in planning the strategy and tactics of a project, that they were allowed to learn through choices freely made and personal experiences, even though hardly won. Thus the Mission, learning itself from experiences as widely separated in space as Mexico and New Zealand, as far apart in kind as those deriving from studies of a modern factory system or the ways to change attitudes in consumer groups in contemporary industrial society, was unanimous in its conclusions that without full and continuing co-operative participation by the people in any community no project was likely to succeed as an integral, organic institutional development.

Partly deriving from this conclusion and partly responsible for it was the further judgment of the Mission that only through the fullest use of anthropologists with their particular understanding of peoples and cultures and their skills at social investigation could the work of technical assistance experts be made more efficient in the next or action phase of the Mission. Through his ability to understand the structure and functioning of village social organisation, the anthropologist can provide the technological expert with the basic information that the expert requires before he can plan his programme of work. Again, through his understanding of social process the anthropologist can gauge the impact of a particular project on a given community, can evaluate the tensions resulting from such impact and can therefore advise experts on both the implicit and overt responses of the community to the often new and conflicting demands of a new development programme. Technical assistance experts need to know and fully understand both why they are successful and why they are sometimes unsuccessful in underdeveloped countries. Very often reasons for success or failure are patent. In other circumstances, however, reasons may not be so obvious. Therefore in order that both community and expert may profit from experience there must be available persons with techniques for evaluating success and failure, even for turning, in an extreme case, failure into success. The anthropologist naturally cannot claim to work technological miracles, but at least he can claim that his training has made him aware of and sensitive to human problems involved in the impact of technological change upon non-literate communities. In this awareness is often to be found a first wisdom, and in this first wisdom the skills whereby social tensions can be reduced and social change made acceptable.
It is thus not without reason that the Mission hopes for the fullest use of anthropologists in all the subsequent action phases of its work.

**CONCLUSION**

This informal record of some aspects of the work of the Andean Indian Mission has purposely avoided cross reference to the official report of the Mission for the reason that here the emphasis has been on those problems of mission work which are probably common to missions wherever they are called upon to operate, and not therefore peculiar to work in one geographical or cultural region. Also, this record is that of one person only, whereas the report embodies the unanimous judgments of all members of the Mission. Nonetheless this analysis of the methods of the Andean Indian Mission has been made as objective as possible so that those concerned with technical assistance may gain greater appreciation of the problems that have to be solved no matter in what part of the world similar missions are at work.

The Andean Indian Mission finally can be thought of in various ways: as a record of ardours and endurances; as a study in a sombre key of Indian life among some of the world's most spectacular and dramatic scenery; as an attempt to map the outlines of one of the more exciting challenges to the skills in social engineering of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies. The Mission was all these things and much more, because it was an attempt at collaboration that was really international from the faint beginnings to the final report. Now that the first phase of the Mission's directives has been completed it is possible to look forward with a renewed confidence to the tackling of a harder, but not impossibly difficult task: the job of building, with international help, a new way of life that will offer hope and encouragement to all the peoples of the Andean region.