SECOND ITEM ON THE AGENDA

Abrogation or extinguishment of international labour Conventions

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I. Introduction

1. This document has been drafted to comply with the request made by the Working Party, after making a preliminary examination of the general document GB.264/LILS/PR/1 (paragraphs 51-57), "to prepare ... a paper concerning abrogation or extinguishment of some Conventions".  

2. The subject-matter of this request and the manner in which it will be examined need a little explanation.

3. Abrogation or extinguishment of a Convention is used here to refer to the process enabling the legal effects of an instrument to be terminated.  

4. There is no provision for such a process in the present standard-setting system of the ILO; the body of standards is updated by the juxtaposition of the original text of the Convention and the revised text which continues to have some, if not all, of its legal effects. Although this situation is the result of not being able to do anything else rather than a choice, it has traditionally been acknowledged that it has several practical advantages — in particular that of not automatically releasing any parties to the revised Convention who might refuse to accept the obligations ensuing from a revising Convention from any obligation in the area covered.

5. However, as the body of standards has continued to grow, the coexistence of revised and revising instruments has accumulated disadvantages; and this has given rise to the question of whether the advantage of maintaining obligations, of which some are outdated, still justifies such an increase in complexity. Only an examination on a case-by-case basis could provide an answer to this question for a specific Convention. This document does not set out in any way to pre-empt this case-by-case examination; it is merely trying to provide the Governing Body, as requested, with the whole range of technical possibilities so that it might be able to choose, in full knowledge of the facts, the necessary course of action if, and only if, it concluded that there was a need to take action. The factors determining these courses of action will be described in two parts. The first will examine the reasons and implications of the fact that the Conference, while having the power to adopt Conventions, does not have that of nullifying the legal effects. The second part will envisage possible ways of remedying this situation.

II. Limits of the Organization’s power to nullify the legal effects of Conventions it has adopted

1. Legal theory behind these limits and practical consequences

6. The Conference very soon found itself faced with the need to remedy the shortcomings, failure or outdated nature of instruments it had adopted at its first sessions. But neither the Constitution nor the first ILO Conventions foresaw the possibility of amending them. However, given that nothing prevented the

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2 GB.264/LILS/4, paragraph 42.

3 Except that the numbering of other Conventions should presumably, for practical reasons, keep some indication of the former instruments.
Conference from adopting a new Convention on a particular subject already covered, the question of what to do with the former Convention was raised.

7. This is not the place to review in detail the theoretical discussions to which this problem gave rise in the years 1928-29. It should merely be recalled that the Conference’s refusal to accept that it had the power to abrogate a revised Convention was based on an overall approach to the legal nature of these Conventions. According to this approach, initially put forward by the Legal Adviser, it was not possible to take the “quasi-legislative” character of international labour Conventions too far — although it was acknowledged to have “exercised a certain influence on the creation of the International Labour Organization”. Once adopted, international labour Conventions took on a life of their own, independent to a great extent of the Conference which had given birth to them; indeed, because they had been ratified, they became an “actual contract between States” which the Conference had no authority to change.

8. However, another school of thought opposed this “contractual” approach, believing that Conventions should rather be considered as “conditional international laws” whose ratification created first and foremost obligations towards the Organization. After a scholarly and in-depth discussion, the Governing Body and then the Conference tacitly came round to the first approach, for reasons that had as much to do with its practical repercussions as with its intrinsic merits.

9. What matters for the purposes of the present study is to understand that the practical consequences of this “contractual” approach are twofold. Not only does it prevent the Conference from directly altering the effects, in other words the obligations derived from the revised Convention, but it also restricts the Conference’s prerogatives with respect to the Convention as the source of possible new obligations. This distinction needs to be explained.

(a) Inability to alter the obligations created by the revised instrument

10. Under the reasoning of the contractual approach, the obligations ensuing from the ratification of a Convention cannot be nullified by the will of the Conference but only by the will of the parties to the “contract”, who may express this will in two ways:

— by denunciation, which can only occur at the time and under the conditions provided for under the Convention;
— by the ratification of a revising Convention, but only if the revised Convention had provided for the possibility and the revising Convention has decided on such termination.

Both these ways of proceeding are uncertain because although the Organization may encourage States to denounce a Convention to terminate obligations that it no longer considers contribute to any real progress (a rather clumsy — if not paradoxical — way of coping with the problem), it cannot oblige them to do this or remove the various obstacles or red tape that might stand in the way.

5 ibid., p. 763.
(b) Limits on the Conference’s power to dry up the source of future obligations

11. Even if all the effects, i.e. the obligations created by a Convention, could be brought to an end at a given moment by the parties, this would not prevent the instrument from “being revived” by new ratifications. Contractual theory nevertheless acknowledges that the Conference has the power to “sterilize” a Convention for the future by closing it to ratification. But this sterilization can only be as a result of a Convention which revises the Convention to be sterilized; and such a revision is not always possible for two sets of reasons:

— reasons of a legal nature in the case of Conventions adopted before 1929 which do not contain a revision clause. Given that, according to the contractual approach, they became “the property of the States ratifying them”, they are supposed to be completely outside the Conference’s control and cannot therefore in principle even be closed to ratification. In order to circumvent this situation, the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), resorted to a very complex procedure, based on Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to ensure that Conventions on minimum age predating 1929 would be closed to ratification; under this procedure, the various Conventions relating to minimum age “shall be closed to further ratification when all the parties thereto have consented to such closing by ratification of this Convention or by a declaration communicated to the Director-General …” (Article 10, paragraph 3);

— reasons of a practical nature or expediency in so far as, even for Conventions adopted after 1929 which contain a revision clause, it might be unwise or inappropriate to go ahead with revision because the fact that the original text is outdated might be attributed to its subject-matter rather than its actual content (sometimes even to the fact that the Convention has fulfilled its objective) — in which case a revision would have no sense. Two examples suffice to illustrate this point. The first arose recently with respect to the proposed revision of the Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1958 (No. 109); it was thought preferable, to avoid condemning the revising text to the same fate as the text it would revise, to limit it to the matter of hours of work and manning and to refer the issue of wages to a Recommendation. The second example concerns specific Conventions applying to non-metropolitan territories (understood as colonies); their amendment by way of revision would be to no purpose.

12. The table enclosed in the appendix gives a clearer picture of the cumulative aspect of the problem. The section “left dormant” also reflects the adjustments that have had to be made in practice — the scope of which must be dealt with separately.

2. Attempts to extend ways of dealing with outdated Conventions and their limitations:

The solution of leaving “dormant”

13. It may be seen from the concepts described above that the legal effects of any Convention in force are in principle the following:

— first of all, the revised Convention, provided that it is not the subject of a Convention revising it and closing it to ratification, may continue to be ratified. As the enclosed table shows, this has occurred quite frequently even for Conventions left dormant, and not only in the event of succession of States;

— from a more basic standpoint, the Convention makes it compulsory for all parties to apply its provisions, failing which they are subject to constitutional procedures under article 24 or article 26 of the Constitution;

— finally, it contains the obligation to report under article 22 of the Constitution.

14. This latter obligation is the one — the only one — which is subject to certain adjustments when a Convention is left dormant. In 1959, the Committee of Experts put forward the proposal that as article 22 only provided for an annual report and not necessarily an annual report on each Convention, reports should not be requested on all ratified Conventions every year. This left the “door wide open” for further adjustments in 1976 and 1993, which introduced a “periodicity of reporting” varying according to the importance attached to the Convention — whilst also allowing for reports to be requested outside such periodicity as well as exemptions (GB.258/LILS/6/1).

15. It may be observed from this that practical adjustments have their limitations. First, they do not cancel the basic obligations derived from the instrument; second, although they might cut down on procedural obligations, this might be at the expense of an interpretation undermining the inviolability of constitutional obligations. It is therefore up to the Governing Body to examine whether, in cases when the Organization has truly reached the conclusion that the obligations deriving from a given Convention no longer have any real influence on social progress, it might not be preferable — from the standpoint of the credibility and clarity of the standard-setting system — to be able to take all the steps that follow from that conclusion. It must of course be considered whether this involves resorting to measures which are out of proportion to the actual problem in hand. This matter will be examined here below.

III. Possible solutions

16. The first part of this report has shown that within the framework of the contractual approach, the legal effects of a Convention can only be totally eliminated by a combination of two actions: one is the “sterilization” of the

7 To reinforce this justification, it may be observed that this article only obliges Members to agree to make an annual report, which implies that they must be requested to do so; if the Governing Body does not see fit, for perfectly legitimate and practical reasons, to request Members for the report, the obligation is left without effect.
Convention, which must necessarily take the form of a revision, to render the Convention inoperative as a source of future obligations; the other action is to nullify the existing effects through denunciation of the Convention or ratification of a revising one.

17. It might of course be ventured that the simplest way of addressing the complications and vicissitudes of this dual operation would be to review and perhaps replace the “contractual” approach, which is the cause of this operation, by the “quasi-legislative” approach — already advocated before the war — with weighty arguments to recommend it. Such a course would however be neither desirable nor realistic — particularly given that the Governing Body’s role is not to decide between various legal theories. This having been said, two approaches might logically be envisaged: that of adjusting more efficiently the measures available to deal separately with the Convention and its effects; and that of delegating power to the Conference, which, without taking a position in favour of one or other theory, would allow the Conference to deal simultaneously with the source and the effects referred to.

1. Adjustment of measures to nullify the effects and source separately in the case of outdated Conventions

(a) with respect to the effects, by stepping up the “exit” procedure in force

18. It seems scarcely feasible to change the principle whereby only parties to a Convention can cancel the effects of their ratification by denouncing the Convention or, whenever possible, by ratifying the Convention revising it; but it might be possible to speed up the procedure — at least on a point of detail. As may be seen by the enclosed table (see Convention No. 28), a Convention for which the number of ratifications has fallen below the necessary number for its entry into force (two for all the non-maritime Conventions) is still considered to be in force. However this situation seems to be the result of an oversight. Article 55 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does indeed provide that “unless the treaty otherwise provides, a multilateral treaty does not terminate by reason only of the fact that the number of the parties falls below the number necessary for its entry into force”, but this text reflects the practice of multilateral treaties which generally require a large number of ratifications to enter into force; it certainly does not envisage the case when — the required number being two as for international labour Conventions — the lower number is one and the application of the rule would lead to a situation which was in accordance with neither the usual interpretation of the term “Convention” nor the contractual theory itself, which implies at least two parties. Consequently, nothing would prevent the Conference from confirming that a Convention ceases to be in force when the number of ratifications falls below that prescribed for its entry into force.

(b) by varying the methods of “sterilization” of the Convention as a source of obligations

19. According to present theory and practice, this sterilization is only possible, as seen earlier in this paper, by means of (i) a revising Convention and
then (ii) only with respect to Conventions adopted after 1928. It was only from this date onwards that Conventions contained a standard revision clause. The question might have been raised — and there was no shortage of people opposing the contractual approach — how this revising clause could authorize the Conference to close the revised Convention to ratification while, under the reasoning inherent in this approach, the parties were supposed to become “owners” of the Convention. However, if the view is taken that the standard revision clause is tantamount to an advance delegation given by the ratifying States to the Conference of the power to change the content of their rights, there is no contradiction. Be that as it may, the matter raises two questions which affect the possibility of relaxing or making more flexible the constraints of this theory.

20. First, it is worth bearing in mind that, without detracting from the “contractual” theory and practice, it is highly questionable to conclude that Conventions are the “property” of the parties. The fact that the ratification of a Convention creates rights and obligations between them does not mean that they become owners and can demand that the instrument be kept open with a view to further ratifications — whatever the Organization’s opinion as to its actual utility. What is more, this approach seems to take scant account of the fact that membership of the Organization is a prerequisite for adhering to an international labour Convention, thus implying rather that the Convention can have no effect outside the fold — and therefore independent of the will — of the Organization. Finally, there is nothing in the general law of treaties to suggest that a Convention must be maintained, particularly since the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may apply also to treaties adopted within an international organization, stipulates that it is without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.

21. While continuing to consider that obligations deriving from a Convention remain, in spite of its revision, outside the control of the Conference, it would therefore seem perfectly acceptable that the Conference acknowledge that it has the right to decide by an acte contraire — i.e. an instrument to undo what it has done, adopted in conformity with the established procedures and majority requirements — that a Convention is no longer apt to serve as a basis for new obligations. This decision to abrogate for the future would be tantamount to instructing the Director-General not to register any new ratifications of this Convention. It would also settle the case of Conventions predating 1929 considered obsolete which, according to present doctrine, are doomed to be self-perpetuating.

8 It is relevant to note that when the International Law Commission was examining the termination of treaties by consent of the parties, it seriously considered providing for the consent of not less than two-thirds of all the States “which adopted the text”, particularly in the case of “treaties brought into force on the deposit only of very few instruments of ratification” (see report of the International Law Commission on its Eighteenth Session, in: United Nations, General Assembly, Official records, 21st Session, supplement No. 9 (A/6309/REV.1), p. 78.

9 In an article published in the British Yearbook of International Law in 1933, Wilfred Jenks expressed himself his doubts concerning the impossibility of closing Conventions predating 1929 to ratification, pointing out that the Conference’s competence in the matter “cannot be considered a finally settled question” (BYIL, 1933, Vol. XIV, Revision of labour Conventions, pp. 48-64).
22. If the Working Party is not prepared to accept this conceptual aggiornamento of limited scope, it could — at least for Conventions after 1928 — ensure that they are neutralized while strictly adhering to the “contractual” approach, through a “killer Convention”. This would be a revising Convention limited to closing the revised Convention to further ratifications, without replacing any of its substantive provisions. This “killer” Convention (which could, as the case might be, cover several Conventions at once) would enter into force under the same conditions as other Conventions (two ratifications) and, similar to any other revising Convention, would also close the revised Convention to further ratifications.

2. Solutions for simultaneously nullifying the obligations under a Convention and their source

(a) A Convention-related solution

23. In the present constitutional set-up, an operation of this nature is — for the reasons already given — impossible in the case of Conventions in force. It would however be perfectly feasible for future Conventions on the basis of an additional final clause stipulating, as in the case of revision, that States — when ratifying the instrument — would agree in advance to the Conference having the power to abrogate, for the future as for the past, the effects of the Convention. Indeed, given that States party to a Convention may agree that the Conference has the right to change the alleged property rights ensuing from ratification, there is no reason why they should not a fortiori delegate to the Conference in advance the authority of releasing them from the Convention under a specific clause to this effect. Moreover, this theoretical possibility was expressly brought up in the discussion before the war.\(^\text{10}\) This suggestion was not taken up merely because at the time, the practical advantages of retaining the former Convention seemed to outweigh the disadvantages. Looking back, this decision seems even more regrettable given that such a clause would have been limited to enabling the Conference to proceed with such an abrogation after a case-by-case analysis; it would have in no way implied the automatic abrogation of the revised Convention by the mere fact of its revision. In other words, by failing to go ahead with this idea, the Conference deprived itself of the possibility, that it might find extremely useful today, to cancel all the legal effects of a Convention in cases where it concludes that this Convention had failed to attain its objective or, on the contrary, that it had fully attained this objective.

(b) Abrogation on the basis of a new constitutional provision

24. The only way to cancel both the effects and cause at the same time — past Conventions as well as future Conventions — would be to authorize the Conference to do so by amending the ILO Constitution. This solution is far less drastic than might seem at first.

25. From the technical and political standpoint, this solution might appear a considerable task because, according to article 36 of the present Constitution,

it would require a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the delegates at the Conference for its adoption, as well as a majority of two-thirds of ratifications—including those of five of the ten Members of chief industrial importance. The general impression that these conditions would be almost impossible to meet is based on experiences which, however, are completely unrelated and occurred in an entirely different context. In the case in point, the amendment would not aim at restricting rights or increasing obligations; it would rather create the possibility for all Members to extricate themselves from the obligations deriving from ratified Conventions without having to go through all the manoeuvres and vicissitudes of denunciations at the Organization's instigation or of "killer Conventions". If the Conference embarked on this course, the Office could regularly ensure the follow-up by carrying out appropriate ratification campaigns at certain intervals.

26. From the legal standpoint, this solution would make it possible to circumvent the obstacles inherent in the contractual approach without however having to give it up. In fact, the contractual approach was only able to prevail because the Constitution—as indeed the Conventions themselves—was silent as to the Conference's possibility of abrogating instruments. If this gap were to be filled, it would also lose its raison d'être.

27. If the fear of carrying out a sort of retroactive "expropriation" makes the Conference hesitate to accept that it has such a power with respect to Conventions already adopted and in force, it could easily assuage these misgivings by adopting an "opting-out" clause giving the States parties to the Convention the possibility of remaining bound by the instruments—provided that they express their wishes to this effect within a specific time-limit after the decision to abrogate. In a nutshell, such an amendment could for instance provide that "With respect to a specific item included in its agenda under the conditions provided for by this Constitution, the Conference may, by a decision adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the delegates present, abrogate any Convention, including the obligations it has created for all the Members having ratified it, with the exception of those Members which, within (12) months from the date of abrogation, shall have informed the Director-General of their wish to remain bound by the Convention". (A drawback in having such a clause is that it might be tantamount to indirectly and gratuitously consecrating the "contractual" approach in the Constitution.)

28. When making an overall assessment of the merits as well as the difficulties inherent in this constitutional approach, it is important to bear in mind the symbolic value that the power conferred on the Conference would have on the image of international labour Conventions; they would cease to seem a mere juxtaposition of more or less disparate treaties and be viewed as a real body of international labour "legislation". ¹¹

¹¹ In the context of an overall discussion on the concept of standards, it is relevant to note that the solution of delegating the Conference with the power of abrogating a text might very well be extended to the power of amending some provisions in the text, without having to go through the whole procedure of revision, which, by their very nature (technical or other) are liable to expire very quickly. This possibility was already envisaged during the discussions of 1928-29. It might, by a judicious case-by-case examination, help resolve the dilemma between Conventions limited
IV. Conclusions

29. The preceding analysis shows that the Conference has a wide range of means at its disposal to prune its body of standards more rapidly and efficiently if it wishes, without necessarily having to break away from a practice and theory which must be carefully taken into account to avoid inadvertently undermining the system whilst trying to strengthen it.

30. To sum up, these various means may be grouped into two major categories of solutions:

(a) A *Convention-related solution* which would involve the establishment of separate procedures for cancelling existing Conventions on the one hand and for abrogating future Conventions on the other:

(i) in the case of each existing Convention, the Conference would have to reach a decision to: (i) classify it as outdated and, consequently (ii) inform the member States that its denunciation would no longer be considered as a lack of social progress; and (iii) close it to ratification if it is still open. This decision might take the form of an *acte contraire* — i.e. a decision adopted by the majority of two-thirds with immediate effect by the Conference — or that of the adoption of a “killer Convention” which would close the Convention to ratification upon receiving two ratifications — it being understood that in both cases all rights and obligations already derived from the Convention would be cancelled if only one ratification remained;

(ii) for the future, the insertion in any new Convention of an additional standard final clause which would delegate to the Conference the power of abrogating, by a two-third’s majority, all the effects of a Convention both for the past and the future — if and only at the moment it deems this appropriate.

(b) A *solution of a constitutional nature* which would specifically acknowledge the Conference’s power to abrogate for the past and the future any Convention under the same conditions as those required for its adoption.

31. *The Working Party may wish to examine to what extent one or the other of these solutions should be taken up. Depending on the case, the Office might then draw up, for the Committee on Legal Issues and International Labour Standards (LILS), a detailed legal mechanism for implementing the solution — or combination of solutions — chosen.*

Geneva, 12 February 1996.

*Point for decision: Paragraph 31.*

to overgeneralized principles and Conventions which go into so much detail that they are likely to dissuade countries from ratifying them or to be rapidly outdated.
Appendix

The following table groups the international labour Conventions which, on the basis of objective criteria, are of interest from the standpoint of the cumulative effects of the body of standards. Conventions not in force and those left dormant, of which some are also affected by the cumulative effect, have been added to the list and are characterized by the total or partial lack of legal effects inherent in any Convention as defined under paragraph 12 of the document.

Given that it was decided to include all the Conventions in question on one page and the fact that this limited the space, it would appear relevant to explain the methodology used to draw up the table.

The 64 Conventions contained in the table have been divided up into five groups or categories.

- The first two categories concern Conventions not in force and which, on account of this, have — according to the terminology used in the document GB.265/LILS/WP/PRS/1 — been shelved (i.e. they are not included in the compilation of Conventions and Recommendations or in the annual report III(5) at the Conference). These have in turn been divided into two subgroups depending on whether they are open (category I) or not (category II) to ratification.

- Groups III, IV and V concern Conventions in force which have been revised by later Conventions. The first of these (category III) contains the list of these Conventions adopted before the inclusion of revision clauses in 1929 and which, subsequently, have not been able to be closed to ratification on account of the Convention revising them entering into force. Category IV covers Conventions revised after 1929 which nevertheless remain open to ratification but by virtue of a specific revision clause contained in the Conventions revising them. Conventions adopted or revised by protocols (Conventions Nos. 89, 91 and 110) have been omitted from this category, as has Convention No. 95, of which only one Article was affected by Convention No. 173 which revised it. Category V contains the list of revised Conventions which are closed to ratification following the entry into force of the Conventions revising them.

- Category VI contains the list of Conventions “left dormant” which do not enter into any of the above-mentioned categories. The Conventions left dormant which also belong to another category are underlined.

Concerning the titles of the columns, the following should be pointed out:

- Last ratification: this column refers to the last ratifications registered, excluding the confirmation by new Members of Conventions applicable to their territories before being admitted to the ILO as a new member States (decolonization, splitting up of States, etc.), which are not considered as new ratifications. No account is taken of the actual effectiveness of these last ratifications, i.e. irrespective of whether these ratifications have no longer any effect because of being subsequently denounced.

- Number of ratifications: these two columns contain the number of ratifications which are effective but non-cumulative, i.e. they give the total number of ratifications after deducting the denunciations which have been made.

- Denunciations: alongside the number of pure denunciations or automatic denunciations following the ratification of the relevant revision Convention, the dates of the last denunciations appear in brackets.

- Representations and complaints: this column gives the dates on which representations (R) under article 24 of the Constitution or complaints (C) under article 26 were made on the subject of the application of a Convention.
The maritime Conventions are outlined in grey (for example No. 15). The data contained in the table are those in force as at 31 December 1995. A list of the titles of the Conventions contained in the table is enclosed.
### Categories of Conventions

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<th>Representations Complaints</th>
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- No. 86 1953 15.06.73 22 - -
- No. 104 1958 14.06.88 26 - -
TITLES OF CITED CONVENTIONS

C.3 Maternity Protection Convention, 1919
C.4 Night Work (Women) Convention, 1919
C.5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919
C.6 Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention, 1919
C.7 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920
C.10 Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, 1921
C.12 Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921
C.15 Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 1921
C.17 Workmen’s Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925
C.18 Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention, 1925
C.20 Night Work (Bakers) Convention, 1925
C.21 Inspection of Emigrants Convention, 1926
C.23 Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926
C.24 Sickness Insurance (Industry) Convention, 1927
C.25 Sickness Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1927
C.28 Protection against Accidents (Dockers) Convention, 1929
C.30 Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930
C.31 Hours of Work (Coal Mines) Convention, 1931
C.32 Protection against Accidents (Dockers) Convention (Revised), 1932
C.33 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention, 1932
C.34 Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention, 1933
C.35 Old-Age Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933
C.36 Old-Age Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933
C.37 Invalidity Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933
C.38 Invalidity Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933
C.39 Survivors’ Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933
C.40 Survivors’ Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933
C.41 Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1934
C.42 Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934
C.43 Sheet-Glass Works Convention, 1934
C.44 Unemployment Provision Convention, 1934
C.46 Hours of Work (Coal Mines) Convention (Revised), 1935
C.48 Maintenance of Migrants’ Pension Rights Convention, 1935
C.49 Reduction of Hours of Work (Glass-Bottle Works) Convention, 1935
C.50 Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention, 1936
C.51 Reduction of Hours of Work (Public Works) Convention, 1936
C.52 Holidays with Pay Convention, 1936
C.54 Holidays with Pay (Sea) Convention, 1936
C.56 Sickness Insurance (Sea) Convention, 1936
C.57 Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1936
C.58 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936
C.59 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1937
C.60 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), 1937
C.61 Reduction of Hours of Work (Textiles) Convention, 1937
C.62 Safety Provisions (Building) Convention, 1937
C.63 Convention concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work, 1938
C.64 Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939
C.65 Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939
C.66 Migration for Employment Convention, 1939
C.67 Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention, 1939
C.70 Social Security (Seafarers) Convention, 1946
C.72 Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention, 1946
C.75 Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1946
C.76 Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1946
C.82 Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947
C.86 Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1947

C.89 Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948 [and Protocol, 1990]

C.90 Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1948

C.91 Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1949

C.92 Accommodation of Crews Convention (Revised), 1949

C.93 Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1949

C.96 Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (Revised), 1949

C.97 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949

C.101 Holidays with Pay (Agriculture) Convention, 1952

C.103 Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952

C.104 Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1955

C.107 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957

C.109 Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1958

C.112 Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention, 1959

C.121 Employment Injury Benefits Convention, 1964

C.123 Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, 1965

C.128 Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits Convention, 1967

C.130 Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969

C.132 Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970

C.138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973

C.146 Seafarers' Annual Leave with Pay Convention, 1976

C.152 Occupational Safety and Health (Dock Work) Convention, 1979

C.153 Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention, 1979

C.157 Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982

C.160 Labour Statistics Convention, 1985

C.165 Social Security (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1987

C.166 Repatriation of Seafarers Convention (Revised), 1987

C.167 Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 1988

C.168 Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention, 1988

C.169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989