

WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME RESEARCH

Working Paper

RURAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY RESEARCH PROGRAMME

PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES AND ACTION OF
THE RURAL POOR IN ANTA: PERU

by

Santiago Roca
with the collaboration of
Miguel Bachrach and Jose Servat

Note: WEP research working papers are preliminary documents circulated informally in a limited number of copies solely to stimulate discussion and critical comment. They are restricted and should not be cited without permission.

September 1980.



Copyright © International Labour Organisation 1980

ISBN 92-2-102533-0

The designations of countries employed, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of the material in this paper do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers.

The responsibility for opinions expressed in WEP research working papers rests solely with their authors, and their circulation does not in any way constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office of the opinions expressed in them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Introduction	1
Haciendas and peasant communities: mobilisation and repression, 1950-70	2
The co-operative attempt and peasant uprising	6
A. The co-operative attempt	6
B. Peasant uprising	10
The morphology of peasant mobilisation in 1975-79	13
A. Actors and goals of the mobilisation	13
B. The participatory process and action	15
B.1 Descriptive elements	15
B.2 The path of peasant participation	17
C. The method of organisation	21
D. Organisational and participatory shortcomings	23
Conclusions and final interpretations	25
Footnotes	29

PREFACE

Since 1977 the ILO has an on-going programme of research and technical co-operation in the area of Participation of the Rural Poor in the Development Process, being directed by Md. Anisur Rahman. The research component of this programme seeks to study initiatives, whether taken by the rural poor themselves or by other parties, to promote their participation, with a view to obtaining insights and lessons for practical policy and action. From this research effort, a volume of eight case studies with an editorial synthesis has been prepared and is expected to be published shortly. Further research is underway, of which the present study is one.

In this study Professor Santiago Roca, in collaboration with his colleagues, discusses two successive phases of mobilisation of the "peasant communities" in Anta in Peru - one against oppression in the Haciendas and the other to assert their right of self-determination vis-à-vis a bureaucratically managed co-operative model. In dealing with the latter the author analyses in an original way the social division of participation in the mobilisation process, and the social process of participation promotion. None of these two mobilisations seem to have fundamentally improved the peasants' conditions and given them a lasting control on their own destiny. The author's discussion of the shortcomings of such movements, in terms of inadequate vision of the leadership, the gap in perception between leaders and the masses, and the lack of clear economic thinking in combination with political work, merits serious reflection.

Dharam P. Ghai,
Chief,
Rural Employment Policies Branch,
Employment and Development Department.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research team expresses its sincere gratitude to the peasants and peasant communities in Anta that allowed us to share part of their lives, and to Hernán Castillo, Jesús Foronda, Bruno Kervin, Gerardo Lovon, Eduardo Pimentel, Grimaldo Rengifo and Marco Ugarte, for their invaluable help throughout the different stages of research. Also to Anisur Rahman for his constant support and confidence in us. Full responsibility for what is written, however, remains with the authors.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the southern highlands of Peru, 20 miles from the Inca Empire's Capital Cuzco, there exists the Province of Anta - a relatively backward area, ancestrally an important progressive and strategic Inca town. Inside it, 3,500 metres above sea level, there exists a large flat surface with steep hills and higher plateaus surrounding it, shaping a sort of huge basin. Its name is Antapampa - the subject of our study - which as a whole covers three out of the eight Anta Province's districts.

The three districts that form Antapampa have a total population - predominantly rural (75 per cent)¹ - of about 26,800. Indian communities "peasant communities" as called today, comprise the largest proportion of Anta's population, followed by previous haciendas and small and medium farmers.

The Pampa is basically an agricultural and cattle area. Out of its 58,991 hectares of land, 32,000 are natural pastures, 4,528 irrigated and 10,434 dry land, the rest being forest and urbanised areas. The main agricultural products are potato, corn, wheat, barley, habas, and oat. Potato is the most important crop, accounting for more than 65 per cent of total production. Production of the peasant communities is mainly geared towards subsistence of their families without much diversification. Barley is the major cash-crop cultivated by them.² Small- and medium-size farms are market oriented, selling most of their production, more diversified in their portfolio of activities and engaged significantly in cash-crop production (e.g. onions in small farms and barley and tomatoes in medium-size farms). The ex-haciendas share the same characteristics as the farmers - only they are even more diversified in crop production and also participate in industrial activities such as brick and tejas, processed products for human consumption, craft workshops, etc.³

Dairy products and cattle are also of importance in the Pampa. All farm units produce them, the haciendas being the most modernised ones. Mineral activities are of minor importance.

The labour market in Anta seems relatively closed. Labour migration in and out of Anta is minimal. Family labour is used for agricultural and cattle activities as well as for secondary activities, such as construction, artisanry, hut repair and some marketing activities. The majority of peasants need to do for their subsistence further reciprocal and wage work within their communities or in large- and medium-size farms..

Poor over-all infrastructure, lack of electricity and safe drinking water and deaths due to respiratory and gastronomic diseases are some of the common characteristics of most peasant communities in Anta. In contrast, ex-haciendas have electricity, drinking water and other service facilities. There is only one health centre and nine poor sanitary posts in the whole area.⁴

Behind this broad description of the general setting lies a long history of social exploitation and oppression. The purpose of this article is to analyse this and to see how the peasant communities faced this oppression. Were there any participatory attempts by the people in organising themselves in order to identify their own problems and reality? How did participatory action take place in the group or movement? Were the peasants liberated from oppression of the dominant groups in the area?

To start, the following section will briefly delineate the main social relations in the area before the agrarian reform of 1969. It will include the characterisation and development of the hacienda system at the expense of the peasant communities; the process of land recuperation of the peasant communities; and finally, the period of rebellion and repression. Whenever possible and as information is available this section will try to show whether or not the peasants participated in their movements and how it enhanced the emergence of a new structure. The third section will study the co-operative model imposed by the agrarian reform law of 1969 and the process of peasant uprising that followed. It will be shown how, despite good intentions and original ideas, the co-operative movement failed due to lack of peasants' participation in organising, designing and implementing their own alternatives. Section four will look into the morphology of the peasants' uprising of 1975-79. It will describe the actors and goals of the mobilisations and analyse peasants' participation in them. This will lead us to an abstraction of the method of organisation and to point out the major shortcomings of the movement. Finally, the last section is an attempt to examine the impact of peasant participation in the reduction of dependence and on the emergence of self-reliant development in Anta.

II. HACIENDAS AND PEASANT COMMUNITIES: MOBILISATION AND REPRESSION 1950-70

Historically the two most important agrarian institutions in Antapampa and in the whole Peruvian highlands were the hacienda and the Indian community. The Indian community (peasant community) is a direct descendant of the Ayllu - the main social and economic institution in the Inca Empire - and of the Indian Reductions imposed by the Spanish in 1570.⁵ The hacienda was created by the arbitrary assignment of land made by the Spanish conquerors. In the beginning the haciendas took a lot of the irrigated land and during colonial and republican periods - through a process of appropriation and expulsion of the Indian communities - conquered most of the cultivable land in the area. The hacienda did not destroy the Indian or peasant communities but subjected them to exploitation and dependence. The Indian fury against this oppression was expressed on several occasions, the most notable one being in the Tupac Amaru's Revolution in 1780. This Revolution originated in Cuzco and spread throughout the southern highlands of Peru and part of Bolivia, to have an abrupt repressive end soon after its beginning.

The nineteenth century is a continuation of previous practices and fragmentation and desolation of the peasant communities. The peasant communities did not have legal rights to resist appropriation of their lands by external forces. They were pushed to marginal lands, and themselves initiated a process of internal parcelation and community differentiation. It is only since 1920 that for the first time the Indian community was recognised as a "legal and economic" institution in Peru.⁶ From then on, in the 1930s, a special office was created within the Ministry of Labour to deal with the peasant communities' rights. A group of intellectuals also created different committees to help them, and the peasants themselves started to wake up again to fight for their own rights. The situation of the peasant communities however remained insecure. Four hundred years of exploitation could not be terminated only by formal recognition of the peasant communities.

At the middle of the twentieth century the main characteristics of the traditional hacienda system and its relation to the peasant communities were the following:

- (1) The haciendas normally controlled most of the lands of the region; the peasant population lived from the products of scarce and marginal lands around the haciendas. The haciendas reserved for their direct management only central and best suited lands. The rest of the hacienda lands were "rented" to local "tenants" or "comuneros" who live within or near the hacienda.
- (2) The tenants or comunero tenants⁷ were obliged to work in the central hacienda land for a number of days, usually the best days of the year, without receiving any payment. It was not unusual for tenants to be obliged to work with all their family members. In addition the tenants and their wives had to do specific tasks. For instance, women had to serve in the landlord's household or in the administrator's house, and men had to carry water, wood and other products. Any disobedience would lead to the tenant's expulsion from the hacienda without any compensation. Tenants were also most of the time forced to sell their product to the landlord at a price fixed by the latter without regard for market values.

In the case of peasant communities with lands within the hacienda the conditions were very much the same. The community had also to work without compensation for a number of days and/or to hand over freely to the landlord part of their production. This latter procedure was also used for individual tenants rather than requiring them to do free work in the hacienda.

- (3) Social and economic control of the peasant population was organised by the principle of segmentary privileges. In practice this meant that the landlord or his administrator conceded special privileges to some peasants at the expense of others. The procedure used was an informal one. This had the double effect of fostering personal links of loyalty between the power holders and a specific group of peasants while preventing the formation of horizontal solidarity among the peasants.⁸ This mechanism was very effective, as long as the peasants perceived that the only means of improving or maintaining their position was by ensuring the landlords' benevolence. In this quest for gaining the partron's favour, fellow peasants were naturally perceived as potential competitors or even as enemies.

The above policy had positive economic consequences for the landlord and also served as the basis of a peculiar management style. In large estates, the management was divided according to relative access to the different geographical areas. At the lowest level there was a mayordomo or caporal which controlled local production, assistance to work, obedience, etc. This person was frequently recruited from the local peasant population so as to ensure a precise knowledge of the local people and ecological conditions. His loyalty was sustained by granting him a bigger plot, free grazing rights, access to free labour force, etc., which evidently enhanced his social status and power. Since their situation was totally dependent upon the landlord's favour, it is not surprising that the mayordomos were the most ruthless and "efficient" managers.

A conglomerate of small units or the whole estate was managed by a mestizo, with some technical and administrative knowledge, who enjoyed fairly broad discretionary powers. This person was in charge of supervising the over-all productive unit and commercial activities of the estate engaging also in personal trading activities. The actual landlord was absent most of the time. He usually took care of the "external" management of the estate: e.g. credit problems, and social and political relations with regional or urban sources of power.

- (4) Discipline and submission to the hacienda authorities were strictly enforced. Any attempt of disobedience or defiance was brutally punished either by physical force or by unlawful imprisonment carried out in collaboration with the local authorities. Such iron discipline was not only applied to hacienda's tenants but also to "pure comuneros" (members of peasant communities). In these aspects, the power of the hacienda over the subjected population was, in some places, carried on to extreme abuses. Neither the tenants nor the comuneros had any legal possibility to defend their rights.

However, even without resorting to violent measures the hacienda had a powerful means of ensuring the obedience of its tenants: i.e. land. On an average, it seems that the situation of the tenants was relatively better than that of their fellow pure comuneros since they had access to land in both the community and in the hacienda and also the possibility of becoming, by the landlord's grace, small farmers.⁹ In an economy where land is the most valued resource, expulsion from the hacienda or even the mere curtailment of the tenant's plot, were punishments severe enough to enforce the latter's obedience.

- (5) The patron channelled all information and communication to the landlord directly or through the administrators, who were the only ones to have contact with the outside structures.

To sum up, the haciendas had an enormous local power thanks to the monopoly of land and to the monopoly in the access to external sources of political power. In these matters the State was very permissive in the prerogatives given to the traditional hacendados. This was facilitated by the physical isolation of the highlands, but also, at a political level, by the traditional coalition of hacendados with the financial and commercial oligarchy and the local governmental power (municipalities and state local government). This alliance proved to be a viable political way of ruling the nation for many decades. The web of interlocking interest between the hacendados, local authorities and wealthy merchants - which sometimes were the same person or members of the same family - was a successful and profitable system for governing a segmentated populace. The stability of this system was largely maintained by the internal division of the peasantry, which in turn was based on the absence of viable alternatives of living and behaviour.

The peasant communities lived in marginal lands bordering on the hacienda's territory with little possibility of development, and depending on the hacienda for temporary work. Internally, communal territory had been gradually disintegrated and fragmentated. As a matter of fact, communities as such were ancestrally legal

owners of the land; but in practice each peasant family possessed usufruct for, and passed on in inheritance, the plot(s) they cultivated. Each peasant family felt as "a land owner" and in many cases a process of selling and privatisation occurred within the community. In this process the best lands (already marginal lands) were appropriated by a handful of persons, some of them not comuneros, while the majority of comuneros had only small parcels. As a consequence, there was a polarisation of social groups in the communal territory due to the unequal access to its resources. This allowed for economic and social differentiation and differential regional, social, and economic prestige.¹⁰ The status of a person as determined by a mixture of economic and personal qualities was the basis for the hierarchy of the power of the peasants in the community. Leadership was concentrated on the wealthiest and Spanish-speaking peasants.

The subjugation of the peasants started to be questioned at the middle of the present century. A significant role - during the 1950s and 1960s - was played by the Workers' Federation of Cuzco, whose lawyers started to represent the peasants at the labour regional office.¹¹ Soon tenants and peasant communities, under the guidance of these lawyers, formed unions and held a series of strikes. Peasant communities demanded the return of lands taken from them by the haciendas, and the tenants asked for the elimination of child work, gratuitous obligations, work on Sundays and holidays, obligatory selling of goods to the landlords, reduction of the number of days worked, and the abolition of fines.¹² In 1961 the Departmental Federation of Cuzco peasants (created at the end of the 1950s) had 214 syndicates affiliated to it. In 1961 a split occurred within the movement among the younger leaders and the older ones. Hugo Blanco's ideas of invading haciendas and giving instruction on armed self-defence to a group of peasants were questioned by the older leaders who finally withdrew from the movement.

Peasant mobilisation went on and became, partly as a result of the strong opposition of the landlords, more and more radical. Blanco promoted the occupation of haciendas and these went on throughout 1962. Police repression caused the escalation of peasant resistance leading to considerable violence in the region. Soon thereafter, troops were moved into the area, and this culminated in horrifying massacres. Hugo Blanco and hundreds of peasant leaders and lawyers in the area were taken into custody (1963), while scores of people died.¹³

Several authors pointed out that a number of factors were responsible for the weakening of the hacienda system and the resurgence of peasant communities and tenants' rights: the modernisation of the economic structure, an accelerated urbanisation and migration process, the improvement of communications between rural and urban areas, a revolution of rising expectations by the peasant population and the rise of a government apparatus with bureaucratic and other links with the peasantry (Quijano 1965, Cotler y Portocarrero 1969, Whyte 1970, Alberti 1970, Pease 1977, Kapsoly 1977).¹⁴ Most of the above factors contributed to the erosion of traditional authorities and to the expansion of external opportunities.

The essence of any movement or mobilisation, however, depends on its goals, on its organisation and on how its leadership is related to the masses. On this aspect Craig¹⁵ argues that in the period from 1952-58 peasant mobilisation and organisation development were an autonomous and independent effort. The advisory

role of the lawyers rarely interfered with the wishes of the masses. The organisational goals never went beyond the objective and subjective conditions in existence. From 1959 to 1965 the situation seems to have been quite different. Some peasants in Antapampa felt that the mobilisation process was an eruption of spontaneous action and not a well designed organisational effort with concrete revolutionary goals. Only in Antapampa there was a "demonstration effect" of what was happening in La Convención and Lares (main centres of the whole movement), and some peasant communities started invading the haciendas.¹⁶ As a whole, there was no systematic ideological conscientisation but mainly a fierce reaction to oppression and a desperate need for land and other resources for survival. The goals of the movement were not perceived clearly by the majority of peasants. In the end, the movement acquired a restorative rather than a revolutionary character.¹⁷ In this sense a wide gap separated the leaders from the base.¹⁸ This shows the inability of the leadership to implement democratic procedures for peasant participation in the direction of the movement. This explains - partially though superficially, as this has not been researched in depth - why the peasant movement was so easily defeated and then appeased.

The appeasement came also through the Agrarian Reform Laws of 1963 and 1964 which explicitly provided for distribution of lands only to peasants and peasant communities which did not hold any invaded areas. This led many peasants to voluntarily vacate and move out from the haciendas.¹⁹ In practice, from 1964 onwards, the conditions for tenants improved a little, but the peasant communities did not see their needs for land fulfilled. The previous "equilibrium" was soon restored. Although legally the peasants achieved some higher wages and the abolition of unpaid labour, most unions broke up and the peasants started becoming afraid of repression. Nothing changed very much. Another period of submission began.

The situation seemed to be under control until 1967-68 when the limitations of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964 began to be evident (the possibilities of bypassing the law were very numerous and the legal limits to carry it out were endless, besides there being constant opposition from the landlords). Peasant struggles slowly began to reappear when the military coup took over in 1968. As one of its first important decrees, the military government elaborated an extensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1969 changing radically the conditions and context of the peasant struggle. The following section will analyse the attempt made by the Agrarian Reform Law to liberate Anta's peasant economy.

III. THE CO-OPERATIVE ATTEMPT AND PEASANT UPRISING

A. The co-operative attempt

The Agrarian Reform Law No. 17716 given by President Velasco was conceived as "an instrument to change the Peruvian agrarian structure, designed to substitute the latifundio and minifundio regimes by a just system of ownership, tenancy and land exploitation ... through the creation of a new agrarian order".²⁰ The agrarian reform among other things should "(1) guarantee the peasant communities' ownership rights on their lands ... (2) promote the co-operative organisation ... (3) strengthen their small and medium ownerships worked by the owners ... (4) eliminate indirect forms of land exploitation and give the land to those who work".²¹

Within this general framework agrarian reform officials started their work in Anta. Two sets of problems were initially faced: first, landlord opposition had to be counterbalanced by organising the peasant population, and secondly, it had to be decided what kind of new productive structure should be created. The first problem was complex because the Government feared the revitalisation of the Departmental Peasant Federation of Cuzco (FDCC) which initially stated its support to the agrarian reform process but asserted that expropriation without payment (confiscation) of hacienda lands should be done in special cases.²² This qualified support convinced local authorities of the need to stimulate the creation of a more moderate local (Antapampa) peasant organisation. A group of experienced leaders stimulated by the initial euphoria of the reform decided to collaborate with the authorities and created the Provincial Front of Peasants of Anta marking an initial distance with the FDCC.

The kind of productive structure to be created in Anta was also highly problematic. In Antapampa there existed a mosaic of productive organisations. There were several dozens of haciendas, about 30 peasant communities and nearly 190 small- and medium-size farms. Furthermore, within most of the haciendas there existed small tenant plots and within each peasant community land was very fragmented due to private peasant usufruct (see section II). This was aggravated by the fact that all these different forms of production organisation were mixed and dispersed all over the Pampa. The Ministry of Agriculture decided therefore to create a special commission to study the possible ways of organising the PIAR²³ Anta. The Commission was formed with local and national agrarian officials, a special FAO-IDB mission, and members of the National Office of Co-operatives. Peasant participation was not considered, and the influence of the peasants was only indirect through their contacts with some local agrarian officials.

Three views were expressed in the Commission: some supported the SAIS model;²⁴ others the creation of three provisional service co-operatives integrated into a central co-operative that over time would include tenants, ex-haciendas and communal lands (not individually possessed);²⁵ and others proposed the criterion of a single production co-operative which would be composed of the complex tapestry of expropriated haciendas and the peasant communities. All these alternative models were discussed in Lima and finally the last proposal was approved. At the end of 1970 the Minister of Agriculture ratified the Agrarian Production Co-operative (CAP) as the model for Antapampa.

Meanwhile, in January 1971, the peasants were able to organise their first Provincial Congress. In it they expressed their doubts about the success of the CAP model and proposed a reconsideration of the three-service-cooperative alternative.²⁶ Besides, they also demanded (i) independence and impartiality of agrarian reform authorities; (ii) the enrolment of specialists from among the peasants in the fields of capacitation²⁷ and education; (iii) the launching of an agricultural extension campaign throughout Anta; (iv) reorganisation of the Agrarian Bank; and (v) creation of a co-operative bank. In most of these proposals lay the latent aspiration of the peasants for creating an independent self-managed peasant organisation.

In June 1971, the CAP statutes were completed and the co-operative formally received under its control 33,062 hectares of land. Haciendas were expropriated and, together with peasant communities and tenants' lands, were incorporated into a single production unit. The CAP accepted peasant communities as juridical entities, and their comuneros and ex-tenants of the haciendas as their members. Representation would be obtained through local geographical subcommittees that would send representatives to the Delegates Assembly. This Assembly would elect the Administrative and Vigilance Council of the Co-operative. Central lands (previous central hacienda lands) were to be managed under CAP control,²⁸ while land of peasant communities and tenants remained in communal or in decentralised usufruct. Profits from central lands and equipment of the co-operative was to be shared between ex-hacienda tenants and workers, and the peasant communities.²⁹ Medium and small farmers were not affected in the area by this reform.

Peasant expectations were initially high. In the view of some of the peasants, the Government was genuinely socialist oriented and the creation of the co-operatives was a step towards the construction of socialism.³⁰ Agrarian reform officials furthermore agreed to the peasants' demand for capacitation courses. They wanted to foster a sense of integration among tenants living in scattered and isolated places, and it was also necessary to neutralise the demands of some peasant communities which had legal struggles with former haciendas which were now part of the co-operative. Capacitation courses would also prepare peasant leaders for managerial responsibility and to further the education of their fellow members. Promptly, a peasant educational team was formed from among the leaders that attended these courses, and they were sent to stimulate participation and education in their home communities. Their actions were very fruitful during the first year, as productive activities were carried out smoothly, and there even was a sense of satisfaction among the participants.³¹ Nature also seemed to respond generously and record output was obtained.³² Part of the CAP's surplus went according to the law to directly benefit the peasant communities and tenants.

While this excellent performance was on, serious differences emerged between the general manager and the administrative council of the co-operative, and the former was expelled from it. The peasants started to argue that they were capable enough to run their own co-operative by themselves. The agrarian reform officials did not accept this. The peasants elected an "executive committee" (instead of the general management) composed of peasants and created an "advisory committee" which included technicians and professionals. The experiment did not last very long and a Commission for Reorganisation of the co-operative was appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture "to define a new administrative structure to solve the co-operative problems".³³ The post of the general manager and other important vacant jobs were filled out according to the preference of state officials. As a result of this, the Provincial Front of Anta's peasants originally created to endorse the agrarian reform practically disintegrated. The peasants did not accept the idea of being under official control. From then on, gradual tensions began to accumulate between peasant leaders and non-peasant managers. First, peasant leaders argued that they worked "shoulder to shoulder" with their bosses, while the technicians only supervised their work. Later on, the masses began to claim that

technicians should also work physically, and this was hardly acceptable to the latter. Secondly, there was a sense of distrust of the managers for their apparent lack of involvement, and on dependence on state authorities for direction. Three cases illustrate the basis for such distrust: (a) due to the extraordinary potato campaign of 1973, a governmental agency (EPSA) had built storage facilities in Anta and offered the co-operative to keep the products and wait for a rise in prices. The co-operative accepted this proposition. At the outset, a large part of the stored products were spoiled, generating losses for the co-operative; (b) a similar case occurred in 1974 when a top governmental official³⁴ "ordered" the peasants to cultivate a large quantity of wheat. According to experts, it is not advisable to cultivate much wheat in the area because of the risk of their being frozen before harvest. Even though this fact was fairly evident, wheat was cultivated and losses were between 40-50 per cent of production; and finally (c) one peasant leader publicly demonstrated that he was getting better yields per hectare in his own plot than the yields obtained in the co-operative under state control.³⁵

These facts and the discovery of an embezzlement deteriorated very much the relationships in the CAP. The co-operative furthermore began to have economic difficulties. These were expressed in serious financial deficits, lack of personnel control, irregular practices in storage, sales and cash departments, etc.³⁶ The management staff pointed out that³⁷ (a) the dimensions of the co-operative were too complex for central management (many production units are isolated, making transport, access, control and co-ordination exceedingly difficult); (b) different land tenure and labour systems hinder the integration of the different areas into a single unit; (c) there had been duplication of functions between managerial and co-operative authorities leading to disorder and arbitrariness; and (d) the co-operative had lacked a system of promotion for its members to leading posts because it had operated under a traditional system geared to local power that enabled a small group of wealthier peasants to retain such posts.

Peasant communities on the other hand initiated their informal withdrawal from the CAPs. They did not see any benefits from the co-operative. Moreover, they argued that the CAP behaved in the same and even worse manner than the previous haciendas. From our field work interviews, the peasant communities resented the following facts: (a) the co-operative had abandoned some agricultural and pasture lands which were badly needed by them; (b) the forestation programmes of the CAP had deprived some communities of agricultural and pasture lands from which they had directly benefited; (c) they had not received the necessary services promised by the co-operative such as transports, commercialisation facilities, cattle facilities, credit, technical assistance, etc.; (d) the co-operative continued with the ex-haciendas exploitative practices: peasants had to work without payment in co-operative lands, and are also charged money for the use of natural pastures or for the usufruct of ex-haciendas lands; (e) the co-operative had only served the interests of its bureaucracy and other authorities without any benefit for the peasant masses; (f) peasants had initially contributed their indemnifications to the co-operative and they did not get anything in return; (g) ancestral land should have been given back to each peasant community rather than to the co-operative;

(h) the co-operative had scarcely provided any jobs in the area. On top of this, some chiefs of field units forged signatures of part-time peasants to receive money that belonged to them. In general, payment to permanent and part-time workers was late by various months.

The situation did not improve during 1975-76. On the contrary, two other embezzlements were discovered, and most socially oriented leaders who demanded an explanation were expelled from the co-operative. Managers and governmental authorities had evidently won the battle against the self-managed independent organisation of peasants, but their victory on political grounds forced them to lose control in other aspects. There were two crucial problems for running the co-operative: a socio-economic problem and an ideological problem. The socio-economic problem was how to integrate a huge growing area³⁸ with different land-tenure systems, with different ecological niches, and with different social groups. The ideological problem was how to convince, motivate and stimulate all members to participate in this challenge. Since there was no definite answer to the first problem and since state interference inhibited peasants' participation to find a solution for the second, the co-operative attempt resulted in improvisation in daily management and in contradiction with the goals set for it. The co-operative became a new oppressive structure in Antapampa, and the peasants started to look at it as an "old ass", meaning something that has been transformed into a heavy burden for them.

Gradually, peasant dissatisfaction became almost uncontrollable. Tenants started to invade small non-cultivated areas and peasant communities organised themselves to fight against the new oppressor. They wanted the devolution of their ancestral lands, and the elimination of indirect forms of land exploitation (by giving land to those who work) that still remained in Anta. Both points had been included in the agrarian reform law of 1969 but in practice none of them were implemented.

B. Peasant uprising

As the antiparticipatory character of the co-operative developed, leaders of the peasant communities strove for independent immediate solutions to the communities' problems. The earliest one was an attempt to organise in 1975 the Association Pro-Commercialisation Mateo Pumacahua. A group of well intentioned young peasants demanded better prices of agricultural products for the peasants. They decided to fight against the middlemen and the state commercialisation enterprise (EPSA) who were paying extremely low prices for the peasants' goods. Unfortunately, lack of resources and mass support made this Association collapse.

In the same year the Departmental Federation of Cuzco Peasants (FDCC) initiated its revitalisation, and in a meeting in Anta it was agreed that, due to exploitative conditions, lands from the co-operative should be recuperated. One year later on 5 December 1976 the peasant community of Chacan "recuperated" (invaded) for the first time 159 hectares³⁹ of legal ancestral lands which had been adjudicated to the co-operative in 1971. Simultaneously, many tenants augmented their plots through invasion of non-cultivable co-operative areas. These actions and the economic problems faced by the co-operative prompted the Government to create in

March 1977 an intervention commission to take control of the co-operative, and organise a multidisciplinary team to investigate the whole situation. Soon thereafter, four communities took symbolic possession of 2,000 hectares of land as an announcement of their intention to recuperate them. One month later, 30 of Anta's peasant communities gathered in an assembly convened by the FDCC and decided to nominate a commission to organise the creation of the Zonal Federation of Peasants of Anta and Urubamba (FEZOCAU). This commission gathered secretly with 23 delegates of the peasant communities and planned a massive recuperation of lands from the co-operative. The plan was discovered by the police and the authorities from the Ministry of Agriculture rallied over the area in an attempt to appease the comuneros, promising that land would be given to them. In spite of all this, in September seven peasant communities recuperated 5,848 hectares of land, and in December of the same year three other peasant communities also recuperated some land.⁴⁰

Agrarian reform officials tried to control this convulsive situation. They had previously held an unsuccessful seminar (August 1977) to restructure the co-operative and to calm the communities. Later, the attitude of the authorities became very ambiguous: they repressed peasant mobilisation, conceded lands to some communities and fostered direct confrontations between some communities and the co-operative and between different peasant communities.⁴¹ The objectives of this policy were to gain time dividing the peasants on the basis of local, minute problems, in order to avoid a direct confrontation against a cohesive organisation.

In January 1978 after nine months in office, the Co-operative Intervention Commission closed its mission. After 26 million soles of accumulated losses during 1975 and 1976, in 1977 under commission management, the co-operative had 400,000 soles of profits. The commission reorganised management procedures and increased efficiency in the CAP. On the other hand peasant recuperation of lands forced the Government to accept revising the scope of the co-operative. In March 1978 a series of meetings between prominent authorities and peasant communities were held to discuss the new boundaries of each peasant community and the reduction of the co-operative. Finally, in April 1978 the scope of the co-operative was reduced to operating the main installations, machinery, and facilities and keeping the central lands of previous haciendas. Marginal lands or lands won under legal conflict or litigation were handed over to peasant communities or groups. From its 38,180 hectares, the co-operative was reduced to 7,539 hectares.⁴²

By this time Antapampa became widely recognised as a major area of peasant unrest. The FDCC was affiliated to the Peruvian Peasants' Confederation (CCP) and the peasant community of Chacan became the headquarters of the Fifth National Congress of Peasants, organised by the CCP in August 1978.

After some apparent calm, in November 1978 the peasant group of Lucrepata invaded another 50 hectares of land. The attempted take over failed because it also touched lands claimed by other peasant communities who protested and allowed the co-operative to remain there.

The Government in its intention to gradually appease peasant unrest, announced in the beginning of 1979 its development plan for Anta. The main objectives of this plan were: (a) to redistribute existing resources; (b) to optimise resource utilisation and use of the labour force; (c) to have peasant participation and control in the marketing and commercialisation of their goods; (d) to improve the communal and intercommunal organisations. The last objective sought to concentrate on communal and intercommunal development instead of seeking the consolidation of the minifundio system. The strategy of attaining these objectives was one in which the actor, the implementer and the benefiter would be the peasant communities themselves, with the support of the public sector.⁴³ For the first time in history the peasants were to take autonomously their production and accumulation decisions. Peasant participation included the preparation, setting of priorities and financing of development decisions.⁴⁴ The plan envisaged starting with the poorer peasant communities.

The peasants tacitly accepted this plan, and in April 1979 created the Provincial Federation in charge of administering the Rotative Fund of Anta. This Fund was initially financed by an agreement between the Dutch and the Peruvian Government and was supposed to constitute an instrument for reaching the plan's objectives.

Meanwhile, most individual communities were still facing problems with the co-operative. Lands were being claimed by both sides and in many areas the redistribution was not done with practical considerations. This led to severe conflicts. The need for land again became the main issue. During 1978 the co-operative had 13 million soles of profits realised from its better land concentration and rationalisation of management due to the redistribution of 1978. But the peasant communities did not improve their situation very much, most of them still having less land per family than what was considered as the minimum necessary for survival.⁴⁵ Moreover, the provision of credit, technical assistance and other facilities still discriminated against them and supported the co-operative. The General Assembly of the Zonal Federation of Peasants of Anta and Urubamba (FEZOCAU) which was held in April 1979 was very clear on these subjects. Peasants complained that the co-operative was regaining some lands, the ex-hacendados were coming back, delays in settling the court cases were favouring ex-hacendados and the co-operative, the Agrarian Bank did not help them, land of the peasant communities was very poor in quality, the agrarian reformed benefited the technicians of the co-operative, and conditions of the peasants remained poor by way of lack of drinking water, electricity and irrigation channels, low agricultural prices,⁴⁶ etc.

In September 1979 peasants mobilised again in the community of Tambo Real in reaction to the non-fulfilment of contracts and promises made by the Ministry of Agriculture. Tambo Real's peasants occupied 100 hectares of ancestral lands that were still in the hands of the co-operative regardless of the fact that there was a legal resolution against it. The main problem was that in the area in question there was a barn which the co-operative did not want to return.

In October and November 1979 six other peasant communities in a series of actions occupied most land still in the hands of the co-operative and demanded its liquidation. This time the occupation included cattle, machinery and co-operative installations. The peasants refused to accept the situation with a few people

benefiting from the co-operative (338 families), while the majority were not served by it. After much pressure the Government accepted the liquidation of the co-operative and today there exists a Liquidator Commission in charge of completing the process.

IV. THE MORPHOLOGY OF PEASANT MOBILISATION IN 1975-79

A. Actors and goals of the mobilisation

To understand the real character of Anta's peasant mobilisation we stayed in four peasant communities which recuperated lands from the co-operative.⁴⁷ In each peasant community we enquired in respect of the peasant mobilisation from 1975 to the first half of 1979, about their goals, and the structure and process of peasant participation. The basic unit of any peasant mobilisation in Anta being the peasant community, each such community differs in its particular participatory process depending on its historical problems, previous experiences, internal socio-economic differences, ideology, leaders' behaviour, level of organisation and consciousness, actual situation, etc. Nevertheless, our intention being to present a global analysis, we have taken the four peasant communities we visited as proxies to explain the morphology of peasant mobilisation in Anta at that time.

There are several important actors of the mobilisation process. By law,⁴⁸ all peasant communities are required to have a General Assembly and an Administrative and Vigilance Council. The General Assembly is the highest governing body of the community. The Administrative Council is in charge of the day-to-day management of the communities' resources, while the Vigilance Council is supposed to supervise and control the management activities. The law also provides for the creation of special committees in charge of agriculture, cattle, education, etc., as each community deems necessary. Besides this internal governing structure, each peasant community may voluntarily affiliate itself to a second-level organisation such as the Zonal Federation of Anta's Peasant (FEZOCAU) and the Departmental Federation of Cuzco's Peasants (FDCC).⁴⁹ While the internal communal organisation represents a managerial approach to run the community, the FEZOCAU and the FDCC structures resemble normal syndical organisations. In spite of severe deficiencies in the functioning of both types of organisations, the reality is that peasant grievances are channelled through either of them, which thus become major actors in the mobilisation process. In each peasant community there also exists a "dynamic" group which, regardless of their formal status,⁵⁰ takes most of the initiatives in communal life and presents problems and alternatives to the General Assembly and in their affiliated second-level organisations. This "dynamic" group centres around two or three peasant leaders who, together with the younger peasants, are usually the most active participants in the mobilisation.

Peasant leaders may be classified with respect to the goals they attribute to the mobilisation. Some see the movement and their organisations (communal and syndical) as a tool for raising the standard of living of their fellow comuneros. They feel that pooling communal work for specific purposes (such as working on communal land, or developing communal enterprises) can help them develop the material condition of their communities. In addition, intercommunal organisations

are viewed to serve as a means of defending themselves from outside aggression and, eventually, to lobby for larger demands (better agricultural prices, mutual credit, services, etc.). Other leaders accept the aforementioned goals, but also place importance in other far-reaching objectives. They think that the community should be the focus of political education and consciousness raising: material improvement should go, hand in hand, with ideological education. In this context the community should be solidly prepared to contribute to the formation of a new social order, and intercommunal organisations should be supporters and instruments of the path toward socialism.⁵¹ The last group of leaders is generally affiliated to a political party and sometimes hold important positions in larger organisations (either FEZOCAU, FDCC, CCP).

For the average poor peasant the main goal of the mobilisation is to satisfy his urgent need of enough land for subsistence.⁵² The poor are generally very active in the mobilisation, although some of them only follow passively the initiatives of the more enthusiastic. In any case they have little to lose from the mobilisation. Relatively wealthier peasants usually refrain from direct involvement during the first crucial steps, and try to neutralise the mobilisation by slandering the leaders. However, when the occupation has proved to be successful they vehemently claim their share of the benefits or may even try to get personal advantages.⁵³ For local federations as FEZOCAU the mobilisation represents the interest of peasants in the area, but at the same time it is a step forward in the popular struggle. FEZOCAU's leaflets tend to emphasise wider objectives, usually containing urban-national demands and party slogans.⁵⁴ However, they help to organise the active group of comuneros and act as their spokesmen at regional and national levels.⁵⁵

The principal and direct "enemy" of the peasants is the co-operative or the interest group that benefits from its existence. The degree of conflict with the co-operative however varies. Some lands seized by the communities are of no major economic or strategic importance to its functioning. In these cases the co-operative does not react legally or physically to the invasion. But when key sectors are involved,⁵⁶ it carries out legal and violent actions to change the situation.⁵⁷

The government agencies maintain an ambiguous position. In some cases they try to force the withdrawal of invaders by various means (legal suits or imprisonment of leaders), or try to create conflict among neighbouring communities.⁵⁸ In other cases, they accept the occupation of land by the peasant community and legally sanction it.

It should be added that there have been some conflicts between peasant communities and medium-size farmers. Some communities claim that the land held by the farmers is theirs, but no major action has been taken to realise this claim. There exists a sense of identification between the farmers, managers of the co-operative and government officials. They share a negative attitude toward the peasant organisation. The only possible exception to this sort of zonal "power block" is a mixed governmental-foreign mission: CENCIRA-HOLANDA, which holds a positive view toward the peasant communities.⁵⁹

At this point it is important to recognise that there is a considerable gap between the alleged goals of the mobilisation, proposed by the peasant leaders and their organisations, and the concrete actions realised so far. More precisely, besides the co-ordination of land occupations and half-hearted attempts to organise a permanent commitment toward communal work (on the basis of the recuperated land), there has been no practical initiatives to cover other goals. Questions such as education, health, technical assistance, better prices for agricultural products, feasibility projects, commercialisation facilities, credit, etc., have been particularly ignored. In other words, the goal of the movement until June 1979 has been confined to solve the immediate necessity of land and its defence.⁶⁰

B. The participatory process and action

B.1 Descriptive elements

The organisation for land seizures presupposes the existence of at least three elements: a peasant leader with a relatively higher level of consciousness and experience; a widely perceived need for more land; and a feeling of exploitation and humiliation among the peasants. By personal initiative or, more commonly, with outside sponsorship,⁶¹ the peasant leader holds a series of secret meetings with a selected group of comuneros who he thinks will accept his views and participate in the mobilisation. This group is mostly composed of younger peasants, comuneros with urban experience and radical ideas, and some poor peasants.⁶² The leader explains to them the general situation faced by the community, stresses the practical necessity of organisation for a successful land occupation, and tries to enhance the general level of political consciousness of the group. Later, they discuss the ways in which these ideas should be diffused within the community (or a larger group), and the ways in which the community should be organised for the actions. There may be an intermediate period where this nucleus spreads the ideas informally, in groups of three or four persons and, when local conditions or larger co-ordination⁶³ deems it appropriate, a General Assembly is called.

In the General Assembly the community, led by the initial group, discusses its need of land and the means of obtaining it. The masses generally accept the views of this leading group and rapidly form a Command for Land Seizure,⁶⁴ a Peasant Guard and a Feminine Guard. The direction of the Command and Peasant Guard is normally taken by the "active" nucleus, but participation is extended also to other peasants.

Occupation occurs at dawn, and a large proportion of the families assemble to till the soil with their tools and cattle. The Command oversees the operation while the Peasant Guard shapes a network of communication and potential defence. The Feminine Guard looks after the food and stands around in the terrain to serve as a cushion against potential aggressors. A mail system is implemented through the use of chasquis (Indian runners) and special watchmen are posted all over the area. If there is no negative reaction from the co-operative or from local authorities, the rich and/or fearful peasants begin to assist the work and, eventually, full participation is achieved. Nature and climatic conditions define the radicalisation of the process. Peasants always invade lands at the end of the harvesting season and at the beginning of the sowing period from (August to November).⁶⁵

During the first year of occupation, land is collectively cultivated and the community seeks legal recognition of its tenure. The massive communal gatherings to work on land are occasionally used by the leader (or the active nucleus) as moments for collective reflection or education, but this does not necessarily happen. More frequently, these are social events for general intercourse and communal decision making.

After the first harvest, the output is sold entirely. The fund thereby raised is utilised for communal services (e.g. to build a school), for investment purposes (e.g. to buy a tractor) or for current expenditures (e.g. to finance legal proceedings). At this point a crucial problem is raised: should the occupied lands remain as a collective asset, or should they be distributed individually among community members? The answer to this dilemma varies, but the predominant tendency is to divide the land in individual plots.⁶⁶

The reasons for this are explicitly stated as follows:⁶⁷

- (1) The obligation to assist in collective work is not respected by all members. Typically, the rich comuneros are frequently absent and prefer to pay fines rather than work. Other comuneros sometimes prefer to work on their own plots instead of on communal lands.⁶⁸
- (2) Proper discipline in collective work in terms of work schedule and efforts is not maintained. Thus, some comuneros work harder than others. Sanctions are not actually enforced.
- (3) There is weak control on economic operations (purchase of fertilizers, seeds, sale price, etc.) and final results. In many cases nobody knows where the money has gone. In other cases the income obtained from sales is meagre, or is invested in purchases which do not always benefit all members directly.⁶⁹
- (4) Peasants are by nature generalists and do not respect the division of labour in communal work.

On the other hand, the peasants contend that when they work on their individual plots the effort and preoccupation are much greater, and the results are directly enjoyed by them. Besides, for young peasants without land, the alternative of receiving an individual plot is immensely superior to maintaining lands collectively. It appears that, under the present conditions, individual material benefits are greater if seized lands are entirely (or mostly) distributed among community members.⁷⁰ However, if conditions (1)-(4) were absent (or radically changed), and if adequate investments would be undertaken (from out-of-farm yield and credit), the attitude towards communal work might be positively altered.

The decision to distribute seized lands is taken by the General Assembly of the community, which immediately oversees the procedure. Land is then divided into plots of identical size,⁷¹ and each comunero receives one piece by random allocation or negotiative bargaining. In any case, every comunero receives a plot regardless of his economic situation or his participation during the land occupation.⁷² Finally, when land is already distributed, the impetus of the collective concern gradually wanes, the organisms created for the action (Command, Peasant

Guard, Feminine Guard, etc.) cease to function, and things get back to apparent "normality". However, there always remains a small amount of land reserved for communal production as a means of unity and of gathering together.

B.2 The path of peasant participation

In order to properly understand the path of peasant participation in this mobilisation process, we selected the main issues involved in the mobilisation, and requested a group of peasants - from each of our four selected communities - to answer questions as to who took the initiative, who implemented and who evaluated the actions under each issue.⁷³ All issues of the mobilisation were classified into operative, co-ordinative and strategic issues. This enables us to follow up the actors of the decision-making process at each one of its different phases (initiative, implementation and evaluation) and by the distinct nature of issues (operative, co-ordinative and strategic). The results were the following:

The influence and participation of the FDCC, CCP and political parties are restricted to eight cases out of a total of 135, representing a "6 per cent participation" through the whole mobilisation process (tables 1 and 2). It is important to note that they only participated during the initiative phase of the decision-making process and in strategic issues, second only to the internal "dynamic" nucleus. It can be inferred therefore that the FDCC, CCP and political parties acted as initiators and catalysts of the mobilisation and thereafter they let it be guided by local groups or individuals.⁷⁴ As a whole the recognised influence of the highest-level organisations has been, for the average peasant, quite limited.

The FEZOCAU participated in nine opportunities, most of them being concentrated in strategic decisions but dispersed over the three different phases of the decision-making process. This expresses the relative weakness of FEZOCAU not because of its lack of interest on the mobilisation but due to its own internal problems and the communities' refusal to allow major interference from outside in matters which impinge most directly on their interest.

The Communal Assembly is one of the most important actors in the whole mobilisation process. Its participation was reported in 34 opportunities, representing 25 per cent of the total opportunities reported in the investigation (tables 1 and 2). Its main influence has been exerted in co-ordinative issues. However, it has also played an important role in decision making on strategic issues. Its lower level of participation occurs in the initiative phase but during the implementation and evaluation phases it turns out to be a major actor (tables 1 and 2). This implies that the Communal Assembly raises its level of participation as the mobilisation process progresses. Although its participation in evaluation is the higher of all groups (12 points out of 26) it may be noted that many issues are not evaluated at all, neither by the Assembly nor by any other group.

For example, three out of the seven strategic issues evaluated by the General Assembly in table 1 have arisen due to problems with outside agents⁷⁵ (the co-operative, governmental authorities and other communities). This means that if no exterior problems occur, evaluation of actions are not undertaken. In any case the communal assembly is the main focus and actor of participation after the initiative has been taken.

Table 1: Peasant participation in the mobilisation process by actors, phases of the decision-making process and by types of issues*

Actors/phases of the decision-making process/types of issues discussed	Initiative phase			Executive or implementation phase			Evaluation phase			Total		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
FDCC, CCP and political parties	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
FEZOCAU and other peasant communities	0	1	4	5	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	8
Communal Assembly	1	3	1	5	1	8	8	17	0	5	7	34
Administrative and Vigilance Councils	1	5	3	9	2	4	5	11	1	4	1	26
Specialised committees	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	5	4	0	0	9
Dynamic nucleus	7	4	12	23	2	0	6	8	1	0	1	33
Individual peasants	2	3	1	6	7	0	2	9	1	0	0	16
Total	11	16	29	56	13	13	27	53	7	9	10	135

* According to the information we collected during the fieldwork in four peasant communities of Anta. We have not considered information from other sources. This means that the table synthesises the impressions of the peasants interviewed in each community.

A. Operative issues: include the activities related to the functioning of the Peasant and Feminist Guard, the chasquis and the watchmen.

B. Co-ordinative issues: these are the decisions related to the organisation of communal production and distribution of lands after the invasions. It also includes the management of internal conflicts and the judiciary.

C. Strategic issues: include those related to the over-all planning of the occupation, fixing the dates of it and negotiating with outside bodies.

Table 2: Peasant participation in the mobilisation process by actors, phases of the decision-making process and by types of issues* (vertical percentages of table 1)

[illegible]

⌘ As explained for table 1.

Administrative and Vigilance Councils have a total of 26 registered involvements. It is the third group in importance after the "dynamic" group and the Communal Assembly. Co-ordinative issues are the most important ones dealt with by these councils (table 2). The Council's participation in the initiative, implementation and evaluation phases always ranks second among all actors. This behaviour is quite natural because as formal heads of the community, they have to support and promote the initiative of the land occupation and are also called upon to oversee its execution. When the results are problematic or negative, they logically tend to be out of the evaluation process,⁷⁶ which will be undertaken by the community at large in a General Assembly. Operative decisions formally lie outside their field of competence.

Specialised committees are one of the least important groups in the whole mobilisation process. They only begin to participate once the initiatives have been taken. Their presence is more pronounced for the implementation of some strategic decisions and for the evaluation of operative issues. In reality, it seems that their general participation is largely formal, to be present only for the execution of decisions already taken by the General Assembly and without much autonomous thrust from its own members. This is fairly manifest in the fact that they do not share any initiatives in any kind of issues. In addition, an indirect indicator of their general performance is their pre-eminence in the least important decisions (operative ones) and during the weakest phase of the mobilisation period (evaluation/control).

The "dynamic" nucleus of peasants and its leaders is one of the most important actors in the mobilisation process. This group is the most important one for strategic and operative decisions and by far the predominant one in the crucial phase of initiatives for any kind of issues. Forty-two per cent of total initiatives were taken by them. Their participation decreases to 15 per cent in the executive phase and to 8 per cent in the evaluation phase (table 2). This behaviour corroborates the view that participation of the leadership group is mainly concentrated in the initial stages of the mobilisation, and fades after the organisation period.

Unorganised or non-elected peasants also individually play a role in the initiative and executive phases of mainly operative issues (tables 1 and 2). This implies that the average common peasant is also concerned about the mobilisation process but his contribution is mainly in relatively minor (operative) issues.

It is important to notice from table 1 that the evaluation phase is the weakest phase of the whole mobilisation process. It seems that there is no permanent mechanism to evaluate the results of decisions taken, in order to learn from mistakes. The number of evaluated issues numbered 26, against 56 and 53 initiative and executive issues, respectively.

To sum up, it can be concluded that the dynamic group, together with the FDCC, CCP, plays a significant role in generating the mobilisation. Once this is attained the General Assembly takes care of much of its execution. Only very few people and organisational levels worry about the evaluation of actions. It can also be asserted that the dynamic group and later the General Assembly participate

more in strategic issues while the councils and the General Assembly take the leading roles in co-ordinative issues. The direct influence of political parties and the FDCC, CCP ceases to exist after the initial strategic decisions are taken.

It can therefore be said that there exists a social division of participation in the process of mobilisation in Anta. It does not happen that everybody participates in everything or that some participate in everything and others in nothing. Each actor has participated in some issues and retreated in others, their degree of influence in each phase and in each issue varying according, it seems, to individual, group, organisational, ecological and socio-economic factors. Whether this social division of participation represents an optimal participatory path is another question which will require a larger study to be answered.

To illustrate this participatory peasant path, let us show some of the results of a questionnaire handed over to 96 peasants of three of our four selected communities.⁷⁷ It was found that two peasant communities held General Assembly meetings once every two weeks, while the other one met once a month. Most peasant communities in other places (not in Anta) do not have such a high rate of meetings. When it was asked who decided the distribution of lands among peasants, 34 per cent responded "all together" while only 18 per cent alluded to "the leaders". A significant percentage (41 per cent) did not answer this question.⁷⁸ When asked whether they knew the FDCC bulletins, pamphlets or leaders, a majority (63 per cent) claimed not to know them at all. In the same manner 83 per cent stated not to have been afraid to participate and raised questions in General Assembly meetings. Finally, when asked who had ordered the taking of the lands from the co-operative, 75 per cent replied "we all want to", 24 per cent referred to the leaders of the community and only 1 per cent to outside political parties and the FDCC. It may be noticed that 90 per cent responded that "recuperated" land has been divided equally among all peasants without any discrimination between leaders and the masses, nor between the relatively rich and poor⁷⁹ peasants, nor among active versus non-active comuneros. These facts broadly confirm the apparent democratic and self-reliant character of the mobilisation.

C. The method of organisation

It is now possible to synthesise a general process that takes place in peasant organisation in Anta. Its manifestation will depend on a series of external and internal characteristics⁸⁰ of the particular community, and in the relative "novelty" of the action that is performed.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the abstraction of a least common set of elements is adequate to understand the inner logic of the organisation method.

The peasant's world-vision and rationalisation of the logic of events is largely determined by concrete facts that prevail in their environment. The starting point for any organisation process is therefore the perception of their situation. This perception consists of the recognition of their distressed material situation, the crucial role of nature's forces, the recurrence of the agricultural cycle and, in general, the sense of being "trapped" within a closed system. This system has a set of rules and attitudes which have to be respected in order to sustain the natural life process. Consequently, risky decisions are avoided.

Peasant leaders (or urban experience) introduce an elementary cognition upon these basic perceptions. That is, a primary sense of the social determinants of the unfavourable situation is internalised. Activities from other peasant communities and political leaders play an important role in this process. Cognition implies the awareness of the extortion exercised by merchants, the unfair possession of lands by the co-operative, the negative attitude of local authorities, etc.

Discussion and collective reflection with the leaders generate a rationalisation of the oppressive relations with local (or national) power groups, and the possible ways of changing this situation. If the leader maintains a dialectical relation with the masses, the process of collective reflection becomes a permanent activity; otherwise it disappears. This part of the process is usually initiated within a small group of peasants, who will later spread their ideas among their closer friends or relatives. The rationalisation then turns into concrete solutions for definite problems. When concrete proposals have been worked out, or suggested from outside agents of change, a General Assembly is called to decide a specific course of action. At this point, collective rationalisation is transformed into concrete organisation for remedial action. In other words, a definite solution is planned in detail, assigning responsibilities and considering possible reactions or results. The organisation is a factor that allows timid and passive peasants to feel more secure in becoming involved in the mobilisation even if they lack individual psychological bases for it.

When organisation has been clearly defined and accepted, practical actions take place. During this process, every participant accomplishes a specific task previously agreed upon in the organisation period. Participation during actions presupposes the communal acceptance of a (new) set of attitudes and behaviour towards the particular problem to be solved, and a sense of "effectiveness" with regard to the means chosen in the organisation period.

After actions have been realised, results are bound to appear. However, these may take quite a while to be clearly seen in positive or negative terms. For instance, the ultimate results of a land occupation are only evident after one or two years, when natural (harvest), legal (achievement of secure tenure) and organisational (communal vs. individual usufruct) problems show a particular resolution. On the other hand, the active influence of the leaders usually diminishes between the actions and the final results, especially if no negative reactions from the outside are present. Consequently, the evaluation of the results is largely an individual process which takes place without much order. As each participant forms his personal balance of the actions, he internalises a particular experience from the events. This experience will feed back into his initial perceptions and cognitions, and will significantly determine his future attitude towards new organisational efforts.

If results are overtly negative the reaction of the peasants varies according to the cause of the failure. For instance, when negative results are due to leadership mistakes or misguided information,⁸² participants become strongly disappointed and the movement wanes. On the other hand, if external agents cause undesired results the reaction of the participants can be either (1) towards greater

internal cohesion or (2) dispersion of the movement. The fundamental factors that provoke one response or the other are basically two: the relative strength of the movement and the political circumstances at a national level. In this respect the example of a single peasant community during two distinct periods of time merits mention to illustrate our argument. The peasant community of Compone struggled during the late 1950s and early 1960s to achieve official recognition and to recuperate part of their lands. When repression was exerted at a local and national level the movement rapidly came to a halt, and no further attempts or organisation were made for more than ten years: the peasants were fearful and no successful possibilities of struggle were anticipated. The leaders in this case did not reflect together with the masses about their failure and did not extract any experience from it. Soon the masses were dispersed and stayed inactive for a long time. In contrast, today's actual intransigence of the co-operative and official authorities in giving up pasture lands for the community has strongly bound them together. They have now reasons to believe that they can successfully remain in possession of the seized lands, since no communities in the area have experienced large-scale repression or major setbacks in their claims over occupied land. It is true that some peasants lack psychological bases for the action, but organisational leaders have developed an adequate strategy of action to meet the peasants' needs and build up external support. Even though the local federation (FEZOCAU) is not spectacularly powerful, the authorities' grip on the situation is also relatively weak, and hence the peasants can expect a positive outcome as long as they remain internally united against the co-operative.

It should be added that when the peasants achieve indications of their land rights, and the leaders do not canalise the movement towards other tangible and higher-level goals, the movement stagnates and the peasants prefer to be engaged in their own individual economic problems. If their enquiries are however channelled to collective activities the leaders may still be able to raise the level of consciousness and new peasant developments may emerge, whereas in the first case the leaders have to wait for new conditions to attempt other actions.⁸³

D. Organisational and participatory shortcomings

We have already said that a larger study will be needed in order to know whether the social division of participation encountered in section IVB represents an optimal participatory path; the same holds for the question as to whether the method of organisation outlined in section IVC is the most adequate one. For the moment we shall try to look more deeply into several characteristics of the participation and organisational process not touched upon so far.

One is related to the preparation of the masses and their process of conscientisation. In the beginning, the initial "active" group is quite active but, after a time, lacks continuity in its efforts for further consciousness raising. This is related to the fact that there are no mechanisms for spreading the new knowledge to the rest of the community. Therefore, although previous figures showed a significant participation of the peasants in their General Assemblies, in practice peasant participation is due to extreme necessity of land and to the

opportunity presented to them to enlarge their small plots and improve their economic situation. It has already been mentioned that a majority of poor peasants follow the mobilisation process because they do not have anything to lose. Also the rich peasants only show up in it once they perceive its success and its potential benefit to them. The preparation of the masses is therefore rather superficial and is generally conducted during the initial actions. After that, the active group loses perspective, and the movement acquires a vindictive rather than a revolutionary character. Land occupation is the only perspective the movement had until April 1979. Nobody knew what to do after land invasions. This is also related to the fact that the most conscious leaders moved from one community to another to promote peasant mobilisation and did not have time to remain in their own communities to enhance the level of consciousness. There is only one clear exception to this tendency in which case the main leader was able to form a local community conscientisation group.⁸⁴

Secondly, as the peasant mobilisation is not concerned with economic mechanisms but only with land occupations, the economic structure remains intact within the community. This implies that values and ideologies alien to the movement continue to be filtered in through the marketing, money lending, production and consumption of goods. Capitalist production and personal unequal development are enforced through these channels and the peasants do not even notice this surreptitious influence. Furthermore, for him the production alternatives are those he has seen in the hacienda system and with the medium-size farmers. Therefore after the taking over of lands, what is still in the peasants' consciousness appears on the surface and they tend to follow past behavioural patterns. It is not surprising then to find some peasants behaving as the old landlord or as medium-sized farmers. Unless the movement manages to deal with the economic flow and structure in new ways no fundamental improvement can be expected.

Thirdly, the peasant communities act mainly independent of each other, thus limiting the nature and scope of the mobilisation. Only once was there an attempt to co-ordinate efforts between the communities, but due to reasons that will be seen later it did not encourage further collective actions. Each peasant community is submerged in its own problems and does not worry about those of others. The most avid and dynamic communities are the ones to benefit more from the mobilisation. We have seen cases where neighbouring communities fight with each other for obtaining greater benefits or when a relatively wealthier community became expansionist trying to gain the territory of other poorer communities.⁸⁵

Fourthly, the old peasants in some communities were the less willing to participate in the mobilisation. This initial resistance is explicable by the massive repression they suffered in the 1960s. At that time they were put in jail and left to their own luck, with no peasant or political organisation supporting them. Individual previous experience is therefore a factor that has to be counter-balanced with "effective" organisation to stimulate peasant participation.

Fifthly, the peasant organisation has not been as orderly as it might have been. At the base level there are three barriers that hinder the correct functioning of the communal organisation: (1) internal sanctions and controls are not truly enforced and, as a consequence, communal discipline, commitment to collective decisions, and leadership trust are debilitated;⁸⁶ (2) there is social differentiation among community members, and this implies the existence of different interests

which may sometimes be conflicting with the "general" interest of all community members; and (3) there is a limited amount of collective activities in relation to the traditional activities. Most of the peasants' time is expended in their own family plots without leaving much time for collective reflection.

Sixthly, at the second and third level, organisation is even more defective. The FEZOCAU and the FDCC have lacked regular meetings and whenever they were convened, a sterile political debate emerged. The majority of peasant leaders that attend FEZOCAU and FDCC meetings have a definite political affiliation, while a significant - but minority - group shows no particular political preference. The unfortunate problem is that the political parties struggle for leadership of the FEZOCAU and FDCC most of the time and energies are wasted in sterile political discussions. The principal political parties in the area share similar conceptions but their conflict and mutual distrust are acute.⁸⁷ The internal conflict of the FEZOCAU ultimately disappointed non-politicised leaders,⁸⁸ dampened initiatives and reduced the effectiveness of the organisation: party problems substituted the peasants' problems.

In this last aspect, the parties usually bottle themselves up in theoretical and abstract debates which are far away from the practical necessities of the peasants.⁸⁹ Neither the parties nor the syndical organisations (FEZOCAU, FDCC) seriously plan the way to guide or advise viable alternatives for the development of the productive forces, or to look for effective organisational forms that would allow the peasants to be armed themselves with a practical pressure instrument. On the contrary, an artificial and unhealthy competition takes place between political parties as to who is conducting the seizure of lands. Nobody is concerned about the consciousness and effectiveness of the peasant organisations whose actions become more of a spontaneous rather than of a reflective type. Many times, once the mobilisation is started, the syndical and political organisations try to mount on it to make it serve their own interests. Exceptions occur when local community leaders assume a real peasant posture or when they use the party for meeting the communities' needs rather than for the attainment of more far-reaching objectives.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that relations of the peasants with Cuzco workers, students and other communities is rather weak, limiting the effectiveness and the scope of the organisation.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL INTERPRETATIONS

The previous sections have shown the attempts made in Anta over the last three decades to liberate the peasants from oppression of the dominant groups in society. Three patterns can be easily distinguishable. First, the spasmodic and higher charismatical mobilisation of the 1950s and 1960s where without much intensive organisation and peasant conscientisation a group of young leaders were able to mobilise a significant amount of peasants' communities. Second, a governmental attempt in which a group of perhaps well intentioned functionaries and officials tried to impose an "ideal model" (the CAP) supposedly good enough to change the exploitative conditions and productive relations in Anta. And third, a series of largely autonomous mobilisations that combined spontaneity with organisation and some degree of peasant participation in their main decisions.

The principal issue is however whether the peasants were or were not liberated from oppression in these different attempts, and what role the nature of peasant involvement played in their successes or failures.

In the first case - although information has been scanty, and the available facts suggest that the mobilisations were repressed (first "physically" and later "culturally") much before a new agrarian structure could be established. Furthermore, most of the invaded lands were returned to the landlords, and only minor advantages were gained in legal terms. Even the latter were hardly accomplished in practice. Unfortunately, neither the physical nor the cultural repression could be stopped by the peasants. The "physical" repression would have been difficult to fight (the army was sent to the region); but the "cultural" repression was also not stopped due to the lack of consciousness and ideological preparation of the masses and to the extreme dependence on a charismatic leader who, once in jail, left the movement adrift.

The second is a painful case that teaches us how not to proceed in doing an agrarian reform. To leave out (from the beginning) the peasants' voices and alternatives is a very risky way to go about it. If to this is added on the one hand a lack of experienced people to scientifically study the production alternatives and forms of organisation, and on the other hand, an inflexibility in the productive model proposed, the experiment is almost certain to fail. And this is what happened in Antapampa - the peasants did not participate in, and did not take any important decisions before, during and after the agrarian reform. The model imposed from above unfortunately was not in tune with the ecological, socio-economic and cultural realities, and the ideal of creating a self-managed liberated enterprise (the CAP) transformed itself into an exploitative structure. This is an excellent lesson for those who think that the self-management enterprise is the panacea that will solve all problems. Self-management enterprises must be evaluated in their practice in order to know whether they have been instruments of liberation or of oppression. In the case of Anta the self-management enterprise never became really self-managed, but adopted the "state form". The Antapampa Cooperative was run as a state enterprise managed by state officials and run by a minority of persons with no participation of the majority of their members. Furthermore, it came to be seen as the rich one in a sea of poorness. This tells us that when the agrarian structure is not modified according to the general need of all the people, it is doomed to failure. In this case inequality was mixed with historically legitimate rights of the peasant communities. The agrarian reform was explicit in asserting that it would "guarantee the integrity of the peasant communities' ownership rights on their lands". In practice this was not accomplished at all. If the organisational model would have been a much more flexible and autonomous structure and if the peasants had participated in planning, executing and evaluating it, the results might have been different.

The third and last attempt is still in process and therefore difficult to evaluate in terms of its final success or failure. However, there are contradictory elements that allow us to make some annotations and which will determine the final character of the movement. First of all, nobody could deny that relative to the other two attempts, the degree of peasant participation and organisation is much

higher now than before. The peasants (consciously or not) get together regularly once or twice a month to debate about their own problems and "we all want to" assertions are common in them. Secondly, the goals of the mobilisations are relatively much more "progressive" among the average peasant, and more "conscious" among their peasant leaders. Thirdly, the mobilisations are largely flexible and autonomous, letting each community to fight according to their natural, ecological, socio-economic and cultural circumstances. Fourthly, the mobilisations are coming from below through a catalytic action of the peasants' second level organisations and political parties and autonomous peasant leaders. Fifthly, regional conditions as a whole are less repressive than 20 years ago. Sixthly, the methods used by the peasantry come from praxis and from the real world which thus get elevated to organisation and action, returning again to praxis in a dialectical form.

In spite of all these factors we have already pointed out (Section IVD) the critical deficiencies at the level of basic, second level and political organisations involved in the movement. The form in which the peasants and their leaders solve these contradictions together with the way in which the goals of the mobilisations are related to the technological, ecological, economic, social and cultural realities of Antapampa, will finally determine the success or failure of the peasant movement. Esteban Puma, an extraordinary advanced peasant leader, gives us much hope when he argues that the communities' path to liberation in Anta could only be done with active participation of the peasants in communal decisions, and through two parallel and necessary processes: (1) the continuous conscientisation of the peasants for changing the productive relations; and (2) the control by the peasants of the economic structure at all of its levels, with the creation of works and industries in their hands to develop the forces of production. To change the relations of production and to develop the forces of production are for him two concomitant processes.⁹⁰

Today's Antapampa is a very dynamic area, new interesting processes are emerging as the peasants face real economic and social realities. For example in order not to divide the central lands and barns and avoid the problems of boundaries between adjacent communities, there exist today - after 500 years of fragmentation and disintegration - a voluntary process of integration among some peasant communities. Groups of three to five communities are gathering together to manage ex-haciendas and ex-state co-operative lands. The Liquidator Commission of the co-operative for the first time in peasant history is composed of nine peasants and six governmental officials - i.e. having a peasant majority to decide all issues. This Commission has been set at the Pampa level, meaning that the 33 peasant communities are now able to understand each other's problems and to plan a global alternative. Not everything is encouraging however. There are communities that still feel marginalised from the process, and conflicts between communities are a daily phenomenon. The Antapampa peasants still do not have a solid organisation with concrete economic proposals as to how to form a new structure and to solve intercommunal problems. The case of the community of San Martin is illuminating: San Martin - the unified peasant community that integrated Lucrepata, San Rafael and Ayllumayo (some of them part of the ex-cooperative) - was able to create a Central Administrative Council, but the peasants are having problems in marketing,

in feeding the cattle redistributed to them by the ex-cooperative, and the cattle are losing weight.⁹¹ The need to evolve an optimal participatory and organisational path is therefore paramount. This path needs to be formulated, implemented and evaluated by the peasants' majority and it must be related to developing the productive forces and changing the relations of production.

Otherwise, if production fails, the peasants will be further encouraged to divide the lands, equipment, modern central plants, etc., among themselves, resulting in a de facto private parcelling of land which could easily lead to an egotistic individual - dog eat dog - development in Antapampa. The Liquidator Commission has therefore a difficult job because they are not only responsible for liquidating the co-operative but for transferring land and cattle to the peasant communities by solving the problem of boundaries, promoting economic units in charge of modern machinery and installations to benefit all communities, and of taking care of all pending ex-cooperative obligations. The Agrarian Bank (the only Bank that gives credit to the peasants in Anta), instead of supporting the liquidation process, has stopped its loans, leaving to PRODERM (a special institution created by an agreement between the Peruvian and Dutch Governments) the role of a financial intermediary for the liquidation process.⁹² The political parties, instead of co-ordinating efforts to offer alternatives to the peasants' problems, are giving signs of unhealthy behaviour. All this means that the way towards complete liberation is still far away.

This study however, is only a first attempt to study the process of participation of the poor peasants in Anta. There are different internal and external factors that affect this process which need to be studied in order to have a complete picture of the participatory option for rural self-reliance and development in Anta. These factors are of great importance in explaining the continuity of the peasant movement, the eradication of exploitative relations, or the emergence of new social classes in Anta. Among the internal factors we may mention ideology, social differentiation, individual personality, ecology, education and organisational structure. Among the external variables, greater attention should be given to the economic system, conjunctural situations, external alliances, political parties and the church and foreign involvement. An understanding of these factors will certainly help the peasants in designing their own strategy for their liberation.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ II Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda, ONEC, Lima, 1974.
- ² Production of barley is entirely sold to the beer company that operates in Cuzco city. This company generally gives credit to the wealthier comuneros in order to tie up the sale of barley to them: it also operates with middle-sized farms.
- ³ Diagnóstico de Redinversionamiento, Ministerio de Agricultura, 1978.
- ⁴ CENCIRA-Holanda, Plan de Desarrollo de Antapampa Diagnóstico, Cuzco 1979.
- ⁵ J. Villafuerte R., La Formación de la Hacienda en Anta en Critica Andina No. 1, Marzo 1978, Instituto de Estudios Sociales del Cuzco, pág. 118.
- ⁶ Peruvian Constitution of 1920.
- ⁷ Comunero-tenant is a peasant who maintains both status. "Comunero" for being a member of the peasant community and "tenant" for usufructing land within the hacienda boundaries.
- ⁸ Cotler, Julio, "The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru", Studies in Co-operative Industrial Development III, No. 12, Washington University Social Science Institute 1968. Alberti Giorgio, Los Movimientos Campesinos en el Perú, IEP 1970, Perú, Whyte F. William, El Mito del Campesino Pasivo, La Dinámica del Cambio Rural en el Perú en Estudios Andinos Año 1, Vol. 1, No. 1970.
- ⁹ Small- and medium-size farmers are presently the third important category in Antapampa. These farmers have become owners of land and work as private entrepreneurs.
- ¹⁰ Vásquez, Mario, Organizaciones Empresariales en las Comunidades Campesinas. Proyecto SINEA, Serie No. 2, Ministerio de Alimentación, 1979.
- ¹¹ Gerrit Huizer has a very good description of peasant movements in La Convención and in the Peruvian highlands. The Convención being relatively close to Antapampa we will assume that similar processes but at a slower speed happened in Anta. This was confirmed in some interviews of our field work. (Huizer Gerrit, The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America, Lexington Books, 1972.)
- ¹² Montoya Rodrigo, "Luchas Campesinas, Relaciones de Producción y Reivindicaciones en el Perú del Siglo XX", Discusión Antropológica, Año III, No. 3, 1978, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
- ¹³ Huizer Gerrit, op. cit.
- ¹⁴ Quijano Aníbal, "El Movimiento Campesino en el Perú y sus Líderes", Revista Trimestral América Latina, Vol. 8, No. 1, Mayo 1965. Cotler, Julio, Organizaciones Campesinas en el Perú, 2da. Edición. Cotler J. y Portocarrero F., Perú Peasant Organisations in Landsberger H., op. cit. Whyte William, El Mito del Campesino Pasivo, op. cit. Alberti Giorgio, "Los Movimientos Campesinos", El Campesino en el Perú, IEP 1970. Pease, Henry, "La Reforma Agraria Peruana", in la Crisis del Estado Oligarquico, Estado y Política Agraria, DESCO 1977. Kapsoli Wilfredo, Movimientos Campesinos en el Perú 1879-1965, Delva Editores, Lima, 1977.
- ¹⁵ Craig Wesley, "The Peasant Movement of La Convención in Henry Landsberger (ed)", Latin American Peasant Movements, Cornell University Press, 1969.
- ¹⁶ From our field work. This was mentioned several times by various peasants during our interviews.

17 Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Cuzco, Balance de las Luchas del Movimiento Campesino Cuzqueño, Panfleto, 1978.

18 The leaders wanted peasant organisation to develop step by step, the functions of the power oligarchy developing into regional federations and finally attaining control of a massive peasant and popular movement. This movement would culminate in the seizure of power as an essentially mass phenomenon. But, the base only wanted to improve their incomes or rental relations with the hacendados and at the most to recuperate part of their own lands.

19 Neyra Hugo, Tierra o Muerte, Cuzco, 1970.

20 Ley de Reforma Agraria No. 17716. El Peruano 1969.

21 ibid.

22 Ginneken Peter van, "Nota sobre la Organización Campesina y su relación con la Reforma Agraria en el Perú", Informe Provisional Inédito.

23 PIAR was an integral project of rural settlement which tried to integrate the different forms of production organisation for a planned and total development of the area.

24 SAIS is the Agrarian Society of Social Interest; a model which joins a hacienda and its neighbour peasant communities and allows communities participation in management and profits of the SAIS.

25 "Modalidad de Adjudicación PIAR Anta", Ministerio de Agricultura, p. 10.

26 Diagnóstico de la Micro Región de Antapampa, Ministerio de Agricultura 1977, pp. 7-8.

27 A term used in Latin America to denote training in a wide sense, including, e.g. orientation, conscientisation, etc.

28 It may be recalled that there were several dozens of haciendas throughout Anta. Each was located in a different geographical area and at some distance from any other. Furthermore, medium and small farmers were not expropriated, and their farms were located all over the Pampa.

29 Modalidad de Adjudicación Proyecto Anta, Ministerio de Agricultura, 1970.

30 From interviews during our fieldwork.

31 From interviews during our fieldwork.

32 Entrevistas to Agrarian Officials in Lima. Informe Confidencial CODERSO, Cuzco, 1977.

33 Diagnóstico de la Micro Región de Antapampa, Ministerio de Agricultura.

34 One of our official sources asserts that the decision came from the Minister of Agriculture.

35 Interview to agrarian officials and campesinoes involved in the act.

36 Informe Final de Intervención Cooperativa Agraria de Producción Tupac Amaru II, Antapampa No. 106, Zona Agraria Cuzco, 1978.

37 Diagnóstico de la Micro Región de Antapampa, Ministerio de Agricultura, 1977, pp. 12-16.

38 From its initial adjudication of 33,062 hectares of land, the co-operative enlarged through its seven consecutive phases of implementation to 38,180 hectares. Informe Final de Intervención, op. cit., p. 2, Cuzco, 1978.

39 Sur No. 1, 1978.

40 Sur No. 1, 1978.

41 Interviews in our field work.

42 Diagnóstico de Redimensionamiento, Ministerio de Agricultura, 1978.

43 Plan de Desarrollo de Antapampa, Diagnóstico CENCIRA-HOLANDA, 1979.

44 *ibid.*, p. 313.

45 The minimum unit for reasonable subsistence per family is considered to be 6 hectares. The average size of most peasant communities is around 3 hectares per family. Internal differentiation is very high.

46 From our field work. Attendance in the General Assembly of FEZOCAU, April 1979.

47 The four communities selected represent a sample of the 33 peasant communities in existence in Anta. The sample has been gathered considering accessibility, importance in land recuperations, and socio-economic differences.

48 Estatuto Especial de Comunidades Campesinas, Decreto Supremo No. 37-70A, del 17 de Febrero 1970, Ministerio Agricultura.

49 The FEZOCAU and the FDCC are not legally recognised by the Government. Both of them are affiliated to a third level organisation: The Peruvian Confederation of Peasants (CCP).

50 That is, whether they have a formally assigned responsibility or not. They generally hold formal duties, but this is not a necessary condition.

51 We will not enter into the details of peasants' conception about the State; the strategy of revolution, existing parties, etc.

52 They do not generally foresee other objectives that could be undertaken by their communal organisation or FEZOCAU.

53 If pasture lands are invaded, rich peasants introduce relatively more cattle. Sometimes they may propose to pay special quotas for the usufruct of recuperated lands, so that they, rather than the poor comuneros, may use them.

54 In several leaflets, they called for the "unitary strike". A strike does not have a disruptive meaning within most peasant communities.

55 These roles are not always fulfilled efficiently. FEZOCAU has lacked regular meetings, has not created special commissions to have a continuous presence or reflection on certain problem areas and its directive bodies have not met frequently enough. In other words, this organisation acts only on particular occasions and with a limited scope of activities. As a consequence its real authority in the area is also naturally limited.

56 For instance, one peasant community seized 600 hectares of pasture lands which were not so important in themselves but because of the facilities installed within them. In another case the lands taken were near a milking stable.

57 In those communities the co-operative sent their workers to repel the invaders. As a result a few people were killed and many were injured.

58 A conflict between two communities recently erupted because there were two legal resolutions claiming conflicting rights for the same plot. Also, cases have been reported where governmental officials promised to hand out the same piece of land to two neighbouring communities. As a result, mutual distrust was generated among them.

59 They are actually managing an investment fund to carry on projects within peasant communities. Their goal is to foster internal solidarity and to improve their material conditions.

60 This has been the situation until June 1979, before the last wave of invasions occurred in October and November 1979.

61 From FEZOCAU, FDCC, CCP or leftish political parties.

62 Very frequently these characteristics are all embodied in a single group.

63 The timing of the actions is sometimes imposed by the parties or the FEZOCAU or decided upon independently.

64 In some cases the Command for Land Seizure is formed before the General Assembly is called. In this case the General Assembly ratifies the composition of the Command Guard.

65 No other period has any meaning. If they invade the lands after the sowing season, most of the seed will be destroyed during the invasion and nature and climatic conditions will not allow them to resow again.

66 Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the FDCC recommends that the land should be initially kept communally and, after the first year: (1) only part of the land should be collectively held; (2) the distribution should favour the poorest peasants; and (3) it should favour the more active participants in the occupation. See: "Moción sobre las Tomas de Tierras al III Congreso de la FDCC", Manuscript, 1978.

67 These reasons have been repeatedly stated in many interviews with peasants.

68 Since labour requirements are concentrated on definite periods of the year, assistance to collective work implies leaving one's plot unattended for some time. This is particularly delicate during harvest, since production may be lost or damaged if recollection is delayed.

69 The lack of appropriate control created distrust between comuneros and the leaders in charge of the money. It is very frequent to hear accusations of theft towards responsible comuneros.

70 This is of course speaking about the average peasant.

71 We have been informed of one case in which lands were distributed as follows: (1) every comunero had to pay his past fines in order to receive a plot; (2) after cleaning this situation, each one had to pay a quota for a certain amount of land, which was supposedly collected to sustain further legal procedures. In this fashion some peasants acquired larger extensions of land than others.

72 Paradoxical as it may appear at first sight, these rules are justified by the participants for the sake of maintaining the internal solidarity of the community. The difference between practice and the FDCC proposal mentioned in footnote number 66 may be noted.

73 The interviews were done by groups of 4 to 6 peasants and then transformed into our special charts.

74 Of course the leaders are in close touch with second- and third-level organisations but these organisations do not have any direct influence on the activities concerned.

75 From our work sheets.

76 Since they are formally responsible for the results, when problems appear they will try to ignore them and the evaluation will be carried only by the pressure of the masses - if it comes.

77 We could not manage to hand over the survey to community number 4.

78 Other answers were: the rich peasants, 2 per cent; young peasants, 3 per cent; and local authorities and politicians, 2 per cent.

79 Please remember that the terms rich and poor are used in relative terms within the area. The rich peasant in Antapampa may be a very poor person at the national scale levels.

80 Such as the degree of internal homogeneity, past experiences, personal commitment and preparation of the leadership, reactions from "allies" and "enemies", etc.

81 In this sense, the method of organisation for "new" or "recurrent" activities is obviously different.

82 One of the visited communities was very demoralised, and had a breakdown in its organisation because the leaders had falsely promised them lands if they would support other communities in their land occupation. When the leaders refused to give up lands in exchange for the support, there was rupture with the leadership (who was censored in a general assembly) and the larger organisations that are behind them (party and federations). Actually, this community is internally divided and its organisation is no longer operating.

83 Fieldwork interviews.

84 The local community group is composed of young peasants who returned to the community after a few years of secondary or in some cases university studies. They have been exposed to outside structures and alternatives. "The idea of the group is not to create a group of "zares" but to level up their fellow peasants". Interview with Esteban Puma, op. cit.

85 Two significant cases were reported during our field work.

86 Examples are numerous and pervade all level of the organisational structure.

87 Both parties were in a common front during the last electoral campaign.

88 During the meeting of FEZOCAU in April 1979 several leaders abandoned the meeting because the discussion turned out to be around a political problem of the parties.

⁸⁹ Peasants look for the solution of their very practical local problems and to improve their economic situation. They do not understand abstract conceptions. The average peasant does not know much about ideologies and political parties. Tables Nos. 1 and 2 of the previous section showed the relatively small influence peasants perceive of the political parties in their movement.

⁹⁰ Esteban Puma: fieldwork interview, April 1979.

⁹¹ Sur, Nos. 21, 22 and 24, Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, Cuzco, 1980.

⁹² Sur, ibid., 1980.

WEP Research Working Papers are preliminary documents circulated informally in a limited number of copies solely to stimulate discussion and critical comment. They are restricted and should not be cited without permission. A set of selected WEP Research Working Papers, completed by annual supplements, is available in microfiche form for sale to the public; orders should be sent to ILO Publications, International Labour Office, CH 1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland. This list includes many, but not all, papers which exist or may be issued in microfiche form.

Previous publications

- WEP 10/WP.1 Land reform in Asia, with particular reference to Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand - Zubeida Ahmad.
- WP.2 Reproduction, production and the sexual division of labour - Lourdes Benería.
- WP.3 Employment and income generation in new settlement projects - R. Weitz.
- WP.4 Research on participation of the poor in development - Md. Anisur Rahman.
- WP.5 Participatory development efforts in rural Bangladesh: A case study of the experiences in three areas - Mahabub Hossain, Raisul Awal Mahmood and Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad.
- WP.6 Agricultural co-operatives in North Vietnam - Amit Bhaduri
- WP.7 Sind Hari Committee, 1930-70: A peasant movement? - Mahmood Hasan Khan.
- WP.8 Land reform and peasant associations in Ethiopia: A case study of two widely differing regions - Alula Abate and Tesfaye Teklu.
- WP.9 Transition to collective agriculture, and peasant participation - North Viet Nam, Tanzania and Ethiopia - Md. Anisur Rahman.
- WP.10 Rural development planning and the sexual division of labour: A case study of a Moslem Hausa village in northern Nigeria - Richard Longhurst.
- WP.11 Peasant struggle in a feudal setting - A study of the determinants of the bargaining power of tenants and small farmers in five villages of district Attock, Pakistan, 1980 - Nigar Ahmad.