

Overcoming Rural Underdevelopment

Proceedings of a Workshop on
Alternative Agrarian Systems and Rural Development
Arusha, Tanzania, 4 - 14 April, 1979

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Preface

The workshop on "Alternative Agrarian Systems and Rural Development" was organised jointly by the University of Dar es Salaam and the International Labour Organisation. Its starting point was the realisation that rural development efforts over the past quarter of a century have not succeeded in reducing poverty in most developing countries. In many cases, the number and proportion of rural population in absolute poverty have tended to increase. It was against this background that the International Labour Organisation undertook a series of case studies of attempts to achieve equitable rural development through innovations in organisation of agricultural production. The nine case studies included in the ILO volume "Agrarian Systems and Rural Development" constituted the main document for the workshop.

The main objective of the workshop was to provide researchers and policy-makers from developing countries with an opportunity to exchange experiences and views on the effectiveness of different agrarian systems to generate growth, equality, employment and participation. Apart from the case studies included in the ILO volume, the workshop was expected to cover other innovative experiences in rural development. It was felt by several participants that because of the widespread interest evoked in other developing countries by the villagisation and Ujamaa experience, Tanzania would be an appropriate venue for the workshop.

A distinctive aspect of the workshop was the diversity in backgrounds and rich experience in rural development of the participants. The workshop brought together planners and administrators both from countries covered by the ILO study and others with interesting experiences in rural development, leading scholars in rural development, the ILO staff members and external collaborators responsible for the study, the representatives of employers' and workers' groups, and of international agencies with a strong interest in rural development. In all 38 persons from 13 countries attended the workshop.

The choice of participants was intended to ensure that the results and conclusions of the ILO study would be subject to rigorous evaluation by independent experts and be broadened and enriched by the experience of countries not covered by the study. It was also hoped that the workshop would be a means for the mutually beneficial exchange, within a clearly structured analytical framework, of the lessons of experiences among developing countries in the important area of rural development. From these deliberations, therefore, it was hoped to arrive at fresh insights into the problem of eradicating rural poverty and new ideas on the design of rural development strategies which would prove useful to planners in the Third World.

Especially with the latter objective in mind, the workshop was divided into two parts. The first part was intended as a general analytical discussion of the issues raised by the ILO study and of interesting country experiences not covered by that study. The ILO study covered innovative attempts in rural development under three kinds of agrarian systems: peasant agriculture under the system of private land ownership (South Korea, Bangladesh and India), communal farming (China, Cuba and the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union) and the transitional category (Tanzania, Guyana and Egypt). The workshop also discussed the experiences with agrarian reform in Sri Lanka, Chile, Ethiopia, Madagascar and West Bengal. These experiences were presented by participants who had either observed the process at first hand, or had been directly involved in the implementation of agrarian reform measures.

The second part of the workshop provided an opportunity to participants to study and learn from the Tanzanian experience at first hand. In addition to the briefing provided by Tanzanian policy-makers and researchers, the participants - in groups of three to four - were able to visit and stay in six villages for three days. The intention was that each group would live in the villages during this period to observe the functioning of the village economy and institutions, with particular emphasis on the question of transition to communal production. These visits were preceded and followed by discussions with regional and district planning authorities within which the villages were located in order that the

village-level observations could be placed in the context of national policy and the political and administrative institutions for their implementation. The reports of each group were then presented and discussed by the workshop with the aim of distilling aspects of the Tanzanian experience which could prove useful to other developing countries and also to discuss issues arising from the field observations which would be of interest to Tanzanian authorities.

The workshop generated lively and impassioned debates. The experiences and the issues treated in the ILO study provoked a great deal of interest and the participants made critical and penetrating comments. The workshop was greatly enriched by a discussion of experiences of other countries not included in the study. For most participants, the village visits and the discussions on them were the highlights of the workshop. The present volume attempts to capture the highlights of the workshop presentations and discussions. In view of the importance of the subject dealt with here, it is hoped that this volume will be of interest to policy-makers and researchers working on rural development.

In conclusion, we would like to thank the participants and the conference secretariat for making the workshop possible and for contributing to its success. Our sincere thanks also go to the Swedish International Development Authority for financing the workshop.

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Acknowledgements

The planning and organisation of this workshop has been a collective effort from the beginning. The workshop would not have been possible without the generous grant from the Swedish International Development Authority. The Regional Commissioner for the Arusha Region, The Hon. Ndugu P. S. Siyovelwa, honoured the workshop by delivering the keynote address. We received encouragement and support at all stages of the preparation of the workshop from Mr. I.M. Kaduma, Vice Chancellor, University of Dar es Salaam and Mme. A. Béguin, Chief of the Employment and Development Department, ILO. Their active participation at the workshop is a reflection of their deep interest in problems of rural development.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the help received, especially in connection with the field visits, from the Prime Minister's Office and the Regional and District Administrations in Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Dodoma Regions. We are deeply indebted to the village authorities and peasants in the villages visited (Endakiso, Chekereni, Mareu, Mlowa-Bababarani, Mseta and Singe) for their hospitality and for sharing with us their information, views and insights.

The participants contributed to the success of the workshop in ways which went well beyond what is expected of them in a normal workshop. Apart from chairing of sessions, members of the workshop acted as rapporteurs for various sessions and for some of the village reports. We have drawn heavily upon their work in preparing the proceedings of the workshop. We would like especially to thank Messrs. Arulpragasam, Bandyopadhyay, Griffin, Ndunguru for chairing various sessions; Messrs. Bandyopadhyay, Teklu and Mlambiti for preparing rapporteurs' reports on different sessions; and Mme. Béguin, Messrs. Griffin, Leiserson and Rudra for field notes on the following villages: Singe, Endakiso and Mareu. The village reports on Chekereni, Mlowa-Bababarani and Mseta were prepared respectively by Messrs. Ghai, Lee and Radwan.

Mme. Jacqueline Mettral helped with the workshop accounts and the travel of the participants. For secretarial assistance we are indebted to Mrs. Sandra Berlinka, Mrs. Frances Kaufmann, Mr. D.L. Kessy and Mr. A. Mchulupete.

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Organisation of the Report

The report will be in five parts. This introductory section will be followed by a summary of the principal findings and issues discussed in the ILO study which constituted the background document for the workshop.¹ While this chapter attempts to serve as a self-contained background to the discussions, it is obvious that such a summary cannot do full justice to a large and carefully documented empirical study; the interested reader is therefore urged to read the full study. This chapter is then concluded with a brief summary of the discussions on the findings of the book.

The second chapter summarises presentations on country experiences with rural development in countries which were not covered by the ILO study. These were Ethiopia, Chile, and Madagascar. In addition there was also a presentation on the recent experience in an important state in India, West Bengal, where a Marxist government has been attempting major structural reforms since coming into power in 1976. It was felt that this particular experience merited special attention since it represented a significant departure from the over-all Indian experience analysed by the case study in the volume and also illustrated the problems of implementing structural reforms in the context of parliamentary democracy.

From this discussion of general issues and country experiences the workshop moved into its second phase, the study of aspects of the Tanzanian experience through the village visits. Chapter III of this report begins with a short introduction which explains the objectives of the Ujamaa and villagisation programme and provides a brief historical background. This is intended to serve as an orientation for the synthesis of the findings and impressions of the six individual village reports which follows in Chapter IV.

¹ D.P. Ghai, A.R. Khan, E.Lee and S. Radwan (Eds.) Agrarian Systems and Rural Development (Macmillan, London, 1979).

I. Agrarian Systems and Rural Development:
A Summary of the ILO Study¹

I.1 Background

The purpose of the volume was to analyse the performance of some of the different forms of organisation and institutions in promoting rural development in given historical circumstances in recent times. With this objective in view nine experiences varying from private peasant agriculture to communal land systems were studied. The countries were South Korea, India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Guyana, Tanzania, USSR (Soviet Central Asia), China and Cuba.

These were all cases where serious attempts were made to overcome the problems of rural underdevelopment and poverty by way of organisational and institutional innovation.

The case studies in the volume were divided into three broad categories. First, was the system of individual farming carried out under private ownership of land and other means of production. The distinctive feature of this category is the predominance of peasant farming in the framework of a private agriculture. South Korea, India and Bangladesh were included in this category. Secondly, and at the other end of the spectrum is the system of communal farming carried out under collective and/or social ownership of land which was studied with reference to three major experiences: China, the Soviet Central Asian Republics and Cuba. Finally, there was an imprecise intermediate category, characterised by a mixed system of social and private ownership of land in which were placed Egypt, Tanzania and Guyana. In the latter two countries collective and private ownership of land and means of production coexist. Egypt, however, represented a borderline case. While there is no communal ownership of land, there is, none the less, a comprehensive system of supervised co-operatives through which the State enforces land consolidation, regulates certain aspects of agricultural production such as crop rotation and implements a tight procurement system. Moreover, membership of these co-operatives is compulsory, distinguishing the Egyptian system

¹ This section is a slightly amended version of the introductory chapter of Agrarian Systems and Rural Development.

from the usual pattern of voluntary co-operatives with partial coverage and limited functions which prevail in most developing market economies. In addition it could be claimed that particularly in the 1960s, the Egyptian agrarian reforms occurred in the context of a substantial extension of State ownership in the economy and that there was reason to believe that the system of co-operatives would develop into a fully-fledged system of producer co-operatives.

In spite of these imprecisions, it could be argued that the typology that was used provided a convenient framework of analysis. It conforms to the broad categories in terms of which most people think and in which the countries concerned prefer to project their own experiences.

Each of these categories could be loosely described as having different 'agrarian systems'. This term has been used as an organising concept throughout most of the study and its use was intended to draw attention to four key elements which recur in the analysis. These were the pattern of land ownership, the organisation of agricultural production, the structure of incentives and the over-all economic context in which agriculture is situated. Although the relative importance of each element varies from case to case, together they constitute a common analytical core which runs through the case studies. Thus the scheme of analysis focuses on these key elements and their interrelationships.

The performance of the alternative agrarian systems was evaluated in order to identify the major factors conducive to agrarian change, the main problems faced by each system and, by so doing, perhaps suggest policies that might improve the performance of each. The performance of each case was generally evaluated on the basis of a number of common criteria. The first was productive efficiency: the extent to which each system succeeded in promoting growth on the basis of an efficient use of resources. The second was the extent to which each system succeeded in providing employment and promoting an egalitarian distribution of income. The third was the ability of each system to generate surplus to sustain its growth on the basis of self-reliance. Besides these criteria

an attempt was occasionally made to determine the performance of the system in promoting popular participation and in satisfying basic human needs.

I.2 Alternative Agrarian Systems: Performance, Problems and Policies

In this section, we shall present, separately, over-all evaluations of the performance of each of our three types of agrarian systems. The intention is to synthesise the observations about performance as well as problems and policies that are contained in the individual studies.

I.2.1 The System of Private Farming

The first cluster of countries - India, Bangladesh and South Korea - have agrarian systems based on the private ownership of land and agricultural production is based on individual farming. These countries have experienced widely divergent rates of growth and differ in terms of over-all economic structure and level of development and demonstrates that widely divergent outcomes are possible within a given system of land ownership.

In Bangladesh, the rate of growth in agricultural output per capita during 1950-1973 has been negative (-1.1 per cent per annum). Over the same period, India has had only a moderate rate of growth (0.8 per cent) while, in contrast, the rate of growth has been three times higher in South Korea (2.3 per cent).¹ At the same time, there is little doubt that the numbers in absolute poverty (defined conservatively as inadequate food intake) in the rural areas of Bangladesh and India have increased whereas it is highly likely that absolute rural poverty no longer exists in South Korea.

No simple conclusions can be drawn from these stylised facts since they subsume within them complicated economic and political factors.

¹ K. Griffin and A. K. Ghose, "Growth and Impoverishment in the Rural Areas of Asia", World Development, Vol. 7, No. 4/5, April/May 1979, Table 3, P. 364.

Without pretending to provide more than a partial explanation, however, the difference in the degree of land concentration can be singled out as a central differentiating characteristic. In the two countries on the Indian sub-continent, land ownership is highly concentrated and powerful landowning interests exist. The agricultural surplus is also highly concentrated and a substantial proportion of the rural population live in poverty as small tenant farmers and landless labourers. As is well known, under such an inegalitarian structure, institutional monopolies exist in the land and labour markets and the rural rich can influence the political and administrative structure in their favour. There is thus a strong tendency for inequality in the distribution of wealth and income to increase, and for poverty to be perpetuated.

Within such a structure and in the absence of a major shift in political power in the countryside, there are limited options in rural development strategy. Maximising the rate of growth and hoping for 'trickle down' to occur is often seen as the only way out of the 'poverty trap' within the given economic and political constraints. Such a strategy, however, as the Indian case study demonstrates, rarely succeeds in bringing about the requisite broad diffusion of a new technology and in increasing the rate of labour-absorption in agriculture. The new technology is beyond the means of the poor majority and its introduction exacerbates inequalities and often leads to an absolute deterioration in their welfare.

The need for full diffusion of the new technology and to counteract its disequalising and immiserising effects is usually recognised but effective instruments for attaining these objectives do not exist. The usual instrument adopted is some form of administrative intervention designed to counteract the exclusion of the poor due to highly imperfect markets. Thus co-operatives are instituted as distribution channels for new inputs and for credit, and extension services are created as the sales network for the disembodied part of the new technology. 'Comprehensive', 'integrated' approaches are launched in the hope that a 'big push' will do the trick better.

But as the Bangladesh study (which evaluates the much publicised Comilla model of rural co-operatives as a vehicle for rural development) shows, such improvisations cannot easily overcome the combined forces of entrenched economic and political interests. 'Co-operative capitalism' as the means to broad-based rural development is difficult to achieve in a situation where assets are very unequally distributed and a substantial minority are dispossessed and destitute. It is true that the Comilla experiment does show that a massive concentration of resources in a small area and generous subsidies on new inputs can generate impressive increases in output. But it also shows that even in such an artificially favourable situation, an equitable distribution of income was not achieved, marginalisation and immiserisation were not arrested and the use of the co-operatives in the interests of the rich was not prevented. Worse, it is even doubtful if the co-operative infrastructure per se, as opposed to the infusion of heavily subsidised new inputs, made any independent contribution to the observed growth.

The studies on Bangladesh and India also show that, even the simple growth objective, when it is directed to the rural economy as a whole and not merely to an experimental enclave, is extremely difficult to attain. In India, the various mutations of a growth strategy over a quarter of a century have not achieved any acceleration in the rate of agricultural growth while in Bangladesh the attempt to replicate Comilla has had no perceptible effect in stemming the fall in per capita agricultural output. Thus even the feasibility of promoting sustained growth on a national scale has yet to be demonstrated.

A central contradiction inherent in a growth strategy within a highly unequal agrarian structure is that such a strategy requires, and obtains, the lion's share of investment funds for agricultural development. The logic of a growth maximisation strategy dictates that resources should be concentrated on progressive farmers and regions. There is consequently relatively little in the way of development resources that will be left over to deal with the mass poverty that remains unalleviated by growth. Thus, the opportunity cost of growth that does not 'trickle down' is the benefit that could have

been derived from using these investment funds in a direct attack on poverty. It is little wonder therefore that resources devoted to 'small farmer programmes' and to public works schemes have been puny in relation to estimated requirements. Thus, a Paretian justification for a growth strategy is patently unconvincing; those who lose absolutely are not compensated, both because benefits do not trickle down and because the demands of growth leave little for the implementation of compensatory 'poverty-orientated' schemes.

The case of South Korea, on the other hand, appears to show that a radical land reform can install a system of egalitarian peasant farming which ensures growth without mass destitution. Prior to land reform, South Korea suffered from the sub-continental syndrome of today: endemic rural poverty, a tenancy system characterised by high rent burdens and an extreme concentration of agricultural surplus. It also had one of the most unfavourable land/man ratios in the world. Against such a background, the land reform needed to be drastic, and drastic it was. Expropriation was almost total, the ownership ceiling was set at a level that ensured near-universal access to land, and firm provisions were instituted to prevent the re-emergence of disequalising tendencies. There was thus a drastic reshuffling of the claims to land and the rules of the game were then redefined to exclude extreme polarisation. Yet within these constraints, the system remained one based on individual farming.

The post-reform system based on very small family farms has obviously worked. The egalitarian base created by land reform has resulted in the easy diffusion of new inputs and there is consequently a broad uniformity in production conditions across farms of all sizes. Growth in output and productivity has been impressive while the broad access to asset ownership guaranteed by the reform has ensured that the benefits from growth have been widely shared. The South Korea case also shows, however, that disequalising forces will still continue to operate even after a drastic reform and continued firm enforcement of land ceilings and restrictions on land tenancy are required.

It is important to note, however, that there were several factors specific to the Korean case which made the transition to a more egalitarian system feasible. The reforms took place in the immediate aftermath of a major social upheaval and the pre-reform system of small tenancies and the absence of widespread landlessness made the conversion to a system of family-operated farms easier. Furthermore, the level of agricultural productivity was already high at the time of the land reform and thus favourable preconditions for further growth already existed. Finally, the task of rural development in South Korea has been greatly facilitated by its extraordinary rate of export-led industrial growth. Labour-absorption in industry was extremely high and since 1969 the rural population has been falling.

These case studies suggest that gross inequality in land ownership is the dominant obstacle to broad-based rural development. Thus, where feasible, a radical land reform offers a swift way out from mass rural poverty and the post-reform system, as the Korean case has shown, can still be based on individual farming. Where such a reform is not possible the task will be very much more difficult.

I.2.2 The Intermediate Category

Within this category Guyana and Tanzania provide interesting points of comparison in terms of the problems of transforming underdeveloped agrarian structures.

The agrarian structures which were inherited by Guyana and Tanzania from their colonial past could broadly be described as dualistic and dependent, but with significant differences on several points. Although plantations existed in both countries Guyana was much closer to the model of a pure plantation economy¹ than Tanzania. One crop (sugar) and one multinational corporation attained a prominence in the Guyanese economy which had no parallel in Tanzania. In addition, the Guyanese economy was built on the basis of importing African slaves and Indian indentured labour

¹ See G.L. Beckford Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World (New York, Oxford University Press, 1972).

and little survives of the indigenous Amerindian population. The peasant agriculture that has developed in Guyana originated from the attempts of the imported plantation labour to break away from a strong dependence on the plantation system. In Tanzania, by contrast, a plantation sector intruded into a large pre-existing indigenous system of peasant agriculture without destroying it. Thus, although by 1961 the plantation sector had come to account for 20 per cent of total cultivated land and the bulk of agricultural exports, the vast majority of the Tanzanian population still earned their livelihood in traditional agriculture.

These differences in initial conditions accounted for the difference in emphasis in their respective strategies for agricultural transformation, although both countries espoused a form of 'socialist' ideology. In Guyana the focus was on nationalising the plantation sector, whereas in Tanzania it was on transforming the peasant economy through villagisation and the fostering of communal production on the Ujamaa model. At the same time, however, Guyana did have plans for introducing 'co-operative socialism' in the peasant sector and Tanzania did nationalise her estate sector.

It was difficult to evaluate the achievements of these strategies for agricultural transformation in these two countries. In neither case had there been an established alternative agrarian system for long enough to permit a meaningful evaluation; the main changes have been too recent.

One problem that both countries face is that of growing differentiation among the peasantry. In Tanzania this process was still not very marked at the time of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 but the trend was clearly towards increased differentiation. This was one of the major factors which prompted the attempt to pre-empt this development through the institution of a system of Ujamaa villages. Private land on new settlements was equally allocated and communal production in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities was actively encouraged. Furthermore ceilings were imposed on private land ownership and restrictions were placed on the hiring of permanent agricultural labourers. The principle of equal distribution

of land on new settlements was also followed in non-Ujamaa 'development villages'. Although the land distribution remained unchanged in settled villages, the massive extent of villagisation that has occurred by 1976 indicates that this principle of distributing new land would have made a significant contribution to ensuring equal access to land among the Tanzanian peasantry. Moreover, communal production on the Ujamaa model, although still of relatively limited scale, together with communal action in non-agricultural activities would have also made some contribution to greater equality in income and asset distribution. The quantitative impact of these changes cannot be estimated precisely. It remains true, however, that if these measures are applied consistently, and if steady progress were made towards increasing communal production, then the Tanzanian strategy would succeed in ensuring a far greater degree of equality than would prevail under a system of 'laissez faire'.

It is also important to note that the Ujamaa and villagisation programme in Tanzania does not appear to have caused any serious disruption in agricultural production in spite of the vast resettlement of the rural population and the other problems of transition that were involved. Villagisation often meant the shift from an extensive to an intensive mode of cultivation and the adoption of new agricultural technology. Furthermore, in Ujamaa villages communal production meant the introduction of an entirely new institution with many attendant organisational problems.

In Guyana, on the other hand, little real progress has been made so far towards building 'co-operative socialism' among the peasantry. According to the author of the Guyana study, "co-operatives have resulted primarily in the creation of barely disguised agencies of State or estate control".¹ Differentiation of the peasantry has proceeded to a much greater extent in Guyana and in spite of the fact that, like Tanzania, it is a land-abundant country (with a population density of 10 persons per square mile) landlessness and land-hunger among the peasantry were very real problems. This

¹ See Chapter 6 of Agrarian Systems and Rural Development, op. cit.

situation arose from the need of plantations to preserve an adequate labour supply by encouraging the emergence of an independent peasantry, the pre-empting of the best land and of investment funds by the plantations and the fact that the heavy cost of opening up new land ruled out spontaneous settlement by peasants. In addition, the nationalisation of the plantation sector in Guyana has not been followed up by any moves for land reform in the peasant sector, or to reduce land-hunger through a vigorous resettlement programme. Moreover, the unfavourable relationships which bound the sugar-growing section of the peasantry to the plantations have as yet been unchanged. Similarly, production relations within the nationalised sector remain unchanged and a 'confrontationist' system of industrial relations, a high degree of absenteeism, low wages and poor working conditions still prevail. There has thus been as yet little tangible change in the condition of the Guyanese peasantry and plantation workers arising from nationalisation and the inauguration of co-operative socialism.

In considering this record of agricultural transition in these two countries, certain fundamental problems were identified. One was that of devising appropriate incentives in the process of agricultural transformation. In Tanzania, this issue is crucial for inducing faster growth in communal production, which at present accounts for only a small fraction of total agricultural output. Since private ownership of land still predominates, it is important to find means other than mere moral suasion to induce communal action if the Ujamaa ideal is to be achieved within a reasonable period. Similarly, in Guyana, 'co-operative socialism' among the peasantry can only be attained if appropriate incentives are created to replace the present unfavourable system which binds peasant producers to plantations and the huge inequalities in land ownership within the peasant sector are redressed.

A second problem is that of reorganising and transforming the relations of production within the nationalised sectors in both countries. If nationalisation is to have a far reaching impact on the welfare of the rural population as a whole, then more than a simple legal transfer of ownership is

required. In particular, the structure of production may have to be reorganised to meet the requirements of an over-all rural strategy. Continued dualism and the concentration of resources on the plantation sector as a convenient means of extracting a surplus for the non-agricultural sectors, may be incompatible with the over-all goal of egalitarian rural development.

The final consideration relates to the policies that are followed in relation to settlement patterns and the allocation of new land in land-abundant countries such as Tanzania and Guyana. In the latter country, the historical obstacles to new peasant settlements have not been overcome and consequently land-hunger as well as what the author of the Guyana study calls the "disintegration of rural communities" remain as serious problems. Since plantations occupy the best land and the extension of the land margin, in spite of the huge potential, is difficult, attention would have to be focused on a comprehensive land reform (covering both plantation and peasant land) to ensure equitable access to land and a balanced pattern of rural settlement. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the extension of the land margin has occurred far more easily. Under the traditional pattern of extensive cultivation, expansion of cultivated area has been possible without infra-structural investment. The control of the State over access to land is thus much looser than in a land-scarce country or one where new settlement is not possible without heavy infra-structural investment. The justification for altering the pattern of settlement through villagisation thus lies less in the need to 'grant' land than in the imperatives of increasing agricultural productivity, reaping economies of scale in the provision of social services and bringing about the eventual socialist transformation of rural society. This implies that, unless the benefits of villagisation are immediately obvious to the rural population, progress would either have to be gradual or a certain degree of compulsion would have to be applied. The Tanzanian experience is indeed one where a reliance of gradualism gave way to a greater reliance on compulsion in the programme of villagisation. We have noted earlier that villagisation in Tanzania offered an opportunity

for influencing the distribution of land towards greater equality and that the principle of equal distribution of new land ensured that this was realised. It remains true, however, in Tanzania as in Guyana, that the extension of the land margin cannot be a substitute for comprehensive land reform. In Tanzania, the inequalities in ownership in the regions with long established settlements (and which also happen to be the more prosperous regions) would have to be dealt with in the course of the socialist transformation.

Turning to the case of Egypt, it was observed that successive agrarian reforms beginning in 1952 have virtually eliminated the very large land ownerships and created an extensive network of co-operatives, but left ownership almost exclusively in private hands. However the control of the State over the agricultural sector was extended and this enabled it to manipulate the inter-sectoral terms of trade in such a way as to ensure the transfer of agricultural surplus to the modern sector.

In evaluating the performance of the post-reform agrarian system we shall concentrate on growth, distribution and the disposal of the agricultural surplus.

The growth performance of Egyptian agriculture over the last twenty-five years, has, on the whole, been slow. The average annual growth rate of agricultural value-added did not exceed that of population. Certainly, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed an acceleration in growth, mainly reflecting the impact of improved co-operative services and the effect of the new crop rotation system. But by the end of the 1960s, there was a slow-down in growth due to the combined effect of a number of factors most important of which were the lack of continued investment in agriculture infrastructure, the decline in co-operative services and a lack of resources to transform the technique of production (which in turn was due to the squeeze to which agriculture was subjected).

As regards land and income distribution, the initial period of agrarian reform witnessed a definite reduction in inequality and a drop in the magnitude of absolute poverty. But by the beginning of the 1970s, the equalising

effects of the reform were thinning out, and this, together with a rapid population growth, explains the increase in inequality and impoverishment. After 25 years of agrarian reform, the initial inequalities in rural Egypt have not fundamentally diminished: 40 per cent of the households were landless and 35 per cent lived in poverty. Moreover, the slow growth of agriculture, on the one hand, and the inability of industry to absorb the new entrants to the labour force, aggravated the employment situation. This led to the rapid 'tertiarisation' of both the rural and urban sectors as the rural poor who faced limited access to land and had no prospect of employment in agriculture, tried to join the ranks of the so-called 'informal sector' in urban areas, and to engage in low productivity activities such as handicrafts and petty trade.

Government policies towards the rural sector have compounded the problems of ensuring growth and equitable distribution. A slight improvement in real per capita rural income during the 1950s and 1960s was followed by stagnation, and the rural-urban differentials in real per capita incomes have been widening. Two key factors explain these disparities. First, in Egypt, the Government has, until recently, manipulated the inter-sectoral terms of trade in such a way as to be able to squeeze agricultural surplus. The effect of these policies was a net transfer of agricultural surplus to finance capital formation in the rest of the economy. After allowing for Government investment in agriculture, the net outflow of surplus from agriculture amounted to 15 per cent of agricultural income in Egypt over the period 1960-75.

The attempt to achieve a rapid and egalitarian rural development through major institutional change in Egypt no doubt resulted in initial gains, but since these reforms did not continue, the forces of the system, mainly the inherent inequalities, acted in such a way as to erode these gains.

I.2.3 The System of Communal Farming

The stereotype of a communal agriculture that most people have in their mind is based largely on a popular version

of the Soviet collectivisation experience. It conjures up a picture of sluggish growth, egalitarian income distribution and a high rate of involuntary accumulation imposed by the State policy of transferring resources from agriculture to industry. The three experiences analysed in the volume substantially contradict this stereotype. They also make neat generalisations impossible.

The growth performance of Cuban agriculture, except in very recent years, has not been encouraging. But in Soviet Central Asia collective agriculture served as a vehicle for rapid growth especially after the first half decade of collectivisation. In China, in spite of some vicissitudes, the communal agriculture achieved a reasonably, though not a spectacularly, high long-term rate of growth. Clearly, collectivisation does not necessarily condemn agriculture to stagnation. Nor is it a sufficient condition for rapid growth. One must go beyond the mere fact of collectivisation and look into the details of organisation and policies within the framework of which the system works. As is evident from the case studies, the performance depends largely on the proper evolution of what may broadly be called a system of incentives.

In the provision of employment and egalitarian distribution of income the performance of the system, as exemplified by the three cases, is uniformly good. Employment is guaranteed and sometimes imaginative provisions are made to overcome the problems of seasonality and to ensure greater participation of women. Basic human needs are by and large satisfied; especially in the areas of health, education and social security the production units serve as the organisational framework for the provision of services. Poverty, in the sense it prevails in large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, is virtually unknown.

It is, however, not true that collectivisation automatically and easily overcomes all inequalities in the distribution of income. For Cuban agriculture the relevant

information is not available, but in both Soviet Central Asia and China significant, even considerable, inequalities in rural income distribution persist. Such inequality derives from difference in earning capacities of individual members (aggravated by the difference in their dependency ratios) within a basic production unit, differences between basic production units and differences between regions. Once again, as emerges from the experience of China, the minimum feasible inequality in any given historical and cultural situation is determined by the need to provide material incentives to ensure a reasonable rate of expansion of production ('development of productive forces') without which the very basis of an egalitarian social system would flounder.

On accumulation the evidence was less certain. The limited information about the Soviet Central Asian collective farms shows that a farm can often save at a high rate. The case of the Chinese communes was even more convincing: the total contribution to capital formation is frequently of the order of 30 per cent of a commune's net output. It was, however, not true that collectivisation is an inevitable mechanism of transferring vast resources out of agriculture. Neither in Soviet Central Asia nor in China has such large transfer of resources been a feature of State policy towards agriculture. In both cases the ability of the system to provide reasonable incentives derived substantially from the policy of not extracting a large surplus out of collective agriculture.

The success of a collective agriculture depends crucially on the provision of a well-balanced system of incentives. As is evident from the experience of Cuba in the 1960s and of China during the Great Leap Forward, an attempt to curb material incentives, without a proper development of the political and cultural consciousness of the population (the possibility of which is itself unproven), can have disastrous consequences for productive efficiency. The provision of incentives in a collective economy is not a simple task that can be administered easily. As is discussed in the case study on China incentives at three different levels - individual, collective and sector - need to be provided on a consistent and comprehensive basis.

The proper configuration of the basic collective unit ('the basic accounting unit') is crucial to the development of a system of incentives for the individual workers. Such a unit should be small enough to make a proper assessment of individual performance possible. It also means that the hierarchy of organisation should be such that the activities involving indivisibilities and economies of scale are handled by a higher level of collective organisations. The organisation of the Chinese communes perhaps constitutes what may be called a successful example. In the three-tiered organisation, involving the team, the brigade and the commune, the team is almost universally the basic accounting unit. Its small size - usually about 30 households - is highly conducive to a proper evaluation of individual performance so that rewards can be made proportional to such performance. The larger land improvement or irrigation works, as well as the industrial enterprises embodying economies of scale, are naturally beyond the ability of a team to handle efficiently. These are organised by the brigades and/or the commune. A proper configuration of the production units and an appropriate degree of decentralisation of decision-making among different levels of production units are essential preconditions for the evolution of the system of incentives.

Incentives must also be adequately provided for the various collective units - the teams, the brigades and the communes to name the Chinese ones - to induce them to achieve greater productive efficiency. Here the systems of taxation, procurement and distribution of inputs play a crucial role. Both in the Soviet Central Asia and in China the State authorities have demonstrated considerable imagination in recent years in evolving an incentive-oriented system of taxation and procurement. The main ingredient of this policy is a two-tier procurement system with a lower price for a basic procurement quota and a much higher price offered to any voluntary sale over and above the basic quota. The system effectively renders the marginal rate of taxation (subsidies) lower (higher) than the average.

Finally, the question of incentives for the agricultural sector as a whole is linked up with the question of the

extraction of resources out of agriculture through taxation or the imposition of unfavourable terms of trade. Unless such resource extraction is modest the agricultural sector would be subject to serious disincentive which would be transmitted downward to affect adversely the incentives of the collective units and individuals. In some early experiences of collectivisation excessive extraction of resources through such means was undoubtedly the chief factor in explaining slow growth. It is, however, interesting to note that neither in Soviet Central Asia nor in China has State policy favoured any large and continuous extraction of resources out of agriculture. This may have been one of the most important causes of the success collective agriculture has achieved in these two cases.

In all systems of communal agriculture some form of private activity continues to exist. In Cuba it takes the form of private peasant households who cultivate about a third of the arable land. In Soviet Central Asia and China it takes the form of private plots to which all members of the collectives have claim. The advantage of the continued existence of private activity is the flexibility that it provides the system: it is far simpler to allow individual households to grow their own vegetables and poultry than to set up a network of supply for the distribution of such perishable goods. But it also creates additional problems of operating the collective economy. Collective income is subject to deductions for taxation by the State, financing of welfare services and collective accumulation. It is virtually impossible to subject the earnings from private plots to such deductions and it is at best difficult to subject the peasant producers, such as the ones in Cuba, to equivalent deductions. The result is a built-in bias in favour of labour allocation to private activities. Such bias is further aggravated by the fact that private production can frequently be sold freely while collective production is subject to procurement at fixed prices. Given the difficulty and high cost of taxing private activities, it would be hard to devise policies to correct the balance. Also, it would be undesirable to give up this source of flexibility by abolishing private activities altogether. All the State policy can do is to keep the distortion to a minimum by

subjecting collective production to no more than modest taxation and surplus extraction and by raising productivity in collective activities by directing as much investment to them as is feasible.

I.2.4 Some Concluding Comments

In the above the achievements and problems of the three broad categories of agrarian systems, as well as the comparative analysis of the cases in each category, have been discussed. To conclude, let us briefly recapitulate the major conditions of success of each category of agrarian systems.

In a system of private farming the most important condition of egalitarian growth is an equitable land reform and its continued enforcement. In the present set of case studies this is the characteristic that distinguishes South Korea from the other two cases of private agriculture and largely explains its vastly different performance.

The question may be raised that the present case studies do not really include an example of successful private agriculture without an egalitarian land reform such as in the Punjab in India and Pakistan. Although no case study on these areas has been included in the present volume we have evidence from previous studies to serve as the basis for an answer to such a question. While the growth in output in the Punjab has been quite impressive, it has been reasonably well established that the performance in terms of income distribution has been unencouraging, even dismal.¹ Moreover, compared to many South and South-east Asian countries the Punjab has a far more favourable land/labour ratio. South Korea, on the other hand, has about the lowest land/labour ratio in the whole world - even lower than that most archetypal of the land scarce countries, Bangladesh.² Nor is the South Korean

¹ For example, see the evidence in Chapters 2 and 3 of ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia (Geneva, 1977).

² The amount of land per member of an agricultural family is slightly lower in Bangladesh than in South Korea but per agricultural labourer land is lower in South Korea because of a higher labour participation rate. See FAO, Production Yearbook 1976 for the data on which these statements are based.

experience an isolated example: similarly strong redistributive measures achieved similar results elsewhere - in Japan and in Taiwan to mention only the leading contemporary examples.

Perhaps the most important question is that of the feasibility of such a highly egalitarian land reform. In South Korea, Taiwan and Japan such reforms were initiated by occupying armies and directed against landed aristocracies, large sections of which were closely identified with the recently defeated forces. Also, in South Korea disruptions were avoided since the reforms left the actual operational units relatively unaffected - an outcome made possible by the fact that while the pre-reform distribution of ownership of land was very unequal, that of actual operational units was highly equal. This condition does not appear to obtain in areas like the Indian subcontinent.

Yet another condition of success is the continued enforcement of the ownership limit imposed by a land reform. An important question is whether such an enforced limit can be a viable framework for agricultural development in the long run if the rest of the economy experiences a more or less unbridled capitalist expansion as in South Korea. One must continue to observe the Korean case for answer.

On a somewhat different plane one must worry about another kind of feasibility consideration. Can egalitarian peasant farming continue to serve as an organisation for growth in those densely populated Asian countries which cannot foresee anything but a continued absolute pressure of population on land? In many parts of Asia the prospect of an average farm size declining to the level of a fraction of an acre is real if egalitarian land distribution is to take place and continue to be in existence for a decade or two. Would this not render the peasant farms incapable of deriving any advantage of economies of scale and of coping with activities (e.g., the management of water) which involve significant degree of indivisibility? Without doubt, agriculture in such societies would need to have a transition towards some form of joint farming, be it in the form of co-operative activities to cope with the indivisibilities or of full-scale communal farming.

While in a system of private farming the most important question is that of the distribution of ownership in a communal system it is the question of incentives (broadly defined, as we have done, to encompass the issues of the configuration of efficient production units and decentralisation). Communal systems are built by destroying capitalism. Along with capitalism they destroy the capitalist system of incentives which is more advanced than all systems of incentives that historically preceded it. It is absurd to hope that collective agriculture can succeed without carefully building up an alternative system of incentives. One need not reject the vision of some socialist planners that mankind must ultimately be able to transform itself so that it no longer requires material incentives to fully utilise its productive potential. But no one can seriously claim that such a transformation immediately follows that of ownership. The most optimistic assumption is that such a transformation may be possible in the very long run. Until then, a solid and comprehensive system of incentives must continue to operate.

The most important fact about the cases in the intermediate category is that they all represent different stages of transition from private farming towards some form of joint farming. Essential features of such transition are the continued predominance of private ownership and the attempt on the part of the State to promote some combination of co-operative, collective and State farming by gradualist (i.e., non-revolutionary) means. These transitional characteristics define the basic conditions that need to be fulfilled if such a system is to succeed. Since private ownership predominates an essential condition of egalitarian distribution of income is an egalitarian distribution of land and other means of production. In the three cases reported in this volume the main source of inequality derives from that of the distribution of land. In Egypt, the agrarian reform eliminated the very large landowners but paved the way for the consolidation of the position of the medium and rich farmers at the cost of a high and rising degree of landlessness. In Tanzania the distribution of landholdings in the newly settled villages is equitable but

that in the much richer older villages continues to be less equal. In Guyana the peasant sector is highly stratified.

The coexistence of private and joint farming underlines the importance of balancing incentives for the two forms of organisation. In Egypt collective ownership is virtually non-existent and the problem of incentive consists of the effects of the State action towards agriculture in the form of the imposition of a heavy (and perhaps asymmetrically distributed among income groups) concealed tax through the manipulation of prices. In Guyana and Tanzania the State/collective sector is extensive so that the problem in these countries is to ensure that relative incentives for the different forms of organisation do not create obstacles in the way of appropriate balance of effort. Thus the vision of making Ujamaa villages the vehicle of growth and collectivist transformation will not be realised unless the incentives for collective work are properly organised to match that for private farming. Nor will the objective of egalitarian growth be promoted in Guyana if the relatively poorer peasant producers of sugar-cane are discriminated against in order to augment the State sector's surplus which is not deployed to achieve particularly egalitarian purposes. In the final analysis one must continue to watch these to determine if the phenomena of persistent inequality of the peasant sector and the inconsistent balance of incentives between communal and private activities are mere mistakes to be corrected with the accumulation of experience or if they are the manifestations of the logical inconsistency of the gradualist path which ostensibly attempts to redistribute income and wealth away from the rural rich without fundamentally altering the balance of their power in the society.

In every system the question of surplus generation and extraction is of overwhelming importance. It determines the incentives for the sector and ultimately for the production units and individuals. As the dominant sector of a developing economy, agriculture must save at a reasonable rate if the hope of growth is to be realised. But there is no need to extract massive proportions of such surplus out of agriculture to finance industrialisation. There are clear feasibility and

desirability limits on such transfer. The question of how much of resources can be transferred without any serious disincentive effect can only be answered with reference to each specific circumstance. In China, for a period immediately after land reforms, a significant resource transfer out of agriculture took place. But such resources were only a part of the rent and profit previously accruing to the landlords. Thus the peasants' incomes also increased at the same time as resources were being transferred and the problem of disincentive was not a serious one. The Soviet policy of resource extraction out of agriculture (to which the Central Asian experience reported in this volume was an exception) had, on the other hand, serious effects on the incentive of the sector.

It is not, however, the over-all level of resource transfer out of agriculture that alone is important. Equally important is the distribution of the burden of surplus extraction among different groups of the rural population. Thus, there are cases in systems of individual farming where the over-all terms of trade have improved for agriculture but, because of asymmetrical effects on different groups, this has led to a deterioration in rural income distribution. In general, therefore, a simple reduction in the level of surplus extraction out of agriculture is not by itself a sufficient condition for attaining balanced rural development.

The question of the desirable limit on resource transfer is perhaps even more important. Given the objectives of the society and the production (including export) possibilities it is a question of which sectors should receive investment in what proportion? In few of the contemporary cases of industrialisation through the extraction of resources from agriculture were decisions made on the basis of a proper investigation of this question.

I.3 A Summary of Discussion on the ILO Study

This summary does not purport to cover all aspects of the discussion. Rather, the intention is only to record the principal points which emerged during the discussions of the ILO study. These points have been grouped under specific

headings and no individual attributions have been made. It should also be noted that discussions in the workshop were free and wide-ranging and there was no attempt to arrive at consensus on issues or adopt resolutions. The following should thus be read as a record of the diversity of viewpoints represented, some of which appeared to be widely supported while others were essentially views held by one or two individuals. It is hoped however that the very diversity of views represented at the workshop will prove stimulating to policy-makers and researchers from a broad spectrum of countries and backgrounds.

I.3.1 Typology Used in the Study

Several participants felt that the typology that had been used in the study, namely the division of countries into three categories of agrarian systems (private, mixed or transitional, and communal), was not entirely satisfactory. To one speaker the typology looked very much like an ex-post imposition to "create order out of chaos". While private and communal systems were logical categories the same could not be said for the transitional category. Another speaker felt that the countries in this category were a veritable mixed bag and that the concept of 'transition' itself was not a useful classifying principle since every system could be said, in some sense, to be in transition.

Yet another view was that it made no sense to classify agrarian systems on any basis other than that of the existing class structures. For instance, the countries included in the category of private farming exhibited significant differences in their class structures and focusing on these differences would contribute more to understanding agrarian change in these societies than an emphasis on the fact that they were all characterised by the private ownership of land.

The editors of the volume agreed that there were conceptual problems with the mixed or transitional category but felt that this was not a very serious limitation of the study. The typology was a relatively minor element in the analytical framework of the study. The important consideration was that

the case studies represented comprehensive evaluations of the performance of each country according to broadly uniform criteria and thus constituted a sufficient basis for discussing the significance of alternative forms of organisation in promoting rural development. Each case study had certain lessons to offer and it would be instructive to focus on them.

1.3.2 Methodology

Several speakers felt that the study relied on too narrow a set of evaluative criteria and did not sufficiently emphasise wider considerations of political economy. A serious shortcoming was the total absence of class analysis. Policies and strategies were listed and described without linking these to the class structure and the nature of the State which formed and executed these policies. It was maintained that this revealed a naive view of the process of social change and greatly impoverished the studies; the key questions of why particular policies were introduced, whose interests it served, etc. were avoided. In particular favourable references that had been made to South Korea, Taiwan and Japan were mere apologia. The so-called 'success' of agrarian reform in these countries could not be understood without reference to the class structure of these societies, the nature of the State and their position within the world capitalist system.

A related point was that of problems with comparisons across economic systems. Certain common elements could be identified but there were also large differences in levels of development, in social, political and economic particularities, and in historical features which needed to be taken into account. The totality of issues involved had tended to be ignored in the ILO study.

One question on which it was felt that a wider approach could have proved more useful was in the explanation of changes in rural poverty. It had been mentioned that an important finding of an earlier ILO study [Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia, (Geneva, 1977)] was that in a wide cross section of countries the phenomenon of increasing poverty was encountered

and interestingly, this was true irrespective of the rates of growth of population, agricultural production and other indicators of development. While many participants expressed interest in the question of rising poverty and its relation to the agrarian systems it was suggested by some and agreed by others that the question of poverty could not be looked at only in terms of agrarian systems. It was also suggested that to study agrarian systems in isolation from their national as well as international contexts could be unsatisfactory.

One participant felt the study depended too heavily on abstract criteria and preconceived notions of particular forms which agrarian change had to take. Different institutional experiments had been described without reference to the motives for introducing such changes and the precise nature of outcomes that were intended. It was argued that it was important to recognise that there were many motives for change and many ways for implementing it.

Another participant singled out what he considered to be a missing link which weakened the analysis considerably. This was the structure of production which had an important bearing on a number of issues that were discussed in the case studies. Changes in the production structure directly determine changes in the distribution of income and were hence a crucial element in land reform programmes. A common problem of all attempts to change agrarian systems was that of how to modify production structures to ensure greater access to productive resources, a better distribution of income and reduced dualism between plantation and peasant sectors.

On the criticism that the ILO study ignored the nature of the State and class analysis, one of the editors said that this was not an entirely justified criticism. The authors certainly did not subscribe to the theory of the neutral state. Furthermore, a blanket condemnation was unjustified since the different authors used a variety of approaches. There had been no attempt to offer a theory of agrarian change or to write a political manifesto. Rather the intention was to evaluate a number of experiences using wider criteria than just economic growth. He concluded by doubting whether any

theory of the state could provide a blanket explanation of changes in agrarian systems. Such theories were an important part of any explanation but could not in themselves explain everything.

I.3.3 Land Reform

The desirability and viability of redistributive land reforms as a means of transforming agrarian systems and of reducing rural poverty was a central issue of contention in the workshop. Three distinct positions emerged.

The first position was a total rejection of these reforms on the grounds that they could not offer a long-term solution to the problems of rural development. They were essentially relief measures that could not alter the fundamental character of the agrarian system. The creation of small-scale peasant agriculture would not solve the problems of rural poverty since the forces inherent in a system of private ownership of land would reinstate inequality and thus nullify the effects of the initial distribution. The only long-term viable solution, according to this view, was the transformation of private land ownership into communal ownership.

The second position was a strong advocacy of distributive land reforms. This rested on the argument that both historical experience and empirical evidence suggest that egalitarian peasant systems have been compatible with the reduction of poverty. The cases of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were cited as examples.

It was argued that a land reform would lead to greater equality, reduced poverty and increased productivity. There existed abundant evidence that as compared to large farms, small farms have higher employment and yields per unit of land; a higher capital/land ratio but lower capital/labour ratio; and that income distribution in small peasant systems tended to be more egalitarian. Even with an initial fall in production, the share of income of the rural poor tended to increase because the redistribution of land meant the redistribution of income from property. Furthermore, some of the arguments advanced by critics of distributive land

reforms were not supported by facts. For instance, the argument that small peasants' ability to save was lower than large farmers and, therefore, their contribution to accumulation was limited, was not supported by the limited evidence available. The objection raised by opponents of land reform that in the long-run this system was bound to break down under the influence of the disequalising factors inherent in a private ownership system ignored the fact that in the intervening period a number of favourable changes could have been created which made a reversal difficult. One such change was the decline in rural poverty while the other was the growth of non-agricultural sectors to absorb surplus population from the rural areas. Moreover, the experience of China showed that an egalitarian peasant system does not hinder the ultimate transformation to socialism but may prepare the way to the establishment of communal agriculture. Finally, an additional argument in favour of land reform was that giving land to the landless was a swift means of increasing their economic power and enhancing their participation in the political system.

The third position was a rejection of land reform based on the argument that small peasant farms are not the most productive forms of organisation. The starting point of this argument was that the most appropriate tenure system was that which guaranteed the efficient use of resources. It was further argued that neither the state farms nor small peasant farms could achieve these objectives. Small subsistence farmers were neither able nor willing to understand and acquire technical knowledge and modern management methods. Moreover, it was argued that the fragmentation of land into small plots might perpetuate traditional methods of cultivation and reduce the marketable surplus. These arguments were used to advocate the maintenance of large farms which - it was claimed - were more efficient and acted as leaders in introducing new technology. Another argument in support of large farms from a point of view different from that mentioned above was that these large farms facilitated mechanisation and thus increased productivity. Evidence in support of this argument was based on the experience of the Soviet Union during the period of collectivisation.

A subsidiary issue arising out of the debate on land reform was that of the replicability of successful experiences. Several participants argued that basing the case for redistributive land reforms on the success of the South Korean or Japanese experiences ignored two important factors. First the success in these cases was due to specific factors such as the enforcement of land reform by a foreign power and the fact that these were countries locked into the world capitalist system. Secondly, a distinctive feature of the East Asian model has been the rapid expansion of industry which helped to absorb surplus labour and thus reduce poverty. Hence, in countries which were unwilling or unable to fulfil these conditions the effects of a land reform could turn out to be quite different.

I.3.4 Methods of Implementing Changes in Agrarian Systems

The importance of political mobilisation and organising the rural poor in support of agrarian reforms was emphasised by several speakers at various points in the discussion.

One speaker, drawing on his experience in the implementation of land reform legislation felt that public meetings were an effective means of mobilising support among the rural poor and could serve as countervailing power to overcome fears of victimisation on the part of individual labourers or sharecroppers. He felt that the organisation of the peasantry into independent pressure groups was vital to the success of changes being introduced under mixed systems.

Another participant, citing the example of West Bengal, stated that fear of economic sanctions and the lack of countervailing organisational support was a major deterrent to action by the poor and that group action and delinking from traditional sources of finance were important conditions for success.

Others stressed that it was important to raise political consciousness in order to further the development of communal production.

I.3.5 Aspects of Communal Systems

It was noted that the common characteristics of these agrarian systems were the socialisation of the means of production and coexistence of private farms.

These countries, it was argued, had achieved a remarkable growth of production and equitable distribution of wealth and income as a result of the elimination of landlessness and transfer of the surplus for accumulation purposes.

It was also noted that forms of collective ownership and agricultural organisation varied among these countries as did methods of work organisation and systems of remuneration. The relative importance of private farms also differed considerably.

One speaker, commenting on the study of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, said that because of the vastness of the country and differences in climatic and ecological characteristics, there was regional specialisation in the cropping pattern all over the country. This primarily explained the emphasis on cotton production in the Central Asian Republics. He added that the relative sizes of collective and state farms varied depending on socio-economic and technological considerations. Most of these farms were mechanised and there had been a growing intensification of production and expansion of agro-industrial enterprises. The choice of agrarian system in any country was dictated by the economic and cultural levels of the society. This was illustrated by the experience of the USSR.

The speaker also disputed the claim that about 40 per cent of the collective farmers' income came from the private farm. Firstly, these private farms obtained their material inputs from the collectives, and the farmers depended on the collective funds for financing these inputs. Secondly, in most cases, farmers were reluctant to take private farms since it entailed additional work.

A second speaker raised the question of whether a stage of peasant proprietorship was a necessary condition before moving to a higher form of socialist agricultural organisation. If this were so there would still be a strong argument for the redistribution of land even in a socialist system. But another participant felt that history showed that this was not always the case. Rather, the political situation at home and international conditions dictated the pattern and pace of the process of development. In the Soviet Union, collectivisation was not emphasised initially, but dispossession of large capitalist farmers and distribution of land to the peasantry was effected. But expropriation may not necessarily be followed by redistribution as in the case of Cuba.

On the question of agricultural organisation, a speaker indicated the inherent tension in the hierarchical structure of the Chinese four-tier system. These various levels - commune, brigade, team and private plots - were rather specialised and had a distinct function to serve. There were certain forces at work which were likely to determine the evolution of this organisation. As labour in rural China became scarce and the adoption of labour saving technology increased, there would be a tendency to strengthen the communal level to take advantage of economies of scale. But a corollary to a growing scarcity of labour was a rise in the levels of income of the rural population. The shift in the consumption pattern to high protein food products such as vegetables and dairy products would favour the growth of small farm plots which fitted such a production pattern.

On the question of incentives, a speaker pointed out that the important aspect was to examine their impact on the opportunity of movement from one category to another of the job hierarchy and from one collective to another. Commenting on this, one of the co-authors of the study on Soviet Central Asia observed that education and technological knowledge were important factors for mobility. An upward movement was not easy for the non-technical staff of the collectives.

The same speaker pointed out that inter-collective differences in terms of income levels and standards of living

of the members continued to exist. The major factors accounting for this were differences in natural resource endowments, in initial levels of development and proximity to urban centres. However, in the USSR, the Government had adopted a number of policies to control such income differentials. The pricing policy of the Government permitted a continuous process of equalisation of income. State investment and loans favoured poor collectives. The relative importance of collective consumption was steadily increasing which might also counteract the tendency of inter-collective income differentials. But, notwithstanding these measures, there were still considerable inequalities among the collectives.

II. Country Reports

This chapter summarises the presentations made by participants on countries which had experienced or were undergoing interesting experiences in agrarian reform not covered by the ILO study. The participants who made these presentations had an intimate knowledge of the countries they spoke about and in most cases had been actively involved in the implementation of agrarian reform programmes.

II.1 Ethiopia: Presentation by Mr. Tesfaye Teklu

Only 11 per cent of the total arable land in Ethiopia is under cultivation. Agriculture contributed a little over 50 per cent of the GDP. Eighty-eight per cent of the potential labour force were engaged in agricultural activity. Agriculture was also the most important source of the country's foreign exchange earnings and the dominant sector of the economy.

In the pre-1974 era the dominant type of production relations in agriculture was feudal. There was, however, a north-south dichotomy which was not the product of geographical factors but of a long historical process. In the North prior to 1974, peasants had the right of usufruct of land, which was dominantly family owned, but were not entitled to sell it. In the South, however, peasants had seldom enjoyed such a right since an overwhelming proportion of the land was owned by feudal landlords.

In the over-all development strategy prior to 1974 agriculture was generally given a lower priority. But within the agricultural sector the Government laid greater emphasis on organised farms producing commercial crops and largely neglected the peasant sub-sector.

In 1974 the military took power. The new Government declared its adherence to the principles of 'scientific socialism', and as a first step it nationalised the key sectors of the economy (i.e. industry, financial institutions, etc). In March 1975 rural lands were also nationalised and since then land has ceased to be private property except for individual holdings with a ceiling of 10 hectares of non-transferable land. The use of hired labour in peasant holdings was also prohibited.

The formation of peasants' associations was also required under the 1975 law. Eight hundred hectares was stipulated as the minimum holding limit for the formation of such an association and the membership was to be open to all tenants, agricultural labourers, landless peasants and owners of land below 10 hectares. There is hence a definite class basis for the membership of such associations. Further, the law abrogated the existing feudal relation between the landlord and tenants.

The general policy direction in the peasant sub-sector is to promote service co-operatives and at a later stage to develop producers' co-operatives. Three peasants' associations can form a service co-operative and membership is open to all members of the peasants' associations. Landlords, however, are not allowed membership of the co-operatives. These service co-operatives generally provide storage facilities, agricultural inputs and marketing facilities and also establish consumers' shops for supply of essential commodities at fair prices.

A service co-operative society has a general assembly, consisting of the delegates from the constituent peasants' associations, which elects the members of the executive committees. There are also different sub-committees for different subjects such as finance, marketing, etc.

There are at present 343 registered service co-operatives, covering 9 per cent of the peasants' associations. The logic of the whole exercise is that after peasants gain sufficient experience in the service co-operatives, they would be induced to go in for a higher form of co-operatives i.e. producers' co-operative. A producers' co-operative consists of a general assembly of all members, an executive committee whose chairman is also the chairman of the general assembly and a number of sub-committees as production teams. Six per cent of the farm households are currently under producer's co-operatives.

In 1976 the Government announced the National Democratic Revolutionary Programme which recognised three sub-sectors in the agrarian sector: state farms; producers' co-operatives; and private plots.

The Government has not come out with any comprehensive development plan and so far no comprehensive development strategy has been worked out. Neither is there a coherent agricultural price policy with prices of agricultural products being changed too frequently. There is however a tremendous rush for expansion of co-operative societies and peasant associations are being called upon to discharge numerous administrative and technical functions for which they do not, as yet, possess requisite skill and experience.

II.2 Discussion on Ethiopia

During the discussion a point was raised about the relationship between the private farms and the government policy and the instruments used by the Government to ensure that the private farms follow a nationally accepted policy regarding production, cropping pattern and the like. Another point was raised as to whether private farms were totally outside the producers' co-operatives and operated as separate entities in respect of marketing, provision of inputs or giving quotas of specified crops and the like.

Responding to this query, Mr. Teklu stated that there was no coherent pricing policy, though the Government seemed to favour the producers' co-operatives by differential prices as compared to private farms. Producers' co-operatives are in their formative stage and their impact on the agrarian sector, as yet, is rather insignificant. Generally every peasant association earmarks about 10 to 15 per cent of the total cultivable land or so as communal plot where producers' co-operatives function. Peasants continue to have their private plots; for most of the peasants, work in producers' co-operatives is a part-time occupation. Recently a basic quota for sales to the Government has been introduced; after this quota is supplied the rest of the produce can be sold in the open market.

In response to another query, Mr. Teklu clarified that under each peasant association there were various other societies like the Youth League, the Women's Association and the Revolutionary Defence Committee.

The growth of the Women's Association has not been as rapid as that of the Peasants' Association. Each peasant association has a producers' co-operative based on voluntary membership. But there is a tendency to push the peasants' associations to form producers' co-operatives.

Mr. Teklu also gave further details about the formation and workings of co-operatives. Before registering service co-operative societies it is ensured that:

- (i) the constituent peasants' associations are stable and strong;
- (ii) the associations express their willingness;
- (iii) 50 per cent of the members pay their fees as initial capital;
- (iv) peasants' associations are under the leadership of poor peasantry;
- (v) the associations have a concrete programme of action for the registration of producers' co-operatives, and
- (vi) that the society would have a fairly large tract of land under its control and that the members have socialised this means of production.

Continuous political education is being carried out to motivate peasants to form service co-operatives. Peasants themselves can assess the advantages of such societies. They get storage facilities which individually they cannot manage. They get a fair price for their products by eliminating middle men. They get their essential items from the society's consumers' stores at fair prices and near their residence. But in cases of producers' co-operatives the initiative is still from the top. Pressures are being put to form such societies and it is apprehended that it may have an adverse effect in the future.

Replying to a query on taxation, Mr. Teklu said that there are two types of taxes in the agrarian sector. In the first place there is a tax on the produce. Secondly the State realises differential rent for the use of land at progressive rates.

In reponse to a question on state farms, Mr. Teklu pointed out that in Ethiopia there had been a fairly large commercial farming sector. These farms have been converted into state farms where machines are used exclusively. Though in the areas where land has been redistributed peasants have resorted to the traditional methods of cultivation, the Government is planning a rapid extension of state farms. This would ensure an increase in the level of mechanisation.

In summing up, Mr. Teklu stated that it would be difficult to give any definite opinion as to whether the formation of state farms had any deleterious effects on production and efficient management of farms. It had been observed that some of the state farms were running at a loss. As a result the workers there could not appropriate any surplus in addition to their fixed wages. Most of these farms had been foreign owned. In their enthusiasm after the revolution the workers seized these farms. Often conflicts arose between management and workers. Many farms were suffering from a lack of proper managerial talents. Further, the fact that these farms were situated near the war zone made matters more complicated.

II.3 Madagascar: Presentation by Dr. R. Andriamananjara

The presentation was divided into three broad parts:

- (i) historical evolution of the agrarian system in Madagascar;
- (ii) the current efforts, and (iii) a projection of the future trends.

For the convenience of presentation, the speaker divided the history of the agrarian system into four distinct periods.

- (i) the pre-colonial period prior to 1896;
- (ii) the colonial system 1896-1960;
- (iii) the post-colonial system 1960-1972
- (iv) the turning point, 1972-1975.

In the pre-colonial era, in theory, land belonged to the sovereign but in practice, subject to certain restrictions, land could be owned and disposed of by individuals. There were two distinct groups who held land during this period. In the first group were the members of the nobility, civil servants and merchants who held large areas of land. These lands were either directly cultivated by slave labour or forced labour (corvée system) or indirectly by the share-croppers. In the second group were the free men who owned small tracts which they could dispose of any way they liked. The technique of agriculture used by both the groups was substantially the same. Primitive hand tools were used. Excepting some organic manure, no fertilizer was used. Agriculture was mainly devoted to production of food-stuff and there being little irrigation, it was highly sensitive to weather variation.

During the colonial era old smallholders continued and they got titles to their lands. New groups of smallholders joined their ranks due to the break-up of the large estates of the nobility. Slavery was abolished and the nobility was denied the privilege of the corvée system. This resulted in the dissolution of their estates and in many cases share-croppers became owners. The colonial rulers introduced 'concessions' - which meant grant of land free of cost or at nominal prices for agriculture, forestry and mineral exploitation. These concessions were given to (i) a handful of local people, (ii) many foreign nationals to set up medium size farms, and (iii) foreign companies to set up huge farms for large scale operations. Most fertile land was given to foreign firms.

Thus in the colonial era the agrarian system was characterised on one hand by a vast multitude of smallholders of land and on the other by large plantations owned by foreign nationals and companies. The technique of production in the smallholding sub-sector continued to be outmoded and yields were low. And the emphasis was on production of food-stuff. The plantation sector introduced modern techniques both biochemical and mechanical. It utilised free or very cheap labour. Plantations used the corvée system - a privilege which was withdrawn from the nobility. They produced cash crops for exports to the

metropolitan market. The large-scale sector also introduced the processing industry. Productivity was obviously much higher in the plantation sector as compared to the traditional sector.

In the post-colonial era there was hardly any change in the agrarian system introduced during the colonial regime. The only change was the introduction of the Regional Development Corporations and the state farms in the large scale sector. The RDC produced mostly food-stuffs partly for local consumption and partly for export. The state farms mainly engaged themselves in intensive livestock farming. Both these institutions introduced some processing of primary products.

The dichotomy between the traditional sector and the large-scale sector introduced in the colonial era not only continued but was accentuated. The pseudo co-operatives introduced in the traditional sector had no effect.

The period 1972 to 1975 was an era of ferment in national consciousness. There was general dissatisfaction. The post-colonial period was an era of stagnation. The rate of growth of agricultural products, particularly food-stuff, fell short of the rate of growth of population. Madagascar became net importer of rice. The value of import was 10 per cent of the total production and 50 - 60 per cent of the marketed output. Though the plantation sector had a better performance in terms of output, there was little improvement of the standard of life of the rural population.

In search of an alternative the country chose through a referendum the socialist option for development as outlined in the "Charter of Malagasy Socialist Revolution".

The main objectives of the long-term (up to 2000 A.D.) and mid-term plan (1978-80) are twofold:

- (i) economic independence for reinforcing political independence; and
- (ii) achievement of balanced and equitable growth.

It was recognised that there could not be any balanced growth without the active participation of the masses and that agriculture was the basis of the economy while industry

constituted the engine for its development.

The main tasks before the nation were how to eliminate the exploitative aspect of the modern sector and to integrate it within the national economy without any decrease in efficiency and secondly how to energise the traditional sector.

So far as land ownership was concerned, Madagascar adopted the principle of 'land to the tiller'. But the tiller owners would pool their resources of both land and labour through co-operativisation. It was through co-operativisation that the disadvantages of micro holdings would be overcome.

The transition programme envisaged three levels of co-operativisation. Type III was the lowest level where each member continued to own his land and tools but could put these at the disposal of the co-operative on specified terms of contract. The member was under no compulsion as he retained the output of his land. Under type II the member retained ownership of his land and tools but could voluntarily bring them to the co-operative for collective exploitation. The remuneration would be determined by work performed and the value of the land and tools placed at the disposal of the co-operative. To prevent earning of rent by hiring out land and implements, members had to participate for a minimum number of work days for an entitlement to the remuneration for land and tools. Under type III members would pool these means of production (land and implements), work collectively and would be remunerated on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work". There would be no private ownership of the means of production. Members would however be allowed to keep small plots of land for kitchen gardening and poultry raising for family consumption. No time limit had been fixed on the approach in gradual transformation from lower to higher forms of co-operativisation.

In the non-traditional sector the policy had not yet been clearly defined. Recent action of handing over two nationalised coffee plantations to a co-operative indicated a trend towards co-operativisation of even the large-scale modern sector. To ensure mass participation in the development process it had been

accepted that the fruits of development would go to the workers. This would entail fair pricing policies, marketing facilities and the like and secondly, conditions would be created to make the required tools available to workers.

During the discussion that followed his presentation Mr. Andriamananjara clarified that to provide incentives to rapid co-operativisation, expropriated land above a 500 hectare ceiling was being distributed to those who agreed to function under co-operative cover. Further the State was giving cheap credit facilities through co-operatives which the individual non-member would not be entitled to. Moreover the State adopted a preferential policy regarding supply of better seed, fertilizer and pesticides to the co-operatives. Individual non-member farmers would not have easy access to these inputs.

II.4 Chile: Presentation by Prof. J. Chonchol

In presenting the Chilean experience, Mr. Jacques Chonchol stated a brief resumé was rather difficult because of wide variation in the colonial history of Latin America and Africa. The historical experience in Latin America was quite different from what happened in Africa.

He then presented a few salient facts about Chile. The country is about 4,500 km. long with an average width of 200 km. In the north it is arid. In the middle it has mediterranean climate. It rains in winter and agriculture depends on irrigation from snow fed rivers. The south receives a lot of rain and agriculture does not have to depend on artificial irrigation. Typical products of the agrarian sector are cereals, fruits, vines - wines, cattle breeding, meat, poultry and the like. About 75 per cent of the population of about 11 million live in the cities: Santiago has a population of 3 million. The last 50 years saw a rapid process of urbanisation.

The traditional system of landholding presented an acutely skewed pattern. There was heavy concentration of land in a few hands. Most of the latifundists had an interest in agriculture but some were industrialists and city merchants. About 2 per cent of the rural families owned 80 per cent of land.

As a result most of the peasants had either no land or only minuscule holdings. They had so little land that the family could not survive on the production of such holdings. A large number of peasants lived within latifundias. They were paid wages in cash. In addition they were allowed to hold small plots of land. There were other workers who moved from one latifundia to another in search of jobs.

Most latifundists had a diversified production. In the same farm they produced cereals, bred cattle and practised mixed farming including horticulture.

Though the poor peasants wanted land reforms as they expected to get land they could not exert sufficient pressure as they lacked political power. Curiously it was the urban middle class which wanted to break and change the traditional agrarian system. They felt that the traditional system was blocking economic development. There was rapid growth of urban areas and industries resulting in a big demand for food. But the traditional latifundias failed to supply adequate food resulting in food import and balance of payment problems. The urban middle class felt that the existence of vast areas in few hands resulted in inefficient and low productivity extensive cultivation. To have efficient and high yield intensive agriculture it was necessary to reduce the size of holdings substantially. Secondly, the poverty of the masses in the rural area hindered industrial expansion. Twenty-five per cent of the population were priced out of the market. The internal market was getting constricted with resultant adverse effect on urban industrial growth.

In the past some attempts at land reforms were carried out but they failed because of the organised opposition of the landowning classes. No law could be passed. But the Cuban revolution had a tremendous impact on Chile. The US reaction to the Cuban revolution was to put pressure on the conservative groups of Latin America to modernise and to bring about some kind of land reform. The Kennedy Government came to power in USA and took the view that US aid would be substantially reduced if the Latin American governments refused to undertake land reforms. This was the Alliance for Progress policy of 1961.

With the coming to power of the Christian Democrats Chile had the first important agrarian reform law. The period 1964-70 witnessed not only the passing of an agrarian reform law but also its implementation to some extent. The new law prescribed a ceiling of 80 hectares of irrigated land or its equivalent. Land above the ceiling was liable to be expropriated. If the owner had been cultivating his land in good condition he had the right to keep a reserve of land. The main attempt was to limit the size of holding to increase capital investment per unit of land and to provide a more intensive method of cultivation. The expropriated land was to be given to the peasants in the latifundia and also to incorporate some peasants from the minifundia. For the initial five years after expropriation there would be collective cultivation through the co-operative system of production. Credit and technical assistance would be provided by the State. After this period land had to be assigned in family holdings without the right for its division through inheritance. Land could also be assigned to co-operatives. The main aim was to assign land to the peasant family units to be serviced by the co-operative system. State farms were to be permitted in special cases. Another important feature of the law was the control of the irrigation water. Right to use irrigation water was private. The law abrogated private property over water and the State could expropriate excessive rights and transfer them to peasants. Ten per cent of the value of the expropriated land was paid in cash and the rest in 25 year bonds.

Since the attempt was to introduce a capitalist system in agriculture a trade union law was simultaneously enacted to give trade union rights to the rural workers to negotiate wages and terms of employment with capitalist entrepreneurs in rural sectors. As it was difficult to render services to large numbers of minifundists it was provided that cheap credit and technical assistance would be given if they organised themselves. Committees of small peasants were gradually organised voluntarily. These organisations were also helped by the State in building

houses, dispensaries and communal roads. Though the Christian Democrats set a target of distributing land to 100,000 peasant families about 33,000 peasants received land by 1970 when the Christian Democrats were voted out of power.

In November 1970 Allende became the President. His coalition of parties did not have a majority in the legislature. Though he had the presidential executive power he had a minority in the legislature. Therefore, he could not bring about a new law plugging the deficiencies of the earlier law. The attempt was then to implement the old law rigorously and to make the best use of its expropriative provision. Between November 1970 and September 1973 6.5 million hectares of land were expropriated. Latifundias ceased to exist. With determined political will expropriation was done through the old deficient law.

Land reform itself brought in its wake a new set of problems. Conflict arose between peasants living within the latifundia with outside peasants. The insiders felt that now that the latifundists had gone all lands should be shared by those who had been there for many years. Bringing in peasants from outside would limit their chances of getting more land. It became difficult to reconcile this conflict.

The second conflict was between the bureaucracy and the peasants. The bureaucracy was manned by highly urbanised middle classes. The best among them had a paternalistic attitude towards the peasantry. The Government decided to send bureaucrats to the countryside to help the peasants. Quite a number resisted going to live in the countryside and others who wanted to do so took a commanding role which positively hindered peasants' participation in the process of agrarian reforms.

Thirdly, rapid changes in the social situation, increase in the wages of the urban worker and in the buying power of the poor peasants through land reforms increased the demand for food from amongst those who had no opportunity so far to eat adequately. There was a 14 per cent increase in demand for food and 5 per cent increase in production in 1971. Due to nationalisation of multinational corporations and the

copper mines the country faced an economic blockade and no external help was available to meet the food shortage. There was inflation which facilitated the destabilisation of the Allende régime.

On the organisational side, joint committees of trade unions and small peasants were created at the commune level. These communal councils were also designed to balance the bureaucracy at local level.

Soon after the overthrow of Allende 40 per cent of the large estates (approximately 4 million hectares) were restored to former owners or to new latifundists. Peasant committees were disbanded. Old leaders were tortured, killed and imprisoned. Free market for land was established. With international prices of imported inputs increasing and the price of the agricultural output remaining steady a crisis developed in agriculture. In 1974 production increased slightly compared to 1973. A fall in output was witnessed in 1975-76. In 1977 there was a slight increase to be followed by a fall in 1978. This has gone together with a large decrease in real wages of workers and a sharp increase in unemployment.

II.5 West Bengal: Presentation by Mr. D. Bandyopadhyay

In 1967 and 1969, there were two short-lived United Front Governments. One of the major programmes of these two Governments was to detect land held in benami in excess of the ceiling. The mechanism was simple. To prove that any land was being held in excess of the ceiling, evidence of the share-cropper and the agricultural workers working on the land was highly important. The share-cropper knew with whom he had the economic relationship, to whom he handed over the share of the crop and who exercised effective ownership rights over the land. Similarly, the agricultural workers had the knowledge about the actual owner of the land who really enjoyed the usufruct of the property. Their testimony was of immense value. They came forward to give information and evidence mainly inspired by the open call given to them by the Government to help the administration in detecting land

held clandestinely. After initial hesitancy, in 1967, the village poor - the bargadars and agricultural workers - came forward in large numbers to the different camps set up by the Government to give information about location of the benami land and to testify that such lands were held in benami in excess of the ceiling. In a short time, it almost assumed the character of a mass movement throughout the State which resulted in the vesting of approximately 500,000 acres of valuable agricultural land. In the history of the vesting of land in West Bengal following the promulgation of the Estate Acquisition Act, this was the most significant achievement through spontaneous popular participation. The momentum continued till about the end of 1970 and early 1971. Thereafter, it petered out.

Unfortunately, the resultant euphoria precluded any serious attempt to organise the village poor on a sound basis. As a result, as soon as there was a change of Government and the inevitable back-lash started, spontaneous mass action by the unorganised share-croppers and agricultural workers disappeared leaving the prominent participants to face the retribution individually.

The new Government which came into power in 1977 declared twin priorities in land reform. The first was the recording of the names of the bargadars and the second was the detection of land held beyond the ceiling under the new family ceiling law.

Moreover, to find out the true feelings of the village poor an exercise was undertaken through what is known as 'reorientation camps' in May 1978. For each of these two camps about 40 landless agricultural workers, landless share-croppers and marginal farmers were selected. About a dozen or so functionaries at the grass-root level of the land reform or revenue organisations were also deputed to participate in these camps. The non-official participants identified their problems and suggested solutions which they thought would be the most suitable in the prevailing circumstances. One of the initial recommendations of the

bargadars in these two camps was that the methodology of settlement operation and the recording of the names of the bargadars had to be changed if the Government desired large-scale registration. It was very clear that share-croppers were suffering from terror psychosis. They were afraid of economic sanction, i.e. withdrawal of consumption loans. They were also afraid of social repression which took various forms. Sometimes their womenfolk would be subjected to derision and insult when they went to draw water. Sometimes their children would be harshly and unfairly treated in the village school. They were afraid of being involved in false criminal cases and they were afraid of the revenue functionaries and the police officers particularly because of the part they (officials) had played during the period from 1971 to 1976. To them, the change in the Government did not mean much until there was a definite change in the delivery system favourable to them at the village level.

There was an attempt to change the recording system following the suggestions of the workers. Squads of officers visited the hamlets where the share-croppers lived. They camped in the village primary schools. They held evening meetings in these hamlets. The share-croppers spoke out what they felt. Names of the share-croppers were noted down. On the next day these names were verified in the fields in public. Tentative lists were hung up, inviting objections from the landowners and other interested persons. The objections so filed were again verified in public and it was found that most of the objections could not be sustained through public scrutiny. Thereafter, the lists of bargadars were published and certificates given to them. This had a startling effect on the village poor.

After having experimented in a few places the procedure for a short-cut method of recording of share-croppers was formalised. The Government of West Bengal launched a programme called "Operation Barga" whose main features are identification of priority areas with the help of the peasants' organisations, evening group meetings in the hamlets

of the beneficiaries to enable them to overcome the fear psychosis through group-action and public verification of claims and objections. Till now, by and large, it had remained an administrative programme though with a definite bias for the poor.

In analysing this experience in West Bengal certain serious obstacles to the process of reform stood out. So long as the landowners had a clear option to choose the mode of cultivation either by share-croppers or by hired labour, the situation would always remain disadvantageous to the landless rural workers whether they were share-croppers or wage earners. To ease the situation in favour of this group it was essential to inhibit this right of free exercise of option to choose the mode of cultivation. Agricultural workers in a basically mono-cultural region with an adverse land/man ratio had an average period of employment of 90-120 days a year. Their aspiration was to become share-croppers so that they might get a share of the produce of the land as an insurance against starvation. So they competed with existing share-croppers in underbidding their share of the produce. This threat had a deleterious effect on the morale of the share-croppers. They were known to voluntarily agree to a share of the crops much lower than what the law prescribed. A system of thika barga operated in certain remote areas where share-croppers annually changed the share. If by administrative-cum-mass action the option of the landowner could be restricted, the share-croppers would be in a position to claim a higher share of the produce. That would also help agricultural workers in securing slightly better terms of employment.

Setting up an alternative credit support system for the share-croppers was as important as recording their names in ensuring security of cultivation. Usury was the most potent instrument of exploitation in the rural areas. The victims of rack-renting were also the victims of usury. So any attempt to give protection against rack-renting without making any arrangement for alternative source of consumption and production credit would make a mockery of the entire process of land reform. A determined effort had been initiated to bring larger numbers of share-croppers within the ambit of

institutional finance, both co-operative and nationalised commercial banks. The hurdles were far too many. The nationalised commercial banks had their attitudinal problems. Even the recorded bargadar was not a worthy proposition to most of the bankers. Even though policy directives enjoined that short-term crop loans should be given to bargadars it took a lot of effort to make the commercial banks undertake substantial financing for this group. The consumption element had to be built into the crop loan on the basis of the minimum wages for man-days required for raising a crop.

There was in addition the problem of weaning the share-cropper away from the clutches of his exploiters on whom he was utterly dependent, which required a high degree of promotional activity. Even though a poor bargadar or an agricultural worker pays anything between 150 to 400 per cent per annum for the consumption loans that he took, he preferred to remain dependent on his known landowner or usurer than to establish a link with the unknown impersonal benefactor, the bank. He preferred this illusory security in debt bondage to uncertainty of emancipation. Therefore, it would require a lot of initial preparation to sponsor their cases for the institutional finance. Moreover, because of personal relationship he got at least a part of his need at a time when he needed it, from his patron. It might not be that prompt when dealing with an institution. Moreover, usury being the most important source of exploitation, the usurer and the landowner would put all the pressures that they were capable of to prevent the prey from getting away from their grip.

To popularise institutional finance among the poor the Government of West Bengal had introduced a "Scheme of Zero Interest". Those share-cropper assignees of vested land who would repay the loan taken from the banks or co-operatives within the scheduled period would not have to pay any interest. The Government would bear the entire interest cost from its own budgetary resources. Sustained efforts would be required both by the State Government officials, bankers and genuine co-operators to develop a viable credit support system for this group.

To create the necessary conditions for the share-croppers and agricultural workers to take active part in the process of land reforms, it was also necessary to reduce the possibility of exercise of violence by the rich against them. For this purpose withdrawal of gun licences of the landowners, verification and confiscation of their unlicensed weapons, publicising the right of self-defence, encouraging formation of self-defence units by the rural poor might have some salutary effect. The minimum that a government should do was make a clear and unambiguous declaration of policy that it would be on the side of the poor who had so far been denied the legitimate rights and privileges in securing full benefits and protection that they were entitled to under various laws.

II.6 Miscellaneous Points Emerging from Discussion of Country Experiences

During the session on country experiences, various references were also made to countries other than those for which presentations had been made. In the following we record some of the more interesting of these observations.

In connection with redistributive policies, it was pointed out by a participant that introducing a welfare state in a developing economy without giving sufficient attention to the productive base of the economy could be harmful. Although the rural population stood to gain a great deal from various subsidies and from free educational and health facilities, these benefits would be nullified in the longer run if basic issues of agrarian reform and agricultural productivity were neglected.

It was also observed that in countries where a land frontier existed, land development programmes were unlikely to provide an easy solution to agrarian problems. Such schemes tended to be expensive and to be implemented in a paternalistic way by governments. They were also unlikely to be able to absorb a sufficiently large number of settlers to have a significant impact on reducing landlessness and rural poverty.

On the implementation of land reform programmes, it was observed that people's participation was crucial. A successful land reform was possible only with strong political will at the top which was backed by mass support and participation. It was felt that one way of ensuring people's participation was to entrust the implementation of land reform programmes to elective bodies at the village level in which tenants and landless workers have strong majority representation. The established administrative machinery was to be avoided since it was unlikely to prove responsive to the interests of the rural poor. Similarly an implementation machinery based on patronage along narrow political lines was bound to be unsuccessful.

III. Ujamaa and Villagisation in Tanzania

III.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief introduction to the Ujamaa and villagisation programme in Tanzania. It is hoped that this material will provide the context for an appreciation of the village reports to readers who are not familiar with the agrarian institutions created in the wake of the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The focus is on the main objectives of the Tanzanian strategy for rural development, the process of villagisation and the institutional framework and functioning of the villages.

The Ujamaa system was established in part to overcome the weaknesses in the agricultural system inherited from the colonial era some of which had been accentuated in the early years of independence. These included the existence of dualism, growing economic differentiation among smallholders and regions, low productivity and low level of labour utilisation in the smallholder sector and the pattern of rural settlement with preponderance of isolated homesteads spread over a vast country. In addition to surmounting economic problems, the Ujamaa system was designed to create the institutional framework for political democracy and for a socialist, self-reliant pattern of rural development. Thus the main objectives of Tanzania's rural development policies and programmes may be summarised as follows: the creation of a framework that would facilitate both the mobilisation of the rural population and the diffusion of technological and organisational innovations to diversify and increase agricultural and non-agricultural production, the encouragement of collective and co-operative forms of production, distribution of goods and marketing - with a view towards transforming the rural sector into a socialist structure capable of promoting rural development without excessive differentiation in wealth, income and power; improvement of the basic social and economic infrastructure, with particular emphasis on meeting the basic needs of the masses and the promotion of inter-regional equity.

The guiding ideology stressed that responsibility for achieving these rural development objectives must lie primarily with the peasants themselves, who would be supported morally, organisationally and materially by the Party and the Government, working mainly through their district level structures and a variety of rural institutions.

III.2 Process of Villagisation

The settlement of the rural population into villages was the cornerstone of the Tanzanian strategy for rural development. President Nyerere envisaged three distinct stages in the villagisation process. In the first stage the scattered smallholders would move into villages to facilitate the provision of services and to organise production more efficiently. In the second stage each village would initiate communal activities in an embryonic form. In the third and final stage the villagers would be persuaded that communal activity was a superior form of organisation and, as a result, would convert themselves into predominantly communal farmers with some provision for private plots. To date the last stage has not been reached; individual smallholdings remain the overwhelmingly dominant form of organisation.

Although experiments in communal farming and village settlement had been pursued in the years preceding and following independence, it was the Arusha Declaration issued in February, 1967 which gave an impulse to large scale creation of villages. In the early stages, the Party and the Government relied almost entirely on the peasants' own initiative to establish villages. Their role was confined to providing assistance in the building up of basic social and economic infrastructure. Later in 1969, the Government decided to select a few areas for accelerating the process of villagisation. The areas selected were Dodoma, Iringa, Lindi, Matwara and Mara. This resulted in a big spurt in the growth of villages; the village population rose from 58,000 in 1968 to over 1.5 million in 1971. Following the experiences gained during this period, the Party decided in 1973 that villagisation should be made compulsory for the entire rural population.

The Government was given three years to implement this directive. Consequently, large scale mobilisation of the peasants into village communities began in 1974. The proportion of the village population rose from less than 18 per cent in March 1974 to over 60 per cent in March 1975 and by the end of 1976 nearly 90 per cent of the population was reported to be living in villages. Thus in little over two years, nearly 10 to 11 million people were incorporated into villages.

The period was marked by a number of changes in the characteristics of the villages. The average village population rose from 345 in 1971 to over 500 in 1974 and more than trebled between 1974 and 1976 to reach a figure of 1,700. Typically, the establishment of a village involved settlement on new lands. In the early years and right up to 1973, the greatest progress in villagisation had been made in areas of low potential with sparse population depending largely on subsistence farming. Conversely, densely populated districts, where crop production was most developed and where individual rights to land were most entrenched, were least affected by the Ujamaa movement. From 1973 onward, the emphasis shifted away from the creation of Ujamaa villages with communal production to mass villagisation based on block farming in which peasants cultivate individual holdings within an overall block of land allocated to the village.

These changes in policy relating to the organisation of agricultural production were accompanied by equally far-reaching changes in other aspects of rural policy. In 1972/3, there was a major attempt at decentralisation of rural development programmes. The regional and district administrations were strengthened and invested with additional powers, responsibilities and resources. The role of the parent ministries was reduced to preparing broad policies and guidelines. Until 1976 the co-operatives played an important role in produce marketing and distribution of inputs. It was, however, felt that they served the interests of better off farmers and suffered from a number of deficiencies. Consequently, in 1976, the Government abolished all primary marketing co-operatives and co-operative unions. Their purchasing and

marketing functions were to be shared between the parastatal crop authorities and the newly-established village multi-purpose co-operative societies.

III.3 Institutional Framework and Functioning of the Villages

By 1978, practically the whole of the rural population of Tanzania was living in more than 8,000 villages. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 provides the legal institutional framework of the villages. It provides for registration of villages by a registrar, thereby conferring legal status and certain rights and obligations. Under the Act, the village is deemed to be a multi-purpose co-operative society. There is provision for the constitution of a village assembly, consisting of all persons aged 18 years or over, and for the election of a village council of 25 members by the village assembly. The posts of the village chairman and secretary are filled by the chairman and secretary of the local Party. They are elected by a meeting of all party members in the village. The village council is empowered to do "all such acts and things as are necessary or expedient for the economic and social development of the village". It can plan and co-ordinate the work of villagers engaged in agriculture or other activities. It is also empowered to set up committees dealing with such subjects as finance and planning, production and marketing; education, culture and social welfare; works and transport; and security and defence. A village may be designated as an Ujamaa Village by the Registrar when it is established that "a substantial portion" of its economic activities are being undertaken on a communal basis.

Although the villages are intended to be self-governing socio-economic units, they exist and operate within the context of a national economic and political system. The villagers are institutionally linked to the party structure through the village's party branch which is directly represented in both the district and the regional organs of the Party. Through this link, the villagers participate indirectly in the

process of selecting sub-national and national party leaders, as well as in making or influencing party policies. Within the village party organ, the members have an opportunity to discuss matters that are of concern to them or their village, make recommendations, and forward them to the higher organs of the Party for consideration.

Similarly the village is linked to the Central Government's administrative system at the district level through its election of a representative to the District Development Council. Each district in turn sends one representative to the National Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage.

Although there are similarities in the organisational pattern of the villages, there are also substantial differences in terms of size, major occupation of its members, nature and degree of co-operation in production as well as in use of common services, and the socio-economic well-being of its members. The variations are largely a result of differences in the physical environment of the village and its traditional socio-economic, cultural and political characteristics. The majority of the villages are agricultural in the sense that they consist of peasants who are predominantly engaged in food and/or cash crop farming. In the areas where the inhabitants are predominantly engaged in herding or animal husbandry, pastoral villages have been established. Along the coast and near lakes, a number of fishing villages have been created by those who are predominantly engaged in fishing.

The mode of production exhibits wide diversity. There is a small number of villages where communal cultivation is significant but in the overwhelming majority, private small-holdings continue to be the dominant mode of agricultural production. Where communal cultivation is practised, the villagers are required to work for a specified time on communal farms and other joint activities. In the more densely populated parts of the country such as Arusha, Kilimanjaro and West Lake Regions, the existing settlements were designated as villages with minimal changes in patterns of land distribution. The newly settled villages differ from the earlier pattern in that instead of practising shifting

cultivation in isolated holdings, each family engages in settled agriculture on relatively equal size plots forming part of a block farm. In principle the land is allocated by village authorities in equal plots to each family. In actual practice, because of a number of reasons the distribution may not be completely egalitarian. The ownership of livestock continues to be in private hands and is more unevenly distributed than land. The growth of economic differentiation at the village level is controlled by restrictions on hiring of permanent employees. The village provides a suitable framework for the mobilisation of surplus labour, especially during slack seasons, for the construction of a wide range of social and economic infrastructure. It also facilitates the organisation of non-farming enterprises, an increasing proportion of which is communally owned. In addition to their role in productive activities, the villages also constitute a service co-operative with responsibility for collection and marketing of produce and for supply of inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides. Its principal sources of revenue consist of levies on marketed production, and surplus from the operation of communal activities.

Among the positive factors that emerge from the few years of implementing Ujamaa village policy are the following: first, an increasing number of rural families now have access to clean water, primary schools and dispensaries. The Government investment in these basic services is being utilised more efficiently and effectively than in the past. For example, the goal of universal primary education would not have made as much progress had the people not been grouped in village communities, and their village councils not assumed the role of ensuring that every family sent their children to school.

Second, both the structure of the villages and the nature of operation of their social, economic and political activities have provided a potentially unique base for realising the ideals of genuine participatory democracy. The village structure has enabled the political system to achieve the objective of giving the masses within their local community the possibility to

participate in initiating, planning and implementing decisions that pertain to their development. Besides the village unit has become an effective communication link between the Government and the peasants.

Third, in an increasing number of villages, interest in and commitment to collective and other co-operative undertakings has increased - thus enabling the peasants to take advantage of economies of scale, specialisation and division of labour. The communal farm within many of the villages has come to serve several purposes. It is proving an effective instrument of mobilising rural labour for surplus agricultural production and for rural capital formation. It is also serving as an instrument for diffusing technical innovation in the villages by demonstrating the advantages of ox ploughing, tractorisation and high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers and appropriate spacing techniques. Moreover, collective farms act as a rudimentary social security system for the village. Most villages save a certain amount of their communal production in 'food reserve' as a precaution against poor harvest.

Fourth, there has been a mushrooming of collectively owned and run income-generating non-farm activities such as shops, grain mills, small-scale industrial undertakings (e.g. weaving, carpentry, masonry), modern animal husbandry, and transportation services. Besides providing essential services to the villagers, these activities are proving to be a growing source of employment for school-leavers, thus discouraging them from migrating to urban areas. Among the current difficulties faced by non-agricultural enterprises are a shortage of managerial and technical skills.

Fifth, the redistribution of land brought about by the villagisation process, the restrictions on hiring of labour and the requirement for all able-bodied people to work, has resulted in: (a) eliminating landlessness among the rural population; (b) encouraging each peasant to produce enough food to meet subsistence; (c) decline in large individual landholding in view of scarcity of wage labour; and (d) increase

of work discipline among many peasants in both individual and communal farms.

Finally, the new opportunities brought about by equitable distribution of resources as well as social, economic and political powers within many of the villages are changing the attitudes of an increasing number of peasants towards the role and rights of women at home and in village communities. Women are playing an increasingly active role in the total social and economic life of their communities - a fact that is slowly changing the peasants' perception of their status in the society.

Despite these positive signs of progress, a number of goals remain to be realised. First, the level of production and yields continue to be low. In many places both land and labour are underutilised. There is, therefore, need to take measures to intensify agricultural production and increase productivity. This would require a wider diffusion and adoption of biological, chemical and mechanical innovation.

Second, a generally low level of commitment to collective undertakings still persists in many villages. This is encouraged by, among other things (a) predominance of individual farming within the village economy; (b) relatively poor performance of some communal undertaking due to poor organisation of production; lack of work discipline, lack of financial control, poor management, and lack of incentives for individual participation in communal production. In order to improve the management capacity of the villages, the Government has embarked on an ambitious programme of seconding managers and other technicians to the village governments. There is also a government programme under way of assisting the villages to identify potential trainees and to train them in such skills as book-keeping, shop management, agriculture, and animal husbandry. Third, in some villages, there continues to be an unacceptable degree of economic differentiation caused by unequal land distribution and private ownership of productive assets other than land (e.g. livestock, tractors).

Fourth, non-farming communal activities especially small-scale industries - have not grown rapidly. Among the main factors that impede small-scale industrialisation are difficulties in obtaining raw materials regularly, scarcity of technical skills among the villagers and marketing problems.

IV. Six Village Profiles: A Synthesis of Impressions

IV.1. Introduction

This chapter is based on the information and impressions collected by the participants in the course of their visits to six villages. These visits were organised as an integral part of the seminar and indeed were regarded as its highlight by most participants. It was hoped that through these visits, the participants would obtain a first-hand experience and impressions of the achievements and problems of the Tanzanian strategy for rural development at the grass-roots level. The visits also provided an opportunity to study in a concrete context the general issues raised at the seminar, particularly those related to the problems of transition from private to co-operative mode of rural production. Finally, it was hoped that the participants' observations and intensive discussions with villagers and government officials might generate some information and insights which could make a modest contribution to a better understanding of the working of the new agrarian system instituted in the wake of the Arusha Declaration. To achieve these objectives an informal questionnaire was prepared in advance to obtain information on some aspects of village production, distribution, institutions and of the role of rural women. Each village was visited by three to four participants one of whom served as a rapporteur for the group. This chapter is based on the reports prepared by the six rapporteurs.

It is important at the outset to stress the limitations inherent in an exercise of this nature. In the first place, the reports were prepared on the basis of merely three days' visits and discussions. Secondly, the villages were not selected on any scientific basis. This was not our intention. Nor, given the fact that we were able to visit only six out of more than 8,000 villages, would this have been possible. It is well known that while there is a common institutional framework governing the villages as laid down in the Village and the Ujamaa Village Act of 1975, individual villages within districts and regions and across regions show enormous diversity in the

level of development, patterns of production, extent and sources of social and economic differentiation and in many other respects. The reader is, therefore, warned against the generalisation of the impressions and conclusions presented here to rural Tanzania as a whole.

The material collected in the individual village reports and synthesised in this chapter, is very much in the nature of general impressions and tentative conclusions. We have little doubt that a more intensive study would lead us to enhance the information we were able to collect and consequently revise our analysis and conclusions. Despite the limitations and reservations mentioned above, we believe that this chapter sheds some light on the operation and performance of the Ujamaa and villagisation system in Tanzania. In particular we have attempted to explore some dimensions of the system which have received inadequate attention in the past writings on the subject such as the transition from private to communal basis in the organisation of production and distribution.

This chapter is organised into six sections. The first gives a general background of the six villages visited. This is followed by a discussion of the production system at the village level. Here we deal with such issues as the relative importance and operation of the communal and the personal sectors in the village economy, both agricultural and non-agricultural; the organisation of work in the communal sector; efficiency in resource allocation with particular reference to labour utilisation and techniques of production; accumulation and growth potential. The third section deals with living standards including social consumption, and with the extent and sources of economic differentiation. In the fourth section, we have a brief discussion of the role of women in the social and economic life of the village. The fifth section summarises our impressions of village institutions and leadership with special reference to village democracy and popular participation. In the concluding section, we present our tentative conclusions on the future evolution of the system and proposals for strengthening its performance.

IV.2 Background to the Villages

Some basic information about the six villages visited is provided in Table I. Of these villages, four lie in the northern part of the country. Mareu, Endakiso and Singe are located in the Arusha Region while Chekereni is in the Kilimanjaro Region. The other two villages - Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani - are in the central part of Tanzania in the Dodoma Region. In contrast to the northern part which receives relatively more rainfall, thus favouring crop cultivation, the Dodoma Region is characterised by sparsity of rainfall which is concentrated in the December to April period. Livestock rearing is therefore a much more important sector of the rural activity than in other parts of the country. Land is relatively scarce in the northern region. Chekereni and Singe in particular are faced with problems of land scarcity. On the other hand, Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani are located in sparsely populated areas and access to land is no problem.

The history of the creation of these villages shows two patterns. The settlements in Mareu and Mseta go back many years in the past. Mareu was settled in the late 1940s by farmers who were removed by the British colonial authorities from the Mareu highlands which were to be reserved for white settlers. Mseta is located in an area which originally formed part of a European estate subsequently sold to some Asian families. The land was then bought by the district authorities and offered to villagers in 1968. The other four villages are of more recent origin being created in the 1970s and involved either grouping of the peasants scattered in the neighbourhood or as in Chekereni, resettlement of villagers in a new area. Four of the villages have between 400 and 500 households. The two extremes are represented by Singe (307 households) and Mlowa-Bababarani (660 households).

Table I

The Six Villages: Some Basic Information

Name	Region	Population	Number of Families	Share of Communal Cultivation (%)	Average Size: Personal Plots (acres)
(1) Chkereni	Kilimanjaro	2,800	500	20	3
(2) Endakiso	Arusha	2,300	464	10	10
(3) Mareu	Arusha	2,000	407	15	9
(4) Mlowa-Bababarani	Dodoma	3,112	660	25	3
(5) Mseta	Dodoma	2,296	441	14	4
(6) Singe	Arusha	1,330	307	4	2

IV.3 Organisation of Production

IV.3.1 Three Modes of Production

The village economy is characterised by three modes of production: the garden plots attached to dwellings, the personal plots either separately spaced or as components of a block farm; and the communal farm. In terms of area cultivated and the allocation of family labour, the first is the least important: in the six villages, their size varies between one quarter to one acre per household. Nevertheless, these plots represent a useful source of food and income for the family permitting cultivation of fruit and vegetables and rearing of poultry, goats and cows.

The dominant mode of production is personal plots. Their relative importance as proportion of the cultivated land varies a good deal. The one extreme is represented by Singe where 96 per cent of the cultivated land falls in this category and the other by Mlowa-Bababarani where 75 per cent is under personal cultivation. The proportions in other villages are: Chekereni (80 per cent of land under effective village control and 90 per cent of the total land); Mseta (86 per cent); Mareu (85 per cent) and Endakiso (90 per cent).

The average size of personal plots shows considerable diversity - a reflection of the history of settlement, abundance or scarcity of land, and production patterns. In Chekereni and Mlowa-Bababarani, the average size is 3 acres. It is slightly higher in Mseta (4 acres) and lower in Singe (2 acres). The average size is surprisingly high in Mareu and Endakiso - around 9 to 10 acres. The relatively low size of personal plots in Chekereni and Singe is a reflection of land scarcity in these two villages. In Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani one would expect larger personal plots as land is available in abundance. The explanation for the relatively low average holdings would appear to lie in the importance of livestock activities, communal cultivation as well as in the constraints imposed by water availability and labour supply. The prevalence of primitive technology and low yield of agriculture owing to harsh climatic conditions may be other

contributory factors. The relatively high average size of personal holdings in Endakiso and Mareu is more difficult to explain. The presence of a few extremely large holdings offers a partial explanation. The history of the settlement of Mareu which goes back to the 1940s may be the main explanation for large average size of holdings. In addition, more widespread use of tractors and ox ploughing permits cultivation of larger holdings.

Personal plots may be spaced around dwellings or constitute components of a block farm. In some villages like Chekereni, the latter pattern prevails. Mlowa-Bababarani and Mseta are in the process of establishing block farms. The block farming system facilitates some co-operative work arrangements even within the framework of the personal cultivation system and thus has important implications for the future evolution of the system.

IV.3.2 The Communal Farm: Patterns and Relative Importance

It is generally recognised that the relative importance of communal farming varies a good deal from one village, district and region to another. There are instances of a handful of villages in Tanzania where the bulk of cultivation is communal but it is believed that in the great majority the collective sector in agriculture hardly exists. In any case, hard data on this question are difficult to come by. The villages surveyed here shed interesting light on some aspects of the relative importance and forms of communal cultivation. First, these villages show that communal farming is quite important; except for Singe, its share varies from 10 to 25 per cent of the cultivated land. Secondly, it is generally believed that in the more developed and densely populated parts of the country especially in the Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions where villages in some sense pre-date the Arusha Declaration and formal villagisation took place more recently, the communal sector is insignificant. The village of Chekereni evidently does not conform to this pattern.

Perhaps more interesting is the pattern of communal ownership revealed in these villages. There are two points worth making here. First, while in five villages communal farming operates as an integral part of the village economy and is firmly under the control of the village government, in the sixth village, Mareu, internal disputes led to a group of peasants outside the framework of the village government to take up Ujamaa farming. The second notable feature is that apart from the communal farm belonging to all members, there are in most villages special communal farms ranging in size from 3 to 10 acres which are cultivated and managed by distinct groups - in most cases by women's organisation but in Singe by a youth group as well. Within this overall pattern, there are interesting minor variations such as in Chekereni where a few full-time village employees are allocated small pieces of land on communal farms whose cultivation represents their contribution to communal efforts. This arrangement gives them flexibility as to the timing and extent of labour input in the communal effort.

The field visits also indicate that the importance of communal farming could change over a relatively short period of time. In Endakiso, for instance, communally cultivated land fell from 1,900 acres in 1974 to a low of 300 acres in 1977/78. Likewise, communal cultivation in Mareu fell from 470 acres in 1977/78 to 242 acres in 1978/79 - a fact attributable to internal disputes in the village between the supporters and opponents of Ujamaa farming.

The variations in the relative importance of collective farming are reflected in the average area of communally cultivated land per household. In Mareu, it is exceptionally large - around 6 acres per family. This is a reflection of the fact that about a quarter of the village households broke away from the majority in a dispute with the village authorities and continued to practise communal farming when the latter decided to revert to personal plots. The other extreme is Singe where the share per member is insignificant. Perhaps more typical of the country as a whole are Chekereni (0.6 acres), Mlowa-Bababarani (0.5 acres), Mseta (Less than 0.4 acres) and Endakiso (around 1 acre).

Another index of the relative importance of the communal sector is the allocation of labour time to this sector. Communal labour is generally compulsory; an exception to this is Endakiso which relies on voluntary labour. In terms of the amount of communal labour Mareu comes at the head of the league (5 days a week), followed by Chekereni (4 days), Mlowa-Bababarani, Mseta and Singe (3 days each). The lowest figure is 1 day per week planned for this year in Endakiso. At first sight, these figures except for Endakiso represent an impressive proportion of the labour time of members devoted to communal tasks.

A number of factors, however, suggest that the figures given above grossly overestimate the magnitude of labour input into communal activities. In the first place, there is some ambiguity in the number of hours worked per day; for instance in Mlowa-Bababarani if members finish an assigned task, they can leave early. In varying degrees and to the extent that piece-rates are operational for some tasks, this situation is replicated in other villages. Secondly, it is not clear that in all villages, the obligation to do communal work extends right through the year. In Chekereni village, it appears that compulsory communal work is required throughout the year, but in Mseta, it seems to be concentrated in the period from January to March and in Mareu from December to February. It is highly likely that communal labour is also required for other times of the year but the number of hours worked and the intensity of work doubtless vary considerably.

Thirdly, and this is perhaps the most important factor, the attendance rates fall well below the theoretical maximum. In Chekereni, they were estimated at 40 - 50 per cent of the theoretical maximum. It is likely that similar rates of absenteeism prevail in other villages as well. Most villages impose a fine of Shs. 8 to 12 per day for non-attendance but they are not always able to enforce it.

It should be noted that communal labour is not devoted exclusively to cultivation. It may be regarded as a resource available to the village for a wide variety of communal tasks.

These include construction of class-rooms, health centres, offices, warehouses, road maintenance and provision of security services for the villagers. A major achievement of the villagisation programme is that it has provided a suitable institutional framework for the mobilisation of surplus labour, particularly during slack periods.

IV.3.3 Work Organisation and Payment Systems

Organisation of work for communal production is generally the responsibility of the appropriate committee of the village council. Typically workers are organised into groups each headed by a supervisor. The details of work organisation, however, vary from one village to another as does the responsibility for work supervision. In Chekereni, for instance, individual workers or groups of workers are assigned specific tasks by supervisors who are members of the village council. The supervisors hold weekly meetings in the field to discuss issues relating to labour utilisation. This provides an occasion to reassign workers from one group to another in an attempt to secure a better balance between labour supply and requirements on specific tasks. In Mareu, a sub-committee of the Ujamaa group initially prepares proposals as to cropping patterns and resource allocation. These are then taken up by a committee of 20 persons who run the communal farm. After the approval of the production plan, the sub-committee is given the responsibility for its execution. It gives weekly directives to individual members about the work they are supposed to do in different teams.

In other villages, family cells act as the basic unit for work organisation. In Endakiso, households are organised into cells of 10 families and the cell leader, a party member, is responsible for seeing that work is completed. In Singe, the village is divided into 10 cells and each cell leader is responsible for assigning tasks to individual workers and for ensuring that work is completed on schedule.

In Mlowa-Bababarani and Mseta, the work arrangements are more elaborate. In the former, the labour force is grouped by

families into seven sections and each of these is sub-divided into 10 cells. The section and cell leaders are responsible for implementing the work programme decided upon by the 'works committee' of the village council. These section and cell leaders are usually not members of the village council. In Mseta, the villagers are organised into cells, each cell comprising not less than 10 families. A group of cells constitute a production team with a membership in excess of 60 households. Each team has an elected supervisor who reports to the crop production committee of the village council. The supervisors are elected on the basis of their farm experience and participation in communal activities.

The payment on communal activities is in accordance with the number of days worked. In all villages regular records are kept of the number of days worked by each member. There is a fixed rate for a day's work and this applies equally to men and women and no differentiation is made for the type of work done. A mixture of piece and time-rates system appears to prevail in most villages though there is a tendency to move increasingly to piece-rates. In Chekereni, for instance, initially most of the work was organised on a time-rate basis. This is still the case for certain kinds of operations which do not lend themselves to conversion to piece-rates. For instance, the following operations are still performed on a time-rate basis: weeding, watering and picking of oranges, bananas, vegetables; feeding of poultry; cattle tending and milking. But the trend is towards extension of the piece-rate system to as many operations as possible. The piece-rates are converted into day-equivalents. They are adjusted periodically through a process of trial and error.

In Mlowa-Bababarani, work is organised on a type of piece rate system. The basic obligation to work is laid down in terms of number of working days. The 'working day', however, is not defined in terms of hours of work but rather in terms of specific tasks allocated to individuals. The obligation for the day is deemed to be fulfilled as soon as the assigned task is completed. In the case of the communal sorghum farm, each family is designated responsibility for 1/2 an acre per

able-bodied member of the household and it has to accomplish within this area the over-all tasks such as planting or weeding set for a particular working day.

Each village has evolved its own policy on distribution from the proceeds of the communal activities. The one extreme is represented by Singe where no distribution was made to members in the past year. It may be recalled that communal farming represents only 4 per cent of the cultivated land in this village. In other villages, the practice appears to be to retain part of the proceeds for emergency and development purposes. However, the accounting procedures are such that it is difficult to measure precisely these shares. In Chakereni, for instance, the village authorities operate a single bank account. All receipts from the sale of the produce from the communal sector and other sources of revenue such as village levy, fines, payments in lieu of communal work, are credited to this account and expenditures on purchase of materials, equipment, repair and maintenance and social services, are debited to the same account. The balance remaining at the end of the year is shared out among the members in accordance with the number of days worked. In 1978, this amounted to Sh.2.50 per day. This works out roughly to Shs.125 per month on the assumption of full day's work for 25 days a month. The village does not keep any food as reserve for emergency use.

The villagers participating in communal cultivation in Mareu have worked out a somewhat more elaborate system. There the payment is made in three parts. One part is paid out immediately after the harvest on the basis of a per household member norm for meeting consumption requirements. Another part is distributed over the year on the basis of the amount of work done over a period of time - weekly or monthly basis. Over and above these, if somebody does some extra work, the individual is paid in cash and on the spot. The commune does not distribute the full amount of production. A certain amount of grain is maintained for meeting emergencies. For the current year the rate of payment for a day's work has been fixed at 6 kg. of maize; and the payment for extra work has been Shs.10 per day. The subsistence quota for each family member is fixed at 60 kg. per month per person.

In Endakiso, last year, 50 per cent of the surplus was retained and the rest was distributed in kind as maize at the end of the crop year in accordance with the number of days worked. In Mlowa-Bababarani, out of 305 tons of sorghum harvested on communal farm, 5 tons were retained as reserve. From the proceeds of the sale of the rest, approximately 50 per cent was distributed to members in accordance with the number of days worked, the balance being used for investment and to finance on-going activities. In Mseta, the proceeds of the communal farm are disbursed in the following manner: 10 per cent for the general reserve fund, a certain proportion to cover the working capital for the next crop season and the rest shared out among the villagers in accordance with the number of days worked.

The preceding description of work organisation, methods of payment and disbursement of proceeds from communal farming brings out both the differences and similarities among the six villages. The policies pursued in each of these areas have important implications for incentives to collective activities and hence for the strengthening and growth of the communal sector. These issues will be taken up in the concluding section.

IV.3.4 Efficiency in Production

In this section, we record our impressions of yields, cropping patterns, use of improved agricultural practices, techniques of production, and utilisation of labour and capital equipment. The word 'impressions' is used advisedly as it did not prove possible to collect the necessary data on inputs and outputs on communal farms. For personal farms which are the predominant mode of agricultural production, even the most basic statistics could not be obtained for most of the villages. The discussion here will, therefore, largely draw upon the information obtained on communal farms.

The over-all impression was that of low yields and productivity. The yields showed a great deal of annual variation depending primarily on weather conditions. In Mareu, for instance, the maize yield per acre was 7.6 bags in 1971/72, fell to 5.2 bags in 1977/78 and rose again to 12.8

bags in 1978/79. In Mseta, the yields varied between 10 to 12 bags per acre, while in Singe, owing to the use of improved seeds and other inputs, the maize yields were reported to have risen from 15 to 25 bags per acre. It was not possible to compare the yields on personal plots and communal farms. Some of the studies carried out in the sixties and early seventies reported considerably lower yields on communal farms in relation to personal holdings. This did not appear to be the case in most of the villages visited by us. The general impression we obtained was that the yields were comparable in the two farming systems. The personal plots within a village showed considerable yield variations. In the absence of data on inputs, it would not in any case be possible to draw conclusions about the efficiency of resource use in personal and communal cultivation.

There was evidence of increasing use of modern inputs - improved seed varieties and fertilizers in particular. This appeared to be the case especially on communal farms which probably receive preferential treatment in the supply of inputs and of extension services. In Chekereni, for instance, it was reported that the communal farm has gradually introduced improved methods such as application of fertilizers, and lining in planting. Several villagers pointed out that they had first learnt of such improved methods of cultivation from the communal farm and had subsequently gone on to apply them on their personal plots. In Mlowa-Bababarani the communal farm has been planted with a new high-yielding variety of red sorghum and this is intended to serve as a demonstration farm. The experience of Chekereni and Mlowa-Bababarani underlines the role of the communal farming as a vehicle for wider diffusion of innovations. In Mlowa-Bababarani, the communal farm also introduced the cultivation of vineyards.

There did not appear to be discernible differences in cropping pattern between the communal and personal plots in most villages. In Endakiso, however, there was some difference where the communal farm emphasised sorghum and beans, while individual holdings stressed maize, sunflowers and millet. The major difference in productive activity between the two

sectors is accounted for by animal husbandry. Only Mareu, Chekereni and Mlowa-Bababarani maintain a small comunally-owned herd. The overwhelming proportion of livestock are individually owned.

The techniques of production consist primarily of hoes and to a much lesser extent tractors. The use of tractors for ploughing, however, is quite widespread. Reliance is placed primarily on hiring of tractors either from government agencies or private owners. The commonest tool of cultivation continues to be the hoe. Ox ploughing is practised on a very small scale in Singe and Endakiso. It is remarkable that in Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani where livestock rearing is an important economic activity, practically no use is made of ox ploughing. Likewise, apart from Chekereni which has developed an impressive surface irrigation system, none of the other villages have so far succeeded in tapping water for irrigation purposes. This clearly places severe constraints on intensity of cultivation and hence on labour utilisation, especially in the dryer Dodoma Region.

There would appear to be considerable scope for output expansion in the short to medium term. Apart from the introduction of new varieties of seeds, more intensive application of fertilizers and pesticides and an upgrading of agricultural technology, there appear to be possibilities of increased production from a more rational and intensive use of existing resources. There would appear to be scope for increased diversification of production in Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani to include cultivation of fruits and vegetables. In Chekereni, a wide variation in value of output per acre cultivated was observed for different activities. The range was from Shs.40 for oranges to Shs.2,824 for vegetables. Value of output per acre for other crops was as follows: rice (Shs.1,222), cotton (Shs.571), beans (Shs.343), bananas (Shs.223) and maize (Shs.190). These figures indicate gross returns to land and make no allowance for past investments and differential inputs of labour and other factors. It would, therefore, be wrong to draw conclusions about over-all efficiency of these activities.

On the other hand, some of the differentials in gross returns per unit of land are so great that they are unlikely to be offset by input cost differences. It would, therefore, seem that even given the need for some diversification to ensure optimum labour utilisation and the provision of food security, there might be scope for obtaining higher incomes through a more efficient allocation of resources.

Secondly, it would seem that output could be increased through more intensive labour utilisation. There was an impression of low work intensity in Mareu, Mseta and Mlowa-Bababarani. Thus a more intensive application of labour could contribute to increased cultivation and output, even after allowing for the constraint of the seasonal peak in labour requirements during the harvest. The more serious problem is that of underemployment during the slack season. The development of irrigation facilities to permit multiple cropping and of drought-resistant crop varieties would be necessary to generate a more even pattern of demand through the year.

In most villages, there appeared to be unsatisfied demand for tractor services. Yet the field visits confirmed the findings of earlier studies that the existing equipment is not fully utilised due to breakdowns and lack of spare parts.

IV.3.5 Non-farming Activities

Most villages have similar but rather limited range of non-farming activities. All villages have a shop, and except for Singe, a flour mill. Most operate tractor-hire services. In Chekereni, there is a butchery, in Mseta a handloom workshop and a lorry, and in Endakiso, a building brigade. Mareu operated a soap factory and a furniture workshop but these closed down in 1976 with the setback suffered by the Ujamaa group. Some other activities are undertaken on a part-time basis by individuals. For instance, in Chekereni, there is a part-time carpenter, tailor and bicycle repairer. Some basket-weaving, sewing etc. is undertaken by women. Most villages have plans for establishing additional activities; Singe, for instance, is planning to set up a flour mill and carpentry shop.

In general, the range of non-farming activities is quite restricted. It is surprising that tailoring, black-smithing and furniture making are absent in practically all these villages. Three factors would appear to explain this situation. Firstly, the levels of income are relatively low; hence there is limited demand for non-basic goods. Some of the basic consumer goods demanded are produced by medium and large-scale enterprises usually located in urban areas. The proximity to towns as in Chekereni and Singe is an additional factor restricting production of non-farm goods. Secondly, there is a general paucity of technical skills needed for operation of some of the activities such as black-smithing. Thirdly, some activities such as food-processing, making of mats, stools etc. are often undertaken within the household.

Another interesting feature of the non-farming activities is that they are almost exclusively communally owned and managed. In some places and as in Chekereni these activities are reserved exclusively for the communal sector. The attendants and technicians employed in these enterprises are hired and paid by the village authorities. The communal ownership of these enterprises has some importance for the future evolution of the rural economy in the country. Firstly, as the villages advance to a higher stage of development, the volume and range of such activities should expand, thus strengthening the communal sector of the village economy. Secondly, these activities offer potential opportunities for accumulation which, however, are not yet fully exploited.

IV.3.6 The Communal Sector: Over-all Performance and Accumulation

It is evident from the preceding account that the performance of the communal sector has varied a good deal from village to village. In Singe, communal production, both agriculture and non-farming, is of relatively insignificant proportions. However, there are plans to expand its scope in the non-farming sector to include bee-keeping, flour milling, carpentry, fish-drying and a tailoring unit. In Mareu, communal production was quite advanced but suffered reverses when an anti-Ujamaa faction obtained a majority in the village council.

This resulted initially in the return of some communal land to its previous owners and the cessation of communal soap and furniture enterprises. In Endakiso, also, disputes involving some villagers and party members had an adverse effect on communal activities. Nevertheless, the village is planning to expand communal cultivation.

In Mlowa-Bababarani and Mseta, the communal sector is significant in farming and dominant in non-farming activities. But there have been no significant increases in the volume and range of crop production though a number of non-farming projects have been initiated. Chekereni emerges as the one village where the communal sector has shown a great deal of dynamism and vitality. Communal cultivation has increased from 30 acres in 1970 to 300 acres in 1978. The village has plans for its further expansion but these have been frustrated by land shortage. It has an impressive range of non-farming communal activities and plans are under way for their further expansion.

At this juncture, it should be recalled that in addition to engaging in directly productive communal activities, the village also serves as a service co-operative. The villages are responsible for collecting and marketing produce and act as agents for provision of inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, pesticides and the channelling of credit from parastatal bodies.

An important factor determining the advance of the communal sector is the source and volume of accumulation. All villages have received considerable funds from the government and parastatal bodies. These funds have primarily assisted in the construction of economic and social infrastructure - building of roads, provision of water, construction of classrooms, dispensaries and communal buildings. They have also financed investment in directly productive assets such as purchase of transport vehicles, tractors, machinery etc. Villages have three major sources for internal generation of surplus funds: communal farm, profits from non-farming activities, particularly the village shop, and levy on marketed products. It would seem that most villages have used these surplus funds to expand non-farming activities.

This point may be illustrated with reference to the experience in Mlowa-Bababarani. Half of the earnings from communal activities have typically been retained and invested. So far the investments have been (i) the acquisition of a 10 ton Fiat truck (ii) the starting of a village shop (iii) purchase of a small flour mill (iv) starting a small herd of cows and goats.

The main source of revenue was from the communal sorghum farm - yielding about Shs. 300,000. In addition, Shs.36,000 were collected as a levy on private crop sales handled by the village authorities. The total revenue of Shs. 336,000 was disposed of as follows: Shs.150,000 were distributed as cash payment to all those who participated in work on the communal farm and the rest was used for investment and to finance on-going activities. Shs.60,000 were allocated to the village shop, Shs.40,000 to the lorry service and the remaining Shs.86,000 were deposited in the bank. The picture that emerges is that there is a large potential surplus from the communal farm which could form the basis of reinvestment to expand communal activity but that this has been used without clear reference to investment criteria or proper accounting procedures. In particular the potential for reinvesting the surplus from new activities that have been started does not appear to have been tapped. This may particularly be the case with village shops. In Endakiso for instance, despite a turnover last year of Shs.166,674, the surplus was only Shs.1,661. This in turn was in part due to government price controls on essential consumer goods which did not permit the village to cover its high transport costs.

In all this discussion, it is important to bear in mind that villages are relatively recent creations: most of them date from the early seventies. The village institutions are a recent innovation in the agrarian system in Tanzania and communal productive activities are a relatively new experience for most villagers. Inevitably, the major source of potential surplus available to the villagers - the labour power - has gone to building up the social and economic infrastructure. In most cases, new dwellings had to be built, roads, schools, dispensaries and community buildings constructed.

This point may be illustrated by the experience in Singe. A primary school was built in the early seventies: Singe and two other villages contributed bricks and labour; the Government provided cement, timber and corrugated iron for the roof. Per class-room, the respective contributions of Government and the villages were estimated at Shs.7,000 and Shs.5,000 respectively. Tap water was brought in at the school. Pipes were provided by the Government and laid by the villagers. Recently, boring machines were made available by the Government for the installation of two tubewells. The village is expected to contribute its own labour plus any local materials required. The construction and maintenance of access roads is wholly the responsibility of the village. It involves substantial work in dry seasons as the roads are badly damaged by the rains.

The village has undertaken various communal projects since its creation. The village shop, which was wholly built by the villagers, started in 1976 with an initial capital of Shs.6,000 collected from the villagers and now has assets worth Shs.110,000. A second project consisted of the construction of a village canteen, financed by the labour provided by the villagers and profits from the shop. A third project was the construction of a village storage with matching contributions from the Government. Other projects included the construction of an assembly hall and a village office. The village is planning in the near future to improve water supply facilities and to construct a dispensary. In varying degrees, such investment in social and economic facilities has taken place in other villages. In totality, these facilities represent a major effort at mobilisation of surplus labour for capital accumulation.

IV.4 Living Standards, Income Distribution and Sources of Differentiation

It was not possible to obtain any worthwhile data on levels and distribution of incomes. The over-all impression obtained in all the villages was that of extremely low incomes and low standard of living. Yet despite the low average incomes, the manifestations of extreme poverty such as encountered in most developing countries were relatively rare. This is mainly due to the fact that all households have their farms on which they

can grow food to meet their basic subsistence requirements. Landlessness in the villages visited by us is practically unknown. Thus extreme cases of hunger, starvation and even acute malnutrition are virtually unknown. Practically all families have their own dwellings, though the standard of housing is extremely modest. Modern facilities like toilets, running water and electricity were practically non-existent in the dwellings occupied by the villagers. In some villages, programmes are under way to build brick houses with more adequate space and lighting arrangements. However, in many cases the dwellings built in the villages represent a modest improvement over previous shelters. While the majority of villagers are able to meet food and clothing requirements, the range of other basic consumer goods is severely restricted. This may be illustrated with reference to the 'inventory of consumer durables' we were able to put together for Chekereni - one of the more prosperous villages visited.

Practically all families own a lamp, buckets and utensils and at least one 'jembe' (hoe) and 'panga' (long knife). But apart from that, the list of possessions belonging to a village of approximately 500 families consists of the following:

bicycles	-	20
radios	-	30
stoves	-	15
watches	-	10
sewing machines	-	5
tables and chairs etc.	-	40 households

In most villages, one had the impression that there were a handful of relatively extremely wealthy families but for the overwhelming majority, the income distribution would seem to be remarkably egalitarian. The inter-village differences are, however, likely to be more substantial. Our guesstimates indicate, for instance, that a typical household in Mlowa-Bababarani might earn an annual income (including own consumption) of Shs.2,400, while the comparable figure in the northern villages such as Mareu and Chekereni might be in the neighbourhood of Shs.4,000 to 5,000.

There are three major equalising factors which are at work in all villages, though their relative importance varies

from one village to another. The first factor derives from the fact that land allocation is controlled by the village authorities and each family is entitled in principle to similar size plot. As we shall see later, this principle is not always observed in practice and the actual land distribution in some cases diverges considerably from the theoretical ideal. Nevertheless, in relation to the situation in most developing countries, land distribution remains remarkably egalitarian. The second equalising factor is the operation of the communal sector and the third the importance of social consumption - universal primary education, basic health care, water supply, etc.

The relative importance of the communal sector in the different villages was discussed earlier. From the point of view of income distribution it is important to underline the fact that villages require a certain amount of labour for communal activities from all villagers irrespective of their economic or social status and that proceeds from communal work are distributed in a completely egalitarian manner according to the number of days worked. It is true that in actual practice there may be varying degrees of absenteeism but we did not have any evidence that such absenteeism was correlated with the economic position of the household. Communal ownership of practically all non-farming enterprises strengthens the egalitarian thrust in income distribution while blocking off potential sources of private accumulation and wealth. Another relevant feature of the communal sector is that non-agricultural workers employed in these enterprises - shop and mill attendants, mechanics, tractor drivers, book-keepers etc. - earn relatively modest salaries - generally from Shs.200 to 400 per month. They may be able to supplement their income by some family farming, but it seems that their total incomes are not too out of line with the average peasant incomes in the village.

The growing importance of social consumption makes a substantial contribution towards greater equality in living standards. Primary schools exist in all villages and are generally well attended. In some cases, the schools only go

up to standards III or IV but opportunities exist to attend schools in nearby villages and plans are under way to add higher classes. Attendance at schools is free except for the recently introduced fee of Shs.20 per annum per pupil. The access to secondary schools is severely limited but this is a reflection of the national situation. Attempts are being made in some villages to diversify curriculum and to involve children in agriculture. In Singe and Mseta work in the school field is performed in all standards. In Singe both boys and girls have classes in domestic science and handicrafts. Although an effort has been made in this village to give some practical orientation to the curriculum, nevertheless the educational system remains fairly traditional and there would appear to be scope for further innovation in curriculum. The Educational Centre in Mlowa-Bababarani offers classes to villagers in metal-working, carpentry and home science so that opportunity exists for some rudimentary skill acquisition.

The creation of villages has also made it possible to institute nursery schools. In Chekereni the kindergarten runs throughout the year except for the school holidays. It serves several purposes: first, it gives young children an opportunity to get to know each other. Secondly, it enables mothers to engage in productive activity. Thirdly, it prepares young children for primary school. During vacations, the primary school children look after the younger children so women could continue to work without interruption. There is no charge for the school. Adult literacy classes are held in most villages as part of the national literacy campaign.

The situation with respect to medical facilities appears to be less satisfactory. Four villages have dispensaries. Plans are under way in Singe to construct one. Chekereni has first aid facilities but no dispensary. Generally, patients have to travel some distance to visit dispensary or health centres in neighbouring areas. Family health services for women were particularly felt to be a deficiency in some villages. Villagers have equal access to health services irrespective of their social and economic status or contribution to communal work.

A major achievement of villagisation is the provision of water facilities for domestic use. All villages have access to communal taps free of charge. Water is obtained through pipes either from the nearby municipal system as in Chekereni or through springs and wells.

The Government has ambitious targets with respect to primary education, adult literacy, health facilities and water supply. It can be expected that over the next few years each household will enjoy access to basic facilities in these areas. Since these are provided practically free of charge, the growth of social consumption is likely to constitute a significant element in reducing differences in living standards within and between villages and between rural and urban areas.

These then are the main influences contributing to greater equality in wealth, incomes and consumption. Offsetting these factors are some disequalising factors, of which we single out one - inequalities in distribution of land, livestock and other productive assets. It proved difficult to obtain data on land distribution but the limited available evidence and discussions with villagers indicate that while the majority of households have roughly equal personal plots, a few individuals, at least in some villages, have managed to maintain relatively large holdings. For instance in Mareu, the average size of private farms is around 10 acres but some holdings are as much as 40 or 50 acres and the largest private farm is 700 acres. In Mseta, the range between the smallest and the largest holdings was 1 to 20. Of the few families visited, the landholding per capita varied from 0.83 to 1.50 acres. In Endakiso, the amount of land available to each household varies but 5 acres is the minimum and the maximum may be partially determined by the amount which the household is capable of cultivating with its given labour force. In Mlowa-Bababarani, the only firm statistic on land was the size of the communal farm. For the rest, there was a vague general notion that each household had an average of 3 acres in private cultivation, a figure that was believed to represent the maximum that could be worked by a household with the prevailing technology. In Singe, households are entitled to

house plots of 1 acre and farm plots of 2 acres in the block farm. The polygamous households may obtain additional land.

The land distribution in Chekereni presents an extremely complex picture. It illustrates the clash between the traditional rights to land and the new land policy under which the village authorities are responsible for land allocation within the village. It also illustrates the complications caused by multiple residences and migration between two areas. In principle, as in other villages, there is complete equality in distribution of land for personal use: each member is allocated 1/2 an acre for his dwelling and vegetable garden, and 3 acres as his personal plot. In practice, the actual land distribution diverges from the ideal of complete equality. There are four factors which account for this divergence. First, while the cultivating unit is the family, land is allocated on the basis of membership of the village. There are instances where both the husband and the wife are members, thus securing entitlement to 6 acres of personal plot. There was one case of a husband with 2 wives and thus with total personal plots of 9 acres. No doubt this type of situation is rare. But it was not possible to ascertain the precise distribution of land by families.

The second disequalising element is the presence of about 94 members who have thus far not been allocated personal plots because of land scarcity. It is possible that a handful of them holding full-time jobs in the village and because of special family circumstances have shown no interest in personal holdings. At least some of these 'landless' members may have land elsewhere either in other villages or more frequently on the mountain slopes. This brings us to the third complicating factor. Some village members possess land elsewhere as well, and more especially, on the mountain slopes. For instance, the husband or older son may have a personal plot in the village while the wife or some other member of the family may have a smaller holding on the slopes. It was not possible to determine how widespread such a practice is. The village leaders thought that such a situation would be quite exceptional. During the village visits it was discovered that at least one village member had a personal plot in the village but also a holding managed by his wife on the mountain slopes.

The fourth relevant factor is that 30 per cent of the land is under dispute. According to the designated boundaries of the village, this land belongs to the village but in actual practice a number of outsiders have claimed possession on grounds of traditional ownership. The village authorities have taken up the issue with the district and the regional authorities and even attempted to reach the Office of the Prime Minister in order to have the dispute settled in their favour. Some of them argued that many of the outsiders are rich people living in towns and "owning hundreds of acres". The district authorities have thus far maintained that land must be preserved for the use of outsiders. They argued that most of this land "belongs" to families living on the slopes. Many of them are extremely poor with tiny holdings on the slopes barely adequate even to produce their minimum subsistence requirements. Furthermore, they have traditional claims to the land going back to several years before the creation of the village. No doubt the truth lies somewhere in between. We were not able to ascertain the usage to which this land is presently put. Parts of it are used by the villagers for cattle grazing, and undoubtedly a substantial part remains uncultivated.

Another source of economic differentiation is disparities in ownership of livestock. As indicated earlier, most livestock is privately owned. We were again not able to obtain reliable data on distribution of livestock by households but the limited available evidence indicates considerable concentration in ownership. In Singe, one-third of the households own livestock and the number of cattle varies from 1 or 2 to 100. In Mlowa-Bababarani, the distribution of livestock was said to be more unequal than that of land. Not all families owned livestock and among those who did it was claimed that there were a minority of households who owned several hundred head and that a large part of these herds was kept outside the village. In Endakiso, there is slightly less than 3 animals per capita or about 15 per household. However, only 135 out of the 464 households have any animals at all. Of those owning livestock, there are approximately 50 per household; the distribution around this average is unknown.

While there are considerable inequalities in livestock ownership, it is important to note that these are not usually reflected in differences in incomes or in consumption patterns since the livestock is kept primarily as a store of wealth and is used for various ceremonies. However, with increasing emphasis on the economic use of livestock as a source of milk and meat, it could become a significant source of income differentiation.

Private ownership of other productive assets such as tractors, lorries etc., is much less common and is usually associated with ownership of large landholdings. Only a handful of persons in the villages visited by us dispose of such assets. In one of these villages, the richest man owned 20 acres of land and owned 3 lorries and 2 tractors. His lorries transported the village produce to the district headquarters and tractors were hired both on personal and communal farms.

IV.5 The Role of Women in Villages

The establishment of villages appears to have had a positive effect on the position of women. Women are entitled to village membership in their own right. In some villages they are also entitled to personal plots, whether married or single. It is, however, not very common for married women to possess personal plots. In communal cultivation women play an active role. There is no clear sexual division of labour either on communal farms or on family plots, though some of the more arduous tasks and jobs such as herding will typically be carried out by men and women may play a more important role in keeping poultry and tending the vegetable garden. Women also share equally in other communal tasks and self-help projects.

The creation of villages and the installation of village water supply have reduced somewhat the labour involved in fetching water. Water carrying and firewood fetching is still done mostly by women and children. This combined with the other household chores - cooking, washing, feeding babies etc. - means that women on average put in longer hours of work than men. In Singe, for example, water has to be fetched on average

three times a day from points that are 1/2 to 1 mile distant from a typical dwelling. Forest land is on the edge of the village territory and the figure of 1 to 2 miles distance does not appear to be an overestimate. Wood-gathering has to be done on average every other day. Thus if the above figures are broadly correct, fetching water and wood amount to an average daily walking distance of between 4 and 8 miles, the return trip being made with a heavy load on the head. In recognition of the additional tasks undertaken by women, they are often let off early from communal tasks. They are also given a 'maternity leave' of 4 to 6 weeks if they are members of the village and thus partake in communal work.

In all villages women are represented in the village councils. Typically, however, out of 25 members, women members would number between 3 and 5. Their low representation may be explained in part by the heavy demands on their time caused by their household duties and in part by their relatively low level of education. In all villages except for Mareu, there is a local branch of the Union of Women in Tanzania (UWT). The membership of the UWT varies between 10 and 40 per cent of the number of adult women in the villages. UWT groups are, however, fairly active. In most villages they run special women's communal farms and organise classes in cooking, sewing, basket-weaving and child care for the village women. In one village, the agricultural extension worker was a woman and she was an active member of the UWT branch. She was articulate and well aware of issues of women's rights and said that the UWT also acted as a pressure group on issues concerning women in the village.

The institution of kindergartens is contributing significantly to the amelioration of women's position. Women also have access to all the social services provided in the village on an equal basis. In this connection, it was noted that girls were well represented in both the teaching staff and the student population in primary schools. A problem facing women that was highlighted in some villages concerns maternity and health services.

IV.6 Village Institutions, Democracy and Participation

The basic institutional structure is similar in all villages. The supreme policy making body at the village level is the assembly which consists of all villagers. It meets at least once a year and takes or approves decisions on major policy issues. The main executive body is an elected village council of 25 members. The chairman and secretary of the village council are chairman and secretary of the Party Branch at the village level. The council has five committees dealing with planning and finance; production and marketing; education, culture and social welfare; communications and transport; and security and defence. Most of the decisions on such key issues as land allocation, cropping patterns, investment plans, rate and amount of remuneration for communal work, are taken by the village council after consultation with the government technical personnel. These institutions are functioning in all villages. However, as noted earlier, in two villages - Mareu and Endakiso - disputes among different factions have had an adverse effect on the efficiency and vitality of the village institutions.

The basic framework for the functioning of participatory democracy already exists in most villages. The village assembly and the village council provide a sufficient basis for universal participation in decision-making and for a system of checks and balances to operate in the use of executive power by village officials. Furthermore, with relatively little pronounced evidence of economic differentiation among the population, it is unlikely that the political democracy will be subverted by unequal economic power. There is also a clear realisation that preventing the growth of economic differentiation is important to the attainment of the Ujamaa ideal and this augurs well for the prospects for participatory democracy in the village.

One possible obstacle to genuine democracy is the uneven distribution of education and knowledge among the adult population of the villages. In many cases both the chairmen and the secretaries of the village councils have educational attainments well above the average for the village. Similarly, it is likely that the many educated government employees based

in the village, while not having a vote in village affairs, exert some guiding influence on decision-making, especially in the area of communal economic activity where national guidelines have been laid down.

While it would be wrong to argue, as some do, that knowledge is a precondition for genuine participation, it none the less remains true that unequal access to knowledge can be a hindrance to participatory democracy. It would appear, therefore, that adult education, especially in the field of political education has an important contribution to make to the strengthening of participatory democracy. With the current investment in the education of children, however, this problem is likely to disappear in the longer run.

IV.7 Some Concluding Observations

The most important priority in the future is to enhance agricultural production, productivity and yields. This issue is taken up subsequently. The agrarian system evolved since the Arusha Declaration is still in a stage of transition. The impressionistic survey of the six villages given here leads naturally to some speculative remarks about the future evolution of the system. Three alternative modes of cultivation exist in the villages and it is not clear which will ultimately predominate. The outcome will depend on the policy towards communal farming and also the relative efficiency and attractiveness of each of these competing modes of production to the villagers.

Communal farming has received official support and has consequently enjoyed a disproportionate amount of modern inputs, credit and technical assistance. It has in some villages served as an instrument for technical innovation. In some cases, the output from the communal farm also serves as a rudimentary social security system for the village.

It is by no means clear that these advantages will continue to operate in the future. If the dissemination of technical innovations to private farms is rapid and thorough, then the advantage of higher productivity (and potentially higher returns from labour input in the communal farm) will

disappear. This particular advantage of the communal farm will continue only if a constant stream of technical innovations continues to be introduced but it is difficult to foresee that this will indeed happen. The second advantage is potentially more durable but it too depends on developments in private farming. As the relative size of the private sector increases, the social security provided by the communal farm will diminish in significance. Similarly if output per man increases significantly in private farming there would be less need for communal farming as a buffer against insecurity.

On the other hand, as agriculture advances to a higher stage of technology, the advantages of co-operative production should become more evident. This is particularly the case with mechanical innovations. The optimum utilisation of machinery will generally require large-scale farming. In this respect, the block farming introduced in most villages may be looked upon as an intermediate step towards large-scale communal farming. It facilitates group provision of extension advice. It allows more easily for exploitation of economies of scale from mechanical cultivation and thus lays the foundation for conversion of personal plots into collective farming at a more advanced stage of agricultural production.

In order to promote the relative expansion of communal farming it will be necessary to increase its economic advantages as a system of production and to devise appropriate incentives to bring about a shift in labour allocation and other resources in its favour. This means above all that careful attention will need to be given to methods of work organisation, payment systems and allocation of proceeds from communal production between distribution and accumulation. Thus far major emphasis has been placed on exhortation to induce labour for communal work. Political education has a major role to play in this. But this will need to be supplemented by a system of work organisation and remuneration which will bring rewards into line with the quantity and quality of labour supplied. More effective methods of work organisation and remuneration based on piece-rate systems should make a useful contribution in this area. It is also important that distribution from the proceeds of communal production should be more frequent and

regular. Excessive deductions for accumulation, running costs and welfare services will have a major disincentive effect on supply of labour for communal farming.

Ultimately, the future of communal farming will depend on increases in production, yields and output per worker. There appears to be considerable scope for increased production through a more efficient allocation of resources between different activities and between the communal and the personal sectors. Over a longer period, increased production will depend on the introduction of animal or mechanical powered cultivation techniques to replace the present system based largely on hand tools; tapping of water resources for irrigation and introduction of high-yielding varieties and better cultivation practices.

In the immediate future, there is an urgent need for collection of some basic data as a tool for improved economic management. Such data should include information on land use, the distribution of private landholdings and labour and other inputs into private and communal farming. Such information is important for monitoring changes in the degree of differentiation, for determining the appropriate allocation of labour between communal and private activities and for devising appropriate incentive systems. In many villages there already exists adequate information on acreage, yields, value of production etc., for the major crops and projects in the communal sector. What is required is collection of similar data with respect to personal plots. Furthermore, accounting procedures for communal economic activities need to be improved and some investment criteria need to be instituted with respect to the disposal of the surplus from communal production. It is by no means clear that past investments in most villages have been the most desirable from the point of view of strengthening communal production.

Improvements in methods of production as well as in planning mentioned above, require an upgrading of village skills at all levels. The village council and the village manager have a central role to play in this. Currently, most of the technical, extension and planning services are provided

by government officials. A more self-reliant cost effective pattern of development would require that such tasks be taken over increasingly by the villagers themselves. This in turn calls for an imaginative programme of short-term training courses in a wide range of skills. The adult literacy and the universal primary education programmes provide the necessary foundation for launching such an effort.

Availability and distribution of land remain important issues in land-scarce villages. In the medium to long run, incentives to settle elsewhere in land abundant parts of the country must play a major role in relieving land shortage. In the short run, greater equity in land distribution can be achieved by a more effective application of the agreed policy on land allocation by village authorities. A necessary precondition of this is the existence of reliable records on total land available to different families.

ANNEX

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