3.2 Labour policies and social dialogue
Social dialogue means any exchange of views among organized interest groups in the labour market on the social
C and, more particularly, the labour-market C implications of economic trends and policies. There are many potential arrangements for dialogue, whether they be ad hoc, Aone-off@ and informal, or more formal, regular institutions for discussion or negotiation. Participants are similarly varied. In most countries they include long-standing labour market actors C trade unions and employers= organizations C but social dialogue may also include any agency of representation, such as elected employee representatives, mass organizations, such as the Vietnamese Women's Organization, or a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that coalesce around particular labour market concerns, as for example, child labour or women's access to jobs. This section reviews some features of social dialogue in the region together with labour policies. It will focus in particular on the most institutionalized arrangements for dialogue that are associated with a country's formal industrial relations system.Three observations may be made at the outset. First, the region is characterized by a wide variety of industrial relations systems. Alongside industrial relations institutions of long standing in, for example, the advanced industrialized countries and South Asia, are countries with a stronger tradition of direct government intervention in the labour market where workers
= and employers= organizations are only gradually emerging or have yet to emerge as independent, representative bodies. Second, the scope of social dialogue here concerns that relating to employment C the quantity and quality of jobs an economy generates and the extent to which social dialogue can contribute to promoting both. Among most countries in the region, there has been one unifying subject of dialogue: the search for the right balance between labour market efficiency, or Aflexibility@, and social protection.Labour market flexibility has been an important theme in those countries undergoing structural adjustment, or simply adjusting to the heightened competition of globalization. It has assumed new importance in the context of adjusting to economic recession, as the social actors seek to avert job losses or to find new sources of job creation. Thus, however much its contours and focus may vary, social dialogue on employment is in many ways dialogue on labour market flexibility, and that dialogue has
Apre-@ and Apost-crisis@ dimensions. The aim of flexibility is to enhance the labour market's ability to adapt to change. And adapting to change relies on the content and quality of labour market governance. In the main, four dimensions of labour market flexibility frame the social dialogue over employment concerns. Each of these has implications for national and enterprise levels, as well as for intermediate levels (as summarized in Appendix table 3.1).Third, in many countries of the region, the social dialogue on labour market flexibility extends to only a minority of the
Aformal@ or Amodern@ sector, and thus only to a small proportion of the total labour force. Indeed, Alabour market flexibility@ is the rule for the majority of workers in most countries, whose informal jobs and incomes are neither the subject of social dialogue nor the object of social protection. Nevertheless, labour market flexibility remains important in the context of the formal sector, and as such is important for employment growth in the economy as a whole.Social dialogue and employment
There is ample evidence (as we shall see below) to show that well-functioning institutions of social dialogue are a source of labour market flexibility. Although often limited in the Asia-Pacific region, social dialogue has had a role to play in the search for employment stability in the present crisis by promoting the appropriate balance between sound economic policies and the need for social protection. In a recession, social dialogue helps minimize social costs and consequences of needed adjustments. It is fairly clear now that the absence of dialogue can constitute a major rigidity in labour markets. It impoverishes the flow and quality of information. Ultimately, people will resist change resulting from decisions in which they have not participated, but which may affect their lives in major and adverse ways.
It is less clear, however, how social dialogue can play a positive role in promoting employment in normal times, or, indeed, in times of rapid growth. A long-standing empirical observation is that the countries in the region with the greatest economic and employment growth are those with weak traditions and actors of social dialogue, and often with a history of labour repression. Where democratic traditions are of longer standing, and traditions of social dialogue more deeply institutionalized, labour markets have been described as more rigid, and economic and employment growth less remarkable.
Two points can be made in this context. First, the long-running debate over whether the weakness of social dialogue, or indeed its repression, materially assisted some countries
= economic growth objectives has yielded at least a few common points. There would appear, first of all, to be no systematic relationship even among the fast-growing economies in the region between a country's industrial relations policies, institutions and system and its rate of economic and employment growth. There would, moreover, seem to be a positive relationship between economic growth and the demand for democratic participation: strategies based on limiting the latter are in any case sustainable for only a limited period.Second, adjustment to economic openness is likely to occur more smoothly with strong and appropriate national institutions of social protection, of which the channels of social dialogue are an important part. Recent years have witnessed an emerging consensus among international agencies, including the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the ILO on the value of social dialogue in adjusting to the more rapid changes brought by globalization. The OECD finds, for example, that government policies to liberalize trade regimes are likely to go hand-in-hand with policies to extend the right to freedom of association. As the Asia-Pacific region is well aware, openness to external economic forces exposes citizens to greater external risks. Collective organization is one of the best safeguards for mitigating those risks. Sustainable economic and employment growth are therefore more likely to occur in the presence of well-functioning channels of social dialogue than in their absence.
The institutional framework of social dialogue
Tripartite relations are a feature of institutional life in many Asian countries. Generally, however, tripartism has not traditionally been a strongly established mechanism in the policy- making process. Some of the more developed countries in the region provide an exception to this rule. In Australia and Japan, for example, a variety of tripartite mechanisms of relatively long standing can be found. Far more recent has been the emergence of the Republic of Korea's Tripartite Commission which, in February 1998, produced a Tripartite Social Accord, the substance of which was almost immediately translated into law. In Singapore, as well, tripartite involvement in policy has traditionally been substantial in such areas as productivity, wages, and employment issues.
In South Asia, tripartite structures are of long standing. In Sri Lanka, for example, there are 37 tripartite wage boards for various trades. But tripartism relies on the extent to which the parties involved are truly representative of their constituents. This has implications for the effectiveness of tripartism, as do the pronounced trend towards decentralization of collective bargaining (although bargaining itself is not extensive), and the multiplicity and politicization of trade unions. Tripartism continues to play an important role in the subregion, however, and there are recent encouraging signs. India's tripartite Labour Conference in 1996, for example, established a national Bipartite Committee to formulate comprehensive proposals on industrial relations law. Sri Lanka's Tripartite National Labour Advisory Council drafted a National Workers
= Charter in 1995, adopted as policy by the Sri Lankan President and designed to promote collective bargaining and industrial peace. Following its ratification of international labour Conventions No. 144 on Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) and No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, Nepal established a National Tripartite Advisory Council in 1996 to strengthen industrial relations in the country's transition to the market economy.Many South Pacific countries have well-established traditions of tripartite relations covering a broad range of policy areas (industrial tribunals and dispute resolution, minimum wage determination), and as part of the consultative process over law and policy. As concerns social and economic policies bearing on employment, there have been developments in the region since 1995. In Fiji, for example, the Fiji Trades Union Congress participated in that country's National Economic Summit for the first time, following the Government's agreement to reactivate the Tripartite Forum
C a mechanism that had not been used since 1984. One key purpose of the Forum is to foster a stable industrial relations environment conducive to job creation. The momentum behind the development of tripartism in Fiji arose from the Suva Declaration of 1994, a preparatory document for the World Summit for Social Development. As a consequence of the Summit, several tripartite committees have been formed to give effect to its commitments, Commitment No. 3 in particular. Papua New Guinea's National Tripartite Consultative Council, which had also become inactive, was revitalized in 1996.In the transition economies, tripartite relations do not yet play an important role in policy-making. The broad authority of the State and its overarching role in economic and social development have meant that the State continues to be the dominant partner in labour market governance. In the presence of a strong State, there has been a corresponding underdevelopment of workers
= and employers= organizations in many of these countries. While trade union federations are both numerically and financially strong, they continue to suffer from a lack of fully independent relations vis-à-vis government; they are not strong at the grass-roots level, and their representativeness of workers for whom they speak is open to question. At the same time, employers= organizations in these countries are only nascent, and require a sustained effort at building their capacity to become an effective voice of employer concerns. As will be seen below, however, new labour laws in China and Viet Nam since 1995 seek to devolve greater responsibility for labour market Agovernance@ to trade unions and management.Trade unions in the fast-growing economies of East and Southeast Asia, meanwhile, are weak relative to those in other market economies. While trade union
Adensity@ (Appendix table 3.2) is a poor indicator of trade union effectiveness, there is none the less a link between the two. This, again, begs the question of how representative or effective tripartite relations can be.While the weakness of participant organizations often enfeebles tripartite initiatives, tripartite mechanisms do function in the countries of the subregion. Good examples are Malaysia's Tripartite Labour Advisory Board or Thailand's National Labour Development Advisory Council and National Wage Committee. Indonesia's tripartite bodies at various levels deal with wages, dispute settlement and retrenchments. The Philippines has a comparatively rich and wide experience of tripartism over the full range of labour issues dating back to the 1970s when its first Labour Code was enacted, and long before other countries in the region had institutionalized tripartite mechanisms.
Bipartite collective bargaining is underdeveloped in many countries in the region. There are various reasons for this, including cultural ones. In some of the fast-growing economies of East and Southeast Asia, deference to hierarchy, avoidance of open conflict and a preference for affective-personal rather than rational-legal means to resolve problems are both obstacles to trade union organization and impediments to engaging the full participation of the workforce. Recent changes in the legal environment have worked both for and against the development of collective bargaining. In Thailand, a military government in 1991 replaced trade unions with associations in the state-owned enterprises and ended collective bargaining. Legal steps to restore trade union and bargaining status in state-owned enterprises, and legislative reform of the rules governing labour-management relationships in the private sector, are now being taken in the country.
Indonesia's turbulent political climate in May 1998 resulted in that country's ratification of the ILO's Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and granting of legal recognition to the trade unions. The ILO is working closely with the Government and the social partners in formulating a legislative framework for industrial relations.
Among the advanced industrialized countries, public policy changes in New Zealand in the early 1990s resulted in substantial de-unionization and the curtailment of collective bargaining. Changes in the political landscape and legal reform in Australia (Workplace Relations Act of 1996) have also weakened support for collective bargaining. On the other hand, the general strike in the Republic of Korea in December 1996 improved the climate of freedom of association and accelerated the legal acceptance of the country's second major trade union federation, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions.
In the transition countries, 1994 and 1995 saw the promulgation of basic labour laws in Viet Nam and China, respectively. In both cases, the new laws give strong public policy support to employee representation at the enterprise level and the promotion of collective bargaining. There remain concerns over the law in China, and indications for both countries show that the practice of collective bargaining lags behind the law's provisions for it. In both countries there is a need for training in negotiating skills, as well as the further development of labour-management relationships at enterprise level. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that by January 1998 an estimated 120,000 collective bargaining agreements had been concluded in China, up from 24,000 a year earlier. Research by China's Ministry of Labour and Social Security, moreover, found a correlation between the existence of collective bargaining agreements and a reduction in disputes. This underscores the role that industrial relations can play in fostering a climate of social stability and industrial peace.
In South Asia, the decentralization of collective bargaining is also an important trend. Relative to other Asian countries, South Asia is characterized by a more recent shift from import- substitutive industrialization to export promotion. The increased competition generated by exposure to international markets has been an important cause of decentralization and has given a boost to collective bargaining.
Even in locations with relatively well-established trade unions and industrial relations frameworks, however, collective bargaining remains weakly developed. In Hong Kong (China), for example, collective bargaining remains the exception rather than the rule. The available data for the Philippines suggest that a mere 364,000 workers
C 1.5 per cent of the total employed and only 10 per cent of unionized workers C are covered by collective bargaining agreements. In Malaysia, while union members relative to the total workforce form a distinct minority, the majority of the Aorganizable@ workforce are trade union members, and collective bargaining is reasonably well established.The stark reality remains that in no country in the region is collective bargaining a vehicle for social dialogue for the majority of workers. While there is a clear trend towards labour-management cooperation through other means, this has not yet been broadly diffused and needs to be strengthened. The main reasons behind this trend are the heightened competition and more rapid product market changes associated with globalization. Both workplace cooperation and work reorganization have thus become tools for improving competitiveness and thus sustaining jobs.
For example, recent research covering 300 collective bargaining agreements in the Indian private sector found that half included provisions for greater flexibility and closer cooperation in the labour-management relationship. Another study of the Indian private sector found that the diffusion of labour-management cooperation was assisted by the presence of foreign, multinational corporations, but not necessarily
Adriven@ by foreign firms. Indeed, the best-case example of labour-management cooperation in that study was the Indian Taj Hotel chain. Evidence from other Indian companies, such as Aravind Mills, Infosys, Ranbaxy, Sundaram Fasteners, and Durgapur Steel, shows competitive strategies built upon institutionalizing closer, collaborative arrangements.Among the advanced industrialized countries, the model of labour-management cooperation emulated implicitly or otherwise has been that of Japan. There are structural roots to the Japanese cooperative model (e.g.
Alifetime employment@, encompassing blue- and white-collar enterprise unionism, labour-management committees). There is also evidence that cooperation has lain at the heart of Japan's external competitiveness. Beyond Japan, Singapore is the first country in the Southeast Asian region to have successfully implemented a variety of programmes on labour-management cooperation.In many countries throughout the region, there are alternatives to, and often vehicles for collective labour-management relations other than collective bargaining. Labour-management committees are sometimes provided for in legislation, as in India, the Republic of Korea or Thailand, or are relatively well institutionalized without legal backing, as in Japan and Singapore. Such committees can be important vehicles for improving the climate of social dialogue, and also for increasing productivity, on which sustainable employment relies.
Social dialogue and employment adjustment
Despite weaknesses in tripartite approaches to policy making, the period of the Asian financial crisis and its aftermath appear to have created opportunities for strengthening social dialogue at the national level in many countries. Difficult economic times have given new impetus to social actors at the national level in their efforts to safeguard or create jobs. Dialogue at the national level has often been about improving the efficiency or flexibility of the labour market; at the same time, equal weight has been given to the need for worker protection and social stability. How the balance has been struck is evident from the examples in Appendix table 3.3.
It seems clear that social dialogue has played a role in efforts to minimize the social costs of retrenchments where these must occur. In addition, a key issue in the recent rounds of retrenchment has been protection of workers from unfair labour practices in the dismissal process, and securing for those workers their rights to back pay and severance payments. Trade unions in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand have urged greater vigilance in ensuring that workers
= rights to unpaid wages and severance payments are upheld by employers in the recession. The recessionary climate in the Philippines, meanwhile, has (as elsewhere) reduced the bargaining power of trade unions. If the demands of globalization prior to the crisis had often resulted in substantial trade union resistance to Adownsizing@ and work reorganization, the current recession has weakened union resistance to job losses, sponsored a stronger focus on negotiating severance payments by trade unions, and enhanced the trend towards work reorganization C often with improved labour-management cooperation.Many countries throughout Asia and the Pacific have mechanisms that are often tripartite for resolving individual or collective disputes. With the financial crisis, the number of individual disputes over job security and unfair dismissal, and the non-payment of wages or severance pay, is likely to have increased across the board. Among transition countries, this has clearly happened in China, whereas among the newly industrializing countries, both Thailand and Malaysia have shown an increase in cases handled through the dispute settlement machinery, and in the number of cases of unfair dismissal. In the majority of countries, there has been a growing interest in improving the functioning of dispute resolution through conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and the labour court system. Ensuring workers
= protection and the fairness of the process of job loss are additional areas in which social dialogue has an important role to play.Social dialogue over the issue of job loss has been motivated both by the direct consequences of the financial crisis on the real economy in several countries of the region, and by the planned or policy-driven consequences of privatization. With a few exceptions, there are no relatively comprehensive data on the extent to which social dialogue over retrenchments has characterized adjustment at the enterprise level. In South Asia, Indian trade unions have been generally less supportive of the trend toward economic liberalization. Public-sector undertakings play a dominant role in the Indian economy, and the Government's plans for
Adisinvestment@ (rather than full privatization) have often been resisted and sometimes reversed. Employment security in Indian enterprises is less a matter of negotiation than of labour law, which makes lay offs contingent on government approval. One study found that 16 per cent of employees in formal-sector enterprises are in fact redundant, and some have argued that this is a consequence of the Arigidity@ of legislated employment security. The rigidity in retrenchment seems to have encouraged the use of contract labour. Adjustment also occurs in India through the use of voluntary retirement schemes, and their use has been on the rise as economic restructuring progresses.The Korean motor manufacturer Hyundai Motors was the scene of a much-publicized, 36-day strike in the summer of 1998 over the company's announced plan for 1,538 lay offs. As a result of mediation by the Government and political groups, agreement was reached for laying off 277 employees (with a
Agolden handshake@ of 7-9 months= salary), and the company's commitment to train without pay the remaining 1,261 employees for a period of one-and-a-half years. In Japan, a 1997 survey revealed an increase in the percentage of collective bargaining agreements with provisions on the use of shukko (the secondment of employees to other firms).A survey of 425 Malaysian companies undertaken in early 1998 revealed that, in a majority of cases, a wide range of alternatives to layoffs had been deployed and that, at that date, retrenchments had been relatively few (Appendix table 3.4). A particularly good example of a
Ahumane@ approach to weathering the crisis is the case of The Cycle & Carriage Bintang Bhd, which initiated a temporary shutdown scheme whereby 435 of its production workers were asked to take three months= leave at 75 per cent of base pay, while retaining their employment and varied benefits with the company. The company's next step has been temporarily to place its employees with other firms that have labour shortages but are currently instituting a Ahiring freeze@. Such cross-firm secondment not only sustains employment but can produce a more broadly trained and experienced workforce upon return to the original employer. Through widespread media coverage, the practice has aroused interest among several other large Malaysian companies.Social dialogue and wage adjustment
Social dialogue over the relationship of wages to employment has both pre- and post-crisis dimensions. Dialogue has focused on three issues in particular: minimum wage, downward adjustment of prevailing wage levels, and the trend in productivity- or profit-linked pay. In some countries (e.g. Thailand), the minimum wage, even prior to the financial crisis, was perceived as damaging competitiveness and discouraging employment expansion, although this perception was not universally shared, particularly by the workers
= organizations. In other countries (e.g. Malaysia), interest in performance-based pay has been growing for a number of reasons, among which the concern that wages might be rising faster than productivity with a consequent negative effect on competitiveness and jobs. A tripartite accord in 1996 sought to expand the use of performance-related pay which is currently practised in only 1 or 2 per cent of Malaysian firms. Recent (1998) legislative changes to the definition of the Awage@ were designed to increase incentives among employers to adopt performance-based pay schemes.Wage determination in much of Asia's private sector, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, has often been described as being the outcome of market forces. In the overwhelming majority of countries, collective bargaining occurs at the enterprise level. Bargaining at the decentralized level is always more constrained by market forces. Since in many countries of the region collective bargaining is only carried out at the enterprise level, and is also not very widespread,
Amarket forces@ may be thought to play an even greater role. With the crisis, there is evidence that in those countries most affected, both nominal and real wages have been adjusted downward. In Thailand, for example, it is estimated that substantial downward wage flexibility has been a chief means of sustaining jobs (Appendix table 3.5). In Malaysia, inflation has eroded real wages, but downward nominal wage adjustments have been less widespread.Among the advanced industrialized countries, Japan practises decentralized collective bargaining but within a fairly highly coordinated national system
C particularly with regard to wages. The country's prolonged economic downturn is showing evidence of changing traditional wage practices. Trade unions that have supported the seniority-based wage system are now offering less resistance to the spread of Amerit-based@ pay adjustments. While merit-based pay serves many objectives, a central one in the recession is to control labour costs and thus preserve jobs. In 1998, the Japanese trade union federation, RENGO, was shaping its policy towards the 1999 spring round of wage adjustments whereby it would considering agreeing to no rise in the basic wage in return for guarantees on means of avoiding lay-offs. One of the main adjustments in Japan has been the reduction of overtime hours as a means of preserving jobs. Since overtime in manufacturing averaged 8-10 per cent of worker compensation, this reduction in hours results in wage reductions as well.In Singapore, enterprise-level bargaining prevails, but is strongly influenced by the Guidelines established in the tripartite National Wage Council. Singapore strongly encouraged a flexible compensation component in its 1986 Wage Council decisions, and performance-based pay is now the norm in Singaporean firms. For 1998, the Wage Council guidelines have been mindful of the deteriorating labour market situation. As such, they call for
Awage restraint@, and recommend to employers and trade unions that: (1) total wage adjustment should reflect the economic slowdown; (2) built-in wage increases should lag behind productivity growth; and (3) variable components of compensation should closely reflect the performance of individual companies.In some other countries, there has been a trend toward decentralization which has been policy driven, rather than ad hoc. Australia and New Zealand are examples of two national systems in which formerly centralized wage negotiations have, through policy change, become decentralized. In Australia, legislation also backs the spread of performance-related pay. In unionized settings, unions have been involved in the design and control of performance-related pay systems in a majority of instances.
The Singaporean wage system referred to above has, since the 1980s, also devolved decisions on actual base wage increases to the enterprise level. Evidence for the Republic of Korea shows that real wages declined by 8.1 per cent in the first quarter of 1998. The reduction has been most marked for male production workers in manufacturing. Thirty per cent of Korean establishments employing over 100 workers had completed their bargaining by the end of May 1998. As is clear from the outcomes for 1,610 establishments (presented in Appendix table 3.6), efforts to maintain employment were reflected in wage bargaining outcomes.
Among South Asian countries, evidence shows that performance-based pay systems are gaining acceptance in India. The spread of these systems often comes in tandem with major changes in work organization designed to improve productivity and competitiveness. Liberalization in India, as has been noted, has spurred collective bargaining at enterprise level; decentralization, in turn, is a key factor behind the spread of work reorganization and the uptake of performance-related pay systems. In Sri Lanka, performance-based pay has been the object of a national tripartite agreement.
Among South Pacific countries, Fiji's social and economic development plan extending into the new millennium calls for the widespread adoption of performance-based pay systems by the year 2000.
There is considerable debate in some countries in the region as to the relevance of minimum wages. Large groups of workers lie outside minimum wage protection, and yet it is these groups that are most vulnerable to the poverty that a minimum wage seeks to address. There are also concerns relating to the loss of competitiveness in export markets or loss of attractiveness as a location for inward foreign direct investment if the minimum wage is set too high. The latter debate is complicated by data inadequacies, unclear criteria for minimum wage determination, and political pressures, all of which have multiplied the doubts. While these concerns were less significant in the climate of rapid economic and employment growth which many countries enjoyed, they are now more ominous.
Actual or planned reforms of minimum wage systems are important policy issues in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Among newly industrializing countries, the new Labour Protection Act in Thailand foresees the replacement of the existing national three-tier system of minimum wages with the decentralization of minimum-wage fixing to the provincial level through tripartite provincial wage committees. The rationale for decentralization is the perceived need to adjust the minimum wage more closely to economic realities at the local level. While the move could be seen as encouraging the development of tripartism at the provincial level in Thailand, the country's trade union federations have been largely critical of decentralization. Outside the metropolitan area, Bangkok, in particular, labour organization is weak. Trade unions thus fear that decentralization may become a vehicle for employer determination of the minimum wage, with the actual effect of lowering it.
In the Philippines, minimum-wage setting was devolved in 1989 to tripartite bodies at the regional level (the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards). The regional bodies conduct public hearings through which the concerns of specific sectors can be aired, and with tripartite participation, the process can be thought of as a form of regional bargaining. From 1990 to mid-1996, five wage orders were issued by the regional boards.
In Indonesia, the need for a review of the minimum wage system was one of the recommendations of a national tripartite forum in 1995. A national workshop on the reform of the minimum wage system took place in August 1998 and made several recommendations on policy in this area. One of these urged a gradual approach to upward adjustment of the regional minimum wage towards the aim of fulfilling
Aminimum living requirements@. While substantial progress had been made towards fulfilling this objective, the economic crisis has halted the process by eroding the purchasing power of the minimum wage.Wages and, indeed, the industrial relations climate generally, have become a sensitive subject in some of the Pacific island countries, such as Papua New Guinea. There, as in the other island economies, the negative effects of liberalization policies on employment and the desire by governments and employers to reduce labour costs and improve flexibility to enhance external competitiveness have also centred on the wage issue. In Papua New Guinea, the
AMinimum Wage Determination@ of 1992 fundamentally changed the wages system, propelling employers and workers away from centrally fixed wages to collective bargaining, and introducing an emphasis on wage increases linked to productivity gains.Overall, the above discussion suggests that social dialogue has two important roles to play in an economy. First, it has the potential for generating a social consensus on a broad range of economic and social policies, and such a consensus is important for their successful implementation. Second, it can be an effective mechanism for ensuring labour market flexibility, which has become essential for economic and employment growth in a globalized world.
An effective framework for tripartite consultation is necessary for developing social consensus on policies, while bipartite collective bargaining institutions are needed for ensuring labour market flexibility. The review of the existing mechanisms of social dialogue in the Asia-Pacific countries, presented above, shows a number of unresolved issues and problems. In particular, the roles of tripartite and bipartite institutions are not always clearly distinguished, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized collective bargaining remain inadequately understood. These are the issues and problems which will need to receive urgent attention in future.
