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## Foreword

This is a paper of the ILO's Migration Programme, located within the Conditions of Work Branch. The objectives of the Programme are to contribute to (i) the formulation, application and evaluation of international migration policies suited to the economic and social aims of governments, employers' and workers' organizations, (ii) the increase of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrants and the protection of their rights and dignity. Its means of action are research, technical advisory services and co-operation, meetings and work concerned with international labour standards. Under the Programme the ILO also collects, analyses and disseminates relevant information and acts as the information source for its constituents, ILO units and other interested parties.

The ILO has a constitutional obligation to protect the 'interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own'. This has traditionally been effected through the elaboration, adoption and supervision of international labour standards, in particular the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97); the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143); and the non-binding Recommendations supplementing them. International legal instruments of this kind are designed to influence national legislation and regulations in each country which has ratified these Conventions; and in this way they aim at changing not only legislation but the actual practices as well.

Within the framework of its activities aimed at assisting Member States in the design and implementation of policies and measures that provide effective protection to migrant workers and improve the management of migration flows, particularly in terms of reducing irregularities and integrating established migrants into host societies, the Migration Programme launched, in the early 1990's, a project to analyse the extent of labour market discrimination against migrant workers, and the efficacy of anti-discrimination policies to combat such discrimination. As this project drew to a close, the natural follow-up appeared to be to assess the efficacy of measures to encourage not only labour market, but also, in broader terms, social integration. The Migration Programme thus asked Dr. Jeroen Doornik to undertake a study of policies aimed at integrating migrant workers and their descendants as elaborated in three western European countries, namely France, Germany and the Netherlands. This report constitutes the first step towards elaborating a wider assessment of integration policies in other migrant-receiving states.

This study breaks new ground in that it develops a comprehensive and comparative methodology to assess the integration of migrants and their descendants, not only in the labour market but also in society at large. In applying this methodology, the author found convincing and extremely worrying evidence for the actual labour market disintegration of Turkish migrants in all three countries. Although the prospects for their descendants seem to be better, they do not reach levels of comparable categories of nationals. Where integration efforts aimed at the labour market have met with little success, the record of broader policies to promote the integration of migrants and their descendants into society was found to be more promising, notably in the Netherlands. Dr. Doornik argues that this can only be explained by this country's sustained efforts at legally integrating foreigners. In other words, immigration policies as such appear to have a number of

consequences for the potential of integrating migrant workers and the members of their families.

In his conclusion, the author draws up a number of policy proposals for governments concerned with integrating their migrant populations and improving social cohesion among their entire resident population. These proposals cover not only targeted labour market policies and easily accessible redress mechanisms to counter discrimination, but also policies aimed at granting all long-term residents social, political and legal rights.

It is hoped that the insights provided in this paper will contribute to the on-going discussion on how to improve the efficacy of integration policies.

November 1998

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## Executive Summary

Between the late 1950s and mid-1970s most West European States saw the immigration of ‘guest workers’ who came to fill vacancies at the bottom-end of the labour market. During that time, the integration of these labour immigrants was of little concern to the governments of receiving countries because a) their stay was not perceived as being permanent, and b) the position of these immigrants was not in any way seen as problematic as long as their presence on the labour market was needed. This changed after the economic recession of the mid-1970s when many of these ‘guest workers’ became unemployed and, against the original expectations of both immigrants and governments, many did not return home and instead gradually started to bring over their dependants. Since then immigrant populations of considerable size have become a normal feature of most West European States, among which France, Germany and The Netherlands, the countries to which we devote this study.

Once the presence of these former ‘guest workers’, their spouses and descendants had become permanent, it also became clear that, at least for the time being, labour market needs for their skills would sooner decrease than increase. In economic terms this caused a trend of disintegration of these immigrants: i.e. their labour market position increasingly became precarious. Furthermore, integration into other segments of society lagged behind in many instances.

In most countries of settlement governments have sooner or later developed policies by which labour market disintegration trends should be halted or reversed and integration in general terms should be promoted. In this study we have looked in some detail at the types of policies devised by French, German and Dutch governments. In some instances these policies are explicitly targeted at immigrants and their descendants. In other instances policies are of a general nature and aimed at all (potentially) disadvantaged members of the country’s population. Whether governments choose to develop general or group-specific policies is to a considerable extent determined by how States perceive themselves: e.g. as culturally homogeneous or heterogeneous, as countries of immigration or not. The three States under consideration show considerable differences among them in this respect.

In seeking to establish how effective several types of integration policies are, we found that the data on which such an analysis should be based confront us with a number of methodological problems. These are outlined in chapter 2.

In chapters 3 to 5 the position of immigrants (focusing on Turks in particular) in the labour market, in the educational system and in society at large in France, Germany and The Netherlands on the one hand, and integration and immigration policies towards them on the other, is analysed. In the final chapter we have to conclude that disintegration is a feature common to all three States, albeit to varying extents and in varying aspects. We argue that this variation is not only explained out of differences in integration policies and labour market demand but also to a considerable extent out of differences in immigration policies between States. In conclusion we draw up a number of policy proposals for governments concerned with integrating their immigrant populations and improving social cohesion among their entire resident population.

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Most West European States have during the past decades experienced relatively large-scale immigration of foreign nationals. In a number of instances such immigration passes almost unnoticed and is no way perceived to be problematic to the immigrants concerned or the State in which they temporarily or permanently settle. By and large these immigrants stem from industrialised nations like other EU-members, Northern America or Japan, are well skilled, and their arrival fits with the receiving State's economic needs in general and those of the labour market in particular. Even if those immigrants bring along cultural traits that are not indigenous in their new surroundings, they are generally considered to be well integrated, if only because for all intents and purposes they are self-reliant. This kind of migration can be considered, for all those involved, to be a *direct* and, beneficial consequence of an increasingly globalized economy (Doomernik et al. 1997, Doomernik and Penninx 1997).

Globalization also has *indirect* and unsolicited consequences. Many more people than ever before, and in regions previously untouched by it, are now tied into the world economy. On the one hand this may mean a growing prosperity for smaller or larger numbers of people but it also leaves considerable numbers of people uprooted from their lands and with little economic perspective. Producing for the world market makes workers vulnerable to shifts in demand and prices, and if they produce cash crops these are likely to have replaced traditional peasant-like modes of production. In addition to civil wars and ethnic strife, this process produces growing numbers of migrants. They move to the ever-expanding metropolises of the third world, together competing for scarce employment and housing. Under such conditions it demands little of the imagination to understand that many regions of today's world witness an increasing emigration pressure.

Emigration pressure as such does not mean that people will actually move. For this to happen links have to exist between countries or regions of origin and those of resettlement. This explains why migratory patterns are seldom random. Links, or intermediary structures as they are frequently called, can be diverse in nature (see e.g. Sassen 1996). They can be colonial or post-colonial in character; based on economic relationships due, for example, to the off-shoring of production; consist of ethnic relationships, kinship and family networks. The presence of immigrant communities in receiving countries is the clearest such link. In addition, there need to be the links that actually make movement possible: airline connections, shipping and the like (for a full discussion see Van Amersfoort 1996, Van Amersfoort and Doomernik 1998).

West European countries show themselves to be reluctant hosts to those immigrants who arrive uninvited. At least in part due to international obligations<sup>2</sup> they nevertheless have to accept the settlement of large numbers of them and will have to do so in the foreseeable future. Their reluctance is to a considerable extent to be explained by the fact that these newcomers join relatively large numbers of immigrants (and their descendants) from earlier decades whose social and economic position is at best ambivalent. In spite of governments' concerns, research findings

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<sup>1</sup> Thanks are due to Manolo Abella, Hans Mahning and Roger Zegers de Beijl for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this report.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967, and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

generally show that the macro economic effects of immigration from the developing world are positive, even in those countries that do not belong to the traditional immigration nations (Coussey 1997). Furthermore, demographic trends suggest that the need for immigration in the coming decades will rise rather than decline (Doomernik et al. 1997).

When those earlier immigrants arrived as 'guest workers' between the 1950s and early 1970s their integration, as far as the labour market was concerned, posed no problem. After all, their arrival was induced precisely because there was a great need for their labour. Moreover, by both immigrants and receiving States their presence was perceived to be of a temporary nature and questions as to any other form of integration outside the labour market simply did not arise to any major extent. After the 'oil crises' of the mid 1970s this gradually changed. The need for 'guest workers' drastically declined and many already present were made redundant. However, these migrants did not return home, or at any rate not in the expected numbers, as economic opportunities at home were even worse. Instead many brought over their family members to join them. Although not all countries of settlement immediately acknowledged that this process implied that they had become, if only for the time being, countries of immigration, most of them today have developed policies that aim at promoting the integration of these labour migrants, their spouses, and their children.

Due to economic restructuring, going hand in hand with a globalizing economy, at present there is little demand in Western Europe for the skills these 'guest workers' were originally recruited for. And in spite of the policies mentioned, until now attempts to integrate them in other sectors of what is more and more becoming a post-industrial economy have been only partly successful. Indeed, as Böhning (1995) points out for the German labour market, the present situation is aptly defined as disintegration. This in itself may come as no great surprise as these previous 'guest workers' by and large are not young and flexible any longer. The fact, however, that their children, constituting the second generation, also are faced with serious problems, primarily on the labour market but in other spheres too, is much less obvious. Born and bred in their parents' country of settlement, their starting position should not be too different from that of native children.

The above serves as a general introduction, depicting processes taking place in all West European societies, albeit to varying extents. And in most if not all of those societies these processes cause concern among policy makers, politicians and the general public alike. It is considered to be undesirable when particular segments of society are threatened to become more or less permanently marginalised, especially when these segmentations closely follow ethnic lines. Not just out of the obligations a liberal democracy must feel towards all its citizens and legal residents, but also because it implies a gross loss of potential contributions to society and its economy and because of the considerable risk for society's fabric.

In this study we will investigate how different West European States try to come to grips with these processes, and especially what types of policy instruments they employ to counter their effects. Especially relevant will be the question whether it is possible to identify policies that show themselves to be particularly effective (or not) and whether we can use their example in order to suggest modifications in current practices. To this end, three States have been selected: France, Germany and The Netherlands. Each of these has a different conception of its own society and how it perceives immigration and the presence of non-native populations. At least partly as a result of these differences, they have different policy concepts when it comes to integrating foreigners, or trying to stem potential or actual disintegration tendencies. Lastly, they are also in different stages of economic restructuring, making the effects of those processes more or less acute.

To make a comparison as equally based as possible, we will focus our attention (without keeping other categories completely out of view) on Turkish immigrants and their descendants when looking at policies and their effects on former 'guest worker' populations. This choice is mainly inspired by the fact that Turkish 'guest workers' moved to all three States in varying yet substantial numbers, for the same reasons and broadly at the same time. In addition, we will also look at policies aimed at the integration of the relative newcomers who still consist primarily of first generation immigrants, frequently from regions much further afield.

Before we can move to a discussion of the current position of immigrants and their descendants in the three selected countries, and of their integration policies, we first need to go into some methodological considerations. We need to establish what types of policies actually constitute integration policies, how they relate to other policies and general policy objectives, what could be a good way to operationalize the readily used but often ill defined term "integration" and what could be its indicators, and how policies and their outcomes can be compared between States that in many relevant aspects differ from each other.

After the chapter on methodology, three chapters of country studies are presented. In the final chapter (chapter 6) a comparative analysis is presented. The chapter is concluded with an overview of a range of options, in terms of policy and data collection, for the three countries in particular and for post-industrial immigration countries in general.

## **2. Methodological considerations**

In this chapter we need to investigate in some detail how best to operationalize the concepts underlying 'integration' and 'integration policies'. Subsequently we will address the types of data and their (potential) sources that are the most suitable indicators if we want to establish in how far integration in a certain field has taken place. Finally we discuss the intricacies of comparing the integration of immigrants and their descendants in countries that in many relevant aspects differ from each other.

### **2.1. Integration**

As Böhning (1995) correctly noted, integration should be seen both as a process and also as the state lying at its end; or put differently 'integration' as leading to 'being integrated'.

The integration of newcomers as a process involves two sides: the individuals and their communities who set out to find a satisfactory position in society on the one hand, and the receiving society and the individuals constituting it on the other hand. This two-sided process can only take place when society recognises the fact that its own interests are served by integrating newcomers. This is not by necessity the case as immigrant policies in such diverse countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Gabon, South Korea or Malaysia show (cf. Doornik 1998). Non-integration, be it on the housing market and taking the form of segregation, or on the labour market taking the form of under- or unemployment, or disintegration of people who are there to stay, inevitably leads to high economic and social costs, and is bound to point out the difference between people instead of stressing what they have in common. Much like in chemistry, processes by which several elements are joined together into a new product can also be reversed, again freeing the individual elements. The same holds true for the integration process, the reverse being

disintegration.

Integration as state of being can be defined as a situation in which immigrants hold a position which is similar to natives with comparable and relevant characteristics; notably in terms of age, education, and gender. However, it should be pointed out that one cannot be too rigid in this definition's application. The percentage of immigrants among fishermen in Bretagne, among shepherds in the Highlands of Scotland, or among farmers in the German Sauerland, are destined to remain low relative to their numbers in society at large. Rather one should judge the position of immigrants in broader terms and look at the level of integration in certain societal spheres in general: the housing and labour markets, and the legal and educational systems. In addition one could also look at the level at which immigrants have adopted the cultural traits of their host societies. Especially the extent to which this latter aspect could concern policy makers strongly depends on a State's self-perception. Integration as a state may imply that the immigrant<sup>3</sup> (and more commonly his descendants) has completely assimilated into society and, with the possible exception of his surname, is no longer 'different'. This then could be labelled as assimilation. In contrast integration could also be seen to have been achieved when immigrants retain much of their own culture but are equal to natives in their access to a society's resources and institutions.

Following the example of Castles and Miller (1993:39) we can distinguish four ideal types of nationhood - a concept closely related to a State's self-perception - and thus with direct consequences for the notion of who belongs to the nation and under what conditions newcomers can become full members.

The imperial model views belonging to a nation "in terms of being a subject of the same power or ruler" (Ibid.). No modern liberal State fits this model but the European past has seen very clear examples in the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. Until the Nationality Act of 1981 also in Britain this type remained formally in operation (Ibid.).

The ethnic model, which defines membership of a nation as based upon common roots and destiny, reflected in speaking the same language, having the same culture and hence belong to the same ethnic community. This then almost by definition excludes newcomers with other cultural traits and different roots from becoming full members. Among the main immigration countries, Germany comes closest to this type. Well-known illustrations of this are the often voiced phrase *Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland* (Germany is not an immigration country) and its reluctance to grant citizenship to all those who are not born out of at least one German parent (the prevalence of the so called *jus sanguinis*, literally 'law of the blood' but perhaps better translated as 'law of descent'). If citizenship is granted through naturalisation this is preferred to be seen as the crown upon a process of (near) assimilation. At the same time, however, large numbers of immigrants arrive who are granted German citizenship the moment they cross the German border. These are the so-called *Aussiedler*, descendants of German colonists who moved to settle in the Eastern parts of Europe in earlier centuries. This underlines the importance of the country's 'law of descent'.

In the Republican model belonging to society is predominantly defined as belonging to a political

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<sup>3</sup> In this paper *worker* and *immigrant* are treated as masculine nouns, and the corresponding personal pronouns and possessive pronoun used are therefore *he*, *him* and *his*. Obviously, this bears no relation to the potential or actual share of females in any migrant population or among its descendants.

community. Newcomers may then become full members provided they adopt the receiving State's culture and accept to live according to its political rules. Citizenship then is a prerequisite towards integration rather than, as is the case in the ethnic model, the final result of that process. In spite of some fluctuations in its policies, France can be considered to be a good example of a State functioning according to this model. This is reflected in its *jus soli*, the 'law of the soil' which grants citizenship not only to children of French descent but also to anyone born on French territory (a principle that has seen modifications and discussions in the recent past but is likely to be reintroduced shortly, see chapter 3), and by the relative ease with which foreign born immigrants can become citizens. It is further reflected in a strong belief in the assimilating capacities of the French nation and the ensuing lack of any kind of minority based rights or minority targeted policies.

The multi-cultural model finally, is based upon the idea that cultural differences within a society are normal. These are not by necessity problematic provided they do not hinder full participation in society's core fields, i.e. in the educational system, on the labour and housing markets, and in democratic decision making processes. To this end, equality for the law needs to be achieved as best and quickly as possible. Uncomplicated citizenship rules are one instrument to achieve this but States functioning according to this model may additionally grant many civil and political rights to foreign nationals making them in those respects almost equal to nationals. The Netherlands, for example, granted local suffrage to non-EU nationals who legally reside in the country for five years.<sup>4</sup> It furthermore has policies explicitly aiming to integrate immigrants and their descendants, whereby integration as a state is defined as having equal access to society's resources and institutions. Assimilation is no policy goal, instead provisions are present to facilitate the institutionalisation of the immigrants' culture and religion.

From this brief overview it will have become clear that France, Germany and the Netherlands each have rather different images of what constitutes nation and society, and as to who could or should belong and who could or should not. Hence it is to be expected that the governments of these States will have different ideas as to what constitutes integration, how this should be achieved and whether general or specific policies to this end are required.

## 2.2. Policies

Hammar (1985) was among the first to point out that it is helpful to make a clear distinction between immigrant policies and immigration policies, and many authors have meanwhile adopted a similar view. Immigrant policies are those that seek to affect the position of an immigrant in a receiving society. In case they are aimed at increasing the level of participation, they can also be labelled as integration policies. Immigration policies are those by which a State tries to control who immigrates and for what purpose and duration. However, such a demarcation should, in spite of its analytical usefulness, not mask the fact that both types of policies are closely connected and each has a marked effect upon the other. In Hammar's view integration policies can only be successful when immigration is kept under control; i.e. when there is no unrestricted settlement of foreigners. This especially pertains to liberal democratic States, where governments have a certain responsibility towards all persons who legally (and to a certain extent even illegally) reside within their borders. Among these responsibilities is to guarantee a minimum subsistence level for those

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<sup>4</sup> The right to vote and stand as candidate for provincial and national elections is still seen as the privilege of nationals.

who cannot support themselves; in terms of income but also adequate housing, training, schooling for children, health care and the like. In effect, these States have to set limits to the influx of immigrants of whom it is not *a priori* clear that they will not need State support; both for simple budgetary reasons and for maintaining a consensus on the need to integrate and accept the newcomers already present in society. Although this principle in itself is difficult to dispute, it is not at all easy to determine where the limits to immigration lie and how precisely it affects integration processes. It seems those limits are generally set less on the basis of objective criteria as on considerations following from the way a State perceives itself, as discussed in the previous section.

The way in which States control immigration, i.e. the instruments they employ to this end, directly and indirectly impacts upon integration policies and their effects. For one they determine who has which particular legal status. Generally speaking immigrants who have gained the right of abode are eligible for more and/or other integration facilities than those who are awaiting the outcome of an asylum request, not to mention immigrants who are illegal residents. Among those immigrants who possess a residence title, further differentiations may be made. In some instances a few years of legal residence may qualify immigrants for a secure legal status that makes them nearly equal in all material respects to natives, in other instances such a secure position remains contingent on particular conditions (e.g. being employed or otherwise financially self-sufficient) for a long period of time. This then may have serious consequences for the immigrants' sense of belonging and their desire and ability to integrate into society at large (see Groenendijk et al. 1998). Furthermore, waiting periods can be imposed on newcomers before they are allowed to enter the labour market or the educational system. A similar rule may apply to their right to family reunification, a right that can be further curtailed by demanding that the immigrant has sufficient means, adequate housing and such. In case immigrants become or are nationals of the receiving society yet again other rules apply. All this makes clear the relevance of the links between immigration and immigrant policies.

A State's self perception also has obvious implications for the goals governments set when they formulate immigrant - or integration - policies and the shape these take. Two dimensions can be discerned when analysing integration policies: the societal fields they are aimed at, and whether they are mainly or exclusively targeted on immigrants and their descendants or rather on disadvantaged groups in general.

As to the first dimension - integration in specific societal fields - the most commonly targeted field is the labour market. With the possible exception of people born rich or otherwise economically well off, being integrated in the labour market determines to a considerable extent a person's integration in most, if not all, other spheres of society. The amount of income one earns determines to a large extent the housing one can afford, the quality of the schooling one's children can enjoy (which also may well be related to the part of a city or town one lives in) and also in other respects determines the quality of life and the future prospects of one's off-spring. Besides the financial aspects of being economically active, work constitutes an important element in the individual's sense of purpose and structures day-to-day life. >From any government's point of view, moreover, it is costly to support people who cannot take care of themselves; under- or unemployment means a waste of human capital; and unemployment may destabilise society's social fabric.

In addition to integration policies aimed at the labour market, governments may also try to support and encourage the integration of immigrants (or other potentially or actually marginalised persons)

in other fields. As pointed out, there are more or less direct links between housing, schooling and income, and governments may assume that once the latter is taken care off, integration in other fields should be an automatic consequence. In practice this link is not mono-dimensional and, moreover, is not instantaneous. Place of residence, for example, may determine a person's access to employment and/or upward mobility. One needs only imagine a situation where large numbers of disadvantaged people are housed together in sub-urban areas with no or few industries, with no or few direct transportation links to the city centre or other parts of town where employment could be found, and, as a consequence of the general low income situation, little retail or other economic activities within the area itself. This example is not as hypothetical as it may sound<sup>5</sup> but more common are situations where some kind of geographical clustering of disadvantaged persons - among whom immigrants are often disproportionately found - occurs, especially in the larger cities. This then may cause governments, be it local or national, to devise measures by which to increase the chances for proper education for second generation immigrants<sup>6</sup> that might as a result of the low income, poor education and lack of language abilities of their parents otherwise remain beyond their reach. Another type of policy may be aimed at providing good quality housing as such or at trying to move poor housed people into other neighbourhoods; perhaps dispersing them, in the hope to increase the integration of immigrants.

As for the second dimension, integration policies broadly speaking can be of two types: general policies aiming to improve the position of all people who are marginalised or are at risk of becoming so, and generic or targeted policies only aimed at specific types of disadvantaged persons, e.g. immigrants. In Hammar's (1985) terms such a distinction could also be labelled as one between indirect and direct immigrant policies.

Examples of indirect or general policies could be those whereby long-term unemployed have access to retraining programmes or job schemes, or, on a different front, urban renewal schemes, improving housing quality, infrastructure and the like, in principle equally benefiting immigrants and natives. It should be borne in mind however that equality in principle can be seriously hampered in practice by lack of access, generally for practical reasons like insufficient knowledge (e.g. as a result of language barriers) of rights and the benefits to be had by participating in such general schemes.

A good example of direct integration policies are those whereby newcomers are assisted who lack the basic attributes needed to participate on the labour market, e.g. language courses and training to bring an immigrant's skills up to the necessary level. Other policies could be to extend the right to vote to non-nationals hoping thus to increase their political participation and sense of belonging to society, or, to the same end, establish institutions in which non-nationals can voice their specific needs and claims. In addition, policies are also conceivable whereby immigrants are offered facilities for retaining some core aspects of their own culture (e.g. religion) or even are

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<sup>5</sup> The suburbs around many of the main French cities, and the housing estates around the larger Scottish cities are some European examples that spring to mind.

<sup>6</sup> At times a confusing and inaccurate term. The second generation may be considered to consist of people born in the country where their parents resettled and therefore are strictly speaking not immigrants. Furthermore, in many instances these children are citizens of the receiving State and not foreigners. Depending on the definition, second generation immigrants may also be the children born abroad of the original immigrants but immigrating as minors and not on their own initiative.

encouraged to do so. Although such policies may have a significant impact on the general sense of well-being and belonging of immigrants, it should be pointed out here that policies in the field of language and culture are not of our main concern in this study.<sup>7</sup> We will, however, make occasional mention of them to explain the general political/societal context in which labour market and educational integration policies are placed.

The most obvious example of direct immigrant integration policies are those which can be brought under the general heading of positive action. Quota may be laid down in law or be institutionalised practice by which immigrants or, more generally, people belonging to disadvantaged ethnic categories are receiving some kind of preference when applying for jobs or for places in the educational system. These policies can be active, for example when employers are under an obligation to give preference to members of such specified population categories in hiring practices, or passive, when they are, for instance, under an obligation to report on the relative numbers of such persons in their work force. Somewhere between active and passive policies are those whereby government institutions prefer to grant projects to employers with a certain minimum number of disadvantaged workers among their employees.

Finally, governments may put in place legislation aimed at combatting discrimination; in general terms, for example by adherence to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and/or the International Labour Organisation's Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No 111), or in very specific terms by either defining such discrimination as a criminal offence or prohibiting it in civil law (Zegers de Beijl 1995). Although such legislation is often difficult to enforce - while discrimination is hard to prove beyond reasonable doubt - its symbolic valuable cannot be underestimated for it underlines a State's commitment to the equality of all persons under its jurisdiction.

Such a model does not pretend to be more than just a tool with which to filter out relevant variables and to order them in what is likely to be their most significant relationship. In this particular case, we had to choose the highest level of abstraction that could still yield sufficient insight in the processes at hand. Choosing any lower level of observation - almost all variables being highly complex in themselves - would create a model with endless sub-variables and thus

### **2.3. Indicators and sources**

Potentially a whole range of indicators can be used to measure integration with. These indicators, moreover, can be had from many different types of sources. Those indicators that are most likely to inform on the level of integration, we have brought together in a heuristic model (table 2.1). render it useless for our present purpose.

The model shows the direct relationships between, on the left-hand side, immigration policies, and, to the right hand side, the level of integration into the labor market specifically or in society in general. Originally the model was designed to evaluate the interaction between immigration policies and integration in those instances where labor immigration is current practice and did not take the possible presence of a second or third generation into account (Doomernik 1998). Including them requires the model to incorporate the children's educational attainments and, since schooling determines labor market access, we inserted this variable in the column labeled "level

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<sup>7</sup> Many details on such policies in France, Germany and The Netherlands can be found in Vermeulen 1997.

of labor market integration”.

Although the model makes visible that integration, integration policies and immigration policies are intertwined, the focus of our present endeavor lies on the two right side columns: one listing those variables that are particularly relevant if we define integration in a narrow sense, and one if we want to add those variables that are pertinent if we elect a broad definition.

If we wish to evaluate the effectiveness of integration measures we have to formulate criteria by which to do so and to define which fields we consider particularly relevant. Following a narrow definition of integration we then first and foremost need to investigate integration policies aiming at labor market participation. However, to arrive at a more comprehensive picture and define integration in a broader sense of which pure economic aspects are arguably the core, we would have to look at other societal fields as well: e.g. the housing market, the legal system, political and social participation, for all these are clearly interrelated. Although those fields do receive some attention in this study, and we point out the data and sources relevant for an evaluation of the levels of integration at large, time, resources and data availability prevent us from going into them in empirical detail. Being forced to set priorities our focus will thus be on labor market integration and, as it forms the road towards the labor market for second and subsequent generations, the educational system.

We also need to address the sources most likely to yield the data by which the position of immigrants and their descendants on those two societal fields in France, Germany and the Netherlands can be established, and their development over time.

A general problem pertaining to all data on the fields discussed below is that it is not always easy to determine who are our subjects, or put differently, how to trace them. Comprehensive databases predominantly cover individuals who are legal residents or, when the labour market is concerned, legally employed; but not by necessity! It may well be the case that persons who are registered in a population census or survey are illegal residents, and the same holds true for population registers. And instances where the opposite phenomenon occurs can neither be ruled out. This then means that it is not at all easy to establish the size of an immigrant population and hence to make absolutely valid statements about the number of unemployed, for example. By the same token, if we cannot be certain about the numbers of immigrants legally or illegally active on the labor market an evaluation then becomes even more complicated.

**Table 3.1 Population (thousands) of France, foreign and domestic born (including colonies and Overseas Territories), and nationality (1911 – 1990)**

<i>Year</i>	Total Population	French birth	Naturalized	Foreigners	French birth	Naturalized	Foreigners	Total immigrants	As % of total popula tion
1911	39,192	37,652	85	218	127	168	942	1,110	2.8
1921	38,798	36,847	80	277	164	174	1,255	1,429	3.7

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1926

	40,228	37,384	45	325	187	204	2,084	2,288	5.7
1931	41,228	37,937	55	291	216	306	2,423	2,729	6.6
1936	41,183	38,220	100	288	248	416	1,910	2,326	5.6
1946	39,848	36,908	301	310	343	552	1,434	1,986	5.0
1954	42,781	39,571	295	245	377	773	1,520	2,293	5.4
1962	46,456	42,133	336	220	905	931	1,931	2,862	6.2
1968	49,756	44,009	297	402	1,766	1,019	2,262	3,281	6.6
1975	52,599	45,907	280	667	1,858	1,112	2,775	3,887	7.4
1982	54,296	47,169	254	845	1,991	1,167	2,870	4,037	7.4
1990	56,652	49,55	472	739	1,719	1,308	2,858	4,166	7.4

Source: INSEE 1997: 17

Note: Immigrant population calculated as all foreign born naturalized persons and foreigners

Another potentially complicating factor lies in the definition of the term “immigrant” and the way varying definitions are used by government and other institutions responsible for the compilation of the statistics we need for the purpose of our exercise. ‘Non-national resident’ as a rule is a variable that is enumerated in a number of labor market and population statistics. When, however, an immigrant becomes a national of the receiving state, the nationality variable loses its relevance. For population statistics this poses no major problem as ‘foreign national’ may simply be changed into ‘foreign born’.<sup>8</sup> The immigrant’s children, however, may not by this means be traceable. In France and the Netherlands they will, in many instances, be nationals and not foreigners. As a remedy, it can be an option to compile a statistic of persons who have at least one foreign born parent, as is done in the Netherlands. Together with their parents, these persons then constitute the several ethnic minorities which are the explicit target of Dutch minority policy. For the purpose of measuring the integration of the members of such ethnic minority groups on the labor market, there is little alternative but to register their ethnic identity, a concept moving beyond the distinction between nationals and foreigners or foreign born persons. This criterion can then be

<sup>8</sup> It then still remains difficult to distinguish them from e.g. a Dutch person born in a foreign country because his or her parents, also being Dutch, resided abroad as diplomats, business people and the like.

used either when enumerating a labor force survey or through a register where employers are required to deposit statements about their employees' ethnicity.<sup>9</sup>

### 2.3.1. Labor market

Recalling that we consider integration as a state to imply that immigrants or categories of immigrants are in an equal or comparable position as natives with equal characteristics in terms of education and professional qualifications, upbringing, age, and gender, this would mean that on the labor market they would be employed equally in the same sectors (i.e. industry, retail, services, etc.), earn similar wages, work similar hours, show the same level of (un)employment, enjoy equal training and retraining facilities, show the same level of job mobility, and are not faced with discrimination.

Some of those variables are relatively easy to measure, others are not. Education and professional qualifications for one can only be unequivocally established when the person in question has been educated in the host country. Otherwise it may well be hard to establish the "value" and compatibility of a migrant's human capital within his or her new surroundings. To give one example: an immigrant may have been a professor of law in the then Soviet Union and hence be highly qualified and trained and having enjoyed a high status in society, in any Western European country, with quite different laws and regulations in most fields, his human capital is of little value.<sup>10</sup> In other words: it would be odd to expect to find such an immigrant in a labor market position even remotely equal to his previous one. In contrast, many of the immigrants who came to Europe as 'guest workers' brought qualifications (even though they may have been relatively limited) that were in great need in recruitment countries and of less use in their countries or regions of origin. A comparison between educational and professional background of foreign trained immigrants on the one hand and natives on the other relative to their labor market position in effect poses some problems. This, of course, is different when we look at the children of those immigrants, provided they were born and bred in the host society or immigrated as infants.

Data pertaining to age and gender are much less likely to pose a serious problem but, as pointed out in the previous section, to relate those to a person's ethnicity becomes more difficult as he or she has been integrated into the legal system: i.e. is a citizen or the child of a citizen.

Labor force surveys are a common feature of all three countries that are the subject of this study. Provided they also enumerate data on nationality and/or ethnicity, they offer a good basis on which to evaluate the labor market position of immigrants and their descendants. Ideally, they are organized in such a fashion that specific cohorts (e.g. of immigrants) can be traced through time. If this is not possible, it can still be feasible to evaluate integration or disintegration processes by establishing the growing or declining presence of certain categories of workers in specific labor

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<sup>9</sup> As part of the Dutch Law on Equal Participation of Immigrants in the Labour Market's (1994) implementation, employees in firms with 35 staff or more were obliged to state their ethnicity. This was a contentious issue as many individuals and some workers' organisations saw this as an infringement on personal privacy.

<sup>10</sup> For a full discussion of social, cultural and economic capital and their rates of exchange in the migration process, see Doornik 1997a.

market segments and the relative wages they earn. Other surveys, like the German socio-economic panel (SOEP), can also be the source of such data (see e.g. Seifert 1994).

### **2.3.2. Education**

Obviously, educational attainment determines the level of integration of immigrant's children, on the labor market but also in more general respects. Several factors affect these attainments: the importance parents attach to formal education and the extent to which they can financially, emotionally and practically support their children before and during their school period; the availability of good quality education; and the social and political climate. This climate is determined by the level of explicit or implicit hospitality extended by the government and is reflected in the way its institutions deal with non-natives, but obviously also by the presence or absence of racial discrimination and violence in society in general and the way the State prevents or combats these when they occur.

As far as children of a foreign nationality are concerned, statistics in France, Germany and The Netherlands are more or less readily available and make it possible to establish the presence and distribution of these children throughout types of schools, universities and other parts of the educational system. Yet, as was pointed out earlier, children of immigrants are not by necessity foreigners. The case of the *Aussiedler* being a good case in point. And the same, to a considerable extent, holds true for immigrant children in France and, increasingly, in The Netherlands. Only the latter country has developed several survey based methods by which to monitor the educational attainments of children whose parents were immigrants, regardless of their nationality but provided they belong one of the ethnic groups targeted by the government's minority policy (see e.g. Tesser and Veenman 1997).

## **2.4. Integration broadly defined**

Although for analytical purposes, especially when discussing government policies, it is helpful to distinguish between integration defined in a narrow sense as pertaining to the labor market and the educational system, and in broader sense as pertaining to other relevant spheres of life, it should be stressed once more that such a distinction bears only limited resemblance to the realities of social life. Labor market access, or perhaps more accurately income, impacts on the extent to which persons, native and immigrant alike, are able to participate on other societal fields. And the reverse holds true as well.

### **2.4.1. Housing market**

As any interested observer can see, and can otherwise learn from many media reports, ethnic segregation is a phenomenon endemic to almost all larger West European cities. As such this is not by definition a problem nor very surprising. If we remember the decades before the 'guest-worker' era, the same neighborhoods now so frequently inhabited by immigrants and their descendants were usually populated by native working class and lower middle class families. Or put differently, residing in those quarters was a result of low income and proximity to the place of work. The latter factor may have lost some of its relevance due to increased mobility and the concentrating of economic activity outside residential areas but the former still holds true. As Park et al (1925) put forward based upon their research in Chicago, in immigration countries and under free market conditions neighborhoods go through phases of ethnic succession; whereby the latest newcomers are concentrated in the cheapest and least desirable parts of town, while the previous

occupiers move one step up the residential ladder. Be this at it may, conditions in West European cities are not completely comparable to those in the United States. and it is therefore not necessarily the case that a similar process of upward mobility takes place. One important basic difference lies in the fact that the allocation of large parts of the low-rent housing stock are under some form of government control. Another is that the geographical mobility found in the Chicago of the 1920s was not (just) the result of the arrival of new groups of immigrants but also of *economic upward mobility*. When this upward mobility fails to materialize a gradual move into better neighborhoods or into the suburbs will not spontaneously arise. By and large, it will be then up to local governments and other institutions like housing associations to stimulate mobility by different means or to improve the quality of poor housing stocks.

Quality of housing is one factor involved in the integration process as is the geographical mobility of immigrants and their descendants: good housing permits people to stay in their present neighborhoods but moving into higher quality - generally less densely build-up - neighborhoods is a sure sign of upward mobility and, hence, increasing integration. It is, therefore, of obvious importance to establish whether segregation or mobility takes place, and who is concerned.

Breebaart et al. (1995) compared the segregation of ethnic groups in a number of major European cities, among which Amsterdam, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main and Paris and found that such a comparison poses several methodological problems. Apart from the issue of 'how to find members of ethnic groups' who are not registered as non-nationals in population registers, there turned out to be considerable differences in the spatial scales on which population data are aggregated. For Paris data are not available on a smaller scale than that of the *quartiers* and *arrondissements* which on average have 100,000 inhabitants, whereas for the other cities this lies around 10.000 individuals (Breebaart et al. 1995: 134, 165). There are also marked differences between the methods by which population data are collected and in their frequency. For The Netherlands and Germany data are available through population registers and are thus almost instantaneously at hand and as a rule published annually. In France, in contrast, population data are enumerated in population censuses held on average every seven to eight years and are not retrievable from a permanent population register.

#### **2.4.2. Legal status**

Already discussed above was the fact that the strength of the legal status immigrants possess may differ considerably between France, Germany and The Netherlands, even when they are in all other respects rather similar. A person's residence status not only relates to the security of his stay (e.g. the conditions under which an immigrant may be expelled) but also has consequences for his rights as a member of society, most notably political rights. Most if not all States reserve national suffrage to their citizens but some do grant passive and active voting rights on the local level to foreigners. This becomes more relevant when access to citizenship (and thus full voting rights) is difficult to obtain. It is then somewhat paradoxical to see that it are precisely those States with liberal naturalization and citizenship rules that also tend to encourage non-citizens to be political active on the local level.

Not being a national of one's country of residence has other rights related consequences, especially on the labor market. It is common for States to reserve employment in (parts of) the civil service and in security related functions (military, police, secret services and the like) to citizens. The logic behind this is that persons who do not belong to the nation and cannot exercise political influence cannot be expected to be loyal executioners of political decisions. However,

States go to varying lengths in the interpretation of this principle. In The Netherlands restrictions are limited to core public security functions (police, military) whereas in France the entire civil service is out of bounds for non-citizens.<sup>11</sup> Germany can be considered to stand between these two extremes.

The situation of EU-citizens in other EU-States comes close to that of nationals when it comes to labor and other rights and includes suffrage for local elections. These rights were part of the Maastricht Agreement of 1991.

As to the evaluation of immigrant's political rights and the extent to which they exert them, sources on the one hand are found in legislation, and in the enumeration of voting behavior - especially participation rates - on the other. Naturalization rates can also be considered to indicate a) the opportunities for gaining full rights offered by society, b) the extent to which immigrants desire to become full members. However, the interpretation of these latter figures with respect to integration has to be careful for immigrants may have a range of reasons for applying (or not) that bear little relationship to their social, cultural or political affiliations.<sup>12</sup>

### 2.4.3. General aspects

The extent to which immigrants are integrated in the above societal fields will by and large determine where their orientation lies and how they will want to see their children socialised. If integration in those fields can more or less objectively be established, this is somewhat different if we want to know how well integrated immigrants *feel* themselves to be. Short of asking the immigrant directly, we can only hope to find some indirect indications: for example the size of the remittances sent to the country of origin compared to investments made in the country of resettlement as to indicate plans for the future; the extent of inter-ethnic marriages; the sex ratios among ethnic communities; and when applicable, participation rates in elections; and, again with caution, naturalisation rates. All or most of these data are collected and made public, usually by the State's statistical offices. However, they cannot be more than indications of a trend as all have methodological problems attached to them.

Remittances are only registered in as far as they are made by bank transactions, and it does not seem far fetched to assume that for practical reasons much capital changes hands in cash or is shipped in the form of consumer and other goods. Inter-ethnic marriages are hard to track when they do not involve spouses with different nationalities, so German data are easier to get than, say, French as in France large parts of the population of immigrant origin consists of citizens.

The sex ratios within a given ethnic community provides an indication of the extent to which immigration for the purpose of family reunification and - formation is likely to take place. A population with disproportionately large numbers of young males, for example, is likely to generate an inflow of young females from the country of origin, and vice versa. The extent to which this actually takes place, i.e. whether an immigrant or a descendant contracts a marriage with a person from the country of origin or one (already) resident in the country of settlement, gives some

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<sup>11</sup> Kruyt and Niessen (1996: 29) estimate this to pertain to approximately 5 million jobs.

<sup>12</sup> See for example Van den Bedem (1993) who found for the Dutch case that many different motives can lie behind a request for naturalisation, and also that a number of eligible immigrants are not even aware of their right to become citizens.

idea about the level of social integration, if, and this needs to be stressed, this is not the result of restrictions in the immigration policy of the country of resettlement. Obviously, the significance of this indicator gains considerably when coupled with data on inter-ethnic marriage rates.

Participation levels in elections can only be measured when the voter is a foreign citizen and hence only applies in the Dutch case where non-nationals from third (i.e. non-EU) countries have local voting rights. Otherwise a targeted survey (e.g. in conjunction with polls held on election days) is one of the few practical alternative means by which to establish the interest of former foreign nationals in the democratic process.

In all likelihood, there is a strong correlation between the level of xenophobia and racist sentiments among the native population and the feeling of security and belonging among ethnic minority groups, especially when these sentiments are translated into acts of discrimination and violence. In the framework of a wider ILO programme aimed at combatting labour market discrimination of immigrant and ethnic minority workers,<sup>13</sup> recently several studies have been done in order to establish the occurrence of labour market discrimination, for example (Bovenkerk et al. 1994, Goldberg et al. 1995) for The Netherlands and Germany respectively. It was established beyond doubt that discrimination is a feature of the Dutch and German labour markets.

Racist acts of violence are difficult to trace and any evaluation strongly depends a) on the extent to which victims report this to the authorities, b) on the ways in which crime statistics are compiled. An act of grievous bodily harm against a member of an ethnic minority may be registered as just an act of violence without taking the ethnic background of the victim into account. But even an enumeration of such facts coinciding may lead to a distorted picture as it still does not say much about the motive behind the act. And to establish the motive beyond doubt, the perpetrator will have to be apprehended and brought before a court of justice.

An indicator for disintegration found on the side of the immigrant and his descendants, not only social but also economical, can be found in the crime rates among them; i.e. the relative numbers of persons convicted for such violations like theft, robbery, extortion, grievous bodily harm, murder and the like. Not included should be those misdemeanours that can only be committed by foreigners precisely because they are a consequence of their legal position; e.g. failing to renew a residence permit, or being an undocumented alien. A potential problem when trying to establish the crime rate among members of ethnic minorities again lies in the way statistics are kept; is merely a distinction made between nationals and aliens or is the inmate's ethnicity known?

## **2.5. Comparing national cases**

In the previous sections it has become sufficiently clear that the statistical basis on which to undertake a comparison of the level of integration of immigrants and their descendants in Germany, France and The Netherlands is a shaky one. Every country has its own idiosyncrasies when it comes to data enumeration and aggregation. Even when entering the realm of relatively robust statistics like employment and unemployment figures, the basic problem arises of identifying the subjects we are primarily interested in. If these statistics only discern between nationals and foreigners, as is in the case of France, they will only tell us something about the labour market position of relative newcomers; i.e. broadly speaking those persons who have not been in the country long enough to become citizens. All other persons, even when they are still in relevant

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<sup>13</sup> For details see Zegers de Beijl 1997.

respects ‘different’ from the native French population cannot be identified in official statistics. This is the understandable consequence of the fact that France has no minority policies, be it on integration or other issues, and the State apparatus thus experiences no need for generating such data.

The main instrument used by the French authorities to collect detailed data on the country’s residents is by means of INSEE’s (*Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques*) population census, which on average are held every seven to eight years. It covers total population by sex and age; economically active population by sex and age, industry, occupation, status in employment, highest educational level (ILO 1996); and nationality. Although no details are provided other than “all persons residing in France for at least six months”, it seems safe to assume it also includes some but unknown percentages of illegal residents. The main problem involved with these population censuses is that they do not enumerate a subject’s ethnic background. Once an immigrant is naturalized he is statistically ‘lost’ and, by the same token, so are his children.

A further important survey is the *Enquête sur l’emploi* or employment survey. This survey is held annually. Its sample, the rate of which is about 1 : 300, is based on the last population census. The survey is partly panel based (i.e. the same households are interviewed in consecutive surveys) but every year 1/3 of the respondents is renewed. This survey records the nationality of those enumerated. However, it does exclude those workers who live in hostels. In most instances such persons are immigrants (ILO 1990: 104-111) and thus this labour force survey can never provide a complete picture of the immigrant population’s labour market position.

The same holds true for the monthly unemployment figures, though for different reasons. It only enumerates those members of the active labour force who register with the employment exchange. This implies there is always a ‘grey area’ of people who do not bother to register, are deleted from the register because they did not accept suitable job offers, or are in employment without mention. Furthermore, the chances that (all) undocumented immigrants register seem remote. Whether or not the nationality of the unemployed workers is documented could not be established on the basis of readily available sources.

All these official statistics thus pose serious problems for anyone interested in the societal position of immigrants, and especially, their naturalised offspring. It is for this reason that INED (*Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques*) decided to organise its 1992 survey *Enquête mobilité géographique et insertion sociale* which, as we will see, was a one-off endeavour and as time goes by it is by definition to lose its significance. Still, to date it proves to be the best source for the kind of data we are interested in. Most if not all the variables comprised in our heuristic model and even others are taken into account: apart from labour market and education, savings and remittances, living conditions, marriage behaviour (exogamy and endogamy) and demography, language use and ability, leisure activities, religious orientation, and social relationships and peer group orientation.

Lastly, there is a census-based panel survey titled *Echantillon Démographique Permanent*. This is a panel survey based upon the population censuses and, on average, comprises a one per cent sample of all immigrant groups.<sup>14</sup> It is the *only* longitudinal study that has more on offer than a person’s nationality in relation to his labour market position. On the basis of the 1975 census it

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<sup>14</sup> For details on its methodology see Roualt & Thave 1997.

now is possible to establish the current position of young adults who in that year were registered as children born out of immigrant parents, regardless of the nationality these youngsters hold today. In combination with the coming population census, it will provide a valuable though limited instrument by which to evaluate the position of immigrants and their descendants over a longer period of time. Interesting to note is that we have not come across any government publications in which the EDP is used for the purpose of policy analysis.<sup>15</sup>

In Germany, in marked contrast to the French situation, the category “foreigners” may well include persons who - apart from their nationality - do not in any relevant way differ from native Germans. Yet, the fact that all of these foreign nationals are immigrants or their descendants does provide us with a suitable statistical basis by which to evaluate their socio-economic integration over time. The major exception to this rule is made up by the *Aussiedler* or ethnic Germans who, coming from Eastern and Central Europe are considered return migrants who have a right to German citizenship. Soon after their resettlement they are statistically ‘lost’. It is only through surveys that we can keep track of their integration process.

Data on immigration, emigration and the stock of foreign populations are kept by the *Ausländer Zentralregister* and stored in a permanently updated database. Accepting the unavoidable margin of error common to all administrative databases, it provides current figures at any given point in time.

As already pointed out, the fact that immigrants and their children by and large remain foreign citizens has one advantage: they are easy to spot in the official statistics. It is, therefore, possible to establish the relative and absolute employment and unemployment figures of foreign nationals as totals are collected from the regional labour exchanges and processed by the Federal Employment Services (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*). These data, which are monthly updated (ILO 1989: 90), only provide macro data and hence do not allow for an assessment of labour market mobility. Micro data can be found in the *Sozio-Ökonomisches Panel* (SOEP), a panel based survey (see section 4.2 for details) designed in such a fashion that the relative presence of immigrants is made extra large. Another source is the annual micro census which enumerates such variables as hours worked, income, industry, level of education/qualifications, participants in employment promotion schemes like the *Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen* (ABM) (ILO 1990: 116).

Education comes under the responsibility of the individual States (*Länder*) and as a result data on foreign pupils and their position within the educational system are first and foremost found at each of the sixteen Ministries of Education. These do, however, maintain a common secretariat (*Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) where these data are compiled into comprehensive statistics.

A targeted survey that only covers the immigrant population is the one commissioned by the Federal Labour Ministry: *Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Mehrländer et al. 1996). This survey to date has been held twice (1985 and 1995). Apart from data pertaining to the immigrants’ position on the labour market and in the educational system, it yields valuable data on savings and remittances, residence status, language use and proficiency, union membership, demography (family size, choice of partner), living conditions, intentions on return migration, leisure activities,

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<sup>15</sup> Which, obviously, does not by necessity mean that such publications do not exist.

membership in voluntary associations, and religious orientation. It does not, however, provide for a control group polled from the population at large.

Taking together the wealth of data available from the above mentioned sources, by and large the implementation of our heuristic should be possible.

In The Netherlands data and stocks and flows of foreigners and nationals are always current, as they are in Germany, because every municipality maintains a population register. In the recent past many instances occurred where foreigners were registered regardless of their legal status. Since this made it possible for those foreigners to attain a working permit, currently efforts are being made to prevent illegal residents from being included in population registers. Further statistical enumeration is geared to monitoring the position of immigrants and their descendants as closely as possible. As a result they generally do not only list a person's nationality but also country of birth and that of his parents. The main examples of these statistics are those compiled by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* (CBS), published annually and showing the sizes of the foreign population by nationality and those persons who, by virtue of at least one foreign born parent, belong to those specific ethnic categories that are of primary concern of Dutch integration policies. Based on the same criteria data from the annual Labour Force Survey are also made available by the CBS.

As to the educational system specific cohort surveys are maintained to monitor the position of young immigrants and Dutch born children of immigrants in it over time in comparison to native children. The general position of the second generation and young immigrants is covered by a sample survey that is repeated with some frequency which is titled the Survey on the social position of the allochthonous and their use of services (*Survey sociale positie en voorzieningengebruik van allochtonen, SPVA*).

A compilation and analysis of the above mentioned statistics is annually provided by the *Sociaal Economisch Planbureau* (SCP), a government sponsored think tank that provides up-to-date information on which government policies are, or can be, based.

Apart from the differences in the enumeration of who is an immigrant or the descendant of an immigrant between the three countries, the various types of statistics, their diverging frequency and availability, comparison is further complicated by the fact that economic and labour market developments in these countries are at different stages of the restructuring process moving from industrial to post-industrial economies. For example, where employment in the primary and secondary sectors in The Netherlands has to a large extent been replaced by employment in the tertiary sector, this process is still clearly underway in Germany.

These compounded reservations must make us tread carefully when looking for comparisons. Ideally an international comparison should be possible between the levels of integration of any particular immigrant group present in different States - like here with immigrants of Turkish origin in three States. However, because data originating within the institutional framework of a particular State by virtue of uniform definitions are much more comparable than those stemming from more than one State, our primary comparison is based on the position of immigrants and their descendants relative to natives of comparable socio-economic background in the labour market and in the educational system. Subsequently, we will seek to establish which particular features of French, German or Dutch policies are responsible for the relatively larger or smaller differences between the position of natives and immigrants in those countries. Lastly, we will then seek to establish whether particular characteristics of those policies, or lack thereof, can be

labelled as particularly effective or, in contrast, counterproductive in the integration process of immigrants and their descendants.

### 3. Country Report France

#### 3.0. Introduction

In contrast to Germany, The Netherlands and all other States in Western Europe, France has a long and explicit tradition of being an immigration country. At least partly this resulted from much lower fertility rates than its neighbouring countries, especially after 1860. A period of rapid industrialisation started some two decades later, creating a strong need for unskilled labour that could not be met from native labour supplies. Since then this has led to considerable immigration from at first Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany, then from Spain and Portugal, followed by Turks and North Africans (Castles and Miller 1993: 57-8, INSEE 1997: 16). All this time and until today immigrants have consistently made up 10 to 15 per cent of the working classes (Noriel quoted in Castles and Miller 1993: 58).

Until the First World War, the State played only a minor role in this process. Immigration mainly was of a spontaneous nature or resulted from employers' recruitment activities. The War, tying large numbers of young men to the front lines, 1.4 million of whom consequently died in action or were disabled as a result of injuries, caused the French government to pursue a more active immigrant recruitment policy (INSEE 1997: 16). With some ups and downs (e.g. during the economic crisis of the 1930s) immigration remained a welcomed phenomenon until 1974. In that year the economic downturn following the steep increase in oil prices, caused the French government to end its active immigration policy. This did not mean that immigration actually came to a halt but the relative number of immigrants in the French population as a whole did not further increase and remained at around 7.4 per cent (Ibid.) for over a decade. Then, by the end of the 1980s, a new increase occurred, predominantly of asylum seekers and refugees. This increase not only affected France but many parts of Western Europe, among which Germany and The Netherlands.

France's immigrant population for a long time was mainly of European origin, and even today (i.e. according to the 1990 census) they account for half, or 50.4 per cent, of all immigrants. However, a clear shift away from their predominance can be noted. Where in 1962 only 21.3 per cent of the immigrants had come from other continents, in 1990 35.9 per cent originated from Africa (among which 13.3 per cent from Algeria and 11 per cent from Morocco) and 11.4 per cent from Asia (including Turkey: 4 per cent). Among European immigrants largest groups stem from Italy (11.6 per cent), Portugal (14.4 per cent) and Spain (9.5 per cent) (INSEE 1996: 19) (see table 3.1).

For a long time, the integration, both as a state and as a process, of these immigrants appears to have posed little problems. The concurrence of labour market integration and the French policy of assimilation - primarily through the educational system and, for citizens, military draft - made these immigrants 'disappear' into mainstream society within few generations; only their surnames hinting at foreign origins. By the mid-1970s this gradually changed.

Unemployment levels began to rise considerably and among those who became unemployed, immigrants, especially those of non-European origin, were disproportionately hit. The

unemployment rate for French citizens in 1995 stood at 9 per cent whereas for foreigners in general it stood at 20 per cent, and for specific groups like Turks or Moroccans at around 37 and 36 per cent respectively (INSEE 1996: 85).

**Table 3.1. Population (thousands) of France, foreign and domestic born (including colonies and Overseas Territories), and nationality (1911 – 1990)**

<i>Year</i>	Total Population	French birth	Naturalized	Foreigners	French birth	Naturalized	Foreigners	Total immigrants	As % of total population
1911	39,192	37,652	85	218	127	168	942	1,110	2.8
1921	38,798	36,847	80	277	164	174	1,255	1,429	3.7
1926	40,228	37,384	45	325	187	204	2,084	2,288	5.7
1931	41,228	37,937	55	291	216	306	2,423	2,729	6.6
1936	41,183	38,220	100	288	248	416	1,910	2,326	5.6
1946	39,848	36,908	301	310	343	552	1,434	1,986	5.0
1954	42,781	39,571	295	245	377	773	1,520	2,293	5.4
1962	46,456	42,133	336	220	905	931	1,931	2,862	6.2
1968	49,756	44,009	297	402	1,766	1,019	2,262	3,281	6.6
1975	52,599	45,907	280	667	1,858	1,112	2,775	3,887	7.4
1982	54,296	47,169	254	845	1,991	1,167	2,870	4,037	7.4
1990	56,652	49,556	472		739	1,308	2,858	4,166	7.4

Source: INSEE 1997: 17

Note: Immigrant population calculated as all foreign born naturalized persons and foreigners

Since the 1970s France has been going through a process of economic restructuring, away from jobs in the primary and secondary sectors towards employment in the tertiary sector of the economy. In 1970 services accounted for 49 per cent of employment, in 1997 this figure has risen to 70 per cent. At the same time manufacturing went down from 24 per cent to 15.5 per cent (the secondary sector as a whole from 38 per cent to 25 per cent, respectively). Manual work has also made way to an increasing number of office related jobs: the former in 1970 still accounted for 47 per cent of all wage and salary earners whereas the latter kind of employment increased from 20 to 33 per cent.<sup>16</sup> Since these shrinking parts of the economy traditionally accounted for a large part of the employment of immigrants, their continuing high unemployment can, at least to a certain level, be explained by this process. However, not only did many immigrants lose their jobs, perspectives for those entering the labour market has also become considerably worse than for native youngsters. Authoritative sources find that racial discrimination is a key factor in this and an estimated 30 to 60 per cent of immigrant children face acute socio-economic marginalisation (Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales quoted in Hargreaves 1996; 612).

In addition, an increasing geographical segregation between middle class, often French, families and members of ethnic minority groups can be observed whereby the latter are frequently found in the poorer parts of the suburbs, or *banlieues* surrounding the major French cities. At the same time, the social and political climate in which immigrants and members of ethnic minority groups find themselves has clearly changed with the growing significance of the *Front National*, a party with xenophobia as its *raison d'être*. It is against this backdrop that we are to examine French integration policies.

### 3.1. Policies

As outlined in the introduction to this study, the base on which French policies towards immigration and integration have been formulated in the past and, by and large, are still made today, is an open one. Three factors have contributed to this basically welcoming attitude: the demographic need for immigrants and the timing of the industrialisation process outlined above, and “political changes associated with the rise of republicanism and colonialism.” (Hollifield 1994: 145). The republican ideal - which can be seen as something of a “founding myth” of the French State - made liberal immigration and refugee policies into a cornerstone of French policy making as a whole. In this concept equality of people extends beyond those constituting the ‘nation’ proper: i.e. newcomers should be treated equally. This also pertained to the French overseas territories and to its colonial possessions in Northern Africa and is reflected in the granting of French citizenship to their inhabitants. Due to these three factors, the economic and demographic need for immigrants and the republican ideal, until 1974 immigration went virtually unchallenged and unchecked. After the Second World War, the French Government set targets for the importation of labour, ranging from 430,000 for the first five-year economic plan to 325,000 for the 1966-1970 plan. To assist the fulfilment of these goals a neutral (i.e. neither siding with the interests of employers- nor with those of workers organisations) government agency - *le Office nationale d'immigration* (ONI) - was created with the task to ensure the smooth recruitment and immigration of foreign workers. However, in daily practice ONI mainly legalized the status of labour

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<sup>16</sup> INSEE homepage [http://www.insee.fr/va/keyfigur/fb012\\_a.htm](http://www.insee.fr/va/keyfigur/fb012_a.htm), consulted in March 1998.

immigrants ex post facto and the target figures bore little relationship to the actual, labour market driven, immigration figures (Hollifield 1994: 150-1).

As a result of the economic downturn of the mid-1970s for the first time the government explicitly sought to restrict labour immigration and stimulate the return of redundant foreign workers. Especially North African immigrants met with the consequences of a turn in French policies:

*(...) the change in French immigration policy in 1974 marked a sea change in the thinking about immigration in France. Suddenly immigrants were viewed more as guests than settlers, more as a liability than an asset. The French government also began to back carefully away from official ties to former colonies in North and West Africa. Whereas the various Gaullist governments of the 1960s had taken great pains to maintain close political and economic ties with France's former African colonies, even if this meant continued high levels of immigration, the administration of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was willing to sacrifice the special relationship between France and its former colonies if this could help put an end to further immigration (Hollifield 1996: 155)*

Not only did the immigration policy change, so did, not surprisingly as the two are always intertwined, integration policy.

*By trying to respond to increasingly hostile public opinion and by attempting to use foreign workers and their families to solve rising problems of unemployment, the government (...) began to chip away at the foundations of the republican consensus in the areas of immigration and naturalization. In so doing, they fanned the flames of conflict between citizens (i.e., French) and immigrant workers (...). (Hollifield 1994: 156)*

Like in other countries around that time, attempts to curtail labour immigration resulted in an upsurge in other types of immigration, or, more correctly, it began to take place increasingly under alternative legal provisions, predominantly family formation and reunification. Undocumented immigration increased as well. Subsequent hopes of banning legal immigrants from the labour market, and thus reducing their incentive to migrate, were frustrated by the judiciary that eventually prevented this impairing of civil and human rights. In France the Council of State played a crucial role in upholding the State's republican values and even though subsequent governments have tried to further reduce immigration, many attempts stranded or were defused as a result of interventions by the Council.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1980s, socialist led governments eased some of the strains on immigration created by their right wing predecessors by declaring an amnesty for illegal foreign workers, by expanding the rights of association to foreign residents, and by curtailing the police's authority to conduct arbitrary identity checks (Hollifield 1994: 162).

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<sup>17</sup> The Council does not have the formal power to reject or declare unlawful government decisions - unlike the German *Bundesverfassungsgericht* or the US Supreme Court - but its moral weight is such that in effect there appears to be little difference (cf. Hollifield 1994: 157).

The victory of the republican “right” over the Socialists in 1993 again brought changes in French immigration and integration policies. Under the infamous second Pasqua Law, named after the Interior Minister, waiting times for family reunification were increased from one to two years. Furthermore, naturalisation ceased to be automatic for French born second generation immigrants upon reaching maturity (*loi Méhaignerie*), and the powers of police and administration were increased to check identities and detain individuals suspected of being in the country illegally.

Current politics once more bring changes to French policies. One of the first acts of the socialist Prime Minister Jospin after taking over government in 1997 was to commission a critical appraisal of immigration and integration policies by the scholar Patrick Weil, whose conclusions (1997) are currently under debate in French parliament. In all likelihood, naturalisation practices are to return to their former State, granting French citizenship according to the *jus soli* principle.

French integration policies are of two types: targeted and general. Targeted policies are reserved for immigrants, a category in France defined as newcomers who not as yet have become French citizens. Once immigrants and their descendants have become citizens, only general policies apply. This is an important consequence of the republican French tradition which, although challenged in the past decades, is still the leading principle in integration policies: the consequent denial of policy-relevant differences between citizens, regardless of their ethnic background. The term immigrant is, in policy making, and etymologically correct, reserved for those persons who are born abroad. As far as this principle stresses equality before the law, few will argue against that. However, it also ignores cultural differences between individuals and communities and the objective fact that some or even many persons, even though equal before the law, do not enjoy the same opportunities to fully participate in society. In other words, by emphasising the presumed assimilationist qualities of French society, the interests of immigrants and especially their descendants and others who do either not want to assimilate into mainstream French society or, perhaps more seriously, are not equipped to do so, remain out of reach of official policies.

Assimilation was expected to be the unavoidable result of a submersion into French culture and hence remained unquestioned. This by and large changed with the settlement of considerable numbers of Maghrebians from the mid-1970s onwards. Restrictive immigration policies affected them much less than many of the previous immigrant categories because they either were French nationals already or had easier access to France as a result of the country’s special relationship to its former colonies. Their presence gradually eroded the presumed self-evident character of the assimilation process. Religion became the main contentious issue around which much of the discussion about assimilation versus different, less far-reaching, forms of integration occurred. (Weil and Crowley 1994: 113, Wihtol de Wenden 1998).

### **3.1.1. Targeted policies**

Clearly the most important French policy instrument towards immigrants is that of naturalisation. For a long time naturalisation was considered to mark the beginning of a successful integration process, ending in the assimilation of the immigrant. As we saw, this principle no longer remains unchallenged, from the side of immigrant communities, or from the side of the government. The latter in 1993 decided that citizenship should not automatically be bestowed on any person born in France upon reaching maturity. Instead it should be granted upon the immigrant’s request between the age of sixteen and twenty-one, thus requiring the immigrant’s initiative and choice: *par manifestation de volonté*. The new rules, which came into force on 1 January 1994, at least for the time being, seem to have had little effect on the naturalisation rates among youngsters (Weil

1997: 26). And even in spite of these revisions, French citizenship laws are still liberal for the barriers imposed on French-born second generation immigrants are first and foremost symbolic and clearly not insurmountable for those who want to become French citizens. The main problem as found by Weil (Op cit.: 28) is that those members of the second generation who are not duly informed about their rights, or fail to see the importance of acquiring citizenship, may at a later age be unexpectedly faced with the consequences of having a less secure residence status and no full social and political rights.

For immigrants - i.e. those persons who are not French born - naturalisation is generally possible after five years of legal residence and upon proof of sufficient knowledge of the French language (and after two years for those who marry a French citizen) (INSEE 1997: 136).

The main instrument for other targeted policies is the *Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles* (FAS), a scheme which is administered by the Employment Ministry's *Direction de la Population et des Migrations* (DPM). FAS funds are mainly available for general policies (50% of its budget goes to housing) but as far as targeted policies are concerned, these are mainly spent on language courses and training for newcomers, like refugees and family members of earlier immigrants. The budget FAS has at its disposal has more than doubled since the early 1980s and to date stands at well over a billion Francs (1,210 in 1992, the latest figure that could be retrieved) (Mahnig 1998: 38).

### 3.1.2. General policies

Many more funds, from the FAS or otherwise, are spent on the revitalisation of urban and suburban neighbourhoods and economies, fighting crime, improving education and reducing unemployment. Although to a considerable extent immigrants and their descendants are touched by these measures, the ailments they are meant to cure are defined in general terms. In the words of Kruyt and Niessen (1997: 33):

*All problems are defined in general terms - social exclusion, public safety, unemployment, deterioration of social cohesion - or in veiled language, such as 'loss of urban diversity'. The message is that there are no immigrant ghettos.*

Current policies mainly aim to enhance the chances of teenagers and young adults.

*These measures are not targeted solely at foreigners, but apply to young French people too. They cover education, preparation for working life and, more generally, the social environment. Mentoring schemes<sup>18</sup> have been extended to provide support for young people in finding and keeping a job. The "Prévention Été" schemes, called "Ville, Vie, Vacances" since 1995, are targeted in particular at the most marginalized young people, offering them social and cultural activities during the summer holiday period.*

*The stated objectives of the 1996 Urban Regeneration Pact ("Pacte de relance pour la ville") are to combat exclusion in urban areas and encourage the occupational, social and cultural integration of people living on high-density housing estates or in distressed areas. The programme in general is founded on prioritizing vulnerable areas*

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<sup>18</sup> E.g. *Le parrainage vers l'emploi*.

*according to their economic and social problems and on introducing positive discrimination in the areas of the economy, taxation, education and housing. The aims are to encourage enterprise creation (tax advantageous zones), provide jobs for young people in the 18 to 26 age bracket, restore equal opportunity through schools, modernize and diversify housing, restore social harmony and strengthen the role of associations (SOPEMI 1996: 101).*

We have no means to evaluate the extent to which these general measures are implemented nor the possibility to say much about their effects on the position of immigrants and their descendants. However, as an example of a major attempt at urban renewal we should point at the *Grand Littoral* Project in Marseilles where the creation of jobs for those living in deprived areas was achieved (De Rudder et al. 1997).

### **3.2. The position of immigrants and their descendants on the labour market**

Since there are no policies (minority policies or otherwise) that single out specific categories of people other than foreigners, the French State has never perceived the need to collect data which should help the evaluation of the societal position of members of ethnic communities. This means that for the purpose of our analysis we basically have to restrict ourselves to those individuals who are categorised as *immigrés*; i.e. foreign citizens and naturalised first generation immigrants. There are two major exceptions to this rule. One is found in a survey conducted by the French *Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques* (INED) in 1992 based on a sample.<sup>19</sup> The survey results published in 1995 (Tribalat and others 1995, Tribalat 1995) offer a comprehensive insight in the position of immigrants and their descendants in most societal fields and thus is a valuable source. Unfortunately, this survey was a once-only undertaking and its findings will therefore lose their significance over time. Yet, for the moment they enable us to place other, regularly enumerated statistics, from population censuses (the most recent being held in 1990) and annual labour force survey's in perspective. The population censuses bring us to the second main exception to our rule. They are used by the *Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques* (INSEE) to establish cohorts of immigrants, who then together with their descendants are monitored in each consecutive census thus providing a longitudinal perspective. This *Échantillon Démographique Permanent* (EDP) can, as Richard (1997) has shown, be used to measure the labour market progress over time by foreigners and, more importantly, their children. The French government seems to consider these data as somewhat sensitive as they are not made available to the general public and, instead, are predominantly enumerated for INSEE in-house purposes (Richard, personal communication).

Table 3.2 clearly indicates that as far as immigrants (the French official definition, foreigners plus naturalized first generation immigrants) are concerned, the unemployment rates both in 1990 and 1995 are nearly twice as high as they are for the labour force as a whole. Although this points at present inequality in labour market access, these data do not indicate an increasing disintegration trend from 1990 onwards. Among men in both categories unemployment rose with around 40 per cent. Whereas for the female part of the total labour force unemployment rose, immigrant women

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<sup>19</sup> Containing 12,500 persons who were born abroad (accounting for approx. 1 in 20), 2,500 persons born in France but having at least one foreign born parent (as these immigrants populations settled relatively early; Algerians, Spaniards and Portuguese), and 2,600 subjects from the population as a whole.

unemployment figures slightly dropped. This decrease is solely accounted for by women over 40 years of age; among the youngest categories, natives as well as immigrants, in contrast, a substantial increase can be noted. One way of explaining this phenomenon would be that these elder women previously were not present on the labour market and only entered after their child-rearing period. It seems likely that they looked for a job without registering as being unemployed and only entered the statistics once they managed to find it. Meanwhile, labour market access for the youngest immigrants is increasingly problematic.

Looking at the (former) nationalities of the immigrants who are active on the labour market, we find significant differences in their rates of unemployment. Behind the already considerable higher average figure for immigrant workers of 18.8 and 21.8 per cent for men and women respectively shown in table 3.3, hide even higher figures for African, Turkish and Asian immigrants. Among them, Turks, and especially Turkish women, suffer the highest unemployment levels. Immigrants from EU-countries do much better, especially Portuguese and, probably, immigrants from countries not specified in table 3.3, ranging at similar or lower levels than apply to French native workers.

Three explanations for the low unemployment levels of EU-immigrants, as compared to the other groups, come to mind. First of all, there is likely to be a difference in skill levels. This is exemplified by the fact that EU-immigrants show a stronger presence in medium and high skilled jobs (table 3.4), where, as we have discussed in the introductory chapter, demand is increasingly present. Secondly, economic developments in countries of origin are likely to play a significant role. Even if a non-EU immigrant faces prolonged unemployment in France, perspectives in his country of origin may be even bleaker, especially when he currently has a claim to unemployment or social benefits. The third factor may be related to immigration policy. The freedom to move within the EU for the purpose of taking up employment, does not extend to third-country nationals. In other words, an EU national facing unemployment shall easily be tempted to return to his country of origin or another EU-State in order to try his luck elsewhere. Moreover, there is always the possibility to return to France once more. These options are not available to other immigrants: prospects of moving to another foreign country are small and returning to the country of origin for a prolonged period of time is likely to bar a future resettlement in France.

**Table 3.2. Unemployment among the economically active population (eap) in France 1990 and 1995, total labour force and immigrants, in per cent**

	1990 Total EAP	Immigrant EAP	1995 Total EAP	Immigrant EAP
<b>Men</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>18.8</b>
15 – 24 years .....	15.3	30.5	21.0	37.2
25 – 39 years .....	6.7	13.6	9.7	19.8
40 – 49 years .....	4.6	11.3	7.8	17.2
50 and over .....	5.4	11.7	7.3	15.6

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<b>Women</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>21.8</b>
15 – 24 years .....	23.9	30.5	32.2	39.0
25 – 39 years .....	12.2	25.6	14.8	25.9
40 – 49 years .....	8.5	17.8	10.0	17.4
50 and over .....	8.0	16.6	8.2	12.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>19.9</b>
.....				

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Source: INSEE 1997: 85

Even though the categories used by the INSEE to classify the French labour force seem somewhat arbitrary and vague, table 3.4 indicates a segregation between immigrants on the one hand and French natives on the other. Within the immigrant population, furthermore, marked differences can be found.

French natives are less employed as 'workers' and those who are, are more likely to be skilled workers. Instead they show a clear predominance in the intermediary and higher skilled professions. Because the last column shows all members of the labour force, i.e. including 7.1 per cent immigrants, figures for just French natives would even be somewhat more pronounced.

**Table 3.3. Unemployment among immigrants (male and female) in France in per cent, 1995**

<i>Country of origin</i>	Men	Women
<i>European Union* of which:</i>	8.8	10.7
Spain	13.2	11.3
Italy	11.9	11.2
Portugal	7.1	8.9
Algeria	26.5	36.0
Morocco	28.7	43.3
Tunisia	28.1	28.5
Black Africa	26.2	31.2
Turkey	29.3	44.7
SE Asia	17.4	25.1
Other countries	16.8	20.1
Total (19.9 (Table 3.2))	18.8	21.8

Source: INSEE 1997: 85\* *The EU of then still 12 member states*

**Table 3.4. French labour force according to selected nationalities and socio-professional category\*, 1995 in per cent**

<i>Socio-professional category</i>	Total	Spain	Italy	Portugal	Algeria	<i>Morocco</i>	Black Africa	Total immigrants	Total France
Farmers	0.8	1.5	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.2	---	0.7	3.6
Craftsmen, traders, entrepreneurs	9.1	11.3	15.8	6.9	9.4	5.2	7.6	9.0	7.5
Officials, highly skilled	9.0	9.4	7.0	1.1	4.3	5.5	9.7	9.3	13.0
Intermediary professions	11.7	13.3	15.6	7.8	9.4	6.8	11.7	10.5	21.0
Employees	25.3	28.0	22.3	27.3	22.7	19.1	31.3	24.2	28.4
Workers of which:	44.1	36.5	38.5	56.6	54.0	63.1	39.6	46.3	26.4
Qualified	28.6	22.6	29.4	35.6	28.5	30.0	20.1	27.4	17.3
Unqualified	13.9	11.2	9.1	18.9	25.0	25.8	19.1	17.1	8.2
Total percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Absolute x 1,000	731	118	106	401	188	153	107	1,576	22,120

Source: INSEE 1997: 75

\* Original designations of these categories respectively are: agriculteurs exploitants; artisans, commerçants, chefs d'entreprises; cadres, professions intellectuelles supérieures; professions intermédiaires; employés; ouvriers (ouvriers qualifiés, ouvriers non qualifiés)

\*\* The EU of then still 12 member states.

The divergence between EU-immigrants and others we can further examine by using the INED-survey of 1992. In Tribalat and others (1995: 240) table 3.5 can be found:

**Table 3.5. Time spent during potential labour market activity, country of origin, in per cent total duration of phase spent in the following situation, in per cent**

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Employed</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>	<i>Non-active</i>	<i>Unstable</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Algeria</b>					
Men	80.1	6.0	5.5	8.4	100
Women	33.7	14.6	42.7	9.0	100
Total	66.1	8.6	16.7	8.6	100
<b>Morocco</b>					
Men	79.8	6.3	5.0	8.9	100
Women	41.9	11.6	38.7	7.8	100
Total	68.5	7.9	15.1	8.6	100
<b>Portugal</b>					
Men	90.0	1.7	3.7	4.6	100
Women	70.7	5.0	18.9	5.4	100
Total	81.1	3.2	10.7	5.0	100
<b>Spain</b>					
Men	91.6	1.8	3.2	3.4	100
Women	69.2	2.8	23.6	4.4	100
Total	80.6	2.3	13.2	3.9	100
<b>SE Asia</b>					
Men	68.9	6.3	14.6	10.2	100
Women	47.7	11.3	32.8	8.2	100
Total	59.2	8.6	23.0	9.3	100
<b>Turkey</b>					
Men	76.8	7.9	5.4	9.9	100
Women	33.1	18.0	40.2	8.7	100
Total	64.3	10.8	15.3	9.6	100
<b>Black Africa</b>					
Men	66.0	7.0	16.3	10.7	100
Women	33.7	15.9	41.4	9.0	100
Total	52.4	10.8	26.9	10.0	100
<b>Total</b>					
Men	82.3	4.6	5.8	7.3	100
Women	54.9	8.8	29.5	6.8	100
Total	71.6	6.3	15.1	7.0	100

Source: Tribalat and others 1995: 240

Among immigrants, who in almost half of the cases are employed as ‘workers’, the EU immigrants are disproportionately found among the skilled workers, whereas among immigrants from less developed countries the numbers of skilled workers come close to those of unskilled workers. The fact that immigrants from Black Africa do not fit this pattern completely because they are generally underrepresented among the workers and strongly present among the employees can tentatively be explained out of a selective emigration process: not so much low skilled persons left but those who belonged to the socio-economic elite in the Francophone Sub-Saharan former French colonies.

Most relevant for our present purpose are in table 3.5 the columns enumerating (un)employment and an unstable, precarious situation. Inactivity, i.e. not being present on the labour market, is less relevant as we have no way of knowing whether inactivity is the result of a free choice (e.g. pursuing a study, caring for children, affluence) or because of restrictions.

If we compare the figures from table 3.5 with those yielded by a control group taken from the entire population (table 3.6) we find that they are nearly similar to the ones for immigrants:

**Table 3.6. All respondents, time spent of potential labour market activity, country of origin, in per cent total duration of phase spent in the following situation, in per cent**

<i>Control group</i>	<i>Employed</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>	<i>Non-active</i>	<i>Unstable</i>	<i>Total</i>
Men	82.9	3.0	9.4	4.7	100
Women	67.3	5.4	20.6	6.7	100
Total	75.2	4.2	14.9	5.7	100

Source: Tribalat and others 1995: 240

At first glance, this may seem odd. When, however, we have a second look at table 3.5, it becomes clear that behind the average figures for the entire immigrant population hide considerable differences. Immigrants from countries currently belonging to the EU - Portugal and Spain - make up a considerable number of the first and second generation immigrant population and since they have very low unemployment rates, they compensate strongly for the much poorer labour market position of Algerians, Turks, Sub-Sahara Africans, and to a lesser extent those from Morocco and South East Asia. Among those women, and most notably those from Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, appear to be in an especially vulnerable position.

The *Echantillon Démographique Permanent (EDP)*, also partly used to create the sample for the INED survey leads to similar conclusions. In the 1975 population census 15,345 children were identified from families whose head was either a foreign citizen or a naturalised French citizen. Of those children 74 per cent was also present in the 1990 survey, by which time they all had reached adulthood. Analysing EDP data and correcting for such variables as age and educational attainment, Richard (1997) concludes that the ethnic background of the survey’s subjects is indisputably a factor negatively correlating with these young people’s chances on the labour market. Especially, young people with a North African background face labor market discrimination. The above conclusions are reflected in the average wages earned by immigrants compared to natives.

**Table 3.7. Average annual family incomes (couples with children) in 1991, in per cent**

	< 90,000 Francs	90,000 – 120,000 Fr.	120,000 – 160,000 Fr.	>160,000 Francs
<i>Algerians</i>	20	32	31	11
Moroccans	16	34	27	23
Portuguese	13	22	33	32
SE Asians	13	23	30	33
Spaniards	14	19	29	39
Turks	27	39	23	11
Black Africans	24	29	25	23
Control group	9	16	23	52

*Source:* Tribalat and others 1995: 201

Table 3.7 shows that differences between immigrants and natives in average incomes is not particularly striking for the middle incomes between 120,000 and 160,000, but if we look at the lowest and high income categories marked differences catch the eye. Whereas over half of the families in the control group earn more than 160,000 a year, no immigrant category comes even remotely close to such a score and, especially among Turks and Algerians only few families manage to accrue such an income (which, by the way, is still only set at a minimum of approx. \$25,000, £17,700 or DM 47,000 and hence not particularly high to begin with). Among the smallest earners, immigrant families in contrast are disproportionately present: Turkish families are three times as likely to have to make do with a minimal income than families in the control group of native born. In the 90,000 to 120,000 bracket they are still more than twice as likely to be found, as are Algerian and Moroccan families. If we want to predict the direction the labour market segregation will move in- in terms of differences in unemployment rates and in the types of professions immigrants and French natives are found in - we need to evaluate the developments in the educational system and look at possible barriers for young people leaving school and entering the labour market.

### 3.3. The educational system

Where labour market statistics based on the distinction between ‘immigrant’ and ‘non-immigrant’ or native already pose serious problems, this is even more the case when we seek to evaluate the position of second or third generation immigrants in the educational system. The proportion of pupils and students of foreign descent but who are born and bred in France, and hence not statistically enumerated, is likely to be large. This especially pertains to children who are over eighteen years of age, the age at which most second generation children become French citizens.

INSEE data basically show that immigrant children of non-European background are faced with considerable disadvantages when entering the educational system. However, this is not very surprising when taking into account the socio-economic position their families are in. Whereas among French natives only 15 per cent of the fathers and 16 per cent of the mothers have left school without a degree in secondary education, these figures are 64 per cent and 77 per cent for Turkish parents respectively. Among Maghrebian parents these figures lie higher still (INSEE 1997: 67). Moreover, these children come from considerably larger families than their French fellow pupils (on average a French family has 1.7 children against 3.1 in Turkish families). Their parents spend considerably less per child on its education (FF 742 against FF 3,344 annually) than French parents do (Ibid.). A further disadvantage precisely stems from the fact that pupils are immigrants: their initial socialisation took place in a foreign language. Indeed, in majority these children arrive during or past kindergarten age (INSEE 1997: 56).

Seventy-five per cent of French-born children manage to complete elementary school without repeating one or more classes. The same is only managed by half the immigrant children (48 per cent). Even a comparison with native children of working class families (64 per cent), still leaves immigrant children lagging behind. Once in secondary school, differences between working class children and immigrant children loses its significance but a marked gap between those two categories and the average for native born pupils remains. Forty-one per cent of the immigrant children finishes secondary education (*collège*) successfully without repeating a class. For French-born working class children this figure is 44 per cent. The average for all native born children, in contrast, is 57 per cent (INSEE 1997: 56-7).

Although these findings are no reason for being cheerful as they indicate that the French educational system does not manage to even out class or socio-economic related differences between pupils, they should not surprise us to any great extent as far as they pertain to children who themselves are immigrants. Indeed, the fact that they perform about the same as native children from working class families, indicates the school system's ability to integrate immigrant children to an extent similar to that of comparable native children. According to our definition of integration as a state of being, this then should be considered to be brought about.

The above data only discern between foreign born and French born children. There is no further differentiation in INSEE's publications between nationalities of immigrant children. Nor can we differentiate among children born in France, among whom are to be found many pupils from a range of ethnic backgrounds. As to the first problem, it is conceivable that such a distinction would be possible on the basis of raw data of the survey these figures are derived from; i.e. the *Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche*'s national panel of 1989 among pupils in secondary education (*second degré*). Not all variables covered by the survey, however, are known to us. Whether plans exist for another cohort study is equally unclear. The relevance of a distinction between ethnic background can be found in the survey results of Tribalat and others 1995 (see table 3.8) which show considerable divergence in educational attainments of persons who arrived in France before they reached their seventh birthday. Although they may still have a linguistic disadvantage compared to French born children, they went through all or nearly all of their school careers in France. Turkish pupils perform considerably poorer than all other immigrant children: 37 per cent leave the educational system without a degree and only 17 per cent manage a Baccalauréat or higher.

**Table 3.8. Educational attainment of immigrants in France who arrived before age 7, 1992, in per cent**

<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Without degree</i>	$\leq$ BEPC	CAP-BEP	$\geq$ Bac
<i>Algeria</i>	13	6	43	38
Morocco	27	12	31	30
Portugal	26	9	47	18
SE Asia	NA	NA	NA	NA
Spain	14	14	41	31
Turkey	36	13	34	17
Black Africa	NA	NA	NA	NA

Source: Tribalat and others 1995: 260

*BEPC* = *brevet d'études du premier cycle*, equivalent to the UK's O-Level; *BEP* = *brevet d'études professionnelles*, a secondary professional education; *CAP* = *certificat d'aptitude professionnelle*, a secondary technical education; *Bac* = *Baccalauréat*, equivalent to A-Level

As to the second problem, we partly face the same barriers as discussed earlier: once a person becomes a French citizen he is statistically 'lost'. The Ministry of Education does enumerate, however, how many foreign children are attending French schools.

The 1991-1992 school year saw 48,586 Turkish children in primary school (including pre-school or kindergarten), 29,061 in secondary education (INSEE 1994: 49, 51). But then we do not know whether they are immigrants or children of immigrants (and of what generation).

In conclusion, attempts to evaluate the educational career of the descendants of immigrants based upon government statistics is only possible as far as they are still foreign nationals. This means that there is no way to establish whether the legal integration of immigrants - which is accomplished upon naturalisation - is accompanied by further integration by means of the educational system and, subsequently, on the labour market.

### 3.4. Entering the labour market

We have seen that children of non-European descent appear to do less well than native and EU children in the educational system, and this pertains to Turkish children in particular. This already predestines difficulties upon entering the labour market in general terms and especially when hoping for upward mobility relative to the first generation's attainments. Furthermore, as Richard

(1997) showed on the basis of the EDP, they are faced with discrimination, especially under conditions of a shrinking labour market when competition is strong and employers can afford to be 'choosy'. Analyses based on this panel survey were only possible for those categories of immigrant children that were of significant size in 1975: 3,277 children of Italian origin, 2,983 Portuguese children, 2,955 Algerians, 2,637 Spaniards, 679 Poles, 637 Moroccans and 467 children of Tunisian origin. Turkish family reunification and -formation at the time were still at their initial phases. Once children enumerated in the 1982 census come of age, and a new census has been held, more current figures should become available.

Though possible to prove with the help of statistical data, evidence of racial discrimination is very hard to find in individual cases. Observers recount numerous instances where employers preferences were *likely* to be racially biased, but barring explicit statements on their side, little action can be taken (De Rudder et al. 1994, 1997). If ethnicity does not exist, or at any rate is not significant in terms of policy making, governments are unlikely to want to acknowledge its relevance for other actors.

*French law has no "positive" legal instrument to halt or prevent either indirect discrimination or, more particularly, institutional or systematic discrimination, since it has no means of taking account of groups that are in a minority situation. Nor can it promote positive discrimination measures to offset the collective inequalities that have been inherited from the past.* (De Rudder et al. 1997: 5)

This fundamental attitude is further exemplified by the continuous refusal by the French government to enter international treaties and conventions that aim to protect the interests of national, ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities (Op.Cit.: 4).

French law does prohibit discrimination on racial grounds, as it's a clear breach of the republican concept of equality, but the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, who not only has to prove that discrimination took place but also that it was an intentional act (Op.Cit.: 5, MacEwen 1995: 129), rendering such proof virtually impossible to deliver by individual victims.<sup>20</sup> To an important extent this results from the fact that discrimination charges have to be filed under provisions in the penal code and cannot be filed under those of civil law where the benchmark for proof may be lower.

### 3.5. Conclusion

In this country report we have restricted our evaluation to the position of immigrants on the labour market and in the educational system. It was, furthermore, based on secondary sources which by and large are of a statistical nature. We have not come across such data on the specific effectiveness of such programmes like the *Pacte de relance pour la ville* which therefore has to remain out of view. We can only safely assume that the position of immigrants and their descendants would be worse without such efforts.

It has become abundantly clear that the position of immigrants and their descendants, as far as they stem from non-European countries, is problematic. This conclusion is based on the apparent high

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<sup>20</sup> See Haut Commission de l'integration quoted in Draft Manual on Equality, ILO.

unemployment levels and difficulties experienced by school leavers to find suitable employment relative to French natives. Important to note is that the educational system *does* seem to be able to achieve a considerable level of integration. Immigrant children, by and large, and in spite of their obvious problems in adapting to the French language and culture, during their secondary education reach educational levels comparable to native children of similar socio-economic background. Renewed disintegration occurs when they enter the labour market, a fact that can only be explained by the presence of wide spread discrimination and geographical segregation.

Furthermore, there are good reasons to expect this disintegration trend to reach beyond the population we have statistical data on. It is indisputable that sections of the larger French cities know high levels of deprivation in terms of employment, income and housing quality, that especially concern persons of foreign, mainly North African, descent but who are also in many instances French citizens.

Compared to the decades before 1974, when non-European immigrants came to France because of good prospects of finding employment, disintegration has occurred, as a process leading to the current state of affairs.

Although French data are generally only current on the moment population census data become available and by and large only allow for a distinction between nationals and first generation immigrants, these data do allow for an analysis of integration on the labour market and in the educational system, especially when coupled with the EDP. This means that, in principle, the effectiveness of targeted policies, which in France only address immigrants, could be established as far as they aim at integration defined in a narrow sense. Unfortunately, we had no access to EDP data.

If we want to measure the level of integration as defined in a broader sense, the situation is more ambivalent. Compounded with the fact that integration in fields other than the labour market and the educational system should be resulting from general policies and is arguably even more important for the naturalised immigrants' descendants about whom we know little, there appears to be a serious lack of data by which to evaluate the effectiveness of general integration policies.

## 4. Country Report Germany

### 4.0. Introduction

Not unlike France, Germany has a long tradition of labour immigration - Poles coming during the industrial revolution, workers from Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands shortly before the First World War, East Germans and repatriates from former parts of the German Reich after 1945, and 'guest workers' from Turkey, Yugoslavia and other countries shortly afterwards - yet, the German State has never acknowledged the possibility that this might mean that Germany is a country of immigration. Generally speaking, immigrants are not supposed to settle, unless they are of German descent. This fundamental stance has its consequences for Germany's immigration and integration policies.

During the period that Turkish and other 'guest workers' arrived to fill vacancies for unskilled labour in the primary sector of the German economy, their arrival was applauded. However, already then no permanent settlement was envisaged, neither by the German authorities, nor by most of the migrants themselves. Mechanisms were put in place that should ensure this to remain the case. Labour rotation was the main instrument. A guest worker should stay with an employer for a pre-arranged period of time, return home, and be replaced by another guest worker. This principle soon eroded as employers found it impractical to invest time and money in the continuous training of newly arrived workers. So in practice many migrants stayed for longer periods of time but their residence status was tightly linked to their employment status: prolonged unemployment ending the legal residence of the guest worker concerned. Hence, integration other than on the labour market was not a goal of governmental policies.

Like in France and The Netherlands, guest worker recruitment came to a halt in the 1970s, 1973 in the German case. Subsequently, several processes took place. For one, the employers tried to stimulate the return of workers who's presence was not longer deemed necessary. Already between 1973 and 1981 this caused an estimated 650,000 Turkish workers to return to their country of origin (Mertins 1983). In 1983 the government started a comprehensive return programme.<sup>21</sup> It is not precisely known how many people returned as a result of these incentives but between 1982 and 1986 the net-migration rate of Turkish citizens in Germany was negative (Lederer 1997: 188, 193). However, and secondly, those Turks who choose to remain in the country increasingly started to bring over their families from Turkey. In the longer run this meant that the Turkish population did not decrease and, instead, has remained on the increase since 1986. Lastly, the fact that prolonged unemployment endangered a guest worker's residence permit made them look for other economic opportunities. Being self-employed (at times by using a German front man for this business) was an option probably more frequently and earlier used than among Turks in other countries of settlement (cf. Sen 1989).

With some exceptions - e.g. in the case of Polish and Czech temporary workers - present day Germany retains its restrictive immigration policy towards all persons who are not EU-citizens or ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*). As a principle, the bottom-line is that Germany is not a country of immigration and foreigners are only allowed to settle when international or other obligations leaves the German authorities with no alternative. Meanwhile, Germany has in the recent past seen by far the largest numbers of asylum seekers among the EU's States, both in relative and absolute

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<sup>21</sup> DM 10,500 was offered per family and an additional DM 1.500 per child. Premiums paid for pension schemes would be reimbursed.

terms. Including the *Aussiedler* and other immigrants they arguably made Germany into the most significant immigration country world-wide during the early 1990s (Doomernik 1997b). This stance towards immigration has its consequences when it comes to formulating integration policies. Legal integration has little priority as the level of the immigrants' integration on the labour market and into German culture is seen as the prerequisite for the extension of full legal rights. Until such integration, bordering on voluntary assimilation, has taken place, the option of return should remain open and visible. If immigrants have lived in Germany for a prolonged period of time (as a rule ten to fifteen years)<sup>22</sup> and are prepared to relinquish their old nationality, they can become German citizens. From the State's point of view this then implies that the immigrant has ceased to be 'different' and has become thoroughly German. This is not to say that labour market integration is not a policy issue. Indeed, the German government is increasingly concerned with the labour market position of immigrants and has developed policies to enhance the immigrants' chances. But at the same time, return migration is seen as a viable option that should be brought to the immigrants' attention.

It should be pointed out that the idea of Germany as a homogenous and non-immigration country does not go unchallenged. In all larger political parties, and especially those on the left, for the past few years strong voices can be heard advocating a more liberal and realistic conception of Germany as a non-homogenous State and the place immigrants should have within it. Already by the end of the 1980s attempts were made to grant local voting rights to foreign citizens in some of the States (*Länder*) governed by the social democrats (SPD) (e.g. North Rhine Westphalia). The constitutional court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) ruled that granting such rights would be a breach of the German Basic Law. And currently, debates centre around such questions like whether it would be admissible for foreigners to be naturalised without relinquishing their former nationality, or whether Germany should adopt integration policies leading into the direction of a multi-cultural society. For the time being, however, integration policies are not brought into line with those ideas; i.e. on the federal level, for the individual *Länder* have a considerable amount of autonomy when it comes to devising and implementing integration policies - differences we cannot do justice in this study.

In practice this means that by far the largest number of Turkish immigrants are still statistically logged as foreign citizens, and so are their children. Naturalisation rates are nevertheless on the increase. In 1995, 31,578 former Turkish nationals became German citizens (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung etc. 1997c: 14) bringing the naturalization rate for Turks to 1.57 per cent of the Turkish population (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung etc. 1997a: 11) which is not strikingly high. In contrast, the largest numbers of recent immigrants, i.e. the *Aussiedler* who are Germans, are not foreigners, and as a result are quickly 'lost', statistically speaking. However, and not without paradox, since we choose to focus our attention on Turkish immigrants, our evaluation is greatly helped by this effect of current German policies.

#### **Table 4.1. Foreign nationals residing in Germany, 1994 - 1996**

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<sup>22</sup> Seven years for recognised refugees, eight years of residence for the immigrant's children.

<i>Nationality</i>	1994	1995	1996
<i>Europe</i>	5,776,691	5,917,080	6,003,943
of which EU 12 – 15	1,560,998	1,808,411	1,839,851
of which Turkey	1,965,577	2,014,311	2,049,060
Africa	292,163	291,218	298,643
America	108,310	108,359	109,598
Asia	665,086	705,397	743,468
Total	6,990,510	7,173,866	7,314,046

*Ausländerzentralregister, quoted in Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung,*

*Source:*  
1998.

Table 4.1. shows that Turkish nationals are by far the largest non-German immigrant population. Natural increase of the Turkish population for the past few years lay at 45,000 on average. Net migration of Turkish citizens in 1994 and 1995 respectively stood at 17,583 and 43,221, taken birth rates and net migration together the annual increase should be considerably higher (14,000 in 1994 and 52,000 in 1995 (Statistisches Bundesamt quoted in Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1998) than the official data represented in table 4.1. These discrepancies seem to indicate that even with a population that, by virtue of its nationality is traceable in all relevant statistics, it still is difficult to maintain completely compatible data bases.

Here we should point at some recent developments that set Germany apart from France and The Netherlands. The unique unification process of East and West Germany in 1990 had quite a few direct, and especially indirect, consequences for the country's foreign populations. In economical terms, the unification process caused a considerable upsurge, mainly as a result of decades of unfulfilled consumer demand from the eastern part of the country. This rise in economic output did not last very long though. From as early as 1992 it became clear that the German economy was in for a major restructuring process. Productivity went down, unemployment levels went up; not only in the eastern part of the country where many firms were closed down and large numbers of people lost their jobs, but also in the West. Especially hard hit are those sectors where low and unskilled labour is concentrated: the primary economy where many immigrants tend to find employment. The government's abilities to deal with these developments is severely hampered by the huge costs involved with the reconstruction of East Germany's economy, infrastructure and institutions.

Coinciding with German reunification was a strong increase in acts of violence towards immigrants (Böhning 1996). Several of those made headlines all over the world and caused great concern, abroad as well as in Germany itself, but many others remained virtually unnoted.

East German Neo-Nazis, whose part of the country until today only knows relatively few residents of foreign origin, showed themselves to be especially aggressive. But also in Germany's western half xenophobia and violence markedly increased.

In this report we will focus our attention on what used to be Western Germany, for it is home to virtually all Turkish immigrants and their descendants. Immigrants in the Eastern half are small in number. They either are post-1990 asylum seekers and refugees or former guest workers of the German Democratic Republic, predominantly from Vietnam.

#### **4.1. Policies**

We have already briefly discussed the relationship between integration and immigration policies, a relationship that is probably more salient in Germany than in France or The Netherlands. A secure residence permit in Germany is closely tied to the ability of a foreigner to provide for himself (or of being provided for, as is the case with dependant relatives). Although the *Länder* have a certain amount of discretionary power when it comes to the implementation of immigration policies and can thus be rigid or more tolerant, becoming unemployed in Germany, and particularly becoming dependant on social security, in many instances puts a foreigner's legal position at considerable risk.

Depending on the duration of legal stay, a foreigners residence status *can* gradually become more secure. Current German aliens law basically knows three legal statutes: limited residence permit (*befristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*), unlimited residence permit (*unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*), and an establishment permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*). It is only this latter status that allows a foreigner to remain in the country even when he needs to claim social security benefits for any longer period of time. Upon renewing his residence permit, a foreigner may claim to be granted the next secure status, provided he fulfils the legal requirements (to list the conditions for the most secure status: being financially independent, having no substantial criminal record, having sufficiently large living quarters, having secured a future old age pension). If, however, he fails to file his claim, e.g. out of ignorance about his rights, an improved status is not automatically bestowed upon him. In effect, only relatively few immigrants, even among those 40 per cent who have resided in Germany for over fifteen years, have attained this most secure status (Groenendijk et al. 1998: 48). Among Turks only 26 per cent holds the most secure residence status (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*) (calculations based on der Bundesregierung etc. 1997a: 28). Whether this is because of being unable to fulfil all the requirements, or because of a reluctance to encourage immigrants to apply for it from the side of the alien police, it still means that many immigrants will experience a permanent or lengthy sense of ambivalence and a reluctance to integrate. Indeed, by stressing the fact that many immigrants have (as yet) no rightful place in society, ammunition may be lent to those seeking to incite feelings of xenophobia among the native German population.

Nevertheless, the German Government does seek to maintain and develop policies that should enhance the professional integration of its foreign residents. Policies to this end are both of a targeted and general nature.

##### **4.1.1. Targeted policies**

Germany knows several targeted integration policies; large efforts are made to facilitate the integration of recognised refugees and *Aussiedler*. Both categories have access to language courses

and a range of privileges. These categories of immigrants are free to decide whether they want or need to study German or need other training opportunities. In principle they may rely on social security benefits for the rest of their lives without seeking to participate in German society to any considerable extent. However, German authorities try to integrate them (with the exception of old age pensioners and the handicapped) into the labour market as quickly as possible. The procedures envisaged are broadly as follows:

Social security benefits are only meant to support people until they either take up a regular study (for those who have not yet a learned profession) for which grants are available or come under supervision of the employment exchange. Before this happens, the immigrant has to bring proof of past employment in his country of origin. When they do they are granted unemployment benefits (which are substantially higher than social security) and are offered a language course. When they, subsequently, are not yet deemed fit for the German labour market they may be schooled further in their old profession or be taken into a retraining programme. This entire process of professional adaptation may take up to three years, provided the immigrant does not lose time along the way. If he does not manage to find a job afterwards himself, the immigrant perhaps may join a temporary work scheme (*Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahme*, ABM), initiated and funded by the Ministry of Labour.

The generous facilities made available to refugees and ethnic Germans are not extended to other newcomers, pointing out once more that immigration policies can make a considerable difference for integration policies and which immigrant is eligible to enjoy them (see also Seifert 1997). Nonetheless, also members of former guest worker populations are subject to particular facilities aimed to improve their chances on the German labour market. Especially during the past few years the German Government has increased its efforts to enhance the integration of Turkish and other immigrants from former recruitment States. At the heart of those lie policies aimed at young people in the phase between leaving school and joining the labour force. They can receive extra job oriented training and language courses. The latter is also available for elder immigrants who, often after decades of employment, find their language capacities to be insufficient when looking for alternative jobs (Bundesministerium des Innern 1997). The German government, furthermore, acknowledges the fact that foreign women are in an especially vulnerable position.

*Foreign women, who until now predominantly occupied themselves with the care of their families and therefore have insufficient language proficiency shall (...) be motivated to be trained and find employment (Op.Cit.: 27, author's translation).*

Every year language courses for about 24,000 women are funded by the Federal Employment Services.

#### **4.1.2. General policies**

In addition to the targeted policies mentioned above, there are general policies aimed at the labour market integration of disadvantaged persons, especially the young. All those are basically run by the employment exchange. The Federal Employment Services, the *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*, functions as their umbrella organisation and sets, in association with the Ministry of Labour, the broad policy goals.

In 1996 about 14,500 young foreigners joined employment oriented programmes (*berufsvorbereitende Bildungsmassnahmen*) accounting for 21.1 per cent of all participants (15.3

per cent if calculated for the entire Republic) (Bundesministerium des Innern 1997: 22). Another 51,000 disadvantaged youngsters participated in programmes offering support to those who join in-house or on-the-job training programmes<sup>23</sup> where conditions are not always optimal for the pupils with learning difficulties. In addition, 19,300 pupils received such training in non-commercial State sponsored firms (*überbetriebliche Einrichtungen*) (Op.Cit.: 23). A last major effort consist of a category of training, retraining and experience building programmes (*Fortbildung, Umschulung und Einarbeitung*), again co-ordinated and funded by the Federal Employment Services. In 1996 39,500 foreigners benefited from these facilities, 94 per cent of whom were unemployed at the time (Op.Cit.: 26). The sources quoted do not enumerate the relative proportions of foreign/national participants in these schemes. Judging from the overall size of the foreign population relative to Germany's population at large, it seems safe to assume foreigners to be more likely to be among their beneficiaries than native Germans.

#### 4.2. The position of immigrants and their descendants on the labour market

The employment structure of the Turkish population in Germany has shown considerable changes since the 1960s. The main source on which to base this observation are targeted surveys that have been twice commissioned by the German labour ministry.<sup>24</sup> The most recent survey was held in 1995 (Mehrländer et al. 1996). The previous survey was conducted in 1985 thus allowing for some interesting comparisons. Some of the findings pertaining to the labour market were coupled with data from other sources, e.g. the Federal Employment Services. Table 4.2 exemplifies the labour market dynamics for Turkish workers.

As table 4.2 shows, in 1968 the largest proportion of Turkish workers could be classified as un- and semi-skilled workers. Since then two trends have clearly taken place: the number of unskilled workers has drastically gone down, and a diversification into initially not present professions has developed. Both trends indicate an upward socio-economic mobility. This, however, is only a partial picture. For it does not yet take into account unemployment level, nor does it offer a comparison with the native work force.

**Table 4.2. Turkish men, labour market position, 1968 – 1995, in per cent**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1968</i>

<sup>23</sup> When it comes to professional training, Germany knows a two tiered system; students may stay within standard educational institutions, or they can leave those to continue their education as a trainee within a company and receive their formal qualifications there.

<sup>24</sup> The survey was realised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut für Gegenwartsfragen (SIGMA). Of ex-guest worker populations it enumerated Turks, ex-Yugoslavs, Italians and Greeks (little over 1,000 respondents for each nationality).

Unskilled worker	13.7	29.6	32.1	35.0	43.0
Semi-skilled worker	38.8	38.6	42.4	47.0	38.0
Skilled worker	25.5				
Foreman	2.6	}19.5	16.7	16.0	16.0
Master	0.4				
Lower white collar	7.0				
Middle white collar	4.4	}7.6	5.6	*	*
Higher white collar	1.3				
Civil servant	-		*	*	*
Other	5.4	}4.7	3.1	*	*
No response	1.0		*	*	*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Mehrländer et al. 1996: 74

\* not enumerated

Data for table 4.3 originate from the German Sozio-Ökonomisches Panel (SOEP), a panel containing 12,000 individuals in 6,000 households.<sup>25</sup> Foreigners, accounting for 3,000 subjects, are purposely over represented in this sample. Sub-samples are available for Turkish, ex-Yugoslavs, Italians, Greek, and Spaniards. The samples are smaller than those in the Labour Ministry's survey (Mehrländer et al. 1996) but should yield a significant level of representativity.

Seifert (1994) used the SOEP data base to analyse the professional mobility among foreigners in general, and Turks in particular, compared to that of the native population. His findings are unambiguous. The bold figures in table 4.3 indicate the percentages of persons still in the same professional category in 1989 as they were in 1984. They show a considerable amount of mobility among foreign workers, upward but also in quite a number of cases downward. Job security appears to be low. Mobility among natives is considerable too. However, here predominant patterns are in the upward direction.

**Table 4.3. Labour market mobility between 1984 and 1989, all foreigners, Turks and nationals, in per cent**

	<i>Unskilled</i>	<i>Semi-skilled</i>	<i>Skilled</i>	<i>White collar</i>	<i>Self-empl.</i>
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<sup>25</sup> After German unification this panel was extended to comprise 13,500 respondents in 7,000 households, amounting to approx. 0.00016% of the entire population.

<i>Foreigners</i>					
<i>All foreigners</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>36</b>	45	17	1	1
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	18	<b>65</b>	15	1	1
<i>Skilled</i>	4	23	<b>65</b>	5	3
<i>White collar</i>	3	20	1	<b>75</b>	2
<i>Self-employed</i>	16	-	1	15	<b>68</b>
<i>Second generation</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>29</b>	53	17	1	4
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	3	<b>59</b>	36	2	-
<i>Skilled</i>	-	28	<b>61</b>	7	5
<i>White collar</i>	5	34	2	<b>59</b>	-
<i>Females</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>39</b>	33	27	1	-
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	21	<b>63</b>	15	2	-
<i>Skilled</i>	10	22	<b>57</b>	5	6
<i>White collar</i>	-	30	2	<b>68</b>	-
<i>Turks</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>50</b>	46	2	1	1
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	24	<b>67</b>	6	2	1
<i>White collar</i>	5	10	1	<b>82</b>	2
<b><i>Germans</i></b>					
<i>All Germans</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>39</b>	46	5	11	-
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	11	<b>53</b>	21	12	3
<i>Skilled</i>	1	11	<b>72</b>	13	3
<i>White collar</i>	1	4	2	<b>89</b>	4
<i>Self employed</i>	1	2	2	19	76
<i>16 – 25 years</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>16</b>	64	6	14	-
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	10	<b>44</b>	27	15	4
<i>Skilled</i>	2	4	<b>76</b>	14	3
<i>White collar</i>	-	14	2	<b>82</b>	2
<i>Females</i>					
<i>Unskilled</i>	<b>44</b>	4	3	12	1
<i>Semi-skilled</i>	12	<b>64</b>	8	13	3
<i>Skilled</i>	6	10	<b>67</b>	15	1
<i>White collar</i>	1	5	1	<b>91</b>	1
<i>Self employed</i>	2	1	0	34	<b>63</b>

Source: Seifert 1994: 22

One would be tempted to suspect that the insecure labour position of immigrants by and large exists on account of the first generation, which, after all, generally tends to be poorly educated.

Comparing the data for second generation immigrants with those for young Germans, these hopes prove themselves to be largely unjustified. Among young natives upward mobility is substantial, especially for those starting off as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. And those who already were employed as skilled workers, and even more so those who are white-collar employees, show a high level of job stability. Second generation immigrants also manage to realise a significant upward mobility, most strikingly from unskilled workers, via semi-skilled towards skilled workers. However, downward mobility from the skilled worker level to semi-skilled appears to occur frequently. It also appears hard for them to retain a position as white collar worker; 41 per cent of those second generation immigrants who were employed as such in 1984 had lost their position five years later. All experienced a status decrease. On the basis of Seifert's aggregated data, we cannot tell whether any meaningful differentiation between the different nationalities that comprise the category 'second generation' can be found. Moreover, we do not know whether the disintegration tendencies already manifest in 1989 have since taken any significant turns for the better or the worse, although given the German economic developments of the past years the latter appears the more likelier possible outcome. The answers to both questions could be had from an updated analysis of the annual SOEP data.

The different labour market positions for foreign workers on the one hand and for native Germans on the other, becomes once more visible looking at the average earnings. Placing the average earnings for German workers at a full hundred, Turks and Italians earn 73 per cent of that, ex-Yugoslavs 81 per cent, Greeks 76 per cent, and Spaniards 75 per cent (Rürup et al. 1994 quoted in Goldberg et al. 1995: 6).

Not only are there differences, and indications of disintegration found among those who are in employment, the likelihood of experiencing unemployment is not equally shared among natives and foreigners either.

Table 4.4 shows that five years after the first oil crisis, unemployment levels between foreigners and natives were still at par. Indeed, several immigrant groups had virtually no unemployed among them. Since then, however, a gradual divergence between the unemployment rates among native and foreigner workers has become evident. During the 1980s foreigners on average had unemployment rates that were about 50 to 60 per cent higher. In periods when the total unemployment rate went significantly down this had no positive consequences for the foreign labour force: between 1989 and 1992 overall employment opportunities clearly improved but at the same time unemployment among foreign workers only rose further, an obvious sign of lasting labour market disintegration. Among all foreigners the Turks are by far the hardest hit: the total number of unemployed workers in 1996 being 181,694 and their unemployment standing at twice the level as the overall rate (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 1997a: 50).

**Table 4.4. Unemployment rates among foreigners and total labour force 1979–1996, in per cent**

<i>Year (September)</i>	<i>Entire labour force</i>	<i>Total foreign workers</i>	<i>Greeks</i>	<i>Italians</i>	<i>Portuguese</i>	<i>Spaniards</i>	<i>Former Yugoslavians</i>	<i>Turks</i>
1979	3.2	3.9	3.6	4.5	1.7	2.9	2.3	4.2
1980	2.5	4.8	4.1	5.5	2.1	3.2	2.8	6.3
1981	5.4	8.5	6.9	8.4	3.8	5.1	5.2	11.2
1982	7.5	11.8	9.9	11.9	6.6	7.3	8.2	14.9
1983	8.6	13.7	12.0	13.9	9.7	8.9	9.7	16.7
1984	8.6	12.7	11.7	13.9	7.3	8.8	9.3	14.4
1985	8.7	13.1	11.4	14.7	7.6	8.7	9.0	14.8
1986	8.2	13.0	11.5	14.6	7.7	8.5	8.2	14.5
1987	8.4	14.1	12.1	16.1	8.0	9.1	8.8	15.5
1988	8.1	13.9	13.5	15.9	7.4	8.9	8.5	14.5
1989	7.3	11.2	11.4	13.2	6.1	7.7	6.9	11.6
1990	6.6	10.1	9.7	10.5	5.5	6.8	6.0	10.0
1991	6.0	10.6	10.1	11.2	5.8	6.7	6.5	11.0
1992	5.8	12.3	12.7	13.6	6.3	7.7	9.2*	13.5
1993	7.4	15.3	17.4	18.3	9.7	10.8	11.0**	17.4
1994	7.9	15.5	16.2	17.0	11.2	11.2	9.8**	18.9
1995	9.0	16.2	15.8	16.2	12.3	10.6	8.8**	19.2

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1996	11.2	18.6	17.8	18.0	13.2	11.7	9.9	22.5
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Source: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 1997a: 50

\* excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia

\*\* excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia

Figures do not include the new Bundesländer

Our conclusion must be that even though there is marked upward labour market mobility for second generation immigrants compared to their parents, they do significantly lag behind if compared to their German peers. Two possible explanations for this spring to mind: the objective skill levels of immigrants make them less interesting for employers to hire, especially in times of wide spread unemployment, or they are faced with some forms of discrimination. For the first generation poor skill levels are bound to play their role. For the second generation this conclusion comes too early, and we will discuss their performance in the German educational system in the next section. As to the possible effect of discrimination, we may turn to a recent study done by Goldberg et al. (1995) in the context of the ILO's wider programme on labour market discrimination as detailed in section 2.4.3, where by means of practice testing the selection processes of a large number of German firms was investigated. Two candidates, a Turkish and a German young man with equal qualifications and their respective nationality as the *only* objective difference between them, applied to potential employers. The basic criterion to establish discriminatory practices was whether one candidate was invited to proceed in some form or other when, at the same time, the other was turned down outright. The entire test was performed once by telephonic response to job advertisements to establish discrimination when semi-skilled jobs were targeted, and once for higher qualified jobs where employers were approached by means of unsolicited application letters. Results were unambiguous in the cases where employment in semi-skilled professions was aimed for: discrimination was evident in 19 per cent of the applications (Op.cit.: 28). The results from the testing were less clear-cut in the cases where higher qualified jobs were involved. For all types of employment taken together results were not significant: i.e. discrimination did seem to occur but not to any extent beyond what could not be explained by statistical error. However, disaggregated on the level of specific types of jobs, the picture is a different one. It would seem that for those types of jobs where remuneration is relatively low compared to the skills required and that, in effect, are less likely to attract qualified native workers, discrimination rates are low or insignificant. The clearest example for this being nursing jobs, for which there is an increasing demand and few candidates. Discrimination becomes very significant, in contrast, when foreigners apply for white collar positions in industry and banking. Rates then reach 50 per cent and over (Op.cit.: 38).<sup>26</sup>

The authors stress more than once that their experiment did not move any further than the very first contacts between candidates and potential employers. And they expect discrimination rates to lie considerably higher when the phase of actual hiring candidates had been reached. Legislation combating discrimination is not well developed in Germany (even though the Basic Law does provide a base for it) and where present not made explicit (Op.cit.: 81). Aside from the judicial effects such legislation should have, the statement it would imply as regards the government's stance towards the presence of immigrants and their descendants as an integral part of society could already be very beneficial.

### 4.3. The educational system

Taken together children with a foreign nationality tend to attain lower levels of qualification in the educational system than their German peers do. Especially when looking at those who leave school

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<sup>26</sup> It should be pointed out, though, that the number of valid cases on which this conclusion is based is small (two applications for a job in industry and 19 for a banking position) and should, thus, be treated with some caution.

with an *Abitur* in their pockets (high school qualification for admission to a university) differences are striking: 8.8 per cent of foreign children reach this level as compared to 28.3 per cent of German children (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung etc. 1997b: 9). When differentiating between nationalities, it turns out that children from Greek, Portuguese and Spanish backgrounds do considerably better than those from Turkey.

*The situation of young people of Turkish origin is characterised by relatively poor educational attainments - no degree or merely a lowest secondary degree, under-representation in high school (Gymnasium, Realschule) and over-representation in lower level vocational training (Berufsvorbereitungs- und Berufsgrundschuljahr) and by very poor preconditions and chances in the educational system.*<sup>27</sup> (Op.cit.: 13).

To a certain extent these problems can be explained out of the specific characteristics of the Turkish immigrant population: parents who have insufficient knowledge of the, rather complicated, German educational system and are thus unable to guide their children in the right direction; the fact that German to most children is a foreign language, something which is not positively encountered within the system (Op.cit.:18-20); and other culturally defined 'differences' that set Turkish children apart from their German peers. However, the structural barriers on the side of the German State in general and the educational system in particular are not to be discounted.

For one, the uncertain legal situation in which many Turkish parents and children find themselves, keeps them from making an unequivocal choice for a future in Germany. This has repercussions for their choice of schooling and career as it may seem better to select a profession that also may hold a future in the country of origin. Many white collar professions do not offer such promise. This ambivalent attitude is found in several surveys:

*Whereas the numbers of young people who want to return decreased between 1979 and 1989 from 29.6% to 5.6%, the numbers of youngsters who are not yet sure increased: without plans or with the intention to stay on for a couple of years are **more than 60% of the respondents. This is extraordinary because many of those are born and bred here.***<sup>28</sup> (Op.cit.: 25, note 33, our emphasis).

Secondly, there are many indications for the presence of discrimination in the mechanisms by which in the educational system pupils are stimulated and promoted or restrained in their choices. Racial discrimination, be it explicit or implicit, seems to be a key factor determining which child receives additional stimulation and is helped to develop its full potential and which child is deemed predestined for a less successful school career:

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<sup>27</sup> *Die Situation von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft ist sowohl durch relativ schlechte schulische Voraussetzungen - kein Schul- oder nur ein Hauptschulabschluss (lowest secondary degree), Unterrepräsentation in den Schulformen Gymnasium und Realschule, Überrepräsentation im Berufsvorbereitungs- und Berufsgrundschuljahr - wie auch durch besonders schlechte Bildungsvoraussetzungen und besonders geringe Ausbildungschancen.*

<sup>28</sup> *Während sich die Rückkehrwünsche der Jugendlichen von 1979 bis 1989 von 29,6% auf 5,6% verringert, nimmt gleichzeitig die Anzahl der Jugendlichen zu, die unentschieden sind: Ohne Pläne sind oder Einige Jahre bleiben wollen über **60% der Befragten. Dies ist erstaunlich, da sehr viele hier geboren und aufgewachsen sind.***

*This pertains to migrant children, respectively their parents, because they are perceived as a “problem”. Meanwhile migrants are not able to defend themselves against decisions made by the schools as they are not citizens, have fewer rights and have problems communicating<sup>29</sup> (Op.cit.: 29).*

Again, one of the problems here lies in the lack of rights endowed by the legal system.

Lastly, the German school system offers few possibilities to take ethnic or cultural differences into account or to understand bilingualism as an advantage instead of as a problem (Op.cit.: 17-8). Given the fact that Germany is not perceived by its government to be a multi-cultural State, it is not surprising that key institutions like the educational system reflect this position. Schooling, implicitly and in effect, aims for assimilation rather than for diversity.<sup>30</sup>

#### **4.4. Entering the labour market**

For those children who do not intend to enter institutions of higher education like a university, or for those who as a result of their school results are not able to, vocational training is the most common alternative. Typically for the German situation is that a pupil might either do this within the school system proper, or by becoming an apprentice in a firm. In return for his (fairly cheap) labour, the apprentice receives on-the-job training by an experienced craftsman (in the case of a smaller firm) or in-house training (in the case of a large company like a bank or a retail chain). In addition he may spend some hours per week in school. This apprentice system is a very common way to be trained for a career and popular with many young people. As a result, it is not always easy to find a vacancy, especially not in sought-after professions. However, foreign youngsters experience considerable greater problems in securing an apprenticeship than Germans do. This is partly the result of the fact that they are foreign citizens. For non-EU citizens like Turks, the civil service remains out of bounds and hence a whole range of possible careers - e.g. police, the administration - where wages are relatively high and dismissal unlikely (Santel 1995: 15).<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, they may lack the necessary school degrees and/or face discrimination on the side of employers. Their own experience in this respect was enumerated by the 1995 survey conducted by the Labour Ministry (see table 4.5). Sixteen per cent of those who tried to find an apprenticeship in a firm were not successful in their attempts.

Even bearing in mind that the figures in table 4.5 are based upon the personal appraisal of the subjects involved, the racially motivated discrimination experienced by Turks seems to be considerable. The table also brings to our attention once more that lacking school results are another major factor in explaining the problematic career entry of Turks. Interestingly, among those

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<sup>29</sup> *Diese betrifft Migrantenkinder bzw. Ihre Eltern, weil sie als “Problem” empfunden werden und die Migranten sich weniger gegen schulische Entscheidungen wehren können, da sie keien Staatsbürger und rechtlich geschwächt sind sowie sprachliche Schwierigkeiten haben.*

<sup>30</sup> The presence of some Greek and Italian schools, or of a single Islamic primary school in Berlin (cf. Doornik 1995), does not basically negate this as they in turn tend to have homogeneous student populations.

<sup>31</sup> In functions coming under the heading ‘general public administration’ in 1990 24,250 foreign nationals were employed, accounting for only 1.3 per cent of all foreign workers (data Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung).

who failed to find an apprenticeship they share this lack of qualifications with Greeks who, in contrast, did experience much less discrimination.

We already saw that the German Government is committed to enhance the labour market integration of foreigners. Concrete projects are diverse and funded both by federal sources (Labour Ministry where all immigrants are concerned and Interior Ministry additionally when measures pertain to *Aussiedler*) and the *Länder*. The language courses, funds for which stem from the Federal Labour Ministry and distributed by the *Sprachverband Deutsch für ausländische Arbeitnehmer*, attract large numbers of participants, about three quarters of whom are under thirty years of age (Sprachverband 1995: 93). About 500 organisations with 2,400 teachers among them offer the courses.

Through the regional labour exchanges considerable funds are available to aid the general (i.e. not explicitly targeted on foreigners) integration of young people who are particularly vulnerable to fall in the gap between school and labour market. The Nürnberg labour exchange, for example, has an annual budget of about 13 to 14 million DM to assist a thousand young persons, German and foreign, on their trajectory from school, into an apprenticeship and finally on the labour market. In case no employers can be found who want to take on the school leavers, there are State sponsored institutions (*überstaatliche Einrichtungen*) that can take over the tutorial role employers otherwise play. In North Rhine Westphalia several cities have seen initiatives whereby employers organisations (*Industrie und Handelskammer* and *Handwerkskammer*) have joined forces with the labour exchange and other interested parties to stimulate employers of foreign origins to increasingly create places for apprentices, benefiting foreign and German young people. This initiative finds following, e.g. in the Nürnberg region, but seems to depend much on the initiatives of engaged individuals rather than to reflect official policy initiatives.

To quote one more example, the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs of North Rhine Westphalia has initiated a programme that should close the gap between the educational system and the labour market. Employers engaging unemployed young people receive generous subsidies towards the labour costs. About 10,000 persons would qualify, one third of whom are immigrants. No special provisions for foreign young people are part of the programme but extra care is taken to reach immigrant children; e.g. advertising not just in German media but also in those used by Turks and other immigrant communities.

It is not easy to establish the effectiveness of these particular measures, not in the least because they are not comprehensive and nation wide, and are of recent date and thus likely to first and foremost benefit those young people who currently are leaving school or an apprenticeship.

**Table 4.5. Barriers experienced in becoming an apprentice, employed and formerly employed, nationality, in per cent, multiple choices allowed**

	<i>Turks</i>	Former Yugoslavians	Italians	Greeks
<i>Without necessary school degree</i>	37.4	24.0	18.5	36.0
Too few places available	39.5	42.9	47.0	40.3
Failed entry exam	17.2	11.5	7.5	13.9
Wanted to earn immediately	7.6	22.3	27.4	5.6
Parents objected	7.6	-	7.1	3.3
Partner objected	3.6	7.6	-	-
Lacking language proficiency	14.2	41.5	28.9	19.6
Turned down on ethnic grounds	18.5	5.5	-	8.4
<i>Other</i>	17.1	18.2	19.4	21.0
No response	3.3	-	-	-

Source: Mehrländer et al. 1996: 67

In spite of the efforts to increase the access of young foreigners to the labour market by virtue of the apprenticeship system or through the normal schooling system, figures for recent cohorts of school leavers do not merit much optimism. The Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (quoted in Beaufrage der Bundesregierung 1997c: 19) concludes that, in contrast to the 1980s, no further improvement in the educational attainments of foreign children can be observed. Twice as many foreign youngsters leave the system without a secondary degree as their native German peers (15.4 per cent and 7.7 per cent, in 1995 respectively) (Op.cit.: 18).<sup>32</sup> As a result nearly half of foreign men and more than half of women between ages twenty and thirty have to make do without any completed vocational training (Op.cit.: 19). Whether current efforts will bring a decrease in these figures remains to be seen.

<sup>32</sup> Conversely, 8.9 per cent of foreign pupils leave the educational system with a high school diploma (*Hochschulreife*) against 25.6 per cent of their German peers.

#### 4.5. Conclusion

Even though unemployment levels among foreign workers, and Turks in particular, are not as high in Germany as they for example are in The Netherlands (see chapter 5), for the past decades they have been and remain consistently higher than for native workers. The fact that even the period of economic upturn between 1989 and 1992 saw no improvement in the employment levels among the former guest worker populations, indicates a clear trend in the direction of disintegration. Whether the recent steep increase in unemployment in the German labour force is going to disproportionately affect immigrants and their descendants cannot be firmly predicted but given the fact that especially employment in the primary sector of the economy is under pressure, this would seem likely. The ability to acquire new skills fitting the changing demands on the labour market will be crucial, for German and Turkish workers alike. Another question is whether young people leaving the educational system are already equipped with those necessary skills. The high drop-out rate among the youngest cohorts of Turks currently trying their luck on the labour market, at least suggests this not to be the case. Fewer Turks than Germans reach the higher echelons of the educational system, and many more end up competing for jobs on the bottom rung of the labour market.

Comparing the labour market position of young Turks and their German peers, we found that even when both categories enter in the low skilled segment the Germans stand a better chance of achieving upward mobility and, to a much stronger extent, manage to sustain the gains made. Turkish youngsters do show considerable mobility but this is not only upward; status improvements made are almost just as easily lost.

This relatively poor integration into the labour market of the second generation is, is related to at least the following two factors: the immigrants' legal position and implicit and explicit discrimination. The legal ambivalence in which many immigrants and even their children find themselves, prevents them from making unequivocal choices. This has clear implications for the integration of the immigrants and, more importantly, for the choices made by their children. To put it simply, they fail to feel secure about their future prospects. This compounds with discriminatory practices in the educational system and on the labour market; the first probably not so much resulting from wilful acts on the part of teaching staff but rather the consequence of ethnic stereotype and the implicit belief - inherent to the system - that the German school system functions without bias. Subsequent labour market entry is further hampered by discrimination on the side of employers, leaving the immigrants' children with a disadvantage in competing for scarce jobs with their German peers.

By 'virtue' of the fact that immigrants and their descendants by and large are foreign citizens, we have sufficient statistical data at our disposal with which to evaluate the effectiveness of German integration policies. Summarising, we find that disintegration as defined in a narrow sense is taking place where first generation immigrants of Turkish origin are concerned. In the light of current economic restructuring of the German economy, we must expect this trend to become even stronger. As for the educational attainments of the second generation and their subsequent access to the labour market, the trend is hardly more positive. General policies as they have been formulated and implemented seem not to have been a suitable tool to counter this process. Targeted policies, which are few as far as Turks are concerned (excluding those who are granted refugee status), are neither substantial enough to effectively supplement the general policies.

As far as integration in general terms is concerned, we find that many Turks, among them many born and bred in Germany, find themselves in an ambivalent position, not knowing where they belong and where their future could or should lie. The German immigration policies are one factor causing this as are, at least partly echoing the government's reluctance to legally integrate foreigners, xenophobic tendencies present in the German population. The absence of an explicit anti-discrimination policy is another important factor indicating the government's reluctance to move towards integration policies that reflect everyday reality and thus giving further impetus to a marginalisation of non-EU immigrants.

## 5. Country Report Netherlands

### 5.0. Introduction

In the past, for example during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, immigration into The Netherlands was probably larger in relative terms than it is today (Lucassen and Penninx 1994). And even during the second half of the last century the country witnessed considerable labour immigration, albeit often seasonal (Lucassen 1984). In spite of this tradition, this century The Netherlands started off being a country of emigration. Even during the 1960s and 1970s, when considerable numbers of guest workers arrived, the government tried to stimulate its citizens to move abroad to countries like Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Population forecasts made many fear that the country would not be able to accommodate all; in terms of geographical space and in terms of labour market needs. The paradoxical nature of having policies for both importing and exporting labour, at the time appears not to have been noted or publicly discussed.

In contrast to some other countries, the ban on recruitment in 1974 did not coincide with any extensive measures to stimulate return migration among guest worker populations, in the Dutch case largely of Moroccan and Turkish origin. Indeed, unlike in Germany there were few attempts to seriously curb the ensuing process of family reunification, although official policy was not to encourage this immigration (Lucassen and Penninx 1994: 147). The numbers of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants thus increased considerably. Because their integration, on the labour market and otherwise, did not pass without problems, their presence gradually created policy challenges for the government.

In 1981 the government published its concept policy document on minority policies (*Ontwerp-Minderhedennota*). It formulated two basic ideas: those immigrants who preferred to stay and settle should be allowed to do so and their integration would need to be stimulated, those immigrants who preferred to return should be assisted. As to the integration of those who settled, categories of target groups were pinpointed: besides former guest workers, (post) colonial immigrants from Surinam, the Caribbean, Dutch East Indies/Indonesia, and, somewhat idiosyncratically, caravan dwellers and gypsies (cf. Penninx 1988). At a later stage refugees also became a category for explicit government attention.

Mindful of the ethnic minority position of many Blacks in the United States at that time, aim was to avoid the same outcome in the integration process of immigrants in The Netherlands. Long-term marginalisation coinciding with ethnic difference would, in the government's view, over subsequent generations, lead to the coming into being of ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, policies were never aimed at assimilating newcomers. Indeed, their cultural autonomy (e.g. in the field of religion) was explicitly safe-guarded.

This minority policy has remained fundamentally unaltered since then, even though subsequent governments have set different accents and have moved into the direction of policies that should ensure self-sufficiency among immigrants and their descendants instead of what in the media came to be known as 'cuddling-them-to-death'. Behind this rhetorical change we mainly find that policies, in the fields of welfare and labour, by and large are no longer only targeted at ethnic minority groups but take all disadvantaged categories into consideration.

The broad policy goal of arriving at a multi-cultural society where groups from different ethnic and/or cultural backgrounds live side by side peacefully and enjoy equal opportunities to

participate in society's core fields call for a close monitoring of the integration of immigrants and members of, what in The Netherlands has become known as, ethnic minorities (basically precluding the question of whether those minorities have already come into being or are likely to be a reality in the foreseeable future). This then means that it is of importance to know what their position on the relevant societal fields looks like. This is reflected in the data that are collected for statistical purposes. Population and other statistics do not only include nationality and country of birth but also enumerate the country of birth of a subject's parents.

Table 5.1. provides an illustration of the Dutch government's desire to keep track of the size of its immigrant population and its off-spring. It, furthermore, indicates that the considerable increase of those ethnic minorities between 1990 and 1996 (about a third for the Turkish and Moroccan populations and 18 per cent for the Surinamese) to a large extent can be accounted for by a growing presence of a second generation. Among those young people, both parents of whom in most instances will have been foreign born, many are Dutch nationals. Among Surinamese hardly any members of the second generation are foreign nationals but this is almost entirely to be explained out of the fact that Surinamese immigrants were Dutch nationals in the first place.

Using as a criterion that at least one parent should be foreign-born is a suitable way of establishing the size of populations comprised of immigrants and their descendants, at least for the time being. Rates of mixed marriages are still relatively low. If, however, this were to change - and such a phenomenon could arguably be considered to be the indicator for social integration *par excellence* - the strange result would be that the size of ethnic minorities would rapidly *increase* whereas the sociological relevance of it would *decrease* at a similar rate. This is especially true if we want to measure their sizes once a third generation has reached marriageable age. When these children are Dutch nationals, and Dutch law provides for this to be the rule rather than the exception (Fleuren 1996: 53), place of birth of one or two grandparents is the only suitable statistical variable left. Even though the numbers are still small, increases in mixed marriages are already observable<sup>33</sup> (CBS quoted in Muus 1994: 70).

Another effect of the Dutch Government's concern with the societal position of the country's immigrants and their descendants is the annual report on these matters published by the Social-Cultural Planning Bureau (*Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP*). Its analyses are predominantly based on national statistics and recent academic research findings. National statistics provided by the Central Bureau for Statistics (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS*) include those from the population registers and the Labour Force Survey (*Enquete Beroepsbevolking, EBB*), a continuous survey yielding data on more than 100,000 persons aged 15 and over aggregated and published annually. In addition, systems have been devised by which to monitor the performance of children from ethnic minority groups during their school career. Since the 1988/89 school year 12,000 primary school pupils are bi-annually tested for their language proficiency their ability to do sums (*Landelijke evaluatie onderwijsvoorrang, LEO*). Secondary education is covered by

**Table 5.1. Largest categories of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, 1990, 1996**

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<sup>33</sup> It is, however, not known how many Dutch partners contracting marriages with a foreign spouse can be classified as belonging to one of the ethnic minorities.

<i>Ethnicity*</i>	1990**	1996
<i>Turkish</i>	206,000	271,764
Turkish national	191,000	154,310
Born in Turkey	NA	167,498
Netherlands born with $\geq 1$ Turkish born parent of whom Dutch nationals	NA NA	104,266 58,266
<i>Moroccan</i>	168,000	225,253
Moroccan national	148,000	149,841
Born in Morocco	NA	140,734
Netherlands born with $\geq 1$ Moroccan born parent of whom Dutch nationals	NA NA	84,519 39,055
<i>Surinamese</i>	237,000	282,310
Surinamese national	15,000	15,174
Born in Surinam	NA	180,961
Netherlands born with $\geq 1$ parent born in Surinam of whom Dutch nationals	NA NA	101,349 100,822

Source: 1990: CBS 1997a; 1996: calculations based CBS 1997b

\* calculated according to the official definition; i.e. born abroad or having at least one foreign born parent

\*\* figures are rounded off

the CBS which maintains a cohort survey of pupils who entered in 1989 (*Voortgezet-  
onderwijsc cohort leerlingen 1989, VOCL'89*). A major source on the position of young people is

the Survey on the social position of the allochthonous and their use of services (*Survey sociale positie en voorzieningengebruik van allochtonen, SPVA*) enumerated by the Instituut voor Sociologisch en Economisch Onderzoek (ISEO) of the University of Rotterdam. Data collection for the SPVA has taken place three times since 1989 and focused on young people aged 15-24 of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillian/Aruban origin, and contains a control group of native peers (Tesser and Veenman 1997). The annual SCP reports offer unsparing accounts of the major problems currently facing people of Turkish origin and most other categories of immigrants from the non-industrialised world; in finding employment, in their educational attainment, on the housing market, and on their disproportionate presence in correctional institutions.

## 5.1. Policies

The fact that The Netherlands knows a long standing tradition as a consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977), a system whereby the inclusion of minority groups - in the Dutch case Catholics, Protestants, liberals and socialists - is made possible by making them institutionally independent from each other. Only at the level where policies are made, these separate 'pillars' meet. Even though this 'pillarisation' of Dutch society was most significant from the early part of this century until the 1950s or 1960s, it did much to set the tone in political and public debate until today. Main characteristic of a consociational democracy is that political disagreements are settled not so much by confrontation but by pacification and compromise, leading to equal access to society's resources for all parties involved. This has resulted in a legal framework guaranteeing minority groups the possibility to create their own institutions, fully funded by the State. These rights extend to newcomers. The Netherlands, as a result, for example know a considerable number of Islamic primary schools and an Islamic national broadcasting corporation (Doomernik 1995). In other words: Dutch society is founded on the principle of 'differences' just as much as on the idea of 'commonness', which helps to explain the present stance towards recent newcomers, and has been conducive to formulating the idea of a Dutch multi-cultural society.

### 5.1.1. General policies

As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, many policies that were put in place in the 1980s that specifically aimed at the integration of immigrants, were substituted during the mid-1990s by general integration policies for all disadvantaged persons, nationals and immigrants alike. Large sums were made available to combat social exclusion in the four main cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), or at least to eradicate its most depressing symptoms. The most visible result of this has been the urban renewal of run-down neighbourhoods where ethnic minority groups are particularly present. This presence is on the one hand the result of general policies in the allocation of low-rent housing based upon objective criteria like income, household size and urgency, and on the other of the fact that many middle class families leave the larger cities and move to the suburbs with semi-detached houses.

As to labour market integration, comprehensive efforts have been, and are still being, made. The main general policy instrument is the creation of additional jobs; i.e. employment beyond the needs dictated by the free market. The oldest of those schemes (1992) is aimed at the young and is called Youth Employment Guarantee Law (*Jeugdwerkgarantiewet, JWG*) which makes available work for every person under 21 years of age (until age 23 for school leavers) who has been unemployed for six months. Not accepting this offer means losing social security benefits for three months. As

long as subjects have not found regular employment they may remain in this scheme until they reach their 27th birthday.

In 1995 policies came into force that target all long-term unemployed. Many of those jobs are created in the public sector and are usually referred to as *Melkert* jobs, after the Dutch Minister for Employment and Social Affairs. The basic funding of these additional jobs is mainly provided for by the reallocation of those social security benefits participants would otherwise be entitled to. The minimum duration of unemployment required in order to qualify depends on the precise modalities of the job-creation scheme, of which there are several, and ranges between one to three years. *Melkert 1* jobs are planned to be a permanent addition to the labour market and 40,000 long term unemployed should as a result be reintegrated. The *Melkert 2* scheme (1995-1998) is intended to create jobs for which employers receive a substantial subsidy (Fl. 18,000 annually) if they take on long-term unemployed workers for a minimum duration of six months and a maximum of two years. *Melkert 3* jobs, are created by allowing jobless persons who depend on social security to retain their benefits while pursuing job-training or accumulating working experience. The *Melkert 4* programme, lastly, resembles *Melkert 2* in that it subsidizes the labour costs (again Fl. 18,000 per annum) for employers but this time solely for cleaning services. Goal of these schemes is on the one hand to increase the quality of public life (reducing crime rates and vandalism by employing people as *stadswacht* (literally: city guard) or as ticket collector in the public transport sector to reduce fair dodging, in nursing, and the like, and to stimulate people to seek for or retain employment in the private sector.

It is hoped that people who were no longer used to a regular life and without recent working experience, after some period in an employment scheme will be better qualified and more attractive to employers. In 1996 around 73,000 people were employed through such job schemes (accounting for 13 per cent of total employment growth between 1990 and 1996) (CBS 1997c: 77).

We have not been able to establish in detail the relative or absolute numbers of long-term unemployed from ethnic minorities employed through the several *Melkert* schemes. We do have, however, some data for Amsterdam from which becomes evident that long-term unemployed natives are twice as likely to be employed in a *Melkert*-job than would be expected from their relative share among such unemployed workers. The reverse is true for Turks and Moroccans who are only half to one fourth as likely to find such employment (Sandburg 1998). The grounds for this phenomenon could not be established. Other sources indicate that young people with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillian/Aruban background nation-wide seem to benefit to a considerable extent from the existence of the Youth Employment Guarantee Law (JWG) (Tesser and Veenman 1997: 203). Given their relatively poor performance in the educational system (see below) this, in itself, is not surprising. For the Youth Employment Guarantee Law the net-effectivity rate for those young people (i.e. the proportion of those who would probably not have been able to enter the regular labour market without it) is estimated to lie at 25 per cent against an overall figure of 18 per cent (Op.cit.: 204).

### 5.1.2. Targeted policies

Since the early 1980s, the Dutch government has pursued a policy that should extend a maximum of legal and social rights to foreign residents, in the hope that such rights would enhance their overall integration. Basically, after five years of legal residence their rights only differ from those of citizens where provincial and national elections are concerned and in their access to certain government positions. After the same amount of time has lapsed foreigners can also apply for

naturalisation (after three years when having a Dutch national as spouse). In addition, naturalisation and citizenship laws have over time been further relaxed and since 1991 dual nationality, e.g. Turkish *and* Dutch, has been possible.<sup>34</sup> Naturalisation rates are considerably higher in The Netherlands than they are in France and Germany: a rate of 9.4 per cent of all foreign residents in 1995 (SOPEMI 1996: 133).

The past decades have seen several policies specifically targeted at increasing the employment levels of immigrant groups. Probably the oldest example stems from the 1980s when a quota of public sector jobs became reserved for Moluccan immigrants.<sup>35</sup> Since 1987 the government attempts to increase the relative size of employees from immigrant origin in the public sector: policy Ethnic Minorities in the Public Sector (*Etnische Minderheden bij de Overheid, EMO*). Its instruments were targeted recruitment, the setting of target figures, monitoring and make public the ethnic composition of the public sector labour force, evaluation of selection procedures, information, and, when equally qualified, preferential hiring (Tesser et al 1996: 127). Although this policy has not had the overall desired effect, it did help to double the number of Moroccan and Turkish young people in the civil service between 1987-1989 and 1993-1995 (Tesser and Veenman 1997: 134). On the local level, similar initiatives have been developed by municipal governments, again in the form of preferential hiring practices; not just aiming to balance the proportion of ethnic minorities but also - if relevant - for example that of the disabled and of women.

Employers in the private sector, meanwhile, did not want to commit themselves to a similar effort until, in 1990, under government threats to enforce quota for the recruitment of workers from ethnic minorities, when in the *Stichting van de Arbeid*<sup>36</sup> agreement (the *STAR* agreement) was reached to increase the number of employees from ethnic minorities by 60,000 in the period between 1990 and 1995. To assist in this, the labour exchanges were to appoint officials whose task it would be to balance the needs of employers with those of job-seeking members of ethnic minority groups (Tesser et al. 1996: 129-30). As it turned out the readiness among employers to implement the *STAR* agreement has not been as large as originally anticipated. This again fuelled discussions on the possible advantages of installing legal quota or devising policies similar to those known as contract compliance in Northern America. Judging this to be a step too far, the government in 1993 proposed the Law on the Promotion of Equal Employment Participation of the Allochthonous (*Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen, WBEAA*). This law requires all private and public enterprises with 35 employees or more to register their employees' ethnic background and to strive for a work force which is representative of the overall population. Both employers and employees organisations initially showed considerable reluctance to implement this law but after a large PR offensive most of them have agreed to comply (Op.cit: 140-2). Whether the law will indeed have the desired effect for the time being remains an open question.

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<sup>34</sup> Lately, dual nationality has come under debate as legislation formalising existing practice did not pass the First Chamber of parliament.

<sup>35</sup> Predominantly former soldiers in the Dutch-Indian colonial army who were brought to The Netherlands upon Indonesian independence and who had long hoped to be able to return soon to their own independent State on the Moluccan Islands.

<sup>36</sup> The Dutch Labour Council, a platform for dialogue between employer organisations, trade unions and the Government.

In education, special facilities exist for primary schools with disproportionate numbers of immigrants' children. These high numbers can be attributed to two factors; the unequal geographical distribution of immigrant families, and the selective preference among native parents for schools that are predominantly frequented by ethnic Dutch children. In the media the former schools are frequently labelled 'black schools', a depiction that in the light of the pupils' diverse ethnic backgrounds has little bearing on social reality. Notably the fact that 'black schools' receive additional staffing funds, and are thereby able to decrease class-sizes and hence increase the amount of attention spend per child, is an important policy tool.

The targeted policies mentioned above are mainly relevant for those immigrants who have been in The Netherlands for some length of time, and for their descendants. From 1 January 1996 in addition there are policies specifically aimed at the integration (*inburgering*) of newcomers. This *Inburgeringsbeleid* is aimed at refugees and asylum seekers with a temporary leave to stay, immigrants who arrive in the course of family formation and reunification (usually with a partner who is considered to belong to one of the ethnic minorities), and Antillians and Arubans older than 18 years of age in case they run the risk of becoming marginalised. The policy has a three stage goal: social, educational and professional self-reliance. The first foregoing the second stage and that again the last one, whereby social self-reliance is seen as the absolute minimum for an immigrant to be able to function in Dutch society. The first stage is achieved when the immigrant has a basic knowledge of the Dutch language and has absolved a course in Dutch culture and society. The second stage prepares the immigrant for entrance in the educational system, and the last stage enables him to take up employment (Brink et al. 1997). The years 1996 and 1997 were considered to be a trial period. From then on the necessary educational capacities should be in place and the programme would no longer be merely on a voluntary basis. A newcomer relying on social security benefits is to sign a contract specifying his obligation to follow the programme under risk of losing the entitlement to part of his benefits. This does not mean that those who are not dependant on financial assistance cannot participate. The 1996-97 trial period has meanwhile been evaluated (Ibid.) but the relative small numbers of participants and the limited amount of time that has elapsed since the implementation started do not allow for any firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of this policy, at least not as yet.

## 5.2. The position of immigrants and their descendants on the labour market

Whereas a healthy economy has brought unemployment rates among Dutch natives down to 5.8 per cent in 1995, the rates among people of Turkish and Moroccan origin (here: foreign born and foreign nationals) in the same year was extremely high: 41 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. Taking into account the already very low labour market participation rates of 42 per cent and 40 per cent respectively, the picture does not invite much optimism: of all Turks between the ages of 15 and 64 only 25 per cent is employed and for Moroccans this figure lies only marginally higher at 29 per cent (calculations based on Muus 1996: 28).<sup>37</sup>

Among immigrants from the former Dutch colony Surinam, another large population of concern to Dutch minority policies, the situation is less problematic. Their unemployment, although still more than double the rate for the native population, lies at 15 per cent. Migrants from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba yet again have poorer prospects on the labour market. Their unemployment rate lies at 28 per cent (Ibid.) Still, for both categories of (post) colonial immigrants a decrease in unemployment can be observed (Tesser et al. 1996: 85). The general trend among former guest

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<sup>37</sup> Net participation rates for Turks and Moroccans taken together but differentiated between males and females are 40 per cent and 16 per cent respectively (Tesser et al. 1996: 85-6).

workers goes into the direction of long term unemployment for many of those currently out of work. As far as their children are concerned, a similar bleak perspective faces young Moroccan men whose unemployment rate lies markedly higher than for any other category of young people. The mirror image of this is found in their disproportionate large presence among the inmates in Dutch prisons. However, other second generation immigrants and especially the women among them, show an increasing ability to find employment (Ibid.).

The present fields of occupation and the professional status of former guest worker populations still reflect the characteristics of the recruitment period; i.e. a predominance of low- and unskilled workers in labour intensive sectors of the economy (see tables 5.2 and 5.3). Table 5.2 shows half of all Turkish workers to be employed in the sector mining (virtually non-existent in the Netherlands), industry and public services. Moroccans, of whom more than a third can be found in this sector, in comparison are more likely to have found employment in the branches labelled 'commerce/repair services' and 'other services'. These distinctions are not very conclusive but as table 5.3 indicates we can expect Turks and Moroccans to fill the positions located at the bottom rung of those economic sectors.

**Table 5.2. Relative presence of all foreign nationals employed in the Netherlands per branch, and for selected nationalities, excluding self-employed, 1994, in per cent and for selected nationalities, excluding self-employed, 1994, in per cent**

<i>Branch</i>	<i>All foreigners</i>	<i>EU Nationals</i>	<i>Mediterranean</i>	<i>Of which Turks</i>	<i>Of which Moroccans</i>
Agriculture/fishing	3	1	5	7	7
Mining/industry/ public services	35	33	42	49	37
Construction	3	3	4	2	3
Commerce/repair services	20	19	20	17	23
Transport/ communications	6	7	5	5	3
Banks/insurances	8	10	4	2	3
Other services	25	26	22	20	23

*Source:* Calculations based on Muus 1996: 79  
Totals do not add up to a full hundred due to rounding off.

**Table 5.3. Foreign employees in The Netherlands, 1994, estimates, professional status, composed as table 5.2, in per cent**

<i>Profession</i>	<i>All foreigners</i>	<i>EU citizens</i>	<i>Mediterranean immigrants</i>
<i>Scientific, specialists, artists, etc.</i>	18	26	5

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Managerial and higher  
executive

	3	3	0
Administrative	12	16	9
Commercial	5	7	3
Service	16	11	18
Agricultural/fishing	3	1	6
Production and related	43	34	61

*Source:* Calculations based on Muus 1995: 80

Taking together the high unemployment rates and low participation levels quoted earlier, and the labour market position of those who are employed as depicted in tables 5.2 and 5.3, an unequivocal disintegration trend becomes visible. However, for now this conclusion has to remain by and large restricted to the first generation of immigrants. As we pointed out in the chapters on France and Germany, the fact that they perform poorly on the labour market can, in the light of the generally observable process of economic restructuring, not come as a great surprise. In order to arrive at more definite conclusions we now need to examine whether the observed disintegration trend extends to the immigrants' descendants, many of whom are not enumerated in the statistics underlying tables 5.2 and 5.3 (contrary to many Dutch statistics based upon the nationality criterion) because increasing numbers of them are Dutch nationals.

Based upon statistics enumerated for the Labour Force Survey (EBB) we can look at the net participation rates for age groups 15 - 24, 25 - 44 and 45 - 64 of the assembled ethnic (i.e. including Dutch nationals of foreign descent) categories Turks/Moroccans, Surinamese/Antillians/Arubans (past and present colonies) and autochthonous. These data, brought together in figure 5.1, fail to provide a rosy picture. Even among the youngest cohorts of Turks and Moroccans, many of whom will either have been born in The Netherlands or have been socialised there, net participation rates are considerably lower than among their native peers. Moreover, convergence trends between these two cohorts are hardly in evidence. Within the category of Turks and Moroccans itself, this is different: the rate among females gradually approaches that of the men in their age group.

The question arises whether the low net participation rates among young Turks and Moroccans is directly related to their attainments in the educational system.

### 5.3. The educational system

Data from the LEO (*Landelijke evaluatie onderwijsvoorrang*) show that children belonging to the ethnic minorities that are targeted by the Dutch government's minority policy do not perform as well as their native peers. Where twelve year old native children (in the last year of primary school) in 1988, 1990 and 1992 reach an average standard score of 52.5 for their language skills,

children from minority groups reach just over 40. Their abilities in arithmetic are somewhat better (43) but still do not reach the level attained by native children (52). Furthermore, no significant changes in either category can be seen in the subsequent years. Disaggregating the data for all children from ethnic minorities it becomes visible that for language skills Turkish children score worst (37.5), Moroccans do better (39), and Surinamese perform considerably better (43.5). Knowing that in Surinamese households Dutch is the lingua franca this latter observation is not a very surprising one. The difference between Turks and Moroccans, in contrast, is. As for arithmetic the differences between the three ethnic categories are insignificant. What all three have also in common is that children in group 6<sup>38</sup> (when they are about 10 years of age) perform better than those who have reached the last year of primary school. Cohort analysis shows that this outcome can be explained by the fact that the younger cohorts have been in The Netherlands longer (and thus probably were born there) and as a result are better equipped. As Tesser et al. (1996: 182-3) - from whose work the data quoted above derive - note, there is no reason to attribute the improved performance of children to an increase in the quality of the education.

Even when data are balanced out to include only children from a working class background (parents not higher educated than elementary vocational training (*lager beroepsonderwijs*)) we still find marked differences between native children and those from minority groups (Op.cit.: 185). The inter-generational upward mobility in evidence among native youngsters is not to the same extent present between first and second generation immigrants, even though it is considerable in itself (see table 5.4).

#### **Table 5.4 about here**

In contrast to some of the findings in the German country report, Dutch literature does not cite implicit or explicit discrimination in the school system as a factor likely determining the educational career of the immigrants' children. Instead, several Dutch studies have shown that the specifics of the cultural capital<sup>39</sup> parents possess almost completely explain the immigrants' children educational attainments, notably the parents' level of learning (Op.cit.: 204). Knowing that children from working class families do better than pupils from Turkish or Moroccan background this, in effect, implies that there are considerable differences in cultural capital between poorly schooled natives on the one hand and immigrants on the other. Put differently: working class cannot be taken to be a suitable overall label. Knowing that many of the former guest

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<sup>38</sup> In The Netherlands children enter elementary school when they are four years of age. The first two years are much like nursery school but are labelled groups one and two respectively. During the last elementary school children are in group eight.

<sup>39</sup> As used by P. Bourdieu, e.g. in *Distinction. A social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Harvard University Press, 1994.

workers came from rural areas and, in a number of instances, were practically illiterate such a conclusion seems justified.

Their average poor scores in primary school has its consequences for the type of secondary education the immigrants' children enter and how they subsequently fare. Those children who finish some type of secondary education on average do this with lower qualifications and the number of drop-outs, i.e. those who leave before graduation, is considerable too. Depending on the type of education (ranging from elementary vocational training (12 to 16 year olds) to middle level vocational training (16 to 18 year olds) the rates of pupils leaving without passing their final examination reaches from 41 per cent to 48 per cent for Turks and from 47 per cent to 52 per cent for Moroccans. Among native children these rates are 29 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. (Tesser et al. 1996: 200, citing data from SPVA 1994). Those who have left the system with no other qualification but a primary school education rate 35 per cent for Turkish pupils and 39 per cent for Moroccan ones. Among their native peers this happens to only 8 per cent of children. Differentiation between the sexes shows that especially young Moroccans are prone to leave the system without any qualification.

#### 5.4. Entering the labour market

For the time being, as we have seen in the previous section, many children from families that are of concern to Dutch government's minority policies fail to reach educational levels at par to those of their native peers and this not in the least pertains to young people of Turkish origin. Those who leave the educational system without any qualification, the so called drop-outs, depend on the labour market needs for unskilled workers. This demand is relatively small and competition is considerable, not only with those native youngsters who dropped out of the system but also with more highly qualified workers who either cannot find employment on their own level or who are still pursuing an education and earn some money on the side. The very recent strong increase in employment attributed to what Europe-wide has become known as the *Poldermodel* (compromises between employers' organisations and trade unions where limited income developments are traded off against job growth) has not yet accounted for in the latest SCP analyses. This means it is not yet clear whether increasing demand for middle- and high skilled workers will relax competition in the low skilled sector (Tesser and Veenman 1997: 125).

Differences between young people who leave the educational system with some type of diploma and those who do not are in evidence for all 15 to 19 year olds. Among school drop-outs (in 1993 - 1995) less than 70 per cent was employed whereas this pertained to nearly 85 per cent of those who had attained some kind of qualification. As we saw, among Turkish and other youths the numbers of drop-outs is considerably higher than among native children. However, differences in educational attainment only explains for one in five to one in three their smaller chances of finding employment (Tesser and Veenman 1997: 124). In effect, there must be other factors accountable for the remaining four in five to two in three of the chances of finding employment. One sided access to recruitment networks is one factor as are culturally defined differences in ambition (e.g. an outspoken desire to become self-employed).

However, a major factor frustrating labour market access among low skilled job-seekers of foreign background are discriminatory practices on the side of employers. As Bovenkerk et al. (1994) convincingly show by the example of young Moroccan men who look for semi-skilled work, discrimination exists to such an extent that this "strongly suggests that the possibility of actually

getting a job is almost zero for the Moroccan applicant” (Op.cit.: 52). For those who have reached higher educational levels, discrimination plays a smaller role but remains a factor (Op.cit.: 54).

Among the countries under consideration in this report, The Netherlands stands alone in the fact that it has explicit anti-discrimination legislation. The provisions on which a plaintiff can base his case under civil law against discriminatory action have existed for some time but have recently been brought together in one comprehensive act (*Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling*): the Equal Treatment Act of 1994. Increasingly complaints pertaining to labour market discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity or nationality are brought forward which indicates a growing awareness among immigrants about their rights. Before the Act came into being it could still be noted that:

*(...) there is evidence of continuing discrimination and disadvantage particularly with respect to employment. This evidence, together with the low level of complaints and even lower numbers of successful proceedings, suggest that the avenues available for complainants, the support provided, the evidence required in order to prove the complaint and the remedies available, broad as they appear to be, are in some measure inadequate both in achieving effective redress for individuals and in securing a change in practice to promote equality of opportunity in the private, voluntary and public sectors. (MacEwen 1995: 141)*

The cohort studies currently monitoring the educational performance of young members of ethnic minority groups (*Landelijke evaluatie onderwijsvoorrang, LEO* and *Voortgezet-onderwijscohort leerlingen 1989, VOCL'89*) do not yet allow for any conclusions as to how many students managed to enter and complete some form of higher education like vocational college or university. Until then, the only available source are statistics compiled by the Ministry of Education and Science. In it are enumerated the numbers of foreign nationals attending such institutions. Even realising that many children of the second generation are Dutch nationals, the numbers might still provide an indication. In 1989, 340 university students were Turkish nationals. Five years onward (1994/95) their number had increased to 708. A similar substantial increase can be noted for Moroccan students (202 and 507 respectively) (Muus 1997: 79). The increases noted, obviously, are relative. Putting the number of university students at large at around 160,000, the absolute presence of Turkish and Moroccan nationals is marginal in absolute terms. How fast these figures will rise in the coming years and what a university degree will mean for the labour market career of these graduates remains to be seen.

## 5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have been able to arrive at a detailed description of the position of immigrants and their descendants in The Netherlands on the crucial fields of education and the labour market, allowing for the evaluation of their integration defined in a narrow sense. Much of the data used originate from surveys not known in France and Germany because their existence is a direct consequence of the monitoring needs inherent to Dutch minority policies. The general trend arising out of their findings is one of clear disintegration as far as the first generation is concerned and of lagging integration of their descendants. The Dutch Government's general integration policies are not as successful as it would wish. Even though it seems sensible and fair to design policies in such a fashion that *all* vulnerable people are their equal beneficiaries, the conclusion appears justified that many immigrants and their descendants are even more prone to exclusion than other vulnerable groups. As far as integration in the labour market and in the educational system is

concerned this may then call for policies specifically targeted on members of ethnic minority groups.

On the other hand, as a number of observers have noted (see e.g. Vermeulen and Penninx 1994) Dutch politicians and policy makers seem to hold unrealistic expectations by hoping that populations of poorly educated and in many instances illiterate immigrants from peripheral areas within one or two generations will no longer be different in material terms from Dutch mainstream society. Be that as it may, this begs the question how an explicit integration policy like in the Dutch example seems to have such poor results if we compare the outcome with the position of Turkish and other immigrants in France and Germany. The answers to this question, however, have to wait until the final chapter.

As for the integration of Turkish immigrants and other former guest workers and their descendants defined in general terms, our conclusions can be of a more positive nature. Past but now basically extinct targeted policies and current general measures seem to have created conditions under which members of ethnic minority groups have access to the same quality housing as natives with comparable social and economic positions and are not geographically segregated on account of their ethnic 'difference'. Important too is that those immigrants who have been in The Netherlands legally for five years or longer have a secure residence status and do not fear deportation on account of being unemployed. Indeed, in many aspects they enjoy the same rights as citizens have: the opportunity to become politically active in all spheres apart from provincial and national government, and to fully institutionalise their religious and cultural interests. Moreover, if they so choose, acquiring Dutch citizenship is possible after five years of legal residence. Even though discrimination does occur, acts of racially induced violence are rare in comparison to France and Germany. General policies towards a multi-cultural society can thus be seen as achieving a climate in which diversity can thrive.

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1. Introduction

To summarise our findings from the previous chapters on the position of immigrants and their descendants - as exemplified by people of Turkish origin - in France, Germany and The Netherlands, in all three States trends of disintegration are in evidence, both for the first and the subsequent generations.

However, in the clarity with which this trend shows itself and its magnitude, we found marked differences between these States. Does this mean that the position of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in France and especially Germany is *really* better than it is in The Netherlands? Or would this conclusion be based on biased or incomplete knowledge and hence be spurious? Or both? And if Turkish immigrants and their descendants in neighbouring countries 'do better' than their compatriots in The Netherlands, does this then disqualify Dutch integration policies, and the Dutch multi-cultural model in favour of the more assimilationist approaches common in Germany and France? In an attempt to come as closely as possible to the answers to these pressing questions, we will first of all return to a topic already dwelled upon in chapter two: what precisely do we know about the immigrants we are interested in. Subsequently, we will look at the differences in immigration policies between the three States under consideration in order to establish whether they may hold the answer to some of our questions. Lastly, we will return to integration policies as such, especially dwelling upon the relationships between integration defined in a narrow sense (labour market and education) and defined in a broader sense and the policies aiming towards them.

### 6.2. Data

The data that allow for the easiest comparison between France, Germany and The Netherlands are those pertaining to the labour market: employment and unemployment figures. Even though we have to be careful because French data may be biased towards first generation immigrants (as unknown but potentially substantial numbers of their children could be French citizens and thus not present in most statistics) whereas German and Dutch data cover both immigrants and their descendants, the data leave little room for doubt.

In France 11.6 per cent of the entire labour force is currently without employment. For Germany and The Netherlands these figures respectively are 11.2 per cent and 5.8 per cent (natives). This would invite the expectation that the unemployment figures among workers of Turkish origin would be lowest in the latter country. In actual fact, however, the exact opposite is true. Their unemployment rates in France, Germany and The Netherlands respectively are 37 per cent, 22.5 per cent and 41 per cent. Knowing that The Netherlands are currently witnessing a rapid job growth, the almost static unemployment levels among workers of Turkish origin imply that their role on the labour market has become marginal. In effect, the economic need for their presence is small; i.e. if we restrict our judgement to their input in the formal labour market. This is different if we include their presence as consumers and their productivity in the informal economy, topics we have not dealt with in this study.

Looking at the performance of pupils of Turkish background in the educational system, the trend is a similar one: in all three countries pupils of Turkish origin on average do not achieve the same

results as the average for their native peers. Yet, this conclusion is fraught with considerably more reservations as the data on which it is based are less unequivocal. For one, second generation pupils born and bred in the settlement countries have only recently appeared on the scene. Figures are thus still distorted by pupils who were not born in French, German or Dutch-speaking surroundings or even enjoyed part of their education abroad before being re-united with their parents. The Dutch cohort studies quoted show this effect to be significant and marked improvements in the performance of younger cohorts of pupils are in evidence. The fact that the parents themselves often are poorly educated as compared to the average educational level of the native population, and are thus not able to guide their children during their school career in a similar fashion, is another important factor explaining the fact that children of immigrants from Turkey do not reach results equal to their native peers. In France this becomes clear when comparing Turkish pupils with those whose parents are of an equal socio-economic status. It then becomes evident that differences between the two categories of pupils are no longer significant. We found that this does not (as yet) apply to the Dutch case, where a similar analysis still shows pupils of Turkish background to do worse. This suggests differences in data accuracy, in the socio-economic characteristics of either French or Turkish members of the 'working classes', or in the educational systems.

Unfortunately data for France and Germany are not comparable with the findings from these Dutch targeted surveys. French data only pertain to Turkish pupils who are foreign nationals, whereas German data do not allow for any conclusions as to the differences in attainments between pupils born and bred in Germany and those who have arrived sometime during their childhood. On the one hand it would be likely that a similar relationship between educational attainment and the age of arrival (respectively being born in the immigration country) could be found in France and Germany. On the other hand, the fact that the increasing attainments still visible among Turkish pupils in Germany in the 1980s has levelled out in the 1990s (see 4.4) seems to speak against that. As we will point out further down, this could be explained out of a lack of integration in fields other than those we have included in our narrow definition.

Data on which to base a comparative analysis of the integration of Turkish immigrants and their descendants in other fields than the labour market and the educational system are even less comparable and/or not in all instances available. The only, and very relevant, exception to this rule pertains to the integration into the legal system. Where France and The Netherlands know liberal rules as to naturalisation and citizenship, Germany persists on maintaining its 1913 imperial edict which primarily bestows citizenship upon all those of German origin. The naturalisation of an immigrant of non-German descent is considered to be the crown upon a completed integration process whereas in the French and Dutch views immigrants who want to stay should be equipped to become integrated by granting them all necessary legal rights. This fundamental difference in policy is reflected in the naturalisation rates: 1.57 per cent of the Turkish population in Germany, 9.2 per cent of the entire foreign population in The Netherlands and for France this figure can be estimated to lie in the vicinity of 3 to 4 per cent. For the German case we have found that this low naturalisation rate coincides with a highly ambivalent attitude among many Turks, both of the first and the second generation, as regards the permanence of their stay in Germany. This strongly suggests that integration beyond the scope of labour market and education has not yet progressed to a considerable extent in Germany.

A comparative appraisal of data can only lead to the following conclusions. For the first generation of Turkish immigrants labour market disintegration in all three countries, though at

varying rates, is in clear evidence. The prospects for their descendants seem to be better but not reaching levels of comparable categories of native youngsters. This is much in evidence in Germany and The Netherlands. Data on the French situation are less clear.

Looking at integration in general terms, trends appear to diverge between the three countries under consideration. Integration in The Netherlands seems to be least problematic. In Germany general integration is still fraught with barriers. For France few data are available but there are reasons (the political presence of xenophobia, and, like in Germany, the occurrence of violence against foreigners) to believe that the position of Turkish immigrants and their descendants leaves much to be desired.

Perhaps worthwhile at this point is to recall some recent observations by Böhning (1996) on unemployment levels among foreign workers as compared to nationals, and on the occurrence of racially motivated violence in a number of immigration countries. They lead him to argue that the types of general policies - be they aimed at assimilation or at a multi-cultural society (or 'salad bowl' as he labels these) - have little consequences for economic integration. However, they do make a considerable difference when it comes to social cohesion. Only policies aimed at a multi-cultural society manage to produce such cohesion unequivocally (Op.cit.: 9). In this study we have made no further attempt to arrive at a full appraisal of the position of Turkish immigrants and their descendants according to a broader definition of integration,<sup>40</sup> but we will return to the issue of policies in the next section.

### 6.3. Policies

In chapter 2 we already pointed out that even though it makes sense to analytically distinguish between immigration and integration policies, in actual fact both types are closely related. Recalling what we mean with these types of policies: immigration policy defines who is allowed to be present in a country, for what purpose and under which conditions, whereas integration policies are those that should ensure the participation of those who are allowed to settle in all or particular fields of society. The latter policies are basically of two kinds: targeted policies and general policies, whereby in France, Germany and The Netherlands targeted policies (if in existence) by and large aim at labour market integration and, for the younger generations, into the educational system. In addition, the attempts in France and The Netherlands to legally integrate immigrants can be also be considered to be targeted policies.

In the chapters on each country we have dwelt upon the presence of integration policies and had to conclude that it is very difficult to establish what their precise impact is, even though it is obvious that e.g. employment schemes like those in The Netherlands will prevent disintegration trends to be even more pronounced than they already are. We can only establish with certainty that none of the policies does achieve equal access to the labour markets of these countries nor do they as yet have led to the desired level of educational attainment among young people of Turkish origin. Although one could argue this to mean that governments do not do enough in terms of

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<sup>40</sup> Issues pertaining to the availability of data (and their comparability) on which to base such a comparison was discussed in chapter 2.

integration policy, this also would be a gross overrating of what governments are capable of, especially under conditions of an increasingly free and global market. At the same time public opinion and, in its wake, parliaments tend to show what Vermeulen and Penninx (1994) have called ‘democratic impatience’; i.e. governments are forced to come up with immediate, and often short-term, policies to remedy the outcome of long-term processes. This pertains to immigration policies (Doomernik et al. 1997) as well as to integration policies. If the position of immigrants and especially their descendants does not improve within a short time span, or even deteriorates, it is often forgotten that the inter-generational mobility required of the immigrant’s descendants to arrive at the same socio-economic level as natives, is very considerable. Indeed, much like was the case with the emancipation of the French, German and Dutch working classes earlier this century, it seems realistic to expect equality between natives and the descendants of immigrants not be achieved before a third generation has come into being. For these reasons it is important to discuss those effective instruments that *are* within relatively easy reach for governments and that create the framework in which such inter-generational mobility can take its course.

No great material costs are incurred by changes in legal provisions pertaining to immigration, residence status, social and political rights and legal protection against discrimination. Yet many policy tools in these fields are often not present or under-utilised, even though their impact can be considerable. We found several examples of this in the preceding chapters.

The impact of certain provisions in immigration policies for the integration process of immigrants and their descendants can be well illustrated if we compare Germany with France and The Netherlands. The former country displays considerable reluctance when it comes to granting non-EU foreigners a secure residence title. The latter countries, in contrast, offer the equivalent of an establishment permit (making expulsion possible only when the alien poses a security threat) already after a few years of legal residence. In Germany this status is contingent on a range of conditions like being in employment. When labour is in great supply and opportunities for low and unskilled workers poor this may have serious consequences for the immigrant’s residence status. As we have seen, relatively few Turkish immigrants indeed have progressed through the subsequent residence titles and have gained an establishment permit. It is not far fetched to see a direct relationship between this and the fact that so many Turks, even of the second generation, express great ambivalence as to where their future is likely to lie: in Germany or in Turkey. This ambivalence is mirrored in the low naturalisation rates and, conversely, also the result of the relative difficult access to German citizenship. When, furthermore, a government has as its policy that return migration should always be clearly presented as a viable option for those who become unemployed, this again underlines that, all things being equal, migrants are not welcome to stay. Such policies do nothing to create a climate in which immigrants feel comfortable and, indeed, maintains the myth among its citizens that migrants and immigration are basically a *problem*, instead of being phenomena that basically are of benefit to society.

We have seen that among the three countries studied, unemployment among Turks is by far the lowest in Germany. At least to a considerable extent this is the result of German immigration policies and the resulting ambivalence among these migrants. The question should be raised though, whether the by-effects, i.e. when looking at integration in wider terms than labour market participation and access, have not been a price too high to pay.

Although no one knows for sure how the German economy and labour market will develop in the foreseeable future, there appears to be the distinct possibility that similar trends as took place in The Netherlands one to two decades ago will manifest themselves: a rapid and strong decline of

the primary economy. Whether under conditions of rapidly rising unemployment figures among Turkish immigrants and their children it remains possible to 'export' potential or actual unemployment seems dubious and, at any rate, hardly justifiable in terms of human rights.

Another aspect of immigration policies is that they may place migrants under *zugzwang*. Once a secure legal position has been attained, migrants from underdeveloped countries lose virtually all incentive to return home for more than a brief visit. The risk of losing the right of access and settlement in the countries they migrated to is too large to take. Only those who are retired or in those few instances where economic prospects in the country of origin are better than they are in the immigration country are they likely to return voluntarily. Compounded with the fact that all EU States are reluctant to accept the immigration of so-called third country nationals (persons who are not citizens of one of the EU States), this puts a serious break on the free flow of people and hence the optimal functioning of a free labour market.

Other policies incurring few costs but potentially being beneficial are those that combat discrimination on grounds of ethnic and racial background or nationality. France, Germany and The Netherlands have acceded to the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The extent to which these States act upon ICERD provisions varies considerably, however. Neither of these States monitors incidences of discrimination but in The Netherlands complaints are invited. Of the three countries Dutch legislation offers the most comprehensive protection against discriminatory practices, both in civil and in criminal law. Such a comprehensive body of legislation is lacking in France and Germany where the threshold for complaints, furthermore, appears to be high, if only because complainants depend on the high burden of proof required for proceedings under criminal law (Kulke 1995, MacEwen 1995). The same authors make the point that even though legal action may always remain difficult because acts of discrimination are often hard to prove, the symbolic value of clear anti-discrimination law should not be underestimated. It functions to signal the State's commitment to equality, both to the immigrant population *and* society at large.

Related to anti-discrimination legislation are those provisions that seek to increase the numbers of immigrants and their descendants (or other disadvantaged categories) in the labour market, in certain sectors thereof or in particular types of positions. Among the three countries we devoted this study to, only The Netherlands has made moves in this direction. By law (Law on the Promotion of Equal Employment Participation of the Allochthonous, WBEAA) employers of firms with 35 or more employees are required to provide lists enumerating the ethnic background of their employees. It is hoped that this will create awareness among employers and incite them to adjust hiring practices in such a fashion that their labour force in due cause resembles the ethnic composition of the overall population. Unfortunately, it is too early in the day to arrive at any conclusion as regards the effectiveness of this policy. Another targeted policy pursued by the Dutch government is a form of preferential hiring whereby for many positions in the public sector members of ethnic minority groups are preferred if their qualifications are equal to that of native candidates. Although it has increased the number of such employees in government services, no labour force that is representative for the population at large has as yet been achieved.

#### **6.4. Recommendations**

Admittedly we have not been able to unequivocally establish precisely how effective efforts to integrate immigrants and their descendants on the labour market and into the educational system have until now have been. This, however, should not be read as to imply that these policies

therefore are ineffective. Indeed, the absence of such policies in times where labour market needs and supply are not congruous would in all likelihood have made disintegration an even more wide spread phenomenon. General policies keeping as many people as possible active on the labour market are therefore an important instrument. If, however, their impact is not equally spread among all (potentially) disadvantaged groups, targeted policies - quite apart from those that endow non-nationals with legal rights - may be called for. Of the latter policy type we have found few examples, the most explicit being the Dutch WBEAA. German and French governments are reluctant to single out for positive treatment specific categories of people either because it would undermine the principle of all citizens being equal or because it could be construed as a favour kept from others. In The Netherlands debates around the introduction of the WBEAA mainly concentrated around its possible stigmatising effects. This clearly indicates that targeted policies are a sensitive matter and would require additional policies, e.g. aiming to create and maintain public consensus about their necessity.

Other recommendations follow directly from our discussion in the previous section and can thus be outlined briefly.

If governments accept the importance of social coherence between all people residing in their territory, it is of primary importance that immigrants are encouraged to feel themselves to be members of society. The same holds true for the native population: there should be no doubt about the government's commitment. Apart from the obvious need to ensure the integration of immigrants and their descendants in the labour market, to this end the granting of social, political and legal rights is of the utmost importance.

Principle rights should be:

- the right to a permanent establishment permit after a limited period of legal presence without conditions as regards employment or income, e.g. after three to five years;
- the right to family reunification with no discriminatory provisions attached to it (i.e. provisions that are reserved for aliens) and no limits as to a minimum or maximum of duration of legal residence within which reunification should take place;
- the right to vote in local elections for holders of a permanent establishment permit;
- the right to acquire citizenship once the immigrant is in the possession of a permanent establishment permit;
- the right for those who want to migrate back to their country of origin or to a third country to retain an establishment permit (and hence the option to return) for a prolonged period of time;

the extension of the rights of free movement within the EU currently endowed to citizens of member States to those immigrants who hold a permanent establishment permit.

Furthermore, governments should in every way possible combat discrimination in all fields of society. The necessary basis for this has to be provided for by means of a comprehensive body of legal provisions. This has to be backed with sufficient and suitable means by which to implement

these provisions; e.g. low thresholds for complainants to claim their right to equal treatment, and effective law enforcement.

Lastly, we have found that comparing the levels of integration of immigrants and their descendants was seriously hampered by the lacking availability of relevant data. As long as immigrants are foreigners, statistics provide fairly accurate and meaningful information. In case immigrants become citizens of the receiving State this is no longer a matter-of-course. Since becoming a national does not at the same time alter a person's culture, skills or physiognomy he will then still be potentially at risk of being faced with discriminatory practices and/or lagging integration. This means that governments which implement the rights outlined above, will be confronted with the need to monitor over time the socio-economic position immigrants and their descendants are in.

Monitoring the position and progress of immigrants and their descendants on the labour market and in the educational system are the first requirements. However, as we have established that integration in those areas - integration defined in a narrow sense - is closely linked to integration in more general terms: monitoring of the housing market, and the participation rates in a host of sub-sectors of public life in general is required.

Several suitable ways of monitoring have in this study been reviewed, such as registering an individual's place of birth and (for the second generation) of his parents in population registers, or enumerating these data in population censuses and relevant surveys (household surveys, labour force surveys, targeted sample surveys) is one option. In addition, registers like those kept as a result of the Dutch WBEAA are also feasible, which could have as an advantage over the former means of enumeration of leaving to the individuals concerned to decide whether and how they want to be registered. However, some caution is in place. First of all, due care is needed to protect the privacy of individuals. Secondly, monitoring should be flanked by the government's commitment to act on what their data reveal. And lastly, governments should be conscious about the potentially stigmatising effects for the individuals concerned, a risk which greatly increases when such a commitment to act is lacking.

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