Incentive Factors Affecting Productivity of Public Servants in Ogun State: Evidence From Ado-Ota Local Government Area

By

Constantine Imafidon Tongo (Ph.D)

(Lecturer, Department of Business Studies, College of Business and Social Sciences, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria)

Abstract

The theoretical justification for the actualization of public sector goals is premised on the notion that those under the sector’s employment should be imbued with the spirit of selfless service. However, this has become a theoretical fad based on the findings of a cross sectional study which sought to know the extent to which financial and non-financial incentives affected the productivity of different groups of public servants in Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State. Based on the study’s results, three types of public servants were identified and described. These are the “deadwoods”, “egocentric servants” and “loyal servants”. While the deadwoods and egocentric servants are the misfits of the public sector; only the loyal servants are apt for jobs in the public sector. Consequently, recommendations were offered on how the sector could attract and retain those that are most suitable for its employment. Also, directions for future research with respect to confirming the veracity of the study’s findings were provided.

Key Words: Performance Incentives, Public Service, Productivity, Loyal Servants.

1.1-Introduction

The use of performance incentives dates back to the era of scientific management movement, which was championed by Frederick Taylor in the early 20th century to resolve the problem of soldiering at work. Since then, the private sector in most countries has continued to employ performance incentives with a view to raising the productivity of their workers.
While research on the impact of incentives on employees’ productivity has been a prominent area of interest in human resource management; it has been largely ignored by public sector scholars (Behn, 1995; Reilly, 2003). This may have been occasioned by the fact that the goals of the public sector is different from those of the private sector; and contemporary scholars of public administration believe that while private sector employees are motivated to maximize their own utilities, public sector employees should seek to maximize the social welfare of the people in society (Wright, 2000). In other words, employees in the public sector should possess a motivational need for public service. This is referred to as public service motivation (March and Olsen, 1989; Perry, 2000; Wright, 2000). What this implies is that, incentives that are directed towards the self aggrandizement of private sector employees would not apply to public servants.

However, past research has shown that low productivity is recorded in almost all public sector organizations in Nigeria (Mbogu, 2001; Ezulike, 2001; Iheriohanma, 2006); and findings from other studies do reveal that the low productivity associated with Nigeria’s public servants could be raised if they are provided with some financial incentives (Tongo, 2005).

However, while these studies have shown the importance of financial incentives in boosting the productivity of public servants in Nigeria; little or nothing is known about the extent to which non-financial incentives could also be utilized in achieving the same purpose.

It is on this note that the present article becomes relevant. Employing both the financial and non-financial incentives of Locke’s (1968) goal setting theory of motivation; the article sets out to know whether both types of incentives affect the productivity profile of a sample of workers in Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State.

As a background to the study, the article begins with a discussion on public service motivation. This will be followed by a presentation of past research outcomes in the area of incentives and productivity linkages. The research methods deployed by the study shall come next and then the discussion of research findings would be treated there after. In the final section, recommendations and directions for future research would be presented.

1.2- Literature Support For the Concept of Public Service Motivation

In reviewing the literature on public administration, it is apparent that many scholars believe that individuals who work in the public service are different in their motivations for work in comparison to individuals who work in the for-profit, private sector.
Work motivation in the public sector is premised on the idea that individuals who choose to work in the public sector have an ethic that is oriented toward public service and a sense of duty (Staats, 1988). Perry and Wise (1990), used the phrase “public service motivation” to describe work motivation in the public sector. According to them, public service motivation can be defined as an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions. Brewer and Selden (1998) define PSM as the motivational force that induces individuals to perform meaningful public service. It has also been defined as the “beliefs, the values and the attitudes that go beyond self interest or organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity, and that induce through public interaction, motivation for targeted action” (Vandenabeele, et. al., 2004).

Public service motivation could also be defined as an individual’s psychological propensity to be induced to respond to the changing needs of people in society, via government institutions with expected economic rewards immaterial (Tongo, 2005).

In order to shed some more light on the concept of public service motivation, March and Olsen (1989), see public service as a shared definition of the common good. According to them those who seek to manage the affairs of government have a primary interest in helping to realize this common good. Such persons are likely to be motivated by fulfilling obligations, maintaining trust and obeying rules. It then means that managing the affairs of a government must be completely different from managing the affairs of a business organization.

For instance, Perry and Wise (1990) have argued that people with high public service motivation (P.S.M) are more likely than others to choose government jobs, to perform better on the job and to respond more to non utilitarian incentives once in government. Since the public service sector is charged with the responsibility of promoting the general social welfare, as well as the protection of the society and every individual in it; the composition of the public workforce has been expected to reflect the nature of work in the public sector, by attracting employees who desire greater opportunities to fulfill their altruistic motives. Hence public administration scholars have tended to view employee motives as inputs brought to the work situation that represent the raw materials in the public sector motivational processes (Perry and Porter, 1982; Bozeman, 1987). Consequently, an underlying premise of the public sector literature on work motivation is that the characteristics of employees and their work environments in the public sector are different from those in the private sector (Wright, 2000). While private sector employees are motivated to maximize their own utilities, public sector employees should seek to maximize the social welfare of the people in a society.

Although insufficient attention has been given to work motivation within the context of the public sector, relevant empirical research does exist. However, empirical research has provided mixed support for the existence of public service motivation among public servants.
For instance, Alonso and Lewis (2001), using multiple regressions on responses by 35,000 federal white collar employees tested the link between public service motivation and job performance in the United States Federal Service. They concluded that there is a mixed evidence on whether public service motivation positively affected grades and performance ratings; and that a clearer evidence is needed to show that employees who expected to receive material reward for exceptional performance attained higher grades and performance ratings, and no evidence that the link between rewards and performance mattered any less to those with high public service motivation.

Genebra (2003), in a study of nurses in the public and private hospitals in South Africa, found out that through interviews, that the nurses in the public sector often mentioned the option of leaving the increasingly overburdened public sector for the better pay and working conditions of those in the private sector. Comments from focus groups indicated that staff attitudes were a key difference between the private and public hospitals, impacting both on the way that patients were treated and how the facility was presented and maintained. Factors underlying the differences in morale and motivation of primary care nurses working in the private hospitals versus their public sector counterparts need to be understood. In concluding the reports of the study, Genebra (2003) posed a pertinent question, which is, can the human aspect of the public service delivery in South Africa be improved without major changes in the incentive structure of the public bureaucracy? This question perhaps sought to know the role that incentives played in boosting performance in the public sector.

Drawing from theories of work motivation and public service motivation, Frank and Lewis (2004), examined public and private differences that might produce different levels of work effort in the two sectors in the United States. Their conclusions were as follows: Firstly, government and business offered different incentives for performance. Secondly, public and private workers seek different incentives. Thirdly, public and private workers differed in terms of personal characteristics that predict work effort.

Some researchers have found that managerial employees in the public sector place a lower value on financial incentives (Cacioppe and Mock, 1984; and Jurkiewicz, et al., 1998) and a higher value for helping others or public service (Crewson, 1997) than do their private sector counterparts. Empirical support for these differences, however, has not always been consistent. Several studies have failed to find differences in preference for financial incentives (Crewson, 1997; Gabris and Simo, 1995), while others have suggested that regardless of how public employees may value
financial incentives relative to private employees, such financial incentives are still valued highly by public employees (Rainey, 1982).

Evidence has also suggested that public employees do not value opportunities to benefit society (Jurkiewicz, et. al., 1998) or to help (Gabris and Simo, 1995) any more than those in the private sector. In sum, the research on sector differences in employee motives should be viewed with some caution. Although some evidence has suggested that a relationship exists between employee motives and sector employment, these findings have not been entirely consistent and the causal direction remains uncertain.

1.3- The Nexus Between Incentives and Productivity

Generally, incentives are regarded as variable payments made to employees or a group of employees on the basis of the amount of output or results achieved. Alternatively, it could be payments made with the aim of pushing employees’ performance towards higher targets (Banjoko, 2006). Incentives could also be defined as compensation other than basic wages or salaries that fluctuates according to employees’ attainment of some standard, such as pre-established formula, individual or group goals, or organizational earnings (Martocchio, 2006).

Effective incentive pay systems are based on three assumptions: individual employees and work teams differ in how much they contribute to the organization, not only in what they do but also in how well they do it; the organization’s overall performance depends to a large degree on the productivity of individuals and groups within the organization; to attract, retain, and motivate highly productive workers and to be fair to all employees, an organization needs to reward employees on the basis of their relative productivity (Martocchio, 2006).

However, it has been reported that only 28 percent of British organizations carry out any formal evaluation of the effectiveness of their individual incentive schemes (IPD, 1998). However, “significant and serious problems” have been experienced as follows: individual incentive schemes are too small to act as a motivator. Concerns about the accuracy of management perception of a direct link between pay and individual productivity will motivate employees to higher levels of performance (IPD, 1998).

According to Thorpe and Homan (2000), such a view flies in the face of research which emphasizes the importance of a whole complex of factors when understanding motivation. Furthermore, even if this perception of a direct link between pay and productivity were valid, it is
doubtful that it would remain unaffected by the influence of workplace pressures, both social, economic and political (Thorpe and Homan, 2000).

The literature on compensation also has related the use of incentives to attracting and retaining risk-taking employees, or employees who possess a high degree of openness to new ideas and creativity in solving daily problems (Mohrman and Mohrman, 1993; and Montemayor, 1996). Incentives can therefore boost an organization’s learning capability if used for recompensing attitudes oriented towards flexibility and constant improvement (Lei, et al, 1999; O’ Dell and Grayson, 1998; and Stata, 1989).

In a similar vein, Leonard-Barton’s (1992) viewed the organization as a learning laboratory. She notes that employees find incentive systems symbolically important (for example, they make employees feel they are contributing to the organization’s success). More specifically, Garvin (1993) points out that if employees know that their plans or ideas will be evaluated and recompensed-in other words, that their knowledge will be applied- they are more likely to show learning-oriented behaviour. For instance, Arthur and Aiman-Smith (2001) found that establishing a gain-sharing plan promotes first-order learning and, subsequently, second order learning. The latter has been described behaviourally as “the search for an exploration of alternative routines, rules, technologies, goals, and purposes” (Lant and Mezias, 1992).

According to Reilly (2003), in evaluating the success of incentives in the public service (where it has been most widely tried), it would be hard to establish whether it has aided recruitment or retention, but there has been more attention given to whether or not it has improved employee motivation. The problem with the use of incentives in the public sector is in the practice. Many employees have doubts about whether their managers have the skills to exercise their judgement in a fair and consistent manner (Reilly, 2003).

They fear that judgements will be clouded by favouritism (Heery, 1998) and affected by ignorance of how staffers actually perform. The result is that, as Marsden and French (1998) found in various parts of the public sector, for only a minority (between a tenth and a third of staff depending on the organization) is performance-related pay an incentive to work harder. For the rest, not only had it not motivated them, it had damaged relationships between colleagues and hindered team working.

Specific attention has also been drawn to the difficulties in objective setting for many jobs in the public sector. As Marsden and French (2002) explain, there is not a simple principal/agent relationship that economic theory expects. Staffers often do not have the same clear goals as those
in the private sector with too many conflicting priorities through trying to serve too many masters. According to Reilly (2003), it is not easy to incentivize the police to catch more criminals, customs and excise officers to increase their detection rate, or ambulances to get to incidents more quickly. A target can be set, but care needs to be taken over the process of reaching the goal. The public might complain about over-enthusiastic police, customs officers, or ambulance drivers (Reilly, 2003).

Public sector trade unions have consistently supported employee doubts about performance-related pay and have resisted its introduction. They have also been quick to point to evidence of inequalities in performance assessment by gender or ethnicity, where these have been linked to reward (Reilly, 2003).

Nevertheless, apart from financial incentives, there are also non-financial incentives, which may be relevant to the public sector. In Locke’s (1968) goal setting theory, four of such non-incentives were brought to the fore. These are feedback, time limits to achieve set goals, subordinate’s participation in goal setting, and praise or reproof.

This present study seeks to find out the extent to which both financial and non-financial incentives affect the productivity of a sample of public servants in Ado-Ota LGA of Ogun State.

1.4 Research Methods

A cross-sectional research design was adopted in this study. Consequently, the responses of a cross section of workers in Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State helped us estimate the extent to which the selected incentive factors of this study affect the productivity of the workers. The respondents were divided into three groups based on their present levels of productivity. Respondents with productivity levels that are below the fifty percent point of the highest productive worker shall make up the low productive group. Respondents with productivity levels between fifty and seventy-five percent points of the highest productive worker shall belong to the moderate productive group. Finally, respondents with productivity levels above the seventy-five percent point of the highest productive worker shall fall into the high productive group.

Based on the above classification of the respondents, the levels of dissatisfaction experienced by members of the different groups in terms of the five incentive factors was obtained and compared with each other. If there is no significant difference between the three groups in terms of the dissatisfaction associated with a particular incentive it would be said that the incentive in question does not affect the productivity of workers. Conversely, when there is a significant
difference between the three groups of workers with respect to their levels of dissatisfaction accompanying a particular incentive; we would conclude that this specific incentive factor affects the productivity of workers.

The incentive factors shall fall into two main categories. These are financial incentives and non-financial incentives. The non-financial incentives shall include feedback, setting of time limits, subordinates’ participation in goal setting and praise. Productivity shall comprise two key sub-variables. These are (i) efficiency of the worker (ii) effectiveness of the worker.

The calculated value for the level of dissatisfaction experienced by workers with respect to any of the incentive factor was obtained via numerical values respondents give to the question “To what extent do you feel dissatisfied with the lack of any of the incentive”? on a (1-7) Likert scale.

The calculated value for their levels of productivity was obtained via numerical values respondents present to the questions relating to their efficiency and effectiveness on a (1-7) Likert scale.

To calculate the mean levels of dissatisfaction associated with the different incentives and mean levels of productivity for the three groups of respondents; we carried out an addition of the numerical values that the respondents assigned to these variables. This was followed by dividing the sum obtained from the addition process by the total number of respondents in each of the group.

The questionnaire was divided into seven sections. Section A of the questionnaire focused on ascertaining the biographic profile of the respondents. Section B of the questionnaire elicited responses to the level of dissatisfaction experienced by workers with regards to financial incentives. This section shall be followed by sections C, D, E, and F which shall deal with questions pertaining to the levels of dissatisfaction experienced by the workers in the areas of feedback, setting of time limits, subordinates’ participation in goal setting, and praise respectively. Section G of the questionnaire provided information on the productivity profile of respondents. A copy of the questionnaire would be found in the appendix section.

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for data analysis. The package provided results for skewness and kurtosis of data and test of the formulated hypotheses.

Test on skewness and kurtosis enabled us ascertain whether the data measuring the dissatisfaction level associated with the lack of incentives and workers’ productivity levels were normally distributed and were either amenable to parametric or non-parametric tests.
According to Hardigan, et. al.(2001), the assumption of normality is only rejected when the univariate skew index and kurtosis of a set of data is greater than 3.0 and 10.0 respectively. The results showed that the data were normally distributed because the skewness index for each of them was less than 3.0 and kurtosis was less than 10.

Consequently, because we are interested in comparing the levels of dissatisfaction associated with the lack of incentives between the three groups of workers already aforementioned; the One Way Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA) was deployed to test the formulated hypotheses of the study.

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was also used for the determination of the reliability of the research instrument. The reliability of the questionnaire had a 0.72 Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. According to Nunnally (1978) a questionnaire with a Cronbach alpha coefficient of at least 0.72 should be accepted. Therefore the internal consistency of the questionnaire used in this study was reliable.

The sample under investigation was made up of employees from Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State. It comprised employees of various specializations, such as secretaries, clerks, accountants, e.t.c., but with a minimum academic qualification of W.A.S.C. or G.C.E. certificates.

Precisely, a non-probabilistic sampling method, known as the convenience sampling method was employed. Based on this method, the sampling units that could be easily accessed and conveniently located were selected. This method was selected in preference to random sampling because from previous experiences, civil service workers are extremely difficult to track down in their offices, and so employing random sampling in which we will become limited to administering the questionnaires to certain persons, would end up to be a futile exercise. However, the major disadvantage in using this method is that we may not achieve the best representation of the population understudied.

Nevertheless, in this particular study, one hundred questionnaires were administered to the public servants of Ado-Ota Local Government Area; only seventy nine of them responded to the various items of the filled questionnaire. However, four of these questionnaires were badly filled by the respondents and so they were discarded. Consequently, only seventy five questionnaires were utilized for data analysis.

The findings from the study’s research design are shown below
1.5- Discussion of Findings

The study found out that groups of public servants at Ado-Ota LGA do express substantial differences in their dissatisfaction towards the absence of certain incentives that may affect their productivity levels. These civil servants significantly differed in terms of the dissatisfaction they suffered from the non-availability of both financial and non-financial incentives (i.e. time limits’ incentives, incentives that pertain to subordinate participation in goal setting, and incentives on praise) that the LGA is presently providing for them. However, these groups did not show any significant difference in terms of their dissatisfaction towards the need for them to get some feedback from their bosses on tasks assigned to them. In other words, they were insensitive to the incentive for feedback in spite of the differences in productivity levels.

With regards to the incentives for feedback, the group with the lowest productivity levels portrayed the least dissatisfaction for the lack of this incentive. Their mean level of dissatisfaction for this incentive was 3.6154. While those for the moderate and high productive civil servants stood at 4.5857 and 3.8333 respectively. Apart from the above results obtained for the feedback incentive, other findings also showed that the least productive group of civil servants experienced the lowest level of dissatisfaction as a result of the non-availability of other incentives. These findings are revealed in tables under appendix 2.

Nevertheless, it does appear absurd to find out that civil servants with the lowest level of productivity do suffer from the least level of dissatisfaction at work. Rather, common management wisdom would demand that less productive workers should experience more dissatisfaction with incentives provided by their employing organization. For it is quite consensual to presume that the productivity of such workers could be increased by providing additional incentives for them. But the paradox that surrounds the findings of this study is that the least productive civil servants at the Ado-Ota LGA are less dissatisfied with both the financial and non-financial incentives that this arm of government in Ogun State is presently providing for them while they perform their work. We therefore suggest that this category of LGA workers may constitute what could be referred to as the “deadwoods” of the civil service. These are the deadwoods because their low productivity does not fundamentally stem from the need to provide them with more incentives since they are the least dissatisfied with the inadequate incentives that the LGA is currently providing. It is therefore
believed that these deadwoods are naturally indolent and that the LGA may have little or nothing to do in bringing them out of woods of unproductiveness.

It is important to note that the deadwoods constitute about seventeen percent (17%) of the entire sample size of this particular study. This therefore suggests that the remaining eighty three percent (83%) is composed of the productive work groups i.e. those with mean productivity levels within the range of 3.51-5.25 and 5.26-7.00; as derived from their responses on the (1-7) Likert scale.

Most of the results obtained from the two groups of productive workers show that the more dissatisfied they are with respect to the non-availability of incentives for performance, the less productive they would be at work. Except for the results obtained for incentives on feedback where members of the moderate productive work group (i.e. the group with the 3.51-5.25 mean levels of productivity) were less dissatisfied with the lack of this incentive than those of the high productive group (i.e. those with the 5.26-7.00 mean levels of productivity); the findings with other incentives suggest that members of the moderate productive work group are more dissatisfied with the paucity of performance incentives that characterize civil service work at Ado-Ota LGA. These findings are shown in tables under appendix 2.

The above result therefore implies that the productivity of members of the moderate productive work group could be boosted to higher levels if the LGA provides them with better financial and non-financial incentives than they are presently receiving. However, given the fact that the high productive work group is confronted with the same problem of insufficient amount of performance incentives; and yet their productivity levels are comparatively higher than those of the moderate productive work group; we can conclude that the former work group may be more apt for private sector jobs. According to Frank and Lewis (2004) governments have few incentives to ensure that the enterprises they own are well run. On the other hand, it is said that private owners do have such incentives because they will lose money if businesses are poorly run. Consequently, the government of Ado-Ota may be unable to provide the kinds of performance incentives that the private sector can make available to such groups of workers who need these incentives to be highly productive. It is on this note we would refer to members of the moderate productive work group as “egocentric servants”. These egocentric servants are employees of the civil service who need performance incentives that are presently available to the private sector of business in order to be highly productive within the public sphere of employment.
Conversely, the high productive group of civil servants encountered by this study may require just the optimal level of incentives that government can provide for them to maintain or improve their productivity levels. According to Tongo (2005), this optimal level of incentives should be systematically and rationally fixed by government. This would help to sufficiently precipitate an appreciable level of employees’ productivity required for performance in the public sector. However, the evaluation of these optimum incentives should be done periodically to reflect the prevailing economic and social conditions of the country (Tongo, 2005). This may be the only necessary condition required for maintaining or increasing the productivity of those that are naturally called into the public service in Nigeria. Such persons could be called the “loyal servants” of civic duty because their performance or productivity may have no correlation with those extra ordinary performance incentives that only the private sector can provide. Rather their productivity may derive from a sense of loyalty towards public service; and a concomitant exhibition of high levels of public service motivation.

With regards to this present study the so called “loyal servants” (high productive work group) constitute only about thirty six percent (36%) of the sample size.

1.6- Conclusion

While previous research on incentives that can improve the performance of the public servant in Nigeria had largely focused on monetary rewards; findings from this present study have revealed that non-financial incentives (i.e. time limits’ incentives, incentives that pertain to subordinate participation in goal setting, and incentives on praise) could also affect the productivity levels of workers public service.

Employing a cross sectional research design that involves three groups of workers with varying levels of productivity, this study has shown that they differed substantially in terms of the dissatisfaction they experience for the non-availability of both financial and non-financial incentives at Ado-Ota LGA. Even though we may conclude that these incentives affect the productivity levels of these employees, a critical caveat must be observed.

This caveat underpins the fact that not every person under the current employment of the LGA is apt for civil service job. For instance, members of the moderate production group who were referred to as “egocentric servants” in this particular study may be more suited for jobs in the private sector; since this sector should be able to provide them with all the incentives needed for performance. In a similar vein, there are deadwoods in the civil service whose productivity levels
may not be substantially affected by any more incentives that the LGA can provide. These deadwoods comprise those with the lowest levels of productivity; as well as least dissatisfied with the current incentives that the LGA is providing.

However, apart from the two categories of misfits who have found themselves in public sector employment, there is a third category of staff in the public service. This category of staff is made up of the true “loyal servants” of public service; as their high levels of productivity is most likely derivable from their love to serve society rather than based on quantum amount of incentives that the LGA can provide at any given period. All they may need is that optimum amount of incentives that government can provide per time based on the prevailing economic and social realities.

Following the findings of this study it is recommended that the LGA of Ado-Ota must be more rigorous in its recruitment and selection of personnel that fills vacant positions in the future. This recommendation is occasioned by the need to reduce incidences of bringing “deadwoods” and “egocentric servants” into their employment.

They must therefore ensure that only those that would positively respond to the performance incentives that they can provide are employed by the LGA in the future. There is no doubt that these persons would be more apt for jobs in the public sector.

It is also recommended that in order to retain such persons in their employment, the LGA should be able to provide them with the optimal level of incentives that they require for the sustainability of themselves based on the prevailing economic and social realities of the time.

Though this study has attempted to explore some incentives that affect the productivity of workers at Ado-Ota LGA; it has some limitations. First of all, it employs convenience sampling technique which is non – probabilistic in nature and hence does not allow members of the population to have equal chances of being selected into the sample. This may lead to some bias in enlisting those who should be members of the sample. Therefore it is recommended that future studies should employ samples that are reflective of the entire population. In other words, probabilistic sampling techniques, such as random sampling should be utilized in the future.

Secondly, we suggest that future studies should make use of larger sample sizes cutting across several LGAs in Nigeria.
Thirdly, it is recommended that the quantitative research design employed by the study could be augmented with qualitative research designs that can give detailed accounts of incentive factors that affect the productivity of LGA workers in Nigeria.

It is believed that taking adequate care of the shortfalls in this study would provide better platforms for obtaining more objective and accurate results that could promote the possibility of generalizing the findings of future studies.

References


**Appendix 1**

Dear Sir/Madam,

The questionnaire is aimed at understanding the motivational patterns of a cross section of public sector workers in Nigeria. In order to meet this objective, you have been duly selected as a member of the sample to provide relevant and objective data needed to satisfy the quest for this knowledge.

I wish to appeal to you to assist by kindly sparing a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. You are not required to disclose your identity. I also wish to assure you your answers will be treated in strict confidence and used for academic purpose only.

**Section A**

Please kindly provide the under listed information. You are also required to tick the open bracket in front of your selected option when ever necessary.

**Name of Organization:**

**Sex:** Male {} Female {}
Highest Educational Qualifications: B. Sc { } M. Sc { } Ph. D { }

Age Bracket: 21-25 years { } 26-30 years { } 31-35 years { } 36-40 years { } Above 41 years { }

Tribe: Yoruba { } Igbo { } Hausa { } Others { }

Religion: Christianity { } Moslem { } African Traditional Religion { } Free Thinker { }

Number of years spent in the Organization: 1 year { } 2 years { } 3 years { } 4 years { } 5 years and above { }

Position in the Organization: Upper Level Management { } Middle Level Management { } Lower Level Management { } Non-Managerial Level { }

Section B: Dissatisfaction Level of Financial Incentives

Please tick the most appropriate option underneath the statements presented below. Please do note that the same instruction applies to sections C to H.

(i) I am dissatisfied with the fact that financial rewards is not based on performance in this place of work. Strongly disagree { } Moderately disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

(ii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that there are no financial rewards for over time work. Strongly disagree { } Moderately disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

(iii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that people are not paid differently according to their level of performance. Strongly disagree { } disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

Section C: Dissatisfaction Level of Feedback

(iv) I am dissatisfied with the fact that my boss does not tell me about his/her impression of my performance on the job. Strongly disagree { } Moderately disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

(v) I am dissatisfied with the fact that I am not able to assess my level of performance. Strongly disagree { } Moderately disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

Section D: Dissatisfaction Level of Setting Time Limits
(vi) I am dissatisfied with the fact that my boss does not set time limits on work assigned to me.  
Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
(vii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that I do not set time limits on work assigned to me. Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Section E: Dissatisfaction Level of Subordinates’ Participation in Goal Setting  
(viii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that I do not participate in goal setting Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
(ix) I am dissatisfied with the fact that subordinates’ participation in goal setting is not a practice in this organization. Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Section F: Dissatisfaction Level on Praise or Reproof  
(xii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that I am not praised when I do something spectacular in this organization. Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
(xiii) I am dissatisfied with the fact that bad behaviour is not punished in this organization. Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly disagree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Section G: Productivity  
(xiv) My boss always praises me for completing tasks assigned to me on record time  
Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
(xv) My boss always complains of the fact that I waste resources allocated to me while carrying out certain assignments. Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
Slightly disagree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }  
(xvi) I am always impressed with the results I get when my boss assigns work to me  
Strongly disagree { }Moderately disagree { }Slightly disagree { }Neither disagree nor agree { }Slightly agree { }Moderately agree { }Strongly agree { }
My boss is always impressed with the results I get when he assigns work to me.

Strongly disagree { } Moderately disagree { } Slightly disagree { } Neither disagree nor agree { } Slightly agree { } Moderately agree { } Strongly agree { }

Appendix 2: Tables for Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dissatisfaction Suffered for Lack of Financial Incentives by the Three Groups of Civil Servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values on the Scale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>that are between 0.00 and 3.50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.7946</td>
<td>1.58303</td>
<td>.43905</td>
<td>2.8380 to 4.7512</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that are between 3.51 and 5.25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.2574</td>
<td>1.57877</td>
<td>.26686</td>
<td>4.7151 to 5.7998</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that are between 5.26 and 7.00</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.0559</td>
<td>1.35017</td>
<td>.25984</td>
<td>4.5218 to 5.5900</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4.9313</td>
<td>1.57322</td>
<td>.18166</td>
<td>4.5694 to 5.2933</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Dissatisfaction Suffered for Lack of Feedback Incentives on their performance by the Three Groups of Civil Servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values on the Scale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>that are between 0.00 and 3.50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.6154</td>
<td>1.54318</td>
<td>.42800</td>
<td>2.6828 to 4.5479</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that are between 3.51 and 5.25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.5857</td>
<td>1.23363</td>
<td>.20852</td>
<td>4.1619 to 5.0095</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that are between 5.26 and 7.00</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.8333</td>
<td>1.74863</td>
<td>.33652</td>
<td>3.1416 to 4.5251</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4.1467</td>
<td>1.52850</td>
<td>.17650</td>
<td>3.7950 to 4.4983</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Dissatisfaction Suffered for Lack of Time
Limits’ Incentives at Performing Assigned Tasks by the Three Groups of Civil Servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptives</th>
<th>Dissatisfaction level for time setting incentives</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 0.00 and 3.50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.7692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 3.51 and 5.25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.0571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 5.26 and 7.00</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.7963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3.7400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Dissatisfaction Suffered for Lack of Incentives that Enable Subordinates Participate in Mapping out Periodic Goals to be Achieved by the Three Groups of Civil Servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptives</th>
<th>Dissatisfaction level for goal setting incentives</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 0.00 and 3.50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.0769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 3.51 and 5.25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values on the Scale that are between 5.26 and 7.00</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.7407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4.2467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Dissatisfaction Suffered for Lack of Incentives on Praise by the Three Groups of Civil Servants
Appendix 3: ANOVA Tables for Test of Null Hypotheses

**Hypothesis 1:** Groups of public servants with varying levels of productivity do not significantly differ in terms of how they get affected by the non-availability of financial incentives at the Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State in Nigeria.

**ANOVA**

Dissatisfaction level of financial Incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>20.939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.469</td>
<td>4.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>162.214</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>183.152</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 2:** Groups of public servants with varying levels of productivity do not significantly differ in terms of how they get affected by the dissatisfaction that derives from the non-availability of feedback incentives on their performance at the Ado-Ota Local Government Area of Ogun State in Nigeria.
ANOVA
Dissatisfaction level for feedback incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>13.067</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.533</td>
<td>2.943</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>159.820</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172.887</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 3: Groups of public servants with varying levels of productivity do not significantly differ in terms of how they get affected by the dissatisfaction that derives from the non-availability of time limits’ incentives at performing assigned tasks in Ado-Ota LGA of Ogun State in Nigeria.

ANOVA
Dissatisfaction level for time setting incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>15.857</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.928</td>
<td>3.942</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>144.823</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>160.680</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 4: Groups of public servants with varying levels of productivity do not significantly differ in terms of how they get affected by the dissatisfaction that derives from the non-availability of incentives that enable subordinates participate in mapping out periodic goals to be achieved with their superiors at the Ado-Ota LGA of Ogun State.

ANOVA
Dissatisfaction level for participation in goal setting incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>24.478</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.239</td>
<td>4.784</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>184.208</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.558</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208.687</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothesis 5: Groups of public servants with varying levels of productivity do not significantly differ in terms of how they get affected by the dissatisfaction that derives from the non-availability of incentives on praise at the Ado-Ota LGA of Ogun State.

ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>35.173</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.587</td>
<td>5.542</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>228.493</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3.174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>263.667</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>