ILO - Post-war Lebanon: Women and orher war-affected groups

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ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict

Post-war Lebanon: Women and other war-affected groups

Naila Nauphal

ISBN 92-2-110692-6

First published 1997

Abstract

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	Preface
	Executive Summary
	Acronyms
	Introduction and methodology
1.	History,duration and features of the war
2.	Rehabilitation in post-war Lebanon
3.	The economic situation
4.	The impact of war on the country and the gender implications
5.	Women's activities: A comparison between the pre- and post-war
6.	Assessment of government policies towards war-affected women
7.	NGO's, IGO's and donar institutions
8.	Conclusion and recommendations
	Bibliography
Annex 1	Terms of reference
Annex 2	Directory of NGOs and their heads in Lebanon

PREFACE

This document by Naila Nauphal has been prepared as an input to the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict. This multidisciplinary and interdepartmental programme, under implementation during the 1996-97 biennium, is geared to contributing to the formulation of policy proposals, guidelines for national and international capacity building, training materials, a database and a compendium of relevant initiatives in conflict-affected countries. The programme has undertaken a number of country-level research activities in the different parts of the world on the diverse issues being investigated by it to generate relevant data and insights for the outputs. Ms. Nauphal's report is one example of the country studies.

The situation of women and gender issues in the conflict-affected context constitute a major challenge. This report on Lebanon examines, in the main, the gender impact of the conflict in the country from 1975 to 1990. It observes that the conflict has accentuated poverty, unemployment, low wages and unequal income distribution which have put the weight of reconstruction of the country on those who can least bear it. Women have been more adversely affected by the conflict, which also contributed to changes in gender relations and differences between men and women, in their post-war activities and survival strategies. Ms. Nauphal, inter alia, criticises the atomized approach of the various interventions so far provided by governmental, non-governmental and other bodies to assist women in the country. She stresses the importance of women's groups in reconstruction efforts and in seeking redress to some of the concerns of women in post-conflict Lebanon. The impact of other factors -- legal, cultural and religious -- is also highlighted.

Owing to the limited gender analysis of the conflicts in the Middle East, the Action Programme is circulating this document in the hope that the parts, which are relatively weak, could be strengthened later through comments received from readers.

The Programme is grateful to the refugee studies programme of Oxford University for assisting with the preparation of this report.

Eugenia Date-Bah,
Coordinator,
Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship
Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict,
Training Policies Branch,ILO.
Geneva.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The country's history, since its creation in 1920, has been characterized by successive periods of peaceful coexistence and instability, followed by the outbreak of a war in 1975 which lasted 15 years (1975-90). The intensity and longevity of the conflict has had deep human and structural consequences.

The war had a devastating impact on the economy and the labour market. More than 5 per cent of the population died, combined with a massive movement of out-migration which seriously reduced the human capital of the country that was an essential part of its previous development. A large amount of capital flight has accompanied this emigration, depriving the country of much needed financial resources. The destruction of public infrastructure, buildings and communication networks was large scale. Since the Israeli invasion in 1982, a phenomenal slide of the value of the pound started and continued through the remaining years of the war.

Internal migration was a major determining factor of the demographic and social changes that resulted from the war. More than a million people have been displaced; some were permanently dislocated and the rest returned when hostilities ceased. The social fabric of rural and urban communities was severely affected. In most cases, displacement has disrupted the family and social networks. The imbalance in the population distribution is one of the main compelling reasons for the Government to organize the return of the displaced from over-populated areas to the nearly empty places of displacement.

The post-war picture reflects a definite renewal of economic activity and a good degree of optimism in Lebanon. This should not, however, obliterate anxiety about signs of potential problems facing the sustainability of Lebanon's development. Unemployment, low wages and inequitable income distribution are the most crucial problems: they put the weight of reconstruction on those who can bear it the least. The Government's belief that the "trickle down effect" will resolve social problems is mistaken, especially in light of the experience Lebanon has had prior to the war.

The war has modified the living and working conditions of the Lebanese and has been responsible for the impoverishment of a large part of the population. Almost a third of the Lebanese population is estimated to live below the absolute poverty line. Two thirds of the extremely poor live in the rural areas. The weight of poverty falls unequally on various groups. Women, especially the rural ones, are more discriminated against and tend to be unaffected by poverty alleviation measures.

From 1985 onwards the economic crisis reached unprecedented proportions and resulted in:

reduction of consumption with a qualitative differential effect on women;
increased involvement of women in both formal and informal economic activities, because of the temporary or permanent inability of men to fulfil their traditional role as household providers;
extension of the informal sector, partly due to the disintegration of the public sector;
migration of a large number of active men.

With the changing social structures and gender relations, the collapse of state institutions and services, male-oriented institutions and organizations, the war had a differing impact on the economic stability, access to resources and survival strategies of men and women.

War affected the physical and psychological well-being of the population, but women's vulnerability in health matters is both socially and biologically rooted. Women had more limited access to health care facilities. Further, the reinforcement of their maternal role during the war has led to increased responsibility towards the well-being of their children.

Legal and cultural factors have also contributed to the marginalization of women. The status and conditions of women are determined by the legal premises which define and confine women in a state of subordination. While the Civil Code grants equality for all its citizens, the Personal Status Laws, which regulate gender relationships, contradict all the basic legal principles of equality and non-discrimination. Thus, the State sets the parameters for women's unequal position in the political and family arenas, by accepting the unequal terms on which family laws are based.

In addition, the rise of religious conservatism is a factor whose negative impact on gender relations and on the status of women should be of great concern. The "confessionalization" of the society as a war-related phenomenon has eroded civility, sharpened the segmentation of the social fabric and led to a breakdown of inter-communal relations. The climate of religious intolerance is paralleled by the reinforcement of patriarchal values and can only further weaken women's position.

Women were not passive victims of conflict and their active contribution to the survival of their families and groups remains largely unacknowledged. Women's survival strategies in this context included selling assets such as gold and land which jeopardized their long-term financial security, transforming their domestic skills into marketable ones, and in the worst cases, resorting to socially unacceptable jobs such as prostitution. Women have also taken on tasks usually carried out by men. Their new responsibilities put additional burdens on them as their workload in the domestic arena was not alleviated accordingly. The heavier burdens are shouldered by women heads of households especially in rural areas which were more affected by displacement.

Despite the fact that they were absent from military and political decision-making positions, many women performed war-related tasks and provided essential support for militiamen. Thus, their involvement was through "active resistance".

The war has opened new avenues for women by redefining their role and increasing their involvement in public life. Many women have reorganized their social life around associations and participation in social work and benevolent aid. In Lebanon, new social configurations have emerged as a result of the war. A new organizational life seems to be forming in an attempt to fill a space left by the destruction of the social fabric and the disruption of family life.

The relationship between some war-related phenomena (such as the disruption of the social fabric in Lebanon due to massive population transfers and migration, paralleled by the re-enforcement of sectarian cleavages) with the development of civil society should be studied. In the gap created by the breakdown of family ties there is a potential for the development of a civil society as a base for democracy. Women in post-war Lebanon are eager to join associations which represent alternative support groups.

The reorganization of social interests in a way that cuts across sectarian denominations and traditional affiliations is essential to the establishment of a solid democracy. The importance of labour unions and women's associations in the reconstruction of the country, lies in the fact that they could constitute a cross-cutting, organizational basis which could bring people together around vital issues such as employment, civil and political freedoms. These organizations can thus help overcome the regional, sectarian, and partisan politics that prevailed during the war.

Women have always lacked the public space where they could express their concern and organize their interests in a politically meaningful manner. These groupings are important support systems to women while providing an important escape from an environment that puts too many demands on them. The autonomy they have gained through the war has encouraged them to resist traditionally defined roles and identities imposed on them by their families and society.

The imbalance in policies for intervention in a country emerging from war, in which "war-affected" women receive insufficient attention, is partly due to a lack of sensitivity to gender differences. The difficulty in adequately addressing war-affected women's needs also stems from reasons which are inherent in their condition. Women become even less visible during and following conflict because of increased isolation. They are also less able to voice their needs in times when resources are scarce because of cultural restrictions on their behaviour and expression. The lack of visibility entails restricted access to economic and political resources and inadequate needs assessment by non-governmental and inter-governmental agencies.

Another fundamental issue regarding intervention towards war-affected groups in the country is the lack of a clear, defined strategy with the creation of permanent mechanisms and budget allocations. Governmental and non-governmental interventions can be characterized by an atomized approach that does not address problems at their roots.

ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
CDO	Community Development Organization
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CEDAW	Convention on Elinimation of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CGTL	Confédération générale des travailleurs libanais
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ESCWA	Economic and Social Council for West Asia
ERRP	Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAD	Gender and development
GDP	Gross domestic product
HDI	Human development index
HDR	Human development report
HIV	Human Immuno Virus
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
ILO	International Labour Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IREP	Institut de recherche en epidémiologie de la pharmacodépendance
LFP	Labour force participation rate
M1	Money supply
MNF	Mutlinational force
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOD	Ministry of the Displaced
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOP	Ministry of Planning
MOSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NERP	National Emergency Reconstruction Programme
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PAP	Pan Arab Programme
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PPS	Syrian Popular Party
PSL	Personal Status Laws
RMF	Rene Moawad Foundation
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprises
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
RUNHC	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund for Women
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Forces for South Lebanon
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USJ	Université Saint Joseph
WID	Women In Development
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The report begins by presenting the historical, political and economic context in which reconstruction is taking place in post-war Lebanon. It offers an analysis of the impact of war on the economic and social structures of the country and their subsequent repercussions on the living and working conditions of the Lebanese. It then identifies how these changes have affected women's lives. Finally, it focuses on the policies of intervention by governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, towards women most affected by war. The report is based upon field work undertaken in Lebanon in 1966.

The paucity of data and research

The establishment of a system of proportional representation of the different communities by the Ottomans in 1860, created a precedent for the National Pact in 1943 which organized power distribution in the country. Henceforth, with political representation being regulated by numbers on a sectarian basis, demography became a highly political issue. This explains the lack of censuses and the paucity of demographic data in Lebanon. Every statistic would raise the question of the distribution of power(Hanf, 1993). The last Lebanese census was undertaken in 1932. Later figures are all estimates based on this census and are often biased.

The war has exacerbated the problem even further with the destruction of the existing -- although limited -- data collection system. The Government realises the need for appropriate data for adequate decision-making and its importance in targeting and addressing the real needs of the population.

In October 1996, the Government made public the results of a major survey, the Population and Housing Database, undertaken by the Ministry of Social Affairs (hereafter MOSA) with the assistance of the UNFPA. The sample of the survey covers 65,000 households. Another survey undertaken by the Ministry of Health, the Pan Arab Programme (PAP) Mother and Child Survey, covers 5,431 families.

The surveys have generated long-needed data about the Lebanese population. During the research for this report, the raw data has not been processed and the limited time attributed for this report did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the tables. In the absence of definitions and descriptions of the sampling frame, a rigorous comparison with pre-war figures was not possible. The definition of categories was also not available during fieldwork. Therefore other surveys have been used to give an idea of present trends and to build a comparative framework with pre-war tendencies. The discrepancies found between the different surveys often do not allow conclusions to be drawn.

Funded by the UNDP and in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, the ILO has undertaken labour force and manpower surveys and development of employment offices. These surveys will "generate for the first time in Lebanon since 1970, a fresh and up to date set of employment and labour market data" and "establish a labour market information system"⁽¹⁾.

Fieldwork

Given the lack of data in a post-war context, and the lack of current research, the report is based on qualitative analysis of field interviews, field notes and data collected from six weeks of intensive fieldwork. The report has drawn information from four sources: the ILO questionnaire; interviews with government officials, NGOs' and IGOs' representatives; their publications, and different material collected during fieldwork. The research is not comprehensive. Within the limits of time and the information available, a review of the literature was undertaken and interviews and visits were made.

Different types of documentation were collected: reports and accounts of activities undertaken by those agencies, statements and reports designed for fund-raising, working papers, educational material, and academic research. A collection of unpublished documentation was also made available.

The report presents preliminary information, and more in-depth fieldwork needs to be undertaken to answer with certainty the questions raised by the report. For instance, the documentation which was made available by governmental and non-governmental agencies, the United Nations and multilateral donors present in the country, only provides descriptive accounts of their activities or statements for future plans concerning reconstruction and development. Very little information is available concerning the politics and practices involved in their actual implementation.

The research was conducted in different geographical areas and economic settings. The main focus was on the capital, Beirut, and its suburbs where the large majority of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as government offices are based. Research was also conducted in other cities (Tripoli for instance) and small towns in the North (Zghorta); towards the south (Nahmeh, a village of returning nationals); and in rural areas such as Akkar (north) in order to collect an indicative sample for comparative purposes. Thus, research revealed the different situations of some women in the remote rural areas neglected by governmental and non-governmental agencies prior to the war and in its aftermath. The sample also included social groups from different social strata: urban upper middle-class women, often heading women's associations or other NGOs, urban and rural working-class women.

Interviews were conducted with government officials,⁽²⁾ with representatives of inter-governmental organizations,⁽³⁾ social workers, women's associations and other NGOs, labour unions,⁽⁴⁾ and finally with women such as displaced women and heads of households.

Interviews were also conducted with academics ⁽⁵⁾ and practitioners in national and international governmental organizations. Visits were made to centres for training, workshops, centres for the disabled, for drug rehabilitation and for literacy mainly in a few of the suburbs of the capital where a majority of the inhabitants are destitute, as well as in some rural areas.

The situational context where these interviews took place varied. Consequently, in each one of those contexts the questionnaire was modified and adapted to serve as a base for interviews. With government officials, the questionnaire aimed at evaluating the degree of gender integration in public institutions and development programmes. It sought to identify the opportunities and constraints for women in the reconstruction process. It also tried to determine the degree of sensitivity to women's needs in general, and to "war-affected" women in particular, as well as the degree of sensitivity to a gender differentiated impact of war.

A preselection of 120 active NGOs was provided by UNDP offices in Lebanon. Interviews conducted with 20 NGOs (rural and urban based) were semi-structured and followed the ILO questionnaire.⁽⁶⁾ Although formal interviews were the starting point for receiving information, subsequent multiple visits on a more informal basis became the main approach to collecting data. In those informal gatherings, people would come with their grievances which gave me insight into some of their problems. The information received from those encounters with NGOs was also used to cross-check other NGOs' experiences and views on issues such as the impact of war on women's living and working conditions.

The questionnaire was distributed to 100 NGOs ⁽⁷⁾ of which 70 were completed and returned. Its aim was to determine the extent to which gender considerations and women's special needs were the focus of their activities. The interviewees were also asked to describe their approaches to promote women's empowerment and the modalities of their interventions. The information drawn from the questionnaire is mainly discussed in Chapter 7, but whenever relevant it was referred to in the report, for instance to determine the changes in the role and situation of women, in their involvement in public life (Chapter 5), and to assess some of their needs. It was most instructive for the understanding of NGOs' perceptions of women's problems and needs

Some of these interviews were recorded and direct quotes from their transcription were used in the report, while others were paraphrased. The selection of these quotes was made on the basis of a degree of representativeness.

Some of the methodological difficulties encountered during fieldwork related to the hesitancy, sometimes unwillingness, of some informants to supply information. NGOs were more cooperative than governmental agencies. The most active and willing cooperation came from small local NGOs, despite the fact that they were bombarded with questionnaires. Some seemed to be motivated by a desire for publicity and the hope to receive some attention from the international community. There was a growing sense of despair and frustration, and a manifested mistrust of the Government and its ability to respond to the indigent and the needy.

They felt that the essential role they had played during the war had been forgotten in the process of reconstruction. Multilateral and bilateral donors are now channelling funds through governmental agencies and have decreased their support to non-governmental ones.

In general, the attitude of people was positive. Women, especially those belonging to the vulnerable groups identified in the ToR, were willing to divulge personal history. Some government officials, principally men in those positions, appeared unwilling to volunteer information. They generally showed mistrust, particularly due to the fact that I was seen as an insider who had, through exile, become an outsider. I encountered hostility from some women in high positions. A director of an important centre of research on women, particularly resented the fact that research was being done by an outsider and did not involve her or the centre. The consequences were lack of collaboration and institutional rivalry and a " what is in there for me?" attitude, sometimes explicitly expressed by an informant when asked for a document.

Other difficulties were due to the slow progress on the ground. For instance, many appointments were rescheduled, or informants arrived with considerable delays. At times, personal contacts needed to be used in order to access informants. The "snowball method" was useful to rapidly identify the main actors in each context.

Personal experience

The tension between the distance and the involvement of the researcher conducting empirical investigation, especially in the context of war and human suffering, has been the centre of a wider debate about the desirable, or attainable, degree of objectivity, particularly in the case of "anthropology at home" where the researcher undertakes fieldwork in his own country. The experience of conducting fieldwork in Lebanon as a woman and as a national, raised such questions. However, I tried to maintain a balance between the necessary distance and the advantage of an insider view of how society operates and my own experiences of war.

My status as a national abroad has also affected attitudes and responses. Many, when dealing with a member of the war-diaspora, started defining themselves in contradistinction with those who had left. In the post-war, the meaning and degree of suffering experienced during the war is one of the ways issues of identity and authenticity are negotiated. Those left behind often perceived that their war experience had set them apart and allowed them a higher/greater claim of "true citizenship" and belonging. Further, skills acquired during the war for daily survival are now redundant and resentment was expressed at times towards those who had the freedom of choice and -- what was perceived as -- a more adequate education to meet the requirements of reconstruction.

Surprisingly, there was an "observable silence" in terms of how people interacted, attempting to make the war an invisible experience. The issue of war was rarely brought up and when unavoidable it was referred to obliquely, in an understated manner. Although most people were not willing to talk, continuous comparisons between the past and the present were made. In the older generations, the past referred mostly to the pre-war, idealized life. It is possible, however, that the current silence vis-à-vis the experience of civil war, is itself a coping strategy people are adopting, or a commentary on their current priorities for economic survival. People in the country, showed obvious signs of war fatigue.

Theoretical framework

It has been argued that WID and GAD ⁽⁸⁾ approaches cannot fully capture the situation of women in the context of war. However, both theories can provide an understanding of the gender dimension of conflict. The WID approach brings an insight into the differing impact of war on women's (and men's) economic stability and survival strategies, highlighting processes of impoverishment and disempowerment in an economic perspective (El Bushra et al., 1993). While the GAD perspective on women's status within society is useful to identify how conflict increases the marginalization of women, it helps in examining "ways to support women's efforts to claim and retain a space during conflict" (El Bushra et al., 1993).

Over the last ten years, there has been an increasing tendency for development agencies and other donors to attempt to raise the profile of women. This shift in focus is part of a much larger theoretical development which began in the 1970s in the social sciences and lent greater "analytical visibility" to gender issues (Indra, 1993). It has helped to rehabilitate traditional perceptions of women as "muted groups" (Ardener, 1972), by giving them a voice (Tannen, 1992).

Women in development (WID) is an approach which grew out of a modernization theory of the early 1970s. It is mainly concerned with issues of access and control over resources. It contends that the different and specific needs of women have to be integrated into the development models. The opportunity to participate in processes of development is seen as a critical factor.

The gender and development (GAD) which was developed later is informed by feminist theory and class analysis. It looks more at power sharing and at the structures of gender subordination (Parpart, 1989) and includes debates about vulnerability and poverty to this political analysis (El Bushra, 1993). Women have been persistently marginalized from structures of power, and they need a public space to be able to express their concerns and organize their interests in a politically meaningful manner.

A third appproach reflects the growing concern for development agencies and planners concerning the disruption of gender structures and relations as a result of conflict and the impact of war on women. The focus on development in conflict, and on the gender dimension of conflict stems from the belief that the condition and position of women is aggravated in war. Society undergoes changes which contribute to further weaken women. Women's suffering is usually ignored; the burdens they have to shoulder as a result of economic and social disruption, are undervalued. Even their contribution to the survival of the family and the group is left unacknowledged.

This approach seeks to redress the imbalances in policies for intervention in countries emerging from war, in which women's issues receive insufficient attention. It holds that women are even more invisible during and after conflict and end up more marginalized since the gender-differing impact of war is not being addressed (El Bushra et al., 1993). On the other hand, war opens new avenues for women by redefining certain parameters of their lives, and these opportunities have to be identified and exploited.

This report has used these approaches for the insight they can provide into the condition and position of women during and after the war in Lebanon.

1. HISTORY, DURATION AND FEATURES OF THE WAR

A brief introduction analysing the history, duration and other features of the war

The war cannot be explained sui generis. The relationship between the past and the present situation has to be established. An historical perspective allows connections to be made between the creation of modern Lebanon, the underlying roots of the conflict and the aftermath of war which constitutes the framework of this report.

Following a brief narration on the emergence of modern Lebanon, and the prevailing ideological debates, the present chapter will present an analysis of the causes which led to the 1975-90 war. A presentation of the political and military actors will be followed by a description of the phases of the war (while noting that such divisions are arbitrary and are mainly used here for the purpose of clarity).

1.1 Pre-war Lebanon

During the Ottoman period, the area covering present-day Lebanon was under the jurisdiction of governors residing in the coastal cities. The wilayets of Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut were under direct Ottoman rule. They were inhabited by the dominant orthodox religions of the Byzantine and Islamic empires. The province of Mount Lebanon enjoyed autonomy; the authority of the Ottomans was maintained through indirect rule and the area was governed by local Emirs. Christian and Muslim heterodox communities found refuge there from the persecution of the orthodox dominant rule.

During the First World War, following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations gave France the Mandate over Syria and Lebanon. In 1920, the creation of Greater Lebanon was proclaimed and the Lebanese Republic was created within its existing borders. The creation of modern-day Lebanon brought together areas and different confessional groups which previously had limited contact. The Maronites, the Druzes and the Shi'a of Mount Lebanon lived in relative isolation from the coastal areas inhabited by the Christian Melkites and Muslim Sunni, who attempted to dominate them. It is to the encounter of those two parallel societies, with differing histories and socio-economic systems, that the recent war (1975-90) can be partially attributed (Corm, 1992).

France had helped the Maronite implement their national political programme: the creation of an independent Lebanon. In order to weaken the Arab nationalists, the mandatory power acceded to their demands. The Lebanese remained divided on their country's history and identity. The Lebanese nationalists -- mainly Christians -- put forward the claim to an independent Lebanon, but their views differed as to what borders the State should have; the Arab nationalists, largely Muslim but not exclusively so, aspired to see Lebanon as part of a larger Arab entity or an Arab-Islamic empire.

After the creation of the Lebanese Republic in 1926, profound cleavages over the legitimacy of the State still divided the communities. For the Maronites, the new State was the culmination of their aspirations. For the Muslims, however, it meant the end of their project of a greater Islamic State. For the first time in their history, after having ruled for centuries, they became a minority. However, since 1943 onwards, they participated fully in the country's political life.

The republican Constitution was created by French and Lebanese jurists in 1926. Political representation in the Government and in Parliament was to be based on the proportional representation on a confessional basis of the different sects as stated in article 95. However, the representation favoured the Christians who held most of the key positions in the Government and in the army.

The perceived necessity to conciliate the interests and aspirations of its different communities ⁽⁹⁾ had led the country to adopt a confessionally based system. The sectarian identities were recognized by the unwritten agreement of the National Pact of 1943, an "historical compromise" on the identity of the country and on power sharing between the religious communities. The Christians had to renounce their special relationship with France and the Muslims would in return give up their aspirations for reunion with an Arab entity. The Pact established a complex scheme of power distribution based on the proportional representation of the various confessional groups, the highest post being attributed to the largest community. The President had to be a Maronite, supposedly the largest community; the Prime Minister a Sunni; and the leader of the Parliament, a Shi'a. The general ratio of 6:5 was favouring the Christians, and was based on the results of the last census held in Lebanon in 1932.

The country's history has been characterized by successive periods of peaceful coexistence and instability, followed by the outbreak of the war in 1975 that was to last 15 years. In 1958, a serious crisis had developed into a civil strife mainly due to President Chamoun's collaboration with the United States against President Nasser of Egypt and the Soviet Bloc. This cooperation had antagonized the majority of the Muslim population.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the defeat of the Arabs, the Palestinian refugee population of Lebanon became increasingly militarized. Guerrilla operations against Israel were launched from Lebanese territory which attracted disproportionate reprisals against southern villages. Thousands of villagers (mostly Shi'a) headed towards the capital where they formed the "misery belt" in Beirut's suburbs. The occupation of Cisjordan by Israel, and King Hussein of Jordan's victory over the armed Palestinian groups in his country, drew another wave of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon.

1.2 Causes of the war

Many scholars from various disciplines have reflected on this major crisis (1975-90), but they differ in their analysis of the causes of the war and whether these were primarily exogenous or endogenous. The structural and socio-economic factors were a fertile ground for conflict, while the extraneous factors (regional and international interests and politics) were an important activator of existing dissension.

Since the creation of Greater Lebanon, the legitimacy of the State was always put in question by a significant part of the population. The unequal participation in the new wealth generated in the country and in access to resources, education and capital, was to be a prime catalyst in the political mobilization of different groups against the existing order. Lebanon, and Beirut in particular, became the headquarters of conflicting political interests and factions of the whole region for much the same reasons it had been such an attractive place as a centre for business activity in the Arab world. The guaranteed secrecy regarding financial transactions and the tolerance for public expression (and for radical political discourse), made Lebanon a convenient stage for regional conflict. Regional actors fully exploited the discontent of those left out of the modernization process.

In addition to socio-economic factors, a frail sense of common citizenship, strong religious loyalties, weak institutions and the abuse of the sectarian system by political leaders contributed to further undermine the legitimacy of the State.

Other major determinants were the use of the country as a "surrogate battleground" by Palestinians and the expansionist ambitions and policies of Syria and Israel. With the increasing regional pressures, tensions reached a breaking point in 1975, when a series of incidents soon escalated into a full-blown civil war (Hanf, 1993).

1.3 The 1975-90 war

There is a danger that such a short analysis will give undue prominence to one factor, for instance the religious factor and the Christian-Muslim divide, thus offering a very reductionist explanation. We will attempt to use three levels of narration: the local, regional and international.

1.3.1 The political and military actors

This brief description of the main actors on the Lebanese territory does not reflect the complexity and the shifting alliances that were constantly forming and reforming between the various groups, between the local parties and their regional protectors. Considering the limited scope of the present report, giving each actor, whether local or regional, the right emphasis in the analysis, has proved to be a major difficulty.

In pre-war Lebanon, the political parties played only a limited role in Lebanese political life but became major actors on the Lebanese scene following the collapse of the State. The Communist Party was founded in 1924 as the "people's party" and separated from its Syrian counterpart in 1966. It was anti-confessional and defended the Palestinian resistance. In 1970, its military wing, the Popular Guard was created. At the other end of the spectrum, another party with a supra-national ideology, the Syrian Popular Party (PPS), was founded in 1932. Its secular doctrine aims at reviving the "Greater Syrian" nation comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, the Sinai, Iraq and Egypt. The Socialist Progressive Party was founded in 1949 by Kamal Jumblat and claimed to be anti-confessional. Its militia was estimated in 1996 at 3,000 men, most of them Druze. Another socialist party, the Baath, was created in Syria and is widely spread in the Arab world. It promotes an Arab nationalist ideology which sees Lebanon as part of a larger Arab entity. The Nasserist Party, founded in 1975, was opposed to the confessionalism of the Maronite ( Christian) leaders and claims a "rational modern Arab State". It has close links with Syria and Libya. With its military wing, the Mourabitun (the vigilantes), it played a prominent role during the war. Together these parties formed the National Movement but their military wings were largely integrated with Palestinian organizations.

The other parties, on the whole followed sectarian cleavages. The most important Christian party was the Phalangists (Kataeb). Since its creation in 1963 by Pierre Gemayel, it has had a paramilitary structure. It was a key actor on the war scene. The National Liberal Party was later absorbed by the dominant Christian Party, which resulted in the creation of a single militia called the Lebanese Forces. In 1975, new Christian groups developed parties (e.g. Al Marada, brigade of President Franjieh, El Tanzim, the Guardians of the Cedars) and participated in the fighting. The Shi'a movement, Amal, succeeded to the "Movement of the Deprived" created by Imam Moussa Sadr. It remained neutral at the beginning but played a crucial role in the war. Later, Hezbollah was formed of Shi'a trained by Iranian Pasdarans (guardians of the Revolution).

The coalition of militant Christians was the main opposition against the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that has been headed by Yasser Arafat since 1969. The presence and action of the Palestinians played a determinant role on the evolution of Lebanese politics since 1969 and even more so since 1975. The Palestinians form one of the largest communities in the country in terms of numbers. A "khaldunian Ghalaba, a struggle for domination, between factions more or less defined by their sectarian affiliations (Salame, 1991), was taking place in Lebanon.

Regional actors: Syria has never fully recognized Lebanon's sovereignty. The country is still considered to be a province, arbitrarily severed from Syria by France, the mandatory power. Israel's policy, on the other hand, was to find a definitive solution to the Palestinian problem. With Menahem Begin in 1977, the reprisals against the Palestinian Fedayin became constant and were totally disproportionate to the attacks suffered by Israel. Israel also had, like Syria, expansionist ambitions.

1.3.2 First phase of the war (April 1975-May 1976)⁽¹⁰⁾

Since 1969 tensions have run high in Lebanon. Constant clashes opposed the Christian parties and the army to the Palestinians and socialist parties. Israel's regular military interventions in the south added to the extreme tension.

In January 1975 the leader of the main Christian party (Kataeb) addressed a memorandum to the President in which he accused the Palestinians of violating the sovereignty of the State and asked that their presence in Lebanon be regulated by the same terms and conditions as in other Arab States. A few month later the war had started opposing mainly the Palestinians and their allies, the coalition of the Progressive forces, under the leadership of Kamal Jumblat. This coalition also included the pro-Syrian movements, fighting against the Christian (essentially Maronite) parties of the Lebanese Front.

The army played a minor role during this period. Perceived as being too Christian and therefore not representative, it fell victim to contradictions of the Government which was paralysed by internal dissension and thus lost its mandate to intervene and stop the fighting. It split along confessional lines: in 1976 some of its dissidents formed the Arab Armies of Liberation (pro-Palestinian), others joined the Christian camps, especially in the south where they formed a militia under the control of Israel.

By then the war had spread to the whole country. An agreement was signed between the warring parties but was soon broken. The Palestinian-Progressive coalition was successful in encircling the Christian areas.

1.3.3 Second phase (June 1976-81)

Syria's attitude was changing vis-à-vis its partners. The cease-fire it imposed in January 1976 was the first manifestation of this evolution. However, this apparent volte-face was consistent with the country's policy in the region. Three principles motivated Syria's political programme: keeping Lebanon in Syria's sphere of influence, controlling the Palestinians, and preventing the partition of Lebanon which would lead to the creation of a Christian State, a potential ally of Israel. The division of the country into homogenous, contained zones would also confirm Israel's theory that a multi-confessional State in Palestine was not a viable option. Faced with the escalating tensions in Lebanon, the increasing independence of the Progressive parties vis-à-vis Syria, and with Israel's consent, Syria came to the rescue of the Christians of the Lebanese Front. Later, the Arab League decided to replace Syrian troops with an Arab Peace Force formed by 80 per cent of Syrian recruits.

On the international and regional scene many events were to influence the development of the war in Lebanon: the elections of President Carter in the United States and of Menahem Begin in Israel (former director of the Irgoun, the Zionist terrorist movement), and the initiatives of Egypt's President Sadat to start a peace process with Israel.

In Lebanon, Syria was faced with a strengthened Lebanese Front, and the risk of seeing the Palestinians expelled from the country. In 1978 the first clashes between the Syrian army and the Lebanese Front started and continued until March 1979. The consequences of this last war were serious: President Frangie allied himself with Syria and left the Lebanese Front which led to the massacre by the Lebanese Front of his family and a number of his partisans. A rapprochement between the Lebanese Front with Israel had more far-reaching political consequences.

In March 1978, following a Palestinian bomb attack near Tel Aviv, Israeli troops launched a major operation across the Lebanese border. They occupied a self-defined "security belt" in the south of the country. This attack took hundreds of victims and provoked another massive exodus, mainly of Shi'a residents. The Security Council ordered an immediate withdrawal of Israelis soldiers and created the United Nations Interim Forces for South Lebanon (UNIFIL). Its mandate was to restore the Government's authority in the south. Following its forced retreat from the area, Israel handed the occupied zone to the forces of Haddad, a dissident from the late Lebanese army and whose militia was paid and equipped by Israel. In 1979, he declared the zone under his control "the free State of Lebanon".

For the first time since the war had started, Israel and Syria confronted each other openly in Lebanon. Following the "Zahle incident", Israel's attacks multiplied in different areas inhabited by Palestinians. Only a vigorous intervention by the United States was able to put an end to the conflict. In July 1981 a cease-fire agreement was reached with the American mediation, between Arafat and Begin.

1.3.4 The third phase (1982-87)

The Israeli invasion: Begin could not abide by this cease-fire as his aim was the destruction of the Palestinian resistance. Flanked by Ariel Sharon on one side and Itzhac Shamir on the other, he planned to get to the heart of the matter: Beirut. The United States did not discourage nor disagree. Later it blocked any decision of the Security Council and the General Assembly, asking for the immediate and unconditional retreat of Israelis troops. The operation, "Peace for Galilee", started in June 1982. The Israeli army encircled the capital. Despite the terrible shelling of the civilian population, and the neutralization of 10,000 Palestinians, Israel's aim was not reached. In August 1982, Israel finally accepted to abide by the so-called plan Habib: the Palestinians would be evacuated to Syria and other Arab countries -- 16,000 men left Lebanon, followed by Yasser Arafat.

In the same year, Bashir Gemayel, a Christian leader allied with Israel, was elected President and his brother, Amin Gemayel was elected as Head of State. A withdrawal agreement was initiated between Lebanon and Israel under US patronage and finalized in May 1983. However, when Israel began its retreat it handed its positions to the Druze militias instead of the Lebanese army. This resulted in a bloody confrontation between the Druze and the Phalangists, and subsequently between the Druze, together with the Palestinians (supported by Syria), and the Lebanese army. This war provoked massive population movements. In 1985 the President refused to pursue the agreements with Israel who wanted a peace treaty, but an agreement was signed ending the hostilities between the two countries. Israel withdrew from the occupied areas to a security zone along the Lebanese-Israeli border. A multinational force (MNF) was sent to replace the departing Israeli troops.

Years of mediation and negotiations between the different militias and with Syria were pursued around the issues of internal political reform and Lebanese-Syrian relations. These finally led to the formation of a National Congress for Reconciliation which met in Geneva and Lausanne in 1983 and 1984. A Tripartite Agreement was finally produced in December 1985. Subsequent negotiations were to lead, in 1989, to the creation of a Document of National Reconciliation, the Peace Agreement called the Taef Accords.

1.3.5 Fourth phase (1987-91)

At the end of Amin Gemayel's presidential term, and with a parliamentary deadlock concerning his succession, the appointment of General Michel Aoun as head of the interim Government proved highly controversial. It was met with Syrian and Muslim opposition. However, the General was able to gather huge popular support despite the two catastrophic military campaigns he launched against the Syrians in 1989, and against the Lebanese Forces, his Christian rivals, in 1990. He also opposed the Peace Agreement signed in Taef, Saudi Arabia. He was defeated in October 1990 by the Syrian army with the support of the United States.

President Elias Hraoui was elected in 1989. In September 1990 the political and administrative reforms that were decided in Taef were enacted into law. Accordingly, 140 new deputies were also appointed to fill the seats which were redistributed in order to reflect the demographic change and equally balance Muslim and Christian participation. The Agreement also provided for the demobilization of all the militias with the exception of the Hezbollah which was committed to be contained in the south as a resistance movement against Israel. The majority of the militias were to be integrated in the Lebanese army.

In May 1991 Syria and Lebanon signed a Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination; in September of that year they also signed a Pact of Defence and Security. Both agreements define in detail the nature of the very close relations -- policy, political and economic cooperation -- between the two countries. Different bodies were subsequently created to implement, supervise and coordinate the Treaty and the Pact, such as the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council. However, Syrian hegemony in Lebanon has been actively rejected mainly by the Christian opposition, who also denounced the partial implementation of the Taef Accord as it perceived it to serve mainly Muslim interests, and denounced the restriction on Lebanon's sovereignty. The opposition has been increasingly marginalized by the Syrian-supported Government.

Despite the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the reconstruction process, Lebanon is still suffering from the restriction on its sovereignty with the occupation of the south by the Israeli army and the presence on its territory of approximately 40,000 Syrian soldiers and several thousand secret service agents (Mukhabarats).

1.4 Features of the war

The State of Lebanon had started to disintegrate before the war, when foreign armies started fighting on its territory. Gradually, under internal and external pressure, the State collapsed. The army split, new forces emerged and imposed militia rule to replace state order, and became de facto governments. They succeeded in establishing order at the level of their respective communities. With the collapse of the state authority, the militiamen acted as surrogate police forces and administrators. The authoritarian militia systems were collecting taxes, nominating judges, organizing social services, and so on.

Gradually, the breakdown of the balance between the various sects gave rise to a "new order". The country was henceforth divided into militia territories that could only be entered through check-points and were defended by armed men. On the social level, they set up generous assistance programmes to counter the ravages of war in the absence of a welfare state and the subsequent collapse of social institutions. The involvement of the militias in social programmes was mainly a strategic campaign for popularity. They none the less built roads, supplied water, organized public transport, education, and medical care (Piccard, 1993).

The division of the Lebanese population along sectarian lines later materialized by their residential separation. The militias provoked massive population shifts to create homogenous self-contained zones and exclusive communities. This cantonization allowed for better control and defence of the communities. The planning of a demographic re-distribution has displaced hundreds of thousands of people who are now likely to be re-distributed again and sent back to their places of origin according to the programme of "voluntary return" set up by the Government.

The II Lebanese Republic absorbed the militia heads and turned them into political groups. Former warlords were thus included in the reconciliation and reconstruction process. The incorporation of militiamen in the army and of most of their leaders in the Government was to be interpreted as a sign of reconciliation.

2. REHABILITATION IN POST-WAR LEBANON

This chapter considers the specific phase of the post-war period in which the country is. With the start of the war, many ongoing plans for development were suspended. Twenty years later, plans for reconstruction, requiring a large amount of foreign aid, have taken priority over long-term development. Political and administrative reform have also been undertaken along with economic rehabilitation.

In both the 1990 Constitution and the Taef Peace Agreement, the Preamble states that "the balanced development of all the regions, on the cultural, social and economic levels, is a major pillar of the unity of the State and the stability of the system" (paragraph G). Lebanon's success until 1975 was disproportionately shared by different groups, regions and classes. While Beirut was becoming the regional centre for trade and finance for international and local companies, the rest of the country was being neglected. The rural sector was collapsing, and stagnation in the secondary cities led to a mass migration to the capital. Beirut soon became a very densely populated city, containing almost half the country's population. Even there, the wealth generated in the economy was creating a large gap between those actively involved in the modern sectors of the economy and those who were excluded from it.

The uneven development was a major cause of destabilization in the country in 1975. The social and political degradation of those regions negatively affected the inhabitants' allegiance to the State and the nation. With the beginning of the war, the Government attempted to calm the civil unrest by promising programmes for low-cost housing, subsidies for agriculture, and educational and welfare services. But the outbreak of the conflict prevented these plans from materializing.

2.1 The political context of reconstruction

After a lapse of 20 years, parliamentary elections were held in 1992. A majority of Christians boycotted the elections and, as a result, found themselves underrepresented in the new Parliament. Despite some abstentions from the Muslim communities, the representation of Muslim groups was strong (Shi'a Amal and Hezbollah). The electoral law favoured those who approved the full cooperation with Syria, therefore most of the candidates and elected deputies were allies of Syria. This law also deprived the Lebanese abroad of their right to vote, accentuating the imbalance between Christians and Muslims. These controversial elections created strong tensions in the country and were seen by the opposition as a break from the spirit of the Taef Agreement.

In October 1992, Rafic Hariri of Lebanese and Saudi nationality, was appointed Prime Minister. His main objective was to start a process of rehabilitation of the country's destroyed infrastructure, the reconstruction of the economy, the renewal of the Government's institutions and administrative reform. As provided in the Taef, reform of education, the development of all regions and urban planning are said to be the Government's priorities. But for the new, business-oriented Government the rehabilitation of the economy has been, and still is, the primary focus of the reconstruction effort in the post-war era.

2.2 Physical rehabilitation ⁽¹¹⁾

The civil war and Israel's bombing of the cities and of agricultural areas in the south did untold damage to the country's infrastructure. Although the worst damage was recorded in Beirut, other areas suffered as well. In the public sector as in the private sector, hospitals, schools and residential buildings were destroyed. With the breakdown of the State, public services had collapsed; the economy and the infrastructure were shattered. The damage caused to the country's physical capital was estimated to be in excess of £10 billion.

2.2.2 Phases of the development and reconstruction programme

The 1995-98 period was initially meant to cover the planning and implementation of the entire reconstruction and development programme.

The first phase covered 1992-93 and corresponded with the initiation of a large number of projects which consisted of damage assessment and the repair of the basic services. Preparatory work was undertaken on major projects in 1993.
In the second phase covering 1994-95, it had been planned that some of these projects would continue. Other projects, which had begun prior to 1992, were scheduled for completion. Contracts were prepared for the large infrastructure projects which would be undertaken in 1994, and accelerated in 1996-97.

Reconstruction and the infrastructure development is well under way. Massive rehabilitation and upgrading projects are taking place. The latest post-war reconstruction plan was developed as follows:

Rehabilitation phase: 1992-95. It includes war-damage assessments, and in 1995 the sector master plans would begin;
1995-2000 the country would enter the recovery phase;
2000-2007, it would reach the sustainable development phase with industrial development.

2.2.3 The rehabilitation phase (December 1991 -- five years)

The five year plan, 1991-1996. In 1977, shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Government set up the Council for Development and Reconstruction (hereafter CDR). Reconstituted in 1991, the CDR acts as coordinator for the various ministries and mobilizes external finances. The same year, a five-year rehabilitation plan known as "The Priority Plan" was prepared by a US-based conglomerate, Bechtel Inc. with a local partner, Dar al Handasa. The Plan covered 126 projects identified in 15 economic and social sectors, envisaged expenditure allocations on the following basis:

Table 1

Sector	Percentage
Physical infrastructure Power, communications, transport, water	63.5
Social projects Building of housing, education, health	22.5
Production Agriculture, services, industry	14.0

First change

The three-year plan 1992-95. In December 1991, the Priority Plan was presented to the World Bank and other international donors. Damage assessment missions were conducted and financed by the World Bank and the European Union. These formed the basis for the amendment of the Priority Plan which was renamed in 1992, the National Emergency Reconstruction Programme (NERP). It called for an expenditure of 2,238 billion over a three-year period, covering a series of high impact rehabilitation projects. The programme also included strengthening of the existing institutions and the provision of technical assistance.

The total funding raised for NERP was $23,337.3 million, and was distributed as follows: in $ (million): foreign loans: 1,582.5; foreign grants: 396.8; Lebanese government contributions: 358. The NERP emergency rehabilitation expenditure was planned as follows:

Table 2

Sector	Percentage
Physical infrastructure (as above)	27.3
Social projects (as above)	27.3
Production (as above)	9.8
The government buildings (rehabilitaton of main ministries and revenue earners)	3.0
Management assistance (training, preparation of studies, etc.)	5.0

Within the NERP, another plan which was proposed in 1993 by the World Bank, led the way for foreign financing of Lebanon. The Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan (ERRP) was financed with a loan of $175 million which had a grace period of five years and maturity of 20 years with standard World Bank terms and interest. The ERRP supported the NERP overall objective. Its total budget of $217 million (and additional Lebanese government contributions: $52 million), supported the following sectors in percentages terms:

Table 3

Sector	Percentage
Physical infrastructure
Water supply and waste water	34,3
Solid waste	17.1
Electricity	21.2
Social sector
Housing	14.3
Education	8,6
Other	4,5

In financing theEmergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan, the World Bank recognized that there was not only widespread damage to the physical infrastructure, but inadequacies in major sectors such as housing, neglect in the health sector and falling quality in the educational sector. There was widespread environmental degradation due to uncontrolled solid waste disposal around the country, heavy pollution and unsatisfactory water quality -- all of which posed risks to public health. In addition, the environment had been further damaged during the war due to the abandonment of the agriculture and widespread deforestation. Apart from a basic aim to restore the war-damaged infrastructure, the World Bank loan was designed to encourage the Lebanese Government to undertake what the Bank considered to be essential institutional and financial reforms.

In parallel with NERP and for the same period, the Lebanese Government initiated the Parallel Programme for Recovery and Development (PPRD) which complemented the NERP in supporting medium to long-term recovery. Similar in size to the NERP, this programme devoted one-third of its expenditures to expanding the NERP projects while focusing two-thirds of the expenditures to new projects. The expenditure main sectors were as follows:

Table 4

Sector	Percentage
Physical infrastructure
Electricity	36.0
Roads	14.0
Telecommunications	8.0
Social sector	19.0
Productive sector
Agriculture	11.0
Other services	12.0

Second change

Since the appointment of the Hariri Government in the Fall of 1992, a comprehensive plan (1993-2002) was formulated which not only included the NERP (the immediate rehabilitation phase) but also the PPRD. The Horizon 2000 Plan covering ten years, envisaged that the GDP in 1995 would reach the same pre-war level as in 1975 and thereafter redouble in the year 2002 so that Lebanon would reach the level of upper middle-income countries. The plan was based on three lines of action which were: the re-establishment of the basic social infrastructure to stimulate production; the balancing of the regional distribution of the public investment; and finally the promotion of the private sector by creating incentives to stimulate savings.

This plan splits the programme into two periods which are years one to five and years six to ten Expenditures during the first period total $7 billion while the second period total $4.67 billion, making the total of $11.67 billion. This plan would increase the total indebtedness of the country to 50 per cent of the GDP in 1992, 84 per cent of GDP in 1994 before falling to 39 per cent of the GDP in 2002. The foreign debt component would peak at 37 per cent of the GDP in 1994 before falling to 16 per cent of the GDP in 2002. It is also hoped that the private sector, including the expatriate Lebanese, would contribute $20 billion in the economy during this time period.

This Horizon 2000 planned expenditure is as follows: (in $millions)

Table 5

Sector	Investment and technical assistance costs	Management and implementation costs	Public credits to the private sector	Total	Percentage
Physical infrastructure
Electricity	1630.20	10.80	4.00	1645.00	14.1
Waste water	717.00	3.00	--	720.00	6.2
Solid waste	176.80	3.20	--	180.00	1.5
Water supply	386.50	3.50	--	390.00	3.3
Telecommunications	712.30	2.70	--	715.00	6.1
Transport	2958.50	10.40	--	2968.9	25.5
Social infrastructure
Education	1518.20	11.30	--	1529.50	13.1
Health and social affairs	538.20	38.10	89.00	665.30	5.7
Housing and resettlement	505.00	8.00	537.00	1050.00	9.0
Productive sector
Agriculture	346.40	13.60	200.00	560.00	4.8
Industry	238.30	6.60	150.00	394.90	3.4
Oil and gas	89.90	4.10	--	94.00	0.8
Services and tourism	125.50	3.80	210.00	339.30	2.9
Government buildings	268.30	1.70	--	270.00	2.3
Management and implementation	0.60	149.60	--	150.20	1.3
Total	10211.70	270.40	1190.00	11672.10	100

2.3 Developments in 1996

According to the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy Report (1994-96) the Bank's future lending would concentrate heavily on the social sector. The World Bank has supported selected projects in the physical infrastructure during the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase (a similar policy has been initiated in Bosnia by the World Bank). The Bank has suggested that the private sector investment in physical infrastructure and in the social infrastructure (health and education) should be increased and that thecore investmentplanshould not exceed $3.5 billion for the period between 1995-1997 bearing in mind both the financial and social costs which are involved. Furthermore, they see their role as a catalyst in emphasizing the role of the private sector.

The EIU in its Country Report 3rd quarter (1996) predicts that there will be a fall in the rate of economic growth in 1996 with a slight increase in 1997. This will impact on the development plans which would also delay the contracts that need to be prepared due to a time lag in implementation of the Horizon 2000 plan. The recommendations of the World Bank were to scale down the role of the Government in the reconstruction and to concentrate efforts on a shorter horizon and a core set of projects, and increase the involvement of the private sector.

In December 1996, with the declared aim to strengthen Lebanon's reconstruction process, political independence and security, the United States, the European Union and several other countries and international institutions headed by the World Bank, have decided to infuse the sum of $3.3 billion. The first tranche of $1billion is to be provided immediately. This sum is earmarked for development assistance, reconstruction loans, police training and military equipment. In 1997, the United States will increase its direct assistance tenfold, to more than $20 million. The package will be distributed as follows: $12 million in development aid, $6 million in agricultural credits, and $2.1 million for the American University of Beirut which was severely affected by the war.⁽¹²⁾

2.4 Political and administrative reform

In 1989, the Taef Peace Accord was adopted by the Lebanese deputies in Taef (Saudi Arabia) as a result of an intensification of the civil war in the country. It was not only on the military level that the crisis had reached its peak. A constitutional impasse was also reached as a result of the coexistence of two separate governments. A Higher Tripartite Committee created by the Arab Summit of 1989, proposed a solution to the Lebanese problem in a document discussed by the Lebanese deputies in Taef on the 30 September 1989. This document received Arab as well as international support.

The document aimed at covering the Lebanese problem in its internal and external dimension and thus presented a very comprehensive approach to political, constitutional and social reform and to issues of restoration of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. The abolition of political confessionalism is declared a national goal. The annulment of the sectarian-based representation was implemented in the public sector (but maintained in the Government) and replaced by an equal distribution for Christians and Muslims (except for the first category positions). Under the Agreement, the authority of the President was curtailed and reduced to almost a representative role. However, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers have seen their power considerably enhanced.

2.5 Political developments/constraints 1996

The reconstruction of the country's infrastructure is heavily dependent on foreign assistance. In order to cut down on state expenses, the Government tried to finance its rehabilitation plans through foreign loans (Eurobonds) and aid. Despite the formation of this new Government and the confidence that the Prime Minister inspired due to the strong backing of the Saudis and the United States, the inflow of capital has been slow. The Lebanese expatriates who represent a vital source of income remained cautious in their investments. The climate of political instability that has prevailed in Lebanon and generally in the region in 1996, has affected the reconstruction progress and economic recovery while seriously delaying prospects for further foreign investment.

The Israeli operation "Grapes of Wrath" in April in 1996, the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel the same year, the Lebanese parliamentary elections and the stalled peace negotiations are responsible for these delays. According to the EIU, the direct damage of Israel's operation "Grapes of Wrath" on the south is estimated to be $500 million, in terms of infrastructure, properties, loss of business and delays in reconstruction alone. An example, the Israeli attack on the two electricity stations is estimated to have cost an additional amount of $40 million. The World Bank gave an emergency loan of $50 million but the Arab and European countries have not delivered the promised aid. The economy in the predominantly agricultural areas of the south and the Bekaa suffered most from Israel's bombing. According to the same sources, an estimated 45 per cent of 1996's tobacco crops were destroyed, the livelihoods of some 20,000 families were thus affected. Losses also occurred in other sectors such as fishing.

Israel's attack in April 1996, and the continued conflict in the south, have far-reaching political and economic consequences on the country. The tensions in the area have discouraged foreign investments, thus slowing hopes for rapid recovery. Tourism was also affected by Israel's shelling that reinforced the perception of Lebanon as a dangerous site.

With Netanyahu's premiership increasing tensions are perceptible. Mr Netanyahu's election is delaying the peace talks and hampering hopes for a regional settlement which could allow Lebanon's rapid recovery. The strained relations between Syria and Israel also affect Lebanon which is excluded from decision-making at the regional level -- its foreign policy being indirectly controlled by Syria -- while remaining the potential battleground for all regional confrontations.

Another factor of tension was the Lebanese parliamentary elections which created a climate of serious dissatisfaction in the country. The elections were denounced as fraudulent by the opposition (mostly Christian) and by the majority of people who were interviewed during fieldwork. The amendment of the electoral law was seen as creating the necessary framework for undermining the opposition. Despite rising tensions, Syria and the reappointed Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, act as guarantors of domestic political stability.

The reconstruction process seems to be focused on physical infrastructure at the expense of broader socially oriented programmes. Access to education, health care, training, research and credit should receive much more attention. Environmental protection and improvement should also be paramount, given the damages caused by the war and the chaotic attempts at reconstruction afterwards. The real quality of life of Lebanese citizens could be greatly improved by an amelioration of the pollution of air and water, the reduction in congestion and reforestation. Efforts have been made in that direction, mainly with foreign aid, but remain small scale. It is important that development and not merely growth be sustainable, to give all groups in Lebanon a sense of sharing in the efforts and benefits of reconstruction.

3. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

A brief synopsis of the Lebanese economy from the 1960s to the present ⁽¹³⁾

In the modern economic history of Lebanon we can distinguish three phases, determined by the civil war that lasted from 1975-90. The first phase, the pre-war economy, which was characterized by a sense of prosperity and the hope of a lasting development; the war economy, which has been characterized by a widespread loss of human and physical capacity; and finally, the post-war economy or the reconstruction phase, in which a mixture of hype and scepticism is creating an active but speculative environment still subject to sharp reversals.

3.1 The pre-war economy

The image of a prosperous Lebanon is mainly due to its success in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in using adequately its human, institutional, and geographical resources to benefit greatly from the rapidly expanding wealth of the oil-rich Arab Gulf countries. The development of a modern financial and service sector that channelled the flow of income from the oil boom, the use of its ports, airports and transportation and communication networks for the transit of goods to and from the Arab countries, the large remittances from the supply of an educated and entrepreneurial workforce to the Gulf economies, and finally the exploitation of the beautiful natural environment for luxury tourism and real estate investment, created a dynamic and rapidly modernizing economy.

Lebanon's role as a necessary intermediary in this period can be understood as arising from three main factors that ought to be assessed in relation to their characteristics in the region as a whole. First the natural geography of Lebanon, with a coastline open to the West at the cross roads of Europe and the Arab countries, established its prime locational advantage for the transit of goods. Second, with one of the most highly educated population outside the most industrialized countries, and the existence of an advanced and diversified university system catering to the whole region, Lebanon had a growing supply of human capital. That supply provided the Lebanese and Arab economies with a skilled labour force and qualified professionals able to take advantage of employment opportunities offered by rapid regional development.

Finally, on the institutional level, the combination of a politically liberal democracy and a market oriented economic system, in a region constituted mainly of autocratic political regimes with centralized economies, created an environment capable of tremendous dynamism and adaptation. Beirut was thus able to attract the human and material resources of the region, in search of a relatively familiar safe haven, in which banking secrecy, a modern financial and communication structure, political tolerance and a free multilingual media were in operation. The interaction of these factors made Beirut the centre for international companies wishing to do business in the region, while at the same time having access to modern infrastructure, information and qualified labour.

All these factors contributed to an impressive record in the last decade before the civil war, characterized by a low inflation-high growth path (around 6 per cent annual real growth of GDP and an average inflation level around 5 per cent), with a high balance of payment surpluses and even a fiscal surplus in the last years before the war. The GDP per capita in 1974 was 2,980 Lebanese pounds ($US1,279). As a result, the confidence in the Lebanese economy was rising as witnessed by the steady appreciation of the Lebanese pound against the dollar, averaging 25 per cent between 1965 and 1974. While the Lebanese economy had a clear comparative advantage in services, the existence of sizeable agriculture and expanding manufacturing sectors provided some balance to the development of Lebanon. The sectoral breakdown of GDP (and employment in parenthesis) in 1965 was 12 per cent (29 per cent) in agriculture; 21 per cent (24 per cent) in manufacturing and 67 per cent (47 per cent) in services. The oil-rich Arab countries accounted then for 61 per cent of Lebanon's exports.

3.2 The war economy

As has been noted, the war which broke out in 1975 had a devastating impact on the economy. The intensity of the conflict, and its longevity has had deep human and structural effects. More than 5 per cent of the population died, twice as many wounded and an enormous amount of immigration out of Lebanon has seriously reduced the human capital of the country that was an essential part of its previous development. It was estimated that during the war more than 200,000 professionals and skilled labourers emigrated to find employment outside the country. A very large amount of capital flight has accompanied this massive human migration, depriving the country of much needed financial resources. The destruction of public infrastructure, buildings and communication networks was large scale and has been estimated by the United Nations as valuing $25 billion.

But the actual damage is certainly larger. The war removed the primary reason for the initial success of Lebanon, the confidence in the stability of its system in a politically unstable region. Much of the industrial equipment and productive capital spared is obsolete due to the lack of maintenance. For an economy-servicing regional capital in search of minimal political risks and uncertainty, the civil war was devastating. Lebanon missed most of the potential benefits and opportunities from the oil boom of the mid-seventies to the early eighties. It lost most of the foreign companies doing business in the area to neighbouring countries, and lost its role as the regional business capital.

At the end of the war in 1990, real GDP was at 33 per cent of its 1974 level of $3.5 billion. The fluctuations in output from 1975-90 reflects the varying intensity of the war in Lebanon. The initial drop in output in the first two years of the war was of the order of 65 per cent, but it recovered half of its loss as soon as the situation stabilized in 1977. The Lebanese pound depreciated slightly but held up quite well during the initial years of the conflict. Inflation was up at about 20 per cent a year. Output started increasing slowly but steadily until the Israeli invasion in 1982. The invasion wrought huge destruction in Beirut and south Lebanon and created a serious crisis of confidence leading to a 4 per cent depreciation of the currency with respect to the dollar, attaining its lowest level at 5.49 pounds to the dollar in 1983. This started the phenomenal slide in the value of the pound all through the remaining years of the war. Although GDP started to pick up again in the succeeding years, recovering in 1987 up to 92 per cent of its 1974 level, the confidence was not restored.

3.3 Post-war economy

The passing into law in 1990 of the reforms agreed by most warring factions of Lebanon in the Taef meeting put an effective end to the civil war and ushered a new phase in the economic history of the country. The Hariri Government's priority is economic rehabilitation. At the time of writing, positive results have been seen from both government and private initiatives. Still, doubts remain over major issues.

Broadly speaking, the economic plan of the Government has the following objectives: first, achieving political and fiscal stability in order to restore the credibility of Lebanon and confidence in its economy, as a precondition to the repatriation of capital and skilled labour. Second, the reconstruction of the public infrastructure of roads and communications and utilities network and the strengthening of the public institutions and administration are preconditions for the growth in business activity, finally attracting foreign financing and investments and the rehabilitation of Beirut as a modern commercial and financial centre for regional businesses and tourism. As explained in Chapter 2, the Government has developed ambitious reconstruction and financing plans for the country aimed at achieving these goals. Initially, in 1991, the Government commissioned consulting firms to prepare a $3 billion national emergency reconstruction plan to be implemented in three years. Slow progress has led the new Government in 1993 to release a more ambitious ten year plan (Horizon 2000), involving some $13 billion in planned investments and debt charges. The Plan's targets seemed too ambitious and will need to be revised downwards.

The most obvious sign of the regained stability and the partial restoration of confidence in the Lebanese economy is the recent reversal of the slide in the value of the Lebanese pound against the dollar and of the dollarization of the economy. After reaching a very low value against the dollar at the end of 1992, the Lebanese pound has been steadily appreciating since then. The stability of the pound was put through a test after the Israeli attack in southern Lebanon in April 1996, and showed surprising new strength in the face of a short-term crisis. The dollarization of the economy that has followed the depreciation of the pound against the dollar quite closely has declined significantly. The ratio of deposits in foreign currency (mainly dollars) to total deposits decreased from a high of 90 per cent in 1988 to around 60 per cent in 1994. As a consequence of, and also partly as a cause of, the appreciation of the currency, the inflation rate in the economy has slowed down from a high of around 125 per cent in 1992 to 15 per cent in 1995.

Underlying these reversals are a tighter monetary and fiscal policy since the end of 1992. An increased discipline in the controlling of the fiscal deficit has been requested by the World Bank and the IMF as a condition for increased loans to Lebanon.

In large part, the improved expectations of economic agents reflected in the financial indicators above, are based on the improvement in the real productive capacity and performance of the economy. After a plunge of 45 per cent of GDP in real terms in 1989, followed by a decrease of 14 per cent in 1990, the economy rebounded in 1991 by 38 per cent, and has since experienced annual growth rates of real GDP between 5 and 8 per cent. Future output growth is tightly linked to the renewal and expansion of productive capital. In 1994, gross capital formation represented 28.3 per cent of GDP, reflecting a positive long-term prospect from the part of the local industries, investing in new capital to replace and expand their productive capacity. The sectoral composition of GDP is not very different from what it was before the war. In 1992, agriculture accounted for 12.6 of GDP, manufacturing 18.5 per cent, construction 10 per cent, commerce 28 per cent, non-financial services 17.5 per cent, financial services 8 per cent, and about 5 per cent for public administration. Transport equipment alone represented more than 11 per cent of total imports in 1995.

Agriculture has always represented a bigger share of employment than of GDP, hence its importance in the social and economic situation of Lebanon. In 1985 it employed 23 per cent of the labour force while only contributing 9 per cent of GDP. Its share of employment is probably larger now. Furthermore, agricultural exports have been a stable source of foreign exchange, as are those of the agriculture-based processed food and beverages. Various irrigation projects are being studied to increase the productivity of the land in various areas. After having suffered great losses during the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, and the subsequent ban of Arab countries on agricultural imports of Lebanon, due to the suspected infiltration of Israeli products, the exporters are regaining their traditional markets now. The sector still suffers from lack of systematic irrigation, small land holdings, qualified labour, and especially a lack of access to credits which prevents modernization. In 1994 agriculture received only 1.25 per cent of loans distributed to the private sector.

The manufacturing sector has been trying to recover from the destruction of productive capital, and started reinvesting in modernization and replacement of equipment, without government support. These investments reached $170 million in 1994. The great majority of Lebanon's exports originate in the manufacturing sector. The sector, and especially labour-intensive industries like clothing, textile and furniture, have benefited from the reduction in labour costs and the devaluation in the currency, making their exports competitive. Between 1991 and 1995, exports rose by 51 per cent, from $545 million to $827 million. This good performance has been accompanied by an increasing diversification of the manufacturing sector with new firms established in the chemical, cosmetics, paper, solar equipment, pharmaceuticals and food processing. Access to credit is still very restricted; only 9.5 per cent of bank loans to the private sector were awarded to manufacturing.

In 1994 the construction sector accounted for 10 per cent of GDP, it employed local skilled workers but mainly foreign unskilled workers. After being one of the most dynamic sectors in the recent years, the construction sector has slowed down in 1996, due to an over-supply from the boom of previous years, very high interest rates and too little credit to consumers. The banking sector was consolidated after having gone through a crisis in 1991 and 1992, when the Central Bank withdrew the licence of 15 banks and seven other banks ceased operation. Mergers among commercial banks also contributed to the consolidation process. Total bank assets rose from $15 billion in 1994 to $19 billion at the beginning of 1996 and a few banks recorded profit increases exceeding 20 per cent. The insurance sector has not shown signs of strong revival, mainly due to excessive damage during the war and strong competition from other regional companies.

Tourism has started to pick up again, after a complete halt. Major hotels have been reopening in Beirut and plans for the expansion of capacity are being implemented. The advertising sector has boomed in the nineties, with more than 150 advertising firms and an annual expenditure on advertising of $152 million in 1993, up from $26 million in 1992, fuelled partly by the explosion of television broadcasting stations and other mass media. Construction and general trade received more than 66 per cent of all banking loans to the private sector.

3.4 Conclusion

The overall picture drawn by these figures reflects a definite renewal of economic activity in Lebanon. They should not, however, cause complacency concerning the potential problems threatening the sustainability of the development path that Lebanon seems to be taking. The sustainability of progress has to be understood in its economic, political, social and environmental sense. Nowhere more than in Lebanon is the interdependence of these factors so critical, especially in the context of analysing a post-war development path for the county. The belief that Lebanon's prosperity will derive from the development of services and in particular financial services is leading to a neglect of agriculture and manufacturing. These are vital components of the economy, especially in terms of employment and exports and have definitely not reached their full potential. The danger of the current bias is that it reflects an image of a future of the country that has more to do with perceptions of its past prosperity rather than with reality.

On the socio-economic side, the issue of unemployment, wages and the distribution of income are the most important. The rate of unemployment has been estimated in 1990 to be 35 per cent. As noted, the average duration of unemployment for 66 per cent (EIU 1995) of the unemployed is longer than six months. In agriculture, this is true of 79 per cent of the unemployed, 51 per cent in services and 44 per cent in industry. During the period 1974-93, real minimum wages in terms of Lebanese pounds and dollars have declined 86 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. While good for exporters, it puts most of the weight of the cost of reconstruction on those who can bear it the least. This issue has been the source of most internal troubles since the end of the war. The Government has repeatedly offered wage increases, but fall quite short of meeting the demands of the Confederation of Lebanese Workers. For progress to be sustained in the country, the economy needs to more inclusive and designed to reduce income inequality. The belief that the trickle-down effect of successful growth will resolve most of the social issues of poverty and unemployment is dangerous, especially in light of the experience of Lebanon before the war. The risks associated with a social-political explosion are too high and Lebanon should have a real sense of its potential cost.

4. THE IMPACT OF WAR ON THE COUNTRY AND THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS

The changes in community structure and relationships, the current demographic and educational profile, the living and working conditions, the labour market conditions and their gender implications.

Chapter 4 looks at the changes that occurred as a result of the war in the socio-economic situation of the country and their implications for the family, for women and for some specific groups identified in the ToR. It stresses mainly the negative impact of those changes, while the following chapter puts the emphasis on the avenues war has opened for positive change, and focuses on the role of women as actors (Chapter 5 will use empirical findings to stress women's survival strategies in response to conflict).

However, many of those changes have dual aspects which are often difficult to separate. For instance, while the war has increased women's involvement in remunerated activities, thus increasing their responsibilities and workload, it has given some a taste for a kind of autonomy which could have been unknown to them before.

4.1 The changes in community structure and relationships

An abundant literature on the interplay of political forces and social organizations prevailing in the country prior to the war can be found, but research is lacking on the new social patterns that are emerging and the social configurations that have developed as a consequence of 20 years of civil strife. This section will focus mainly on the most salient changes which occurred during the war, drawing from very fragmented written material and from field research .

4.1.1 Contrasting life-styles

The diversity of cultures and contrasting life-styles of the Lebanese has been extensively commented on. The religious, socio-economic, regional and geographic variables, added to the modern and traditional influences, have all affected Lebanese social organization and cultural perceptions. Historically, the migration from the mountains to the coastal cities -- which started in the nineteenth century and accelerated in the twentieth century -- had vast implications for the country. It provoked the collision of two parallel societies with different cultural and socio-economic systems. In addition, the coexistence of 15 (recognized) religious communities added to the complexity and diversity of cultures and social organizations.

The differences in life-styles found in the country could be also partially attributed to the delicate interplay of both traditional and modern values and behaviours. An example of the contrasting life-styles which existed in Lebanon was reported by Chamie (1984:73): marital relations ranged from one end of the cultural spectrum to the other. Some were "extremely proscribed with very little exchange between the spouses", others were "very active and mutually gratifying".

On the political level, the interaction of a traditional political culture with the national one has produced a vast repertoire of political and legal alternatives, different modes of recruitment and mobilization. National and religious ideologies competed with each other.

4.1.2 Disruption of the social fabric and its impact on family structures

Displacement⁽¹⁴⁾

Displacement is the most serious phenomenon that affected the Lebanese population as a consequence of war. This internal migration followed a concerted plan that was executed in different stages by numerous actors on the war scene. Two-thirds of the population were displaced. A distinction should be made between temporary and permanent displacement. The former was provoked by internal strife and external aggression, such as the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and the fight between Syrian forces and Lebanese militias. In those cases, the people would abandon their homes and go back as soon as fighting had ceased. The latter was provoked by massacres and expulsions aimed at creating confessionally homogenous zones.

Displacements were not continuous but occurred in separate, successive waves, corresponding to the different rounds of the conflict. During 1975-76, approximately 300,000 people were displaced in the capital city of Beirut alone. From 1978-82, an additional 150,000 people fled due to fighting in their area and the Israeli invasion. From 1982-90 a further 360,000 people were uprooted (Lebanese NGO Forum, 1994).

Many surveys and studies have been undertaken to determine the magnitude of the problem of permanent displacement. However, any attempt to compare the figures on population movements and distribution reveals large disparities. The most striking difference is the 900,000 put forward by Faour and, at the other end of the spectrum, the 450,000 of the Ministry of the Displaced (hereafter MOD). For the purpose of this report the figures presented in the findings of the Beaudoin and Kasparian's study (1991) will be relied on. In 1987, they estimated the number of the displaced to be 670,000, representing 22 per cent of the Lebanese population. These figures do not include those displaced in the 1989 conflict.

The same variations apply when it comes to the geographic distribution of the displaced population by province, mouhafazat, or by district number, caza. For instance, Faour and Beaudoin and Kasparian estimated the displaced population in the south at 12.2 per cent, while the MOD put forward the figure of 23.1 per cent. Despite the many discrepancies, all surveys give some indication of the scale of a phenomenon that has affected every region of Lebanon.

More than a million people have been displaced during the war; some were permanently dislocated, the rest returned when hostilities ceased. The social fabric of rural and urban communities was severely affected; life-styles were disrupted. The massive migratory movements across the country have resulted in the disruption of the cultural and social organization of the displaced communities. They have also affected the receiving societies confronted with different cultural practices and values of those coming from rural backgrounds into an urban environment or vice versa.

Internal migration was a major determining factor in the demographic changes that resulted from the war. As a result of this planned human reorganization of the country, the population of Beirut, for instance, underwent major changes: the exodus of a large part of its original inhabitants was balanced by the inflow of refugees from other areas. In the southern suburbs of the capital, 30 per cent of the population is composed of refugees. As noted earlier, this phenomenon has affected every region of the country to varying degrees (Beaudoin and Kasparian, 1991).

The civil war has displaced many rural communities into urban localities. The forced displacement due to political strategies and organized by the militias reinforced the pre-existing rural-urban migratory trend. The major phenomena which characterized the urbanization process in Lebanon could be summed up as follows:

the cycles of rural migration prior to and during the war;
the displacement of the urban population into safer areas, some of which were not yet urbanised at the time;
the expansion of urban agglomerations to reach neighbouring rural areas (USAID, 1995).

These phenomena have resulted in a continuously changing spatial reorganization. The increased urbanization of the population was paralleled with the emptying of the rural areas from a substantial part of the active population. According to ECWA (Abu Nasr et al., 1985), in 1975 a large proportion of the country's population (65 per cent) lived in urban areas. The UN (EIU 1995) estimated that after the war the capital alone had a population of 1.5 million, which represents almost half of the entire population of the country. The imbalance in the population distribution is one of the main compelling factors for the Government to organize the return of the displaced. A demographic balance is hoped to be restored with the resettlement of the displaced from over-populated areas to the nearly empty areas of displacement.

Modification of the family structure

The USJ-Laval survey (Beaudoin and Kasparian) has noted the change in the composition of the displaced families: the size of the household is much larger than in non-displaced families. In east Beirut, for instance, the average displaced household has 5.19 persons compared with 4.03 for the average of non-displaced households (hereafter N-D).

Twenty-five per cent of the displaced households (v/s 21 per cent in the N-D) are large nuclear families with the father, mother, and 4.29 children;
twenty-three per cent of the displaced households have no children under 18 years (against 30 per cent in the N-D families);
the households are more frequently composed of the nuclear family in addition to relatives, (14.5 per cent against 11 per cent N-D);
the proportion of households headed by a single parent is also higher than for the N-D population: 5.2 per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively.

The survey is not gender segregated ⁽¹⁵⁾ and gives no indication as to the proportion of women-headed households, the percentage of widows is not indicated. In general, displaced people tend to marry later than others, the family is also larger. They tend to cohabit with relatives more frequently. The displaced population is young, making up 48 per cent. There is also a high number of single young people.

Family life and social ties

In most cases, displacement has disrupted the (extended) family and social networks while migration of men has affected even the nuclear family. The survey conducted by the USJ/Laval universities shows that links with those who remained in the village were totally severed: 69 per cent of the refugees never visited people from the original home area; 53 per cent of the displaced, aged 17 years and more, have not kept in touch with their places of origin; 37 per cent have built "good" relationships in their new milieu; 32.7 per cent have occasional meetings; while 30.4 per cent have never built relationships with people in the receiving areas. Generational differences are important in the process of adaptation, those who were born in exile had less difficulties in creating social ties. Gender is another variable in the dynamics of adaptation: the survey shows that men were better integrated than women, especially in the 40-49 age group.

Conversely, the family has played an important role in providing material support and help for some of the displaced in the receiving areas. In certain cases, families provided shelter and food in the absence of a proper state system.

The organized return of the displaced will be yet another cause of disruption and pain. Given the lengthy period over which some of the displaced have been living outside their original home area, it is likely that there will be differences in attitudes to return as some of the displaced have re-built some social networks. For many, going "home" may not be a natural outcome of a decade of exile, while making a new home in a new area may be perfectly consistent with their new aspirations.

Closed communities

The disruption of the social fabric was paralleled with the re-enforcement of sectarian cleavages. Fear and insecurity are known to be essential factors in the mobilization of a community along confessional lines. The individual and collective response to fear and violence was to seek refuge in the familiar.

Sectarian affiliations have been reinforced during the war, and have undermined burgeoning class identities. Thus Lebanon has experienced a reversal; it has departed from "a natural historical evolution" (Khalaf and Denoeux, 1988), and has gone back to creating closed communities. The confessionalization of the country is therefore a regression in terms of modernity and the development of a national process. It has thwarted the evolution of social integration which had started before the war when many "encouraging signs such as the increase in inter-sectarian marriages and the emergence of modern parties and unions" were found (G. Salameh, 1991).

Thus, the "confessionalization" of the society has eroded civility and sharpened the segmentation of the social fabric by leading to a breakdown of intercommunal relations. This consequence of the war was accentuated by the spatial segregation of the different communities following the attempts by the militias to create a federation of homogenous cantons.

The climate of religious intolerance was paralleled by the rise of religious conservatism in certain groups. The tendency to narrow religious interpretations was accompanied by the reinforcement of patriarchal values that can further weaken women's positions (Chapter 6 mentions the impact this development has had on issues such as the Personal Status Laws). The opportunities which were opened to them during the war in terms of education and skills could be reversed. In certain cases women are actually asked to revert to their former traditional roles and leave the space for men returning from migration and for the unemployed.⁽¹⁶⁾

4.2 The demographic profile

The population exhibits a varying ethnic and religious composition. The capital, Beirut, the largest city, has a population of 1.5 million of whom a third were displaced in 1991 while the second largest city, Tripoli, had a population of 200,000 (EIU, 1995).

4.2.1 Demographic characteristics

Table 7

	Figure	Year	Source
Total resident population	3 111 828	1994-96	MOSA (1996)
Lebanese resident population	2 930 302 2 660 000 3 200 000	1994-96 1988 1976	MOSA (1996) UN (EIU, 1995) UN (EIU,1995)
Natural annual increase %	2.2 3.1	1982 1970 (until)	UNDP/HDR (1995)
Crude birth rate %	26.9 34.4	1992 1970	HDR (1995)Courbages & Fargues (1973)
Crude death rate %	7.1 9.1	1992 1970	HDR (1995) C&F (1973)
Total fertility rate %	2.5 4.57	1994-96 1970	MOH (1996) ECWA (1980)
Live children per % woman/average	3.4	1994-96	MOH (1996)
Life expectancy	65/men 69/women //60	1992// 1960	HDR (1995)/ MOA (1994)
Human losses	90 000 to 170 000 (3-5% of population)		World Bank (1995)
Injured (of which) disabled	300 000 65 000 (69 868)		World Bank (1995) MOSA (1996)
Displaced	800 000 (25% population)		World Bank (1995)
Migrants	550 000 to 800 000		World Bank (1995)

MOSA (1996) defined the total Lebanese resident population as including those who emigrated since 1993 but excluding the non-Lebanese ⁽¹⁷⁾ and those Lebanese who emigrated in earlier years. The drop between 1976 and 1988 of the population (excluding the Palestinians) is mainly due to heavy war casualties and mass emigration. In 1992 the increase was said to be the result of improved security conditions and the subsequent influx of Lebanese exiles ((EIU, 1995).

Fertility rates: the comparison between the pre- and post-war estimates indicates that there has been a decline in fertility rates in Lebanon. Life expectancy has increased for both men and women.

Human losses are estimated at 90,000 to 170,000 dead (3-5 per cent of the population), 300,000 injured, of which 62,000 (MOSA: 69,868) were permanently disabled, 800,000 displaced, representing 25 per cent of the population, and 550,000 to 880,000 migrants (World Bank, 1995).

The regional distribution of the population (in each province) according to MOSA is as follows:

Table 8

13.1% for the mohafazat of Beirut

36.8% for the mohafazat of Mount Lebanon

12.9% for the mohafazat of the Bekaa

21.6% for the mohafazat of the north

9.1% for the south

6.6% for the mohafazat of Nabatieh

The regional distribution of households shows how family composition varies:

Table 9

Beirut : 4.1 people

Mount Lebanon: 4.4 people

The north: 5.3 people

The Bekaa: 5 people

The south: 4.9 people

Nabatieh: 4.6 people

Beirut has the smallest average family composition, followed by Mount Lebanon; the north and the Bekaa, which are largely rural, have the highest average (MOSA, 1996).

4.2.2 Age and sex composition

The demographic structure is characterized by a very young population. An examination of the age composition of the population indicates that almost the half of the population is under 25 years of age, males representing a slightly higher percentage than the females in this category.

Table 10

Age groups	Male (%)	Female (%)	Percentage of population
Under 15	--	--	29
Under 25	25	23	49
Over 65	--	--	6.9
From 15 to 65	--	--	63.8
Sex distribution
Ratio FM	1:	1.02
Percentage	49.5 (1994-96) 50.2 (1970)	50.5 (1994-96) 49.7 (1970)

The sex distribution indicates that the overall female population is slightly more numerous than the male population. It has been assumed that there was a feminization of the population (Labaki, 1988) due mainly to the labour migration of men and war casualties. The MOSA figures compared to 1970 figures (ESCWA, 1991)⁽¹⁸⁾ indicate a slight increase of the female population since the war.

It is generally assumed that women tend to constitute the bulk of the population after conflict and provoke an imbalance in the female/male ratio. But this does not seem to be the case in Lebanon (according to MOSA figures) despite a large amount of casualties and an important migratory trend.

4.2.3 Nuptiality characteristics

Table 11

	Percentage	Male (%)	Female (%)	Ratio
Married	50.8
Separated and divorced	1.29			2.5F:1M
Widows		1.23	8.5	7F:1M

A large proportion of Lebanese aged 10 years and over (age at first marriage)⁽¹⁹⁾

(MOSA), is married. There is a much higher rate of female widows, compared to men with a ratio of 7:1 women to men. This could be partially explained by a higher number of male casualties during the war and a lower mortality rate of women.

The low level of divorce and separation shows the stability of marriage as a social institution because of cultural as well as structural factors such as the Personal Status Laws (especially the Christian ones forbidding divorce, with some rare exceptions). There is also a noticeable difference between the number of divorced or separated women and the number of divorced or separated men (2.5 (F):1 (M)).

4.2.4 Some consequences for women

Because the majority of war casualties are men, it is usually women who are left to care for the injured and the disabled. If the husband was killed, or handicapped, often women had to find ways to earn income. Despite the fact that they were usually unprepared, inexperienced and unskilled. Others, however, would resort to charitable organizations and therefore increase their dependency on aid.
The absence of men and the increase of female-headed households is one important demographic change that occurred in the household structure as a result of the war (14.2 per cent of