ILO - Population issues and the situation of women in post-conflict Guatemala

ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict

Population issues and the situation of women in post-conflict Guatemala

Sean Loughna and Gema Vicente Abstract

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Preface
Acronyms
Executive Summary
1. Introduction
2. History and characteristics of the conflict
3. The peace process
4. Demographic information
5. The economy and economic activity
6. Impact of the conflict on community and family life
7. Women and the law
8. Education and training for women
9. Women and employment
10. Women's health
11. Governmental departments and organizations
12. Non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations
13. Identifying key war-affected groups
14. Conclusions and recommendations
Annex - Terms of reference
Bibliography

PREFACE

This document, by Sean Loughna and Gema Vicente, has been prepared as an input to the ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict. This multidisciplinary and interdepartmental programme, under implementation during the 1996-97 biennium, will contribute to the formulation of policy proposals, guidelines for national and international capacity-building, training materials, a database and a compendium on relevant initiatives in countries emerging from armed conflict. The programme has undertaken a number of country-level research activities in the different parts of the world on the diverse issues being investigated by it to generate relevant data and insights for the outputs.

Women's situations and gender perspectives constitute a major challenge in the war-affected context and require serious consideration in any policy framework and outputs to be produced by the programme. This study on Guatemala clearly shows that these issues are very complex. Gender issues, in this context, combine with other inequalities suffered by indigenous people and therefore cannot be considered in isolation. Other relevant factors identified include the problem of illiteracy, especially of the women, changes in gender roles and family structures stemming from the war, the contents of the peace agreements and the activities of the various development agencies and NGOs. The negotiation of the recent Guatemala Peace Agreements, in which the ILO participated, covered women and gender issues, indigenous populations and other relevant concerns. The serious implementation of these agreements should, therefore, be critical for tackling some of the problems identified in this report.

This report is being circulated to generate comments and to contribute to the debate on gender issues in the conflict-affected context.

Eugenia Date-Bah
Coordinator
Action Programme on Skills and
Entrepreneurship Training for
Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict
Training Policies and Systems Branch
Employment and Training Department

ACRONYMS

ACNUR:	See UNHCR
AGA:	Asociación General de Agricultores (General Farm Owners' Association)
ARDIGUA	Asociación de Refugiados Dispersos de Guatemala (Association of Dispersed Guatemalan Refugees)
ASC	Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (Assembly of Civil Society)
AVANCSO	Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala (Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences in Guatemala)
CACIF:	Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (Coordinating Committee of Farming, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations)
CALDH:	Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (Centre for Human Rights Legal Action)
CCPP:	Comisiones Permanentes (Permanent Commissions)
CEAR:	Comisión Especial de Atención a Refugiados y Repatriados (Special Commission for Attention to Refugees and Repatriates)
CEG:	Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala (Guatemalan Bishops' Conference)
CIA:	(US) Central Intelligence Agency
CIREFCA:	Conferencia International sobre Refugiados Centroamericanos (International Conference on Central American Refugees)
COINDE:	Conseje de Instituciones de Desarrollo (Council of Development Institutions)
COMAR:	Comisión Mexicana de Atención a Refugiados (Mexican Commission for Assistance to Refugees)
CONAVIGUA:	Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (National Coordination of Guatemalan Widows)
CONGCOOP:	Coordinación de ONGs y Cooperativas para el Accompañamiento de la Población Damnificada por el Conflicto Armado Interno (Coordinating Group of NGOs and Cooperatives Accompanying the Population Affected by the Internal Armed Conflict)
CONIC:	Coordinadora Nacional Indigena y Campesina (National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples and Peasants)
COPAZ:	Comisión Gubernamental para la Paz (Governmental Peace Commission)
CSC:	Coordinadora de Sectores Civiles (Civil Sectors' Coordination)
DCG:	Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party)
EGP:	Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (Guatemalan Army of the Poor)
EU:	European Union
FAR:	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces)
FDNG:	Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (New Guatemala Democratic Front)
FIS:	Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversión Social)
FLACSO:	Facultad Latinoamericana de Estudios Sociales (Latin American Faculty for Social Studies)
FONAPAZ:	Fondo Nacional para la Paz (National Fund for Peace)
FRG:	Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Republican Front)
GAM:	Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Support Group)
GDI:	Gender Development Index
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HDI:	Human Development Index
ICVA:	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IICA:	Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura (Inter-American Institute of Cooperation for Agriculture)
ILO:	International Labour Office
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INACOP:	Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas (National Institute of Cooperatives)
INTA:	Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform)
MINUGUA:	Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificación de los Derechos Humanos en Guatemala (UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala)
MLN:	Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement)
NAFTA:	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO:	Non-governmental organization
OAS:	Organisation of American States

ODHA:	Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado (Archbishop's Human Rights Office)
ONAM:	Oficina Nacional de la Mujer (National Office for Women)
ORPA:	Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (Revolutionary Organisation of the People in Arms)
PAC:	Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Defence Patrols)
PAN:	Partido de Avanzada Nacional (Party of National Advancement)
PDH:	Produraduría de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Ombudsman's Office)
PGT:	Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (Guatemalan Workers' Party)
PID:	Partido Instutional Democrático (Democratic Institutional Party)
PLADES:	Plan de Acción para el Desarrollo Social (Social Development Action Plan)
PRODERE:	Programa de Naciones Unidas para las Poblaciones Desplazadas, Refugiadas y Repatriadas de Centro America (UN Programme for People Displaced, Refugees and Repatriates in Central America)
SEGEPLAN:	Secretaria General de Planificación Económica (General Secretariat for Economic Planning)
STD:	Sexually Transmitted Disease
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	UN Development Programme
UNESCO:	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR:	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF:	UN Children's Fund
URNG:	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 29 December 1996, 35 years of armed conflict in Guatemala formally came to an end. This conflict was between an armed leftist guerrilla movement seeking political and socio-economic reform and the country's armed forces protecting their own economic interests and those of the land-owning élite. In a predominantly agriculture-based economy, the military resisted attempts to reform the massively unequal patterns of land ownership and consequent socio-economic inequity. The last period of emergency and intense conflict, from 1978 to 1985, was characterized by many thousands, of particularly rural, indigenous non-combatants, being killed, villages being destroyed, the internal and cross-border displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and the military-controlled resettlement of many others.

The political, economic and social structure of Guatemala reflects its colonial experience and the polarity of the society that gave rise to the civil war. Spanish-descended élites continue to monopolize power; the majority of the population comprises 22 marginalized indigenous groups, speaking distinct languages. Spanish is the language of the dominant, largely western-influenced, culture known as ladino, although this population includes many poor people as well.

Although there was a return to civilian democracy and constitutional order in Guatemala in 1986, the security forces have prevented genuine social and economic reform taking place through repression and by targeting key leaders and reformists for intimidation, torture, "disappearance" and extra-judicial execution. Weak government and an ineffective police and judiciary system have contributed to the impunity enjoyed by the security forces. The military, who were running projects in rural areas, were more concerned with security than development. The army's use of male members of the indigenous communities to act as informants as well as intimidate, torture and kill members of their own communities, has undermined, if not destroyed, the norms of communal life. Others fled, either into hiding in the jungles of Guatemala or over a border, particularly into Mexico.

During the 1990s, under increasing pressure internally and internationally, the Government and military agreed to engage in negotiations with the guerrillas, eventually leading to the signing of a series of progressive and wide-ranging reforms. Remaining refugees, mainly in Mexico, began returning in larger numbers. However, this process of return had slowed to almost a complete halt by the end of 1996, due to a lack of available land and funding to acquire land (despite government guarantees), as well as continuing insecurity.

The experience of displacement, which for some lasted over a decade, has had an enormous impact on Guatemalan society. Some of those in refuge had access to education and health services which has greatly altered their expectations. Many lived in camps with other ethno-linguistic groups, learnt Spanish and organized themselves politically for the first time. The return of refugees has exacerbated tensions in communities already wrecked by suspicion and fear as a consequence of years of repression. Both returnees and the internally displaced may be accused of having links with the guerrillas. Competition for land is intensifying the deep divisions in some regions. The targeting of assistance exclusively to returnees in some development projects, has served to exacerbate tensions between them and other impoverished, rural populations.

Diminishing state oppression however has not yet led to the hoped for "security". Life in Guatemala is increasingly characterized by lawlessness and crime. People, with little faith in the police and judicial system, are taking the law into their own hands. Contrary to the wishes of the majority of the population, there is likely to be a blanket amnesty for all human rights abuses committed by both sides in the conflict.

Guatemala's population reached 10.6 million in 1996, and is expected to double by 2018. Its fertility rate is still the highest in Latin America and its population is young. Fertility and mortality differ widely among the indigenous population (who mainly reside in rural areas) as compared with the ladinos, because of their differential access to resources, education and health facilities. The reproductive health situation in Guatemala is alarming. High fertility is a function of poverty, culture and lack of education. Women's mortality, including maternal mortality, is also high. Fertility rates are much higher in rural than in urban areas and among indigenous women than ladinas.

The conflict in Guatemala did not substantially alter male/female ratios of the population, since, although men died in higher numbers, women formed a greater part of the cross-border migration. By the end of the period of intense violence in the mid-1980s, there were an estimated 75,000 widows and 250,000 orphans.

Guatemala's economy is the largest in Central America and is still dominated by the large-scale plantation-production of crops for export. Conversely, much of the rural population rely on subsistence agriculture for their family's survival, often with insufficient land. Consequently, these large plantations are able to benefit from the abundance of a low-cost, largely indigenous labour force. In Guatemala, over three-quarters of all families live in poverty and are dependent on seasonal paid labour which also requires migration to other parts of the country; a third of the country live in extreme poverty. Many who are landless or uprooted by violence, are now permanently squatting in urban centres where they lack access to basic services, including adequate housing.

Tax revenue is one of the lowest on the continent, and the introduction of increased tax on gross income has disproportionately elevated the burden on the poorer sectors of the population. Since the 1980s and the regional economic crisis, debt servicing and structural readjustment programmes have become top government priorities. Government expenditure on health, education and housing have reduced in real terms. The Guatemalan Government has been forced to accept the conditions of international financial institutions, which includes the on-going privatization of most government services.

As a consequence of the conflict, together with successive governments' socio-economic reforms, the country's poor majority have become more impoverished. Among these people, the majority are indigenous people living in rural areas, especially in the north and north-west of the country. Evidence suggests that among these, women have comparatively suffered more in terms of inadequate and worsening health, education and economic opportunities.

The problem of illiteracy in Guatemala has been growing. Guatemalan women's illiteracy rate is the highest in the Americas. The inadequate provision of government resources, poverty and cultural attitudes, all contribute to the limited participation of girls in education, particularly in rural areas. Even the syllabus reinforces the inferior status of women. The few training courses available for girls and women follow conventional stereotypes of their role.

Several war-affected groups can be identified as being in particular need of support and assistance. A major social problem facing the Guatemalan Government is the high incidence of impoverished households headed by women. Even where a male head of household exists, he is often absent because he is required to move to find employment. A large proportion of women heading households are widows, who face a whole series of additional problems, not least societal stigmatization.

The lack of economic opportunities open to women forces many of them to work in the informal sector, where there is no legislative protection, less renumeration and where they endure poor conditions. Activities for women and girls in the informal sector are mainly selling sweets, cigarettes, snacks, and so on, on the streets or working as domestic servants. Although not legal, women are strongly discriminated against in their ability to gain access to credits or loans to support their micro-enterprises or for the purchase of land.

Another major social problem in Guatemala is domestic violence, which has increased significantly since the conflict. During the conflict, sexual violence was used extensively by forces acting on behalf of the State. These issues are highly sensitive ones in Guatemala, especially for indigenous women and girls, who make up the majority of those affected. There are no official figures on levels of violence against women, nor are there state provisions to assist or protect victims. Although Guatemala is a signatory to numerous international instruments protecting the rights of women in many areas and the Guatemalan Constitution guarantees equality between men and women, in practice these commitments are contradicted in domestic legislation.

Another large and heterogenous group in particular need of assistance as a consequence of the conflict, are returnees and the internally displaced. The Government is failing to provide land and other assistance guaranteed to these people. The shortage of land and competition for development assistance is exacerbating existing tensions between them and local populations who remained.

With the recently agreed formal end to conflict and the signing of a series of progressive accords that promise comprehensive reform in Guatemala, there is a large amount of governmental, non-governmental, inter-governmental and private money entering the country, in the form of development aid, assistance, investments and loans. Rebuilding Guatemala's war-torn society necessitates an integrated effort addressing both the impoverishment of the majority as well as the breakdown of normal relations at the community level. To acheive both of these objectives, all assistance must target the whole population, while ensuring the substantial inclusion as beneficaries of certain disadvantaged groups.

1. INTRODUCTION

This is a report of research conducted in Guatemala for the International Labour Office (ILO) as part of its "Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict" which is currently being implemented. This Programme aims to analyse the situation of war-affected groups, identify their special needs, and make proposals for training and education requirements leading to employment.

The ILO commissioned the RSP to conduct this research and produce this report on Guatemala as an in-depth study on women's special situation, gender perspectives and population issues in countries emerging from conflict and how to effectively integrate these concerns in training and employment promotion programmes. The report follows the structure of the terms of reference which appear as the Annex. The authors of this report, Sean Loughna and Gema Vicente, between them conducted 60 days of fieldwork for this project in Guatemala (October to November 1996).

The methodology for this research involved fieldwork in Guatemala, collecting secondary literature and conducting interviews with representatives of UN agencies, NGOs (foreign and national), government and research institutions. Interviews were structured around a questionnaire which was adapted from the questionnaire appearing in the ILO Working Paper "Sustainable peace after war" by Eugenia Daté-Bah (May 1996). Questionnaires were also sent to many relevant NGOs, since they were far too numerous to visit.

2. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT

Once at the heart of Mayan civilization, Guatemala ⁽¹⁾ was colonized by the Spanish in the first half of the sixteenth century. Subsequent centuries have been characterized by the struggle between on the one hand, Spanish-descended élites who monopolize politics, capital, military power and resources (land most importantly); and on the other, the impoverished, largely rural and indigenous majority.

The population is ethnically diverse, comprising approximately 22 Mayan indigenous groups as well as Xinca and Garifuna, speaking distinct languages, which together make up about 60 per cent of the population (EIU 1995). The non-indigenous population, known as ladinos, is of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent. They speak Spanish and identify with a dominantly western way of life, especially in terms of patterns of consumption. ⁽²⁾ The ladino population is, however, not homogeneous; it is divided economically, educationally and socially. In fact, many ladinos live at the same levels of poverty as most of the indigenous do.

Although Guatemala gained independence in 1821, until 1944 it was ruled by a succession of dictatorial governments, interrupted by short periods of constitutional rule. The decade that followed was a unique period in Guatemalan history characterized by less repressive rule, the introduction of social and agrarian reforms, and a new Constitution in 1945 which codified respect for civil liberties and acknowledged ideological pluralism. The communist Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT) became close advisors to the successive presidencies of Arbenz and Arévalo in matters such as the suppression of privileges for US companies, which angered the United States as well as the military and large landowners in Guatemala (McClintock, 1985). In the rebel uprising that was to follow, a return to the reforms of this period was often cited as the guerrillas' objective.

After a US-backed military coup in 1954, a general was installed as President, the Constitution suspended and the country returned to authoritarian rule. Between 1954 and 1986 a series of military, and one civilian (but de facto military), governments ruled Guatemala. Over this period the army developed its own version of a Cold War doctrine of counter-insurgency against the "communist threat" posed by revolutionary guerrilla groups which first emerged in the early 1960s. Although a facade of democracy was constructed by holding elections, these were fraudulent and the country became known as the worst violator of human rights in the western hemisphere. The justice system lost its independence and became subordinate to counter-insurgency policies. In response to the worsening human rights situation the US suspended military aid for a short period in the late 1970s.

In the wake of the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the first guerrilla force in Guatemala, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), emerged in 1962. They sought economic and political reform through insurgent military action. In the early 1970s, another two guerrilla groups emerged -- the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Revolutionary Organisation of the People in Arms (ORPA). Both these groups were based in rural areas populated mainly by indigenous communities, the stage for most of the military confrontation. By the late 1970s, the revolutionary movement was becoming increasingly militarized and had wide support from the urban and rural population; combatants at this time numbered some 12,000. In 1982, the guerrillas announced their unification as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). URNG was composed of the former ORPA, EGP, FAR and a section of the PGT.

During the 1960s, in attempting to suppress the insurgency, the army established themselves as the dominant political force in Guatemala and the most powerful and nationalistic military force in Central America (Smith, 1990). Over the following two decades the Guatemalan military also became the most powerful economic actor in the country, establishing its own bank, credit institutions, publishing house, as well as the means to take over productive resources (Peralta, 1980). Concomitantly, high-ranking officers became large landowners. Thus the military was now no longer merely protecting the economic interests of the traditional oligarchic élites, but its own as well (Smith, 1990). A relaxation of political repression in the early 1970s allowed grass-roots organizations such as agricultural cooperatives, peasant leagues and labour unions to re-emerge. During the 1970s, communities of campesinos consolidated to form large regional cooperatives. The army became increasing intolerant of the success of these cooperatives and of the social pressure for land reform.

As the 1970s drew to a close, the conflict was intensifying and human rights were being violated on a massive scale. Large areas of the departments of Quiché, Huehuetenango and San Marcos were effectively in guerrilla hands. They controlled towns, destroyed infrastructure and carried out raids on other departments. This preceded what was the most critical time in the entire 35-year conflict when, between 1978 and 1985, the military Government's "scorched earth" policy in the northern and north western highlands aimed to drain the "sea" of peasant support in order to defeat the guerrillas. This period is often referred to as La Violencia, a reflection of the intense level of violence prevalent during these years.

Between 1981 and 1983, when this campaign was at a peak, it resulted in the destruction of 440 villages, the death or disappearance of some 75,000 people and the displacement of an estimated 1 million people (Burge, 1995). Massacres in this period are said to have left more than 75,000 widows and 250,000 orphans (Piedrasanta, 1995; Bartos and Camus, 1993). By 1985, there are estimated to have been 136,000 widows, although this is clearly an underestimate, given the danger involved in admitting that one's husband had "disappeared" or had been killed for being a "subversive" (Zur, 1993). Although many of those who were displaced returned to their communities or resettled within months of their initial flight, at least 300,000 (some estimates put the figure much higher) remained displaced within Guatemala. Those who fled Guatemala sought refuge in Mexico (numbering at least 150,000) as well as in El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, United States and Europe.

This military assault was mainly targeted against rural indigenous peasants in the departments of Petén, Quiché and Huehuetenango. In its efforts to wipe out any kind of opposition to their authority, the military waged war against the entire civilian population but particularly the indigenous in rural areas who they had come to regard as generally supportive of the insurgency. Clearly, beyond their alleged political affiliation, indigenous people were targeted simply because of their ethnicity in what Menchú (1994) has called genocide. Entire communities were massacred; others fled en masse to avoid the same fate. Those who stayed behind and survived, or had returned, were put into Vietnam-style "model villages", where the army was able to monitor and control most aspects of daily life through their monopoly on reconstruction and development projects and through the introduction of Civil Defence Patrols (PACs) in 1982.

Supposedly voluntary, paramilitary forces, most adult indigenous males in this region, were forced to contribute a number of unpaid hours per week in the PACs, which numbered around 1 million men at one point (Jonas, 1988). They were the eyes and ears of military, required to seek out subversives and themselves became perpetrators of human rights abuses on a large scale, often in their own communities. The countryside had become highly militarized and any allegation of links or sympathy with the guerilla would invariably lead to the death of the accused. By 1984, the army was successful in almost completely annihilating the insurgency. Armed resistance did continue but it was at a much abated level.

One of the groups most visibly affected by the civil war were those forcibly displaced, both internally and in exile. Of the estimated 200,000 Guatemalans arriving in Mexico during the 1980s, some 48,000 were settled in camps in Chiapas by the Mexican Commission for Assistance to Refugees (COMAR) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), who recognized them as refugees. These people had often fled as entire communities who joined other communities in the camps. Although the Mexican Government (which is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees) was initially reluctant, it eventually bowed to pressure from multilateral agencies and local NGOs and allowed them to stay temporarily. Guatemalans in the camps were provided with refugee-like protection and emergency assistance in the form of food, health care, shelter and sometimes education. Generally well received by the local population, they were allowed to move around fairly freely and to work; many families gained access to land and credits.

Initially, in remote areas of Guatemala, and subsequently all over the country, the army's tactics became more selective in the post-emergency phase (since 1985), targeting particular individuals for extra-judicial execution, disappearance or intimidation. Typically, victims tended to be active and leading figures in the community, such as campesino and cooperative leaders, human rights workers, journalists, union leaders, student activists, opposition politicians and Church leaders. People who fled this persecution also largely went to Mexico, usually arriving as individuals, families or small groups. They were generally not recognized as refugees and thus were not entitled to UNHCR assistance. The total number of unregistered Guatemalan "refugees" in Mexico was at least 150,000 during the 1980s, but many have now returned home. If apprehended by the Mexican authorities, they were usually deported back to Guatemala as economic migrants. As a consequence of this and their need to find employment, these people were forced to conceal their nationality and thus their ethnic identity and language. Women were disproportionately affected since, unlike men, indigenous women generally wore traditional dress and were less often Spanish-speakers.

Estimates of the number of internally displaced in Guatemala vary from government claims of 150,000 to the Catholic Church's estimate of 1 million. The majority were rural indigenous from the south-west, north and north-west of the country. By the mid-1980s, the majority (54 per cent) settled in other communities of the same ethnic group, 16 per cent were settled in army-controlled model villages, 12 per cent fled to urban centres and 8 per cent went into hiding in the highlands. The army considered all those in hiding to be subversives and as a result these small groups, which were dispersed throughout the jungle areas, were pursued and attacked by military units. These groups began to collectively organize to defend themselves, not by taking up arms but by surveillance and sharing information about movements of the army and thus "resisting" domination or annihilation by the armed forces. They called themselves the Communities of People in Resistance (CPRs) and decided not to go to Mexico but remained in hiding in Guatemala, despite the harsh and insecure conditions under which they were living. They developed collective means of production since this was safer and more efficient. After more than ten years in hiding, in 1993, they publicly declared that they were no longer willing to flee and wished to settle and reintegrate.

In the wake of the 1981-83 military onslaught in the highlands, the Guatemalan Government, with the support of the military, launched a campaign of security and development, which continued at a reduced rate until the late 1980s. At the heart of this strategy was the resettlement of displaced persons in 33 so-called "model villages", several of which were organized into "development poles" or population and commerce centres. The army oversaw the provision of infrastructure, housing and services, which was provided by public and private agencies. But once the physical outlay was achieved, little development assistance, such as the provision of small scale loans, was provided. Most of the villagers are farmers and prior to the conflict their dwellings were surrounded by fields of corn, beans and other crops. However, in the model villages there was insufficient land for subsistence for the majority of households and work on infrastructure projects was one of the few economic opportunities open to them. These tended to be food-for-work programmes, providing food only to the worker and only for days actually worked. Consequently, malnutrition became a serious problem in many households (Lawson, 1995). The military's campaign in the highlands created a situation of dependency and control in communities rather than one of development.

From 1985, the army began to allow the gradual and limited opening of political and civil space. However, despite the return to civilian rule in 1986 with the introduction of a new progressive Constitution and talk of democratization and national reconciliation, the armed forces continued to exert considerable influence on government and societal structures. The State also continued to employ extra-judicial execution, "disappearance", torture and intimidation to contain those that it saw as a threat to its economic and political interests (Palencia, 1996). However, massacring entire communities was no longer seen as necessary, although this more selective killing did occur in comparatively high numbers. The country had moved from the emergency phase to one of limited tolerance through social control maintained through repressive tactics on a more selective scale. Although both sides in the conflict continued to carry out military operations until the cease-fire in March 1996, it was at a diminished level and the army was the dominant force.

3. THE PEACE PROCESS

In the second half of the 1980s, under increasing national and international pressure to resolve the conflict and to further open up Guatemala to aid and trade, the Government embarked upon promoting national dialogue. A crucial early step was the signing of the Esquipulas II Agreement in 1987 by five Central American governments, including Guatemala. It provided a framework for peace talks and national reconciliation throughout the region.⁽³⁾

In February 1990, the Government finally announced its willingness to enter into talks with URNG without demanding disarmament as a prior condition. Direct talks did not actually begin until shortly after President Jorge Serrano took office in January 1991. In the rather changed climate of the post-Cold War period and in the wake of peace breakthroughs in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the parties in Guatemala agreed upon an agenda for talks in April 1991.

Crucial for the refugee population was the signing in October 1992 by the Government and the representatives of the refugees in Mexico, the Permanent Commissions (CCPP), of an agreement to allow for their safe and assisted return to Guatemala. While "repatriation" is generally considered a process undertaken by individuals, as the Guatemalan government was proposing, the CCPP defined "return" as a process undertaken by communities in a collective, organized and refugee-directed manner. It was envisaged that this would enable them to maintain their identity both culturally and as communities, while linking their subsequent development to the social transformation of Guatemala as a whole. The returnees have been provided some protection in Guatemala by the presence of international observers and development projects aimed at reintegrating them into the economy and society generally.

The talks quickly ran into difficulties over issues such as the army's objection to URNG demands for a Truth Commission to investigate previous human rights violations, the lifting of the 1985 Amnesty Law and the abolition of the PACs. The talks were making little progress when in May 1993 President Serrano declared a "self-coup", ordering a suspension of constitutional order. Although the army initially stood by the President, they reversed their position under threat of international sanctions. Both the military and big business shifted their support to the restoration of constitutional order and for the appointment of Ramiro de León Carpio, the country's Human Rights Ombudsman, as President.

Under heightened international pressure, especially from the United States, to resolve the conflict, a new round of talks was launched under the mediation of the UN. On 10 January 1994, a Framework Accord was signed, appointing a UN moderator for the negotiations and establishing a role for the UN in the verification of subsequent accords. This Accord also provided for the

Assembly of Civil Society (ASC)⁽⁴⁾ to contribute to future negotiations, by discussing and reaching consensus on substantive issues which then served as recommendations in the negotiation process. One of the 11 sections of the ASC is the women's sector, comprised of at least 30 women's groups with representatives from trade unions, academia, feminist groups, human rights and indigenous organizations among others. The women's sector has contributed to ensuring the visibility of women's needs and concerns in the peace accords.

The first Accord signed was the Global Human Rights Accord in March 1994. This Accord became effective immediately upon signing and was well received by national and international observers. It committed the Government to respecting and promoting human rights according to the constitutional mandate, treaties, conventions and other international instruments. The Accord does not, however, consider the gender-specific ways in which women's and men's fundamental rights are violated, such as sexual violence against women.

In September 1994, the UN General Assembly agreed upon the establishment of the Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA), to verify the implementation of the Global Accord on Human Rights and to strengthen key, governmental and non-governmental institutions. After a series of delays, MINUGUA was finally deployed in November 1994 and has subsequently published a report every six months. Its fifth report, covering the first six months of 1996, gave mixed reviews of the Government's performance. While acknowledging a continuing overall reduction in the numbers of human rights violations, it criticised the continuing and unacceptably high levels of state involvement in such abuses by actors apparently linked to the State and its failure to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. The invisibility of women's specific concerns in the Accord has meant that MINUGUA has been limited in its ability to monitor and protect the rights of women, other than advising NGOs and others with respect to on-going proposals to reform discriminatory legislation.

The Agreement for the Resettlement of Populations Uprooted by the Armed Conflict, signed in June 1994, was generally seen as sufficient to address the needs and concerns of returning refugees and internally displaced people. This Accord establishes guarantees for the resettlement of communities, including protection of the rights of the Mayan population. It calls for the urgent removal of mines and explosives. It commits the Government to provide uprooted populations with access to means of production, food security, social infrastructure, legal documentation, employment and local markets as well as training in the use of resources and in management skills. The Accord recognizes female-headed households as in particular need of protection and widows and orphans as the most affected. The Government also commits itself to eliminating discrimination, both legal and attitudinal, in preventing women gaining access to land, housing, credits and participating in development projects. However, it has been criticized for failing to establish mechanisms to facilitate this process (ASC, 1995).

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission for the Historical Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence which have caused suffering to Guatemalan people, was also signed in June 1994. This Commission will investigate human rights violations and acts of violence from the beginning of the conflict to the signing of the final peace agreement. Aimed at contributing to national reconciliation, preserving the memory of the victims and promoting a culture of mutual respect, the Commissions's findings do not individualize responsibility, nor will its investigations and recommendations have judicial ramifications. It was not well received by many observers who objected to army and other security personnel responsible for serious human rights abuses effectively being granted a blanket amnesty. According to a 1996 survey conducted by Borge and associates, 91 per cent of the population want to know the truth about human rights violations, 80 per cent want those individuals responsible to be named and 94 per cent want to see them sanctioned (Fundación Myrna Mack, 1996).

A significant step forward was taken in March 1995, with the signing of the Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous People. Regarded by many specialists as unique in the history of Latin America, this agreement recognized Guatemala as a multi-ethnic, pluri-cultural and multilingual society, in which the indigenous peoples have particularly suffered discrimination, exploitation and injustices. It pledged to eradicate discrimination by creating laws making discrimination on ethnic basis illegal, by abolishing discriminatory legislation and by publicizing indigenous rights. In addition, it made sexual harassment of indigenous women a crime; created an organization to defend the rights of indigenous women and to educate the population regarding the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; and guaranteed the approval, implementation and compliance with ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (which was finally ratified in November 1996). The Government also agreed to make indigenous languages official in Guatemala's Constitution, incorporating their use in the education system, social services, the courts and in public programmes.

The negotiations moved rapidly to completion during 1996 under the presidency of Alvaro Arzú, inaugurated in January of the same year. The newly installed President responded to a unilateral URNG cease-fire declaration in March, by quickly extending it to the army. This cease-fire has been respected by both sides. Dramatically for Guatemala, the President has also purged the army of several high-ranking military officers allegedly linked to corruption.

The Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed in May 1996. This agreement attempts to tackle crucial issues, regarded by some as the root causes of the conflict. However, the URNG is seen as having made large concessions, especially on agrarian reform, to hurriedly bring the negotiations to a conclusion and allow for their own participation in the political system. The accord allows for the setting up of a trust fund for land, but contains no constitutional or legislative reforms to address the grossly unequal distribution of land.

In September 1996, an accord was signed agreeing to strengthen civilian power and redefine the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. Particularly important points in this accord are that by 1997, the 44,000-strong army is to be reduced in size by one third and by 1999, its budget is to be cut by an equivalent amount. The role of the armed forces is to be limited to the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The resulting surplus funds are to be spent in health, education and security. The National Ambulatory Police (PNA) is to be dissolved within one year of the signing of the final peace agreement and a new national civil police is to be formed. It was also agreed to demobilize the PACs, a process which was almost completed by the end of 1996. This accord also contains a section relating to women in which the Government undertakes to initiate campaigns aimed at raising awareness of women's rights, and to take (unspecified) measures to facilitate women's participation in political and social organizations as well as agreeing to "respect, promote and institutionalise women's organizations". The final accord in the Guatemalan peace negotiations for firm and lasting peace was signed on 29 December 1996. The signing of this final accord marks the end of the negotiation process and the beginning of implementation of all the other accords. According to SEGEPLAN, implementation of the peace accords will cost $2.3 billion, which the Government hopes will come from the international community in the form of donations, loans and technical cooperation.

With respect to addressing the rights, needs and concerns of women, the contents of the peace accords are generally positive, promising a great deal of reform in principle. However, the government has not outlined mechanisms for their implementation. There appears to be a lack of political will to redress the disadvantaged situation of women and there are few guarantees from the Government concerning their financing and implementation.

Implementation of the UN supervised demobilization and disarmament will begin at a date to be agreed upon early in 1997. Fifteen days before this date, the rebels will inform the UN of the exact number of combatants, the location of rebel land mines and provide a complete weapons inventory. The ex-combatants are expected to number about 3,000, of whom the vast majority are men. Although mines have been planted around certain key strategic positions, they are relatively few in number. In October 1996, the Norwegian Government announced that on the signing of the final peace agreement it would make $1 million available, through UNDP programmes, specifically for the reintegration of former URNG combatants.

URNG has been preparing for demobilization for some time and has fulfilled assurances to suspend the "war tax" levied on large landowners. The four constituent groups of the URNG were planning to dissolve after the signing of the final peace agreement and reunite to form a single political party. However, divisions between sections of URNG make it possible that they will eventually divide into more than one party.

Although refugees began returning to Guatemala in small numbers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the first organized collective return was of 503 families to establish the community of Victoria 20 de Enero, in 20 January 1993. By the end of that year, 3,000 refugees had returned; 4,000 more returned in 1994 and another 7,000 in 1995. Despite UNHCR's prediction early in 1996 that 12,000 would return that year, only 3,340 are reported to have done so as of November 1996. There were recently estimated to be 32,500 refugees still in Mexico, of which 10,000 to 15,000 are thought to want to return; numerous refugee groups are currently said to be prepared or preparing to leave (ICVA, 1996). The returns are mainly to the north-western departments of Quiché, Huehuetenango, Alta and Baja Verapaz, the northern department of Petén and the south-western department of Esquintla.

The Government has come under heavy criticism for its slow processing of applications for land credits and for not fulfilling its other commitments to the returning refugees. Despite government promises to provide land for all returnees, it claims to have insufficient funds to purchase it. Conflicts over landownership have emerged in part because the armed forces often repopulated land that people fled, claiming that it had been abandoned voluntarily. The new occupants were often provided with titles to the land, regardless of whether titles were already held by another party. If the Government forces the current occupants off the land so that the returnees can reclaim it, as it has indicated it will do in some cases, the hardship of displacement will simply be shifted onto others.

Those who have returned are still waiting for the Government to provide infrastructure and basic services. The little assistance there is, continues to be mainly provided by NGOs. Also of concern are recent official comments that the provisions of the 8 October 1992 Accord, which guarantees these rights, will end on the signing of the final peace agreement. Certainly during 1996 the Government seemed to be more concerned with completing the peace negotiations and securing the financial aid that would follow than with facilitating refugee return and reintegration. As well as uncertainties about their economic security which discourages refugees from returning, returnees' physical security continues to be of concern. The most serious recent incident was the massacre by soldiers of 11 unarmed returnees in October 1995 in Xaman, Alta Verapaz. In other parts of the country, returnees continue to be particular targets of intimidation and violence.

During the 1990s, coinciding with the beginning of the peace talks, the human rights situation improved substantially. For the first time in recent history, the army has allowed a civilian government to conduct criminal investigations into corrupt activities by high-ranking military officers. Investigations have resulted in the suspension of national police, treasury police and customs officials, as well as military personnel and politicians (Central America Report, 1996). However, the alleged continued incompetence and corruption of the police and judiciary are said to be preventing the Government from tackling the impunity enjoyed by the vast majority of violators of human rights.

In a country so long characterized by violence, impunity and corruption, diminishing state oppression has been swiftly replaced by increasing levels of crime and lawlessness. In August and September of 1996, the local press reported 233 homicides and kidnappings and 36 lynchings, nearly 60 per cent of which occurred in the metropolitan area (Guatemala Weekly, 1996). These kidnappings seem to be financially motivated and are increasingly a regional phenomenon. Further, with little faith in the police and judicial system, people are seeking their own retribution against those alleged to have committed crimes (including relatively minor theft) with severe beatings and killings. Groups of individuals, with increasing frequency, have been attacking police stations, releasing the accused and lynching them (CERIGUA, 1996g).

4. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Guatemala's population is 10.6 million,⁽⁵⁾ is growing annually by 2.8 per cent and is expected to double by 2018 (Crónica, 1996). The population has grown steadily since 1950, although this growth slowed in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to escalating violence and outward migration. Women make up 49.5 per cent of the population. The proportion of women to men has remained fairly constant throughout the conflict, since although men were killed in much greater numbers, more women fled the country.

Although falling, the fertility rate in Guatemala in 1995 was still the highest in Latin America, at 5.1 per cent (Cronica 1996). Fertility rates differ markedly between the indigenous (6.8 per cent) and that of the ladino (4.3 per cent) populations and in rural (6.2 per cent) compared with urban (3.8 per cent) areas. Fertility rates are significantly higher among indigenous women living in rural areas who have lower levels of formal education and no access to remunerated work (CIAM/Mamá Maquín, 1994).

Guatemala's population is young, 43.5 per cent being under the age of 15 and only 5.3 per cent aged over 60 years (Crónica, 1996). In 1992, the crude birth rate was 38.7 per cent and the crude death rate was 7.7 per cent (UNDP, 1995).

In 1950, 25 per cent of the population of Guatemala lived in urban areas; this had increased to 38.1 per cent by 1990, of which 51.1 per cent were women. The massive internal displacement and migration which took place was predominantly within rural areas (UNICEF, 1994).

In 1987, 22.4 per cent of Guatemalan women over 15 years of age were single, 37.5 per cent were married, 24.7 per cent were in consensual unions, 6 per cent were separated and 9.4 per cent were widows. Seventeen per cent of households in 1989 were headed by women, although this is an underestimation since it is only in the total absence of an adult male that a household is counted as being headed by a woman (INE, 1989).

In 1955, the life expectancy for women was 42.4 years and for men was 41.9. By 1990, the figure had increased to 64.4 for women and 59.7 for men (UNICEF, 1994). The improving life expectancy slowed during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to the armed conflict and the economic crisis. Despite the improvements that have taken place, Guatemala continues to have one of the lowest life expectancies in Latin America. The Latin American average in 1990 was 63.9 years for men and 69.5 years for women. Life expectancy among indigenous women is 48 years compared to 65 years for ladinas (UNICEF 1994).

During the early 1980s there were considerable differences between the principal causes of death in men from those in women. Women mainly died from illness (respiratory and intestinal infections), perinatal causes and malnutrition; men largely died as a consequence of homicide and civil war as well as illness and accidents. During this period, amongst 15 to 24 year olds, homicide, war and accidents caused 78 per cent of deaths of men and 30 per cent of deaths of women (García and Gomáriz, 1989).

During the 1950s Guatemala was characterized by a high infant mortality rate (two-thirds of annual deaths were of infants under 5 years). Since then there has been major economic growth, but this has not been reflected in an amelioration of health conditions. Currently, 50 per cent of deaths are still of children under five, and for reasons not very different from those 50 years ago. In 1992, the infant mortality rate was 48 per 1,000 live births; the under-fives' mortality rate in 1993 was 73 per 1,000. Although the mortality rate for girls under five has declined from 64.4 per 1,000 in the 1950s to 21.1 per 1,000 in 1990, during the last decade, it remained persistently higher than that of infant males. This is most likely the result of discriminatory parental attitudes which result in a female child population which is malnourished and vulnerable to diarrhoea and respiratory diseases -- two of the main causes of infant mortality.

5. THE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown steadily throughout the 1990s, achieving 4 per cent growth in 1994 (to $12.5 billion) and approximately 4.9 per cent in 1995 (reaching about $14 billion), which is the highest growth rate in 18 years (EIU, 1996). Although this gives Guatemala the highest GDP amongst the six Central American States, it has only the fourth highest GDP per capita (UNICEF, 1994), at approximately $1,500 in 1995. Social and economic indicators are discouraging, and the poor in Guatemala are amongst the poorest in Latin America, mainly due to the vastly inequitable patterns of land ownership and income distribution.

According to UNDP, Guatemala is a "medium" country in human development terms. Guatemala's Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.591, ranking it 112 out of 174 countries. When this figure is adjusted for gender, the Gender Development Index (GDI) was 0.481 for the same year, ranking Guatemala 87 out of 130 countries. The improvement in GDI since 1970 has been relatively low compared to other underdeveloped countries and represents a deterioration in rank of eight places (UNDP, 1995).

Substantial industrialization only began in the 1960s, with the implementation of import-substitution policies which encouraged the manufacture of consumer goods. The economy grew by an average of 5.5 per cent per year during the 1960s and 1970s. This was a successful period for the economy, though the benefits were concentrated in the hands of those already holding the country's wealth. The 1980s, on the other hand, were economically disastrous for much of Latin America, and Guatemala was no exception. Oil shocks and the rise in United States interest rates, combined with escalating armed conflict led to a crisis in Guatemala's balance of payments, heavy government borrowing, a surge in capital flight and a reversal of short-term capital flows to the region. In the mid-1980s, the Government adopted a USAID model for economic diversification into non-traditional export products, such as fruit, vegetables and flowers as well as the maquila production of clothing and textiles. While there was moderate recovery in growth and stability in the late 1980s, these policies have not resulted in a more equitable distribution of wealth.

By 1991 renewed foreign aid and the Government's economic stabilization plan contributed to moderately positive economic growth. However, this growth did not translate into a return to per capita GDP levels enjoyed prior to the economic decline. During the 1990s the Government has been adopting a neoliberal policy of commitment to the free market and non-interventionism and has been supporting regional initiatives towards greater trade liberalization.

The 1990s have also been characterized by ever-rising consumer prices without corresponding wage increases. The Government's failure to support cost-of-living wage increases has resulted in the impoverishment of workers and a contraction of the domestic market due to falling demand. Consumption levels remain low as inflation has far outstripped wage increases, and investment rates have been sluggish as well. Guatemalans' almost insignificant purchasing power has greatly diminished the domestic market (Barry 1992). Inflation was 11.6 per cent in 1994 and was estimated to have fallen to 8.6 per cent in 1995 but to have risen again to 10.5 per cent in 1996. The current account deficit was US$732 million in 1995 and a similar figure is expected for 1996 (EIU, 1996).

Although Guatemala's per capita external debt is not particularly high compared with other countries in the region, the Government has tended to neglect social spending in favour of debt servicing. The country's trade deficit remains serious despite substantial growth in the export of non-traditional goods, which has only served to compensate for a reduction in revenue from traditional exports. For example, Guatemala's negative trade balance with the United States widened from US$185 million in 1980 to US$319 million by 1991.

Central government expenditure was only 9.3 per cent of GDP in 1995, mainly due to its internal debt obligations. In order to reduce its debt with the central bank and to pay off treasury bonds, the Government has introduced an emergency tax. This is a temporary measure to deal with the Government's financial crisis and is intended to increase ordinary tax revenue which, at 7.8 per cent of GDP, is the second lowest on the continent after Haiti. While there is consensus among the political parties that more tax revenue is necessary and that the large-scale evasion of tax should be addressed, there is no agreement on how this should be achieved. The commercial sector and landowners want to see an increase in the rate of value added tax thus affecting the whole population, whereas other sectors argue that the more wealthy in the country should shoulder tax increases alone (EIU, 1996). As an initial measure, in May 1996, the Government introduced an increase in tax on gross income which has been criticized for disproportionately burdening the impoverished majority (CERIGUA, 1996b).

The new Government's priority has been to reduce inflation and high interest rates have contributed to the slowing of the economy in 1996. Responding to pressure from international financial institutions, during its first year the Arzú administration has pushed through the privatization of public utilities. In the latter half of 1996, legislation was passed enabling the privatization of the electricity and telecommunications industries. It has been argued that the Government has been able to adopt such policies, which are almost certain to have negative effects on the poor at least in the short term, because the population's attention is currently fixed on government successes in concluding the peace process (EIU, 1996).

Guatemala's economy is dominated by commercial agricultural production. Large privately owned plantations, mainly located on the country's more fertile land, produce coffee, bananas, sugar and cotton for export. However, the majority of the population is dependent on the subsistence farming of maize, beans and rice cultivated mainly on small plots of land. The below-subsistence capacity of most of these plots, and the non-ownership of land for others, has led to many peasants becoming economically dependent on seasonal work (usually for substandard wages) on the agro-export plantations.

The sectoral composition of GDP has changed little since the 1960s. While agriculture's share has dropped from 30 per cent (in 1960) to 24.4 per cent (in 1994), it is still the most important sector; 49 per cent of the country's labour force is employed in the agricultural sector which accounts for more than half of total export earnings. This represents one of the highest levels of employment in agriculture in the western hemisphere. It is this abundance of low cost indigenous labour in the agricultural sector that has enabled Guatemala to become the dominant economic power in the region.

The contribution of manufacturing and commerce to the economy have altered little, in 1994 representing 14.3 per cent and 24.3 per cent of GDP respectively. The percentage loss of employment in the agricultural sector has been largely compensated by increases in the service (up to 16 per cent) and commerce (13 per cent) sectors. Manufacturing represents about 14 per cent of those in employment (Barry 1994). Guatemala manufactures chemicals, cosmetics, glassware, paper and processed-food exports mainly to the Central American market. The tourism industry has grown steadily during the 1990s and is now an important source of foreign exchange. The Government has expressing its eagerness to significantly expand this industry now that the armed conflict is formally at an end.

In 1981, the poorest 10 per cent of the population produced 2.4 per cent of national income, but by 1989 the figure had fallen to 0.5 per cent of national income. Conversely, the top 10 per cent of the population produced 41 per cent in 1981 and 44 per cent in 1989. The female share of earned income represents 13.8 per cent of the total (UNDP, 1995).

Registered unemployment was 2.2 per cent of the economically active population in 1980, increasing to 6.1 per cent in 1992. However, total unemployment, which includes those not registered as economically active (notably women and indigenous people), has actually increased from 31.2 per cent in 1980 to 39.4 per cent in 1992. This is despite significant job creation in the industrial sector (UNICEF 1994). Large numbers of men and women moving to urban areas having been displaced by conflict, have contributed significantly to this increase.

In the country as a whole, 76 per cent of families live in poverty and 33 per cent in conditions of extreme poverty (EC, 1996). Inequalities in the distribution of land are among the highest in the western hemisphere, with 2.2 per cent of landholders owning 65 per cent of the productive land. Sixty-two percent of the population (80 per cent of the indigenous population) live in rural areas in some 19,000 small communities, each with no more than 2,000 inhabitants. Of these, 80 per cent are classified as living in poverty, compared with 60 per cent in urban areas (UNICEF, 1994). Those living in conditions of extreme poverty are concentrated in rural areas.⁽⁶⁾

Traditionally, the majority of the rural indigenous population engage in subsistence agriculture. Subsistence production usually took place at the level of the household with little shared land beyond the bounds of the extended family. Men were involved in corn production and wage labour, women in the transformational processes including the processing of corn, cooking and the reproduction of children.

In the subsistence economy, the two most strategic resources for any household are land and labour. Furthermore, in this sector, land has value only with the addition of labour. In communities with little cash, the principal way for most households to expand or diversify production, or to invest in old-age security, is to produce offspring who will contribute to the household.

The implications of being landless or unable to produce corn goes beyond economic aspects for most indigenous people in Guatemala. Without a territorial claim in a community of one's ancestors and the means to secure part of one's own food supply, an indigenous Guatemalan has great difficulty in retaining his or her identity as a member of that indigenous group.

As well as a consequence of increasing poverty, communities have also become increasingly dependent upon wage labour because of declining fertility of the land combined with the inheritance system which divides land among offspring. More recently, the situation has been exacerbated by further expropriations of indigenous land during the 1970s and subsequent to that by conflict-induced forced displacement.

Every year tens of thousands of campesinos pack into trucks that transport them from their highland villages to harvest on the sugar and coffee fincas of the southern coast. These people have no, or insufficient, land to sustain their families. Most work more than ten hours a day for less than the minimum wage. For some, a few months of this work will comprise the bulk of their annual income. Thousands live and sleep together on the ground in large open warehouses. Increasingly, over the past three decades entire families have been migrating seasonally to the fincas to work in the harvesting of the crops.

Although, overall, both men and women usually have control over resources and decision-making rights, the husband was considered the head of the household. Men had the predominant role of breadwinners and negotiators with the outside, ladino world. In general, men were not coercive of women who were acting in accordance with their gender-prescribed roles. In certain circumstances a woman may have become more (or even less) dominant in decision-making. If a man developed a serious alcohol problem, for example, his wife may take over most decisions. But prior to the conflict, this was rare.

Through the centuries, indigenous groups have absorbed dominant, ladino machismo attitudes. Often the cultural ideal is for a woman to be supported and protected throughout life by a succession of men -- father, brother, husband, sons (and for divorcees and widows -- father and brothers again and then second husband and sons). These men provided the woman with agricultural labour, household spending money and ritual protection.

The woman's responsibilities are traditionally centred around the household to where she was generally confined, leaving only in the company of her husband or another male relative. In many indigenous groups, for women to work in the fields was actually regarded as taboo, having sexual connotations attached to it. As well as food preparation, women's other tasks included caring for the children, washing clothes, health care, gathering herbs and wild plants and weaving.

Zur (1993) argues, convincingly, that during the two decades prior to the La Violencia (1978 to 1985) spectacular changes occurred: new authority structures, new economics and new religions made re-establishing and reasserting reality after this period of chaos all the more difficult. Although Zur is writing specifically about the Quiché, it is largely true of the indigenous in Guatemala as a whole. Changes preceding La Violencia undermined any stable cultural bedrock to return to once the emergency was over.

The impact of the international money economy on the subsistence economy has been such that the resources which men traditionally control (land) and the products for which they are responsible (corn) have higher commercial values than women's traditional resources and products. Women's reproductive labour has also remained officially outside the commercial economy so that women have not been able to "cash in" on this capacity. During the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional balance between the sexes has been transformed increasingly into a system of female dependance on men

There are reported to be 261 settlements in the metropolitan area which are home to around 1 million people who have little or no access to public services or sanitation. The roots of these burgeoning settlements stem from massive migration to the capital in the 1970s following the 1976 earthquake and then people fleeing the violence of the conflict. Exacerbated by the lack of social and economic development for the poorer sectors, the housing shortage in the metropolitan area has reached a critical state with a shortfall of about 1.4 million units, according to UNICEF.

6. IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON COMMUNITY AND FAMILY LIFE

Prior to the conflict, virtually all of the indigenous population lived in remote mono-ethnic communities, each with their own traditions and "elders" who provided leadership, living in houses spread out along the hillsides. On the whole the various indigenous groupings, while attached to a locality, did not have a strong sense of community as a whole, but one which centred around a pocket of households. Security and respect was sought and found in the household and in the relations between members of small, tightly knit communities. Often they are traditionally passive, and even suspicious, vis-à-vis outsiders and are accustomed to being subordinated to ladinos: a way of being which has been internalised. Traditionally they were not geared for political action.

The conflict, and particularly during La Violencia and the massive displacement that accompanied it, led to a complex series of types of changes to communities. Some of the more important changes in community structure were caused by the following types of disruption:

Some communities were wiped out as the majority or a large portion of their numbers were killed. Survivors fled, sometimes moving on to settle in another community or across a border.

Out of fear, whole or large parts of other communities fled the country and remained together in refuge, settling over the border in the Mexican state of Chiapas. In the mid-1980s many of them were moved to refugee camps in the Mexican states of Campeche and Quintana Roo. In these camps there was much mixing of ethno-linguistic groups, which led to the development of new kinds of communities with new forms of societal structure and organization. Having been in refuge for periods of up to 15 years, some of these communities and groups have returned to Guatemala and others are planning to do so.

Other communities fled the violence but remained in hiding in Guatemala. These groups would often merge with members of other ethno-linguistic groups. They grew their crops in the jungle, but as they were pursued by the military as "subversives", they had to be ready to flee from the military at a moment's notice. As with many of the refugees in Mexico, the fact that many communities fled en masse, remaining virtually intact in refuge, has facilitated them in developing strong communal networks of support. Some of these people organized themselves into the communities of people in resistance (CPRs). In 1993 they ceased fleeing the military and began to look for land to settle down.

Many of those who did not flee, or returned to their own or other communities, were put into "model villages" along "development poles", where Spanish became the common language. Families were allocated houses organized in a grid system and given no choice of who their neighbours would be. These villages were controlled by a highly militaristic system, travel was restricted and anti-subversive "re-education" programmes were introduced. In this way, the military could monitor them and make use of their labour (Lawson, 1995). The army also forced most adult male members of the communities to serve as "voluntary" Civil Defence Patrols (PACs), compelling them to seek out insurgents and even to kill fellow villagers. Thus, many people came to regard the PACs in much the same light as the military.

In their campaign of counter-insurgency the armed forces adopted various kinds of violent tactics which can be broadly categorized into two types: the overt and the covert. Overt violence consisted of burning and bombing villages, public executions and massacres. The Government made no secret of many of these actions nor of their intentions: to terrorize the rural population, which it viewed as subversive.

Covert forms of violence were carried out by clandestine organizations many of them linked to the army and the security forces, although the military (and the Government) disclaimed any involvement in their atrocities. Victims simply "disappeared", and although many reappeared in public places, most were not identified as they had been severely disfigured and then transported long distances. Any action that might be remotely construed as involving a connection with the guerrillas was reported to the army. Such actions might include leaving the village or town, collaborating too closely with the church or concealing relatives.

Torture was employed extensively by the security forces as a method to extract information from people suspected of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathisers. The torturers would exact increasingly brutal torture until they had obtained the names of "other subversives". Under this kind of extreme duress the torture victim was just as likely to name people as being subversive, whether they knew them to be or not. Those named would undergo the same fate with similar consequences.

Sometimes these people were never seen again, on other occasions their mutilated bodies would reappear days or weeks later. There were no political prisoners. The identity of the perpetrators of these killings were often known to the people and on many occasions they were actually members of the community. In villages, where most people were related in one way or another, a killing by a member of that village, especially if witnessed, had a devastating effect on social relations. In this environment of total impunity for those acting on behalf of the State, concepts of innocence and guilt lost their meaning.

Prior to the conflict retaliation through violence is reported to have been relatively rare in the indigenous population (Zur, 1993). An offended party had recourse to community leaders, who might attempt to rectify the problem through one of a number of legal options depending on the seriousness of the situation. Established in early colonial times, these authority patterns, and more recent catechist ones, were severely disrupted by the conflict. The judicial system became non-functional and people were left with no procurable system for settling scores. During La Violencia, however, some people learned to redress wrongs and exact retribution by denouncing their enemies to the army as subversives or, less commonly, to the guerrilla as army informers.

Terror permeated the whole of the society. People lived in fear that they would be accused of being supporters of the guerillas. It was a weapon that people could use against one another and had a devastating impact on relations among them. It destroyed the very foundations of social expectations which lie at the core of any society (Zur, 1994). Popular leaders were also tortured to the point that they were no longer able to function as leaders. Their release as broken men increased the loss of confidence in the prevailing social system and therefore loss in self-confidence. Survivors are often blamed for the violence and are denied the opportunity to create their own history of events. To the present day, many continue to live in fear of perpetrators, who often still live in the same communities. Those responsible for the violence live in fear that the truth will be revealed and thus continue to threaten the communities with further violence (Church, 1994).

There is a strong recognition by indigenous people of this period of La Violencia as a temporal marker -- a certain period in recent history where the level of violence was dramatically elevated. What differentiates this period and other periods of violence was its intensity and degree. Although the time prior to La Violencia, or even the beginning of the armed conflict, are often idealized by people in comparison, these former times were undoubtedly also characterized by hard work, endured hunger and racism. On the other hand, the post-La Violencia period is often perceived to be more insecure with new types of danger, more impoverishment and with increased levels of intra-communal conflict, malicious envy, suspicion, mistrust, selfishness and egotism (Zur, 1993).

Refugees and other displaced people have returned in large numbers, either settling in existing communities or establishing new ones. They may return to find the land they fled now occupied by people they view as military sympathisers. Returnees themselves are often treated with suspicion and hostility, not just by security forces and officials, but by the local population as well and may be accused of having links with the guerrillas. Although such accusations do not have the devastating consequences they used to, it is still an alienating and traumatic experience, especially for those returning to their country having lived in refuge for many years.

People settling in communities after years of internal displacement often encounter similar hostility. To further complicate matters, there is general mistrust and sometimes conflict (over land and other resources) between groups returning from internal displacement and those from Mexico, as well as between groups returning from different parts of Mexico. A number of communities, particularly in the Ixcán municipality of Quiché, are experiencing deep divisions. Most returnees wishing to join these communities are turned away on the pretext that the communities are full. Although shortage of land is a major factor, the reasons are sometimes more about one side of the divided community seeing the new arrivals as potential allies to the other side.

All communal organization which was not integrated into the army was suppressed during the conflict, including religious practice. The authority of the leaders of traditional Maya religions was weakened during the early phase of the war and they disappeared completely in some regions during La Violencia. Predominantly Catholic communities were hardest hit and many churches were abandoned and then appropriated by the army for use as local garrisons where the military would torture prisoners in order to "punish" them or to extract information.

Many people converted to Protestantism as survival strategy as this religion was generally perceived as being aligned with the army. This divided some families as some would convert and others would refuse to, leading to fears from one of being seen as associated with the other. On the other hand, Protestant conservatism has considerable appeal for indigenous women, not least because it is strongly critical of marital infidelity and alcohol consumption (a common contributing factor to domestic violence).

In some regions, important family landmarks and ceremonial practices such as baptisms and marriages ceased taking place because the clergy had all fled or because the circumstances of war made it impossible.

As a result of the conflict, there have been important changes in family structure as well. In 1989, 16.9 per cent of households were headed by women (INE, 1989). However, as noted above, the actual figure is likely to be much higher, especially among indigenous women, since they are reluctant to declare themselves as heads of households. If there is any adult male living in the household, he will normally be recognized as its head; 25 per cent of households in urban areas are headed by women compared with 11.2 per cent in rural areas. However, in the country as a whole, 51.2 per cent of households headed by women are in the countryside (García and Gomáriz, 1989).

Of the female heads of households in urban areas, 38 per cent are widows, 20.4 per cent are separated (or more rarely, divorced) and 19.3 per cent are single. In rural areas, in female headed-households, 56.2 per cent are widows, 14.5 per cent are separated and 9.3 per cent are single. In the country as a whole almost half of women heading households are registered as widows, a high proportion of widows being in rural areas (García and Gomáriz, 1989). Women whose husbands engage in seasonal migratory work are also de facto heads of household, as they have to take full responsibility during the months their menfolk are working in the coastal plantations or abroad.

These women are usually forced to find remunerated work, mainly in the informal sector. They also constitute a large proportion of the rural underemployed. With very little economic, social or moral support, they experience great difficulty in sustaining themselves and their families. Female-headed households constitute a large proportion of those living in conditions of extreme poverty.

Another noticeable change has been the increase in the incidence of violence against women in the domestic sphere. This has been a result of a combination of factors including poverty, the endemic violence in the country and the low social value afforded to women (Samayoa 1993). There are no national statistics that reflect the magnitude of this problem, since it is generally viewed as a private, domestic affair (DIRB 1994). But the problem is certainly a widespread one, affecting all women regardless of age, social status or ethnic identification.

In 1991 it was estimated that 75 per cent of women admitted to hospital with injuries were victims of their partners' abuse; in 1992 ONAM reported that 40 per cent of all murders of women in Guatemala are committed by their husbands (Barry, 1992). The Women's Rights Office (Defensoría de Derechos de la Mujer) estimates that one in four women in Guatemala are victims of abuse in the home.

Women silently endure physical, psychological and sexual abuse because of their cultural and religious values, their economic dependence on men, their fear of men and of criticism which might lead to the loss of their children. Their low self-esteem and defencelessness, as well as the lack of legal recourse or any form of protection, prevents them from seeking help and reporting their aggressors to the authorities.

7. WOMEN AND THE LAW

In terms of formal constitutional guarantees, Guatemalan women are not discriminated against. According to article 4 of the 1985 Constitution of Guatemala: "In Guatemala, all human beings are free and equal in rights and dignity. Men and women, whatever their civil status, have equal opportunities and responsibilities. No one can be submitted to servitude or any other undignified condition" [translation: Vicente].

The Guatemalan Government has also ratified the following international and inter-American conventions which pertain specifically to women:

ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100): concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, 1951;

UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953;

UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956;

ILO Convention 111: concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 1958;

ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169);

UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 1960;

UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1982;

Inter-American Convention Belem do Para to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Violence Against Women, 1994.

However, there is little correspondence between, on the one hand, the standards laid down in the 1985 Constitution or the international treaties and conventions which the Government has ratified and, on the other, domestic legislation. Furthermore, the ratification of international conventions and the promulgation of non-discriminatory laws have not been accompanied by the appropriate mechanisms to implement them. Evidence of physical, sexual and psychological aggression against women is growing every day (CERIGUA, 1996d). There are no governmental institutions in Guatemala which collect data on levels of rape, incest or domestic violence. In addition, there are no shelters or safe houses for abused women in the country (CERIGUA, 1996d).

Proposals to reform the four different Codes (Civil, Penal, Health and Labour) and three Decree Laws (Civil Service Laws, Organic Law for the Diplomatic Service, Ley de las Clases Pasivas del Estado), which reproduce discriminatory patterns, are still pending. It is not uncommon for congressmen to denigrate or boycott the efforts of women members of the Congress to pass amendments to these laws.

Family rights and duties are governed by the Civil Code of 1877, which despite all the reforms it has undergone, contains several clauses which contradict the equality guaranteed to women in the 1985 Constitution. For instance:

Article 144 provides that a husband has the right to prevent his wife from engaging in any paid employment outside the home, if he earned enough to support the family;

Although it sanctions the equality of rights and obligations of husband and wife, article 131 of the Civil Code reserves the administration of the property of the marriage partnership to the husband, except in cases where a marriage agreement stipulates otherwise;

The Penal Code of 1975, despite some achievements, is still wanting:

There are different definitions of adultery for men and women. A woman may be found guilty of adultery if she has engaged in any extra-marital sexual relation. A man may only be considered guilty of adultery if he brings a concubine into the family home;⁽⁷⁾

Accusations of sexual crimes can only be made by the victim or her relatives, thwarting public action against these sort of abuses. Few women are likely to make such accusations publicly. Although less frequent today, it used to be common for the victim of rape to be forced by her family to marry her aggressor;

The definition of rape is confined to vaginal penetration, excluding all other forms of sexual abuse which are only considered as "indecent assault";

A woman's reputation for "virtue" is still a major criterion for judging the guilt of the accused;

A widow is not allowed to re-marry until 300 days after the death of her previous husband;

A woman who prostitutes herself may be prosecuted, but not the person who pays for her services;

Until very recently, women had no protection against physical and psychological abuses from males in their families. In October 1996, Congress passed a Law to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Intra-Family Violence, having postponed the final vote on the bill six times (CERIGUA, 1996e);

The Labour Code also needs reform, for example, in its protection of the rights of working mothers. Decree 64-92 permits women to breast-feed their infants for only one hour daily, while article 155 of the same Code demands the creation of nurseries in workplaces where there are 30 or more women with children under 3 years of age. But the continuing non-provision of nurseries means that women are unable to bring their children with them to the workplace. Furthermore, the effects of article 155 have increased gender discrimination because employers have subsequently limited the recruitment of women. There is no legislation whatsoever on the rights of domestic workers, who are completely unprotected in all aspects of labour relations. The language of the Code is pervaded by paternalist language in which women are compared with minors.

Women's right to own land is not limited by law, but by custom and cultural values, which automatically grant rights over land to the head of household, traditionally assumed to be a male. Although there is no specific law that prevents women from owning land, article 131, which specifies that the head of a family is economically responsible and is the owner of the marriage property, is usually interpreted in this way.

A crucial problem is that Guatemalan women have no knowledge of their existing rights as women and as wives, daughters, workers and mothers.

8. EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR WOMEN

As with health, the availability of educational services is biased in favour of the urban areas. Decades of low participation of rural people in the educational system have resulted in a profoundly unequal society: 47 per cent of the rural population have some primary education, 11 per cent some secondary education and only 2 per cent have access to university (Valdés and Gomáriz, 1992). The level of illiteracy has decreased since the 1950s, when 74.5 per cent of Guatemalans were illiterate; in 1989 the rate was down to 40 per cent. However, in absolute terms, the number of illiterate people has grown: in 1973 there were 1.5 million illiterate people; by 1990 UNESCO estimated there were 2.2 million. Around 60 per cent of illiterates are women, of which 73 per cent are living in rural areas. Indigenous women as compared with their ladina counterparts are at the greatest disadvantage displaying three times the rate of illiteracy. In urban areas 26 per cent of the women are illiterate, but even this is twice the rate of that among men (Samayoa, 1993; Valdés and Gomáriz, 1992).

The uneven distribution of educational facilities between rural and urban areas, poverty, as well as cultural attitudes towards gender roles, combine to put women at a particular disadvantage. According to a UNICEF report, in 1988, 81 per cent of boys between 7 and 14 years in urban areas had access to primary education compared with 74 per cent of girls; in rural areas the percentages decreased to 59 per cent for boys and 49 per cent for girls. If a family is able to send a child to school, it normally sends its boys; girls remain at home to help with domestic work. Later they tend to join their mothers in the market, or work as servants, in order to contribute to the family income (PDH, 1994). The drop-out rates for rural girls who do begin school is higher than that of girls in urban areas. It is assumed that a girl will be supported by her future husband while a boy must be prepared to be the breadwinner of his future family.

The provision of secondary education further highlights the differences between urban and rural areas, and the unequal opportunities afforded boys and girls. Only one third of students in secondary education are girls, although, the percentage of urban middle class girls who have access to higher education is similar to that of boys. Nevertheless, during the years before entry to university, women confront gender discrimination that lowers their chances of access to higher education. In 1987, one out of three men completing secondary school entered university, while in the case of women, it was only one in five (Valdés and Gomáriz, 1992).

There is evidence, however, that middle class women are overcoming their educational disadvantages at university level. In 1975, they comprised only 23 per cent of students, but by 1987 the proportion of women enrolled in university studies rose to 33 per cent; in 1990, at the University of San Carlos, 41.5 per cent of enrolled students and 38 per cent of graduates were women. During the 1980s university enrolment declined as a result of political violence and the closure of the University of San Carlos, where in 1984 more than 80 per cent of all university students in Guatemala were enrolled.

A UNIFEM/UNICEF report written in 1989 which analysed textbooks used in Guatemalan schools showed that they reinforced gender stereotypes. The vast majority of images that appeared in the texts portrayed mostly men engaged in a variety of activities. This reflects the invisibility of women in the public sphere: where women were portrayed, it was solely in their domestic role.

Moreover, the educational system does not recognize the multi-cultural reality of the country, that its students' native languages are often not Spanish nor that Guatemala is a developing country with a very strong agro-export sector, an informal economy and a manufacturing sector. Thus, indigenous women are doubly discriminated against in education, as their gender prescribed roles and cultural reality do not coincide with what is taught in the Spanish-speaking schools, which make up the vast majority of schools.

The content and style of teaching in Guatemalan schools is regarded by many as obsolete and of little use in contemporary life, resulting in some parents withdrawing their children from school. In addition, lack of financial and human resources forces families and communities to employ all the labour force they have at their disposal in economic activity in order to make ends meet. In rural areas, there is a particularly high proportion of drop-outs from school and of children repeating the same course. A 1992 UNESCO report estimated that only 50 per cent of students succeeded in moving up a grade. This is even more evident for girls (Samayoa, 1993) since, as noted, families, especially in rural areas, tend to prioritize the education of boys.

There are few technical training courses available in general in Guatemala, but for women with restricted access to basic formal education, they provide one of the few opportunities for gaining employable skills. UNICEF estimates that 25-33 per cent of beneficiaries of these courses are female; 54 per cent of these take courses in commerce and services. The types of training they receive include courses in dressmaking, textiles, crafts, embroidery, hairdressing, cake decoration and so on, usually leading to work in the informal sector (PDH, 1994).

In Mexico, many refugee women learned to speak Spanish, and those living in camps often had the opportunity to learn to read and write. For instance, in Chiapas, of the women who speak Spanish, 65 per cent learned to do so in Mexico, and of the women who have attended school, 59 per cent did so for the first time in exile. While 91 per cent of those older than 35 are illiterate, 94 per cent of young women aged between 14 and 18 can read and write -- although only 26 per cent of this group has completed the third grade of primary school. There are very few women older than 20 years who have reached any level of elementary school, and if they did it had usually been in Mexico. Many of these were girls and adolescents when they fled, and so their education had been dramatically affected by the repression and discrimination in their home country (CIAM/Mamá Maquín, 1994).

Those who have returned, have found basic public services still woefully inadequate: there are few schools and the rate of illiteracy is still very high; the need for education and skills training is more acute than ever. Figures on the levels of education among the returnee communities between January 1987 and July 1994 indicate that among 1,257 girls between the ages of 7 and 14, 23.7 per cent were not receiving any form of education, 74.9 per cent were receiving primary education, 1.35 per cent secondary education and none had access to university (PDH, 1994).

9. WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT

Since the late 1970s the absence of men from thousands of households as a result of violent conflict and long-term migration for employment, has increasingly forced women in Guatemala to look for remunerated work. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, however, has worsened the conditions under which women are entering the labour market (increasing instability, lowering wages and increasing unemployment). Women now make up about 24 per cent of the economically active workforce. This increases to 40 per cent in urban areas. Participation rates among women are 29 per cent compared with 90 per cent for men (Arend, 1992).

However, the noticeably lower contribution of women to the economic development of the country in the official employment statistics is not due to their low participation. Rather the figures reflect a problem of under-registration of the workforce, which disproportionately affects women in rural and indigenous communities. Women's agricultural work, for instance, is considered as an extension of their "domestic" work and therefore not registered (Valdés and Gomáriz, 1992).⁽⁸⁾ The rates of participation of women in any sector vary according to the definitions employed.

Since the 1950s, women's "registered" participation in economic activities has increased in all sectors of the economy, except agriculture where there has been a remarkable drop. The percentage of women employed in manufacturing has increased from 10.4 per cent in 1950 to 23.2 per cent in 1989; in commerce it increased from 5 per cent to 28.7 per cent and in the services sector from 14.6 per cent to 29.4 per cent over the same period. Conversely, in agriculture women's participation decreased from 68 per cent in 1950 to 16 per cent in 1989 ⁽⁹⁾ (Monzón, 1992; Vigier, 1992). According to an inquiry carried out by INE in the same year, only 9.9 per cent of the female workforce in Guatemala is employed in agriculture, in contrast with 48.4 per cent of men (Vigier, 1992). Agriculture is the main economic activity in the country and also contributes most to the ranks of the underemployed (Vigier, 1992).

For those rural women who do perform remunerated economic activities outside the home, coffee production is the most significant activity. In the south-west of the country, there are 30,600 women working in land clearing, cutting, greenhouse activities and quality control on these coffee plantations. The second most significant economic activity for women is subsistence production of cereals. The north, south and north-west regions present the greatest numbers of women employed in this activity, often assisted by their children. The third most important activity is small-scale production of crops with high commercial value, such as vegetables, fruits and pulses. (UNICEF, 1994).

There has been a significant growth in the percentage of women working in industry (122,000 in 1987, increased to 162,000 by 1989). This increase is mainly due to the growth of the maquilas, although there is a lack of statistical information with which to draw conclusions (Vigier, 1992). Maquilas are large factories (60 per cent of them foreign-owned) producing low-cost products at a high rate of output mainly (in the case of Guatemala) for the garment industry. They maximize on the use of the low cost and abundant labour force, and often benefit from the Government's provision of low start-up costs.

One study indicates that of the 70,000 new jobs created in the maquila industry between 1986 and 1991, women made up between 80 and 90 per cent of this labour force; of these, 54 per cent were women aged between 15 and 25; 56 per cent were single and were generally of low formal education (Incer and Cano, 1993). Working conditions are characterized by long shifts, below subsistence wages, lack of job security and no social benefits. It is not uncommon for women to lose their jobs if they become pregnant. There have also been many reports of women workers suffering physical and sexual abuse in the workplace (UNICEF, 1992).

Figures vary on the size of the informal sector in Guatemala. However, it is clear that a greater percentage of women than men are employed in the informal sector and other precarious sectors of employment which lie outside labour regulations. There has been a marked increase as a consequence of worsening economic conditions and the armed conflict. This type of employment allows women to combine work with care of children and domestic labour, even if it is poorly remunerated and more prone to exploitation.

There are several differences in the way women access the informal sector in comparison with men. Women's units of production tend to be concentrated in areas of work which are a direct expansion of their domestic work, such as dressmaking, bakery and tortilla-making. Such activities are often carried out from within the home, since this allows them to carry out their domestic tasks simultaneously. Activities are concentrated in areas where they require little or no training (such as commerce) but where there is also less potential for expansion and which generate relatively smaller incomes ⁽¹⁰⁾ (Messen, 1992).

In the commercial sector women work selling shoes, cigarettes, clothes and so on, in the street, from market stalls or from their homes. They lack any kind of support in caring for their children and so have to take their children with them. They do not have access to favourable credit or training, making it difficult for them to improve their status. They are also faced with increasing competition, a falling demand for their products and long working hours.

The Guatemalan economy is characterized by a large number of small businesses (such as dressmaking, beverages, bakeries and other food products). According to SIMME, women represent 25.8 per cent of those working in the manufacturing sector. In the service sector they run neighbourhood beauty salons, small launderettes, restaurants and food stalls.

There is strong competition between the small businesses of women, notably those concentrated in textile production, where the prices are persistently low due to over-saturation of the market. Women tend to take small loans, which attract high interest, making it difficult for them to pay the money back. Although women have equal access to credit by law, sexual discrimination persists. There are several "solidarity credit" programmes, but most women are unaware of them (Messen, 1992).

Women's work is not equally remunerated. In the industrial sector, the average income of women is 43 per cent that of men's; in commerce, women receive 60 per cent of the average wage of men; in the service sector, the average salary of women is 63 per cent of men's. The average income of women in the informal sector (which employs 65 per cent of women workers) is only 35 per cent of the income of women in the formal sector. Among technicians, managers and administrators, discrepancies between the average wages of men and women are even higher (Vigier, 1992).

Economically active women tend to be young, 36 per cent of them being under 24 years of age. However, women's entry into the labour market tends to happen later in life than that of men. Only 7.8 per cent of women under 14 are registered as working, although this low proportion is probably due to under-registration of the activities of girls. Women's participation (at least that which is registered) increases after 15 years of age, which is the threshold age. Women between the ages of 30 and 49 years participate in the labour market in greater numbers. (Vigier, 1992).

A socio-demographic inquiry in 1981 found that there were 100,000 children working in Guatemala, 74 per cent in the private sector, 20 per cent for their relatives and 5 per cent self-employed. Poor economic conditions (and losing their parents for some) have increasingly forced children and adolescents to join the labour force very early. In 1989, 4.8 per cent of men and 5.4 per cent of women workers were between 10 and 14 years of age, and 14.1 per cent of men and 17 per cent of women workers between 15 and 19 years (UNICEF, 1992a). Among girls under 19 years of age who were employed in 1991-92, 7.8 per cent had begun their working life by the age of five, 16.2 per cent by the age of nine, and 59.9 per cent began working between the ages of 10 and 14. Only 3.7 per cent of these girls and young women had finished primary school before beginning their working lives (Childhope, 1994).

For most teenage girls, domestic work is one of the few opportunities open to them. There are an estimated 300,000 girls and women employed as domestic workers in Guatemala. Most of them are indigenous women, from rural areas, illiterate and unable to speak Spanish. The majority start this type of work as children. Employees in this sector cannot participate in the social security system, nor is their employment regulated by labour legislation. With no minimum hours or salary, many domestic workers are also victims of physical and sexual abuse (UNICEF, 1992).

Some 224,000 children are estimated to be in poor living conditions and in extreme poverty in 176 different urban areas in the capital. These children and their families live without basic services and in poor housing, often limited to one room. Under these conditions, women and girls are at risk of sexual, physical and psychological abuse. Many of them end up living on the streets. They barely manage to survive by selling flowers, sweets, food, looking after cars, selling newspapers and shoe-cleaning. Some of them enter prostitution to survive.

Childhope (1994) reports that many of these girls come from dysfunctional families: 87 per cent of those who survive through prostitution claimed to have been raped or abused in the home, in many instances by the father. According to the report, 85 per cent suffered from STDs; 30 per cent had undergone an average of two abortions; 25 per cent had given birth to more than one child; and 90 per cent used some kind of drug. Most (80 per cent) claimed that they could only afford to eat once a day and 70 per cent had been confined for a period of time in a remand institution. Unaccompanied girls and boys who are living on the streets of the capital city are particularly at risk and continue to be specifically targeted for extra-judicial execution by paramilitary groups and allegedly state-sponsored security forces (CERIGUA, 1996c).

10. WOMEN'S HEALTH

The health of all Guatemalans, including women, has improved gradually over the past 40 years. However, given the economic and socio-demographic indicators which determine the basic conditions of life -- such as nutrition, housing, education -- the health situation in Guatemala remains one of the worst in Latin America.

As a consequence of the programme of structural adjustment, expenditure on health has contracted from 1.9 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 1 per cent in 1992 (Samayoa, 1993). Only 54 per cent of the population have access to health care (42 per cent through the public and 12 per cent through the private sector). These services are not evenly distributed across the country; most are concentrated in metropolitan areas. In 1992, 80.3 per cent of the country's doctors and 56 per cent of nurses were located in urban centres. The regions having least access to health services are the north, north-west and south-west where 80.3 per cent of the indigenous population and over 50 per cent of the whole population reside (ibid, UNICEF, 1994).

Not only are health services scarce and concentrated in urban areas, they are oriented towards curative rather than preventative medicine. No effort has been made to integrate western and traditional health systems, such as traditional birth attendants (TBAs), with a consequent waste of human and technical resources, in a country where both are scarce.

There is a lack of coordination between the different bodies providing health care -- the Ministry of Health, private services and the non-governmental sector. Due to the deterioration in health service provision, the numbers of mutual help networks and other initiatives have mushroomed, most of which have been undertaken by women.

Public spending has been neglected to the detriment of people's health. For example, drinking water supplies in urban areas reach 71 per cent of the population but only 27 per cent in rural areas; the sewage system only supplies 41 per cent of the population in urban areas and 29 per cent in rural areas. This disproportionately affects women, especially in the rural areas where they spend an average of about one hour every day carrying water (PDH, 1994).

The high incidence of pregnancies among Guatemalan women is in part related to the low level of education of mothers, the lack of knowledge of methods of contraception and family planning and women's lack of control over their own reproductive systems. Since the survival of households depends upon labour resources, there is a strong incentive among both men and women to have large numbers of children. The short intervals between pregnancies and the frequency of teenage pregnancies are also due to lack of information, low levels of education and the long reproductive life, particularly among indigenous women for many of whom it begins at around 14 years of age.

According to UNICEF, Guatemalan women's mortality rate is one of the highest in Latin America: 8.1 per 1,000 between 1985 and 1990. Mortality, as well as fertility rates, vary according to the social position, ethnicity, residence and education of a woman. Mortality rates among indigenous and rural women, for instance, are 50 per cent higher than among the rest of the female population. In 1981, according to one source, the main causes of mortality of women between 15 and 44 years of age were, in order of importance: 13.1 per cent intestinal infections (diarrhea), 12.8 per cent accidents, 11.3 per cent different forms of violence (homicides and military conflict), 11.3 per cent respiratory infections (pneumonia and influenza) and 7.9 per cent due to childbirth complications (García and Gomáriz, 1989).

Maternal mortality is 200 per 100,000 live births. In 1989, registered maternal mortality rates were 12.9 per cent for the Petén and north-western region and 7.06 per cent for the metropolitan area. However, the true figures are thought to be much higher, the national maternal mortality rate being estimated at 20 per cent. The reasons for death during labour were: haemorrhage (49 per cent), sepsis (20 per cent), toxaemia (9 per cent) and others (22 per cent). Maternal mortality is also strongly linked with malnourishment and preventable infections (UNICEF/SEGEPLAN, 1991).

Approximately 75 per cent of births in rural areas occur at home, often in very poor hygienic conditions, and are not always attended by trained personnel. Trained professionals only attend 30 per cent of births in the country: 10 per cent of indigenous births and 59.9 per cent of births in urban areas. The attendance of professional medical assistance at a birth is also closely related to the level of the woman's education, with 96 per cent of university educated women being attended to by a doctor, compared with only 12.6 per cent of women without a formal education (Samayoa, 1993; UNICEF, 1994). The lack of adequate medical assistance during pregnancy (65 per cent of pregnant women did not have any antenatal check-ups) and at birth leave women with permanent health disorders, such as anaemia, urinary incontinence, uterine prolapse, genital and urinary infections and vaginal fissures. Such conditions provoke unnecessary physical suffering, socially isolate women and limit their capacity for work (UNICEF, 1994).

In a 1995 study, 78.6 per cent of women claim they have information about contraceptive methods; of these, 78 per cent know about artificial methods and only 29 per cent are informed about natural methods. There is a substantial difference between indigenous women and ladinas, since among the former, only 52 per cent claim to know about contraception methods, in contrast with 93 per cent of ladina women. A third of those without any formal education do not know contraceptive methods, while 95 per cent of women who have completed their primary education do know (APROFAM, 1985; INE et al, 1996). Nonetheless, according to UNICEF, only 23 per cent of women have access to contraceptives.

Only 21.4 per cent of those women who claimed to know about methods of contraception (of any kind) actually used them. There are sharp differences between rural and urban women: 49 per cent of women in the metropolitan area used contraception in comparison with 19.8 per cent in rural areas; 43.3 per cent of ladinas in the interior against 9.6 per cent of indigenous women. Educational differences are also reflected: only 14.1 per cent of women without any education used artificial forms of contraception in 1995, in contrast with 72.1 per cent of women with a university education. Reasons for not using contraception are mainly: lack of knowledge, fear of possible secondary effects, opposition from their partner as well as cultural factors (INE et al, 1996).

Almost half of the 21.4 per cent of women who use some method of contraception resort to sterilization as a method, especially older women and those with high numbers of children. Only 1.5 per cent of couples use condoms (INE et al, 1996). The low use of contraceptives contrasts with the high number of unwanted pregnancies: 53 per cent of women in relationships, particularly those aged between 25 and 49 years and including those who have been sterilized, do not want to have more children. (García and Gomáriz, 1989).

Guatemalan law prohibits abortion except in cases where the woman's life is in imminent danger. If convicted of having, or attempting to have, an illegal abortion, a custodial sentence normally follows. Women desperate to have an abortion use illegal clinics where a number of women die every year. In April 1996, at least 13 of these illegal abortion clinics, in the capital alone, were under police investigation (CERIGUA, 1996a).

As with other countries in Central America, in Guatemala there continues to be a commonly held perception that AIDS is only a problem for homosexual men. There is no official data on levels of HIV and AIDS in Guatemala. However, according to studies conducted mainly on ladina women in the capital city, the number of women diagnosed with AIDS has increased dramatically during the 1990s, reaching almost one in four of all reported cases by early 1994 (Bezmalinovic et al, 1994). Socio-cultural norms that encourage men to indulge in sex and women to be passive and uninformed about such matters, increase women's vulnerability to STDs, including HIV. There is a general lack of communication between partners on sexual matters and consequently protective behaviours against STDs are not adopted. There are no figures of current levels, but according to estimates of the Pan-American Health Organisation, there will be 81,000 new cases of AIDS by the year 2000 (CERIGUA, 1996f).

Due to lack of reliable statistics, it is only possible to draw a general picture of the situation of disabled women in Guatemala. Physical disabilities due to the conflict are not prevalent. Mines were not extensively used by either side in the war. Torture was used extensively against men and women by the security forces, but the resulting scars of survivors tend to be psychological.

According to available sources, in 1992 there were 26,769 women registered as disabled: 5,235 were blind, 4,700 were deaf, 3,652 were paralysed, 1,496 were amputees, 4,428 had mental disabilities and 7,480 other disabilities (UNICEF\OMS\OPS, 1992). Eighty per cent of disabled men and women live in rural areas, where they lack basic services and assistance. Poverty prevents most travelling to urban areas for medical examinations or treatment.

11. GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

As noted, Guatemala has ratified all the existing international conventions with regards to the elimination of gender inequities. However, the ratification of legislation is insufficient to prevent gender discrimination as the Government has yet to establish the mechanisms to channel its implementation.

The role the Government of Guatemala plays in facilitating the return process and the reintegration of returnees and displaced people is carried out by a series of government and non-government organizations and is uncoordinated.

The Guatemalan Government, The Special Commission for Attention to Refugees and Repatriates (CEAR) and UNHCR developed a three-phase plan for the return of refugees under the International Conference on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA). (For more details on CIREFCA see section 12.) The first phase was the reception of returnees and the provision of emergency aid. The second phase involved projects funded by CIREFCA and the UN Programme for People Displaced, Refugees and Repatriates in Central America (PRODERE), such as primary health care, agriculture and literacy programmes. The third phase involved long term sustainable development to be implemented by the Government in collaboration with NGOs. The National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ) was set up by the Government to finance development in the regions to which the refugees were expected to return. Aware that the government did not have the financial or human resources to implement the extensive reconstruction and development programmes needed, CEAR attempted to collaborate with NGOs. But suspicious of CEAR links to the military, NGOs were reluctant to work with them. Conversely, the Government and armed forces were resentful of NGOs' ability to work with the rural poor and were hostile towards them.

In Guatemala, eight social funds have been established since 1990, the largest of which are FONAPAZ and the Social Investment Fund (FIS). Both use a decentralised model designed to involve municipalities, grass-roots groups, NGOs and the private sector in carrying out local projects. FIS is a semi-autonomous agency which works in poor rural areas. FIS has received international support from the World Bank and other donors such as Germany and Japan. Verification that funds administered through FIS actually go to where they are intended for has been raised as an issue in the past by some observers.

The National Commission for Attention to Returnees, Refugees and Displaced People (CEAR) is the government institution providing assistance to the displaced and formerly displaced. It is mainly concerned in the actual physical return of refugees and assisting them in accessing land. Internally, CEAR works principally with INTA and externally with COMAR and UNHCR. One of CEAR's main constraint