ILO - Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-Affected Countries

ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict

Guidelines for Employment and Skills Training in Conflict-affected Countries

Abstract

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Training Policies and Systems Branch
Employment and Training Department
International Labour Office, Geneva, 1997

Preface
Executive Summary
1. Introduction
2. Conflict and Development: Major Issues
3. Programme Guidelines
4. ILO Potential Actions

PREFACE

The large number of armed conflicts around the world and their impact constitute a major threat to development and social progress in the world today. Employment promotion and skills training are among the critical efforts required for effective reintegration of the millions of conflict-affected groups. They are also indispensable for reconstruction and sustainable peace building. The adverse socio-economic, political, psychological, physical and human consequences of armed conflicts however make employment promotion and skills training a complex issue to tackle. Innovative approaches are required that take adequate account of the nature of the context and its challenges. The guidelines contained in this document are an effort to elaborate the required approaches. They have been prepared as a planning and support tool for policy makers, programme planners and implementers and for other relevant actors at the national, regional and international levels.

The document analyzes, in a succinct form, some of the key issues to be taken into account and provides specific programme guidelines. In addition, it attempts to spell out ILO's potential actions. For a more detailed examination of the latter, the reader should consult the Statement on ILO Policy on Conflict-Affected Countries, adopted at an Interregional Seminar in Turin (November, 1997 ) as well as the document Towards a Framework for ILO Policy and Action in the Conflict-Affected Context (ILO, 1997). The development and utilization of the guidelines should be a dynamic and flexible process. Adaptation of these general guidelines to specific conflict-affected country contexts and illustration of the issues with concrete examples of relevant programmes and projects in such contexts are called for.

We would appreciate receiving feedback from the users of the guidelines to assist the ILO in the process of continually revising them to enhance their relevance. Such feedback should be transmitted to Eugenia Date-Bah, Training Policies and Systems Branch, ILO, CH-1211, Geneva 22, Switzerland.

The guidelines form one of the outputs of the ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict, under implementation during the 1996-97 biennium. The Programme's objective was to enhance local, national and international capacity to plan and implement effective reintegration, reconstruction and peace-building programmes. Many country studies and other analyses in the different regions of the world, national and interregional seminars and consultative meetings were undertaken. A number of outputs were produced some of which can be found in the bibliography and further reading list at the end of this document.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the following to the preparation of the Guidelines: a) external consultants Chris Cramer and John Weeks; b) Eugenia Date-Bah, coordinator of the action programme; c) Paulo Barcia, Irma Specht and a number of ILO field and headquarters staff, both within and outside the action programme; and d) many ILO tripartite constituents, especially those who attended the ILO Interregional Seminar on Reintegration of Conflict-affected Groups, held, 3-7 November 1997, at Turin.

Maria Ducci
Chief, Training and Systems Branch
Employment and Training Department

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document discusses the requirements for employment and skills promotion in conflict- affected countries, focusing on how training and employment programmes should be adapted to this context. The most appropriate mix of tools and methods will depend on the specific circumstances of each conflict affected country. There is the particular need, in such circumstances, for an integrated approach and clearly defined partnerships among a range of actors, local, national and international.

When guidelines are applied to particular situations, they must take account of the origins of a given conflict. Social tensions that contribute to conflicts tend to outlast a formal period of conflict, and need to be addressed by programmes of reintegration and recovery. This document strongly emphasises the need for reintegration programmes to begin with thorough research and analysis of: the origins and impact of specific conflict; and the associated pattern of requirements designed to meet the needs of the diverse conflict affected people. Further, each programme should respond to the manner in which conflict has affected society. The impact of conflict is both direct and indirect. It is manifested in many ways, on combatants, women, the internally and externally displaced, disabled persons, children and refugees. Each group has particular needs. The various groups are, however, not exclusive; and their needs should be 'mainstreamed' in programmes, rather than addressed in programmes that segregate the groups.

Institutions are typically weakened by conflicts, and prior institutional weaknesses may also be among the contributing causes of conflict. Institutional weaknesses require and create an opportunity for close collaboration between institutions such as in employment and skills programmes in the conflict affected countries. The preferred response should be to work with, and simultaneously build up, national and local capacity rather than to bypass the weak local institutions by setting up parallel, externally driven mechanisms for programme delivery.

Workers are made vulnerable by conflict. The public and private capital stock is depleted and labour encounters constraints on its mobility. Much of the mobility that occurs separates people from social support networks and productive assets and leaves them doubly vulnerable. There is an urgent need for improved governance of labour markets to facilitate the reintegration of refugees/ returnees, ex-combatants, war-widows, and others into labour markets. Here also there may be a need to reform regulations if they stifle impact negatively for labour demand. There is an urgent need for improved labour market information systems in the conflict-affected countries. Information can be accumulated rapidly using techniques such as the key informant system. This information should be part of a continuous and on-going exercise. It will, however, be difficult to achieve the objective of employment promotion when macroeconomic conditions are overly restrictive. Macro economic policy should take note of the specific economic and social conditions of conflict affected countries.

Responding to the challenge of conflict-affected populations involves simultaneous implementation of a range of programmes such as : life and peace skills, vocational training, small and micro-enterprise development, and labour intensive infrastructure works. These must be co-ordinated to minimize duplication and maximize complementarities. Such programmes should be directed at communities that contribute to their design and implementation, rather than at special groups. Vocational training and other programmes targeted at ex-combatants can cause perceptions of discriminatory treatment of the other conflict-affected groups and undermine social reintegration. Nevertheless, in some cases there are pragmatic reasons for targeting resources to ex-combatants. At the same time, programmes need to be integrated and dynamic: not only should their component parts relate to one another; but also there should be an ongoing process of information gathering, programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and continual improvements to programme and project design in response to the rapidity of change in the conflict-affected context.

Programmes should maximize participation. Although this may impose costs and delays, it can help to consolidate a lasting social peace, while also facilitating national 'ownership' of programmes. The overall approach should be inclusionary, for example, mainstreaming ex-combatants or disabled persons into programmes for the public at large. As well as lessening the likelihood of discrimination, this approach could reduce administrative and monitoring costs.

Infrastructure rehabilitation and extension plays a central role in most post-conflict programmes. Infrastructure tends to suffer severely in conflict, while being critical to the social, economic and political recovery and cohesion of a country. Infrastructure works have great potential to create employment, directly and indirectly. The labour intensity of a given infrastructure rehabilitation scheme can vary and should be evaluated carefully at an early stage. This involves balancing labour absorption against output quality and long-run maintenance cost. There are various institutional systems for the management and implementation of infrastructure works. 'Best practice' will vary with local institutional capacities. Programmes should aim to create effective partnerships between state and private sector bodies, and to include local communities.

Conflict interrupts skills development for many wage earning and self-employment activities. It disrupts social and other mechanisms through which people develop social skills. Therefore, a skills and employment crisis usually occurs in conflict affected countries, and is often an intensification of the skills shortage prior to conflict. Furthermore, the skills required may change as a result of destruction to economic structure, and disruptions to family life. There will be a need for a wide variety of training provision, including life skills. There may be a need both for training programmes specifically designed at demobilised combatants, disabled persons, women, and children, as well as for communities. However, the social return to including vulnerable groups in broader programmes is likely to be higher than having programmes that segregate people into different schemes. Where possible, training should be provided in communities rather than in distant training centres. On the whole, a flexible approach and the use of a variety of training providers are advisable.

Vocational skills for self- and wage-employment need urgent development. This is also true for businesses skills, which can quickly contribute to employment growth. Such training should be for both the formal and the informal sectors. Because conflict-affected countries are so diverse in terms of levels of development, business skills training must be flexible and adaptive. Many conflict affected countries are low-income, in which the small and informal enterprises provide a major proportion of employment. Promotion programmes should be linked to patterns of demand for goods and services, and in particular should be co-ordinated with infrastructure availability and rehabilitation.

During the profound social and economic changes created by conflict, a number of successful 'conflict entrepreneurs' emerge, with financial assets and experience that can potentially contribute to peace time recovery. Depending on political conditions, it may be appropriate to facilitate the transition of these entrepreneurs into peacetime businesses.

This document also highlights how the ILO specifically can contribute to skills formation and employment promotion in conflict-affected countries. The ILO has a particularly strong role to play, in view of its founding mission, the number of its member states that have experienced or are experiencing conflicts, and Recommendation No. 71 concerning the transition from war to peace, 1944. Central to the effectiveness of ILO operations is co-ordination with other actors, in-country and external. The ILO should be involved from as early a stage as possible in the conflict-affected contexts to plan and design programmes, some of which can be implemented before conflict ends. A unique and important role of the ILO is the fostering of workplace standards and workers' rights, including for small and micro businesses, with a view to ensuring an effective labour force in an inclusive society.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Use of the Guidelines

1. The elements of training and employment programmes are well-known, accumulated over decades of experience. Less well-known, however, is how to adapt them to the conflict-affected context so that they can be implemented effectively. They need to be adjusted to address directly the urgent needs of conflict resolution, reintegration, reconstruction and peace building. This document attempts to present guidelines for the planning and implementation of employment promotion and skills training programmes for the re-integration of conflict-affected people into the mainstream of civil society. In a conflict situation, virtually the entire population is affected to some extent. The focus of the guidelines is on those for whom conflict has disrupted their ability to generate livelihoods.⁽¹⁾ It builds on ILO's experiences, data and insights especially those gathered in recent years such as through the ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (1996-97), International Labour Recommendation No. 71 on the Transition from war to peace and other relevant international labour standards, as well as other pertinent information outside the Organization.

2. The users of this document will be national policy-makers, planners and implementers from government, employers and workers' organizations, other national bodies and actors of civil society, donors, international agencies, bilateral and multilateral bodies and Non-Governmental Organizations in the conflict-affected countries to provide them guidance in planning and implementing skills training and employment promotion programmes. In general, the document stresses that these actors should not act alone but in well-defined partnerships. It is hoped that the document will create an active exchange of views, which will lead to its adaptation to specific contexts and also contribute generally to its improvement.

3. The primary purpose of this document is to provide a planning and programming tool for timely and effective action to implement skills training and livelihood promotion in conflict-affected contexts. To be an effective tool, the guidelines operationalize skills training and employment creation for the specific circumstances of these contexts. Operationalizing programmes is done with full recognition that each conflict situation is different. Conflict affects a range of economies from the very low income (e.g. Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique), to those that are or have been middle income (e.g. Croatia and Bosnia). It is thus difficult to prepare guidelines that will be equally applicable to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Liberia, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. The challenges facing the social partners and other national actors will differ, with regard to level of development and the structure of the economy, as well as the ethnic composition and other diversities of the population, the origins and impact of the conflict, and other features of the country. Thus what will be successful or considered "best practice" in one country may be impossible or ineffective in another; what addresses pressing problems in one region of a country may prove irrelevant or even conflict-inducing in another. The challenges facing the social partners and other national actors in the different contexts will differ, with regard to level of development and the structure of the economy, as well as the ethnic composition of the population, the origins of the conflict, and other factors. However, this does not prevent identifying general operational principles, but it makes it a formidable task and also sets a limit to them, especially in their level of concreteness and even pertinence. The application of such guidelines thus requires flexibility. Ultimately, all guidelines must be adapted to specific contexts and conditions. Thus, comments from users will be required, especially on how the guidelines could be adapted to specific situations and also how to fine-tune them to achieve the appropriate balance between being general and yet pertinent. The elaboration of these guidelines should therefore be seen as " work in progress". The focus of the guidelines is livelihood promotion and skills training in the conflict-affected contexts. Livelihood promotion includes both wage, non-wage or self employment. Training is linked to employment through providing vocational skills, life skills and preparation for employment. This central purpose of the guidelines also serves a political function: to promote policy dialogue among planners, implementers, and donors, in order to generate an interactive exchange in which lessons and experiences are transmitted among the actors in the reintegration and rehabilitation process.

4. It should also be stressed that vocational training and capacity-building are essential components of every integrated programme aimed at the employability of the conflict-affected groups such as through the creation of employment opportunities, self-employment and the development of other remunerative activities. The guidelines presented in this document recognizes this, but to provide scope for more detailed examination of vocational training a separate section is allocated to it. Capacity-building forms the focus of an ILO training package, entitled Skills Support for Capacity-Building of Employment Promoters in the Conflict-Affected Contexts. The training package can be used in conjunction with the guidelines document.

5. Furthermore, this document can be taken as a guide, within the context of the Framework for ILO policy and Action in the Conflict-Affected Context (ILO, 1997), on possible ILO input into the overall Current United Nations effort to ameliorate the causes and effects of conflict in member states. The key to an effective role within the international system is co-ordination among the constituent UN agencies, the international financial institutions and other bodies. One aspect of such co-ordination and of an effective ILO role would be for ILO's participation at an early stage in peace-making and conflict resolution. During that process, the ILO could provide guidance to insert employment and training as a key component of reintegration, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building programmes. But the ILO - and other UN agencies - must preserve neutrality with regard to conflicting groups and interests within society. The ILO can use its traditional tripartite constituency as the basis for promoting open dialogue and 'voice' regulation in support programmes for conflict affected countries, and also as the foundation for promoting reconciliation.

6. Many of the programmes or options for action on livelihoods are relevant for non-conflict situations. However, in a conflict-affected country, there are special problems of design and implementation, which do not present themselves in 'normal' conditions. Especially important is reconstruction of society to meet the needs of the population, which involves, among other things, rehabilitating physical infrastructure, re-establishing the administrative capacity of government and other relevant institutions, and achieving conciliation of previously antagonistic groups. Part of this process is the reintegration of people into the reconstituted social framework. For ex-combatants and displaced persons, this reintegration is also in part a physical relocation. For all conflict-affected groups it is a process of generating livelihoods and overcoming the traumas of violence.

7. This document does not consider in detail the causes of conflict, nor the analytical framework on which reconstruction and reintegration are based, since this detail is provided elsewhere. ⁽²⁾ The causes of conflict are varied and particular and cannot be neatly captured at the level of a general guidelines document. Nevertheless, these guidelines make it clear that all specific programmes must begin with analysis and understanding of the causes of conflict and their implications.

8. Conflict disrupts the development process. Central to reconstruction and reintegration is providing a link from emergency to rehabilitation, and also to the re-initiation of the development process of the conflict-affected country. The guidelines are, therefore, written to incorporate this transition from the outset of reintegration and reconstruction operations.

9. Each conflict has its specific causes, unique solution, and concrete aspects of devastation. Few guidelines can be applied without amendment to all situations. In each country or region of a country, therefore, the relevant actors must assess the appropriateness of each area of the guidelines. This implies that the concept of 'best practice' needs to be interpreted flexibly, so that the particular circumstances of each situation rule decision making.

10. However, experience in different countries can provide a guide to general planning. Discussion of the guidelines by practitioners can help to develop the appropriate flexibility. Thus, the guidelines presented are not written in stone, but form part of an interactive process in which the accumulated knowledge of the various actors is synthesised through discussion and debate.

11. The guidelines put heavy stress on co-operation and division of labour. The reintegration process, designed to facilitate development with an equitable peace, requires the support of all major national, regional and international actors in an inclusive programme of national reconstruction. Coordination is essential among these internal as well as external actors. It is also vitally important to develop institutional capacity and a range of well-defined institutional partnerships between the various actors in the conflict-affected country. This will help to mobilize most effectively the available administrative resources and sources of information; and to enable programmes and projects to be carried out within an integrated framework for greater synergy and impact as well as to better reflect the fullest spread of interests and needs.

12. More detailed sector and subject specific guidelines, such as on "Women and Gender Issues relevant for Skills Training and Employment promotion in the Conflict-Affected Context", " The Trade Unions in Conflict-Affected Countries" and "....The Reintegration of Demobilized Combatants Through Training and Employment " - are available and can be used to supplement the general guidelines contained in this document.

1.2 Glossary of Relevant Terms

13. There is no model of conflict common to all situations. However, the planning and implementation of actions in conflict-affected countries is facilitated by use of key terms. Defining these terms helps to clarify the relationship between the guidelines and the problems they seek to address.

Emergency refers to that period of a conflict during which there is active armed conflict and/or extreme human suffering arising from that conflict, such as famine.
Rehabilitation involves immediate post-war measures to achieve minimum functioning of the transport and communications infrastructure, shelter, and public administration. Rehabilitation measures normally have a short implementation period.
Reconstruction is the first step in initiating the development process, and involvesrepair and expansion of physical facilities, as well as enhancing administrative capacity in the public and private sectors (including NGOs). Rehabilitation and reconstruction are difficult to separate in practice.
Development operations are long-term, continuing the task of reconstruction, but also initiating new programmes to increase physical, human, and social capital.
Reintegration is the general process of re-absorbing the populations affected by conflict into civil society .
Reconciliation is the process of progressively eliminating the tensions and animosities that generated conflict.
Targeting is the identification of people according to pre-set characteristics: ex-combatants, refugees, internally displaced, women, child soldiers, disabled persons etc. The purpose of targeting is to exclude non-targeted people, in principle on objective and fair criteria.

2. CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: MAJOR ISSUES

14. The design and implementation of relevant skills training and livelihood promotion programmes in the conflict-affected countries have, inter alia, to take into account the nature of this context, the conflict-affected groups, and appropriate framework for designing and implementing reintegration programmes .

15. In doing this, it should be borne in mind that the fundamental purpose of reintegration programmes is to contribute to building sustainable peace, a return to civil life and improved material and other conditions of the people. The goal of each actor in the process - local, national or international - should therefore be to contribute to that end. Conflicts can end without being resolved. If so, they may re-occur and thus destroy peace. The process of conflict resolution and peace building seeks, on the one hand, to eliminate certain perceptions, beliefs, and prejudices. On the other hand, it constructs a set of perceptions, beliefs, and positive prejudices that are inconsistent with a return to violence. Implementing the elements of a reintegration programme is in great part technical and managerial. Effective implementation is one of the building blocks in the construction of the edifice of conflict resolution and peace building.

2.1 The conflict-affected context

16. Conflict is a complex process with diverse causes and no general and fixed 'life-cycle'. Review of actual conflicts indicates that most do not conform to the three-fold division: peace, conflict and settlement. Attempts to divide the conflict-affected situation into these phases must inevitably be subjective. Even the dichotomy between conflict and peace can be a misleading simplification. Many countries that suffer from armed conflict do so after an extended period of low-level or regionalized violence. The transition from 'peace' to 'war' is, therefore, a matter of degree and interpretation. Open armed conflicts often emerge after a long-established pattern of heightened and intermittent violence or forms of armed criminality. Continuation, or in some cases, an increase of the latter also tends to affect stability after conflict. Furthermore, formal peace accords are frequently followed by a continuation of armed struggles, which wax and wane. With few exceptions, the related processes of reconciliation and reintegration occur in the context of intermittent violence and insecurity. This adds to the difficulty of defining 'peace' precisely. Implementing programmatic responses to conflict situations occurs in the context of waning conflict, rather than in the context of 'peace' as a fixed, achieved state. A major purpose of these responses is to facilitate the process of building or enhancing peace. If their implementation is dependent upon the prior achievement of a steady-state of peace in the strict sense, they will be severely limited in scope and extent. Furthermore, there is considerable diversity between conflicts in their duration. While many are of long duration, others are relatively of short or medium-term. Some engulf the whole country while others are localized in only some parts of the country. The scale of the impact of conflicts thus tends to differ. Therefore, every guideline for action has its origin and its application in the concrete circumstances of each conflict.

Causes of conflicts

17. Conflicts arise from a variety of causes - such as ethnic tensions, struggle for independence, social exclusion and inequality, poverty, competition for scarce resources, religious differences, oppression and authoritarianism, and other political, economic, social and human human rights' factors. Programmes to facilitate reintegration should be designed and their feasibility assessed with an understanding of these causes. No programme can achieve success without specifically taking account of the origins of conflict and the form taken by social tension (Baden 1997, p. 81).

18. Labour and other economic factors are rarely the sole cause of conflicts. However, they can intensify tensions and accelerate the out-break of armed conflict. Poverty, high levels of unemployment and inequalities of income and wealth distribution can be a major source of tension, more so when they change rapidly, because stable distributions may be accepted as part of the 'normal' operation of society. Changes in income and wealth inequalities result in changes in relative power in society, which affects access to resources. When access by people is restricted, competition over resources can take socially dysfunctional forms, especially if those whose access is restricted perceive themselves as having a corporate or communal identity. A major purpose of programmes of reintegration is to reduce perceived and actual inequities in the competition over limited resources.

19. In some cases , competition over land can be a major contributory factor to conflict. This competition can intensify during the transition to peace, because during armed conflict the general disruption of social life can produce conflicting claims on land. For this reason, arriving quickly at a settlement of the land question is essential to prevent the re-kindling of conflict. Resolution of the land question can itself be a cause of conflicts, and, therefore, must be managed carefully, with the participation of contending agents and groups. Resolution can, but need not in all cases, involve land redistribution. The less radical measure, land titling, can be equally contentious if multiple claims on land are widespread.

20. While not usually autonomous causes of conflict, environmental debasement and population pressure can increase competition over resources. In some cases, this can provoke a sense of desperation in populations that transforms tension into armed struggle. In many cases, environmental degradation and increased population-land ratios can be counteracted by investment and application of different technologies (Karshenas 1991). However, in very poor countries, as in sub-Saharan Africa, the public sector may lack the resources to introduce resource-enhancing measures. Thus, the general level of development, environmental pressures, and population growth combine to create situations vulnerable to conflict.

Impact of conflict

21.The impact of armed conflicts is on the whole negative, but there can also be some positive impact such as gender role changes and democracy. First and foremost, conflicts result in human suffering and death. The human losses outweigh economic costs. The primary reason for ending conflicts is to reduce human suffering. This effect of war cannot be reconstructed, though rehabilitation of survivors must be part of any programme of reintegration.

22. Physical damage, for example, to workplaces and infrastructure, can be costed. There are also other direct and indirect costs of conflict. The direct costs include damage to social and economic infrastructure, the physical capital stock, interruption of trading networks and destruction of crops. Indirect costs are the inflation (perhaps caused by government borrowing to fund the war effort), rising external indebtedness, the diversion of labour into military activities, and the decline of private sector investment due to political instability and direct economic costs. In many cases, indirect costs may exceed direct costs, though the former are difficult to measure with precision. The costs of conflict may continue to affect an economy long after a formal peace accord (Stewart 1993).

23. It is sometimes difficult to assess with any accuracy the costs of conflict on variables such as export earnings, inflation or investment. Indirect costs are often increased by non-conflict factors, including government policy. In some cases government policy might have actually contributed to causing conflict, and be the origin of many of the indirect costs.

24. Among the positive effects of conflict can be the establishment of a democratic government with the previously excluded social groups also represented in it. Furthermore, the very strict gender role divisions may break down owing to the experiences during conflict when women are forced by the exigencies of the situation to assume the "so -called male roles" to ensure the survival of their families and other dependents. Reintegration programmes should try to sustain these positive changes and to build upon them.

Institutional weakness

25. A characteristic of conflict-affected countries is the breakdown of governance and other forms of institutional weakness. The document on Towards a Framework for ILO Policy and Action in the Conflict-Affected Context (ILO, 1997) observes:

distrust and suspicion among the political factions and parties to the conflict...
unstable social situation and insufficient social cohesion...
weak administrative and institutional structures...[and] limited capacity for employment creation and for social services under...economic reform programmes". (ILO August 1997, p. 4)

26. The report of an ILO seminar , Challenges for skills training and employment promotion in a country emerging from armed conflict, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (ILO, October 1997, page 4) also notes that among the characteristics of conflict affected countries are: "weak capacity of social institutions, insecure environments, displacement of large numbers of people, returnees, ex/combatants to be demobilized, destroyed infrastructure, land mines littered on farm lands and other relevant sites, distrust, higher levels of social deprivation and poverty, and breakdown of social services and community support structures".

27. If institutions were not weak prior to the conflict, it is in the nature of conflicts that they become so as violence and uncertainly spread. The weakening results from the out-migration of trained people, disruption of settlement patterns, and the loss of authority by the government (in extreme cases there may be no government in place). The reconciliation process typically begins in a situation in which the institutional capacity to implement programmes is quite limited.

28. There are basically two strategies for implementing programmes in such a context of diminished institutional capacity. One is to build up programmes outside the national institutional framework in a bid to maximise implementation efficiency and speed. The other is to focus a significant part of the programme directly on building and reinforcing national and local institutional capacity, in order to implement reintegration programmes through domestic institutions. The second strategy is clearly the more sustainable and, hence, preferable approach. It has the added advantage of making it more likely that programmes can pick up on locally expressed needs, feeding into a programme whose design and implementation have a higher degree of local and national "ownership" and decision making that can contribute to sustainability of the programmes. Therefore, high priority must be given, early on (i.e. even during "emergency" phases) to capacity building of local institutions..

29. The weakness of institutions in conflict- affected countries also requires that programmes be implemented with imaginative use of partnerships. Particularly productive would be partnerships involving local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Additional source of partnerships is community participation, based upon organisations of conflict-affected people and associations arising spontaneously from the community in response to concrete needs.

Labour force consequences

30. Reintegration programmes occur when the public and private capital stock has been dramatically depleted, and when the utilisation of the remaining capital stock is reduced by damage to supporting physical and social infrastructure. The partial destruction of the capital stock of a country strengthens the relative bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis labour by increasing the supply of labour relatively to capital. Thus, conflict situations are typically characterised by an increase in the vulnerability of wage and non-wage workers. This vulnerability can take several forms:

inability of labour to resist wage decreases;
deterioration of working conditions that threatens health and safety;
suppression of workers' rights, including the right to organise collectively; and
destruction or loss of productive assets of rural and urban informal sector workers, such as farm lands, work shelters and other properties.

31. Vulnerability results from other factors. Both capital and labour are mobile, but labour's mobility is different from that of other commodities. Workers are enmeshed within communities and families, which limits their mobility in practice. This relative immobility of labour weakens its bargaining position vis-à-vis employers. This is intensified if conflict provokes capital flight.

32. A requirement for normalising the labour market in conflict-affected countries is the reintegration of displaced people, returnees/refugees and ex-combatants, into communities, which lays the basis for reducing the vulnerability of workers. Normalization further requires re-establishing labour market governance. ILO conventions on the protection of migrant workers provide useful and relevant guidelines for governance, for many of the issues and problems are similar (see ILO April 1997, pp. 5-7). Labour markets in conflict-affected countries are excessively flexible, to the point of chaotic. The absence of regulations creates the potential for inequitable employment practices. Application of international labour standards can protect workers and socially-conscious employers.

Diversity and profiles of conflict-affected groups

33. Conflict is a social phenomenon, in which the entire population of a country is affected. To some degree, everyone in society must be a part of the reconstruction and reconciliation exercise. All countries have diverse populations, with interests and needs varying according to age, gender, religion, culture, social class, culture, region and ethnicity. Planning social and economic programmes for peace-building must take this diversity before the conflict as well as those emanating from the conflict into account into account. Conflict affected countries also have conflict-specific diversity which cuts across peacetime diversities. Conflict-specific diversity results from the concrete manner in which conflict affects people. Recognising this diversity is a prerequisite of effective programme design and implementation because conflict-specific diversity corresponds to a diversity of needs during and after a conflict. Important conflict-affected groups are ex-combatants, the injured and the disabled persons, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Within each of these broad categories, there is further diversity. Among combatants, for example, there are adult males, adult females, youth, child soldiers and orphans. Each group has specific problems that programmes ideally should address. In brief both the diversity after and before conflict should be taken into account.

34. Gender and age diversity should also be considered for all categories of conflict-affected people. Women often suffer the effects of conflict in one or more of a variety of ways: through loss of family members, through participating in flight from conflict zones; through direct sexual violations as part of the violence of conflict; and indeed in some conflicts women can even benefit from a change in traditionally ascribed gender roles and division of labour which must be recognized in programme planning .

35. When using these categories to plan and implement programmes, it should be recognised that they are not exclusive; a person or family can fall into more than one, such as being injured and displaced. Therefore, analytical use of these categories does not necessarily imply specific programmes for each group. While these categories are useful, they are socially defined in each context. They should not be treated as having a common definition across countries. Further, their use in each situation must be appropriate in order to avoid aggravating the tensions which reintegration programmes seek to reduce (see Baden 1997, pp. xxi-xxii). Groups with special needs can in many cases be 'mainstreamed' into training and employment programmes, to avoid segregating them from the general process of reintegration.

36. Demobilised soldiers represent a group whose particular role in society must be accommodated. Inherent in the peace process is the reduction of the size of the military. In practice, some form of demobilisation and reintegration occurs, with or without government planning and support. However, demobilised soldiers are not the only group whose situation changes fundamentally during the transition from war to peace. Refugees also require a form of "demobilisation", especially those resident, perhaps against their will, in camps. To the extent that demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers also involves aid to disabled soldiers other disabled people who were not soldiers should also be considered (see Medi 1997a & 1997b). There are political reasons for targeting programmes to combatants, if they represent a threat of violence and crime in the absence of effective reintegration into civilian life. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to place first priority on pragmatic considerations rather than equity of treatment across groups. Political imperatives have to be respected. However, the political pressure to focus programmes on demobilised soldiers will not be the same in all countries and circumstances, and greater space for more inclusive programmes for conflict affected populations may open up over time, once immediate objectives of demobilisation have been secured.

37. The goal is that combatants become ex-combatants, and have to reintegrate into society as civilians. This process is fraught with practical concrete problems of implementation. In many situations, the distinction between combatants and civilians is not clear for some or all parties to the conflict. For a government in power, the making of warfare is not restricted to the military, but also includes the police, security forces, and explicitly or implicitly sanctioned irregular forces and militias. On the side of the insurrectionists, the degree of formality of the combatants varies from well-trained soldiers to part-time fighters who melt into communities when not engaged in their belligerent activities.

38. This ambiguity results in an unavoidably ad hoc approach to identifying who was or was not a combatant. In and of itself, this need not create implementation difficulties. Practical problems arise when reintegration programmes target ex-combatants for programme-specific benefits. To implement such targeting, a definitive identification of an exclusionary nature is required. This process of identification can prove contentious, and is vulnerable to political manipulation, especially if the representatives of one side of the conflict take the major role in identification.

39. As already noted above, some people gain from war; for example, in provisioning of the military or from undertaking commercial and physical risks (in transport, for example) that most would not countenance. These people do not represent a vulnerable group, but may have a commercial or entrepreneurial role to play when peace is established. Their commercial and entrepreneurial skills could be drawn upon in the implementation of employment and skills programmes. This is a highly sensitive and often political issue. In some countries these "conflict entrepreneurs" are associated with wartime criminality, corruption, etc. Where this is the case, it is unlikely that such people can be drawn into a reintegration programme. No general guideline can do more than suggest that this is one among the many issues that are specific to each conflict and that must be researched and analyzed to provide a basis for effective programme design.

2.2 General Framework for Design and Implementation of Reintegration Programmes

40. The reintegration process involves the simultaneous implementation of a range of programmes such as life skills, vocational training, labour-intensive works, small and micro-enterprise promotion and macro-economic initiatives to list the most obvious. The conception and implementation of reintegration programmes is often dictated by the contents of the peace agreement as well as the pace and phasing of the peace process. The contents of the peace agreement can generally determine the strategies, modalities and time table as well as the support for skills training and employment promotion programmes within reintegration, reconstruction and peace building processes. The operating environment for different actors -both national and external organizations - thus depends partly on the resources invested in the development of a final peace agreement. Where such an agreement is formulated and agreed upon rapidly, its principles and implications may not be widely shared by people 'on the ground'. Again, these circumstances are likely to sharpen the tension between the urgency of implementing reintegration programmes and the need to make programmes appropriate and sustainable. Programme designers, national and external, need to be fully aware of these issues if they are to put together genuinely effective programmes.

41. Furthermore, programmes, nationally funded or with external support, usually require a functioning government which has at least the tacit support of all parties to the conflict. This condition, however, does not often exist in the conflict-affected context and yet programmes have to be pursued. Closely related to this, implementation requires that the actors have adequate security from violence. The latter, however, need not require a complete end to hostilities as this is rarely possible in the conflict-affected context.

An Integrated approach

42. It is extremely important that the various components and phases of reintegration programmes with a focus on skills training and employment promotion for conflict affected populations are integrated. This obviously increases their efficiency and scope for continuous learning and improvement. It also increases the scope for the effective coordination among international and national (including local) organizations as examined above. To this end, it is possible to see the programme guidelines in Chapter Three not as discrete project packages but as related components of a single, flexible integrated programme.

Local Ownership, participation and sustainability

43. Institutional weakness in conflict affected countries contributes to the tendency for reintegration programmes to be led by external actors, especially donors. As far as possible, this should be avoided. The reality, of course, is that this is never entirely avoided, given the institutional dynamics of large international agencies. But a general guideline is that programmes ought to be designed with this tension in mind; this might mitigate the tendency for frustration with institutional weakness to lead rapidly to the sacrifice of goals of "ownership" and sustainability. The best role for external actors is a facilitating role; even mediation by external actors, valuable as it may be, runs the risk of distorting the peace process.

44. From the outset, programmes must be "owned" by national actors, with external actors disciplining themselves in line with an advisory or facilitating role. When governments are weak, national ownership can be facilitated through participation of other national and local bodies, something that is stressed repeatedly in these guidelines. Participation, by communities and interest groups, is both the vehicle for national ownership and a bulwark against losing it. If there is active participation by conflict affected groups, national ownership will follow. The difficulty to watch for here is that the larger the agency involved, the harder it tends to be to engage the community genuinely; even local level NGOs, which may be better equipped to promote participation, often on close inspection are not fully participatory in their approaches. Programmes need to be alert to the difficulties in realising participation and to the need to encourage mechanisms that can help in relaxing the specific constraints on participation and national ownership of programmes.

45. Community participation prevents an inconsistency between the perception of needs at the central level and actual needs of communities. However, in conflict-affected communities, it may prove difficult to achieve effective representation of all interests. When animosities persist to the point of preventing a community consensus, it is necessary to seek modes of mediation, which could be provided by government at different levels, NGOs, or other agents of civil society. Where no consensus can be reached, implementation can be postponed, in the hope that project success in consensual communities will prompt conflict resolution in other communities.

46. External actor, such as donors, can facilitate national ownership by not setting preconceived rules for efficiency, not stressing 'best practice' out of context, and not applying foreign 'models' of conflict resolution which will result in external actors taking de facto ownership. Each conflict affected country is a new territory which can be explored better with national actors. Genuine 'ownership' may be an ideal that cannot be fully realised but can still be aimed at.

47. When lack of consensus at the local level blocks implementation, planners at a higher level can design programmes to minimise the tensions they generate. This can be achieved by designing programmes to benefit entire communities, rather that target groups. For example, general literacy or skills training open to all may prove locally acceptable and effective, while vocational training for ex-combatants would prompt perceptions of discriminatory treatment.

48. External actor, such as donors, can facilitate national ownership by not setting preconceived rules for efficiency, not stressing 'best practice' out of context, and not applying foreign 'models' of conflict resolution which will result in external actors taking de facto ownership. Each conflict affected country is a new territory which can be explored better with national actors. Genuine 'ownership' may be an ideal that cannot be fully realised but can still be aimed at.

49. An important, but sometimes under-emphasised, aspect of participation is debate over post-conflict economic policy. Arriving at the appropriate economic policy (this is discussed later in this chapter) is not a purely technical exercise. Governments have a responsibility to inform and consult with their populations in the formulation of economic policy. External funders have the responsibility to encourage debate, which both educates the population and links adjustment to local needs and conditions.

An Inclusionary Approach

50. A participatory approach implies that reintegration programmes be inclusive, perhaps in most cases aimed at communities rather than specific groups. An inclusionary approach could be key to the process of creating the perception that peace will be built upon the general welfare and social justice.

51. Concretely, an inclusionary process must make cautious use of targeting as method for rationing benefits. Targeting is by intent exclusionary, even when planners design what they consider to be objective criteria. Where possible, governments and other actors should avoid use of targeting, since it can easily be interpreted by non-beneficiaries as discriminatory and based on political criteria.

52. The question of whether or not to target groups becomes particularly sensitive for programmes for combatants, which involve demobilisation as a first step, and subsequent reintegration. The first is essential for the transition to peace, and its success can be complicated by benefit targeting in reintegration programmes. Creating programmes targeted to ex-combatants feeds back into the demobilisation phase, because strict targeting requires prior strict identification. Strict identification can delay the demobilisation process, and within the subsequent reintegration programme can generate perceptions of inequitably preferential treatment. Finally, the identification process by its nature cannot be completely transparent, due to its inherent ambiguities, and due to the confidentiality of information on individuals. Nevertheless, as stressed earlier, reconciliation and reintegration programmes must respect political imperatives, and these may often prioritize some element of targeting for ex-combatants. The issue should at least be discussed as far as possible, in order to clarify the objectives and issues. In other words, it should not be assumed that, because the question of demobilisation of ex-combatants is a political question, therefore necessarily political parties and representatives have no interest in the technical and broader issues of inclusionary versus exclusionary approaches.

53. To avoid complicating the demobilisation process and undermining popular support for the reintegration programme, targeting can be minimised, used only when it would be perceived as appropriate. Reintegration programmes aimed at ex-combatants might be perceived by the rest of the population as a rewarding mechanism for this group. Concretely, therefore, ex-combatants should be 'mainstreamed' into programmes for the public at large: programmes targeted for all those injured or traumatised, civilians or ex-combatants; skills training and employment schemes that are inclusive; and support for micro and small enterprises which is independent of the role played by beneficiaries during the conflict. In this context, programmes for ex-combatants can distinguish between demobilisation payments and reintegration payments. The former provide incentive for soldiers to demobilise and cover the immediate cost of returning to civilian life. Ex-combatants as a special group need not receive targeted reintegration payments; rather they can acquire reintegration benefits as individual participants in programmes for all conflict-affected people.

54. Such an inclusionary approach would greatly reduce administrative and monitoring costs. It would also facilitate administration by local actors, who would not be placed in the position of allocating benefits on the basis of previous political roles of applicants. The inclusionary approach would target communities, which is consistent with the general goal of re-constructing civil society. Community targeting has the added advantage of being transparent: if, on publicly accessible criteria, some communities gain disproportionately to their needs, it will be clear for all to see.

55. An inclusionary, community-focused approach would facilitate broad-based participation, and integrate special interest groups (e.g., representing ex-combatants) into a broader political discussion which is concerned with collective responses to conflict-created needs. This approach might reduce interest group competition over benefits; or, at the least, direct competition along lines of collective interests.

56. An inclusionary approach to training and employment, which is delivered to communities, facilitates 'mainstreaming' vulnerable groups into the reintegration process. This is especially important for women, who run the risk of being segregated into special projects that reinforce gender segregation and stereotyped economic and social roles. Other groups, such as the long -term unemployed, (ex-)prisoners and the police in the conflict-affected countries, where this force is over-represented, need also to be included in employment promotion programmes to support political stability.

Economic structures and reintegration programmes

57. The design and delivery of programmes is affected by the structure of the economy, especially its rural-urban division, and the importance of formal employment relatively to informal employment. These divisions are closely correlated with the level of development. In a relatively developed country, e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, programmes would tend to focus on the urban sector and wage employment (Howell 1997). In very low-income countries, emphasis would be on the rural sector and self-employment. These differences have major implications for post-conflict tensions and the process of economic inclusion and reconstruction. For example, in a low income country where the majority of the labour force is in agriculture, a major source of tension in the post-conflict context may arise over the distribution of land. For a more developed country, social peace may require emphasis upon legislation to guarantee the rights of workers to organise collectively.

Macroeconomic conditions

58. Conflict is associated with macroeconomic instability: high inflation, growing indebtedness, and unsustainable balance of payments due to a decline in exports. For action to achieve reconciliation and reintegration to be successful, macroeconomic imbalances require prompt correction. In many cases, this will only be achieved without great social cost by external assistance, much of it as balance of payment support. Stabilisation experience in non-conflict countries does not necessarily provide a guide for policies in conflict-affected countries. At the end of a conflict there is typically excess capacity, which can, in itself, reduce the link between fiscal deficits and inflation. To a great extent, inflation may be the result of a lack of credibility of government policy, rather that strictly economic factors.

59. Given the conditions in conflict-affected countries, external assistance for macroeconomic stability should be extended on flexible terms. Orthodox stabilisation tends to stress reduction in fiscal deficits and strict credit limits for the economy. These measures should be tempered by their possible economic costs, and their effects on the various conflict-affected groups. All efforts should be made to realise a 'peace dividend'; that is, a transfer of public expenditure from military consumption to social programmes. The greater the coordination between the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and other external actors such as UN bodies, including the ILO, at the point of designing economic reform packages, the greater will be the prospects for economic adjustment that is sensitive to the particular needs of conflict affected countries and does not worsen their economic deprivation and poverty.

60. If post-conflict macroeconomic policy and employment promotion are consistent, then the reintegration of conflict-affected groups will be achieved more smoothly. On the other hand, success in generating employment and livelihoods will flounder if macroeconomic policies are framed with the sole purpose of stabilisation. In conflict affected countries, stabilisation may not be a precondition for reviving growth. If policy is too restrictive, it can generate competition over scarce access to livelihoods and rekindle conflict. In light of this possibility, the World Bank, for example, stresses social impact of conditionality as part of its planning for operations assessment in conflict-affected countries (World Bank 1997).

61. Experience shows that there is frequently a contrast between the processes that produce political settlement of a conflict and the subsequent economic programme. The political settlement is typically public with external actors playing a role as mediators. Due to the public nature of the peace settlement, open debate occurs, even if some national actors would prefer otherwise. In contrast, post-conflict adjustment programmes, even when they are externally funded, are not usually characterised by transparency, public participation and debate. In the usual case, adjustment programmes are agreed between governments and funders, then presented to the population as fait accompli. Thus an important element of participation, which is debate over post-conflict economic policy, remains under-emphasized.

62. It should be recognized that arriving at appropriate economic policy is not a purely technical exercise. Governments have a responsibility to inform and consult with their populations in the formulation of economic policy. External funders have the responsibility to encourage debate, which both educates the population and links adjustment to local needs and conditions. Sustainable peace and democratization would be facilitated by a more public and transparent process of determining economic policy. This may enable national and international actors to maximise the complementarities between economic policy and peace building objectives, as opposed to heightening the possible tensions between the two.

63. It is also important to note that a particular opportunity and constraint is provided by the nature of employment and the labour market in conflict affected countries. For, given the disruption to formal sector activities it is common in such countries that the informal and self-employment sectors will have a dominant role in absorbing the labour force. Programmes will have to acknowledge this and focus a significant part of their attention on informal and self-employment activities. At the same time, the very nature of informal sector activities makes it difficult to cover them with formal labour standards and regulations: however, programmes may build awareness of such standards into their interventions.

Information Requirements

64. Planning for skills training and livelihoods is required even prior to the peace agreement and the cessation of conflict. Such planning requires labour market information and also information on the profiles, needs, skills, income-generating activities, existing strengths and expectations of all the diverse conflict-affected people . Thus, early in the reintegration process or even prior to the peace settlement, a system of rapid data collection is required. Background studies can be carried out in anticipation of more stable political conditions. On the basis of the background studies, labour market governance and other programmes can be planned. These two concrete proactive steps put in place programme designs ready for implementation once conditions allow. Rapid response to emergency needs requires that these steps be taken prior to formalizing peace.

65. The information on labour markets and skills collected should cover both the past and also the present. Information on the past indicates the potential for mobilising skills for the peace effort, especially the possibility of attracting back trained people who have migrated to other countries. At the same time, current information is key, because conflict is a disruptive process. The conflict-disrupted labour market will be substantially different from that in the past, and it may be impossible to re-establish the ante-bellum conditions.

66. Information on some elements of the conflict-affected groups' profiles is currently collected by some institution, such as the UNHCR and some NGOs. Since the scope of such information does not cover the whole range of their profiles, especially those necessary for planning and implementing skills training and employment promotion programmes. Cooperation between the relevant agencies and institutions, such as between the ILO and the UNHCR, in this sphere could ensure that this draw-back is remedied.

67. When gathering information on labour markets and profiles , realism is required. Domestic and international actors should not expect or require a quality or quantity of data greater than could have been collected for similar activities were the country at peace. As a corollary, reintegration activities in conflict-affected countries should not be postponed by impractical information requirements, especially when the activities and programmes involved are supported by an accumulation of field experience in the country in question and other countries. Collecting information has direct costs, which should be weighed against the benefits it would bring. There are also indirect costs of data gathering, such as delaying/programme a project for lack of information.

68. In most cases, actors implementing programmes will have previously carried out similar projects in the same countries or dealt with similar problems (demobilisation would be a major exception). This concrete experience can be mobilised, through trade unions, community organisations, and NGOs, and the organisations used as implementing vehicles. Early on, government could initiate a 'reconciliation dialogue', which would be the basis for popular participation and involvement of civil society groups into project design and implementation. These would be convened at national, provincial and local levels, thus integrating reconciliation with programme implementation. They would also provide identification and mobilisation of local expertise, and thus play an information-gathering function.

69. A system of collecting feed-back information needs to be integrated into the design and implementation of the programmes. Feedback and follow-up of the beneficiaries of the reintegration programmes are essential to tackle unforeseen and other implementation problems which they may encounter and also to introduce adjustments to enhance impact and efficacy of the programmes.

70. Vocational counselling of the target groups/beneficiaries of the reintegration programmes is critical .

Partnerships between different actors and linkages between programmes

71. Co-ordination between implementing agencies is essential to avoid duplication of programmes and to enhance synergy and impact of the diverse programmes. The programmes can reinforce each other; e.g., teaching literacy will facilitate vocational training, and employment intensive works programmes provide income to support family members in training programmes. Coordination is critical at different levels. Firstly, there is plenty of evidence of international support to conflict affected countries involving a plethora of uncoordinated, sometimes contradictory programmes and projects. Apart from the wastage involved, this problem increases the likelihood of external actors competing to impose their own preferred abstract 'model' and to override local needs; thus, greater international coordination can help to improve 'voice regulation' to allow for national influence over the programme. Furthermore, international coordination from the earliest possible moment is more likely to minimize the risk of overstretching already weak institutional and administrative local capacity.

72. Secondly, coordination among national bodies is critical. This can build on the tripartite constituency of the ILO, but will need to include other relevant local actors ( beyond the ILO's constituents), especially the voluntary sector such as associations of groups of conflict-affected people and other local and international NGOS. Developing closer working relationships with NGOS as strategic partners in the implementation of such programmes is particularly necessary in the conflict-affected context owing to the degree of physical presence and role of the voluntary sector in such a context and the non-existence or weakness of relevant governmental institutions.

73. There may also be situations in which local partnership is a far more effective channel for reconciliation and reintegration programmes than central state bodies. The state or nation can be perceived as at the very core of the problem but more localised initiatives can circumvent grand, state-level divisions. For example, the district partnerships in Northern Ireland have been a successful institutional innovation, building on existing institutions at the local level, for channelling European Commission funding as part of the EC's Peace and Reconciliation Programme. District partnership boards have been set up, comprising representatives of district councils, the voluntary sector, employers organisations and trade unions; the boards select projects and pursue EC approval. Arguably, the process of bringing people together at the local level contributes to improving the potential for a national level peace agreement to stick. This example serves to highlight the potential for programmes that contribute to reconciliation before the formal end of a conflict and not exclusively after the formal end to hostilities. Working with groups at the local level also permits programmes to assist the conflict-affected groups to be undertaken in such conflict situations as Somalia where there is no central state body.

74. Coordination between the different actors - local and international - is also necessary because reintegration programmes should be viewed as a matrix with interactions that generate economies of scale and dynamic synergies, rather than as a list of discrete projects/programmes implemented by each of the different actors in isolation. The reintegration matrix of programmes would typically include the following:

social facilities, including education, health and housing;

rehabilitation of plant to facilitate formal sector employment growth;labour-based public works;

skills training designed for self-employment;

credit, tools and other business support for small and micro enterprises; and

life skills training, including trauma counselling.

75. In rural areas, these would be supplemented by programmes focusing on agricultural livelihoods. The problem of landlessness and conflicts over land would be addressed as part of increasing livelihoods and reducing tensions. With property relations resolved, more technical programmes, for provision of seeds, tools and extension services, can be implemented. An important employment-intensive works programme for rural areas would be clearance of anti-personnel mines, for which there is growing international funding. Such mine clearance is also critical for resumption of economic and social life, especially in the rural areas.

2.3 Other Prerequisites for Design and Implementation of Programmes

76. The success of reintegration programmes has two major aspects: 1) appropriate design on the basis of concrete needs, and 2) a facilitating implementation environment. However excellent may be the design of programmes, they will fail if the political and economic conditions limit implementation. The necessary condition for a programme to be a 'good' one is that it can be effectively implemented. Effective implementation has several prerequisites.

Political prerequisite

77. The political situation must be accommodating. This will be the case if the parties to the conflict have reached a tentative political settlement which lays the basis for national reconciliation. Settlements are a process rather than an event, which implies that judgement and flexibility of interpretation is called for when assessing the adequacy of political conditions for programme implementation. As part of the political settlement, there may be a government statement of the general framework for reintegration. Implementation is unlikely to be effective in the absence of a clear framework, which might include commitment to delivering benefits in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner.

78. When reintegration programmes include international support, implementation follows from an agreement among the government, external donors, and international agencies, such as the ILO. While in part a technical agreement for efficient management, this is also a political process in which the input and role of external actors is established. On this basis, partnerships can emerge between national and international agencies, which at the implementation level can also be extended to NGOs and special interest groups of conflict-affected people. In successfully implemented programmes, these partnerships are the basis of a two-way exchange of views from the national to the local level. Out of this exchange develops the consultative and participatory process which can overcome the weakness of institutions caused by conflict.

Cultural and Ethnic diversity

79. Over and above the diversity of the conflict-affected groups, the cultural diversity should also be recognized as very important. Some conflicts actually heighten the degree of differences between the ethnic and cultural groups of the country. Such cultural and ethnic diversity and developments and sensitivities within this area have to be taken into account in the design of the reintegration programmes. Every effort has to be made to make such programmes inclusive and be perceived as beneficial to all the different groups.

Programming and implementation at the different phases

80. Implementation success is related to conditions of the moment. Some reintegration activities require a greater degree of consensus, security, and institutional strength than others. Table 1 demonstrates this generalisation concretely, by relating different phases of programming to different conditions of conflict.. Draft legislation can be prepared during conflict for consideration when a stable government and provisional legislature is in place. Equitable and fair rules of labour market governance, concrete and detailed, signal a commitment to a just and inclusive process of reconciliation.

81. Once violence abates, programmes can be initiated that deliver skills and employment to consolidate the peace process by giving conflict-affected groups an interest in sustaining non-conflict conditions. At this stage, or even earlier as the situation allows, demobilisation of combatants can be implemented.

Table 1: Implementation Under Differing Conflict Conditions

Conflict status (not necessarily sequential): Elements of the Action Programme (can they be implemented?)	Low level violence, regionally scattered	Generalised violence throughout country (with /without a functioning government)	Peace process (with/without violence)
A. Background studies needs assessment labour force surveys	1 YES (except for regions directly affected by violence)	2 YES (all work need not be done in the country; in-country work can be restricted to major if secure)	3 YES (if violence persists, same as for cell #1)
B. Planning of projects	4 YES (as above)	5 YES (as above)	6 YES (as above)
C. Social & labour policy actions	YES	YES (preparation)	YES (legislation)
D. Training, micro enterprises, & employment schemes	7 YES (as above)	8 NO (except in rare situations where certain areas are secure)	9 YES (as above)
E. Activities for Non-combatants (including social protection & social services)	10 YES (as above)	11 NO (though work with NGOs, labour & employers may be possible)	12 YES (as above)
F. Activities specific to demobilised soldiers	13 YES if demobilisation has begun, NO if not	14 NO (the number of combatants is probably increasing not decreasing)	15 YES (training can begin in demob camps)

82. Strict adherence to this chronology may not be possible in all conflict situations, but a general guideline holds: collection of information, design of programmes, and long-term planning can and should be carried out while tensions remain high. The relevant prerequisite is a commitment to a negotiated peace by the parties to the conflict. Preparation of programmes will contribute to transforming that commitment to a peace settlement.

Management and monitoring Structures

83. A nation-wide and central management and monitoring structure is required for the programmes of reintegration, even those that are community based, One important role for central administration is ensuring consistency and equity in programmes across regions of a country. In part, this is achieved through co-ordination among implementing actors, but co-ordination alone is usually not sufficient. If programmes by different agencies deliver different levels and types of benefits for the same activities, perception of inequitable treatment can result. It is the role of a central administration to establish standards and levels of delivery.

84. The experience from different countries of co-ordinating demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants provides some lessons for centrally managing general programmes of reintegration, but the lessons are limited. Demobilisation and reintegration programmes are based upon a targeted population, and usually are allocated special funding outside of ministerial budget lines. As a result, these programmes can be implemented and monitored by a specially created body, which has limited need to coordinate with established ministries. General programmes to cover the entire range of conflict-affected people cannot in practice be administered in this manner. So great are the needs and so broad the scope of these programmes, that their implementation requires altering previous priorities within established ministries. In effect, the entire government social and economic budget becomes the reintegration programme.

85. Experience suggests that a number of organizational vehicles can perform the central management role. In many countries, a separate, ad hoc administrative body is created within government to manage reintegration programmes, cutting across specialised ministries, such as ministry of labour, agriculture, health, and education. This approach can produce its own problems of co-ordination, if the hierarchy of decision making between ministries and the ad hoc body are not clear. For example, the creation in South Africa of a post-apartheid reconstruction programme (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) lacked clear lines of authority which were accepted by line ministries. On the other hand, reintegration programmes by their nature cannot be assigned to a single ministry, except in countries where there is already a 'super-ministry' whose authority is superior to others. Such a new structure is also often set up for a short while and it does not prepare other existing structures, such as the Ministry of Labour. No general guideline is possible, except to observe that some central administrative umbrella is necessary to avoid duplication of activities and to achieve complementarities; and that the know-how and resources generated by the projects/programmes should feed into the development of the capacity of existing institutions to contribute to long-term peace. Another suggestion (ILO 1997, October) is to establish a Task Force on skills and employment promotion, to be led by the Ministry of Labour but including representatives of other government departments, NGOs, entrepreneurs, United Nations organizations, trades unions and community groups. After completion of reintegration programmes, this Task Force would hand over its functions and activities to the Ministry of Labour.

86. At the same time, effective management and implementation of reintegration and peace-building programmes will depend on coordination among international agencies involved, and on their close cooperation with a national umbrella organization as earlier mentioned. Thus bodies such as the ILO and other components of the UN system including the department of Peace Keeping ( DPKO), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the UNDP will have to work together. This is also important to the development of efficiency within the UN system.

2.4 Programme Constraints

87. It is necessary to highlight some of the major constraints that may hamper the ability to adapt these guidelines to local conditions and implement effective programmes. Here a few of the more pressing constraints are noted which are likely to prevail at the level of generality adopted throughout this document. It brings together in a summary form certain factors mentioned in different parts of the document. The constraints include:

Political environment. Before, during and after a conflict there may not be sufficient political will to allow for an effective programme that meets the requirements laid out in this document such as the need to pursue an inclusionary approach to all programme components. This can still be a problem after the formal end of hostilities, since, as this document has noted, political and socio-economic insecurity tend to persist after the signing of a peace agreement. A particularly problematic case might be where tensions between the constituents of the tripartite base of the ILO's partners are right at the root of a given conflict situation. This would make it especially hard to proceed along the lines set out in these guidelines. Another particular case would be where, beyond typical institutional weakness, the very existence of a state was doubtful.

Extreme institutional weakness. Institutional weakness will be a constraint on the effectiveness of programmes in all conflict affected countries. But in some cases this may be especially acute, frustrating even the most basic of capacity building objectives. This situation would call for a high degree of flexibility in programming by external and national actors. Where there is the political will and facilitating environment but a high degree of institutional weakness, there may be a case for greater reliance on external and more highly localised national organisations initiating the programme. But the objective should remain to develop institutional capacity for sustainable momentum of labour market policies, training infrastructure, business development initiatives, etc.

Extreme infrastructural weakness and economic fragmentation. Where infrastructure provision is very low level and fragmentary, and where the economy in general is weak and fragmented, information will be especially hard to collect and it may be very difficult to reach target communities with a genuinely integrated programme. Again, this will call for some flexibility, so that excessively high and rigid standards of programme integrity and complementarity are not adhered to beyond their pragmatic use.

Weak external coordination. This will place particularly high strain on already weak local capacity for coordination and capacity development, let alone frustrating objectives for programmes to have a high national and local 'ownership' factor. It is also sadly realistic to acknowledge that different international actors at times have their own agendas and methodologies. It is suggested that the best way to try to resolve this problem or to prevent its occurring is to ensure that mechanisms for coordination are in place very early on.

Land mines. Physical insecurity, most obviously in the form of land mines whose distribution is often unclear even to those who sowed them, is a constant constraint on the speed with which reintegration can be realised. There are other sources of insecurity that can frustrate programme ambitions: for example, persistent or rising levels of criminality, usually a problem in and around major towns and on arterial infrastructure connections.

Climatic volatility. Weather patterns are difficult to predict and in some parts of the world events such as a severe drought can add to the stresses on livelihoods, especially rural livelihoods, and therefore undermine the effectiveness of reintegration programmes.

Volatile macroeconomic conditions. High inflation, low incomes, consumer goods shortages and other features of macroeconomic insecurity can all undermine the ability of reintegration programmes to deliver. For example, income generating projects or vocational training in rural off-farm artisanery, can fail if there are no markets for products, or if input costs are too high, or if there is too little incentive to increase market connections thanks to severe goods shortages.

3. PROGRAMME GUIDELINES

3.1 Overview

88. This chapter highlights, for specific programmes, the key principles, challenges, constraints and opportunities in the needs of conflict- affected countries. The programmes include labour market initiatives, infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion, vocational training and "life skills", and enterprise promotion. This range of programmes covers the demand and supply sides of the labour market, with a view to pursuing the objective of working for a lasting peace. Table 2 indicates general aspects of skills training and employment promotion programmes for conflict-affected countries, while it is fully understood that particular programmes cannot proceed in individual countries without being based on a close analysis of the causes of conflict and the dynamics and diverse effects of conflict.

Table 2: Skills Training and Employment Generation in Conflict Affected Countries

Programme Focus by Sector
[Relative importance of programme categories depends on structure of the economy]

Rural sector

Urban Sector

On-farm employment	Non-farm employment	Formal employment	Informal employment
All people: Land for the landless Farm production packages Extension services Credit provision Rehabilitation of marketing & post- harvest facilities Protection of rights of farm workers (application of basic ILO conventions)	All people: Vocational training for self-employment Business training Credit provision Labour-based public works (esp. to enhance marketing & post- harvest facilitates)	All people: Social accord between employers & trade unions for employment growth On-job skills training Protection of collective bargaining & workers'rights Public works focusing on war damage Public provision & support to self-help housing Reallocation of public expenditure to promote employment in social sectors (with flexible provision, e.g. through NGOs, trade unions, employer organisations)	All people: Vocational training for self-employment through skills centres Business & commercial training through skills centres Credit provision Apprenticeship programmes Public provision & support to self-help housing Government regulation of labour standard Government procurement from small enterprises
In addition to the above, the following groups may require other supports:
Programme Focus by Sector [Relative importance of programme categories depends on structure of the economy] (...Continued)
Demobilised combatants: 'Mustering-out' financial packages life skills training with emphasis on reconci-liation; trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration	Demobilised combatants: 'Mustering-out' financial packages life skills training with emphasis on reconci-liation; trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration	Demobilised combatants: 'Mustering-out' financial packages life skills training with emphasis on reconci-liation; trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration for some, integration into civilian police	Demobilised combatants: 'Mustering-out' financial packages life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation; trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration

Women:

Fostering of self-help groups;

Anti-discrimination legislation, with empha-sis on right to land

Women:

Fostering of self-help groups;

Anti-discrimination legislation

Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training proactive job placement	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training
Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling (phased with agricultural cycle) Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business supports	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business supports	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business supports	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business supports

All rural groups:

Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation skills

trauma counselling

drug counselling

All urban groups:

Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation

skills

trauma counselling

drug counselling

89. A number of key principles and features stand out from the preceding discussion and are emphasized in the guidelines elaborated here for the specific programmes . To facilitate the use of the guidelines, these key principles are briefly summarized below:

90. The principle of inclusion is applied to all programmes and given high priority. Social inclusion is an important consideration in the design of labour market policy and regulation. This principle should be given greater weight than abstract concepts of efficiency. Inclusion can be applied to training programmes, where it translates into the need to take training to trainees and communities, and to involve communities in identifying beneficiaries and their needs. The principle of inclusion overrides claims for segregated, targeted support to particular categories of the conflict affected population. Otherwise, support programmes in conflict-affected countries risk being divisive. Once the principle of inclusion is adopted, it is important to make sure programmes incorporate and are sensitive to the needs of women, children, the disabled and ex-combatants.

91. The importance of early and continuous information gathering cannot be stressed enough. In every area where specific programmes are implemented, conflict is likely to have exacerbated the weakness of existing information bases. Programmes have to provide urgently needed information to ensure that their implementation is relevant and cost-effective. Each of the programmes should incorporate from the start measures to develop long run, and institutionalized information collection and analysis.

92. All experience in conflict affected countries dramatizes the institutional weakness affecting programmes for reintegration, reconstruction and reconciliation. There are two major implications. First, it is important to dedicate resources to institutional capacity building; and this should be incorporated into the first stages of a programme. A specific example is the formation of local economic development agencies (LEDAs), as in Central America and Cambodia effectively. Second, institutional weaknesses provide an opportunity to develop effective partnerships between a wide range of organizations, including government and quasi-government bodies, church groups, NGOs, private sector associations, employee associations and trade unions, and local community groups. Successful experiences suggest strongly that these institutional relationships are as important as, or possibly more important than, single institutions. The consequences of conflict present not just a challenge but a positive opportunity to avoid or replace a tendency towards one-dimensional institutional responses to challenges.

93. Training needs are immense in most conflict-affected countries. Training needs to be improved and expanded to meet identified needs of small and micro enterprises, business management and administration and vocational skills formation. This has resource implications, if the training challenge is to be met effectively and rapidly. It requires imaginative collaboration between funding bodies and implementing agencies, both public and private.

3. 2 The Labour Market

a) Principles and priorities

94. The labour market plays a key role in the transition from conflict to peace, for it includes the majority of the adult population. Labour markets function in a variety of ways, ranging from the inclusive to exclusive. Exclusive labour markets treat people solely as commodities, contributing little to social cohesion. The objective of the inclusive labour markets is to maximise the contribution that the labour market can make to ameliorating the effects of conflict and easing the transition to peace. This requires creating a labour market that functions efficiently while incorporating social values. In a conflict affected country the labour market should maximize reintegration and social inclusion, not merely maximize labour absorption.

95. Maximising the potential of the labour market for contributing to peace building and conflict resolution requires policies and mechanisms to address three factors: the demand for labour, the supply of labour, and the information that connects demand and supply. First, this implies that labour market policies are inseparable from efforts to promote the private sector, including business opportunities - formal and informal, small and micro-enterprises. Second, there must be policies to overcome constraints on the supply of labour. These include policies to improve the conditions of work, stabilize the economy, promote freedom of movement within the country, and improve the skills of the labour force. Third, policies are needed that improve the information base of the labour market. These include information on the structure and trends of labour demand and business opportunities (these tend in the countries emerging from conflict to be the sectors of construction, transportation, communications, maintenance and security) that can feed into labour training and skills promotion schemes. Data systems can also foster information sharing between the different actors in this sphere.

96. As earlier noted in chapter 2, labour market governance weakens during conflict. Policies that reconstruct labour market governance should deal with two factors. First, to play a socially healing role in a conflict-affected country, the labour market should provide for equitable treatment of workers. Otherwise, the mistrust and resentment on which conflict grew will be aggravated. Second, governance should avoid excessive regulation, which affects the incentive to hire labour and for small-scale business operators to function . The objective for programmers and policy makers is to move from a labour market with inefficient controls, to one that effectively protects and facilitates the activities of workers and employers - large or small - informal or formal.

97. In conflict -affected countries, labour markets are likely to be characterised by a greater than normal reliance on informal sector income-generating activities, either employment in often small and micro enterprises or informal sector self-employment. This aggravates the information problem that programmers are confronted with. It also means that a particular priority needs to be assigned to measures designed to facilitate the vigorous expansion and strengthening of this sector in conditions that approximate, if they do not actually fulfil exactly, the requirements of international labour standards. Monitoring will be difficult. But here again the success of a programme (in this case those components designed to promote the informal sector), will be enhanced by an implementation and design strategy that is based on partnership and local participants having a stake in design. For this is more likely to generate effective compliance with international labour standards, and to create room for effective "voice mechanisms" for those engaged in informal sector enterprises.

b) Challenges and constraints

98. To normalise labour markets of countries emerging from conflict, donors, governments, and groups in civil society need to debate the macro-economic priorities with regard to raising employment. The employment challenge is to identify sectors of growth potential, and to focus measures on these. There are typical constraints on the ability to meet this challenge. In some, but not all conflict affected countries, economic growth is slow and labour demand sluggish. Even when post-conflict economic growth is relatively fast, the post-conflict recovery may be concentrated in sub-sectors with little sustainability. A large proportion of employment opportunities will be in the informal sector. It is important to identify those informal sector activities which are the result of the temporary breakdown of the formal sector, and those that will continue in the long run.

99. Labour market information in conflict-affected countries is scarce and of poor quality. Conflict tends to worsen the problem through destruction of enterprises, diverting civil servants to conflict-related activities, disrupting social and productive infrastructure, and by displacing parts of the population from their normal abodes and livelihoods.

100. Co-ordination among government ministries and agencies tends to be ineffective in conflict-affected countries, which undermines labour market governance. Employment services, monitoring of working conditions, and social welfare mechanisms typically collapse under the weight of conflict. Thus, the post-conflict government inherits a socially fragmented labour force, and limited resources to promote social reintegration through the labour market.

c) Labour market information, institutions and networks

101. If the labour market is to play effectively a role in the reintegration of conflict affected people, there is an urgent need for better information collection and management. If the labour market is to play effectively a role in the reintegration of conflict affected people, there is an urgent need for better information collection and management Labour market information (LMI) is both limited and poorly organised for effective use in the conflict-affected context. The challenge is to collect useful information, to compile it effectively, and marshall that information for employment promotion. Labour market information must be collected at different levels. At the most general level, governments should improve information on broad trends in the labour supply and demand, to reveal actual and potential shifts in employment opportunities and skill needs, in both rural and urban areas. To be useful to planners and implementers, this information must be relevant, reliable, and collected continuously. It also should be made widely available in the public and private sectors. The basic steps in establishing a labour force data base are shown in Table 3. Beyond its obvious role in labour market policy and project planning, labour market information is critical to the ongoing process of monitoring and evaluation that feed into the improvement of integrated programmes for conflict affected countries (see diagram at end of Chapter two).

102. In peace time, labour force data bases comprise a wide range of information, to be used for short-term adjustment policies and long-term manpower planning. In post-conflict situations, the emphasis is on the need to address immediate labour market policies. While the information gathered should be part of a longer-term data base accumulation, priorities must focus on the reintegration programme. This will usually require use of rapid appraisal techniques. Information must be geared not just to assessing the need for new skills but also to clarifying the spread of existing skills, with a view to utilising these.

Table 3: Establishing a Labour Market Data Base for Conflict-Affected Countries

Stages in data base construction:

Identify the employment experience, expectations, and problems of the vulnerable, excluded and conflict affected

Analyse the causes of these problems
Appraise options for tackling these problems
Design programmes and a supporting policy framework
Select priority projects
Monitor implementation
Evaluate projects and programmes with a view to adjusting labour market interventions

Source: ILO : Labour market assessments for the reintegration of ex-combatants in war-affected Sub-Saharan African Countries (Geneva, ILO, 1995)

103. Collection of information may be limited by a shortage of trained, experienced and motivated staff in those institutions devoted to labour market management, such as ministries of labour. Policy makers and programmers should begin with capacity building of key institutions, as a prerequisite to the pursuit of a committed labour market policy. This involves providing intensive training for existing and new personnel, and improving conditions of work to increase motivation. The institutions and methodologies used in collecting the relevant data will vary with different phases of a conflict - pre-, during and post-conflict. For example, questions on skills profiles and work experience can be incorporated into data gathered by the Red Cross and Red Crescent and the UNHCR in refugee camps and other transit points during a conflict or in the immediate aftermath of the signing of a formal peace agreement.

104. In addition to improving working conditions, skills, and commitment within individual institutions, fostering co-ordination between labour market agencies is important to effective information collection. This involves division of labour, information sharing, and settling common priorities among, for example, the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Labour, and the central statistical office. At another level, these state bodies may be able to function more effectively by forming co-operative agreements with universities and research institutes, as well as private institutions such as NGOs and co-operatives. This broader institutional network enables survey work on employment opportunities and constraints, as well as maximising use of resources. An example of such co-operation is the survey work of the Centre for African Studies (CEA), within the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique, on expectations and problems faced by ex-combatants after the Mozambican war ended.

105. Institutional links can provide for more that a one-way flow of information from researchers to government, or from employers to government. They can be used interactively to inter-change information across sectors, institutions and regions where labour market policies will be implemented. Labour market programmers can use NGOs and local community organisations to alert people to available training scheme and could combine such institutional networks with use of media.

106. Along with government policies addressing the labour market as a whole, there will usually be an urgent need for special employment promotion programmes. In most countries these focus on a range of needs, including rural development with off-farm employment, the urban informal sector with promotion of micro-enterprises, labour intensive works schemes, local employment initiatives, and self-employment. Each of these has its own unique planning aspects. For example, in programmes that address rural development for reintegration, close attention should be given to institutional, technological and infrastructural constraints. These constraints overlap: providing training for small-scale artisanal production requires complementary improvement of infrastructure for access to inputs and for marketing options. Here, co-ordination is key. Successful local programmes require local participation, and to be part of a centrally-designed policy framework.

107. Successful institutional partnerships also require development of support services. These include information dissemination, through labour exchanges, the media, local communities, and NGOs. These institutions can facilitate short-run training for relatively small numbers of people in specific skills or techniques. At the same time, there should be links to larger, formal sector programmes. Every programme should have an explicit commitment to ensure that labour exchanges, job placement schemes, job search facilities and so on are all free from discrimination on gender, race, language or religious grounds or on the basis of disability.

The key informant system

108. The labour market information collected should be as thorough as possible, and its collection and revision should be institutionalised. However, It is highly unlikely that this can be achieved quickly in the context of a conflict or its immediate aftermath. It should not be expected that all the conflict-affected countries, with the diversity in their economies , could meet the same requirements for data collection . Expectations of data quality and quantity should reflect the specific circumstances of each country and conflict. Where data are scarce and the capacity for collection is low, policy makers, programmers and donors should make it a priority to allocate resources to technical assistance for institutional and personal capacity building. The ILO would play the key role in providing such assistance.

109. In conflict affected circumstances it may be impossible or impractical to carry out technically satisfactory surveys, due to lack of personnel, security problems, or time constraints. In place of these, the so-call Key Informant System (KIS) has proven effective in the rapid appraisal of employment problems. This involves identifying reliable and well-informed individuals in social institutions, who provide information on a range of issues. Applications of the approach have included:

conducting specific surveys of employing establishments to assess manpower shortages and training needs;

multi-purpose research in villages to develop a database for local planning;

rural surveys to monitor local employment projects; and

surveys in rural and coastal villages ( such as in Somalia) to be used to create productive jobs and to improve skills.

Where possible, this tool should not be used to conduct one-off, ad hoc, information gathering exercises, but as part of a broader information gathering programme. This would allow 'cross-checks' from different sources on the reliability of informants. The KIS approach could prove especially valuable in conflict affected countries given poor information and the extra load that the informal sector typically bears in absorbing the labour force.

d) Migration and labour markets

110. Conflict affected situations provoke movements of people, often massive relative to the size of the population. This migration is typically viewed negatively, but labour mobility is important to reintegration and adjustment to conflict conditions. In the aftermath of a conflict, migration does not only involve refugees returning to their pre-conflict places of origin. Regional imbalances in levels of development are often exacerbated by conflict, because destruction of transport infrastructure makes remote areas less accessible. The rapidity with which rehabilitation of infrastructure will vary by region. Thus, for many refugees, return to places of origin may be impractical or unattractive. To facilitate people's reintegration into labour markets, constraints mobility need to be reduced throughout the conflict affected country.

111. Labour migration is an uprooting and often traumatic experience, especially when families have been separated. Migrant labourers are especially susceptible to maltreatment, because it is hard for them to draw on support mechanisms of local communities. Hence, it is important in conditions of flux and uncertainty that there are measures and institutions that protect the rights of migrant workers. If not, migrant labourers can become a focal point for rising social tensions.

3.3 Employment Intensive Works Programmes

a) Basic principles

112. Infrastructure rehabilitation and extension plays a central role in most post-conflict recovery programmes. Along with rehabilitation, improvements to infrastructure are vital to the social, economic and even political cohesion of a society. They contribute to long term development, as well as immediately stimulating local economic recovery. Infrastructural improvements provide access to markets, facilitate the spread information, and physically reintegration a country. Infrastructure is also critical to the prospects for ensuring the environmentally sustainable use of land and the prevention of famine.

113. Inadequate infrastructural distribution can contribute to conflict. The neglect of road and rail links to particular areas of Sierra Leone, combined with the deterioration of the educational system, contributed to the spread of violence from Liberia. In Mozambique the colonial infrastructure did little to link the parts of the country, which perpetuated locally perceived differences among the north, central, and northern regions of the country. The physical separation of the country facilitated politicians playing on regional identity. This example indicates that rehabilitation of pre-conflict infrastructure may not be sufficient to integrate the country socially; construction of new transport and communication links may be necessary.

114. Infrastructure works, both public and private, have great potential for creating employment, and employment generation is critical to ensure the durability of peace settlements. Livelihoods, even temporary ones, give people a 'stake' in peace, and narrow the scope for disaffected elites to draw on marginalized or excluded groups. The degree of labour intensity in infrastructure works is, however, variable and needs to be considered at an early stage.

115. The role, design and management of infrastructure projects should be at the top of the agenda for post-conflict rehabilitation. In those countries where infrastructure has been badly affected by conflict, or where inappropriate infrastructure contributed to the conflict, discussion of infrastructure works should be included in political and economic negotiations that accompany formal peace settlements.

b) Post-conflict insecurity

116. Civil wars often have ambiguous beginnings, and rarely reach a sharply-defined end. Insecurity tends to persist beyond the signing of a formal peace agreement. This insecurity can be both political and economic; it can be characterised by high levels of crime, which may or may not be sharply distinguished from political sources of insecurity. As a result, the location of labour intensive infrastructure works must be selected with care. The need for such projects may be greatest where conflict has raged most intensely, where insecurity survives the formal end of hostilities. A major cause of insecurity is the existence of a large, but unknown numbers of landmines scattered over fields and infrastructural facilities. In some areas information in rural areas is vague at best, while in others, such as the Luwero Triangle in Uganda, local people may have a clear idea of where landmines lie. When infrastructure works are planned, local knowledge should be sought. Where landmines are a significant factor, infrastructure works should not proceed without prior clearance operations. A close working relationship among local communities, infrastructure teams, and those clearing mines is essential.

117. There are potential synergies between labour intensive public works and landmine clearance. Some mine clearance operations are conducted with little regard for the absorption of local labour or the creation of skills. By positive contrast, the Halo Trust and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) advocate training demobilised soldiers in the skills for landmine clearance and the removal of unexploded ordnance. These skills can have subsequent non-military uses.

c) Labour intensity of infrastructure schemes

118. There is a consensus that employment maximising technologies should be used in infrastructure works in low-income countries. However, governments often remain committed to more capital intensive techniques. Governments and other actors should be encouraged to consider the benefits that may accrue to more labour intensive methods. Evidence suggests that labour intensive methods can be cost-effective, and less of a drain on scarce resources, notably foreign exchange. Evidence also suggests that labour intensive methods need not compromise durability and quality of infrastructure. The examples of Cambodia and Mozambique indicate this. All technologies require policy makers to strike a balance between labour absorption and the quality of output.

Box 1: Degrees of labour intensity in Cambodia

In Cambodia in the after the 1991 peace agreement, there we two approaches to choice of techniques: that of the ILO, a labour based technology, and that of the UNDP CARERE projects, a labour intensive technology. The more labour intensive approach of CARERE projects used virtually no input other than labour and hand tools. Although this may maximise labour absorption and hence appear to fulfil a key objective of post-conflict rehabilitation, doubts have been expressed about the quality of the works done by this method. ILO projects were based on the principle that as well as securing labour absorption benefits, infrastructure projects should bear in mind other objectives too, including the durability and quality of works. On this basis, a labour based technology mixes labour with light equipment, especially for some aspects of infrastructure work on roads and irrigation schemes. Quality assurance is viewed as particularly important in the light of the need not just to respond to immediate post-conflict needs but also to begin to tackle longer term developmental needs and to generate sufficient credibility for the overall principle of labour absorption that this may more readily be adopted at national government and international donor levels wherever possible.

119. It is especially important that policy makers review the maintenance implications of a technology. Maintenance costs tend to be under-estimated, especially in conflict affected countries. The importance of reviewing maintenance costs is all the greater in conflict affected countries because there are likely to be tight constraints on funding for maintenance, and limited skills and equipment to carry it out.

120. Labour intensive infrastructure works in conflict affected countries are capable of generating income and effective demand in disrupted regions. For example, more than 1.5 million workdays were generated in projects in Cambodia through the reconstruction of roads, repair of irrigation systems, and rehabilitation the World Heritage site of Angkor. The associated demand for consumer goods and productive inputs rejuvenated rural markets. Macroeconomic conditions are important for the income generating success of labour intensive works. For example, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, cash payments may be dramatically devalued by inflation and shortages of goods. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to consider a mix of cash and payment in kind.

d) Long-run aspects of infrastructure rehabilitation

121. An important lesson of works programmes in Cambodia, Uganda, and Mozambique is that the challenge of infrastructure regeneration is enormous, and will continue long after the end of a conflict. At the same time, it provides the opportunity to implement a relief-rehabilitation-development continuum. Reintegration programmes should work on the general principle that interventions incorporate a long term developmental objective where possible. This should apply to employment oriented infrastructure works as well as to skills training. For infrastructure works there are two main implications. First, it is necessary to explore the potential links between infrastructure works and long term, sustainable employment prospects. Maintenance work can provide this. Second, there is a need to focusing training, for local contractors and their employees, on skills that can be transferred from short-run rehabilitation to long-run maintenance.

122. Country experiences suggest ways of incorporating long range goals into immediate post-conflict projects. Given that urgency drives most of the early post-conflict projects, there is often a tendency to overlook maximising local involvement in favour of quick and effective use of overseas skills. A strong feature of ILO projects in north-west Cambodia, for example, was that they