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4. Privatization, restructuring and
labour relations

The ILO report for the 1987 Joint Meeting noted that "it is difficult to speak in general terms of labour relations in the water, gas and electricity supply services because of the great diversity of types of organizations operating in this sector. Because of the mixture of public and private ownership of enterprises in these industries in most countries, labour relations practices and workers' rights in this respect differ according to whether workers are employed by a body under direct government administration, a parastatal or mixed economy organization (...), a licensed private company or a municipal or communal authority, or whether they are members of a cooperative or a self-managed works collective".⁽¹⁾ This diversity in the types of management or ownership of the distribution networks is still a characteristic of these three sectors today. However, what has changed over the last decade is the liberalization of distribution services and the multiplication of trans-frontier investments. Various forms of privatization have also strengthened global economic integration. The evolution of regulations and social practices at the national, regional or multinational levels has not always kept pace with these developments.

4.1. The importance of the national context

The nature of and modifications in a country's general industrial relations framework are essential elements in determining the labour effects of privatization and restructuring.

Unionization is relatively high in the public utilities worldwide. Privatization generally affects unionization, bargaining patterns and collective agreements, but the results are fairly mixed. In countries where public sector workers, or specific categories of workers, have more limited union rights and generally lower labour standards than are current in private enterprises, privatization may well bring improvement. But in a substantial number of cases, unionization and industrial relations are weakened by privatization and restructuring processes.

The national political context and customs play a key role in determining the pattern of industrial relations, even after privatization. ILO studies show that even foreign companies that become the owners or operators of a public utility seem to adapt their policies to the context in which they function.⁽²⁾ The national context thus remains very important in the determination of industrial relations, both before and after privatization.

An example from the United Kingdom clearly highlights the main consequences of privatization on industrial relations in the water sector. The nine water authorities in England -- Anglian, Northumbria, North West, Severn Trent, Southern, South West, Thames, Wessex and Yorkshire -- and the Welsh Water Authority were privatized in the autumn of 1989. Changes in industrial relations have by no means been uniform throughout the ten newly privatized water public limited companies (plcs). On the contrary, individual water plcs have responded differently to the strategic opportunities created by privatization to modify the structure of their industrial relations. Industrial relations in the water industry previously reflected all the characteristics of public sector national bargaining arrangements, such as a high density of trade union membership, detailed national agreements regulating pay and conditions of service, a highly formalized and elaborate system of joint consultation and a commitment to being a good employer. Within two years of privatization, this public sector industrial relations framework had been largely dismantled and reconstructed in the light of new priorities. In contrast to the previous quasi-independent national industrial relations machinery, which had operated outside the control of any individual employer, single-employer bargaining allowed the management in each water company to develop its own industrial relations policies and to intensify the subordination of labour to the business needs of the individual organization. Changes in industrial relations have generally revolved around improving labour productivity through greater flexibility, better training and payment structures linking pay more closely to performance, as well as changes to established industrial relations practices, such as single-table bargaining and the harmonization of pay and working conditions.⁽³⁾

The organization of the electricity sector in Germany is characterized by the federal nature of the State (with the social partners participating at three levels: federal, regional and local). Energy activities are often only one of the spheres in which around a thousand operators share the market, which is dominated by the eight "giants". The capital is private in the case of the large groups and substantially public in the local distribution community enterprises (see box 4.1).

New Zealand has experienced the most extensive deregulation process in the Asia-Pacific region. Arguably, the most significant impact on labour has not been privatization in itself but the introduction of a new industrial relation system at a time when more radical moves to privatize utilities have taken place. Some case-studies indicate that the most significant protection to employees' employment and working conditions in utility privatization processes is through agreements to govern the transfer of existing employment, pay and conditions to the new private employer. Where the whole industrial relation system is being deregulated, it appears that there is no framework within which such a regulated transfer can be negotiated or take place.⁽⁴⁾

Electricity was corporatized in New Zealand in 1986⁽⁵⁾ through the State-owned Enterprises Act. Despite a "good employer" clause in the legislation, corporatization resulted in major job losses in electricity, as in all other sectors. The State Service Conditions of Employment Act of 1988 gave state-owned enterprises powers equivalent to private sector control over their workforce. The legislation allowed for the elimination of wage earning and the introduction of productivity-based contracts for workers. This legislation has been described as the forerunner of the Employment Contracts Act, which came into effect in 1991 and replaced a system of national award coverage in compulsory unionization by individual employment contracts and a focus on one-to-one bargaining between employers and employees, although provision for representation and contracts may cover a number of workers. Unions have no more rights than any other prospective representatives and have no right of access to workplaces where they seek the authority to represent the workers. Contracts are not public documents, even when they cover groups of workers. These changes in the industrial relations system have applied to both public and private employees. However, the removal of national bargaining and compulsory unionization is likely to have had a particular effect on employment and working conditions of employees affected by the restructuring and privatization of the public sector. The use of individual contracts makes it difficult to track changes in employment conditions since such contracts are confidential.
 

Box 4.1 Labour relations in the electricity sector in Germany Like the political organization of the country, the electricity sector is decentralized. There are many public regulatory bodies, with the federal State playing only a secondary role (monitoring of nuclear safety, energy choices, anti-cartel legislation). An Energy Act of 1935 organized the public electricity service and made it obligatory to provide service in exchange for the granting to the distribution enterprises (the so-called EVUs) of exclusive franchises for a period of up to 20 years. The major production/transportation enterprises are linked together by a demarkation agreement (Demarkation Vertrag) which grants each enterprise a territorial monopoly for the construction of new plants, the equipping of transport lines, the wholesale supply of electricity which they sell to local distribution companies in which they usually hold shares. Since 1980, and the revision of the Act respecting cartels, the network, which is owned by the operator, is in certain conditions (if transit does not affect the safety level of the network concerned and if it does not result in an increase in the cost price) open to the other producers or distributors. It is the responsibility of the Länder to issue licences to production, transportation and/or distribution enterprises and to approve their tariffs, which vary from one region to another. This framework is currently being reviewed following the opening up of the electricity sector to a large degree of competition, in accordance with government policy. The Bayernwerk AG enterprise is one of the eight major companies making up the German electricity sector (it was ranked fourth in 1994). It is a limited company in which until 1994 the Land of Bavaria was the major shareholder. Its privatization resulted from a buy-out by the VIAG holding company. The company has adopted a policy of internationalization in the countries of the European Union and Eastern Europe, and in particular in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Staff are subject to private law and the provisions of collective agreements since the electricity sector has not been the subject of any special regulations concerning labour relations. The workforce has been reduced in recent years, from 1,984 employees in 1975 to 1,667 in 1995. The keener competition, which necessarily involves adaptation to market requirements and customer demands, the internationalization of trade as well as the construction of the Community on the basis of cost transparency, are all restructuring factors. The privatization of Bayernwerk has not resulted in any essential changes in labour relations. The enterprise is moving towards the search for heightened efficiency and a reduction of costs based on greater flexibility within different strategic activities and with more emphasis being placed on shareholder value. Management has been strengthened in recent years by the introduction of annual interviews and staff surveys. Internal training plays a major role in the changes made. At the local level, the responsibilities of plant managers have been broadened. The trade union organizations, which are mainly organized by occupational branches, have focused on defending acquired rights, and in particular, the greater flexibility of working time. Their role is important not only in the social life of the enterprise (they sign collective agreements and participate in the Council responsible for monitoring co-managed enterprises) but in the preparation of draft legislation concerning employees. Source: Y. Moreau and B. Maquart: Entreprises de service public européennes et relations sociales, ASPE Europe, Paris, 1996, pp. 57-60.

India also illustrates the importance of national context. A Delhi trade union international energy conference was held in September 1998, organized by the Indian National Electricity Workers Federation (INEF). The conference focused on such questions as guaranteeing access to electricity in a country whose population will reach 1 billion by the year 2000 and the financing of the 8,000 MW of new capacity needed each year to meet a 10 per cent increase in demand. India has no alternative but to allow private investment in power generation: this was the conclusion reached by the 250 delegates at the conference. Private investment does not mean, however, privatizing the existing utilities. According to the INEF, the Indian state-owned thermal power generation giant NTPC wins praise even from the World Bank for its efficiency. The transmission company Powergrid and the State Electricity Boards have managed to achieve an electrification rate of 85 per cent, which is a respectable figure for a huge, predominantly agricultural country. It is doubtful, however, to what extent private investors would be interested in undertaking the specific social tasks related to distribution to remote areas, farmers and the poor.

4.2. The role of the social partners in the privatization
and restructuring processes

4.2.1. The goals of the trade unions

According to one researcher,⁽⁶⁾ the main goals of the trade unions in the gas and electricity sectors are: to protect their members; to ensure that the sectors contribute to the long-term economic and environmental well-being of the community, in particular, through the creation of new jobs; to unionize or foster the unionization of the workforce in the service industries where there is a growth in labour; to organize campaigns to ensure that sectoral reforms take account of problems related to employment.

The existence of trade unions resulting from the organization of a large number of workers into a unit capable of negotiating with management is one of the cornerstones of any good industrial relations system. The goal of trade union action here is to harmonize the necessary competitiveness of enterprises with the aspirations of workers who want to keep their jobs, a decent wage and work in better conditions.

The reduction in the unequal access to information by employer and employee increases the efficiency of enterprises. Workers who sometimes know more than their employers about ways of improving productivity will be more ready to share information if they think they will benefit from any change which may result in the organization of work. Through the presence of a body which represents them -- a trade union -- workers have less to fear that any information provided will benefit only the management of the enterprise. A knowledge of worker preferences by employers can also help reduce labour turnover and costs, which is particularly important in the context of privatization and restructuring.

The trade unions are also waging campaigns, often with success, against discriminatory behaviour against female employees or employees from ethnic minorities. This role is also crucial during periods of restructuring and privatization in so far as certain rules applicable to the public services or inherent in the public service strictly guarantee equality of opportunity in recruitment and promotion, neutrality and non-discrimination.

As noted recently in other sectors such as the post and telecommunications,⁽⁷⁾ trade unions are tending to merge in the public distribution services and acquire a critical size vis-à-vis increasingly powerful employers and to help shape the choices made at the international level. The penetration of multinational energy giants into areas which were formerly state monopolies has helped unions to understand the true meaning of globalization and the international move towards liberalization and privatization. Trade unions which face new bargaining partners have found information on company strategies and behaviour to be indispensable.

Thus, ICEM affiliate unions in the Asia-Pacific region are joining forces to meet the challenge of globalization, restructuring and privatization in the energy industry.⁽⁸⁾ For ICEM, this has meant constructing global networks between trade unions of different countries and even between organized workers in the global facilities of individual multinational corporations. The same sophisticated communications used by multinational enterprises to coordinate their global production systems can also be used by workers and their unions. It is no longer easy to exclude workers from access to strategic information. According to the ICEM General Secretary, building a labour response at the level of the corporation requires direct engagement with multinational management of the enterprises. The objectives here would include the writing of new multinational labour-management agreements at the industry and company levels. While these would not replace the need for national and local agreements, they would underwrite the latter with a guarantee of the application of a similar approach across the global operations of the enterprise concerned.⁽⁹⁾

Similarly, PSI has established regional trade union networks in the electricity, gas and water industries in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. PSI's European arm, EPSU, is arguing for a 10 Step Plan to realize a social Europe in the energy sector. Part of this plan is the need to bring employers and trade unions together of Central and Eastern European countries. The Austrian President of the Council of Ministers, Farnleiter, has taken this up with the European Commission.⁽¹⁰⁾ A recent meeting of the EPSU water and energy unions decided to compare collective agreements, consider a joint European collective bargaining agenda, work on equality issues, prioritize companies for the establishment of European Works Councils, target transnational companies not respecting ILO Conventions, and work in social dialogue with European employers' organizations in the electricity and gas sectors.⁽¹¹⁾

In October 1997, more than 1 million German workers united to form the mining, chemical and energy industrial union IG BCE. The ICEM General Secretary recently stated that trade unions now have only two options vis-à-vis the globalization of capital: one is to remain essentially national-based organizations and act as "mere doorkeepers for capitalism; the other is to redefine the movement to be able to intervene at the new global level where the decisions are made that affect workers and the communities in which they live".⁽¹²⁾

Trade unions are now prepared to liaise beyond their national borders, particularly in cases of restructuring. Thus, in 1996, EDF, together with two United States companies, acquired a controlling stake in the Rio de Janeiro power utility Light. The Brazilian urban workers' federation FNU-CUT, which represents electricity workers at Light, immediately contacted the regional office of Public Services International to reach EDF's French unions. According to an FNU member, meetings with French colleagues provided a very useful understanding of EDF practices and collective agreements and the FNU was put into direct contact with the new owners. The French FCE-CFDT trade union insists that EDF international expansion must set the very best social example.

Under the aegis of their international federations, trade unions are also tending to organize at the regional level. For instance, the effects of privatization in the energy, mining and processing industries were examined by a major Arab regional trade union conference held in Cairo in October 1995, hosted by the three ICEM-affiliated unions in Egypt and the Egyptian mining union.

4.2.2. The specific characteristics of industrial relations
in multinational enterprises

The development of industrial relations in multinational enterprises can take two paths: either the multinational enterprise brings with it parts of its own industrial relations practice consistent with national legislation or it adapts to the practice of the host country in which it is operating. It would seem that most enterprises choose the latter formula, in combination with features from the former. For example, the major French water companies recognize trade unions and comply with national agreements in France; but when they moved into the water treatment sector in the United Kingdom, they adopted the British practices of the 1980s by refusing to recognize trade unions.

It seems that the United States enterprises which have entered the gas and electricity sectors in Europe have not introduced a different management and industrial relations style. For instance, Southern Company, the first United States enterprise to have bought a regional electricity distributor in the United Kingdom, SWEB, recognizes trade unions and collective agreements.

4.2.3. The role of governments

The State is still often the main employer in the public services, even if privatization is gradually reducing the share of these sectors in total employment. Thus the social policy of the State still plays in many countries a leading role in labour relations in these public services. Problems related to water, for example, are often more a matter of policy than of a technical nature. Dialogue between organizations or multinational enterprises and governments can help avoid problems by focusing on the establishment of a national water policy designed to meet the basic needs of populations -- particularly the most underprivileged groups -- through the establishment of an environment which helps improve health and reduce diseases transmitted by water, within a general framework for the sustainable management of natural resources. In this context, consultation with the population is essential if account is to be taken of their actual needs. It is often considered, therefore, the responsibility of the public authorities to establish ways and means whereby the local communities, the private and public sectors, as well as NGOs can collaborate in the provision of the kind of service expected by the public and the cost of which will be acceptable by the latter.

4.3. Consultation and participation: A key element in the
success of privatization and restructuring

Public sector reforms have a greater chance of achieving their objectives if workers and their representatives participate at all levels of decision making, since an agreement based on a dialogue between all the parties is more credible than a unilateral decision.

The ILO strongly believes that a participatory approach is right in principle -- it is a manifestation of the ILO's core remit of promoting social partnership. There are of course realpolitik as well as principled arguments in its favour. Among these are that, in developing a privatization programme, it makes political sense to engage with potential opponents, to anticipate their concerns and to negotiate what is negotiable and make clear the government's resolution about what is not. Another is that there are always compromises and trade-offs to be made concerning the relative priority of a range of objectives, and these can best be reached and sustained in practice through a participatory consultative process.

Privatization works most successfully where it is backed up by social consensus and support; these are the conditions of economic good management. Experience from a range of countries suggests that certain conditions (see box 4.2) can enhance popular support, and therefore success, for the privatization process.

An early step, therefore, is identification of stakeholders and the establishment of institutional arrangements for their involvement. The groups whose authentic representatives need to be engaged in this societal and participatory process include labour unions and professional and civil service representative associations; consumer representative organizations; and community-based groups. Policies and plans need to be explained to them throughout the process, from programme development to implementation, and their views canvassed and taken into account. It does not mean giving a veto to any particular interest group or allowing the views of the noisiest to drown out those of other legitimate stakeholders in charge. It does mean enabling an institutional framework in which all legitimate stakeholders can feed their views and concerns into a process of consultative policy formation.
 

Box 4.2 Conditions for a successful privatization process Transparency in the privatization process; explanation of the benefits of competition, economic efficiency and foreign investment; promotion of popular capitalism without compromising corporate governance; securing commitments from new operators to employment and investment, and putting in place effective monitoring machinery; adequate compensation for retrenched workers; training and redeployment services to enable skills development, labour mobility and job creation through enterprise development; protection of consumer welfare against monopoly power, including regulation of tariffs charged by utility services where privatized, and public policy goals relating to environmental protection, quality and other issues.

It can make sense for potential buyers to be involved, before the actual sale, in discussions about post-sale labour restructuring, since future obligations and trade-offs are likely to influence the price they will be willing to pay for going concerns. Alternatively, or additionally, the capacity and willingness of potential buyers to meet the investment and employment obligations agreed as part of the terms of sale can be a factor in the choice of buyer.⁽¹³⁾

One of the conditions for mobilizing staff consists of providing continuous information on the enterprise projects and their objectives, and the extent to which they are understood and supported by employees. Consultation in one form or another seems to have occurred in most cases of utility privatization, even if this consultation has sometimes been purely formal. In some instances, trade unions have not been involved in the privatization process at all. In the United States, according to the Utility Workers Union of America, unions have neither been consulted nor invited to participate in the legislative and administrative processes leading to deregulation and restructuring. In general, most conflicts and disputes are settled either across the bargaining table or through arbitration. However, many of the issues raised by deregulation and restructuring are typically not covered by the contract and thus not subject to arbitration. Increasingly, trade unions are using tactics such as corporate, political or other comprehensive campaigns to put pressure on companies to resolve conflicts in a positive manner.

Regulatory frameworks often give possibilities for trade unions and other citizens' groups to intervene and influence the regulation. In Belgium, trade unions have statutory representation on the Control Committee for the Electricity and Gas Sector which is an agreement reached between the trade unions, the national employers' federation and several interests in the sector. The trade unions also represent consumer interests.

In order to encourage workers' support of restructuring policies, employers often make use of enterprise projects which set forth the main goals and objectives to be achieved. Thus, Hydroquébec established "a performance challenge" project which explains what the enterprise has to do to become "the best electricity company in Canada by the year 2000".⁽¹⁴⁾

The French electricity company EDF has developed since 1946 along similar lines to those of the public service. However, the enterprise can be said to have gradually moved away from this method of operation since the 1970s, in a process which was further strengthened by the signature with the State of a series of "plan contracts". Since the 1980s the enterprise has been trying to promote a kind of participatory management,⁽¹⁵⁾ with management communication campaigns being organized to facilitate the transition from a technical towards a client-based culture.

Following sweeping legislative reform several years ago, Sweden and Finland now have the most liberal electric power markets in Europe. Municipal electricity utilities are being privatized, and competition between major state-owned and private companies is increasing. Norway has maintained a more controlled system, with liberalization of power production but without privatization. The President of Norway's State company Statkraft believes that the recipe for success has been staff and union participation in the reform process, a view endorsed by the Norwegian Union of Electrician and Power Plant Workers (NEKF), which believes that most workers have benefited from the reforms. In May 1997 the Finnish power company IVO became the first electricity company to establish a European Works Council for union-management cooperation.

In Sweden, according to the Union for Communications and Services (SEKO), following the establishment of joint stock companies required by Swedish electricity legislation (under which the sale and distribution of electricity may not be carried out by the same legal body), the State and commercial enterprises have changed their employer's organizations, with which SEKO has been obliged to sign new collective agreements. SEKO has succeeded through negotiation in maintaining the level of benefits established in collective agreements. Through the Energy Committee of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), on which all LO member federations are represented, SEKO has participated in and influenced the political process, although not to the extent that it had hoped. LO was represented in the large-scale political enquiry which preceded the deregulation of the Swedish electricity market.

One example of the establishment of a formal consultative structure can be seen in the Czech Republic where trade unions participate in a general consultation process for developing legislative standards and decrees. Contentious issues are dealt with in negotiations with Czech Members of Parliament, or directly in individual parliamentary committees. The active role played by Central European trade unions in the restructuring process is bearing fruit despite some inevitable job losses. Hungarian trade unions have reached an agreement on employment, the observance of collective agreements and ways of improving working conditions with Western multinationals wanting to invest in emerging new markets. Czech unions have ensured their presence on new regulatory bodies and in restructuring talks. The Czech trade unions participated in the process for the privatization of water supply and sewage plans on the basis of the laws in force and the provisions of collective agreements. However, according to the trade unions, privatization has adversely affected freedom of association.

According to the Latvian trade union Energija, there is one monopoly company responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution of electrical energy in Latvia, namely the State joint stock enterprise Latvenergo, now in the process of privatization. In April 1997 the basic regulations on privatization were adopted, with the intention being to privatize the energy company as one vertically integrated enterprise but with 51 per cent capital being retained by State. Due to unavoidable reasons the regulations on privatization were modified, with the company being split into generation, transmission and distribution units, each of which was to be privatized on a separate basis. Following strong opposition to such privatization by Energija, an agreement was concluded between the Latvian Privatization Agency and the Latvian Trade Union Federation on the compulsory participation of trade union representatives in the preparation of the basic regulations on privatization.

According to the National Committee of the Union of Public Service and Production Workers SINDIND COMSERVICE of the Republic of Moldova, the transformation of the State Production Directorate Vodokanal (water and heat) of the city of Kishinev into the joint-stock company Apeh-Kanal came about at the request of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which had promised a loan to the company for further restructuring and for bringing the Kishinev water supply up to European standards. The Vodokanal project went ahead without the consent of the work force and without taking into account the views of the trade union enterprise committee. Apeh-Kanal workers are not shareholders, since 100 per cent of the shares are owned by the State. In the event of the privatization of enterprises of the Apeh-Kanal concern and the restructuring of the state production association Fermokomekenergo, the collective agreements for 1998 include provisions making it compulsory to include trade union representatives in any discussions.

According to the Georgian Union of Public Utility Workers in the Republic of Georgia, the Government has announced the privatization of the electricity generating, supply and sales sectors. The first company to be affected has been the Tbilisi municipal electricity supply organization. Telasi, which currently employs 1,200 workers and serves 370,000 consumers (individuals and organizations) in Tbilisi. It was reorganized in May 1998 as a joint stock company, with 75 per cent of the shares being sold on a competitive basis to supply companies serving at least 300,000 consumers. Merryl Lynch of London acted as consultants in the privatization process. According to legislation, Telasi workers will receive 2 per cent of the shares free of charge, although they are demanding 10 per cent and priority options over the remaining shares.

The Public Utilities Trade Union Committee has set up a special group to monitor the privatization process. This group is in contact with the Ministry of State Property and was involved in the drafting of the privatization texts, although many of its demands with regards to workers rights and interests are not reflected in the conditions of sale, and the workforce is represented on the monitoring committee of the new joint stock company.

The Egyptian General Trade Union of Public Utility Workers reported that it has participated in several meetings held by the Egyptian Trade Union Federation over five years on privatization and restructuring, as a result of which the public utilities, and in particular water and electricity, have been excluded from the privatization process.

The Zambian Government has recently embarked on a water sector reform involving the establishment of three water companies. Trade unions are participating at every stage of the privatization process. A wide-ranging public debate was held in which the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions and its affiliates played a major role.

As already noted in Chapter 2, ESKOM is a large public South African enterprise responsible for the generation, distribution and sale of electricity. The company has adopted a strategy consistent with the Government's policy of rapidly increasing the provision of electricity to the disadvantaged sections of the community and has in the current year already made some 300,000 connections. The restructuring programme is based on an interactive bench marking approach using project teams which review work practices and the working environment with a view to enhancing efficiency. The company has established a special task force of three executive directors to work solely on the redesign of the organization, with the assistance of specialized consultants, including as regards the communications process. The five trade unions representing the ESKOM workforce participate on a continuing basis in the consultations on the restructuring and redesign of the organization, with bilateral discussions being held separately on issues relevant to a specific trade union which have implications for the entire ESKOM workforce, such as cross functional conditions of service, joint ventures, use of contractors, etc. The enterprise not only provides detailed financial and technical information but invites the trade unions to engage their own independent technical experts.⁽¹⁶⁾

Consultation is sometimes insufficient. According to the ESCOM Workers Union of Malawi (EWU), the President of the National Labour Centre (Malawi Congress of Trade Unions -- MCTU) is a member of the Privatization Commission, and as such involved in all issues of the process. But whether workers are adequately informed or consulted is doubtful.

The Trade Union of Electrical Workers of Colombia (SINTRAELECOL) reports that it has been involved in national negotiations with the Government which have already resulted in four national agreements enabling the trade union to participate to some extent in the restructuring, privatization and capitalization of companies in the sector. The union has thus been able to safeguard workers' rights through collective agreements, although the fall in the number of its members, as a result of the voluntary withdrawal schemes, is affecting the trade union's position.

According to ICEM, the major restructuring and privatization programmes in the Colombian electricity industry could be at risk if the basic rights of power workers are flouted. In negotiations with SINTRAELECOL, the Colombian Ministry of Mines and Energy recently tabled a proposal that, according to the trade unions, would in effect cancel current collective agreements and curb electricity workers' basic union rights, including freedom of association, free collective bargaining and the right to strike. ICEM believes that the best way of guaranteeing the supply of electricity to all citizens at a reasonable price of maintaining a skilled, motivated workforce is by establishing an appropriate regulatory framework and a national collective agreement covering all companies in the sector, both existing enterprises and future entrants. The trade unions point out that thousands of Colombian trade unionists have been murdered in recent years, including oil workers and their representatives, and that this wave of terror has now spread to the electricity sector with the murder of Odulfo Zambrano, President of SINTRAELECOL's Atlántico regional branch.

* * *

One of the conclusions of a recent ILO sectoral meeting was that "public sector reforms are most likely to achieve their objectives of delivering efficient, effective and high-quality services when planned and implemented with the full participation of public sector workers and their unions and consumers of public services at all stages of the decision-making process".⁽¹⁷⁾ The evidence from ILO studies confirms that an involvement of all stakeholders in privatization and restructuring processes is a prerequisite for success. The active participation of employee representatives and, for a number of matters, also of the users of those water, gas, and electricity services undergoing such changes, is the key to solving or easing most of the challenges posed by those processes. However, evidence also shows that this is an issue where achievements have so far fallen well below expectations.

The full involvement of employee representatives in the design, planning, implementation and monitoring of such changes is desirable, not just on ethical grounds, but because it produces tangible and useful results for labour, society and the enterprises themselves. Trade unions are a valuable source of knowledge and ideas, both at the enterprise and at the more macroeconomic levels, which can help minimize unemployment and its social costs, improve the quality of services and increase enterprise competitiveness. During the early years of privatization and restructuring, the trade unions' general stance towards these processes was largely defensive and uncompromising, with opposition leaving little room for constructive import or counter proposals. This reflected certain apprehensions about the new trends and was consistent with the generally uncompromising stance of the other parties pushing for such changes. In recent years however, there has been a gradual development towards more frequent and more constructive exchanges of views.

Despite many cases of resistance (see 4.4 below), trade unions have shown willingness to participate positively in restructuring, provided they are genuinely consulted and involved in the process and the legitimate interests of their members are given due consideration. In addition to the legitimacy of a social partnership approach to the labour-related aspects of restructuring and privatization, there is evidence that a participatory approach to the actual design, planning, implementation and follow-up of restructuring and privatization can produce positive results for the enterprise and its service to consumers. Employees and trade unions appear to be a rich source of knowledge and ideas about how to improve efficiency and quality; and where this source has been tapped there have been some excellent results, sometimes perceived by employers as greater than the potential gains from privatization itself.

4.4. Resistance to privatization and restructuring

Utilities employees may legitimately fear that they will lose their status and specific conditions of employment as a result of privatization or restructuring. They are often poorly informed of the methods of privatization and restructuring, and fear that they will be marginalized in collective bargaining and lose their job security and all or some of their social protection. They may also believe that labour relations will deteriorate in the new enterprise. In many countries, their conditions of employment and work in fact remain comparable to those of other public employees, both as regards job security and social protection and the rules relating to freedom of association and bargaining rights.

Trade unions in the public sector are often the most important and the most powerful in several countries. The privatization of public enterprises risks weakening them by the resulting automatic reduction of the public sector and by the arrival on the market of enterprises whose workforce is not always organized. However, the trade unions are not really powerless in the event of a planned privatization. Although they may not have been invited to the bargaining table, they have other means available to make their views heard.

A distinction should be made between the public sector and the private sector, even if there is a growing overlap between the two. In the public sector, it is not always easy to go on strike since restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right. The Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO believes that the exercise of the right to strike may be limited, and even prohibited, in the "essential services", i.e. "services whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of whole or part of the population". According to this Committee, electricity services and water supply services may be considered to be essential services.⁽¹⁸⁾ The possible restrictions placed on the right to strike in these public services result in a loss or weakening of an essential means of defence by the workers concerned of their socio-economic and occupational interests, and therefore compensatory guarantees should be provided.

The restriction placed on the right to strike of public employees is in this respect problematic. It respects the rights of the population regarding possible interruptions of services and being taken hostage by public employees. Preference is often given to the protection of consumers to the detriment of public employees because of the social cost of interruption of work by employees in the public sector. The victims of a strike are not only the parties involved in the negotiations but consumers who cannot obtain the same services from other providers.

Each country, and even each enterprise, has a different response to the problem of the right to strike in the utilities sector. In Spain for example, employees in the sector are authorized to establish trade unions, to engage in collective bargaining and to go on strike provided they continue to guarantee a minimum of essential services as defined by the law. In Italy, the electricity sector is one of the essential services regulated, as regards strikes, by Act No. 146 of 12 July 1990. A ten-day advance notice of such action must be given, as well as information to users concerning arrangements and periods of service during the strike. Fines are imposed in the event of non-compliance with these obligations. The Act establishes a minimum service by collective agreement, signed after consultation with the users, which fixes the indispensable services which the administration or service provider must offer. A committee oversees the application of the Act and monitors the consistency of the measures taken with the constitutional guarantee of the rights of the individual. It also issues opinions concerning the interpretation or application of agreements on the minimum service. In the event of disagreement, and when there is a real danger of serious and imminent prejudice to the rights of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution due to a paralysis of the services, the President of the Council of Ministers or the Prefect may, depending on the scope of the dispute, issue an ordinance to guarantee provision of such services.

In France, the right to strike in the public services is regulated by an Act of 31 July 1963, which establishes the trade union monopoly of initiating a strike, and the obligation to give advance notice of five clear days. The difference with the preceding examples lies in the fact that it is the enterprise itself which must decide on the establishment of a minimum service. In the event of privatization or restructuring, it is the responsibility of the public authorities to arbitrate or modify the regulations in force to reconcile the exercise of the right to strike in the privatized or restructured enterprises with the need to ensure continuity of the public service. According to the Palestine General Federation of Trade Unions, there are no constraints in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the right to strike in the gas, electricity and water sectors, except as provided by the Labour Code; advance notice of 14 days must be given, and of 18 days in the case of major services such as electricity and water.

As J.-Y. Ménard and J. Barreau point out,⁽¹⁹⁾ reorganization or structural reform in the two enterprises EDF and Hydroquébec have brought about a twofold cultural change, with a public service culture giving way to a more commercial culture and a technical culture being replaced by a managerial culture. This process always gives rise to polemical reactions. The sense of occupational identity in the sector is very strong and closely related to enterprise identity, since the history of public enterprises has been based on their capacity to meet the technological challenge of providing electricity throughout the national territory. The reduced emphasis now placed on the technical element and the higher profile of management needs and concerns often result in a sense of devalorization and downgrading among workers whose social status depended on their technical professionalism. Managerial culture, by advocating a logic of results rather than technical excellence, reducing the hierarchical pyramid and respect for authority and decompartmentalizing services through customer-supplier relations and prioritizing versatility, radically changes the traditional landscape and means of cooperation.

The Utility Workers Union of America reports that it has vigorously opposed the restructuring of the electricity and gas industries and, in coalition with other unions, residential and small business consumer organizations, senior citizens and sections of industry, it has managed to prevent federal restructuring legislation and slow down the process at the state level. However, successful strikes have been rare in this industry, in part because of the large numbers of management employees available to replace workers during strikes. And ironically, one of the consequences of restructuring may be to make strikes more feasible for unions. As of the time of writing, at least 14 states, including California, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, had adopted deregulation legislation or implemented it through administrative action.

At the Latvijas Gaze enterprise in Latvia there were and are public debates concerning privatization, with the two social democratic parties in Latvia organizing meetings against the privatization of strategic units, including Latvijas Gaze, according to the LAKRS trade union.

On the initiative of the Trade Union of Electrical Workers of Colombia (SINTRAELECOL), and with the participation of its members, many regional meetings have been held in Colombia to convince the public that the privatization of public utility companies is contrary to national sovereignty and will have a direct impact on the family budget and, within a short period of time, will lead to price increases and reduced benefits for workers on low incomes. According to the SINTRAEMSDES Nacional trade union the lack of unity within the Colombian workers' movement allowed the privatization model to be imposed and although each union resisted according to its individual capacities, there was very little consultation with the unions on the subject of privatization. Since most of the enterprises were of a municipal kind, the application of the privatization model was not the same at all times and in all places. In some regions, meetings and debates were organized with the local community by the trade union organizations, although the conclusions reached were not taken into account by the municipal councils. National organizations such as SINTRAELECOL and SINTRAEMSDES held strikes and protest meetings which failed to prevent the imposition of the model. According to the last-mentioned trade union, many of these protest movements were declared illegal and workers were dismissed.

In Spain, in the recently privatized public enterprise Endesa, trade union organizations have campaigned for the maintenance of acquired rights and against the precariousness of employment and flexibilization of working conditions.

In Sweden, on the contrary, in 1993, the trade unions at the Vattenfall production enterprise did not oppose the transfer of all staff to a private law regime, which replaced the previous system of two legal categories (manual workers and employees).

In Poland, in the gas and electricity sectors, trade union opposition resulted in the free distribution of 15 per cent of shares to workers in the newly privatized enterprise.⁽²⁰⁾ However, this distribution has not always allowed staff to participate actively on the management board. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the Privatization Act of 1992 makes provision for the distribution of shares to employees, without any voting rights, for a period of three years, in the event of the privatization of public enterprises.

Various other forms of compensation may be offered, depending on the strength of the opposition and the urgency of the reform process.

In Hungary, the strike movement launched by the trade union in the electricity sector forced the Government to negotiate on the preparation of an agreement to include, in particular, provision for a majority holding by the State, social measures to protect the interests of users and the setting up of an education and training fund for employees in the sector, financed by five per cent of the revenue accrued from the privatization process.

The privatization of electricity was a major concern for delegates at the ICEM Electricity Workers Conference in Harare in September 1996. An agreement had recently been concluded between a senior Zimbabwean Government official and the Malaysian-based multinational YTL for the privatization of Zimbabwe's biggest power station at Hwange, a coal-fired station owned by the national power utility Zesa. According to the ICEM, the negotiations with YTL were shrouded in secrecy and short-circuited a tendering procedure that was already under way. Zesa had shortlisted six joint venture partners from a total of 19 applicants, but the management board did not learn of the deal with YTL until the day after it was signed. Zesa immediately denounced the agreement as illegal and called for its withdrawal, claiming it ran counter to the official policy for the indigenization of jobs and enterprises and would result in higher electricity tariffs. The Zimbabwe Electricity and Energy Workers' Union (ZEEWU) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) issued a joint statement condemning the secret YTL deal as totally unacceptable, and accusing the Government of "privatizing national assets without any guiding policy, without any consultations with national stakeholders". On 23 July 1998, a strike by employees at SONELEL, the Senegalese electricity enterprise undergoing privatization, resulted in a number of electricity cuts. Trade unionists were arrested and accused of sabotage.

Trade unions have made considerable use of national and international public campaigns to express their discontent and influence public opinion without taking consumers hostage. These have sometimes been very effective, as in the United Kingdom, where a public campaign in 1984 and 1985 succeeded in persuading the Government to abandon proposals for water privatization until after the General Election of 1987. Similarly the Italian and Hungarian trade unions have also sought international support for their positions before and after privatization, with some success. In the United Kingdom electricity sector, there was public debate in the press and in other communication media on privatization in general and on the Government's specific proposals for the sector. There was no formal consultation with the trade unions on the principle and structure of privatization itself. The trade unions initially opposed the privatization of electricity, and mounted a publicity campaign which drew attention to the difficulties and risks which would arise. When it became clear that the legislation would become law, because of the Government's large majority in Parliament, the unions sought to protect the interests of their members and of the wider public by representations to ministers and by briefing individual Members of Parliament.

In April 1992, the Electricity Workers Union of the National Electrification Institute in Guatemala called for strike action against the sale of the national public electricity company. The strike lasted 20 days, forcing the Government to consider other alternatives. The privatization however did not take place at the time originally proposed due to the fall of the Government in the following year. Union protests continued as succeeding Governments continued to privatize other sectors such as railways and telecommunications. The electricity company was finally privatized in July 1998, with 80 per cent of government shares being sold off to a consortium, and foreign and national investors invited to invest in electricity distribution. The trade union has acknowledged that the privatization process is now irreversible and is searching for ways to participate in the process, in particular through the purchasing of shares in the new companies.

In Debrecen in Hungary, the local council rejected proposals made by both the Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and Vivendi (former Générale des Eaux) and opted for a public water supply. In Lodz in Poland, the two rival trade unions joined forces to oppose a privatization plan by the local authorities and suggested alternatives by identifying possible sources of financing for the necessary investments. Following favourable local elections in 1995, the water supply remained within the public domain.

Government, unions and local authorities in South Africa agreed in December 1998 on a framework to regulate the involvement of private companies in the delivery of municipal services. An important principle of the agreement was that the private sector should not take over operations where municipalities had a "realistic chance" of delivery quality services themselves. Private sector partnerships could be established where municipalities were genuinely incapable of service delivery because of financial, technological or capacity constraints. Private firms would have to adhere to environmental and delivery standards, health and safety norms and the protection of workers' service conditions. They would also be responsible for monitoring contracts. The agreement also provided for lifeline tariffs, limits on tariff increases and restrictions on the rates of returns.

Mention should also be made of the growing use of the Internet by workers and their representatives as a means of broadening the scope and effectiveness of public campaigns, in particular those concerning multinational enterprises. Thus the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) has a website which includes an anti-privatization database. At the international level, Public Services International maintains a database on multinational companies involved in privatization and includes news on campaigns against privatization.

A recent campaign has been launched on the Internet by several unions condemning Biwater, a privately owned British multinational company, for attempting to silence democratic debate on water privatization in South Africa. Biwater lawyers demanded that LabourNet, a United Kingdom labour news website, should remove a document which the company alleges to be defamatory. The offending document is a press release issued by the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU), which spearheaded the fights against utility privatization. PSI has called on trade unions and governments worldwide to reject Biwater's behaviour as unacceptable and to encourage open and critical debate on privatization.

In contracting out Adelaide's water and sewerage system, the South Australian Government sought a large water/waste treatment organization with experience in operating large urban systems and a significant presence in the Asia-Pacific Region. The trade unions representing workers at South Australia Water were vehemently opposed to privatization and undertook sustained lobbying of political parties in an attempt to prevent it. There was also strong support in the community for public ownership and management of the water services. The trade union and community campaign, however, was not successful in reversing the Government's decision to privatize. Trade unions with members in the public water industry undertook a protracted industrial campaign to ensure the best possible conditions for the employees concerned. When the South Australian Government failed to respond to workers' concerns in a manner judged satisfactory by trade unions, the latter approached South Australia Water and United Water directly, and, as they claim, were largely instrumental in achieving a relatively favourable outcome for transferred employees at United Water.

4.5. The new forms and subjects of collective bargaining

The ILO report for the 1987 Joint Meeting on Employment and Conditions of Work in Water, Gas and Electricity Supply Services pointed out -- and the remark is still valid today -- that:

Collective bargaining is a well-entrenched practice in water, gas and electricity services throughout the world, at least as regards employees subject to general labour legislation. In state-owned services or undertakings run by communal or regional authorities, where employees fall under laws governing public servants, conditions of work are usually fixed by statute or determined unilaterally by the employing authority.⁽²¹⁾

The privatization of enterprises or the restructuring of distribution services often result in new collective bargaining techniques, or new subjects for negotiation, for example wages when they have been previously fixed by the public authorities.

Centralized bargaining has been current practice in northern and western Europe, and requires that most workers are covered by trade union agreements. It achieved decades of positive relations between employers and employees, as well as good conditions of wages and employment for workers in Europe. However, there has been a recent trend towards the decentralization of bargaining for which the establishment of solid guarantees of trade union rights is required to prevent employers from seeking to discourage the establishment of workers' unions.

In the United States, according to the Utility Workers Union of America, non-regulated utility facilities are typically very difficult to unionize, and this sector of the industry is at present largely non-unionized, compared to the regulated sector which is one of the most highly unionized parts of the United States economy. One of the intentions of restructuring the industry is to deunionize it in order to reduce labour costs. A staff report of the Californian Public Utilities Commission has stated explicitly that the utilities should rely more on non-union labour. In the electricity industry, in some cases where generation has been separated from transmission and distribution, resulting in the utilities selling off their generation capacity, trade unions have successfully pursued new long-term agreements with the new owners even before they take possession of the facilities. The utilities with which the Utility Workers Union of America has bargaining relationships have been generally willing to bargain over the effects of deregulation, restructuring and privatization, but not over the direction of the process itself.

In the United Kingdom at the time of privatization, the trade unions made representations to the Government and to the new companies to protect existing arrangements for collective bargaining and for consultation on health and safety. Privatization led to a number of significant practical changes. Today, the search for greater flexibility in management has resulted in the replacement of the national agreements which regulated the situation of staff in the electricity industry between 1952 and 1992 by enterprise agreements. Long-standing industry-wide agreements on pay and conditions (which long pre-dated nationalization) were abandoned in favour of individual agreements covering a single company or even a single division or area of business within a company. The more highly graded senior staff were put on to individual personalized contracts and there has since been a steady process of extending such contracts to other professional and administrative staff, and in some cases to manual and clerical employees as well. The existing industry-wide pension scheme was also effectively divided up among the individual companies, but -- as a result of pressure from the trade unions -- provisions were inserted in the privatization legislation to protect the rights and future entitlements of existing employees.

In Sweden, on the other hand, negotiation at the branch level remains very common, although negotiations are also held at more decentralized levels, both as regards the adaptation of wages to the economic realities of the enterprise as well as working time and its organization. Thus working conditions at the electricity company Vattenfall are regulated by a collective agreement negotiated by the electricity branch of the employers' association SAF, except for managerial staff who negotiate directly their conditions of work and remuneration.

The industrial relations system in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is also changing. The transition economies inherited unionization rates of more than 90 per cent from the trade unions which were organized and supported by the State and the Communist Party. As they became independent, the trade unions saw their membership levels drop in the wake of economic and political changes, and they are still trying to adapt to the new realities and to determine their approach to bargaining.

Reforms in the distribution companies have often been carried out in situations in which there has been a reversal of the roles in collective bargaining. The trade unions have been less active while the employers' organizations have resumed the initiative on such subjects as the flexibilization of management, the annualization of working time or the individualization of wages. The privatization of British Gas has had an effect on the number of trade unions, which has fallen from five covering the different categories of workers to a single trade union per business unit.

In Estonia, trade union reaction to a government privatization plan for the water, gas and electricity sectors essentially seeks to include job guarantees in contracts and ensure that these guarantees are respected after privatization. Thus a tripartite system set up in 1996 requires the Privatization Agency to keep employers and employees informed about the enterprises concerned by privatization and on negotiations held with the possible new operators to determine the conditions of purchase and employment guarantees. In general, the maintenance of jobs is obligatory for a period of three years following privatization, but the public authorities are under pressure to reduce this period and even to suppress any clause concerning the protection of employment.

In Asia, all the main forms of privatization, with the exception of corporatization and commercialization, imply a change in employer, and hence a different employment contract which does not automatically contain all the conditions of previous agreements and awards. In general agreements in the publicly owned utilities are both extensive and exhaustive. There appear to be five general types of agreements now covering employees in the public utilities:

• national agreements or Acts covering all public sector workers, as in Malaysia and Thailand;
• national agreements specific to the water or electricity industry, as in Bangladesh;
• pay commission awards covering specific states or municipalities, as in India;
• enterprise-level agreements, as is currently the case in Japan and will increasingly be so in Australia;
• individual contracts, as in New Zealand.

Each type of collective agreement (other than the last) covers an extensive array of working conditions in addition to pay and hours of work, including maternity leave, training, equality of opportunity for different ethnic groups and occupational pensions (except in Thailand and Japan).

Where no agreements are reached to guarantee workers' rights to transfer these conditions into their new employment, privatization leads to changes in most working conditions which are detrimental to employees. The clearest illustration of this was the contracting out of water meter reading in Sydney Water (Australia), which, in line with international experience in other industries, eliminated employment continuity and reduced leave entitlement and sick leave.

4.6. The weight of public opinion and the
involvement of consumers

Nowadays, in economic sectors of such importance as the utilities, major privatization or restructuring projects are rarely carried out without attention being given to the reactions of consumers.

The effectiveness of a strike or public campaign also depends on the interest shown by the public in the social effects of changes under way and its support of trade union action. A government may abandon a privatization or restructuring programme if it believes that it will become sufficiently unpopular to cause it to lose the next election, or if the trade union is supported by a powerful pressure group. In the latter case, however, there is the risk of satisfying the interests of a small group rather than the collective utility.

To a large and increasing extent public opinion on proposed changes therefore restricts the leeway for action by governments. For example, the liberalization movement launched by the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom cannot be understood without recalling the relative unpopularity of public service enterprises at the time. The practice of long strikes without the guarantee of any kind of minimum service and with frequent electricity cuts had, already in the 1960s, made users hostile to the monopolies.

In Italy, the State had invested little in the public distribution services, which were characterized by low wages and a lack of up-to-date technology. This situation encouraged absenteeism and poor quality of services. Furthermore, the practice of the political placement of employees had destroyed public confidence in the Italian distribution enterprises. The change was therefore welcomed as something positive by the consumers.

In the United States the influence of consumer groups is via the Public Utility Commissions and the regulators. It is based on the right to information, leaving little or no scope for so-called commercial secrets, and the right to participation ensuring that consumer groups have the possibility to intervene and are supported in this. The lack of influence of consumers in the United Kingdom regulatory system is now considered in the review of the regulation.⁽²²⁾

Trade unions frequently seek support from consumers in debates and campaigns concerning the reorganization of the public distribution services. Thus in France, the EDF and GDF trade unions decided to carry out in the autumn of 1998 a national survey of users on their expectations for the future of the public service on the eve of the opening-up to competition in the electricity market. The goal is to collect approximately half a million replies to a questionnaire by the end of 1998.⁽²³⁾

Moreover, consumer opinion is being increasingly taken into account within the framework of privatization and restructuring. Thus in Hungary, during the restructuring of the MVM Electricity Company, better information will be provided to consumers by a recently established service, the Office of Consumer and International Relations. The role of this Office will be important in two spheres: the relationship between the assessment of costs and the fixing of prices; the acceptance of development projects by public opinion. The preparation of the Hungarian Energy Act began in 1991 and was the subject of an intense public debate. The Act was adopted on the last day of the last parliamentary session of the previous majority Government (i.e. just before the elections of 20 April 1994 which gave a 60 per cent majority to the socialists who formed a coalition Government with the liberal party).⁽²⁴⁾

According to the concept adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, the parties involved in the privatization process are the entrepreneurs, the consumers and a regulatory body. Since the interests of these parties are not the same (producers or distributors must make their investments profitable, consumers need to be protected against monopolies or unjustified tariffs), it is the regulatory body which, through the regulation of prices and the monitoring of the good conduct of operators, will ensure the smooth running of the system. Changes in electricity price policy clearly reflect the transformations resulting from the progressive liberalization and privatization processes. Before the introduction of the reform, the Ministry responsible for energy fixed the price of electricity according to social and political criteria, without always taking account of real costs. Such a pricing policy was not a major problem as long as the State, which was virtually the exclusive owner of the sector, could allow itself to temporarily forego any income on its capital invested. However, this situation is no longer possible since it is contrary to economic rationality under the agreements concluded between the Hungarian Government and the World Bank and because of the need to attract national and private foreign capital.⁽²⁵⁾

Under the Act, energy prices have since 1997 had to take account of the following elements:

• the costs related to the reserve capacities to guarantee continuity of service;
• the closing down of establishments and their demolition pursuant to commitments undertaken with respect to environmental protection;
• the costs related to commitments undertaken within the framework of economic and energy policy, the obligation to ensure security of supply and international undertakings of an economic and environmental nature.

1.  ILO: Employment and conditions of work in water, gas and electricity supply services, Geneva, 1987, p. 52.

2.  L. de Luca (ed.): Labour and social dimensions of privatization and restructuring (public utilities: water, gas, electricity), ILO, Geneva, 1998, p. xiv.

3.  S. Ogden: "The reconstruction of industrial relations in the privatized water industry", British Journal of Industrial Relations (Oxford), Vol. 32, No. 1, Mar. 1994, pp. 68 ff.

4.  L. de Luca (ed.), op. cit., p. 95.

5.  ibid., p. 93.

6.  P. Colley: Reforming energy: Sustainable futures and global labour, Pluto Press, London, 1997.

7.  ILO: Structural and regulatory changes and globalization in postal and telecommunications services: The human resources dimension, Geneva, 1998, pp. 63-64.

8.  Icem Info (Brussels), No. 1, 1998, p. 10.

9.  Icem Info (Brussels), No. 7, 1998, pp. 7-8.

10.  Correspondence of Minister Farnleiter with EPSU following the European Commission's Synergia Conference, 24-25 Sep. 1998.

11.  EPSU Standing Committee on Public Utilities, 8 Dec. 1998, in Euro-Flash.

12.  Icem Info (Brussels), No. 4, 1997, p. 5.

13.  B. Martin: "Social and employment consequences of privatization in transition economies: Evidence and guidelines", working paper IPRED-4, ILO, Geneva, 1997, p. 15.

14.  J.Y. Ménard and J. Barreau: Stratégies de modernisation et réactions du personnel, Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1997, p. 117.

15.  J.Y. Ménard and J. Barreau, op. cit., p. 128.

16.  Information provided by ESKOM.

17.  ILO: Final report of the Joint Meeting on the Impact of Structural Adjustment in the Public Services (Efficiency, Quality Improvement and Working Conditions), Geneva, 1995, p. 20.

18.  ILO: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, 4th edition (revised), Geneva, 1996, p. 112.

19.  J.Y. Ménard and J. Barreau, op. cit., pp. 181 and 182.

20.   Financial Times (London), 26 Mar. 1997.

21.  ILO: Employment and conditions of work in water, gas and electricity supply services, op. cit., p. 57.

22.  G. Palast (US regulator): "How American unions and consumers won their rights", PSI Focus, pp. 4-8, Sep. 1997.

23.  Le Monde (Paris), 10 Sep. 1998, p. 18.

24.  J.Y. Ménard and J. Barreau, op. cit., p. 74.

25.  ibid., p. 79.

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