Impact of flexible labour market arrangements in the machinery electrical and electronic industries

Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on
the Impact of Flexible labour market Arrangements
in theMachinery, Electrical and Electronic Industries

Part 4    

Copyright ® 1999 International Labour Organization (ILO)

4. Work organization

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, practitioners, researchers, and policy-makers have tried to define and evaluate particular workplace practices and systems of practices that can spur productivity growth and competitiveness. The recent emphasis is on initiatives labelled "high-performance practices", "employee involvement", "employee participation", or "flexible work organizations".⁽¹⁾

Although until now this report has focused on the actual hours worked and how these can be manipulated and moved around in order to achieve the desired result -- shortened, lengthened, shifted and extended (both on a daily and on a weekly basis to include Saturday and Sunday), etc. -- a great deal more flexibility can be introduced through the reorganization of work itself.⁽²⁾ Major concepts in work organization include: batch production, cellular production, flowline production, just-in-time (JIT), zero inventory (ZI), quality circles (QC), quality of working life programme (QWL), statistical process control (SPC), teamwork and total quality management (TQM) (see box 4.1 below). Generally speaking these terms refer to attempts by companies to sharpen their competitive advantage by exploiting more fully the creativity and problem-solving capacities of their workers in the face of increased competition and rapid technological change. Successful companies will have implemented more than one of the above-mentioned organizational practices, but not all. The key therefore lies in selectivity, and in continuously choosing the right mix at the right time.

Figure 4.1 shows the various factors influencing the implementation of ZI and JIT, based on a study covering Finnish manufacturing companies, including firms in the MEE industries.

Figure 4.2, taken from a study of French, German, Japanese and Spanish machine manufacturing companies,⁽³⁾ perhaps best summarizes the place of work organization in the overall flexibility debate. The inner circle represents the system of work adopted. The second circle displays a number of variables at the (micro) plant level, while the third shows the macro context -- customers, labour market institutions, culture -- within which the enterprise operates.

This chapter will take a macro look at developments in the industry in the United Kingdom, then focus on a case-study of the recent reorganization of two metalworking factories in the United States which serves to illustrate the principles discussed, before returning to some of the wider issues raised in other studies.

4.1. Change in the United Kingdom

A recent survey of 25 companies in the United Kingdom in the engineering industry undertaken by the Industrial Relations Services (IRS) shows that major changes have been made to working methods and terms and conditions of employment in the past five years (see table 4.1).
 

Companies were asked about these changes, why they took place, the effects of change, and how change was communicated to employees, looking particularly at labour-management relations and the role of trade unions and human resources personnel. The 25 enterprises surveyed employ a total of 36,525 employees and range in size from 77 employees at Moulinex Swan Holdings to 15,075 at British Aerospace (Military Aircraft). They were distributed throughout the metal trades sector, although the majority were in the mechanical and electrical engineering industries.

The main findings of the survey were as follows:

• six in ten companies (15) have undertaken major restructuring during the past five years, while eight in ten (20) have made major changes to production or administrative processes during the same period;
• two-thirds (17) are planning to make major changes to their organizational structures and processes in the next two years;
• the two main reasons given for implementing change are to increase productivity and to improve products or services;
• the changes led to redundancies more often than they led to job increases;
• seven out of the ten organizations that operate cellular manufacturing have introduced it in the last four years and all ten say it has increased the quality of their product;
• teamworking, continuous improvement and total quality management are being introduced in all areas of the business and not just in production;
• nine out of the 16 organizations that have introduced teamworking say it has increased employee motivation and job satisfaction;
• according to organizations, continuous improvement is more likely to increase the quality of the product or service than to improve employee motivation and job satisfaction;
• a third of all organizations (nine) have changed their pay system to reflect the new way of working and just over four in ten (11) have adapted their employee appraisal systems;
• ten organizations have changed their working hours: eight have decreased them while two have increased them; and
• eight in ten companies (20) recognize trade unions for full collective bargaining and nearly two-thirds (13) say that the trade unions have been receptive to the changes the company has made.

Table 4.1 shows the nature of the changes in work organization introduced in each of the 25 enterprises.

4.2. A practical example from the United States

To illustrate the introduction and functioning of the above types of flexible work organization, one of the case-studies⁽⁴⁾ prepared for this report examined two mechanical engineering firms in Springfield, Massachusetts which serve as typical examples of how change in work organization can and must be implemented if firms are to survive. One company (Brimfield Precision, Inc.) was a standard contract machine shop bidding on work from other firms and was headed quickly down the road to closure. Today, after a successful turnaround, it designs and manufactures high-quality titanium and cobalt chrome alloy orthopaedic implants and orthopaedic surgical instruments. The other company (Smithfield Tool), after a capital outlay of US$30 million to purchase computer-controlled machinery, is now cost-competitive with non-union firms in the United States and with global competitors in South-East Asia.

Interestingly, the first company was forced to adopt a team-based⁽⁵⁾ way of organizing work to replace its previous machine function-based system of production with its concomitant hierarchical management style. Paradoxically, two opposite events prompted change. One was the loss of three lucrative contracts in its core area of business within an eight-day span, through no fault of its own. The other was the acquisition of a new complex job -- a contract to manufacture a knee implant instrument set -- which the company was ill-prepared to cope with.

Although the order was precisely what Brimfield needed to develop expertise on the instrument side of the orthopaedic market, the shop floor was overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the task. First, the order called for 16,000 component parts to be assembled into 1,200 completed instrument sets. Second, the order generated internal production problems because there were sharp distinctions in the quality standards and scheduling required among Brimfield's key products: orthopaedic implants and medical instruments. Orthopaedic implants are single-machined pieces with extremely high tolerances and quality standards. Instruments, on the other hand, call for somewhat less precision, particularly on finish, but consist of multiple parts that require complex assembly and the maintenance of tight production schedules to ensure that assemblies can be completed on time. Under the company's existing shop-floor organization, supervisors and front-line employees worked daily on implants and instruments and they began to mix up tolerances and quality standards, thus contributing to high internal scrap rates and increased production costs.

Table 4.1. Changes in work organization made in the last five years in 25 enterprises surveyed (United Kingdom)

The first innovation the company implemented to assess cost and quality was statistical process control (SPC). SPC revealed that internal scrap and rework rates were extremely high, and pinpointed where in the manufacturing process specific problems originated. Changes in manufacturing were made, and immediate cost improvements followed. To encourage and support employees to work in new ways, the company implemented twice-monthly "Deming meetings" to familiarize everyone with TQM. To gain control over the complexities of the new instruments order, a decision was made to restructure into product- and customer-focused business units.⁽⁶⁾

Four business units of approximately 30 employees each were established: implantable products, general instrumentation, minimally invasive surgery and general services. The distinct quality control department and tool crib were eliminated. Dedicated teams of workers were assigned to each customer to produce their full range of products and began to behave almost as an engineering and production extension of their customers. Within the business units, cellular manufacturing was implemented by the worker teams. Entire products or components are now machined from start to finish in the cells. Workers assigned to cells are organized into teams of four to seven people, and are cross-trained to perform all work in the cell, including equipment set-ups and programming. Team members make changes to the production process. If the changes are small, employees are empowered to make them on their own; if they are large -- requiring new tooling or the reorganization of machines, for example -- the employee (or team) meets with the business unit manager to discuss the idea.

Between 1982 and 1984, the other firm in the case-study (Smithfield) had been engaged in a $15.8 million programme designed to improve manufacturing and cut costs. But the desired savings proved difficult to achieve and the company was forced to lay off 150 workers temporarily after discovering excess inventories estimated to be worth $10 million.⁽⁷⁾ A new production manager was brought in and the company began to attack production inefficiencies in earnest. Unlike in earlier efforts, production workers were involved. For the new manager, the way to stay out of trouble was to keep inventory at a minimum. "You want to take raw material and turn it into finished goods without it ever sitting on the floor -- the idea is to move it out as soon as you can because it is worth zero if it's sitting in your shop."⁽⁸⁾ For this to occur employee involvement was essential, but this was difficult to achieve in the face of ongoing lay-offs. Total employment dropped to 450 workers in 1986, from 780 in 1984. The company instituted regular voluntary meetings on company time for interested workers and managers to discuss problems in the plant and began workshops for managers to help them learn how to delegate more authority to workers. In a short time one of the groups devised a system that resulted in $100,000 annual savings.

During the earliest stages of the reorganization union leaders were sceptical, but they urged their members to participate in the various work teams and discussion groups. The union president publicly declared that the lay-offs between 1984 and 1986 were preferable to the shutdown of another precision metalworking plant in the region. A decision was made in 1992 to continue a little longer in Springfield and a partnership was established with the University of Massachusetts Amherst Center for Manufacturing Productivity. The parent company committed $4 million for the purchase of new machine tools, while the university worked with the plant's engineers and workers to convert the old-style organization of work by machine tool function to more integrated manufacturing cells. As these improvements were made a new product line was introduced in the Springfield plant, the first in well over 30 years.

Today the plant still competes with a non-unionized facility in the southern United States. To remain cost-competitive while maintaining a wage and benefit scale roughly 20 per cent higher than the southern factory, the union and company negotiated a labour agreement in 1994 that eliminated grades and classifications for most jobs. The contract contains a series of principles that guide cell operations, and management has the authority to establish and eliminate cells and create, combine, and eliminate skill levels, job classifications and cells. Management also has the ability under the agreement to assign employees work outside their cell when needed. The company shares all financial information with the union.

A joint productivity council (JPC) was established, made up of four unionists and four members of management: union members are the president, vice-president, recording secretary and chief steward; company representatives are the director of operations, the human resources manager and two operations managers. The JPC has seven objectives, including the elimination of the need for inspection by building quality in at the source; the establishment of a programme of job training and classroom education; the development of channels of communication between all employees to break down union-manager barriers; and the establishment of training to involve all workers in the continuous improvement process. Union officials have access to all production records and profit-and-loss statements and participate in meetings to determine bonuses. There are also assurances that workers will not lose their jobs because of productivity improvements. Instead, they are shifted to other occupations, with their earnings protected during a period of training for a new job. Finally, the piece-work system was eliminated in favour of hourly rates based on the levels of cross-training workers have mastered.⁽⁹⁾

Returning to the first company covered in the case-study (Brimfield Precision, Inc.), it was found that there had been a 30 per cent drop in the cost of goods produced as a result of the numerous technical and organizational improvements made by the workforce. For example, employees in the implants business unit decided that they should be customer-focused. Today there are three teams in the business unit, and each one builds products for a particular customer. The advantage to this approach is that employees gain specialized knowledge of the customer and their product. This knowledge enables team members to continuously think about how to cut costs and improve the production process. Team members often adjust their personal work schedules to make certain that orders are shipped on time. In one case a rush order was placed for several instrument sets that could only be delivered on time if team members agreed to work around the clock through a weekend. The entire team met and developed a schedule amongst themselves to deliver the instrument sets to the customer.

One team in the implants business unit is responsible for producing hip stems for a particular customer. To raise the volume of production without increasing the time needed, team members cut down the distance the product was travelling (from 5,000 feet to 27 feet) and reduced the amount of parts handling by reorganizing equipment into a manufacturing cell. Prior to cellular production it took 2.5 hours and 11 employees to make a single hip stem; today it takes 27 minutes with four employees.

4.3. Other studies

Other researchers have compared Japanese transplants with domestic start-ups in the United States. Of the 28 Japanese and 20 American companies studied, three-quarters of the Japanese and half of the United States firms were in the mechanical and electrical engineering industries.⁽¹⁰⁾ They generally found that the Japanese-owned transplants in the survey were almost exclusively non-union. There was a general concern among Japanese transplants that unionization would impede flexibility. However, many of the same attitudes were reported by the American-owned domestic start-ups, and the research on plant location decisions also showed that both Japanese and domestic start-ups preferred to locate in non-union states.⁽¹¹⁾

Another major survey⁽¹²⁾ of work organization and employee relations strategies of electronics firms in the United Kingdom found that both domestic and North American companies were more likely than their counterparts from Japan to introduce workplace practices originally associated with Japanese manufacturing. This partially corresponds to the findings of the above-mentioned study, which showed that American personnel managers of Japanese companies in the United States -- despite training in Japan -- were expressly instructed not to merely copy Japanese human resources systems. Rather, they were encouraged to develop new workplace practices that would yield levels of efficiency comparable to those of factories in Japan, but which were compatible with and adaptable to United States workforce and labour market institutions. In this connection one human resources manager said it was his job "to understand American workers and to translate the Japanese objectives into effective American strategies".⁽¹³⁾

With regard to the organization of work, both Japanese transplants and their counterpart domestic start-ups were found to be similar in their adoption of advanced technologies and the substantial use they made of computer-controlled production processes. Work was typically organized into functional "lines" or departments, consisting of ten to 20 employees, each of whom held a job classification with a defined set of duties. Departments often had skill-based job ladders and were always supervised by a foreman. Nevertheless, within this common framework, Japanese companies were more likely than their domestic counterparts to use what is commonly referred to as "Japanese" types of work organization -- job rotation, teams, daily workgroup meetings -- and to provide promotion ladders. Table 4.2 shows that 85 per cent of the Japanese sample had adopted at least one of these practices, compared to 55 per cent of the domestic firms. Japanese transplants were also found to be four times more likely to adopt daily workgroup meetings.

Table 4.2. Comparison of work organization practices:
Japanese and domestic start-ups (United States)

To take another example, the advent of team-based work organization in Finland meant that many of the former supervisory functions of white-collar workers had to be delegated to teams. Furthermore, participation in the teams further blurred the distinction between supervisors and workers.⁽¹⁴⁾ "Delayering" was also observed at electronics companies in the United Kingdom, where teamworking led to a flat organizational structure, with the devolution of what had previously been managerial and supervisory layers to lower levels within the company. It has been observed that flexible work practices have been on the increase in the United Kingdom for the past 15 to 20 years as a necessary condition for improving efficiency and eliminating waste. Rigid demarcation between craft and unskilled workers traditionally channelled different employee groups into fixed tasks, with little or no room for manoeuvre. A flexible workforce erases the distinctions between these different groups of employees and allows companies to delegate a number of previously specialized tasks, such as inspection, to the operator level. As a result of workers performing a variety of tasks, management expects a more satisfied and productive workforce to emerge.⁽¹⁵⁾

4.4. The incidence of unsocial hours

Any shift to a system with more flexible working hours in order to extend operating hours of machines is likely to increase working hours at times which are generally considered to be unsocial. However, the considerable reduction in unit labour costs with the extension of operating hours offers scope for compensating these workers, either financially or with time off. Thus, night or weekend shifts are shorter than standard working time. In some cases a fifth shift is introduced to distribute unsocial hours among a greater number of workers. One example of a shift system proposed by German employers to implement the 35-hour week is shown in table 4.3. But in spite of high levels of unemployment, firms have difficulties finding adequately skilled workers for non-standard hours.

Since 1992, the European Union has gathered a unique set of data on unsocial hours; these sectoral statistics are equally valid for the MEE industries, although they pertain to manufacturing in general. In the EU overall, night, Saturday and Sunday working is less prevalent in manufacturing than in the economy as a whole, in contrast to shift work (see figures 4.3-4.6; and tables F.1-F.4, The industry in numbers). In manufacturing and the economy as a whole, the highest proportion of employees working unsocial hours is found for Saturday work (25-47 per cent in 1996). Conversely, these shares are lowest in the economy as a whole for shift work (14 per cent overall and 18 per cent for men in 1996), but for women the proportion is lowest for night work (9 per cent in 1996). In manufacturing, these shares are generally lowest for night work (15 per cent overall, 5 per cent for women and 19 per cent for men in 1996). Finally, the incidence of unsocial hours is generally much higher in France and the United Kingdom.

Between 1992 and 1996, unsocial hours generally increased for both men and women in all sectors except agriculture. However, the rate of growth differed for various types of working hours. In the economy as a whole, it was highest for Sunday working but lowest for shift work; the incidence of the latter remained the same for women and actually declined for men. Conversely, in manufacturing, the increment was highest for Saturday work; it was lowest for night work for women, whereas for men and overall the increase was lowest for shift work.

Table 4.3. Rolling two-shift system with increased working time despite a reduction in hours (proposed by German employers)
(five workers on two jobs, with an agreed 35-hour week)
 

Moreover, some intersectoral shifts have taken place. Sunday work was already more widespread in the economy as a whole than in manufacturing and the increment was also largest in the former; the reverse could be observed for shift work, with respect to both its relative incidence and its rate of growth. Conversely, Saturday work increased faster in manufacturing than in the economy, although it was relatively less prevalent in this sector. The same could be observed for night work: for men, night work was still relatively rare in the sector in 1992, but by 1996 it had become more widespread in manufacturing relative to the economy in general (see also Chapter 6 for the gender dimension of working hours). In other words, previous sectoral patterns have continued for Sunday and shift work, whereas night and Saturday work have gained importance in manufacturing relative to the economy as a whole, consistently with employers' demands to extend operating hours of machines and make Saturday a regular working day.

4.5. Impact of flexibility on conditions of work

Although much has been advocated -- and a considerable amount implemented -- in terms of devising and introducing flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) (ranging from hours of work to work organization itself), little is known about the actual impact of FMS on the workforce itself. While arguments can be made in favour of the benefits flexibility brings (such as increased leisure as a result of compensatory time off, reduction in monotony through job rotation and improved job satisfaction through the acquisition of more responsibilities), it can equally be argued that without certain limits, excessive flexibility might lead to undue stress and related health problems. Few if any studies have been able to assess the impact of increasingly flexible arrangements on stress, other than standard studies on the impact of shift work.⁽¹⁶⁾ According to a study, the overuse of temporary workers in one case proved to have a detrimental effect by creating tensions between the two groups in the workforce.⁽¹⁷⁾

Another study however has attempted to look at this question by developing and validating a "test bank" for checking the amount of stress to which supervisors in FMS are likely to be subjected to.⁽¹⁸⁾

Research on a related sector -- the automobile industry -- has paid greater attention to the interaction of technical systems and human resources. In one study the author⁽¹⁹⁾ developed three indices (use of buffers, work systems and human resource policies) in an attempt to capture systemic differences in organizational logic between mass production and flexible production. The author also used cluster analysis to distinguish three groups of plants -- mass production, transition and flexible production. The overall finding -- with several caveats -- was that the evidence strongly supported the hypothesis that assembly plants using flexible production systems, which bundle human resource practices into a system that is integrated with production/business strategy, outperform plants using more traditional mass production systems, in terms of both productivity and quality. Nevertheless, the study also concluded that:

These data also cannot address the debate about whether flexible production represents "management by stress". Critics argue that flexible production plants achieve much of their productivity advantage by "sweating" workers through a faster work pace, standardized jobs, social control via peer pressure, and stress from a bufferless system and "kaizen" (continuous improvement) efforts that emphasize reductions of labour input [...] Because the data analysed here do not measure work pace explicitly, I cannot evaluate the claim that flexible production leads inevitably to "speed up" -- or the counterclaim that it requires "working smarter" more than working harder.⁽²⁰⁾
 

Yet another study concluded that although the majority of accidents at work involved stationary automated equipment, accidents in flexible manufacturing systems ranked second.
 

Table 4.4. Reform initiatives in four Australian manufacturing plants ¹

Drawing on experiences in the introduction of FMS, flexible manufacturing cells (FMC) and computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) in Denmark and Sweden, another article deals with the impact on social relations between management and employees and the new challenges faced by the unions. The authors call for a higher profile for unions in developing policies towards the introduction of new technology and work organization. The article is based on six case-studies of enterprises in the Danish machinery building industry which were introducing FMS in metal-cutting processes. The experience acquired in introducing FMS/FMC and CIM in five small plants in the Swedish machine-building industry was also examined.⁽²¹⁾

A recent study examined organizational changes in four manufacturing companies in Australia (see table 4.4). While highlighting the potential for accidents associated with the introduction of more flexible manufacturing arrangements, the study hypothesizes that the greater involvement and responsibilities for workers at the workplace give them more control over their working environment, as well as over the hazards within that environment. Its findings were inconclusive, however, since new forms of work organization had not yet been fully introduced in any of the enterprises studied.⁽²²⁾ Nevertheless, it pointed out the advantages to be gained from communicating with unions and the workforce and associating them more closely with occupational safety and health improvements that are introduced parallel to new forms of work organization.

1.  S. Parks: "Improving workplace performance: Historical and theoretical contexts", in Monthly Labor Review, 118(12), May 1995, p. 18.

2.  See for example, S.J. Procter, M. Rowlinson, L. McArdle, J. Hassard and P. Forrester: "Flexibility, politics and strategy: In defense of the model of the flexible firm", in Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 221-242; R.F. Conti and M. Warner: "Taylorism, teams and technology in 'reengineering' work-organization", in New Technology, Work and Employment, 9:2, Sep. 1994 (Oxford), pp. 93-102.

3.  C. Köhler and J. Woodard: "Systems of work and socio-economic structures: A comparison of Germany, Spain, France and Japan", in European Journal of Industrial Relations (London), Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), pp. 59-82. The corporate cultures of large MNEs are also organizing principles themselves but beyond the scope of this chapter (see G. Hofstede: "Identifying organizational subcultures: An empirical approach", in Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan. 1998), pp. 1-12).

4.  For full details see R. Forrant: Survival of the flexible in the global economy: Employment security and shop floor reorganization in two Massachusetts metalworking firms, Sectoral Activities Programme Working Paper (Geneva, ILO, forthcoming).

5.  For an interesting comparison of teamwork in the United States and Germany see N. Harvey and M. von Behr: "Group work in the American and German nonautomotive metal manufacturing industry", in International Journal of Human Factors in Manufacturing, Vol. 4(4), 1994, pp. 345-360. American production was previously geared to high batches which did not require high skills to produce, whereas German metal manufacturing centred on more customized lower batch production, requiring higher skills (provided through the vocational training system). Global competition has forced both, however, to reorganize in the direction of team or group work, the United States factories tending more towards cellular manufacturing and the German industry towards production islands.

6.  A similar trend has been noted in the above-mentioned survey of engineering companies in the United Kingdom, where cellular manufacturing is the most commonly used organizational principle: each stand-alone unit is responsible for its own quality control and performance, operating like a mini-factory within a factory ("Engineering change", in IRS Employment Trends, 628, Mar. 1997, op. cit., pp. 7-8).

7.  The concept of zero inventory (ZI) is designed precisely to avoid such excesses, at all stages of manufacturing. See Gunasekaran et al., op. cit., pp. 63-78.

8.  Forrant, op. cit.

9.  Studies in other countries, such as Sweden, likewise highlight the trend towards teamwork, shop-floor planning and the introduction of a work culture centred around numerically controlled (NC) machines. L. Bengtsson: "Work organization and occupational development in CIM: The case of Swedish NC machine shops", in New Technology, Work and Employment, 7(1), Spring 1992, pp. 29-43.

10.  P. Doeringer, C. Evans-Klock and D. Terkla: "Hybrids or hodgepodges? Workplace practices of Japanese and domestic startups in the United States", in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, Jan. 1998, pp. 171-186.

11.  ibid., p. 183 (referring to a forthcoming publication of C. Evans-Klock).

12.   "Work organization and employment in electronics", in European Industrial Relations Review, 257, June 1995, pp. 20-25.

13.  Doeringer et al., op. cit., p. 174.

14.  T. Alasoini: "Transformation of work organization in time-based production management: The case of three Finnish electronics plants", in International Journal of Human Factors in Manufacturing, Vol. 3(4), p. 331.

15.  "Work organization and employment in electronics", op. cit., pp. 22 and 24.

16.  While not comparable to the mechanical and electrical engineering industries, other studies have found increased medically certified absenteeism among the remaining local government officials who were still employed after a major downsizing exercise. However, the age and previous health of the employees also needed to be considered. J. Vahtera et al.: "Effect of organizational downsizing on health of employees", in The Lancet, Vol. 350, No. 9085, 18 Oct. 1997, pp. 1124-1128.

17.  J. F. Geary: "Employment flexibility and human resource management: The case of three American electronics plants", in Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 251-270.

18.  Ding-Yu Lin and Sheue-Ling Hwang: "The development of mental workload measurement in flexible manufacturing systems", in Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41-62.

19.  J. P. MacDuffie: "Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: Organizational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry", in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jan. 1995), pp. 197-221.

20.  ibid., p. 218.

21.  "Workplace implications of FMS and CIM in Denmark and Sweden", in C. Clausen and B. Lorentzen: New Technology, Work and Employment, 8(1), Mar. 1993, pp. 21-30.

22.  M. MacIntosh and R. Gough: "The impact of workplace change on occupational health and safety: A study of four manufacturing plants", in Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, Vol. 8(2), 1998, pp. 155-175.

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