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Interactive Conference on

"Organized Labour in the 21st Century"


*Organizing the Informal Sector

*John Cross, PhD. United States - Organizing the Informal Sector: Notes from the Field

*Jorge Mattoso - What to Do with the Informal Sector?

*Giovanna Rossignotti - Unionizing the Informal Sector

*Tom Kruse, Bolivia, Attitudes Toward Helping the Informal Sector

*Jill Murray, Australia - Organizing Women Workers and the Informal Sector

John Cross, PhD. United States - Organizing the Informal Sector: Notes from the Field

Part of the problem in discussing the organization of the informal sector is that it can include many things. It includes exploitative clandestine sweatshops or "putting out" systems where immigrant, minority and/or female laborers may be paid under the table to produce cut-rate inputs for larger factories. It includes on the other hand small stores, street vendors, collective taxi drivers or workshops run by families that use their combined labor to provide necessary goods in under-served communities or niche markets where larger firms cannot compete. In the middle are dependent suppliers or retailers who function as distributors or suppliers for a larger (often formal) firm, but have control over their own work and may have some choices about who to work with. In other words, it can be an arena of intense exploitation, substantive freedom, or a combination of both. For simplicity, we can call the first informal employees, the second informal entrepreneurs, and the third (intermediate) category informal contractors(2). Obviously, these categories should be taken as guides, not absolutes, but the important thing here is that different organizational attributes would be needed for each. In the following pages I will describe some issues that arise in the organization of these different forms of informality from fieldwork in Mexico and Egypt.

Organization in the Informal Sector

As with the labor union movement, organization in the informal sector tends to focus on areas of conflict. In Mexico City, street vendors, collective taxis and informal housing projects tend to be the most organized for the following reasons. 1) They are in constant processes of conflict and negotiation with the state. 2) They have a high potential for internal competition which needs to be regulated in order to provide stability in the market place. 3) They have a high degree of territoriality--that is, a defined "space" they need to defend (whether a market, housing tract or transportation route) and the ability to use their control over that space to collect dues and encourage defensive participation from participants. 4) A more particularistic factor that I identified in the organizational ability of these sub-sectors in Mexico was their ability to form patron-client relations with politicians and bureaucrats, partly based on their territorial ability to mobilize their participants as supporters for their patrons.

Organization in these cases was not focused towards "employers", but towards the state. Informal entrepreneurs do not have a defined employer, of course, but even in the case of informal employees and informal contractors mobilization against the informal middlemen that they worked for directly or the formal companies that they worked for indirectly was infrequent. One main difference is that it is relatively easy to organize a defined "space" such as a street market against a defined "threat" such as state repression since all the participants can agree on the common goals involved. However, informal employees may be wary of organizing in a sweatshop, for example, because of lack of control of the broader demand and labor markets--the employer may simply go out of business and/or open in a new area with different workers. Informal contractors (including the informal employers noted in the previous sentence) lack the ability to control alternative sources of supply or distribution that the businesses they depend on may have access to.

Bridging the gap: Labor Unions and the Informal Sector

There are areas of congruence between labor union organizational strategies and those exercised in the informal sector. However, as we have noted, in the informal sector the types of sub-sectors most likely to organize are those that are most visible, and therefore most likely to be in conflict and need defensive mechanisms. Independent workshops are often the least likely to be organized because they are infrequently the subject of state action and lack a territorial base. However, these have in some cases been organized through cooperatives, typically as a state-sponsored development initiative: for example, by distributing subsidized inputs through cooperatives that are tied to the state (as is the case for tortilla mills in Mexico and many types of workshops in Egypt, where cooperatives were aggressively organized in the 1970s). (3)

Some of the more obvious differences between normal labor unions and informal organizations have already been mentioned. Most informal sector workers do not have a well-defined "employer" who can be negotiated with. Instead, in the case of street vendors, collective taxis and informal housing, most negotiation and conflict is with the state as the regulatory authority, and with opposing interest groups (businesses, etc.). In some cases, such as with informal contractors and informal employees, work may be tied to a supply or client business that can be labeled as the de facto employer, and pressure can be put on that business, either through union tactics, or by organizing a more effective marketplace.

Likewise, since informal economic actors (IEA) tend to be independent in their operations, there is no employer who can collect union dues from the paycheck. Informal sector organizations are therefore compelled to use more labor-intensive methods of direct fee collection. This is also facilitated by the territorial nature of these organizations, since the fee can be seen as a form of rent for the organization's role in guaranteeing the ability to work. Another strategy is to use a key service that money is collected for. In a sense, the current trend towards micro-finance on the part of international development NGOs is a form of organization of the informal sector, since it brings micro-businesses into institutional relations with the creditor agency. Unfortunately, these programs rarely, if ever, use this approach as a method of organizing informal workers to improve their regulatory status, although that was often the original intent, as with the Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh. Instead, the need to collect loan payments (and thus stay solvent) detracts from the ability to service other needs, and in fact in some cases may simply create new forms of dependency. At the same time, the power differential between program staff and clients means that the projects are rarely controlled by the IEA themselves. (4)

The key for effective organizational tactics is to focus on common needs of the IEA sub-sectors that can be better met by working together. In some cases, such commonalities simply may not exist. But in many they do. One commonality, obviously, may involve problems with over-restrictive regulations that fail to recognize the important role of micro-businesses in the local economy. Another may be competing for subsidies that are frequently provided to larger businesses. Keeping in mind the evolutionary connection between trade guilds and trade unions, another role might be self-regulation of markets in order to increase access to supply and demand markets. None of these possible approaches are non-problematic. If nothing else, the organization of the informal sector will be idiosyncratic, implying a different form of organization depending on local conditions, state structures, markets and labor pools.

One final problem to be noted is the potential conflict between informal entrepreneurs and informal employees. As micro-businesses grow, they add employees, and often on the basis of informal contacts that violate labor laws. A labor union that represent informal entrepreneurs must therefore come to grips with how to deal with relations with informal employees. Should they be incorporated into the same union? Should they be excluded? Should they form their own unions?

Conclusion

What I have tried to do in this short paper is to raise some of the issues involved in the organization of the informal sector. In this case, there are not only no easy solutions, there are frequently questions about the very approach we should take. Should informal employees be organized at the risk of putting informal entrepreneurs out of business? Should informal entrepreneurs be organized at the risk of greater exploitation of informal employees? If a decision to organize is made, how can this be achieved given local conditions? Traditional labor unions attempt to pass the cost of unionization onto employers (that is, higher wages and better conditions ideally make up for union dues). Can informal economic actors in a given situation pass their organizational costs onto others (their suppliers, clients or the general market)? If they can't, organizations are bound to fail, since people will only join if the organization leads to a material improvement in their situation. The key is to focus on the goal of traditional labor unions: control of work situations. To the extent that an organization can help IEA control their markets in the way that labor unions help workers in an industry control their labor market, the organization should lead to increased earnings and better ability to improve work conditions. This is one reason why street vendor organizations are so successful in Mexico: they control the space needed for vending. It is also why many micro-loan projects fail to provide a basis for organization (or improve micro-businesses): they fail to help IEA control their markets.

  • This paper is an attempt to briefly summarize my arguments about the organization of informal economic actors (IEA). For further information, you can consult Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City. Stanford University Press. 1998. (In particular the first two chapters and the conclusion.)

  • Cross, John ( 1997) "Entrepreneurship & Exploitation: Measuring Independence and Dependence in the Informal Economy" in theInternational Journal of Sociology and Social Planning 17:37-63.

(3) Of course, since subsidies of all types (except, it seems, tax breaks for major corporations), are being phased out all over, this method of organization is becoming less important

  • In one such project in Egypt street food vendors complained to me that a micro-lending program set up to help them had started to throw vendors in jail because of lack of payment, forcing them to go even further into debt with money sharks or to sell key assets into order to continue working. While half the board was supposed to be made up of vendors, staff members manipulated elections to control decision-making.


Jorge Mattoso - What to Do with the Informal Sector?

For many years the informal sector was presented as a positive adaptation of the labour market to the changes imposed by globalization. In Brazil, it was argued that people should not even worry about the informal sector since those who left their jobs in the formal sector were doing it voluntarily in order to open small enterprises and broaden their incomes.

Unfortunately, reality has been a lot harsher. Globalization has contributed to the acceptance by many countries of the Washington consensus without providing national mechanisms of defence for both production and employment. Brazil has been one of those countries. The indiscriminate commercial and financial opening during the 1990s. (especially after 1994) during the overvaluation of the national currency, leading to the growing dependency on foreign currency, mediocre growth, denationalization and restructuring of the production and labour market.

The labour market in the 1990s also experienced dramatic changes. The unemployment rate more than doubled. Formal employment reduced by 3.3 million of jobs. In the main urban areas, workers with a formal contract represented nearly 57% of the employed in 1989 and in 1999 they counted for 44.5% of the labour market. On the other hand, informal workers that accounted for 19.1% of the workforce in 1989 increased to 26.4% towards the end of the decade. During the 1990s, growth in the informal sector was 62%, according to IBGE data. Labour revenues decreased by 8%.

For many years, Brazil enjoyed constant economic growth (nearly 7% per year in the 1950s, 60s and 70s). This growth took place under a dictatorial regime and workers organizations were deprived of freedom of expression. Growth took place among great inequality and income concentration. On the other hand, a very individualistic society emerged with little space for collective action.



Giovanna Rossignotti - Unionizing the informal sector

I have been enjoying the proceeding discussion. As we move to a new subject, I would like to start with a couple of preliminary remarks. Since the beginning of the 1970's what is generally referred to as the "informal sector" has been the focus of increasing attention in international discussion on economic development. The ILO has undoubtedly played a key role in shaping and implementing policies for the sector. The traditional policy advocated by ILO is based on an integrated approach, combining the promotion of productive potential and employment in the sector and improved welfare for those who work in it through the establishment of a protective environment. Such an approach is geared to progressively upgrade informal sector activities and occupations in order to ultimately integrate them into the modern economy. While the thirty years of ILO experience have demonstrated that the two above-mentioned objectives are not irreconcilable, it seems legitimate to wonder to what extent this approach has reached satisfactory results. There are some questions that immediately come to mind. For example: has the quality of jobs in the informal sector been effectively upgraded over the last decades? Did, in accordance with many predictions, the informal sector evaporate as economic development occurred? Has a "romantic" view of the sector income and employment generation potential taken prevalence over a fair assessment of the "indecent" work affecting the vast majority of those who operate in the sector?

Data referring to recent developments are self-eloquent. Evidence shows that over the last decades while the informal sector has not been absorbed into the modern economy in developing countries, informal employment has spread in many industrialized countries and "grey areas" of informality have appeared even in the midst of the modern economy. It seems, therefore, fair to recognize that many of the original assumptions formulated on the informal sector were not born out by facts. The responsibilities for this state of affairs should be shared among the different actors involved. Unions often argue that governments and international financial institutions have devoted insufficient attention and resources to the transformation of informal sector activities into more highly productive, organized and socially responsible enterprises. At the same time, unions are often criticised for having themselves overlooked the large and potentially powerful informal sector workforce. I believe that it is against this background that trade union strategies to reach out to workers in the sector need to be developed. A clear message in this sense came out of the discussions held at the ILO international symposium on trade unions and the informal sector (Geneva, October 1999) which defined the informal sector not only in terms of informal enterprises but also of informal work or informal employment.

Over the last few years I have been involved with others in the ILO Bureau for Workers' Activities in trying to streamline a global framework for developing effective trade union organizing strategies in the informal sector. What we have learnt so far provides evidence that contrary to many claims, unions can effectively represent workers in the informal sector. Many unions around the world are already organizing these workers, regardless of the sector of activity or of the employment situation of the workers concerned. In doing so, a great deal of creativity is being adopted, although in many cases trade union intervention still tends to be ad hoc and fragmented. We have also learnt that regardless of human and financial investment that unions devote to adapt their structures and the way they operate to organize in the informal sector, their efforts risk being ineffective if they are not accompanied by subsequent action aimed at creating an enabling environment. Organizing home workers at the national level will not be sufficient in itself to guarantee these workers a decent work in the absence of enforceable legal obligations that would make enterprises, including multinationals enterprises, responsible for the social and economic implications of their subcontracting process. In many countries anti-trade union policies continue to be a major constraint for trade unions to organize, even in the modern economy. Moreover, we have found that the problems that the SEIU (Service Employees International Union) faced in organizing low-wage home-care workers in Los Angeles are in many respects similar to the difficulties encountered by the trade union movement trying to reach out to informal sector workers in Ghana. The rigidity of the regulatory framework, the heterogeneousness of work relationship, the mobility and often the invisibility of the workforce, the lack of human and financial resources are some of the factors that more generally impede the work of traditional unions in organizing the unorganized.

Finally, we have learnt that organizing strategies in the informal sector have been successful whenever unions have been able to deliver tangible benefits and increased protection to the workers concerned. In general this requires a number of adjustments in respect to traditional internal trade union priorities, allocation of resources, strategies , etc. This not only involves changing union rules and structures, but more importantly, changing ways of thinking. At the heart of successful organizing in the informal sector are some common components.

First, trade union organizing in the informal sector needs to be built along a consensual and a bottom-up process. At the start, unions need to demonstrate that organizing in the informal sector will benefit current members and the "new members", because the bargaining strength of unions is directly connected to the proportion of workers they represent. A great deal of effort has, therefore, to be devoted to enhance a solidarity culture among workers. Moreover, unions need to remove any limitation on their ability to integrate informal sector workers into existing trade union structures. It is important to ensure that the latter are representative of the workers that unions are organizing, particularly of women and young people which constitute the bulk of the labour force in the informal sector.

The second component is related to organization methodologies and techniques. Recruitment strategies must be adapted. It is important to capitalize upon the union experience of former members who have been pushed into the informal sector and who constitute potential "bridges" between the trade union movement and informal sector workers. But the "new" members, particularly women and young people, also need to be involved and empowered to do the work of organizing their co-workers. At times, a community-based approach may have the best prospects for success when combined with more traditional trade union organizing tactics. This means working intensively in particular communities, linking with community organizations and involving workers within the trade union who already have close contacts with the community. Another strategy which has proved effective to mobilise workers in the informal sector is to organize around specific needs. In many countries unions have attracted members from the informal sector by addressing, through the provision of tailored services, immediate economic and social needs (health, education, savings, loans etc.) of these workers.

Associated with good organizing is also quality education and a good communication policy. Empowering workers in the informal sector in order to enable them to have a "voice" moves beyond the simple "mobilizing" practice. It is more about leadership development. For this to happen, the education programs have to be adapted accordingly. This is not simply about changing education programs to make them more participatory. It is rather about transforming them into action-oriented campaign-based education programmes. In addition, one way increasingly used by trade unions to reach out to their current members and the new ones and mobilize public support is through awareness-raising campaigns or rallies. Radio and television programmes or announcements may be more effective than print media to reach out to informal sector workers in developing countries whose level of literacy is generally low.

The fourth component is building coalitions with like-minded organizations and intensifying international cooperation on advancing rights in the informal sector. This means forging alliances with NGOs, religious groups and other civil society groups acting in defence and for the promotion of the interests of informal sector workers. This also means that greater efforts need to be made to link labour standards to trade issues, to negotiate and implement codes of conducts and framework agreements which set minimum labour standards enterprises should comply with.

I recognize that the framework I described above is highly ambitious. It attempts to identify areas for trade union organization in the informal sector without providing "miracle" solutions. Probably there is no universal solution nor can one be expected for tomorrow. However, I am convinced that the path ahead for unions needs to be two-fold. On the one hand, unions need to prove that they have the willingness and the ability to represent these new categories of workers, being understood that the ultimate objective is to fight for their mainstreaming into decent work. On the other hand, this objective will not be achieved in the absence of an enabling macro-economic and political environment, which still seems lacking in many developing countries.

Tom Kruse, Bolivia, Attitudes toward helping the informal sector

When I was asked to contribute to the discussion on "organizing the informal sector" I probably should have said no; after all, I've never been involved in an organizing drive of "informal sector workers" nor do I know of any successful cases here in Bolivia, where I live and work. However, I have been active in support of unions here for some years now, and am now completing a research project on new forms of informalization and precarious work. The comments that follow are more a review of things learned and limitations encountered from that work. I hope very much that in the responses this email might generate are some examples of organization in the informal sector.

The idea of informality first emerged as a way to name certain "development anomalies" in the post World War II period. Various schools of development thinking held that capitalist economic expansion would lead to broad processes of industrialization and urbanization which would eliminate unregulated forms of production and exchange. The persistence of such unregulated activities was seen to be anomalous, a residue of some pre-capitalist past, soon to swept away by progress and the expansion of wage labor, contracts, etc. It turned out, though, that what were held to be complementary activities to wage earnings under stable contractual relations were in fact quite central to families' livelihoods. As Alejandro Portes argues, what was anomalous, in historical terms, was not the persistence of "informal activities", but the momentary existence of the welfare states, that sought to expand coverage of rights, protections, and stability in the area of work.

The welfare state may be a thing of the past in many places, in other places the degree to which it ever existed is open to question. Certainly where I live those who enjoyed the rights and protections under a welfare-ish state were only ever a minority. Today, with the globalization of production and finance, stable salaried employment is becoming more and more anomalous. While there may be forces of "homogenization" at work under globalization (for example, mass world-wide consumption of Hollywood films), in the world of work I also see willy-nilly processes of heterogenization, producing a proliferation of new and different kinds of work relations. Our research shows that very often in these "new" work relations some very "old" kinds of things re-appear with a vengeance: direct despotic labor control, broad discretionary powers for bosses, paternalistic labor regimes, etc. I hold these are not "residues" from a past; they are our experience of very modern 21st century capitalism.

A key point, it seems to me, is to convince ourselves and others that what happens in the informal sector is very important for everyone who works. There are many good studies now of how at various levels the formal and informal are closely linked. At the general society-wide level, a large informal sector tends to lower the social cost of reproducing labor, producing negative effects on wages generally and a subsidy for formal sector employers. At the industry level, certain formal industries subcontract and outsource to the informal sector, to reduce wage burdens and "externalize" the costs of uncertainty and market volatility onto weak and unorganized groups. And at the household level, formal and informal sector activities are complements in diversified survival strategies, with informal incomes often playing a larger role that formal wages. Thus, just as formal and informal are linked in reality, so too they should go hand in hand in our reflection and action in organizing labor.

How then to depict all this heterogeneity, so that we might work on it? Here are a couple of ideas from our work. In Bolivia today it is estimated that 65% of the economically active population works in unregulated sectors of the economy, while 8 of 10 new jobs appear in the informal sector. But, beyond the categories, how are those 8 of 10 jobs "made"? What are the dynamics at work? In manufacturing, the area I have studied, we have detected two kinds of "informalization": (a) "good jobs" (secure formal sector jobs) that are becoming "bad jobs" through de-unionization (often induced), the erosion of working conditions, outsourcing, or subcontracting; and (b) jobs that are "born bad" and "stay bad" in the unregulated sectors of the economy.

The first process of informalization is born of industrial restructuring that dumps risk an vulnerability on "new", unprotected working classes in unregulated activities. An obvious strategy would be to struggle to shift the burden back onto the "core" plant by insisting that the contracting plant has a clear responsibility legally for the conditions under which subcontractors work in the "periphery". Sometimes the core and periphery are in different jurisdictions, making this hard but not impossible; in other cases, like the ones we've studied, the "core" is right across the street from the "periphery."

Organizing the "periphery" would seem to be an obvious step for unions in the "core" - but often it's not so simple. Simplifying things a bit, we've found that often the "core" unions are older "service" type unions, and in a very defensive mood after having seen so much erosion of their working conditions. They are instructed by the "core" plant that if they want to retain what benefits they have, they should keep their hands off the "periphery". At the same time they have serious problems communicating and coordinating with the new labor force in the "periphery." In the subcontracting shops the workers are mostly younger women, many very vulnerable single mothers, with little or no union experience, and quite often are "captive" to very paternalistic work situations. Here labor control is exercised through the manipulation of "favors" and organization would be seen as "betrayal" and swiftly punished. Contracts are often non-existent, collective bargaining unheard of and largely unimaginable. Benefits, stability and respect, as Gonzalo Saraví has also noted in his studies of Mexican industry, are often seen not as rights but as special favors alternately granted and withheld by bosses. These workers in the "periphery" are obviously loathe to take any risks, and are seen by "core" union leaders as inconsistent partners in struggle.

Summarizing, these are some of the concrete challenges we see under this first kind of informalization:

  • The need to extend solidarities across the "formal/informal divide". This means explicitly the need to address and overcome gender and generational (and whatever other) prejudices that sustain this divide. As the example above suggests, the core periphery distinction is lived as men (core) and women (periphery). Thus, if the gender aspect is not addressed, the class/labor aspect will be frustrated.

  • The need to produce innovative regulations that make core employers responsible for the conditions of their "peripheral" employment.

  • The need to regain ground regarding rights, and to re-member the dis-membered histories of unionization and struggle.

Under the second process noted above - jobs that are born bad and stay bad - the situation we see is a bit more complex. Often there are no direct or immediate links to formal sector activity, with the notable exception of ties to the formal micro-financial sector. In practice microfinance institutions have been famously unconcerned - with minor exceptions - with the working conditions inside the shops and stores they lend to. (There is an important debate going on about the relation of microfinance to poverty alleviation/production, on which also turn some key issues of work conditions in the informal sector.)

What to do there, especially when there is no simple target (e.g., a large firm dumping risk on vulnerable people)? Some debate whether the productive activities in the marginal informal sector should even be considered under the rubric of "labor relations", when so often the relations in production are family relations. With regard to this point, I come down on the side of those who argue that production relations are production relations, regardless of how mediated they are by family, place of origin, community, etc. Wherever mechanisms for making decisions about the conditions of work and the distribution of results are operating between people in the organization of production, then we're looking at "labor relations." That is a theoretical point, but important. It suggests we do need to look at work relations in the informal sector as relations of power, appropriation, control and exploitation, regardless of how intimate the control, or how negligible the socio-economic and cultural distance between the boss and the worker (aunt-nephew, father-daughter).

Moving from the theoretical to the practical, however, we are on very dicey ground here. Regulation of such spheres is not only impossible, but perhaps undesirable: it would mean the wholesale intrusion of the state into family and life. I can think of no actually-existing state I would want taking on that role. That said, what to do in terms of organizing? While my uncle or mother can obviously be my exploiter, is organizing a union in our family shop even thinkable? And what might be gained when the margins of profit are so small?

One problem is the scale or level to work on. At the individual shop level is perhaps absurd, and probably counterproductive. But what other level presents itself? Local level organizations, in our experience, want little to do with the state, and are class-riden and thus loathe to address "labor" issues. Organizing locally is complicated by a naturalization of status and class in community structures. For example, local soccer leagues and festival associations are part of the cement of producers community and "stabilizers" of highly despotic labor regimes.

Another problem is the "unthinkability" of organizing. I am not saying resistance, rebellion and even sabotage don't occur on the shop floor in micro-enterprises. They do, we've seen and documented it. But, given the intimate relations of labor control, it is almost always expressed indirectly (gossip, missing days of work, leaving). In our months of field work in family shops, it "never" took the shape of a claim to state protected "rights".

While above I noted the many workers have little notion of labor rights, here in the "less articulated" informal sector it goes further: there is a logical and willful renunciation from the state, which is seen as hopelessly corrupt and to be avoided at all costs. Here we see the degree to which dis-enfranchisement from the political community has been exacerbated under neo-liberal forms of "austerity management" (state craft). Often, in the daily practices that binds and differentiate people - the warp and weft of the social fabric - the state with it's promise of rights, regulatory structures, procedural landscapes, is markedly absent. The very notion of universal rights, protected by some supra-local entity, is seriously weakened.

I confess I see no simple approaches to "organizing" here, and would very much like to hear from others their thoughts and experiences.

Sources cited:

Portes, Alejandro. 1995. En torno a la informalidad: ensayos sobre teoría y medición de la economía no regulada. México: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.

Saraví, Gonzalo A. 1997. "La Microempresa Ante el Nuevo Escenario Productivo: ¿hacia dónde se dirigen las relaciones laborales? Análisis de un Distrito Industrial en México." Paper read at 1997 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, April 17-19, 1997, at Guadalajara, Mexico.

Jill Murray, Australia - Organizing Women Workers and the Informal Sector

I propose that we backtrack a little, and ask participants if they have any views on a couple of questions which arise from the Conference so far. For your information, I have prepared a brief summary of the debates on women and organizing, but I will start off with several questions which I would be interested in any responses to.

First, the Conference is entitled "Organized Labour 2000", but some of the contributions point to the need to develop different structures and different kinds of institutions, given the shifts in the nature of economic activity, the design of jobs and the fluctuating security of workers. What should the future unions (and other community and solidaristic organizations) look like, and how are they to be developed? Is it possible, for example, to give a generalised answer to this question, or must answers be rooted in the experience of actual workers in given economic circumstances?

Secondly, much of the debates about women and those in the informal sector (including women) has stressed the "outsider" status of these people within the traditional structures of organized labour. Is it possible that this situation is exacerbated by the fact that many trade unions are bound by laws which insist they are directly accountable essentially to their current constituencies: indeed, the Thatcherite trend towards greater regulation of unions can be seen as forcing unions into a deeper engagement with the status quo. What kind of legal and political agenda might be useful in enabling unions as institutions to embrace the needs of non-members (whether potential members or not), form alliances with other non-union groups, and transform themselves into institutions which deal with the interests of non-employees?

Finally, in dealing again with the social clause and fundamental rights debate, it appears that organized labour has a strength and institutional longevity (even in its comparatively weakened condition) as a spokesperson in civil society. How will the discourse about globalization be affected by any further weakening of organized labour? Will we see a growth in the influence of NGOs, and if so, what strategies for democratisation and accountability are necessary? What did the Seattle process tell us in this regard?

The Online Conference has now been running continuously (apart from the New Year break) from September 1999. In March 2000, the Conference discussed organizing women workers, and this discussion has now blended into the April topic of organizing in the informal sector. There are good reasons for this blending of the two topics, as it is reported that women are disproportionately represented in the informal sector and that, in general, the issues which arise from a discussion of the organization of women are usefully considered in the context of the organization of informal forms of work.

Contributions on women and organizing have focussed on two quite different discourses about unionisation : on the one hand, some participants have stressed the difficulties in unionising women and the consequences for women of their allegedly lower rates of unionisation (lower pay rates and levels of job security than men in equivalent jobs, harassment at work, less control over the labour process and unions themselves etc). On the other hand, other participants have warned against characterising women as passive recipients of unionising strategies and stressed the role of women

in creating unionisation (as opposed to unions creating organized women).

The latter approach is useful, because it accords with many of the contributions already made about successful unions which contain a high proportion of women. We have heard from several different countries that unions of nurses and teachers, both with traditionally high rates of female employment, are growing and strong despite the anti-union environments in which they have to operate. As reported in my earlier summary, some academics have associated with strength with the services which unions provide for these professionals, including in the case of nurses professional indemnity insurance. Gay Simkin emphasized that what the primary teachers' union in New Zealand offered its members was the solidarity and service based around a common industrial experience, that of working as a primary teacher.

The notion of various constituencies constructing the form of organization they need is a consistent theme running through the women's debate and that on the informal sector. The ways in which taxi drivers and hawkers organize suits the common needs of those workers, their employment status (that is, they are not employees and therefore do not need to organize in such as way as to deal with a single employer), and the power relations in which they find their work dictated to them. Linda Briskin and others passionately advocated that women needed to, and in fact did, operate in the same way to address their experiences at work through organization.

A number of speakers emphasized the need to view the whole conference, and its various topics in gender terms. Shaun Olney of the ILO stressed the centrality of gender to the processes of collective bargaining, not just a narrow band of "women's issues". The conference discourse has been broadened to include race and disability, with evidence of progress in states such as Canada which had a legislated framework of rights. The debate continues.

Updated by RS. Approved by AVJ. Last Updated 16 March 2004.