2006, Labour Inspection: Chapter IV - Structure of the labour inspection systemDescription:(General Survey) Convention:C081 Convention:P081 Convention:C129 Recommendation:R081 Recommendation:R082 Recommendation:R133 Subject classification: Labour Inspection Subject: Labour Administration and Inspection Document:(Report III Part 1B) Session of the Conference:95 Display the document in: French Spanish Document No. (ilolex): 252006G06 Chapter IV Structure of the labour inspection system 138. The provisions governing the organization and functioning of the labour inspection system in order to achieve the objectives assigned to it by the relevant instruments are set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of Convention No. 81, as well as Articles 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of Convention No. 129. Under the terms of these provisions, the labour inspectorate must function as a system under the supervision and control of a central authority, in cooperation with other public or private institutions and in collaboration with employers and workers or their organizations. Ensuring access to the data needed for developing an appropriate labour inspection policy depends largely on the development of cooperation mechanisms with the institutions that hold such data, including the competent labour administration authorities as well as other public and private bodies and institutions performing similar functions, employers and workers and their representative organizations and, where appropriate, civil society groups such as interested non-governmental organizations. 139. A labour inspection system or service operates in all countries for which the Committee has information, whether or not they have ratified the relevant Conventions, and normally covers industrial and commercial establishments; only more rarely does it cover agricultural undertakings. I. Placing the labour inspection system under the supervision and control of a central authority140. The Labour Inspection Recommendation, 1923 (No. 20), already suggested that the labour inspectorate be placed under the direct and exclusive control of a central state authority, and that it should be entirely independent of local authorities. (Endnote_1) Article 4 of Convention No. 81 reaffirms the principle of having a single central authority while allowing for a degree of flexibility in two respects: firstly, the labour inspection system must be placed under the supervision and control of a central authority only in so far as is compatible with the administrative practice of the Member (paragraph 1); and secondly, in the case of a federal State, the term "central authority" may be either a federal authority or a central authority of a federated unit (paragraph 2). These flexible arrangements take into account certain specific arrangements considered to be helpful in national administrative practice which had come to light during the preparatory discussions. (Endnote_2) Attaching the labour inspectorate to a central authority facilitates the establishment and application of a single policy throughout the territory covered, and makes it possible to use available resources in a rational way by, for example, eliminating duplication of effort. Flexibility clauses applicable to federal States must not be regarded as derogating from the principle of having a single central authority provided that the constituent units of the federal State have budget resources intended for use in implementing the functions of the labour inspectorate within their respective jurisdictions. However, the Committee considered that an initiative in one country to decentralize the labour inspectorate, without also making it an obligation for the decentralized regional or local authorities to institute a system to allow it to function and to provide adequate budgetary resources, was contrary to the terms of the Convention. 141. Article 7, paragraph 3, of Convention No. 129 provides for a number of different ways in which the labour inspection system can be placed under a central authority. It states that labour inspection in agriculture might be carried out:(a) by a single labour inspection department responsible for all sectors of economic activity; (b) by a single labour inspection department, which would arrange for internal functional specialization through the appropriate training of inspectors called upon to exercise their functions in agriculture; (c) by a single labour inspection department, which would arrange for internal institutional specialization by creating a technically qualified service, the officers of which would perform their functions in agriculture; or (d) by a specialized agricultural inspection service, the activity of which would be supervised by a central body vested with the same prerogatives in respect of labour inspection in other fields, such as industry, transport and commerce. 142. The Committee notes that many governments continue to put off ratification of Convention No. 129 on the erroneous grounds that application would require the establishment of a separate inspection system. In fact, in countries where labour inspection in agriculture has been established and with only few exceptions such as Austria (Endnote_3) and France (Endnote_4) it is most often exercised within the structures that exist to ensure coverage of other sectors. (Endnote_5) In Israel, a national coordinator is responsible for the functioning of labour inspection in agriculture within the framework of a common inspection system. Available information indicates that the situation in this area varies widely and may go as far as a total absence of any labour inspection system in agriculture, which is the case in Indonesia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Viet Nam. 143. In most countries, labour inspection is organized as a ministerial department with a central structure and other, decentralized structures, which generally come under the authority of the labour ministry and other related areas such as social affairs, employment, training or immigration. It is possible to distinguish between three major categories of labour inspection system. There are "generalist" inspection systems responsible for monitoring conditions of work, the work environment, and also individual or collective labour relations. These systems often play a part in the areas of employment and training or social security (countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, Japan and Senegal). There are specialized systems in which the range of responsibilities devolved to different departments may be rather broad and concern not only conditions of work but also matters such as labour relations, these responsibilities being shared among a number of specialist departments under the overall control of separate authorities (as is the case in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, Thailand and Argentina) or of one single authority. Lastly, there are systems based on interventions by multidisciplinary teams in which, within one local inspection department, inspectors with complementary areas of competence can intervene together or in turns and consider mainly conditions of work (for example, Austria, Denmark, Kuwait, Norway, United Kingdom and Sweden). 144. The division of the various tasks involved in enforcing the application of legislation on conditions of work may take account of the specific nature of the various types of economic activity. In France, officials of a given inspection unit operate under the authority of the labour minister in the majority of sectors or branches, although in the case of certain activities and enterprises labour inspection comes under the remit of other ministers. (Endnote_6) 145. In a number of countries in Asia and Africa, labour inspection is organized and operates along the lines of the system used in the United Kingdom, where two different inspectorates exist side by side. One is responsible for industrial relations and general conditions of work, including wages, while the other deals with occupational safety and health. In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a single labour inspectorate, which in some cases has been established only recently, has been given the responsibilities previously assumed by the trade unions in areas such as monitoring working conditions and other matters such as illegal employment. In the Russian Federation, the different departments of the Ministry of Labour and the Federal Labour Inspectorate have been brought together in a new department for the enforcement of labour and safety and health legislation within the Ministry of Labour and Social Development. (Endnote_7) In Ukraine, a department has been created within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to enforce labour legislation. (Endnote_8) 146. One model of labour inspection which integrates safety and health with environmental concerns has resulted from recent legislation in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. In Viet Nam, an integrated system under the authority of the Minister of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs has been set up and is being developed with the technical assistance of the ILO in a cooperation project. Labour inspection is now organized centrally under a new department. (Endnote_9) In other countries, bringing together labour inspection services relating to safety and health and social insurance under one system has made it possible to achieve considerable improvements in prevention policy with regard to occupational hazards, as well as significant savings, as a result of the more rational use of available resources. (Endnote_10) 147. In a number of federal States, responsibilities in the area of labour inspection are shared between central government and the constituent units of the State in accordance with principles set out in the country's fundamental law. In Mexico, for example, the federal inspection authority covers enterprises administered by the federal Government, those operating under a federal contract or licence, and those which operate in federal territory. The federal authority also monitors training and safety and health in industries that come under the jurisdiction of local labour authorities, which enforce legal provisions relating to other areas in all enterprises (including those which come under the jurisdiction of the federal authority). 148. In Belgium, the tasks of the labour inspectorate are shared by a number of specialized structures as appropriate to the entity being inspected. The social legislation inspectorate enforces laws and regulations concerning work done in a subordinate relationship as well as issues related to the election of a prevention and protection committee; the works council and trade union delegation also share responsibility for this. In principle, the social inspectorate deals with technical and medical matters only where these are an integral part of the relevant collective agreements. The technical inspectorate enforces laws and official orders concerning work safety in all undertakings where workers are employed under a contract of employment. Enforcement of legislation on workers' health is the responsibility of the medical inspectorate. 149. In China, the labour inspection system is placed under the control of a national council at central level, which is represented in each province by a labour protection department which oversees inspection services at local level. Other local government bodies, within their respective mandates, also support the activities of the labour inspectorate which may, as required, call on the support of other bodies with the necessary technical expertise. II. Cooperation needed for the inspection system to function150. Establishing inter-institutional cooperation and multilateral collaboration is an inherent part of the very concept of an administration system. Since the purpose of a systemic approach is to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, the effectiveness of labour inspection will depend in no small measure on its capacity to function through interaction with its social and economic environment. It requires action to develop mechanisms and areas of cooperation with all the public and private actors concerned and with the social partners and their representative organizations. The designation of a central labour inspection authority ensures that the activities of the authorities placed under its control are coordinated with a view to achieving a clearly defined objective. It also ensures a degree of cohesion between mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration with other public and private bodies and institutions and with the employers and workers and their organizations, which are referred to in Article 5 of Convention No. 81 and Articles 12 and 13 of Convention No. 129. Lastly, by passing on to the consultative bodies that deal with labour and social issues, to all ministries concerned, and to the social partners, some of the information it receives from its subordinate departments, the central authority can contribute to strengthening the labour administration system as a whole.
151. A global and systemic approach to labour inspection has come to predominate in recent decades, especially in the industrialized countries, where it is widely accepted that a high level of protection as regards conditions of work contributes to social cohesion. A wide range of different cooperation mechanisms and institutions are being developed rapidly in a number of transition countries with a view to strengthening the labour inspection system. (Endnote_11) A. Cooperation between the inspection services152. Whatever the form of organization or the mode of operation of the labour inspectorate, labour inspection responsibilities are shared among different departments on a geographical or sectoral basis, or in accordance with the area or workplace liable to inspection. In all cases, it is important that the competent authority take steps to encourage cooperation between these different departments. Exchanging information on inspection methods and the results obtained can prevent much time-wasting. Rationalizing and pooling certain material and logistical resources could, in many developing countries, alleviate the chronic inadequacy of resources available to inspection services. Furthermore, from the employer's point of view, a degree of coordination between inspection services in order to plan and coordinate inspections would have the beneficial effect of reducing the need for a large number of separate inspections at short intervals. 153. Available information suggests that there is effective and regular cooperation in the industrialized countries. That is not the case in many others, including the least developed, even though it is provided for in legislation. B. Cooperation between inspection bodies and other institutions154. If the different functions of the labour inspectorate as defined in the instruments are to be carried out effectively with regard to the main objective, broad cooperation is needed between the various labour inspection departments and the other government departments and public or private services that carry out similar activities. According to Article 5(a) of Convention No. 81 and Article 12, paragraph 1, of Convention No. 129, that cooperation must be "effective". A range of different structures and bodies, in order to meet their respective obligations, have at their disposal a wide range of data, information and research on the world of work, which should be communicated systematically to the appropriate labour inspection departments through appropriate mechanisms. The importance of coordination between the different tasks and responsibilities assigned to the labour administration system is acknowledged by all governments. The methods and mechanisms used for this vary, however, from one country to another. While the development of adequate statistical tools and detailed annual reports has made it easier to asses the effectiveness of these methods in the industrialized countries, this is not the case in many developing countries, where it is difficult or even impossible to compile relevant information. Nevertheless, the establishment of cooperation bodies and mechanisms with a view to exchanges of information on safety and health issues bodes well for the future in those countries. The support of certain public and private actors and the collaboration of the social partners are essential to the functioning of labour inspection, and should be encouraged in order to improve all conditions of work and the protection of workers within the jurisdiction of the labour inspectorate. 155. The different services responsible for employment, equality in the workplace, vocational training, job placement, migration, youth, basic or compulsory education, the disabled and for the gathering of statistical information, can all play a significant part in helping the labour inspectorate to define its priorities for action. For example, statistical data disaggregated by sex, exact data on school truancy, migrants, or job placements for disabled workers in certain activities, are all useful for planning inspections in establishments generally, including establishments where there are workers in vulnerable categories. The institutions discussed below notably cooperate with the labour inspection in a number of domains. (a) Social security and social insurance institutions156. That the respective objectives of social security and labour inspection services are complementary is no longer a matter of debate. The benefits of bringing them together under the authority of a single government authority are becoming increasingly evident in certain countries. Although it is often a legal obligation for the employer, worker or responsible medical practitioner to report accidents at work or cases of occupational disease to the labour inspectorate, it is often in practice the social security services that are the first, and sometimes the only, recipients of such notifications. It is therefore desirable that provisions be in place to ensure that any relevant information on cases and conditions defined by legislation be communicated as systematically as possible to the labour inspectorate. This would give the labour inspectorate the data it requires to identify high-risk establishments and activities and determine means of prevention with a view to eliminating risk factors. By the same token, inspection services should be required to inform the social security and social insurance services of situations that pose a threat to workers' safety and health which they encounter during inspection visits. Raising insurance premiums for employers who are particularly negligent or persistent in disregarding inspectors' injunctions could reinforce the safety and health role of the labour inspectorate. The economic advantages of such cooperation, for both the enterprise and the insurance institutions, has been more than amply demonstrated in all the countries where relevant measures have been implemented. (Endnote_12) (b) The police157. Effective support from the police can be useful, and sometimes essential, in carrying out certain inspection missions. In some countries, occurrences concerning occupational safety and health must be reported in the first instance to the police. Where they are reported without delay to the competent labour inspection service, they may give rise to appropriate and effective inspection measures. Allowing labour inspectors to call on the support of the police when they are obstructed in the performance of their duty can have a deterrent effect, all the more so if effective measures are in place to ensure rapid implementation and in particular to ensure the physical safety of the inspector and allow the planned inspections to take place smoothly. Such provisions exist in many legislations. (Endnote_13) In many developing countries, however, this is not feasible because of the separation of the various institutions and the absence of appropriate mechanisms at different hierarchical levels. (c) Judicial bodies158. The effectiveness of the sanctions available to the labour inspectorate depends to a large extent on the way in which the judicial authorities deal with the case files referred to them by or on the recommendation of the labour inspectors. A growing number of countries are taking steps to develop effective cooperation between the judicial system and the labour inspectorate. (Endnote_14) The impact of such measures is reflected in the annual inspection reports from the governments of certain industrialized countries. (Endnote_15) A study conducted in 1991 by the Inter-American Center for Labour Administration in the Dominican Republic showed the need to develop adequate cooperation between the labour inspectorate and the justice system in order to improve the results of labour inspection, and the trade unions are increasingly complaining of the inadequacy of the support given by the courts to the labour inspectorate in its work. (Endnote_16) Closer coordination between the competent administrative and judicial authorities, education of the legal professions and appropriate judicial training could certainly raise the awareness of judges as to the social and economic value of labour inspection and encourage them to pay more attention to the goals of the labour inspectorate. (d) Tax authorities and the ministries responsible for the sectors covered by inspection159. Machinery should be put in place to ensure that any information needed to identify establishments and undertakings legally liable to inspection and held for other purposes by other public authorities (for example, finance and tax authorities, or departments responsible for issuing operating licences) is made available to the labour inspectorate. The Committee notes that in one country, the central labour inspection authority has strongly suggested that the cooperation of the tax authorities be sought in any proceedings to recover unpaid wages. (Endnote_17) (e) National human rights mechanisms160. Following the recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), many countries have created a national human rights mechanism which individuals may use to file complaints regarding violations of human rights, including labour rights. In these countries, effective cooperation between the labour inspection system and the national human rights mechanism is useful and to be encouraged. (f) Immigration authorities161. In view of the growing numbers of foreign and migrant workers in many countries, the labour inspectorate is often being asked to cooperate with immigration authorities. The Committee points out that such cooperation should be carried out cautiously, keeping in mind that the main objective of the labour inspection system is to protect the rights and interests of all workers and to improve their working conditions. (g) Social research institutions and universities162. One particularly useful form of cooperation in developing a labour inspection policy involves social and environmental research institutions. This is having an impact in industrialized countries like Norway, where research institutions are being involved in efforts to identify labour inspection priorities. A database created jointly by the Electrical and Fire Safety Department, the industrial health and safety authority and the pollution monitoring authority, allows the respective activities of these bodies to be coordinated in a rational way. In addition, the labour inspection services and the county "work and life" centres collaborate at the regional and local levels in joint activities. C. The role of the social partners in labour inspection163. The labour inspectorate can attain its objectives only if appropriate measures are adopted by the competent authority to promote effective collaboration with employers and workers in its activities. A requirement along these lines is set out in Article 5, paragraph 2, of Convention No 81, and in Article 13 of Convention No 129. Recommendations Nos. 81 and 133 also provide certain indications as to possible arrangements for collaboration in the area of occupational safety and health. Part II of the former instrument sets out possible forms and methods of collaboration. The latter advocates recourse in the agricultural sector to committees for hygiene and safety, which include representatives of employers and workers, as one form of collaboration (Paragraph 10). 164. Many governments have provided a considerable amount of information on the specific legal provisions adopted for this purpose. Different levels (national, regional, sectoral and enterprise) and forms of collaboration (tripartite bodies, cooperation agreements, and so forth) coexist. Broadly similar modes of collaboration can be found in the legislation and practice of countries which differ considerably in terms of their economic, political and social conditions. (a) National collaboration bodies165. In a number of countries, a national consultative body, of tripartite composition and with a general mandate for labour issues, is appointed as a basic framework for collaboration between workers' and employers' organizations and the labour inspectorate in the area of occupational safety and health. (Endnote_18) In Bulgaria, the executive director of the general labour inspectorate directs discussions on labour inspectorate reports and proposals. More often, national tripartite councils have been set up specifically to examine questions pertaining to occupational safety and health in industry and commerce. (Endnote_19) In India, the consultative portworkers' committee, chaired by the chief port safety inspector, is also responsible for social assistance. 166. Information on collaboration at the national level between the labour inspectorate and representative organizations of employers and workers in the agricultural sector has been provided by the Governments of Brazil and Poland, (Endnote_20) among others. In Brazil, the principal objectives of the National Standing Committee on Agriculture, set up in 2001, are a greater formalization of employment and the introduction of social protection coverage. The Committee's activities focus on efforts to find appropriate solutions in order to improve conditions of work in agriculture, coordinate planning, implement and evaluate accident prevention campaigns in agriculture, and develop occupational safety and health regulations. (b) Collaboration agreements167. Inter-institutional cooperation and collaboration with the social partners may take other forms. Collaboration focusing on occupational safety and health is ensured through tripartite agreements in Bulgaria (Endnote_21) and Cyprus (Endnote_22). In the Netherlands, the aim of collaboration between employers and workers is to reduce the number of people drawing sickness and disability benefits by improving conditions of work. 168. The Government of Portugal has announced that the labour inspectorate and the social partners have concluded an agreement on working conditions, health and safety at work, and combating occupational risks. The aim is to develop a national prevention plan and a plan of action targeting the most risk-prone sectors. The Government hopes that the implementation of this agreement will be an opportunity to reactivate the National Occupational Health and Safety Council, to establish an observatory for prevention, and to improve collaboration between the occupational risks centre and other interested bodies. This should also facilitate the adoption or modification of legal provisions applicable to the sectors most affected by occupational accidents, as well as efforts to restructure the statistical system for recording and following up occupational accidents and cases of occupational disease. (c) Collaboration between the social partners at the enterprise level in the area of safety and health169. In many countries, special committees exist to deal specifically with questions of occupational safety and health in particular categories of establishment or undertaking. (Endnote_23)In certain developing countries, however, especially in Africa, implementation of legal provisions adopted for this purpose is delayed by the absence of implementing regulations or by the inadequacy of the available means of inspection. (Endnote_24) 170. At the enterprise or establishment level, collaboration between the labour inspectorate and the social partners frequently takes place through contacts with workers designated as safety delegates. (Endnote_25) 171. The Committee wishes to emphasize the importance of ensuring that the forms of collaboration with the social partners are fully compatible with the impartiality and authority of labour inspectors in their relations with employers and workers. The Committee has, for example, drawn attention to the potential risks inherent in an arrangement in which the labour inspectors are allowed to use means of transport provided by one of the parties concerned for their official purposes.* * * <172. In summary, on the basis of the information available to it, the Committee notes the persistent inadequacy, at least in practice, of cooperation mechanisms helpful to the labour inspectorate in its activities. The most obvious reason for this is the tendency for the different authorities involved to operate in isolation from one another. Greater integration of objectives, means, and circulation and processing of information, is needed. For too long, the labour inspectorate in most countries has operated in a reactive manner and in isolation, and the results achieved reflect the means generally allocated to it. This is still the case in many developing countries. In the industrialized countries, greater awareness of the economic losses that result from poor or illegal working conditions has prompted greater efforts to find that solutions that are prevented in more general terms. Institutional cooperation and the active involvement of the social partners continue to prove their worth in this regard. Making available to a central body all the relevant information supplied by the various bodies involved in the labour inspection system greatly facilitates the development, implementation and regular review of a national social protection policy with a view to adapting it to current requirements and priorities. In many developing countries, the major obstacles to the development of labour inspection systems are the chronic incapacity of the labour inspection authority to define needs for the purpose of determining the appropriate budget resources in the light of the economic situation, and the weakness of worker representation. Progressive implementation, with the help of the competent authorities, of effective inter-institutional cooperation and of improved collaboration with the social partners, would undoubtedly be the best way of achieving progress.
EndnotesEndnote 1Para. 10 of Recommendation No. 20. Endnote 2ILO: Organisation of labour inspection in industrial and commercial undertakings, Report IV, ILC, 30th Session, Geneva, 1947. Endnote 3Federal Act on Agricultural Labour. Endnote 4Labour inspection in agriculture is the responsibility of the Minister responsible for agriculture, except in the case of overseas departments and territories, for which competent staff is assigned under the authority of the Labour Minister. Endnote 5For example, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Gabon, Jordan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Endnote 6Labour inspection in agricultural undertakings is placed under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture. Labour inspection in the transport sector covers public transport undertakings and establishments subject to technical inspections by the transport ministry, both within metropolitan France and in the overseas departments (including railways, urban transport, road transport of people and goods, mechanized lifts, motorway enterprises, collection of household waste, air transport and airports, inland shipping and ports. Labour inspection in mines comes under the authority of the Minister of Labour except for quarries on state-owned land placed at the disposal of the Minister of Defence, who is responsible for inspections. Endnote 7According to Order No. 1035 of 9 September 1999. Endnote 8By Cabinet of Ministers Decisions Nos. 1351 of 30 August 2000 and 1771 of 29 November 2000. Endnote 9The department responsible for labour inspection within the Ministry was established by Decree No. 1118 of 10 September 2003. Endnote 10For example, in Australia (New South Wales and Victoria), Bulgaria and New Zealand. Endnote 11For example, in the Czech Republic, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation and Slovakia. Endnote 12The ILO has estimated that every day, on average, some 5,000 or more women and men around the world lose their lives because of work-related accidents and illness. More than 270 million accidents are recorded each year, 351,000 of which are ultimately fatal. Hazardous substances cause the deaths of an estimated 444,000 workers each year. Most workers in the world are not covered by legal preventive measures and will never receive compensation in case of accidents and diseases. The ILO estimates that up to 4 per cent of the world's GDP is lost to work-related accidents and diseases. See Introductory Report, Decent Work-SafeWork, Prevention in a Globalized World, Geneva: ILO/SafeWork, Sep. 2005. Endnote 13For example, in Bolivia, China (Macau Special Administrative Region), Costa Rica, Mauritania, Oman, Senegal, Slovakia, Tunisia and Turkey. Endnote 14For example, in Guatemala the labour inspector, under the terms of a Decree enacted in 2001, can rapidly obtain a judicial ruling giving rulings executory force. In Rwanda, a provision was introduced into the Labour Code requiring courts to provide the labour inspectorate with information on any follow-up to reports of violations. In Senegal, section L.195 of the Labour Code provides for the same obligation. Endnote 15For example, Spain, France and Belgium. Endnote 16For example, in Brazil, Costa Rica and New Zealand. Endnote 17Croatia. Endnote 18In Ethiopia, the Labour Advisory Board; in Mongolia, the National Tripartite Committee for Social and Labour Consensus; in Norway, the Council of the Labour Inspection Authority; in Poland, the Council for Labour Protection; in South Africa, the Advisory Council. Endnote 19For example, in Cyprus, Fiji, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. Endnote 20The Health and Safety Committee, which answers to the chief labour inspector and was created in 2001 under a cooperation agreement with a view to improving safety and health in agriculture. Members include the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, the president of the agricultural social insurance fund, the presidents of the national trade union federations of farmers and agricultural workers, and agricultural employers' organizations. Endnote 21General labour inspectorate statement on cooperation at all levels with two of the most representative trade union federations. At the initiative of the Bulgarian Industrialists' Association, a tripartite agreement on coordination and cooperation was concluded in 2003 with the aim of improving implementation of safety and health activities. Endnote 22Statement of national occupational safety and health policy 1995, with the aim of reducing workplace accidents and cases of occupational disease, and promoting vocational education and training. The statement defines the obligations of the different parties concerned and seeks improvements in legislation. Endnote 23Such as the joint committees set up in France, Hungary, India, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Endnote 24For example, in Benin, in establishments employing 30 or more workers; in Morocco, in craft, industrial and commercial undertakings and in agricultural or forestry undertakings employing 50 or more workers. The Government of Rwanda has stated that the health and safety committees provided for by the Labour Code have yet to be established. In Chad, the establishment of such committees in undertakings and establishments is required by a Ministerial Order of 1999. Endnote 25This is the case in Rwanda. In Sweden, in establishments employing more than five workers, at least one delegate must be appointed by the workers. He or she can require the employer to take any necessary measures to ensure a safe working environment, and can notify the working environment authority of any refusal or prevarication to comply. In the event of imminent danger, or in the case of an operation ordered by the employer in contravention of the ruling by the authority, he or she can order the suspension of work pending a decision by the authority. In Slovenia, the safety representative also plays an important collaboration role: he or she can request an inspection and participate in it. Furthermore, the employer is obliged to inform the representative of the outcome of the inspection.
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