Chapter III. Organisation of labour inspection services and inspection staff

I. Organisation of labour inspection

Administrative structures

(a) Principle of the control of labour inspection services by a central authority

109. The attachment of inspection systems to a central authority or body facilitates the establishment and application of a uniform inspection policy for the whole of the national territory. This is why both Convention No. 81, in Article 4(1), and Convention No. 129, in Article 7(1), stress the desirability of placing labour inspection under the supervision and control of a central authority or body "so far as is compatible with ... administrative practice". In the case of a federal State, the central authority or body may be established either at the federal level or at the level of a federated unit (Convention No. 81, Article 4(2), Convention No. 129, Article 7(2)).

110. The foregoing provisions have been so drafted as to permit some measure of flexibility in application in order that account may be taken of certain special arrangements that have been found useful in national administrative practice. (Endnote 1)

111. Moreover, Convention No. 129 lists, in Article 7(3), four possible formulae to give effect to the principle of control by a central authority in agriculture:

(a) by a single labour inspection department responsible for all sectors of economic activity;

(b) by a single labour inspection department, which would arrange for internal functional specialisation through the appropriate training of inspectors called upon to exercise their functions in agriculture;

(c) by a single labour inspection department, which would arrange for internal institutional specialisation by creating a technically qualified service, the officers of which would perform their functions in agriculture;

(d) by a specialised agricultural inspection service, the activity of which would be supervised by a central body vested with the same prerogatives in respect of labour inspection in other fields, such as industry, transport and commerce.

112. The application of Convention No. 129 does thus not necessarily imply the establishment of special inspection services for agriculture, contrary to the impression which certain governments appear to have. (Endnote 2)

(b) National practice

113. The administrative structure of labour inspection systems may be considered either with reference to the economic sectors covered or with reference to the object of the supervision exercised. In the vast majority of countries national labour inspection systems apply to all branches of economic activity, (Endnote 3) subject to a few exceptions, particularly mining and transport. (Endnote 4) There is often a certain specialisation within this general inspection system; this may take the form either of assigning specialised inspectors to agriculture, (Endnote 5) or of creating a service technically qualified to deal with this sector. (Endnote 6) In other countries, on the other hand, there are separate inspection systems for each branch of activity, or at least for some branches, particularly agriculture. (Endnote 7)

114. All these solutions are expressly provided for by Article 7(3) of Convention No. 129, and take as a starting point the principle that labour inspection services are to be attached to a single central authority, generally the ministry responsible for social or labour affairs. In certain less frequent cases, however, independent inspection services attached to separate national authorities have been set up for agriculture. (Endnote 8)

115. Moreover, in a very large number of countries, the labour inspection system is in principle empowered to perform all the duties of a labour inspection service; (Endnote 9) in many others, the inspection services are specialised with reference to the subject-matter of supervision. This is, for instance, the case in a European country where the inspection system is composed of several specialised inspection services: technical inspectorate (responsible for ensuring accident prevention in undertakings); medical inspectorate (responsible for hygiene and health questions); social legislation inspectorate (responsible for supervising working conditions); social inspectorate (responsible for supervising the payment of social security contributions). (Endnote 10) Generally speaking, specialisation by subject is found in inspection systems based on the British model, where officials entrusted with the application of the legal provisions relating to wages and other conditions of work and with the protection of women, children and young workers exist side by side with the competent health and safety factory inspectors.

116. It would appear from the national practice of certain countries that there has been a trend towards regrouping the inspection services in recent years. (Endnote 11) The idea behind this seems to be that the unification of inspection services should permit a better utilisation of available resources and a reduction in overlapping of on-the-spot inspections. Moreover, in separate inspection systems the conduct of separate activities by different inspection services in a single enterprise may leave certain matters neglected. Needless to say, however they are organised, inspection services have a growing need to have available the whole range of professions and specialisations required by the complexity of present-day production activities.

117. In certain countries the local authorities or municipalities may be called upon to play an important role in labour inspection. Article 12(2) of Convention No. 129 provides that certain inspection functions at the regional or local level may be entrusted to appropriate government services or public institutions on condition that this does not prejudice the application of the principles of the Convention. (Endnote 12) This is, for instance, the case in a Scandinavian country, where the local authorities appoint municipal inspectors to supervise small plants using no machinery. (Endnote 13) Elsewhere, this delegation of authority may be of a more comprehensive nature, certain inspection functions being performed by the local authorities in the place of the state services. Thus, in one country, the supervision of the safety and health provisions in shops and offices is entrusted to the local authorities. (Endnote 14) In another, the functions hitherto performed by the labour inspectorate as regards occupational health and safety have been transferred to the local health authorities under a recent administrative reform. (Endnote 15) In practice, this transfer results in the creation of two labour inspection services: one depending on the Ministry of Labour, which is responsible primarily for the supervision of the application of social legislation; the other, which will be an integral part of the national health service, is in principle competent to deal with health and safety questions. It is still too soon to judge the effects of this reform. The Committee has addressed certain questions to the Government on this subject.

118. In federal States, whatever the criterion of specialisation adopted, authority is generally shared between the inspection service of the federal State and those of its constituent units, although the inspection services of certain countries may depend directly on the federal authority. (Endnote 16)

119. The various systems described above all imply the attachment of the labour inspection services to an administrative authority. In several socialist countries the responsibility for supervising conditions of work rests in large measure on the action of the trade unions, whose supreme bodies constitute the authority on which the inspection services depend, although the State nevertheless retains certain prerogatives in this field. This delegation of authority is exercised in varying degrees. In one country the law has conferred upon the trade unions the sole responsibility for supervising labour protection. (Endnote 17) Elsewhere, the inspection system is of a markedly dualistic nature, a state inspectorate exercising its functions in parallel with an inspectorate provided by the trade union organs. It may be of interest to describe the inspection system of a State that is particularly representative of this type. (Endnote 18) In this federal State the unions enjoy very broad powers as regards the drafting of labour legislation and the defence of the workers' interests and are responsible for the technical inspection of labour and the general inspection of the application of labour legislation. For this purpose they have at their disposal a large body of permanent full-time inspectors, who are assisted by social inspectors at the level of the establishment. On the state side there is a whole system of supervisory and control organs whose functions are somewhat more specialised than those of the trade unions. These organs include the State Committee for Safety in Industry and Mines, which is responsible for the industrial sectors with the highest risks, the health and epidemiological services of the public health service, which are responsible for adopting and securing the application of measures to eliminate or prevent pollution of the working environment, the inspection services of the Ministry of Energy, the corps of inspectors of fire-fighting services, etc. In addition, many ministries administering a particular branch of economic activity have their own services responsible for supervising safety at work in the branch concerned. The operation of this relatively complex system is ensured thanks to the close co-ordination existing between the state inspection services and those of the trade unions, from the level of the union down to the local level. The principal characteristics of this system are to be found in a number of other countries. (Endnote 19) In other countries labour inspection is carried out mainly by a state service, the action of the trade unions being confined more particularly to the undertaking. (Endnote 20) Two countries have recently adopted a similar system, while strengthening the action of the social inspectorates. (Endnote 21)

120. Trade unions are also associated in the supervision of social legislation in other countries with a centrally planned economy. One government (Endnote 22) indicates that the Central Federation of Trade Unions and other organisations as well as the governmental authority conduct labour inspection. Besides regular supervision and inspection, there are often additional joint ones organised by the Party, the State and mass organisations. However, according to the Government's information, labour inspection is less developed in agriculture, although it is constantly being improved.

(c) Collaboration between the different inspection services

121. In the event that an inspection system is composed of a number of different bodies, it is necessary for the various services to maintain close links with each other. This collaboration is all the more desirable when there is no technical unit in which the missions carried out by the different services can be co-ordinated. (Endnote 23)

122. Collaboration between inspection services may take more or less institutionalised forms. Thus, for example, in certain French-speaking African countries where the supervision of safety in mines is the responsibility of a special technical service, the officials responsible for this supervision are obliged by law to inform the labour inspectors of the results of their visits. (Endnote 24) The latter may at any time ask to take part in the inspection visits. In another country, the legislation, which authorises the creation of a specialised body to ensure the supervision of the legal provisions relating to occupational safety and health, provides that all the inspection authorities of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Health, and the National Insurance Institute must collaborate in the exercise of their activities. (Endnote 25) Elsewhere, collaboration is achieved through a committee entrusted with co-ordinating the activities of the various executing authorities. (Endnote 26)

123. When authority is shared between a number of institutions, it may become necessary to adopt certain principles in order to avoid large numbers of separate verifications of compliance, which are often looked on with disfavour in the undertaking. In certain countries regulations exist for the purpose. (Endnote 27) Collaboration between supervisory bodies may also be the subject of agreements setting forth the principles to be followed in this connection. In one case of this kind, a government indicates that the bodies concerned, apart from being able to carry out joint visits, are under the obligation to inform each other of any infringements of legal provisions respecting workers' protection that have come to their notice, and of cases where the measures ordered by another body have not been complied with. (Endnote 28)

124. In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, where the system of supervision involves, as has been seen, many authorities of both the State and the trade unions, special measures are taken to co-ordinate the activities of these various bodies. (Endnote 29)

125. The need for strict co-ordination between the administrations concerned has been particularly keenly felt in cases where certain functions of the inspection services are exercised by local authorities. This is why the Health and Safety Commission of one country has made certain recommendations to the local authorities regarding inspection priorities and methods. In addition, a local and national liaison system has been set up between the Health and Safety Executive and the local authorities to promote a more consistent interpretation of the legal provisions. (Endnote 30)

126. Finally, in federal States, the existence of systems of consultation between federal inspection authorities and the authorities of the constituent units has been mentioned by a number of governments as strengthening the effectiveness of inspection services. (Endnote 31)

II. Collaboration of the labour inspectorate with other institutions

127. Under Article 5(a) of Convention No. 81 the competent authority must make appropriate arrangements to promote effective co-operation between the inspection services and other government services and public or private institutions engaged in similar activities. A similar provision is found in Article 12(1) of Convention No. 129.

128. The importance of collaboration between inspection services and other authorities or institutions seems to be recognised by all governments, even though the information available does not always enable the methods and extent of such collaboration -- which vary from one country to another -- to be determined with precision.

129. In many countries there is collaboration with the different administrations responsible for the technical matters that come under the supervision of the inspection services, such as the directorates, departments or ministries of agriculture, mining or education. (Endnote 32) A number of governments have also referred to collaboration between the inspection services and ministries of health, which are often called upon to play an important role in the prevention of occupational risks. (Endnote 33)

130. It also seems normal that inspection services should have continuous contacts with the other services of the labour administration at both the central and the local levels. It is interesting to note in this connection that the inspection services of one country co-operate closely with the employment services in order to ensure that the level of wages and conditions of service offered to jobseekers is in conformity with the requirements of the legislation and the arbitration awards. (Endnote 34)

131. The action of the labour inspectorate and the social security services is often complementary in the field of occupational accident and disease prevention, even though their activities may have different aims. It is therefore particularly important that, as is the case in certain countries, close contacts should be maintained between these two institutions, (Endnote 35) both at the level of information and at the level of supervision properly speaking. Thus, in one country, the regional sickness insurance funds must supply the labour inspectorate with the information at their disposal on occupational hazards and they may request action by the inspectorate to ensure the application of the preventive measures provided for by the legislation. Regional co-ordination committees have been set up to ensure the harmonisation of these activities, the co-ordination of programmes of visits and the exchange of information and documents. (Endnote 36)

132. The development of technology renders the task of the labour inspectorate increasingly complex. Even when they belong to a high-level service, the inspectors cannot keep abreast of all technical progress. For this reason collaboration between the inspection services and public or private research bodies or institutions is increasing in importance. This collaboration may take place informally, but it is often institutionalised, as in countries where research institutes are integrated in varying degrees into the occupational safety and health supervisory machinery. (Endnote 37)

133. When approved bodies are entrusted with the supervision of certain installations, such as lifting apparatus and steam boilers, the inspection services should work in close contact with these bodies. (Endnote 38) Generally speaking, the results of these verifications must be entered in a special register in the undertaking, which may be consulted at any time by the inspectors. The latter may also request the intervention of specialised bodies if they consider it necessary. (Endnote 39)

134. In the exercise of their functions, the labour inspectors are called upon to maintain relations with other bodies or institutions, such as courts and police forces, particularly when investigating occupational accidents. They may also be called upon to collaborate with the town planning authorities during the procedure for the issue of building permits, as is the case in a number of countries. (Endnote 40)

135. Finally, the Committee stresses that, as certain recent catastrophes have shown (Bhopal in India (1984), Three Mile Island in the United States (1979), Seveso in Italy (1976)), it is important for the inspection services to work in close collaboration with the bodies responsible for the environment.

III. Inspection staff

A. Status and conditions of service

(a) Status

136. Under Article 6 of Convention No. 81 the inspection staff must be "composed of public officials whose status and conditions of service are such that they are assured of stability of employment and are independent of changes of government and of improper external influences". Article 8(1) of Convention No. 129 contains a similar provision. This is an essential principle on which the efficacy of inspection systems rests. Inspectors cannot act in full independence if their service or their career prospects depend on political considerations.

137. In most countries labour inspectors are generally public officials or equivalent officers (Endnote 41) and in this capacity are guaranteed security of employment. This does not, however, appear to be the case in certain Latin American countries, where labour inspectors are not always administrative officials and hence do not enjoy the guarantees of security of employment enjoyed by such officials. (Endnote 42) According to a recent study the tendency to make labour inspection a regular and permanent career whose officials are appointed on the basis of their personal merits does, however, appear to be gaining ground in this region. (Endnote 43) Moreover, in some countries legislation to regulate the conditions of service of labour inspectors has not yet been adopted. (Endnote 44)

138. As can be seen from the preparatory work on Convention No. 81, the status of public officials was considered necessary for inspection staff as being the best fitted to guarantee them the independence and impartiality necessary to the exercise of their functions. (Endnote 45)

139. Other arrangements may, however, be considered satisfactory for guaranteeing the independence of the inspectors; (Endnote 46) the real test of this independence, however, as the Committee has pointed out on repeated occasions, "is to be found in the inspector's unquestioned ability to point out, without fear of open or covert reprisal, that the methods followed in a given undertaking are contrary to the law and must therefore be changed". (Endnote 47)

140. In particular, trade unions in Eastern European countries, which are responsible for a large share of the supervisory activities, appoint and operate their own inspectorates. So far as these inspectors enjoy, under national legislation, the stability of employment guaranteed to officers of public supervisory bodies, this situation was considered to be in conformity with the spirit of Convention No. 81. (Endnote 48) Moreover, it was to take account of the evolution in the actual situation and in the practice of the supervisory bodies of the ILO that a provision was introduced into Convention No. 129 expressly to allow States to "include in their system of labour inspection in agriculture officials or representatives of occupational organisations" on condition, however, that such officials or representatives were assured of stability of tenure and independence (Article 8(2)).

(b) Conditions of service

141. As a rule, the conditions of service of labour inspectors are governed by the general conditions of service of the public service, which in some countries are supplemented by special regulations applicable to the inspection staff. (Endnote 49)

142. It is not the intention of the Committee to make a general study of the conditions of employment of inspection staff, as this would go outside the limits of the present study. Nevertheless, certain aspects of their conditions of service, namely their period of appointment, remuneration and career prospects, directly affect their stability of employment and independence.

143. Regarding the first point, available information shows that, as public servants, labour inspectors are generally appointed permanently on the expiry of a probationary period whose duration varies from one country to another. (Endnote 50) Accordingly, it should be possible to dismiss them only for a serious professional misconduct, which should be defined in as precise terms as possible in order to avoid arbitrary interpretations. Moreover, it is important that a decision to dismiss an inspector, like any other decision to apply a sanction with important consequences, should be taken, or at least confirmed, by an organ offering the necessary guarantees of independence or autonomy with respect to the hierarchical authority and in accordance with a procedure guaranteeing the right of defence and appeal. This would appear to be the case in many countries. (Endnote 51) Given the fundamental importance attached to the principle of stability of employment and independence of inspection staff, one government indicated that inspectors enjoyed better protection than other civil servants in the matter of dismissal. (Endnote 52)

144. While the enjoyment of security of tenure in a permanent administration is the prime guarantee of the independence of the labour inspection staff, the efficiency of the inspection services also demands levels of remuneration and career prospects that are sufficient to attract and retain high-quality personnel and to safeguard them from any undue influence. This objective, however, is not always attained.

145. The information available on the remuneration of labour inspection personnel and their career prospects is limited and does not make it possible to give an overall picture of the situation. Besides, it would be very difficult to make comparisons of any value between the various national scales of remuneration without a thorough study of the purchasing power they represent. Certain general remarks may, however, be made.

146. In most countries the salary systems of public servants are established with reference to public service structures based on the classification of public servants in groups according to the level and nature of the qualifications required. There is usually an official scale fixing the rates applicable to all officials of different bodies and different grades. It is therefore desirable that the classification of labour inspectors in the grade structure should correctly reflect the importance of their tasks and their responsibilities. However, according to a recent CIAT study, it appears that labour inspectors' salaries in certain countries are lower than those of officials of other bodies with equivalent activities, such as social security inspectors. (Endnote 53) Moreover, since the base salary often represents only one element of remuneration, it is important that labour inspectors should also enjoy the bonuses and allowances paid to other officials. This does not always appear to be the case, and labour inspectors are placed at a disadvantage with respect to their colleagues in other administrations. (Endnote 54)

147. Good career prospects are a factor not without significance in contributing to the stability and quality of the inspection staff. (Endnote 55) One government refers to the necessity of reconsidering its policy in this respect with a view to improving the status of the profession. (Endnote 56) This presupposes, on the one hand, that the promotion of labour inspectors is based on objective criteria independent of factors extraneous to their professional competence and, on the other hand, that the administrative structure of the inspection services offers adequate opportunities for advancement. According to the information available, the principle of advancement to a higher grade on the basis of merit appears to be recognised in many countries at the same time as advancement on the basis of seniority within a grade. Moreover, in certain countries the current regulations reserve a percentage of posts in the labour inspectorate for internal promotions. (Endnote 57)

148. The sometimes very low level of labour inspectors' salaries, combined with the absence of career prospects, may cause inspectors to turn from the labour inspectorate towards other administrations with more prestige or the private sector. This is particularly common in developing countries, where the budget of the Ministry of Labour does not make it possible to offer inspectors sufficient incentives to remain in the inspection services, though it is not entirely unknown in the industrialised countries. (Endnote 58) Where the country concerned is bound by Convention No. 81 or Convention No. 129 the Committee has always drawn the attention of the government to the need to improve the conditions of service of labour inspectors so as to avoid their departure. Certain governments have indicated that they have taken appropriate measures. (Endnote 59)

B. Recruitment and training of inspectors

149. The effectiveness of labour inspection depends in large measure on the competence and quality of its personnel. For this reason, Article 7(1) and (2) of Convention No. 81 and Article 9(1) and (2) of Convention No. 129 lay down the principle that labour inspectors shall be recruited with sole regard to their qualifications for the performance of their duties, the means of ascertaining such qualifications to be determined by the competent authority. In connection with training, Article 7(3) of Convention No. 81 and Article 9(3) of Convention No. 129 stipulate that labour inspectors must be adequately trained for the performance of their duties. Such training is to be given not only on their entry into service, but also, as Article 9(3) of Convention No. 129 expressly stipulates, in the course of their employment. Recommendation No. 133 contains certain details regarding the requirements to be fulfilled by candidates for posts of inspectors in agriculture. According to Paragraph 5, candidates for senior positions should be in possession of appropriate professional or academic qualifications or have acquired thorough practical experience in labour administration. As for candidates for other positions (such as assistant inspectors and junior staff), they should, if the level of education in the country allows, have completed secondary general education, supplemented, if possible, by appropriate technical training, or have acquired adequate administrative or practical experience in labour matters. The requirements are, however, lower for countries where education is not sufficiently developed (Paragraph 7).

(a) Recruitment

150. The principle that labour inspection staff should be selected on the basis of merit is generally recognised, candidates who fulfil the general conditions for eligibility (such as age or nationality) being selected according to the procedures in force on the basis of their personal competence and qualifications.

151. In most countries candidates for senior positions in the labour inspection services must hold a diploma of higher education (from a university, an establishment of higher technical education or a national school of administration). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency to require candidates to have a knowledge of labour matters. In this connection it is interesting to note that in one country (Endnote 60) the regulations in force reserve a percentage of labour inspectors' positions for candidates who have acquired experience either in labour-management relations or in the prevention of occupational accidents. Middle-level staff must generally have completed secondary schooling when the level of education in the country allows.

152. In some cases, the lack of qualified staff has led the competent authority to resort to certain stopgap measures. Thus, in certain countries, students have been appointed who divide their time between inspection tasks and the continuation of their studies. (Endnote 61) Elsewhere, young unemployed persons have been temporarily enrolled and police officials have been placed at the disposal of the inspection services. (Endnote 62) Although these situations are relatively exceptional, the Committee must point out the risk they entail for the proper operation of inspection systems, which require a stable and experienced staff.

153. In general, the procedure for recruiting inspection staff is that applicable to the public service. One government indicates that, given the very high moral and professional qualifications required of labour inspectors, their conditions of appointment are more stringent than those of other public servants. (Endnote 63) Competitions are the most usual method of verifying the aptitudes of candidates, who have to undergo written or oral tests or both, supplemented by interviews. In other cases, inspection personnel are appointed by the competent authority after the qualifications of the candidate have been verified by means of an examination. (Endnote 64) Another method, which seems, however, to be less frequently used, consists in recruitment on the basis of diplomas. This is the case in certain countries, where candidates who can present a diploma from a national school of administration, unlike university graduates, do not have to take other examinations. (Endnote 65)

(b) Training

154. The growing complexity of the tasks of inspection services due to technological change makes the systematic training of inspectors indispensable, as never before. It is therefore encouraging to note that most governments indicate that they have taken measures in this field. Some of them have also supplied information on the training and qualifications of inspection officials exercising functions in agriculture. (Endnote 66) Several, however, report a lack of qualified personnel. (Endnote 67) Initial training is undertaken by a variety of methods, which are often used simultaneously. Many governments have indicated that training is done in the field, new inspectors being paired with more experienced officials. This arrangement should, however, be supplemented by theoretical and practical courses for new candidates. The frequency, duration and curricula of courses vary substantially from one country to another. They may be given within inspection services or as part of the training programmes of the ministry responsible for social or labour affairs, with the possibility of special arrangements with specialised institutions. (Endnote 68) In certain countries special training centres for labour inspectors have been established so as to ensure a permanent structure. (Endnote 69) Thus, the training of inspectors in one country is carried out in an institute specially established for this purpose. (Endnote 70) The training, which lasts 18 months, alternates between theoretical courses and practical work. The instruction given is divided into two branches: first, legal, administrative and economic subjects; second, scientific and technical courses. The training of labour inspectors may also be given by national institutes covering all civil servants. These institutes sometimes have specialised sections for inspection personnel. (Endnote 71) When this is not the case, complementary measures must be taken to complete the general training given in national administration schools. In developing countries the absence of adequate budgetary resources sometimes makes theorganisation of regular training courses very difficult. In such cases the training of inspectors relies mainly on international co-operation, in particular on the action of inter-regional institutes such as those set up in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean with the assistance of the ILO. (Endnote 72)

155. Whatever the value of the training given to inspectors on their entry into service, it is advisable that it should be periodically supplemented, not only in order to refresh their knowledge but also to keep them abreast of new technologies. Many governments have referred in this respect to the measures taken to ensure the further training of inspectors by means of various courses or seminars at home or abroad. (Endnote 73) Depending on the availability of resources, further training courses are organised more or less systematically. For this reason, the activities of the regional training centres, which periodically organise courses for adaptation and further training, are particularly welcome. It is to be hoped that there will be a gradual increase in the number of such courses, which is unfortunately too limited to meet all demands.

Endnotes

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Cross references
Constitution: Article 19
Constitution: Article 22
Constitution: Article 35