Chapter II. The role of the labour inspectorate

59. The role of the labour inspectorate is defined in several provisions of the instruments dealt with in this survey. Article 3, paragraph 1, of Convention No. 81 and Article 6, paragraph 1, of Convention No. 129 lay down the basic rule that the functions of the system of labour inspection are to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers, to supply technical information and advice to employers and workers on the subject, and to bring to the notice of the competent authority defects or abuses not covered by existing legal provisions. In addition to these functions relating to the application of legislation, the instruments contain a number of provisions outlining the preventive role of the inspection services: supervision of new establishments, plant, materials or substances and work processes, and the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. Other functions may be assigned to the labour inspectorate, too, as indicated in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommendation No. 133. However, according to Article 3, paragraph 2, of Convention No. 81 and Article 6, paragraph 3, of Convention No. 129, they must not interfere with the discharge of its primary duties.

I. Functions relating to the application of legislation

A. Enforcement of legal provisions

(a) Legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers

60. Article 3, paragraph 1(a), of Convention No. 81 stipulates that the functions of the system of labour inspection are "to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work, such as provisions relating to hours, wages, safety, health and welfare, the employment of children and young persons, and other connected matters, in so far as such provisions are enforceable by labour inspectors". This provision is repeated in Article 6, paragraph 1(a), of Convention No. 129, which adds a specific reference to weekly rest and holidays and to the employment of women. This addition does not alter the scope of the Convention, however, as the list of matters considered as pertaining to conditions of work and the protection of workers is given merely by way of example. (Endnote 1)

61. The fact that the list is not restrictive means that relatively new aspects of labour protection can be taken into account, even if they are not explicitly referred to in the aforementioned provisions of Conventions Nos. 81 and 129. (Endnote 2)

62. In almost all countries, the labour inspection services are empowered by law to enforce labour legislation. In one country that has ratified Convention No. 129, however, the role of the labour inspectorate in agriculture is not yet clear. (Endnote 3)

63. By stipulating that the function of the system of labour inspection is to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers "in so far as such provisions are enforceable by labour inspectors", the two Conventions leave it to the discretion of individual States to determine the range of legal provisions coming within the purview of the labour inspectorate. Consequently, its enforcement functions vary considerably from country to country, depending, on the one hand, on the scope and contents of the legislation in force -- inasmuch as it is not necessarily applicable to all sectors of the economy (Endnote 4) and, on the other, on the Government's willingness to entrust enforcement of the legislation to the labour inspectorate.

64. Legislation is not usually the only method of laying down working conditions; it is often supplemented by collective bargaining. Save for a few exceptions, collective agreements are normally mandatory. It is for this reason that Article 27 of Convention No. 81 and Article 2 of Convention No. 129 specify that "the term "legal provisions" includes, in addition to laws and regulations, arbitration awards and collective agreements upon which the force of law is conferred and which are enforceable by labour inspectors". States therefore can decide whether or not they wish to empower the labour inspectorate to enforce collective agreements and arbitration awards.

65. Many countries have adopted measures to have mandatory collective agreements and/or arbitration awards enforced through the national system of labour inspection. (Endnote 5) In some instances, special inspection systems have been set up. (Endnote 6) Generally speaking, the inspection services are empowered to enforce collective agreements whatever their nature, though in certain countries this is the case only with the collective agreements that have been extended to other undertakings by government decision. (Endnote 7) One government has indicated that the supervision of the application of collective agreements of a general nature, the scope of which is national, is entrusted to the Administration of Labour Protection. (Endnote 8)

66. In several countries, the labour inspectorate is also responsible for enforcing labour clauses on working conditions in undertaking (Endnote 9) that have signed public contracts with the State and other public authorities. In developing countries in particular, making this standard practice is a most useful means of ensuring that the working conditions, and especially the wages, of persons employed to carry out part of a government contract are at least as favourable as those of other workers.

67. In most cases the competence of the inspectorate is very broad and covers all the laws and regulations in force on working conditions and occupational safety and health. There are several ways of defining the coverage of a system of inspection. One is to couch the definition in general terms. (Endnote 10) Another is to draw up a list -- usually non-restrictive -- the provisions enforceable by the labour inspectorate. (Endnote 11) An intermediate solution has been adopted in countries where the labour inspectorate is responsible for enforcing a specific text of a general nature, such as the Labour Code or the labour laws and regulations made under them. (Endnote 12)

68. In several countries where the labour inspectorate is responsible for enforcing certain specific laws, its competence varies according to the subject-matter. When there are a large number of such laws or when they cover a broad range of issues, the sphere of action of the inspection services, though less general, is still considerable. (Endnote 13) Elsewhere, on the other hand, it may be rather more limited, (Endnote 14) though there is a general tendency for the competence of inspection services to be extended as labour legislation develops. (Endnote 15)

69. Certain matters governed by laws and regulations are sometimes excluded from the competence of the labour inspectorate. In one country, only public law provisions relating to the protection of workers come within the purview of the labour inspectorate, which is not empowered to enforce private law provisions relating to such matters as annual leave. (Endnote 16) The same sometimes applies to the enforcement of wage regulations. (Endnote 17)

70. In some socialist countries, labour inspectors are generally empowered to enforce provisions relating to the protection of labour. This is a broad concept, in which the emphasis is sometimes on occupational safety and health. One government indicates in its report that employers infringing regulations on occupational safety, hours of work, weekly rest, wages and the protection of women and children are liable to penalties. (Endnote 18) In another country the state labour inspection system is responsible for enforcing labour legislation, and, inter alia, the provisions relating to occupational safety and health. (Endnote 19) Elsewhere, the inspectorate is empowered to enforce labour legislation and labour protection regulations. (Endnote 20)

71. As already mentioned, the provisions enforceable by the labour inspectorate are not necessarily the same for all workers even where the legislation is of a general nature. (Endnote 21) In many countries, especially the English-speaking countries of Africa, occupational safety and health are governed by legislation on factories that applies principally to industrial undertakings. In agriculture, specifically, several governments have stated that there are very few relevant laws and regulations, if any. (Endnote 22) In certain countries, agricultural workers are covered by special provisions. (Endnote 23)

(b) Other legal provisions

72. In addition to the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work, some governments have taken advantage of the possibility afforded by Article 6, paragraph 2, of Convention No. 129 and have entrusted the labour inspectorate with the enforcement of provisions relating to the conditions of life of workers and their families. (Endnote 24) In several countries these provisions are concerned more specifically with workers' housing facilities. (Endnote 25)

73. Other provisions enforceable by labour inspectors relate to such varied subjects as vocational training, (Endnote 26) social services (canteen, transport facilities, etc.), (Endnote 27) the employment of foreign labour, (Endnote 28) the environment, (Endnote 29) and social security. (Endnote 30) Some of these aspects are mentioned in Paragraph 2 of Recommendation No. 133. (Endnote 31)

B. Information and advice for employers and workers

74. The action taken by labour inspectors in the course of their enforcement work is unlikely to have any effect so long as employers and workers are not fully aware of their reciprocal rights and obligations and, above all, if they are not convinced of the usefulness of the legislation applicable to them. Convention No. 81, in Article 3, paragraph 1(b), and Convention No. 129, in Article 6, paragraph 1(b), accordingly call upon the labour inspectorate "to supply technical information and advice to employers and workers concerning the most effective means of complying with the legal provisions". Like the enforcement function, this information and advice is intended to secure the effective implementation of the laws and regulations; in this sense, therefore, the two functions are interdependent and complementary.

75. The information available to the Committee shows that States are, on the whole, fully aware of the importance of the advisory function of labour inspectors and, in the vast majority of countries, the relevant legislation contains explicit provisions assigning this task to them. Since most legal provisions on the subject call upon the labour inspectorate to supply information and advice, it is unnecessary to cite specific examples. In practice, moreover, labour inspectors engage in educational activities even where there are no specific provisions on the subject. When infringements come to their notice, for instance, labour inspectors generally prefer to rely on persuasion rather than to initiate legal proceedings immediately.

76. The inspectorates' information function takes various forms. In the first place, labour inspectors are naturally called upon to supply advice and information during their inspection visits in undertakings. Secondly, the labour inspectorate often receives written or verbal requests, a form of consultation which has reached such a scale in certain countries that measures have had to be adopted to relieve inspectors of part of the burden. In one country, a central information unit has been set up in the departmental labour directorates to provide the public directly with information on currently applicable regulations or contractual provisions so as to facilitate the work of the inspection services; (Endnote 32) this central public information service should enable the labour inspectors and assistant inspectors to devote more time to visits to undertakings. Lastly, advice and information may take the more general form of the kind of education campaigns advocated in Paragraph 7 of Recommendation No. 81 and in Paragraph 14 of Recommendation No. 133. Many governments have stated that, through the labour inspectorate or in collaboration with other bodies (especially with the employers' and workers' organisations), they have adopted measures to keep workers and employers informed on a regular basis of the requirements of labour legislation, and specifically of problems of safety and health. (Endnote 33) The methods employed include the organisation of courses, seminars, conferences, radio broadcasts, exhibitions and the distribution of posters, pamphlets, and other publications and films.

77. The information and advice dispensed by labour inspectors often entails bringing current legal provisions to the notice of employers and workers, explaining their significance and their scope and indicating the best way of complying with them. In the case of the prevention of occupational hazards, the inspectors may also be called upon to offer technical advice.

78. The labour inspectorates' enforcement function and information and advice function are complementary in so far as they are both intended to promote the effective implementation of legal provisions relating to the protection of workers. It is generally accepted that a successful advisory function will achieve more than mere reliance upon enforcement and nowadays labour inspectors are no longer looked upon merely as policemen responsible for imposing fines on persons infringing labour laws. This development is welcome, particularly as it emphasises the importance of prevention. But a correct balance must be struck between the two approaches to obtain the greatest degree of success of the inspectorates' work. It is essential that, whilst concentrating on their advisory role, inspectors do not lose sight of the importance of enforcement. To some extent they will be assisted in this if the system of penalties is effectively constructed -- a problem which will be examined in Chapter VI of this survey.

C. Notification of the shortcomings of existing legal provisions

79. Article 3, paragraph 1(c), of Convention No. 81 states that one of the functions of the system of labour inspection is to bring to the notice of the competent authority defects or abuses not specifically covered by existing legal provisions. Convention No. 129, which contains a similar provision in Article 6, paragraph 1(c), adds that the labour inspectorate in agriculture must "submit proposals on the improvement on laws and regulations". This function, the importance of which has been stressed by the Committee, is a vital factor in social progress. (Endnote 34) If it is properly understood and properly carried out, it should promote the introduction of new protective measures. Thanks to their direct knowledge of the working environment, labour inspectors are ideally situated to alert the authorities to the need for new regulations that are better suited to the needs of workers.

80. The need to entrust the labour inspectorate with the function of informing the competent authorities of the shortcomings of existing legal provisions would seem to be generally accepted, at least in principle. The normal channel for such information is the periodical reports that the labour inspectors submit to their superiors, though ad hoc reports may also be made. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to judge from available information whether labour inspectors do fulfil this function in practice and, if so, in what cases and to what extent.

81. By reporting on the shortcomings of laws and regulations, labour inspection services are to a certain extent involved in the process of drafting labour regulations. This involvement can sometimes be more direct, such as when a representative of the inspectorate takes part in the work of advisory bodies on labour affairs. In one country, the inspectorate is responsible, inter alia, for assisting the Ministry of Labour in the drafting of regulations made under the Working Environment Act. (Endnote 35) In another, the authority to which the inspection services are attached (Health and Safety Commission) draws up regulations that it submits to the minister for adoption and may itself introduce codes of conduct and issue guidance notes. (Endnote 36) In a third, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration is empowered to adopt legally enforceable standards on occupational safety and health which are enforced by its own officials. (Endnote 37)

II. Preventive function

A. Prevention of occupational accidents and diseases

82. By their very nature, the labour inspectorate's activities as described above help to reduce the incidence of occupational accidents and diseases. Prevention has always been and remains an essential part of the function of inspection. Though there has been some progress, the accident rate is still dramatically high in the industrial sector. (Endnote 38) In agriculture, mechanisation and the use of new substances such as insecticides and pesticides have brought new health and safety hazards. (Endnote 39)

83. Two aspects are particularly relevant to the instruments on labour inspection: the notification of occupational accidents and diseases, and the participation of the inspectorate in their investigation.

(a) Notification of occupational accidents and diseases

84. Article 14 of Convention No. 81 and Article 19, paragraph 1, of Convention No. 129 establish that the labour inspectorate must be notified of occupational accidents and diseases in such cases and in such manner as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations. This principle is embodied in most countries' legislation, though it is not always possible to establish from available information whether the obligation to notify also applies to agricultural undertakings. It may be so in countries where notification is provided for in factories' legislation, unless it is also required under more general laws or regulations. (Endnote 40) In addition, the Committee of Experts has in fact addressed observations to a number of countries that have ratified Convention No. 81 and/or Convention No. 129, either because the labour inspectorate was not notified of work accidents and occupational diseases or because the requirement to do so referred only to work accidents or covered only an extremely limited list of occupational diseases. In many cases, appropriate action was taken (Endnote 41) or promised (Endnote 42) by the governments to ensure fuller implementation of the relevant provisions of the two Conventions.

85. The manner in which the labour inspectorate is informed of occupational accidents and diseases varies considerably from country to country. In most instances, cases of occupational injuries must be notified directly by the undertaking, either immediately (Endnote 43) or within a specified period of time (Endnote 44) which may vary according to the seriousness of the accident. (Endnote 45) A similar requirement is sometimes imposed on any doctor who diagnoses an occupational disease. (Endnote 46) In some countries, all occupational accidents and diseases recognised as such by the law must be notified; (Endnote 47) elsewhere, notification is required only in respect of the most serious accidents, especially those involving several workers or resulting in death or disability. (Endnote 48)

86. Notifying the labour inspectorate is not an end in itself but part of the more general aim of accident prevention. Its purpose is to enable the labour inspectors to conduct investigations in the undertaking to establish the causes of work accidents and occupational diseases and to have steps taken to avoid their recurrence. Although accidents in undertakings may not necessarily cause actual injury, they can provide extremely useful information on the state of the buildings, plant and equipment. In some countries, the legislation therefore also requires the inspectorate to be notified of certain occurrences liable to endanger the safety or health of the workers, even where there are no actual injuries. (Endnote 49)

87. In some countries, on the other hand, the employer notifies the labour inspectorate, not directly but through another body such as the social security institution, (Endnote 50) local or municipal authority, (Endnote 51) police, (Endnote 52) public safety authority, (Endnote 53) or the court. (Endnote 54) This form of indirect notification is not incompatible with the Conventions Nos. 81 and 129, which are couched in very flexible terms. However, if notification is to be fully effective, the time between when the occupational accident or disease occurs and the notification to the inspectorate must be sufficiently short for the inspectors to be able to carry out inquiries in the undertaking if they so wish. The Committee has considered that one month is too long a delay for inspectors to be able to take any urgent steps to prevent further occupational accidents and diseases.

88. Despite laws and regulations requiring notification of occupational hazards, labour inspectorates seem in practice often to be denied information, especially of occupational diseases. This is a general problem to which neither developing nor industrialised countries are immune. Very often, the main reason for failure to notify the inspectorate is ignorance of the relevant legal requirements. Several countries have accordingly undertaken information campaigns to draw the attention of the employers and the medical authorities to this problem. (Endnote 55) One government states that industrial accidents notified to the social security institution are compared with those notified to the labour inspectorate and, when the comparison shows that the latter has not been informed of an accident, the employer is systematically reminded of his obligation to do so. (Endnote 56) Collaboration between the labour inspectorate and the social security agency has also been cited by one government as contributing to the revision of the list of occupational diseases of which the inspectorate must be notified. (Endnote 57) It is important for the labour inspectorate to be kept properly informed that the list must be regularly updated. Other steps have been taken to improve records of work accidents and occupational diseases, such as simplified notification procedures and improved enforcement measures. (Endnote 58)

(b) Investigation of occupational accidents and diseases

89. As has already been stated, the labour inspectorate has to be notified of work accidents and occupational diseases so that the inspectors can decide on appropriate preventive measures. Article 19, paragraph 2, of Convention No. 129 accordingly stipulates that "as far as possible, inspectors shall be associated with any inquiry on the spot into the causes of the most serious occupational accidents or occupational diseases, particularly of those which affect a number of workers or have fatal consequences".

90. Only a few governments have supplied detailed information on the implementation of this provision. Generally speaking, however, it would seem that the inquiries conducted by labour inspectors following an occupational accident or disease are looked upon as an essential component of preventive action. Naturally, because of the limited time at their disposal and the very high rate of work accidents, the inspectors cannot carry out an inquiry in every case and therefore have to make a selection on the basis of, for example, the gravity, frequency or complexity of the accidents or diseases reported in an undertaking.

91. When an inquiry is ordered by another authority, such as the police or the prevention services of the social security agency, it should be possible to invite labour inspectors to take part, and certain governments have indicated that this is the case. (Endnote 59) In some cases, their participation is explicitly provided for by law. (Endnote 60)

B. Prior control of new establishments, plant, substances and processes

92. Convention No. 129 and Recommendations Nos. 81 and 133 contain a number of provisions relating to the prior control of new establishments, plant, substances and processes.

93. Part I of Recommendation No. 81 calls, on the one hand, for advance notice to the labour inspectorate of the opening of any new establishment, and, on the other, for the submission to the appropriate labour inspection service of plans for new establishments, plant or processes of production, for an opinion making their execution conditional upon the carrying out of any alterations ordered for the purpose of securing the health and safety of the workers. When Convention No. 129 was adopted, it was found necessary to incorporate this principle in the body of the Convention so as to emphasise the labour inspectorate's responsibility in the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. (Endnote 61) Article 17 of the Convention accordingly stipulates that "the labour inspection services in agriculture shall be associated, in such cases and in such manner as may be determined by the competent authority, in the preventive control of new plant, new materials or substances and new methods of handling or processing products which appear likely to constitute a threat to health or safety". However, the wording of this provision is very flexible so as to be enforceable by as many countries as possible, whatever their system of inspection. The Article in fact leaves it to the competent authority to determine the cases and manner of the preventive control and therefore does not imply "that the inspection service would intervene in all cases of new plant, new materials or substances or new methods of handling or processing products." (Endnote 62) Paragraph 11 of Recommendation No. 133 goes into more detail and provides that "the association of the labour inspectorate in agriculture in the preventive control of new plant, new materials or substances and new methods of handling or processing products which appear likely to constitute a threat to health or safety ... should include prior consultation with the labour inspectorate on (a) the putting into operation of such plant, materials or substances and methods; and (b) the plans of an plant in which dangerous machines or unhealthy or dangerous work processes are to be used.'

94. The situation varies from country to country. In a few instances, the legislation contains no provision on the subject. (Endnote 63) Elsewhere, the opening of a new establishment or the start of the work must be registered with the labour inspectorate, though the latter's prior agreement is not required. (Endnote 64) Sometimes, notice of the opening of an establishment must be accompanied by the plans, (Endnote 65) although one government stated that this requirement is not stipulated by law. (Endnote 66) The requirements that the inspectorate be notified may concern all establishments (Endnote 67) or only certain establishments, (Endnote 68) such as factories (Endnote 69) or establishments employing a specified number of workers. (Endnote 70) In other countries, the prior agreement of the inspectorate or its opinion is normally required for opening new establishments (Endnote 71) or for building or transforming undertakings. (Endnote 72) In the latter case, in particular, prior submission of the plans is generally required. One government states that measures to implement Paragraph 2 of Recommendation No. 81 are being incorporated in the draft Labour Code currently being prepared. (Endnote 73) The inspectorate's approval may be conditional on steps to bring the establishment into line with safety and health regulations. Here again, this may be compulsory for all establishments or only for certain establishments. (Endnote 74) In some countries, only undertakings officially listed as dangerous, unhealthy or offensive are concerned. (Endnote 75)

95. Prior control may also be required for the machines and manufacturing processes and for the substances used. (Endnote 76) This is often the case with cranes and other lifting apparatus and with steam boilers. In order not to burden employers with the considerable cost of taking the necessary steps to improve the safety of plant or equipment acquired without knowledge of its dangerous nature, the laws and regulations in some countries transfer preventive control to the stage of manufacture, sale or import of the equipment concerned, in which case the labour inspectorate may or may not be associated in the control procedure. (Endnote 77) A separate licensing committee may be set up in such cases in order to give its approval, though available information unfortunately does not show how far the labour inspectorate is involved in such licensing. (Endnote 78)

96. The foregoing also applies to agriculture in so far as the legislation providing for the labour inspectorate to be associated in preventive control covers this sector, or when there is specific legislation. This is not always the case. One government states that the inspectorate is associated in preventive control only in respect of agricultural undertakings covered by the Factories Act. (Endnote 79) As to the countries that have not ratified Convention No. 129, only a few governments have reported in detail on this matter -- particularly as regards the prior control of dangerous substances -- although dangerous substances are in frequent use in agriculture. One government does refer to legislation on the control of pesticides which require prior authorisation of the Pesticides Control Board, of which the Chief Factory Inspector is a member, for the production, sale and distribution of any substances of this kind. (Endnote 80) In another country, when the chief inspector considers that a product may be toxic and dangerous for the workers who use it in agriculture, he may order inquiries and studies on the conditions of work of the persons concerned and on the way in which this product is used. (Endnote 81) Some governments have also stated that the inspectorate is generally associated in the preventive control referred to in Article 17 of the Convention. (Endnote 82) Another government has stated that no agricultural machinery may be manufactured which has not first undergone inspection in the presence of representatives of the competent bodies for the protection of agricultural workers. (Endnote 83) As to the countries that have ratified the Convention but not fully implemented this provision, the Committee has made appropriate observations concerning the shortcomings it has noted.

97. The Committee wishes to draw special attention to the importance of prior knowledge and control. Several factors make this increasingly important. The speed of technical change continues to increase: new chemicals are brought into being and radioactive materials find wider use. Machinery and chemicals created in one country are used in another country, often with a lack of technical information accompanying their transfer. Workplaces are used for a variety of changing operations and the processes and materials used are rapidly changing. However vigilant the inspectors, they will need assistance from other agencies whose specialised functions (e.g. control of environmental planning) or knowledge (e.g. research and development institutes) are essential to supplement the inspectors' knowledge.

III. Other functions entrusted to the labour inspection services

98. In many countries, the inspectorate is entrusted with functions other than those described above. Both Convention No. 81 (in Article 3, paragraph 2), and Convention No. 129 (in Article 6, paragraph 3), stipulate that "any further duties which may be entrusted to labour inspectors in agriculture shall not be such as to interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties or to prejudice in any way the authority and impartiality which are necessary to inspectors in their relations with employers and workers".

A. Functions in the field of labour relations

(a) Settlement of disputes

99. Whereas the prevention of disputes seems a natural function of the labour inspectorate, the same is not true of the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, both Recommendation No. 81 (in Paragraph 8), and Recommendation No. 133 (in Paragraph 3), state that the functions of labour inspectors should not include that of acting as conciliator or arbitrator in proceedings concerning labour disputes. Given the special circumstances that sometimes prevail in agriculture, however, Recommendation No. 133 does accept the possibility that labour inspectors in agriculture may be called upon as a temporary measure to act as conciliators, provided that the necessary measures are taken to relieve them progressively of such functions.

100. The involvement of the labour inspectorate in the settlement of disputes has been (Endnote 84) and remains a controversial issue. Some consider that inspection functions as such are incompatible with conciliation and arbitration functions, as there may be confusion between the role of inspectors as conciliators, seeking a solution acceptable to both parties, and their role as guarantors of the due enforcement of the law -- a role which is incompatible with any idea of compromise. This view is supported by certain practical considerations: the extra work generated by the settlement of disputes may be such as to leave the inspectors little or no time for their principal supervisory function. The opposite view is that the labour inspector, by virtue of his first-hand knowledge of the working environment, is ideally suited to the function of conciliation. Several governments have suggested in their reports that Paragraph 8 of Recommendation No. 81 and Paragraph 3(1) of Recommendation No. 103 should perhaps be amended to allow States to entrust the labour inspectorate with the role of conciliator in labour disputes. (Endnote 85) Another government has pointed out that it is difficult to reconcile the objective of the Recommendations with laws and regulations which call upon the inspection services to prevent and settle all labour disputes not within the purview of the National Conciliation Office. (Endnote 86) Some governments have emphasised that employers and workers themselves wish the labour inspector to act as conciliator. (Endnote 87)

101. The controversy over this matter of principle, which goes back to the adoption of Recommendation No. 81, explains why there has been little change in this respect since the last general survey. There are two main types of situation. In certain countries, the inspectorate's control function is seen as incompatible with the function of conciliation and arbitration. (Endnote 88) Consequently, the task is entrusted to other bodies. Elsewhere, the legislation makes the intervention of the inspection services as conciliator in collective disputes mandatory. (Endnote 89) Moreover, although individual disputes are normally dealt with by labour courts, the legislation in several countries also provides for a preliminary hearing by the labour inspector. (Endnote 90) The countries whose legislation associates the labour inspectorate in arbitration are somewhat fewer. (Endnote 91) In some countries, the situation is not necessarily so clear-cut and, although the separation of the functions of inspector from those of conciliator and arbitrator is recognised in principle, the shortage of officials may sometimes make it necessary in practice for the labour inspectors to intervene in the latter. One government states that the inspectors' functions do not normally include conciliation and arbitration but that, in certain undertakings within the jurisdiction of the central government, it has not been possible to separate the two functions. (Endnote 92) In other States, only some categories of inspectors have conciliation duties. (Endnote 93)

102. From the standpoint of industrial relations, the involvement of the labour inspectorate in the settlement of disputes has unquestionably been highly beneficial in a great number of cases. The fact remains, however, that in numerous countries the inspectors are unable to fulfil their fundamental function of enforcing labour laws and regulations because of the time they devote to their conciliation duties, which is often considerable. This is part of the wider problems of the overburdening of labour inspectors with additional tasks, as touched upon in paragraph 108 below. As already pointed out, it is important that a labour inspector's role as conciliator when endeavouring to resolve a dispute should not induce him to compromise regarding the enforcement of the law. It should, however, be possible to avoid this to a large extent by training inspectors to distinguish between their supervisory function and their conciliation function and, for example, by issuing regular guide-lines to assist the inspectorate in this aspect of its work.

(b) Participation in collective bargaining

103. While in many countries collective bargaining takes place solely at the initiative of the parties concerned, in others national laws and regulations often provide for government intervention, particularly in the case of the agreement's automatic extension to other undertakings or sectors. In this regard, the existing procedure may provide for the labour inspectorate to participate in some way in the conclusion of collective agreements. In some countries, collective agreements are negotiated within a joint committee chaired by the labour inspectorate. (Endnote 94) In others, the inspector intervenes only in the conclusion of collective bargaining that may be extended to other branches. (Endnote 95) Elsewhere, the inspectorate may be called upon to seek a solution only when the joint committee fails to agree. (Endnote 96)

B. Activities of an economic nature

104. In the normal course of its work, the labour inspectorate has to compile extensive quantitative and qualitative data, especially on economic matters. It may accordingly be asked to report to the authorities on aspects of the economy. In one country, the inspection services compile information on national production and trends in production, and on strikes (for instance, causes and resolution of strikes). (Endnote 97) In another country, the external labour services are responsible for keeping the central government constantly informed on such matters as the implementation of its employment and vocational training policy. (Endnote 98) More generally, the inspectorates' knowledge may be very useful in preparing development plans.

105. In this context, Paragraph 1 of Recommendation No. 133 provides for the enlargement of the labour inspectorate's functions in agriculture "so as to include collaboration with the competent technical services with a view to helping the agricultural producer ... to improve his holding and the conditions of life and work of the persons working on it". However, no information has been received from governments on the implementation of this provision.

C. Subsidiary administrative functions

106. The labour inspectorate is often given administrative duties which, if too onerous, may prevent it from performing its enforcement work as it should. (Endnote 99) As already noted, the labour inspectorate in several countries has a supervisory role in social security, usually that of verifying that employers pay their contributions. (Endnote 100) Furthermore, the labour inspectorate may also be empowered to authorise exemptions from legal provisions relating, for example, to working time, the employment of young persons or night work by women. (Endnote 101) Labour inspectors are sometimes responsible for issuing permits for activities, such as the opening of company stores (Endnote 102) or private employment agencies. (Endnote 103) The inspectorate may also have a role to play in employment promotion, for example in the placement of workers. (Endnote 104) It may be required to compile statistics on conditions of work and employment (Endnote 105) or to conduct surveys. (Endnote 106) In several countries, the inspectors are also expected to take part in various administrative committees. (Endnote 107)

107. Lastly, labour inspectors in certain countries are required to enforce laws and regulations concerning collective dismissals. (Endnote 108) In the present economic situation, this is an increasingly important task that takes up much of the labour inspectors' time. In so far as the inspectorate is called upon to assess dismissals from the economic standpoint, this may make it go beyond its essential role of securing the enforcement of the labour legislation. In many cases, in fact, other bodies such as the employment services are responsible for supervising dismissals on economic grounds.

108. The number of additional tasks entrusted to the inspection service is liable, in many cases, to reduce the effectiveness of its principal duties. There is a risk that, with so many responsibilities, labour inspectors may devote more time to subsidiary economic or other duties at the expense of those that should constitute the essential part of their work, namely the enforcement of laws and regulations relating to occupational safety and health and conditions of work. The situation in some countries has reached a point where governments and workers' and employers' organisations may have to consider how to tackle the problem of labour inspectors overburdened with subsidiary duties. There are two main solutions. One would be to increase the staff of the inspection services; this raises the more general problem of the means of action available to the inspection service. The alternative would be to relieve labour inspectors of some of their subsidiary duties. As far as countries that have ratified Convention No. 81 or Convention No. 129 are concerned, the Committee has already made comments in many cases where it has felt that various subsidiary duties of the inspection services might distract them from their principal job. In several instances, steps have been taken or envisaged by governments to remedy the situation. (Endnote 109)

Endnotes

Endnote 2

Endnote 3

Endnote 4

Endnote 5

Endnote 6

Endnote 7

Endnote 8

Endnote 9

Endnote 10

Endnote 11

Endnote 12

Endnote 13

Endnote 14

Endnote 15

Endnote 16

Endnote 17

Endnote 18

Endnote 19

Endnote 20

Endnote 21

Endnote 22

Endnote 23

Endnote 24

Endnote 26

Endnote 27

Endnote 28

Endnote 29

Endnote 30

Endnote 31

Endnote 32

Endnote 33

Endnote 34

Endnote 35

Endnote 36

Endnote 37

Endnote 38

Endnote 39

Endnote 40

Endnote 41

Endnote 42

Endnote 43

Endnote 44

Endnote 45

Endnote 46

Endnote 47

Endnote 48

Endnote 49

Endnote 50

Endnote 51

Endnote 52

Endnote 53

Endnote 54

Endnote 55

Endnote 56

Endnote 57

Endnote 58

Endnote 59

Endnote 60

Endnote 61

Endnote 62

Endnote 63

Endnote 64

Endnote 65

Endnote 66

Endnote 67

Endnote 68

Endnote 69

Endnote 70

Endnote 71

Endnote 72

Endnote 73

Endnote 74

Endnote 75

Endnote 76

Endnote 77

Endnote 78

Endnote 79

Endnote 80

Endnote 81

Endnote 82

Endnote 83

Endnote 84

Endnote 85

Endnote 86

Endnote 87

Endnote 88

Endnote 89

Endnote 90

Endnote 91

Endnote 92

Endnote 93

Endnote 94

Endnote 95

Endnote 96

Endnote 97

Endnote 98

Endnote 99

Endnote 100

Endnote 101

Endnote 102

Endnote 103

Endnote 104

Endnote 105

Endnote 106

Endnote 107

Endnote 108

Endnote 109

Legislation

See related national legislation from Natlex

Barbados: Factories Act

Cross references
Constitution: Article 19
Constitution: Article 22
Constitution: Article 35