|
|
 |
|
|
Promise (327,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Promise
Total judgments found: 55
1, 2, 3 | next >
Judgment 4759
137th Session, 2024
Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of his employment contract.
Consideration 5
Extract:
Although the complainant asserts that he lodged an internal complaint in due time, he provides no evidence of this, and the letter sent to the Secretary-General by the Staff Association on 3 July 2020 cannot be regarded as a complaint within the meaning of the Staff Regulations. Similarly, in view of its relevant case law (see, in particular, Judgments 4253, consideration 6, 3619, considerations 14 and 15, and 3148, consideration 7) and the evidence on file, the Tribunal considers that there is nothing to indicate that, in the present case, a formal promise was made to the complainant by the Organisation to reappoint him at a later date. It follows that the complainant cannot rely on the existence of such a promise to justify his inaction in this regard.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3148, 3619, 4253
Keywords:
late filing; promise;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; late filing; promise; time bar;
Judgment 4758
137th Session, 2024
Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision of the Secretary-General to end her employment and the breach of a promise of employment allegedly made to her.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; late filing; promise; time bar;
Consideration 9
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits that, at the time she filed her complaint with the Tribunal, she was still awaiting the outcome of the promise the Organisation had made to reappoint her and this was the reason why she did not file the complaint sooner.
However, in view of the Tribunal’s relevant case law (see, in particular, Judgments 4665, consideration 6, 4253, consideration 6, 3619, considerations 14 and 15, and 3148, consideration 7) and the evidence on file, there is nothing to indicate that, in the present case, a formal promise was made to the complainant by the Organisation to reappoint her at a later date.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3148, 3619, 4253, 4665
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 4757
137th Session, 2024
Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of his employment contract and the breach of a promise to employ him.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; late filing; promise; time bar;
Consideration 8
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits that, at the time he filed his complaint with the Tribunal, he was still awaiting the outcome of the promise the Organisation had made to reappoint him and this was the reason why he did not file the complaint sooner.
However, in view of the Tribunal’s relevant case law (see, in particular, Judgments 4665, consideration 6, 4253, consideration 6, 3619, considerations 14 and 15, and 3148, consideration 7) and the evidence on file, there is nothing to indicate that, in the present case, a formal promise was made to the complainant by the Organisation to reappoint him at a later date.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3148, 3619, 4253, 4665
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 4665
136th Session, 2023
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, whose post was reclassified retrospectively, claims compensation for the injury he considers he has suffered and requests that his resignation be redefined as a dismissal.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The Tribunal considers [...] that there is no evidence to suggest that a promise was duly and properly made to the complainant on his appointment that he would be promoted to a grade 2 post. On the contrary, the evidence in the file shows that each time the complainant raised such a promise, he was firmly told that the Organization disputed its existence and that any decision on promotion depended on an official’s performance and the extent to which her or his responsibilities had increased.
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 4534
134th Session, 2022
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, a former staff member of UNAIDS, challenges the decision to separate him from service on 31 October 2018, being the date on which he reached his retirement age according to the Staff Rules then in force, as well as the decision not to approve an exceptional extension of his appointment beyond retirement age.
Consideration 7
Extract:
The various elements of a promise and related circumstances that give rise to a legal liability to honour the promise, are fourfold. The third element is that the breach of the promise would cause injury to the person who relies on it. The third element has two sub-elements. One is that the promisee has relied on the promise and the second is that this reliance has caused injury to the promisee in the event of non-fulfilment of the promise (see Judgment 3619, consideration 14).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3619
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 4527
134th Session, 2022
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants impugn WHO’s decision to postpone implementation of the mandatory age of separation adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 70/244 of 23 December 2015.
Considerations 9-11
Extract:
The question of what constitutes an actionable breach of promise was discussed by the Tribunal in Judgment 3619, considerations 13 to 15. The following emerges from that discussion. It is not every statement made by or on behalf of an organisation that is capable of being characterised as a promise that gives rise to a legal obligation on the part of the organisation to honour the promise.
The various elements of a promise and surrounding circumstances that give rise to a legal liability to honour the promise, are fourfold. The first element is that there must be a promise to act or not act, or to allow. The second element is that the promise must come from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it. The third element is that the breach of the promise would cause injury to the person who relies on it. The fourth is that the position in law should not have altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due. The third element has two sub-elements. One is that the promisee has relied on the promise and the second is that this reliance has caused injury to the promisee in the event of non-fulfilment of the promise. As the Tribunal noted in Judgement 3619, there are numerous decisions of the Tribunal applying these principles (see, for example, Judgments 3204, consideration 9, 3148, consideration 7, 3005, consideration 12, 2158, consideration 5, 2112, consideration 7, and 1278, consideration 12). However, they have, as their foundation, the decision of the Tribunal in Judgment 782 which was discussed in Judgment 3619. It is unnecessary to repeat that discussion in detail.
However, it is useful for present purposes to recall that the complainant in the proceedings resulting in Judgment 782 was successful because the defendant organisation failed to honour a promise (that the complainant would be granted an indefinite appointment) which he relied on (by leaving existing stable long-term employment), which caused him injury (lost future income). The complainant in the proceedings resulting in Judgment 3619 failed on the plea of breach of promise because she failed to establish reliance on the alleged promise, let alone that her reliance on the promise caused her injury. As the Tribunal said in that judgment, in consideration 17, “the injury (ordinarily financial injury) must flow from and occur by reason of the failure of the defendant organisation to honour the promise made and relied upon”. The complainant in proceedings leading to a more recent judgment, Judgment 3677, failed on a very similar plea of breach of promise for substantially the same reasons.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782, 1278, 2112, 2158, 3005, 3148, 3204, 3619, 3677
Keywords:
promise;
Consideration 14
Extract:
[T]he complainants simply continued in employment subject to then subsisting provisions concerning the age of retirement. They did not rely on a promise in doing this. Indeed, it is clear they hoped that by continuing in employment they would gain the benefit of an altered mandatory age of separation. While that hope was not realised, they did not act to their detriment because of any promise. The plea based on breach of a promise is unfounded.
Keywords:
promise; retirement age;
Judgment 4377
131st Session, 2021
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant alleges that he was promised promotion to grade D-2.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; promise;
Consideration 5
Extract:
The Tribunal notes that although under its case law – as illustrated, in particular, by Judgments 3204, consideration 9, and 3221, consideration 21 – officials are entitled to expect that organisations will honour the promises they have made in certain circumstances, the right to fulfilment of those promises is subject to various conditions, the first of which is, of course, their actual existence.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3204, 3221
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 4253
129th Session, 2020
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, who states that he was the victim of moral harassment, claims redress for the injury he considers he has suffered.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The Tribunal has consistently held that the principle of good faith implies that a promise must be fulfilled, subject to the condition that the promise should “be substantive, i.e. to act, or not to act, or to allow, that it should come from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it; that breach should cause injury to him or her who relies on it; and that the position in law should not have altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due” (see, for example, Judgments 782, consideration 1, 3005, consideration 12, 3115, consideration 5, 3148, consideration 7, and 3619, considerations 14 and 15). The ILO submits that the complainant does not “appear” to have suffered any real injury, since he waited for almost ten years to raise the issue. This objection cannot be upheld, as the existence of injury does not depend upon the time at which it is alleged. The promise to assign the complainant coordination duties satisfies the criteria established by the case law and should therefore have been fulfilled. The complainant rightly considers that the Organization violated the principle of good faith.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782, 3005, 3115, 3148, 3619
Keywords:
good faith; promise;
Judgment 3870
124th Session, 2017
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant alleges that he was promised promotion to grade D-2.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
case sent back to organisation; complaint allowed; decision quashed; promise; promotion;
Judgment 3619
121st Session, 2016
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the rejection of her internal appeal against the decisions not to convert her fixed-term contract into a permanent contract and not to select her for a vacant permanent post.
Consideration 13
Extract:
The Tribunal favours the approach of the minority, though it accepts that there is room for legitimate debate about what the comment meant and how it might have been understood by the complainant. But there is a fundamental difficulty with the complainant’s case based on the written 2010 promise. It is not every statement made by or on behalf of an organisation that is capable of being characterised as a promise that gives rise to a legal obligation on the part of the organisation to honour the promise. Were that the applicable principle, it would almost certainly introduce an unacceptably high level of caution and constraint into the dialogue between senior officers of an organisation and staff members they manage. Open and frank discussion within an organisation is often a desirable part of good management and it can contribute to a positive culture of inclusiveness.
Keywords:
promise;
Considerations 14-15
Extract:
It is necessary to refer to the various elements of a promise that give rise to a legal liability to honour the promise. They were correctly identified by the IAC in its report though there was a singular failure on the part of the majority to address the third element. The first element is that there must be a promise to act or not act or to allow. The second element is that the promise must come from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it. The third element is that the breach of the promise would cause injury to the person who relies on it. The fourth is that the position in law should not have altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due. The third element has two sub-elements. One is that the promisee has relied on the promise and the second is that this reliance has caused injury to the promisee in the event of non-fulfilment of the promise.
There are numerous decisions of the Tribunal applying these principles (see, for example, Judgments 3204, under 9, 3148, under 7, 3005, under 12, 2158, under 5, 2112, under 7, and 1278, under 12). However they have, as their foundation, the decision of the Tribunal in Judgment 782. It is instructive to review the facts of that case and how the principle containing the four elements, propounded by the Tribunal in that judgment, were satisfied so as to result in a legal obligation on the part of the defendant organisation to honour the promise or, as it turned out, to pay damages for its failure to do so.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782, 1278, 2112, 2158, 3005, 3148, 3204
Keywords:
good faith; promise;
Judgment 3362
118th Session, 2014
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision not to renew his short-term contract and not to advertise his post.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; non-renewal of contract; promise; short-term;
Judgment 3204
115th Session, 2013
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant claims moral damages for the Union’s failure to submit to its Council the matter of the recognition of same-sex marriages.
Consideration 9
Extract:
"It is settled by the Tribunal’s case law that, according to the rules of good faith, anyone who was a staff member of an organisation and to whom a promise was made, may expect that promise to be kept by the organisation. However, the right to fulfilment of the promise is conditional. One condition is that the promise should be substantive. Another is that the promise is from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it. Yet another is that the breach should cause injury to the person who relies on the promise (see Judgment 782)."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782
Keywords:
condition; definition; duty of care; formal requirements; good faith; organisation's duties; promise; staff member's duties; staff member's interest;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint allowed; promise; same-sex marriage;
Judgment 3148
113th Session, 2012
Centre for the Development of Enterprise
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7
Extract:
[W]hile it is true that where a staff member has received assurances, in accordance with the principle of good faith, he or she is entitled to demand the fulfilment of his or her expectations, consistent precedent has it that the right to fulfilment of a promise is subject to the condition that it must be substantive, i.e. to act, or not to act, or to allow, that it should come from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it; that breach should cause injury to him or her who relies on it; and that the position in law should not have altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due (see, for example, Judgments 782, under 1, and 3005, under 12).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782, 3005
Keywords:
duty of care; good faith; promise;
Judgment 3141
113th Session, 2012
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 50
Extract:
Consistent precedent first established in Judgment 782 has it that the first condition governing an official’s right to the fulfilment of a promise made by an international organisation is that the “promise should be substantive”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 3115
113th Session, 2012
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 5
Extract:
By virtue of the principle of good faith, an international organisation which has given a promise to one of its officials must keep that promise, provided it is a substantive one, i.e. an undertaking to act or not to act or to allow action, that it emanates from a person who is competent or deemed to be competent to make it, that the breach of the promise causes injury to the person who relies on it, and that the position in law has not altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due (see Judgments 782, under 1, and 3005, under 12).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782, 3005
Keywords:
good faith; promise;
Judgment 3005
111th Session, 2011
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 12
Extract:
"[A]s the Tribunal observed in Judgment 782, under 1: 'According to the rules of good faith anyone to whom a promise is made may expect it to be kept, and that means that an international official has the right to fulfilment of a promise by the organisation that employs him. The right is conditional. One condition is that the promise should be substantive, i.e. to act, or not to act, or to allow. Others are that it should come from someone who is competent or deemed competent to make it; that breach should cause injury to him who relies on it; and that the position in law should not have altered between the date of the promise and the date on which fulfilment is due.'"
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 782
Keywords:
duty of care; good faith; organisation's duties; promise; right;
Judgment 2810
106th Session, 2009
European Organization for Nuclear Research
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7(b)
Extract:
The complainant impugns the decision not to award him, after his three-year limited-duration contract - which had been renewed twice - expired, an indefinite contract for one of the long-term jobs offered to other candidates who had been found better qualified.
"There is certainly no doubt that a limited-duration contract should be extended beyond a six-year period only as an exceptional measure. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, such an extension is likely to give the person concerned, if not legitimate expectations of a permanent appointment in the near future, then at least the feeling that, contrary to the legal reality, he or she has acquired rights.
In the instant case the circumstances are not such as to engender such expectations. According to the information on file, the complainant was granted an exceptional extension of his limited duration contract owing to the particular employment situation within the Organization. [...] The complainant freely accepted this last extension in full knowledge of the facts and without expressing any reservations about his prospects of permanent appointment."
Keywords:
appointment; contract; duration of appointment; extension of contract; fixed-term; promise;
Judgment 2779
106th Session, 2009
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7
Extract:
"As the Tribunal has found, even though he was not competent to make the representation, Mr [...] made a promise to the complainant that his appointment would be extended beyond statutory retirement age. Mr R. also fostered the complainant's false belief that the promise would be honoured. Despite the complainant's numerous requests over a period of approximately 18 months clearly explaining his belief that a promise had been made, the Secretary-General chose to ignore the opportunities to correct the complainant's misapprehensions and permitted him to act on his mistaken belief. Lastly, the Secretary-General failed to make a decision on the complainant's request for an extension in a timely fashion. This conduct constitutes a breach of the duty to respect the complainant's dignity. At the very least, the Secretary-General should have notified the complainant that the Union did not accept the obligation when the matter was first brought to his attention. This conduct has caused the complainant moral injury for which he must be compensated in the form of moral damages."
Keywords:
compensation; decision-maker; duration of appointment; extension beyond retirement age; good faith; injury; moral injury; organisation's duties; promise; respect for dignity; retirement; staff member's interest;
Judgment 2474
99th Session, 2005
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 25, 27-28
Extract:
[T]he complainant was appointed Head of the Spanish Unit on the basis that he would be promoted to P.5 after one year’s satisfactory service. The precise terms of the minute of 26 March 2002 recording this understanding are:
“On the recommendation of the Director-General, [the complainant] would be promoted to P.5 on completion of a satisfactory performance appraisal after one year in the post.”
[...]
In essence, the Organization is contending that it is relieved of its promise because, although the complainant performed all the functions and the duties of the post in question and performed them satisfactorily for one year, he did not perform them “in the post”. That is because the effect of the decision of 10 April 2003 was that, as a matter of law he was never appointed to that post. The Organization was responsible for appointing the complainant to the post. It is also responsible for the consequences of its decision in that regard.
Because the setting aside of the complainant’s appointment was the direct consequence of its own unlawful actions, the Organization cannot now be heard to say that the conditions which were attached to its promise and which were performed in substance and in fact, were not performed in law. Accordingly, the complainant is entitled to a promotion to P.5 [...].
Keywords:
promise;
Judgment 2112
92nd Session, 2002
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7(c)
Extract:
Subject to the conditions laid down in the case law, an organisation can, even where there is no decision, be bound by a promise or assurances given to a staff member.
In this case, the fact that the complainant was given a copy of the memorandum of 9 June 1999 clearly did not imply a promise that the formalities would culminate in a decision. There were still uncertainties, particularly regarding the 2000-2001 biennium: there might well be a new Director-General, the budget had not yet been adopted, and a post had to be identified.
In his further brief the complainant tries to prove that the words "foreseen for Mr [...]" were written opposite a specific post in a budget document, or a copy of it kept by the Administration, which the complainant came across by chance. The Organization denies, and the complainant fails to prove, that that was so. In any event, it is immaterial for the reasons stated above. Being for internal administrative purposes only, the document would not constitute evidence of either a firm commitment or a promise by the Organization to appoint the complainant.
The complainant has produced no other evidence from which the existence of a promise to appoint him can be
inferred (even if both he and the former Director-General wanted him to be appointed).
Consequently, he may rely neither on the existence of a contract for a period of two years nor a promise that such a
contract would be concluded.
Keywords:
duty of care; good faith; promise;
1, 2, 3 | next >
|
|
|
|
|
